JEM Causation of catastrophe: Lessons from

David A. McEntire, PhD

ABSTRACT the impact of Hurricane Georges on the Dominican What are the causes of disaster? This paper Republic in the fall of 1998, and will then discuss the intends to answer this question by examining the implications this case has for future disaster manage- impact of Hurricane Georges on the Dominican ment policies and operations. Republic in 1998. The paper explores the geographic and developmental context of the nation, METHODOLOGY identifies the many factors that contributed to the dis- To collect the information needed for this study, I aster, and looks at the subsequent effects and response spent nearly two weeks in the in operations. The paper underscores how numerous late 1998, touring disaster sites to see the destruction variables from the physical and social environments caused by Hurricane Georges first-hand and to obtain interact to produce a disaster. It concludes with sug- the impressions of victims. I also met with disaster gestions for improving disaster management opera- experts, emergency managers, and other related pro- tions in the future. fessionals in , including meteorolo- gists, social scientists, representa- INTRODUCTION tives, government officials, and program managers The study and management of disaster is under- from relief and development organizations. I also col- going a transformation. As the weaknesses of prior lected newspaper articles on topics such as the coun- academic and practical approaches become evident, try’s preventative measures, the disaster’s impact, scholars are calling for a holistic policy guide that and the ensuing humanitarian activities at both the includes a variety of causative variables.1,2 The role of domestic and international levels. human beings in “natural” disasters cannot be After returning to the , I corre- ignored or discounted any longer. In the case of why sponded with other knowledgeable persons in the Hurricane Georges wreaked such havoc on the international disaster, development, and humanitar- Dominican Republic, the human component con- ian communities, and searched the Internet to obtain tributing to the disaster is evident in the inhabitation information from local newspapers as well as situa- of dangerous areas, inappropriate construction of tion reports from the United Nations ReliefWeb. buildings, environmental degradation, poverty and urbanization, inadequate healthcare, and a delay in The disaster context in the Dominican Republic warning. Carelessness with structural mitigation The Dominican Republic is a small (18,811 sq. mi.) devices, failure to evacuate low-lying areas, insuffi- developing country that shares the island of cient preparation, weak disaster-related institutions, with in the West Indies. Located in the heart of poor decision-making, an inequitable governmental the entrance to the Caribbean Sea, the Dominican response, the creation of dependency, and incomplete Republic lies in the trajectory of Atlantic hurricanes, recovery assistance were also to blame. This paper which occur from June through November. Adding to will look at how each of these issues played a role in this seasonal threat is the country’s geography; its

22 Journal of Emergency Management Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 2003 low-lying coastal areas are subject to the severe and the majority of radio and TV towers were toppled winds and storm surges associated with hurricanes. everywhere.5 The gusts also damaged radar equip- The precipitation of these storms, combined with the ment and the control tower at Santo Domingo mountainous terrain, also leads to episodes of flood- Airport, knocking the facility out of commercial serv- ing and mudslides. ice for a few days,9 which complicated national and Since obtaining independence from Spain in 1844, international disaster response operations. the Dominican Republic has had alternating periods of The flooding and associated mudslides caused by civilian and authoritarian rule. The nation’s political Georges were also devastating. Nearly 100,000 system is a centralized constitutional government with dwellings in the country were destroyed, an estimat- 26 political subdivisions known as provinces. One con- ed 2,500 alone in the city of Mesopotamia.10,11 In the stant is the tradition of a strong (and sometimes cor- province of San Juan de la Maguana, rising rivers rupt) executive officer; all other branches of govern- washed away at least seven bridges.12 In Cibao, sev- ment, including those pertaining to social welfare and eral plantations of yucca, platano, rice, and corn were emergency management, are weak or neglected. completely flooded.13 The deluge also broke water The country’s economy is centered on agriculture. lines in many cities, leading to sanitation concerns Many of the employees in this sector are poor and fear of an outbreak of infectious water-borne dis- Haitians who are often the subject of social discrimi- eases.14-16 Estimates of damages ranged from $1.2 bil- nation. However, with industry and manufacturing lion to $2.8 billion.17,18 growing, and a new focus on harnessing technology, Although the United Nations Disaster Assess- the population is migrating to urban areas. These fac- ment and Coordination Team confirmed 287 deaths, tors provide a basis for understanding the Hurricane 64 missing persons, and 551 reported injuries from Georges disaster. Georges,19 the exact toll will probably never be known. Death figures ranged from 200 to 2,000,4,20 Hurricane Georges as a catalytic agent but the final count was almost certainly more than On Friday, Sept. 18, 1998, Tropical Storm Georges 500. Also sketchy was the total number of affected was upgraded to a hurricane at 13.0° North and 45.4° persons. Dominican President Leonel Fernandez East (1,560 kilometers east of the Antilles Islands in stated there were 100,000 homeless,18 while the coun- the Atlantic Ocean). This category 3 hurricane, which try’s Public Health and Welfare Office counted packed sustained winds of 186 to 216 kilometers per 134,836 displaced persons.4 The US Agency for hour, moved at a speed of 22 kilometers per hour3 on International Development reported almost 300,000 a path from St. Kitts in the Caribbean to in people affected,4 and the International Red Cross said the US. Five days later, on Sept. 23, Georges lashed that close to 300,000 people had to be sheltered.17 The out against Hispaniola. Several nations felt the Pan American Health Organization reported 865,510 storm’s destructive presence, but “the Dominican displaced persons and as many as 400,000 homeless.4 Republic [was] by far the worst affected country.”4 The impact of the tempest was felt throughout Dangerous locations the nation. Strong gales downed trees, ripped roofs off One factor that increased the impact of Georges houses, and took down power lines. Thousands of was the tendency to ignore risks posed by certain geo- trees were uprooted or split in half in Santo graphic areas. In the Dominican Republic, many peo- Domingo.5 In San Francisco de Marcoris, at least 40 ple choose to live along the banks of rivers.21,22 Since percent of the roofs were blown off.6 In the province of the government has turned a blind eye to the settle- Puerto Plata, electricity was totally suspended.7 ment of these low-lying areas that are prone to flood- Nearly 20 percent of the phone lines across the nation ing,20 it was no surprise that the precipitation from were affected, but in the country’s hard-hit eastern Georges claimed many lives and destroyed much region, that figure rose to 100 percent.8 Electric signs property throughout the country.14,23-26

Journal of Emergency Management 23 Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 2003 The most vivid example of these poor choices of effects of Georges. The main reason for deforestation has location was in Cambita Garabito, a small coffee-pro- been the clearing of land for sugar cane plantations.35 ducing pueblo in the mountains of the province of San Only 22 percent of the original forest cover has sur- Cristobal. When Georges moved over this area, 40 vived,36 but even these remaining wooded areas are people sought refuge from the storm in the local being quickly depleted.37 In 1990, the Dominican school, which was only 20 meters away from the Republic had 1,714,000 hectares of forested land; by Manomatuey River.27 When the river suddenly over- 1995, this number had dropped to 1,582,000,38 a loss of ran its banks, those in the shelter had no time to 26,000 hectares (1.6 percent of total) per year. escape to higher ground.28 The walls eventually gave In a 1997 study,37 Brothers noted that deforesta- way to the violent flooding and most of the inhabitants tion in the Dominican Republic is similar to that of were carried downstream. Five people were later con- the Latin American continent. Agricultural coloniza- firmed dead, while 31 others simply “disappeared.”29 tion, slash-and-burn agricultural practices, pasture That this school was rebuilt in the same location after conversion, road construction, logging, population being destroyed by in 1979 made the growth, and a skewed distribution of land have all event even more tragic.20 The lesson is clear: “Sooner contributed to this growing problem. But government or later, [rivers] reclaim what is theirs.”24 policies and extensive poverty have probably been the underlying forces of this ongoing destruction. Inadequate construction Political leaders such as Rafael Trujillo nationalized Inadequate construction is another reason why many of the country’s foreign-owned industries but Georges became catastrophic. Many of the houses in continued to sanction the exploitation of resources for the Dominican Republic are assembled by their development, while subsistence farmers cleared the inhabitants and consist of wood or hollow block walls land to obtain fuel and to grow crops. with zinc sheeting for the roof—a manner of construc- Henry Welhous,39 a program development specialist tion unable to withstand high winds.22 for the US Agency for International Development in the For example, many of the corrugated roofs were Dominican Republic, called the experience of El Polo “a ripped off houses in Villa Duarte, a neighborhood on the frightening example” of the dangers of environmental outskirts of Santo Domingo30; the flying debris was a degradation. This rural town of 14,000 in the southeast- major cause of injury. Similar problems occurred in the ern portion of the country is surrounded by the Sierra de city of Santiago26 and throughout the country as a Baoruco mountains, which show extensive deforestation. whole.31 But structural failures were not limited to zinc When Georges brought its precipitation to this area, an roofing. The walls of wood-frame houses frequently col- avalanche of water, rock, and mud descended on the lapsed as a result of the storm’s force. In La Ciénega, a community. At least 156 people died in the incident, sector of the capital, even those made out of block suc- which was blamed on both nature and man.40 While cumbed to the winds.32 The eastern parts of the country deforestation has not been directly implicated as the were particularly devastated. In La Romana, up to 75 cause of other mudslides,4 this may also explain why percent of the buildings made out of brick were Georges devastated many areas of the country.42,43 destroyed; hundreds of others were reduced to rubble in San Pedro de Macorís, Higüey, Hato Mayor, and El Poverty and urbanization Seibo.33 Destruction was most common to the fragile Poverty and its impact on urbanization also con- houses built by the poor, which seemed particularly tributed to the disaster. Historically, most people in prone to being “whipped up as if in a blender.”33 the Dominican Republic have lived in rural areas and worked in subsistence agriculture. But political deci- Environmental degradation sions have promoted urban industrialization to further Deforestation, a significant environmental problem the country’s development.44 This, combined with a in the Dominican Republic,34 undoubtedly worsened the biased distribution of land, limited credit availability,

24 Journal of Emergency Management Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 2003 and the large influx of foreign labor, has caused the arrival of Georges. There were several reasons for unemployment rate in rural areas to rise to 40 to 60 this delay. Meteorologists and Civil Defense leaders percent.44 Governmental policies have also worsened assumed that Georges would miss the island, as hur- the economic situation of many Dominicans in rural ricanes in the Northern Hemisphere typically travel areas over the past decades, encouraging migration to in a northwesterly direction. It was also reported that cities, which has led to overcrowding and the use of haz- at least one piece of the country’s meteorological ardous areas.45 The use of these hazard-prone areas was equipment was not functioning because it needed one reason Georges created so much destruction. parts.21 Therefore, the government was not certain about which path the storm would take as it neared Inadequate healthcare the Caribbean. (A respondent who wishes to remain Hurricane Georges had a severe impact on the anonymous complained that the government could nation’s hospitals.46 In the eastern cities of San Pedro de have done a better job simply by paying attention to Marcorís, Higüey, and La Romana, more than 40 percent the reports that came from the US or even by watch- of the healthcare facilities and clinics suffered major ing the Weather Channel.) structural damages or were flattened completely. In both But even as the threat of Georges became more the north and the south, a few hospitals were inundated. imminent, the government delayed in advising the pop- Medical centers in Santo Domingo were impacted to a ulation. Prior to Georges’ arrival, government-operated lesser degree. Therefore, some hospitals were not operat- radio stations were transmitting music and new cooking ing at full capacity or at all, and many hurricane victims recipes. Some journalists believe that the Civil Defense could not receive emergency healthcare. department diluted or censored available meteorology Another concern was the spread of disease. After reports so as not to alarm the populace or have to open the hurricane, public health officials worried about the up emergency shelters while the hurricane’s course was growing number of cases of conjunctivitis, gastrointesti- in question.49-51 When the political leaders finally recog- nal problems (e.g., diarrhea), skin irritations, respirato- nized that a warning would be needed (around 1 p.m. on ry infections, dengue fever, and malaria. These resulted Wednesday, Sept. 23), President Fernández decided to from the lack of clean water (due to destroyed sewer and address the nation publicly. But by this time, the hurri- water lines) and the increased presence of mosquitoes cane had knocked the electricity out of service along with (due to standing water).16,47 The way many Dominicans a good number of the radio and TV towers in the eastern traditionally dispose of trash was another cause for con- part of the country.52 Furthermore, updated bulletins cern.47 Even in normal times, mounds of litter and were not delivered (as promised) while the hurricane debris are piled in the streets; after Georges, this prac- proceeded to wreak havoc.52,53 Thus, thousands of tice became more pronounced. Another factor contribut- Dominicans were ill-advised about the hurricane and ing to health problems was the condition of disaster were unaware what steps to take for protection.52 shelters, many of which were overcrowded (it was esti- mated that as many as 200,000 families were located in Carelessness with structural mitigation devices less than 700 shelters) and lacked latrines.47,48 The Evidence also indicates that the incorrect use of destruction of medical facilities and the infrastructure, structural mitigation devices significantly contributed to the disposal of trash, and the squalid condition of shel- the disaster. According to Frank Rodriguez, the Director ters all led to a deteriorating health situation after the of the National Institute of Hydraulic Resources hurricane, which in turn made people more vulnerable (INDRHI), an emergency committee met 72 hours before to the impacts of the disaster agent. the hurricane to discuss the Sabaneta Dam54 and deter- mined that the water level had to be lowered to allow for Delay in issuing warnings the increased runoff that would enter the reservoirs from Another reason for the severity of the disaster Georges’ precipitation. Rodriguez says his organization was the late notice given to the public about the gave advance notice about the situation to public officials

Journal of Emergency Management 25 Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 2003 as well as to the residents downstream via radio and the elements,64 unofficial shelters sprang up in television.55 The organization also dispatched hundreds churches, schools, and clubs. Many of these were ill- of its own employees, and worked with other organi- equipped to care for the large numbers of disaster zations to evacuate people living in dangerous refugees, but even the official shelters operated by areas.54,55 While people in San Juan de la Maguana the Civil Defense lacked supplies such as food, water, did manage to move to higher ground, it is not clear if latrines, personal hygiene items, and medicines.65-67 everyone downstream was warned or if they were Because the immediate needs of many victims were given sufficient time to evacuate.8,56 not met in the emergency phase of the disaster, three In any event, two gates at the bottom of the dam senators from the Dominican Republic were highly were opened at noon on Monday, September 21, for critical of the lack of preparation that led to the need about 32 hours,54 and were then closed to limit the vol- for improvised shelters, and argued that it worsened ume of water in the river downstream (because of the the agent-generated demands of Georges.66 precipitation associated with Georges). Nevertheless, the This lack of preparation can also be attributed to reservoir quickly filled to capacity and water escaped the weakness of the country’s disaster-related institu- through the “free discharge” gates at the top of the tions.8 Government bureaucracies in the Dominican dam.54 This release of water, on top of the storm’s precip- Republic frequently change with elections, and expe- itation, turned the San Juan River into a flash flood that rienced personnel are often replaced by less-knowl- washed away the city of Mesopotamia. Although the bod- edgeable individuals. For example, the Director of the ies of some 40 drowning victims were recovered, witness- Civil Defense was a political appointee who allegedly es say hundreds of people disappeared during the inun- had a modest understanding about disasters and dation.57 This led to a heated debate about the extent of relief operations. In addition, the Civil Defense in the disaster and who was at fault.14,58 However, the Santo Domingo and other regional offices around the biggest concern was that the reservoir was not sufficient- country lacked equipment and resources, the govern- ly emptied in anticipation of the hurricane.59 One respon- ment disaster committee had not met for at least two dent made the accusation that the deaths were not nec- months before the hurricane, and the Dominican Red essarily caused by the hurricane, but by human error. Cross had only existed as an independent entity for six months (it was previously an arm of the government). Failure to evacuate low-lying areas The effects of this low level of institutional capacity The incomplete evacuation of dangerous areas was were exacerbated by poor decision-making among high- another reason why Georges was so deadly. President ranking politicians. Despite the fact that the hurricane Fernández ordered members of the Civil Defense, the was approaching the island, the President and other Dominican Red Cross, and the Fire Department of national leaders continued to give priority to their meet- Santo Domingo to use loudspeakers to persuade people ings on economic reforms. Only upon the insistence of the to evacuate homes situated on the banks of the Ozama Director of the Public Health and other officials from the and Isabelita Rivers. In some situations, the police Red Cross did the government begin to take the hurri- even used force to remove people unwilling to relocate cane seriously. But by then, it was too late; the hurricane temporarily to public shelters.60 But some people had already made its way to the island. stayed, in spite of the warnings given to them.61,62 The Regardless of the reasons why sufficient measures Director of the Civil Defense called this a major cause were not taken in anticipation of the hurricane, the of death around the country.63 Dominican Republic was indisputably ill-prepared for Georges. Many respondents were disturbed by this fact, Lack of preparation, weak institutions, poor decisions considering that Georges occurred during hurricane sea- The effects of Georges were compounded because son, in a country that lies in the trajectory of these pow- of insufficient preparation. Since the government did erful storms8 and has experienced their devastating not tell people where to go to protect themselves from effects in the past.

26 Journal of Emergency Management Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 2003 Inequitable governmental response Although it is difficult to confirm this relation- The government’s response to Georges also played a ship between relief and dependency empirically, the role in the disaster. The actions of officials limited the experience of Hurricane David supports this correla- ability of people to protect themselves from the disaster tion. Even though this disaster occurred in 1979, agent and illustrated a bias in the distribution of relief some 700 families are still being housed today.69 assistance. For example, before the hurricane hit, thou- Some of David’s victims even sold the houses given to sands of people gathered near shelters but were turned them by the government and returned to live in shan- away by Civil Defense representatives who would not ty towns in dangerous areas.62,70 It appears that some allow them to enter.65 This was especially evident in poor people are “professional victims”62 and that “there is neighborhoods where the government did not want to be a fine line between relief and dependency.”70 responsible for victims if their houses were destroyed by Georges.65 Incomplete recovery assistance What is more, the government did not always send The scope and nature of recovery assistance was relief to those in need. Several individuals and families another aspect of the disaster. The inadequate quantity in Hatillo, Atalaya, Caballero, and Los Brazos com- of construction supplies hindered the ability of people to plained they did not see or hear from the government, rebuild and this may have a bearing on any future catas- noting that their communities are not on the map of trophes in this country. Even though many homes in the political significance.55 Such neglect was especially evi- low-lying areas of Santo Domingo were affected by the dent among the Haitians who work on the cane planta- flooding, many people did not relocate because they tions. There was also evidence that international aid desired to retain what little they possessed after the hur- was being distributed to members of the party in power ricane.71 Recognizing that these homes were located in or hoarded by the government. Some of this aid myste- areas prone to flooding,61 the government did not give riously appeared in large quantities in local stores. reconstruction materials to people who returned and set- tled on the banks of rivers.72 The net effect was that peo- Creating dependency ple not only had no option for relocation, they also lacked Disaster assistance does not, in and of itself, cre- sufficient resources to repair their homes.61 Even when ate dependency—that is contingent upon how the the government provided relocation and housing assis- relief is distributed and received. Yet often, the provi- tance, it reached at best a modest number of victims. One sion of relief is another cause of disaster vulnerabili- respondent questioned why the government was supply- ty. Entering a shelter in Santo Domingo, one relief ing prefabricated homes for only 15 percent of the popu- worker noted such dependency—men continued to lation when it would be 90 percent cheaper to use local play cards and felt no obligation to help unload sup- materials and labor. Another observer concluded that, plies or even get up to receive them when they were after the hurricane, “poverty became more profound and being delivered. Instances like this led the relief work- evident.”69 For many victims, these recovery policies er to conclude that “we Dominicans like our problems doubtless contributed to the impact of the disaster, and resolved for us,” and that “we live in a culture where it this insufficient recovery will certainly increase people’s is enchanting that others give.” Knowing that others vulnerability to future triggering agents. will provide humanitarian assistance may lead to a culture that rejects self-reliance. Perhaps, the theory DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION goes, that is why so many Dominicans live in danger- There are many lessons to be learned from the ous areas and do not insure themselves and their Hurricane Georges disaster in the Dominican Republic, property against potential losses. (Only 14 percent of but four are particularly noteworthy for practitioners the losses in the Dominican Republic were covered by who want to develop sound disaster management poli- insurance.68) Thus, relief operations may lead to a sit- cies. First, it is clear that disasters are a product of uation where personal responsibility is ignored. physical and social environments. A natural hazard

Journal of Emergency Management 27 Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 2003 agent does not produce disaster unless it interacts with In conclusion, disaster management requires a holis- human beings and their vulnerabilities (e.g., a flood or tic approach. Future disaster management policies must mudslide is only a natural phenomenon until people are recognize that: 1) disasters are a product of the physical affected). On the other hand, the presence of social vul- and social environments; 2) there are different types of nerabilities may not lead to disaster unless there is a agents that frequently interact with one another to pro- triggering agent that exposes and exacerbates them duce compound and cascading disasters; 3) many (e.g., a poorly constructed building may not crumble human-related variables combine to produce disaster unless it is subjected to strong natural forces). Future events; and 4) mitigation and development should be the disaster policies must take into account not only physi- focus of any future paradigm (although preparedness, cal factors but social variables as well. response, and recovery issues must not be overlooked or Second, disasters do not only emanate from natu- underestimated). Hopefully, the lessons from this case ral agents such as hurricanes, but may also result study will help generate holistic and integrated disaster from technology and the built environment. Today’s policies. To the extent they do not, the author invites fur- disasters are likely to be produced through a combi- ther discussion about the steps to be taken to improve nation of natural, technological, and human-induced disaster management in developing nations. events. Accordingly, those formulating future disas- ter management policies must allow for complexity ACKNOWLEDGMENTS and not focus on natural disasters at the expense of The author would like to thank the United States National Science Foundation and the Natural Hazards Center at the other types of contributing factors. University of Colorado at Boulder for funding that made this Third, various human-related variables interact research project possible. Gratitude is expressed to the many indi- to produce disaster, including the location of settle- viduals and agencies in the Dominican Republic that provided information for this study. Angie Highland is recognized for her ments, improper construction techniques, environ- contributions in editing this article. mental degradation, inadequate healthcare, cultural attitudes, poverty, and politics. Because the presence David A. 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Journal of Emergency Management 29 Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 2003