Cyberwarfare and International Law S 2011
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Analysis of Cyberwarfare Ethics As It Pertains to Civilian Computer Networks/Infrastructures
Analysis of Cyberwarfare Ethics as It Pertains to Civilian Computer Networks/Infrastructures Vanessa Paradine Terms of Reference and Scope The Department of Defense (DoD) currently operates more than fifteen thousand different computer networks across four thousand military installations around the world, with as many as seven million DoD computers and telecommunications tools in use in eighty-eight countries.1 These networks experience over six million unauthorized probes per day.2 Due to the close integration of DoD and commercial networks, an attack within the cyber domain may significantly impact critical civilian infrastructures and networks. For the purpose of this article, the following definitions are pro vided: • Cyberspace, as defined by the National Security Presidential Di rective 541H0meland Security Presidential Directive 23, is "the interdependent network of information technology infrastruc tures, and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries."3 • Cyberspace operations is defined as "the employment of cy berspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace."4 • Cyberwarfare/cyberattack has not been defined by the Depart ment of the Defense (DoD); however, according to Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III, it can include a range of things-"from exploitation and exfiltration of data to degrada tion of networks to destruction of networks or even physical equipment, physical property."5 • Cyber Threats6 o Virtual-nonkinetic threats to DoD information networks that are just as real and damaging as physical threats. 34 Internatianal Journal of Intelligence Ethics, Vol. 4, No. 1 / Spring/Summer 2013 Analysis of Cyberwarfare Ethics 35 o Physical-kinetic threats mixed with nonkinetic threats; can severely impact the effectiveness of military joint operations. -
Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress
Order Code RL32114 Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress Updated January 29, 2008 Clay Wilson Specialist in Technology and National Security Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress Summary Cybercrime is becoming more organized and established as a transnational business. High technology online skills are now available for rent to a variety of customers, possibly including nation states, or individuals and groups that could secretly represent terrorist groups. The increased use of automated attack tools by cybercriminals has overwhelmed some current methodologies used for tracking Internet cyberattacks, and vulnerabilities of the U.S. critical infrastructure, which are acknowledged openly in publications, could possibly attract cyberattacks to extort money, or damage the U.S. economy to affect national security. In April and May 2007, NATO and the United States sent computer security experts to Estonia to help that nation recover from cyberattacks directed against government computer systems, and to analyze the methods used and determine the source of the attacks.1 Some security experts suspect that political protestors may have rented the services of cybercriminals, possibly a large network of infected PCs, called a “botnet,” to help disrupt the computer systems of the Estonian government. DOD officials have also indicated that similar cyberattacks from individuals and countries targeting economic, -
Counter-Insurgency, Human Rights, and the Law of Armed Conflict Federico Sperotto
Human Rights Brief Volume 17 | Issue 1 Article 3 2009 Counter-Insurgency, Human Rights, and the Law of Armed Conflict Federico Sperotto Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Sperotto, Federico. "Counter-Insurgency, Human Rights, and the Law of Armed Conflict." Human Rights Brief 17, no. 1 (2009): 19-23. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Sperotto: Counter-Insurgency, Human Rights, and the Law of Armed Conflict Counter-Insurgency, Human Rights, and the Law of Armed Conflict by Federico Sperotto* introduCtion ounter-insurgency is the dominant aspect in the United States-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in CAfghanistan, and, since the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has assumed growing respon- sibility throughout insurgents’ sanctuaries, also a mission for Europeans. According to the U.S. military, insurgency represents an intermediate step in the spectrum of conflict, which ranges from stable peace to general war.1 The frame in which military opera- tions are conducted is known as irregular warfare, a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over a population.2 This form of conflict is charac- terized by three principle activities: insurgency, counter-insur- gency, and unconventional warfare, referring to the avoidance of Association of the Courtesy of the Revolutionary Afghanistan. -
Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare Susan W
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Volume 97 Article 2 Issue 2 Winter Winter 2007 At Light Speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare Susan W. Brenner Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal Justice Commons Recommended Citation Susan W. Brenner, At Light Speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 379 (2006-2007) This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 0091-4169/07/9702-0379 THE JOURNALOF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 97. No. 2 Copyright 0 2007 by NorthwesternUniversity. Schoolof Low Printedin U.S.A. "AT LIGHT SPEED": ATTRIBUTION AND RESPONSE TO CYBERCRIME/TERRORISM/WARFARE SUSAN W. BRENNER* This Article explains why and how computer technology complicates the related processes of identifying internal (crime and terrorism) and external (war) threats to social order of respondingto those threats. First, it divides the process-attribution-intotwo categories: what-attribution (what kind of attack is this?) and who-attribution (who is responsiblefor this attack?). Then, it analyzes, in detail, how and why our adversaries' use of computer technology blurs the distinctions between what is now cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyberwarfare. The Article goes on to analyze how and why computer technology and the blurring of these distinctions erode our ability to mount an effective response to threats of either type. -
Deterrence Theory in the Cyber-Century Lessons from a State-Of-The-Art Literature Review
Working Paper Research Division EU/Europe Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Annegret Bendiek, Tobias Metzger Deterrence theory in the cyber-century Lessons from a state-of-the-art literature review SWP Working Papers are online publications of SWP’s research divisions which have not been formally reviewed by the Institute. Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 10719 Berlin Phone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org Working Paper RD EU/Europe, 2015/ 02, May 2015 [email protected] SWP Berlin Table of Contents List of Figures 1 List of Abbreviations 2 Introduction 3 In theory – Deterrence theory and cyberspace 4 Deterrence-by-retaliation and deterrence-by-denial 6 In practice – Suitability of cyber: lessons and implications 7 Key challenges: Credibility and capability to display and use force 7 How to deter? Deterrence-by-denial and deterrence-by- retaliation 9 Determining the type of defence 9 Adding offence to the equation 10 When and whom to deter? Immediate vs. general deterrence and the challenge of attribution 10 What to deter? Narrow vs. broad deterrence 12 For whom? Central vs. extended deterrence 13 Conclusion and outlook 14 Annex 16 Glossary 16 List of References 17 List of Figures Figure 1: Limits to retaliation in cyberspace .................. 9 Figure 2: A possible model of escalation ....................... 11 Figure 3: EEAS figure on a possible inter-ministry division of labour ................................................................. 15 Figure 4: Risk assessment -
Meserole Brookings CV 2021
CHRISTOPHER O. MESEROLE 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington DC 20036 (202) 797-6180 | [email protected] POSITIONS Director of Research and Policy, Brookings AI & Emerging Tech Initiative (2020-) Deputy Director, Brookings AI & Emerging Tech Initiative (2019-2020) Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution (2017-) Post-Doctoral Fellow in Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution (2016-2017) Pre-Doctoral Fellow in Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution (2015-2016) AFFILIATIONS Co-Facilitator, GIFCT CAPPI Working Group (2020-) Co-PI, Brookings High-Level Working Group on Disinformation (2019-2020) Member, Christchurch Call Advisory Network (2019-) Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University (2019-) Member, Research Advisory Council, RESOLVE Network (2019-) Member, Digital Freedom Forum, CNAS (2019-) EDUCATION A.B., highest honors in field, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2002 M.Div., S.T.M, Yale University, NeW Haven, CT, 2009, 2010 Ph.D., University of Maryland, College Park, MD, 2017 RESEARCH Artificial intelligence, emerging technology, international security; digital INTERESTS authoritarianism; counterterrorism and countering violent extremism; nonparametric machine learning, interpretable machine learning, differential privacy and homomorphic encryption, decentralized ledger technology WRITING “Exporting Digital Authoritarianism,” Brookings Institution, September 2019. (With Alina Polyakova.) “HoW Big Tech Can Fight White Supremacist Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, August 2019. (With Daniel Byman.) “Terrorist Definitions and Designation -
Opentext Product Security Assurance Program
The Information Company ™ Product Security Assurance Program Contents Objective 03 Scope 03 Sources 03 Introduction 03 Concept and design 04 Development 05 Testing and quality assurance 07 Maintain and support 09 Partnership and responsibility 10 Privavy and Security Policy 11 Product Security Assurance Program 2/11 Objective The goals of the OpenText Product Security Assurance Program (PSAP) are to help ensure that all products, solutions, and services are designed, developed, and maintained with security in mind, and to provide OpenText customers with the assurance that their important assets and information are protected at all times. This document provides a general, public overview of the key aspects and components of the PSAP program. Scope The scope of the PSAP includes all software solutions designed and developed by OpenText and its subsidiaries. All OpenText employees are responsible to uphold and participate in this program. Sources The source of this overview document is the PSAP Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). This SOP is highly confidential in nature, for internal OpenText consumption only. This overview document represents the aspects that are able to be shared with OpenText customers and partners. Introduction OpenText is committed to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its customer information. OpenText believes that the foundation of a highly secure system is that the security is built in to the software from the initial stages of its concept, design, development, deployment, and beyond. In this respect, -
Cognitive Warfare.Pdf
1 Table of Contents Executive Summary 3 Introduction 5 Evolution of Non-Kinetic Warfare 6 Origins 6 Psychological Warfare (PsyOps) 7 Electronic Warfare (EW) 7 Cyberwarfare 8 Information Warfare 8 Cognitive Warfare 9 Goals of Cognitive Warfare 11 Destabilization 12 Case 1: Destabilization through Confusion 13 Case 2: Destabilization by Sowing Division 15 Case 3: Destabilization as a Means to Influence 17 Influence 20 Case 1: Influencing to Recruit 21 Case 2: Influencing Policy Enactment 22 Case 3: Influencing as a Means to Destabilize 23 Future Threats 27 Looking Ahead 27 Threat 1: Ease of Selection and Virality 29 Threat 2: A New Age of Truth 30 Threat 3: Cyber-induced Institutional Discomfort and Distrust 31 Threat 4: Biological and Therapeutic Emotional Manipulation 32 Threat 5: Enhanced Recruitment of Agents 33 Strategy Recommendations 35 Threat Recognition Framework and Criteria 35 Risk Assessment 36 Organizational Implementations 37 Offensive Considerations 39 Closing Thoughts 40 Bibliography 41 2 Executive Summary Warfare has shifted dramatically over the past several decades, moving away from the physical threats of conventional warfare. War now moves towards the social and ideological threats brought about by mass media and advances in technology. The advent of this new type of warfare is different from anything we have seen before. Although it takes elements from previous types of hybrid warfare, the reach and level of impact it possesses make it far more dangerous than its predecessors. We have dubbed this new way of war cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare, although sharing various similarities to other non-conventional and non-kinetic types of warfare/operations, is ultimately unique in its execution and purpose. -
Uncertainty and Civil War Onset
Uncertainty and Civil War Onset Iris Malone∗ Abstract Why do some armed groups escalate their campaigns to civil war, while others do not? Only 25% of the 960 armed groups formed between 1970 and 2012 became violent enough to surpass the 25-battle death threshold, often used to demarcate \civil conflict.” I develop a new theory that argues this variation occurs because of an information problem. States decide how much counterinsurgency effort to allocate for repression on the basis of observable characteristics about an armed group's initial capabilities, but two scenarios make it harder to get this decision right, increasing the risk of civil war. I use fieldwork interviews with intelligence and defense officials to identify important group characteristics for civil war and apply machine learning methods to test the predictive ability of these indicators. The results show that less visible armed groups in strong states and strong armed groups in weak states are most likely to lead to civil war onset. These findings advance scholarly understanding about why civil wars begin and the effect of uncertainty on conflict. ∗Department of Political Science, 100 Encina Hall West, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305. ([email protected], web.stanford.edu/~imalone). 1 Introduction Why do some armed groups escalate their campaigns to civil war, while most do not? Using an original dataset, I show that only 25% of the 960 armed groups formed between 1970 and 2012 became violent enough to surpass the 25-battle death threshold, often used to demarcate \civil conflict.”1 Only 8% of armed groups surpassed the higher \civil war" threshold of 1000 fatalities per year. -
Taming the Trolls: the Need for an International Legal Framework to Regulate State Use of Disinformation on Social Media
Taming the Trolls: The Need for an International Legal Framework to Regulate State Use of Disinformation on Social Media * ASHLEY C. NICOLAS INTRODUCTION Consider a hypothetical scenario in which hundreds of agents of the Russian GRU arrive in the United States months prior to a presidential election.1 The Russian agents spend the weeks leading up to the election going door to door in vulnerable communities, spreading false stories intended to manipulate the population into electing a candidate with policies favorable to Russian positions. The agents set up television stations, use radio broadcasts, and usurp the resources of local newspapers to expand their reach and propagate falsehoods. The presence of GRU agents on U.S. soil is an incursion into territorial integrity⎯a clear invasion of sovereignty.2 At every step, Russia would be required to expend tremendous resources, overcome traditional media barriers, and risk exposure, making this hypothetical grossly unrealistic. Compare the hypothetical with the actual actions of the Russians during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Sitting behind computers in St. Petersburg, without ever setting foot in the United States, Russian agents were able to manipulate the U.S. population in the most sacred of domestic affairs⎯an election. Russian “trolls” targeted vulnerable populations through social media, reaching millions of users at a minimal cost and without reliance on established media institutions.3 Without using * Georgetown Law, J.D. expected 2019; United States Military Academy, B.S. 2009; Loyola Marymount University M.Ed. 2016. © 2018, Ashley C. Nicolas. The author is a former U.S. Army Intelligence Officer. -
Mcafee Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUP) Policy March, 2018
POLICY McAfee Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUP) Policy March, 2018 McAfee recognizes that legitimate technologies such as commercial, shareware, freeware, or open source products may provide a value or benefit to a user. However, if these technologies also pose a risk to the user or their system, then users should consent to the behaviors exhibited by the software, understand the risks, and have adequate control over the technology. McAfee refers to technologies with these characteristics as “potentially unwanted program(s),” or “PUP(s).” The McAfee® PUP detection policy is based on the process includes assessing the risks to privacy, security, premise that users should understand what is being performance, and stability associated with the following: installed on their systems and be notified when a ■ Distribution: how users obtain the software including technology poses a risk to their system or privacy. advertisements, interstitials, landing-pages, linking, PUP detection and removal is intended to provide and bundling notification to our users when a software program or technology lacks sufficient notification or control over ■ Installation: whether the user can make an informed the software or fails to adequately gain user consent to decision about the software installation or add- the risks posed by the technology. McAfee Labs is the ons and can adequately back out of any undesired McAfee team responsible for researching and analyzing installations technologies for PUP characteristics. ■ Run-Time Behaviors: the behaviors exhibited by the technology including advertisements, deception, and McAfee Labs evaluates technologies to assess any impacts to privacy and security risks exhibited by the technology against the degree of user notification and control over the technology. -
The International Criminal Court
2007–2008 FACT SHEET ONE “The establishment of the Court is still a gift of hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards universal human rights and the rule of law.” – Kofi Annan, Former U.N. Secretary-General at the signing of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court The International Criminal Court The International Criminal Court is groundbreaking because: For more than half a century since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, states have largely failed to bring to justice those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. With the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the world has begun to fulfill the post-World War II promise of “never again.” The ICC is the world’s first permanent, international judicial body capable of bringing perpetrators to justice and providing redress it will serve as a permanent deterrent to victims when states are unable or unwilling to do so. This represents a major stride for to people considering these crimes. international justice. In most cases in the last 50 years, international mechanisms to prosecute On July 17, 1998, at a diplomatic conference in Rome, the international community people accused of these crimes have adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The treaty has been hailed been set up only after the crimes were by governments, legal experts and civil society as the most significant development in committed; international law since the adoption of the United Nations Charter. The treaty entered into force on July 1, 2002. The Court made its first arrest in March 2006 and is scheduled to it will have a much wider jurisdiction begin its first trial in September 2007.