John Morreall* It’saFunny Thing, Humor

Abstract: Thisarticle reflects on the oddness of humor and laughter as human behaviors. It argues against classifying humorous amusement as an emotion by contrasting amusement with standard emotions. It then examines amusement as akind of pleasure, specifically, the enjoyment of psychological shifts. It ar- gues thathumor evolvedfrom mock-aggressive playinpre-human apes,with laughter serving as aplaysignal. Understandinghumorasplaynot onlyhelps explain laughter but also clarifies issues in the ethics of humor,such as the wrongness of racist and sexist jokes,and the question of whether asense of humorisavirtue.

Keywords: Humor, emotion, play, psychological shift,jokes

1Introduction

Most languages have awordfor humorous thatalso means odd and strange. In English it’s funny. Openingthe refrigerator,for example, we ask, “What’sthat funnysmell?” Borrowingmytitle from an earlyanthologyonthe psychology of humor (Chapman and Foot 1977), I’dlike to explorehow humor is itself funny—that is, odd and strange. An obvious place to see this oddness is in laugh- ter.Our faces and torsos tighten up as we rapidlyinhale and exhale, our eyes almostclose and maytear,welose muscle control and might even wetour pants. As standup comics say, what’s that all about?The thingsthatevoke hu- morous amusement are also odd. At 2AMweare awakened by anoisedown- stairs. Thinking it might be aburglar,wetiptoe to the top of the stairs—to see that our cat has tipped over alamp. At dinner,apropos of nothing,someone says, “Apriest,aminister,and arabbi are in arowboat…” and proceeds with astory that obviouslyisn’ttrue. While Donald Trump is on astate visit to Lon- don, a6-meter high blimp is launched in Parliament Square that’sshaped like an angry orangebaby in adiaper,with Trump’sface.

* CollegeofWilliam and Mary,Emeritus;[email protected] https://doi.org/10.1515/phhumyb-2020-0006 34 John Morreall

2Humor versus Emotions

Philosophers often begin their explanations of humorbycategorizing amuse- ment as an emotion (Carroll 2014,55–75). Ifind that abad start,because of the striking differences between an amused person and one experiencing astan- dard emotion. Consider the ways we talk about them. We describe enraged and mourning people as “emotional” but never saythis of laughingpeople. We never tell someone doubledoverinlaughter, “Don’tget so emotional.” We also saythat emotionsinterferewith rational thinking,but we don’tsay this of amusement. Since Charles Darwin’s TheExpression of the Emotions in Animals and Man, scientists have explained the evolution of emotions by tracing their adaptive value as responses to dangers and opportunities (Darwin1872). This approach is illuminating with standard emotions, but not with amusement. The precursors of standard emotions evolvedinmammals tens of millionsofyears ago. Fear, arguably the most basicemotion, motivated and energized animalstoavoid or overcome danger,asbyescaping or combatingpredators. Angermotivated and energized them to overcome enemies. Sadness gotthem to withdraw from activity after an injury or loss, and thus reduce the likelihood of further harm. Sexual passion motivated them to mate and so keep the species going.Parental lovemotivated them to care for their offspring. Humorous amusement (henceforth simply amusement), on the other hand, does not involve practical responses to dangers and opportunities. Indeed, in heavy laughter we lose muscle control and can’tdomuch of anything.That is why, as Robert C. Roberts says, “we explain people’sactions by referringto their anger,fear,and jealousy, but not by referringtotheir being amused” (Rob- erts 1988b, 269). Wallace Chafe even argues that the biological function of amusement is to incapacitateus(Chafe2007, 23). To go deeper into the contrast between amusement and standard emotions, I would like to use an analysis of emotions offered by Jerome Shaffer (Shaffer 1983). He proposes thatemotions have four components: (1) The cognitive.The person has beliefs and desires about the object of the emotion. (2)The motivational. The person is motivated to do something to fulfill their de- sires about the object of the emotion. (3) The physiological. The person undergoes bodilychanges that equip them for those actions. (4) The proprioceptive.The person has sensations, feelings, of those bodily changes. It’saFunny Thing, Humor 35

We can illustrate with acase of fear.Suppose thatinahotel room youopen the closet door to find atarantula scurrying toward you. Fright! The cognitive com- ponent is your belief thattarantulas deliverapoisonous bite, coupled with your desire to avoid apoisonous bite. The motivational component is your urge to es- cape the danger.The physiological component includes the secretion of epi- nephrine (adrenaline), and with it,increased alertness and muscle tension, the release of blood sugar,fasterand strongerheartbeat, the redistribution of blood away from the surface of your skin, and the cessation of digestion. The proprioceptive component is your feelingthe muscle tension, pounding heart, and other bodilychanges. In anger,the other “fight or flight” emotion, the cognitivecomponent is your belief that someoneorsomething is threateningyou, or has alreadyharmed you, along with your desire to eliminate the threat,ortorepaythe harm. The motiva- tion is to overcome whatever is threatening youorhas harmed you. The physio- logical component includes the secretionofnorepinephrine, which triggers bod- ilychanges that equip youtofight,such as faster and stronger heartbeat, increased flow of blood to the head and arms, and greater muscle tension and strength. The proprioceptive component is your feelingthese bodilychanges. This analysis of emotions reveals theirdifferences with amusement.When amusement is strongenough to triggerlaughter,itdoes have the third and fourth components of emotions, the physiological and the proprioceptive.Laughter in- volves bodily changes such as rapid breathingand the loss of muscle control, and we feelthosechanges. Often, however,especiallywhen alone, we are amused without laughing, and then amusement lacks these two components of emotions. Even when amusement does triggerlaughter,furthermore, amuse- ment does not requirethe first two components of emotions, the cognitive and the motivational. When Iamscared, angry,sad, etc., my bodilychanges are caused by my beliefs and desires,and Iammotivated to do something to fulfill those desires—avoid the danger,overcome the enemy, reducethe chances of fur- ther harm, etc. But amusementdoesn’trequirebeliefs, desires,ormotivation.

Ahorse walks into abar,and the bartender says, “Whythe long face?”

If readingthis sentenceamused you, it’snot because youbelieved it to be atrue report and youfelt some emotion toward the horse, the bartender,orthe ques- tion. The verbs are in the present,not the past tense, for one thing.More impor- tantly, youknow that horses don’twalk into bars, and even if one did, the staff wouldn’task it questions. Nor did youhaveany desires or motivation about the horse, the bartender,orthe question. There is nothing thatyou wanted to do, or could do, about this obviouslyfictional situation. We might talk about the “ob- 36 John Morreall ject of amusement” in this joke, as we talk about the “object of emotion” in fear, anger,orsadness, but it is quite unlike the objectsofemotions. The object of amusement here is the unusual waythe question “Whythe long face?” is being used literallyinstead of idiomatically. Usuallythat phrase means “Why are yousad?” but here it is posed to an animal that is not sad but whose species is known for long faces.Inthe languageofthe incongruity theory of humor,what amuses us is the incongruity of “Whythe long face?” being usedinanodd way. Jokes don’tevenneed characters in order to elicit amusement.Consider the gagsign “THIMK” and the quip “Be yourself. Everyone else is taken.” Laughing at these is utterlydifferent from fearing atarantula, getting angry at areckless driver, mourning the death of afriend, or falling in love. Even when what amuses us is areal person, thing,orsituation, we need have no desires or motivation about it.IfIam in ashoe storelooking through the clearance shelves, and find atoy helicopter among the shoes, Idon’thave to likeordislikethat toy,orwant to do anything about it,inorder to find its in- congruous location funny. While the objects of our amusement need not matter to us, the objects of our emotionsalways matter to us, and the strength of our emotionsindicateshow much they matter.Wecare about the objectsofour emotions—positively,asin loveand joy,and negatively,asinfear and anger.The moreweare motivated to do something about asituation, too, the less likelyweare to be amused by it.Ifanobese friend is returning to the buffet line for athird piece of cake, I won’tfind that funnytothe extent thatI’mstill helping her lose weight. Amuse- ment requires asuspension of concern, in the words of Henri Bergson, a “mo- mentary anaesthesia of the heart… Laughter has no greater foe than emotion” (Bergson 1911, 5). Thispractical disengagement in amusement,its idleness,is the basis of dozens of philosophicaland religious critiquesofhumor, starting in ancient times (Morreall 2009,93–94). Considering all these contrasts between amusement and emotions, it is not surprising that they tend to block each another.While we are angry with some- one, afraid of them, or passionatelyattracted to them, we will not find their ac- tions funny. And when we want to calm an angry person, cheer up asad person, or relax an anxious person, we oftenjoke with them. Humor,Iconclude, is not an emotion but aphenomenon of ahigher order.It is not adirect adaptation to dangers and opportunities, and so does not involve the beliefs, desires,and adaptive actions found in emotions. It evolvedmuch later than emotions and then onlyinasingle species, Homo sapiens. It’saFunny Thing, Humor 37

3Humor as CognitivePlay

If emotion is not auseful category for humorous amusement,how else might we categorize it?Agood waytostart is to saythat amusement is akind of pleasure, and humor is what evokes this pleasure.Manythingsbring pleasure, such as a tasty meal, ahot shower,and positive emotions likeloveand joy.What makes humorous amusement special is the relation of the person to the sourceofthe pleasure. With the meal, the shower,and positive emotions, we are attracted to some thing or situation—the taste of the food,the temperature of the water, the person we love, the event that brings us joy.But we need not be attracted to funnythingsorsituations. Indeed, manyofthem are funnypreciselyfor their unattractiveness—mismatched socks, farting at the dinner table, Elvis paintingsonblack velvet,etc. Since ancient times comedy has been populated with unlikable gluttons,drunks, boors, misers, show-offs, windbags, and hypo- crites.That’swhy Aristotle opensbook 5ofhis Poetics by classifying the ridicu- lous as “aspecies of the ugly.” Even when the funnything or situation is not unattractive,moreover,what we are enjoying is not it per se,but,asthe incongruity theory of humor would say, something incongruous about it.The pleasure we takeinthe joke about the horse and the bartender,for example, is not enjoyment of those char- acters:itisenjoyment of the mental gymnastics we go through in reinterpreting “Whythe long face?” at the punchline. To further specify the nature of humor,wecan mention four of its common features,the first two of which we have used to contrast humor with emotion: (1) In amusement,welack practical motivation. Amusement is pleasurable, and so we maywant to continue the amusement itself, but there is nothing we want to do about the amusingthing or situation, such as fixing it.Someone maycause amusement in us, of course, in order to ingratiate themselvesor calm us down from an angry state, but their practical motivation is not ours —we are not practicallymotivated to do anything about the object of our amusement. (2)Inamusement we are epistemicallydisengaged—we are not trying to find or conveythe truth about the object of our amusement. While emotions can be irrational by being based on false beliefs, as in paranoia, amusement cannot be irrational because it is not based on beliefs.The funnything or situation maybereal, but mayalsobeobviouslyfictional, as in cartoons and jokes. (3) Amusement and laughter usually occur within human social interaction. As Robert Provine has shown, we are thirty times more likelytolaugh with 38 John Morreall

other people than by ourselves(Provine 2001, 45). As we’ll see, the social na- ture of humorcan be traced to its evolution. (4) As we createhumor with other people, we allow each other to violate social norms of all kinds, as long as the results are enjoyable. We maydress in an outlandish costume, use homonyms interchangeably, saythe opposite of what we think, pretend to be angry with our friends,etc.

Combining these four features of humorwith the idea that amusement is akind of pleasure points us towardacategory in which to put humor.What are people doing when they suspend practical concern, epistemic concern, and social norms, to simplyenjoywhat they are doing?They are playing. Fewphilosophers have made the simple observation that humorisakind of play. The first wasAristotle. His Nicomachean Ethics,book 4. 8begins with com- ments on humor in conversation and social relations:

Sincelife includes relaxation as wellasactivity,and in relaxation there is leisureand amusement, thereseems to be heretoo the possibility of good taste in our social relations, and propriety in what we sayand how we sayit. And the same is true of listening.Itwill makeadifference here what kind of people we arespeakingorlistening to. Clearly, here, too, it is possible to exceed or fall short of the mean. People whocarry humor to excess are consideredvulgar buffoons.They try to be funnyatall costs, and their aim is moretoraise alaugh than to speak with propriety and to avoid givingpain to the butt of their jokes. But those who cannot sayanythingfunnythemselves, and areoffended by those whodo, are thought to be boorish and dour.Those whojokeinatactful wayare called witty (eutrapelos —literally, turningwell), which implies aquick versatility in their wits. Forsuch sallies are thought to be movements of one’scharacter,and, like bodies,characters are judgedby their movements.(Aristotle, in Morreall 1987, 14– 15)

Aristotle’sidea of humor as playwas not developed until Thomas Aquinas used it in his Summa Theologiae to discuss three issues: “Whether therecan be virtue in actions done in play,”“The sin of playing too much,” and “The sin of playing too little” (Aquinas 1972, 211–27). LikeAristotle, Aquinas says that humor and other playprovide necessary relaxation.

As bodilytiredness is eased by resting the body, so psychological tiredness is eased by rest- ing the soul. As we have explained in discussing the feelings,pleasureisrestfor the soul. And therefore the remedyfor weariness of soul lies in slackening the tension of mental studyand takingsome pleasure… Those words and deeds in which nothingissought be- yond the soul’spleasureare called playfulorhumorous,and it is necessary to make use of them at times for solaceofsoul. (Aquinas 1972, 217)

To understand the kind of playthat humor is, Iwould like to link Thomas’sidea that in humor and other play “nothing is sought beyond the soul’spleasure” to It’saFunny Thing, Humor 39 the fourth point above, that as we engageinhumor with other people, we allow each other to violate social norms as long as the results are enjoyable. Consider these five rules of serious conversation discussed by Paul Grice (Grice 1975): (1) Avoid ambiguity.Inserious communication, we strive for clarity,and so words and phrases with multiple meaningsare hazardous.But alot of humorisbased on ambiguity.AsVictor Raskin showed in Semantic Mecha- nisms of Humor (Raskin 1984), jokes typicallywork by using words that are interpreted in one way, but then, at the punch line, are interpreted in an op- posite way. The abrupt shift from one “script”—set of background assump- tions—to an opposed script is what amuses us. Raskin’soften-cited example goes like this:

“Is the doctor at home?” the patient asked in his bronchial whisper. “No,” the doctor’s young and pretty wife whisperedinreply. “Come right in.” (Raskin 1984,100)

The first script is Patient Seeking Medical Attention, and the second is Man Hav- ing an Affair.Manyquips also switch meanings:

“Ilovecats.They taste alot likechicken.”

“He is awriter for the ages—the ages of four to eight.” (DorothyParker)

“Marriage is agreat institution,but I’mnot ready for an institution.” (Mae West)

“My boyfriend and Ibrokeup. He wanted to getmarried, and Ididn’twant him to.” (Rita Rudner) (2)Donot saywhat youbelievetobefalse. Serious communication requires sin- cerity.There is something wrong—usually morally—with speakers who say what they don’tbelieve. Indeed, that’sone of the TenCommandments. Humor,however,often consists of insincere communication. Most sarcasm works this way, as when athunderstorm ruins our picnic and someone says, “What afun day!” We can also getlaughs by exaggerating what we do believe, as in “He’sasdumb as abag of rocks” and “Yo mama’ssofat she has her own ZIP code.” Pure fantasy also yields statements that the speaker does not believe. Consider two lines by stand-up comic Steven Wright: “Iwas readingthe dictionary.Ithought it was apoem about every- thing” and “My neighbor has acircular driveway—he can’tget out.” (3) Do not saythatfor which youlack adequate evidence.Inserious communi- cation we want information that is true, and so want people to tell us only what they have good reason to believe. But humorisoftenbased on wild speculation, as when someoneinthe office asks whereMegan and Rob are, and gets the answer, “They’re probablyinthe mail room making hot monkey loveontop of the Xeroxmachine.” 40 John Morreall

(4) Do not make your contribution more informativethan is required. Comic sketches frequentlyviolate this rule by having acharacter stretch asimple statement into atediouslylong harangue. In Monty Python’s “Travel Agent” sketch, for example, acustomer in atravelagencystarts with a few complaints about tourists at resorts,but then continues for over three minutes with aseemingly endless list of complaints that is interrupted onlywhen the cameracuts to anew scene.

Writers of fiction oftencreatehumor by violating several rules of serious commu- nication at once, as in Richard Brautigan’s Sombrero Fallout: AJapanese Novel:

He never lacked things to worry about. They followed him around like millions of trained white miceand he was their master.Ifhetaughtall his worries to sing, they would have made the Mormon Tabernacle Choir sound likeapotato. (Brautigan 1976,80)

This passagebringstomind Immanuel Kant’scomparison of the “playof thought” in jokingto“the playoftone” in music and “the playoffortune” in games of chance (Kant 1987, 201–7). “Play of thought” is also agood waytocharacterize humor generally. Isaid abovethat in humor we violate social norms. But thatisjust one instance of a wider pattern. The wayweamusepeople is by violating their mental patterns and expectations in away they enjoy.Weplaywith perceptions, words, and thoughts to cause in them apsychological shift,that is, asudden changeofpsy- chological state. Reinterpreting aphrase at the punchline of ajoke is one such shift.Realizing thatthe noise downstairs was caused by the cat and not abur- glar is another.Soisseeing acaricature of the U.S. President as abig baby doused in orangetanning lotion. Similarly,abruptly switching from thinking of life’sbig questions to thinking of small problems can be funny, as in WoodyAllen’s “Not onlyisthere no God, but try getting aplumber on weekends” (Allen 1971,33). The possibilities are endless. We don’talways enjoy psychological shifts, of course. Accidentallydropping your keysinthe toilet,cominghome to find your house ablaze, learning thatyou have one month to live—these and manyother psychological shifts make us puz- zled, scared, angry,sad, or disgusted rather than amused. Whatisspecial about amusement is that we are practicallyand epistemicallydisengagedsothatwe don’tfeel negative emotionbut enjoythe psychological shift.Wetreat it playfully rather than seriously. The idea thatamusement is away of enjoying psychological shifts has much in common with incongruity theoriesofhumor.But it is more precise. Most in- congruity theories fail to specify that amusement is not just anyreaction to in- It’saFunny Thing, Humor 41 congruity,but away of enjoying it.Also, “incongruity” is seldom defined care- fully. Paul McGhee, apioneer of humor studies, has defined it as “something un- expected, out of context,inappropriate, unreasonable, illogical, exaggerated, and so forth” (McGhee 1979,10). He says that he uses the term “interchangeably with absurdity,ridiculousness, and the ludicrous.” But these three words extend far beyond dictionary definitions of “incongruity,” and analyzinghumor in terms of “ridiculousness and the ludicrous” is circular.

4Laughter as Play Signal

Thinking of humorasthe playful violation of mental patterns and expectations not onlyhelps clarify what’sright in incongruity theories, but alsohelps explain the oddness of laughter.Why does amusement manifestitself as that particular set of visual and auditory contortions?When we find something funny, whydo our facial muscles tighten, our mouths open, and our lungs inhale and exhale in spasms? Whydon’tour ears wiggleand toes twitch instead?Better yet, why isn’tamusement simplyaprivate mental state like remembering or imagining? These questions have plausible answers if we understand humor as aform of play, and amusementasanalternative to negative emotions. According to the dominant theory of the evolution of laughter,byanthropologist Ian van Hooff and others, laughter evolvedfrom facial expressions and vocalizations in pre- human apesthat served as playsignals—wordless messages to others in the group that what was going on was just for fun and not serious (van Hooff 1972). Most playactivities among all animalstakethe form of mock-aggression such as chasing,wrestling, and biting.Soitisnatural that animalsstarting mock-aggressiveplayindicate what they are up to, so as not to be treated as real attackers. Mother dogsrub faces with their puppies, for instance, before gen- tlypawingand biting them. Howler monkeysmake twittering squeaks before they playfullychase and grab each other. Accordingtovan Hooff, the first playsignals in humans evolvedfrom two earlier facial displays:the “silent bared-teeth display” and the “relaxed open- mouth display.” The first is agrin which mayhaveoriginallybeen defensive, with its show of teeth, but over time became asignal of non-combative submis- sion. Today, it’sthe social smile of appeasement,aswhen achild is caught reachinginto the cookie jar.The second playsignal, the “relaxed open-mouth display,” became laughter.Itisstill found todayinchimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans, from whose ancestors our ancestors split off six million years ago. They show it during playful chasing, grabbing,and biting. The mouth is open and the teeth not clenched, which looks very different from the mouth of aseri- 42 John Morreall ous attacker.Breathingisshort and staccato, and there is an obvious lack of upper-body muscle control. All of this sends amessagetoothers in the group: “This is just for fun—I’mnot out to hurt you. Youcan enjoy this.” Laughter is qui- eter in the great apesthaninhumans, because they vocalize “Ahh ahh ahh” on the in-breath, as in panting,rather than “Ha ha ha” on the out-breath. Today, of course, human laughter has developedfar beyond mock-aggressive play, though that is still common in male humor. But laughter still serves as a playsignal. When it’sabsent,anattempt at humor can be misinterpreted and elicit negative emotions instead of amusement.Aprominent example of what can happen in humor without playsignals is aroutine done dozens of times by Andy Kaufman (1948–1984) in which he declared himself “Inter-Gender WrestlingChamp of the World” and challenged “anywoman alive” to defeat him for a$1,000 prize. When women responded, he mocked them as professio- nal wrestlers mock each other.Kaufman had achieved comedic success on Satur- day NightLive,but he was no longer on television when he did this stunt,and he gave no indication that his braggadocio was anything but serious. So, in several cities women humorlesslysigned up to wrestle him, intendingnot onlytodefend their sex but to hurt him.

5The EthicsofHumor

One area of philosophythat needstocome to grips with the playful nature of humorisethics (Morreall 2009,90–124). In the lastseveral decades, philoso- phers have written aconsiderable amount about the ethics of humor,almost all of it focusingonracist and sexist jokes.But even if everythingthey wrote werereasonable, joke-telling is but asmall part of humor.Worse, most of what has been written has not been reasonable, because it has treated joke-tell- ing as serious communication rather thanasplay. Most philosophers writing about racist and sexistjokeshaveanalyzedwhat’swrongwith them as if they followed two of Grice’srules of conversation above: (2)Donot saywhat yoube- lievetobefalse; and (3) Do not saythat for which youlack adequate evidence. The problem is that jokes are not serious assertions and they oftenworkby breakingthese and other rules of serious conversation. Racist and sexistjokes are basedonnegative stereotypes: in the jokes mem- bers of certain groups sayordosomething that shows stupidity,laziness, pro- miscuity, or other shortcomings. Most philosophers have treated these jokes as if they wereassertions that the stereotypes are accurate representations of the groups.Telling aDumb Blonde joke, then, is morallyequivalent to saying, “Blonde women are stupid.” Telling ajoke featuring alazy black manismorally It’saFunny Thing, Humor 43 equivalent to saying, “Black people are lazy.” Such assertions are sexist or racist, the implicit argument goes, so the jokes are sexist or racist,too. In Ronald de Sousa’sessay “When Is It Wrong to Laugh?” he borrows awordfrom Plato— phthonic—to refer to the malicious beliefs and attitudes in sexistand racist jokes.Totell ajoke in which awoman says something revealing asecret desire to be raped, de Sousa says,istoexpress “the belief thatall women secretlywant to be raped” (de Sousa 1987, 239). This belief, accordingtodeSousa, is anhypo- thetical—onlyifyou have it would youtell such ajoke or find it funny. Similarly, in Merrie Bergmann’sarticle “How ManyFeministsDoes It Take to Make aJoke? Sexist Humor and What’sWrong with It,” she says thatsexistjokes express sex- ist beliefs. “Sexist humor does not just incidentallyincorporate sexistbeliefs—it depends upon those beliefs for the fun” (Bergmann 1986). Similarideas about racist jokes expressingracist beliefs abound. Michael Philips even counts as rac- ist the passégenre of Polish jokes.Inhis article “Racist Acts and Racist Humor,” Philips treats Polish jokes as expressing the belief that Polish people are stupid (Philips 1984). He begins this way: “Racist jokes are often funny. And part of this has to do with their racism.ManyPolish jokes,for example, mayeasilybecon- verted into moron jokes but are not at all funnywhen delivered as such” (Philips 1984,75). Fortunately, thereare anthropologists and sociologists to counterbalance these philosophersand show that ethnic jokes need not be racist,and more gen- erally, that humor is akind of play. Christie Davies has studied hundreds of Pol- ish jokes and other “stupid” jokes around the world, and has shown that people tell them not about some group they hate or consider stupid, but about afamiliar group who live at the margins of their culture (Davies 1996). These jokes became popularearlyinthe Industrial Revolution, Davies says,because people were anxious about keepingupwith technical knowledge and skills. Polish jokes peaked in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, atime when Americans wereconcernedabout poor science education in the U.S. By then, people of Pol- ish descent had been thoroughly assimilated into American society and were not thoughttobestupid. They simplyprovided an easy name tag for jokes about stu- pidity,muchasDumb Blonde jokes do now. Consider the joke about the Polish astronaut holding apress conference to announce his plan to flyarocket to the sun. When areporter asks how he could deal with the sun’sintense heat, he says, “Don’tworry,I’ll go at night.” People who tell and enjoy this joke need not have anynegative beliefs about Pol- ish people. They are in aplaymode that need not involvebeliefs. When Ifirst heard this joke, Iwas at ahumor conference in Amsterdam, and it was told about aFrisian astronaut.Ihad no idea who the Frisiansare, and so did not be- lievethem to be stupid, but Ilaughed. Later,when Ilearned that Frisia is an area 44 John Morreall in the northeast of the Netherlands, Istill found the joke funny, but didn’tstart believingthatpeople in the northeast of the Netherlands are stupid. WhatIwas enjoying was the outlandishfantasy of an astronaut ignorant of the most basic features of the solar system. Iwas not believing this fantasy,just entertainingit. Similarly,totell or enjoythe following Dumb Blonde joke, youneed onlyenter- tain the idea of aperson being extraordinarilystupid.

Whycouldn’tthe blonde dial 911? She couldn’tfind the eleven.

Having deniedthat what’swrongwith sexist and racist jokes is that they express the teller’ssexist and racist beliefs, let me turn to what Ithink is wrongwith these jokes.They are not assertions, as I’ve said, but aform of playing with ster- eotypes. Thejoke teller puts ideas into listeners’ heads, not to communicatein- formationbut to produce an enjoyable mental jolt.Nonetheless,entertaining stereotypes can cause harm in at least two ways.One is that it can block compas- sion for the group thatisstereotyped. Amusement is an emotionallyand practi- callydisengaged state of pleasure. To the extent that Iamamused, Iamnot mo- tivated to take action to correct problems. And so, if Itell and listen to alot of sexist and racist jokes,Ican associate the groups in those jokes with my own amusement in away that keeps me from taking their problems seriously.For me, the people in these groups are just mental toys. An example is the cover of the July 1974 National Lampoon magazine, the “Dessert Issue.” Twoyears ear- lier,GeorgeHarrison had organized a “Concert for Bangladesh” and had sold the music as arecordalbum—all to benefit famine victims in Bangladesh. The cover of thatalbum featured aphotograph of astarving child sitting with abegging bowl. The cover of the National Lampoon “DessertIssue” had anearlyidentical picture—onlyofachocolatesculpture of astarving child, with alarge chunk bit- ten out of the head. There is asecond danger in playing with stereotypes even if youdon’tbe- lievethem. In racist and sexist jokes,the standard punchline associates an exag- gerated degree of some negative feature, likestupidity or laziness or promiscuity, with agroup of people. Because of the exaggeration, not even extreme racists or sexists would believethatthe targetgroup is actually that stupid, lazy,orpro- miscuous. But playing with those stereotypes through exaggeration converts mo- rallyobjectionable ideas into palatable ones, indeed enjoyable ones. That allows prejudicialideas to be slipped into people’sheads without being evaluated. If I sayseriously, “Womenare stupid,” youwould probablychallengeme. But if Itell youajoke in which awoman does something more stupid than anyreal woman would ever do, then youmay simply laughatthe incongruity in that exaggera- It’saFunny Thing, Humor 45 tion. As listeners enjoy sexistand racist jokes,they let harmful stereotypes in under their moral radar,asakindofmental toyoraesthetic object.And that keeps thosestereotypes in circulation, which perpetuates racism and sexism. Producers of comedycan even createnew,fictitious stereotypes that are harmful. In 2006,Sacha Baron Cohen released his movie Borat! Cultural Learn- ings of America for MakeBenefit Glorious Nation of Kazakhstan. It depicts Ka- zakhs as crude, boorish, incestuous,antisemitic, racist,sexist,and gypsy-hat- ing—all of which features he derivednot from Kazakhs, but from people he met in southern Russia. Cohen, playing aKazakh journalist,introduces the “town rapist” and bragsthathis sister is the “Number Four prostituteinour country.” The villagescenes were filmed in Romania using local peasants. None wereKazakhs, who are not Slavic but amix of Turkicand Mongolian. In the 1800s the Kazakhs wereinvaded by Russia, and thousands died opposing colonization. In the 20th century,under Stalin and Khruschev,hugeareas of their country wereconverted to agriculture to feed Russians—and amillion and ahalf Kazakhs died in opposing the Russians. So, in creating his fictitious stereotypeofKazakhs, Cohen harmed real Kazakhs twice. He represented them as having vicesthey don’thave, such as antisemitism and hatred of gypsies. And he built that stereotype from negative features of their oppressors,the Rus- sians. It’snowonder thatbefore the release of the film, the government of Ka- zakhstan took out afour-page advertisement in the New York Times to counter the stereotypes in the movie. Joke-telling,asIsaid above, is asmall part of humor,and so my comments on one kind of jokes onlyscratch the surface of the ethics of humor.Fromthese remarks,however,Ithink we can extract aprinciple applicable to humorgener- ally: Don’tplaywith something which youshould take seriously. Likeother forms of play, humor is aluxury to be enjoyed onlywhen practical action is not called for.Inhumans as in other animals, seriousness is the default mode of experience for agood reason: life is full of suffering and danger,and we often have to act to reduce the suffering and avoid the danger.So, don’t, for in- stance, keep harmful stereotypes alive just because they amuse you. And don’t laughabout someone’sproblems whenyou should be concerned about them. In your own life, too, don’tuse humortodeflect moral challenges, laughing off criticism of your conduct whenyou should be doing something to correct it. Having commented on some “Thou shalt not”sofhumor,let me add aword about its positive ethics, an area neglected by philosophers throughout history. We have contrasted the disengagement of amusement with the engagement of emotions, and suggested that when practical action is called for,humoris often inappropriate. But this contrast also pointstoward ways in which humor can be beneficial,evenvirtuous. In situations of conflict,for example, it is 46 John Morreall often good for bothsides to reduce emotionsand discuss the problem calmly. Several police departments in the U.S., for example, train officers in the use of humortodeal with familyfights. San Francisco policeofficer Adelle Roberts put her training to good use in responding to aviolent familyargument.As she approachedthe front door,there was loud shouting and atelevision set crashed through the window.Roberts had to pound on the door to be heard. Avoice inside bellowed, “Who is it?” She shouted, “TV Repair!” Enjoying this joke, the couple stopped fighting and came to the door.Resolving theirdispute took awhile, but Roberts’shumorgot it started. If she had instead raised her gun and shouted, “It’sthe Police. Come out with your handsup,” the couple may have gotten angrier and turned their violence on her. Similarly,when fear and anxiety servenouseful purpose, jokingabout a problem can provide areduction of stress.Inaprogram Idid for aconference of operating room nurses, one nursetold of her first surgery.Because of his ad- vanced cancer,the patient was goingtohaveaportion of his penis removed. The nurse had arranged all the instruments, and awaitingthe surgeon, she nervously looked up at the clock. “It won’tbelong now,” she said. “You’ve gotthat right,” the man quipped. Recent medicalstudies have shownthat laughter reducesnot onlystress chemicals such as cortisol and epinephrine, but blood pressureand sensitivity to pain. It even booststhe immune system (Morreall 1997, 49 – 89;Martin 2004). In humor,then, we can transcend the narrow “here, now,me”perspective of negative emotionsand see ourselvesmore calmlyand objectively.Inthe words of the jingle from the old Candid Camera TV show,self-directed humor helps you “see yourself as other people do.” That can foster humility,patience,resilience, honesty with oneself, and tolerance for other people’sshortcomings. Indeed, Robert C. Robertshas argued that the self-transcendence found in self-directed humoris“basic to the very concept of amoral virtue” (Roberts 1988a,127). Humor also promotes intellectual virtues. In seeking out incongruity,shift- ing perspectives, and playing with bizarre thoughts,weincrease our tolerance for,and taste for,novelty generally. As Brian Boyd has said,

Laughter,bysignaling our pleasureincognitive play, invites and encourages us to prepare playful surprises for one another.Playingsociallywith our expectations reinforces our sense of solidarity,our recognition of the huge bodyofexpectationsweshare; it trains us to copewith and even seek out the unexpected that surrounds and can extend these ex- pectations.(Boyd 2004,16)

This openness to novelty is not just passive.Italso promotes creative thinking. In studies by Alice Isen and by Avner Ziv, subjects who engaged in humor exercises before brainstorming sessions thought up more solutions,and morecreative sol- It’saFunny Thing, Humor 47 utions to problems.Those who had merelyexperiencedsomething funnywere more creative thancontrol groups,and those who had to produce humor—as by thinkingupcaptions for cartoon drawings—werestill more creative (Isen 2004;Ziv 1988). The value of all these virtuesisnot the simple benefit in emotions like fear and anger,ofpromptingustorespond to dangers and opportunities. It is closer to the comprehensive value of rationality. All the lower mammals experience fear,anger,and other emotions. But onlywe, along with afew of the apes that we have taught language, laughathumor. Homosapiens is Homo ridens. From that perspective,humor is not such afunnything,after all.

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