A Common Search for Character: Virtue Ethics and the Values in Action Classification

Dunuwille Eranda Ruwan Jayawickreme

Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind

SPM 490- Prof. John Campbell

Graduation Date- May 2005

1 Submitted May 3rd 2005

A Common Search for Character: Virtue Ethics and the Values in Action Project

I. Introduction

This account will attempt a preliminary evaluation of two discourses that have significantly altered the landscape of their respective disciplines: the science of positive psychology, which rose to prominence at the end of the twentieth century as a reaction to the overemphasis on pathology in psychology at the expense of understanding the nature of productive and fulfilling lives; and virtue ethics, which re-emerged in the late 1950’s as an alternative to the dominant practical ethical theories of deontology, which has its roots in the work of the philosopher Immanuel Kant and utilitarianism, a tradition that descends from the works of the British philosophers Jeremy Bentham, and more famously, John Stewart Mill.

Both positive psychology and virtue ethics entered their respective disciplines with corrective ideals in mind, and it is striking (although not completely surprising, given that the two disciplines remain closely linked) that both embody similar aims. On the one hand, positive psychology laments modern psychology’s continued focus on mental disease as opposed to mental health, and emphasizes a more “positive” approach, with a reorientation of the discipline towards work on how individuals can be lead

“better” lives. Virtue ethics, on the other hand, focused attention on concepts that had long been neglected or insufficiently explained: moral wisdom and education, friendship,

2 deep conceptions of happiness, the role of emotions in our lives, and, vitally, the central questions of what the virtues are and how we should best live our lives. Virtue ethics concerns itself primarily with moral selves, as opposed to moral laws, and this has greatly expanded the horizons of contemporary moral philosophy. Indeed, attempts have been made to mold this discourse into a liberal political philosophy, which have gained the support of eminent philosophers, economists and other social scientists.

The study of what can be termed “human strengths” has a long, if very checkered, history in psychology. However, the advent of the positive psychology movement, championed by such researchers as Martin Seligman, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Ed

Diener, has meant that such research has become an important part of contemporary psychological research. This new field has as its goal the creation of “a psychology of positive human functioning…that achieves a scientific understanding and effective interventions to build thriving individuals, families and communities.”1

In short, it can be seen that both disciplines concern themselves with a question that the Greek philosopher Aristotle (and certainly many thinkers before him) struggled with more than 2500 years ago: how can we achieve the “good life”? How do we live well? In this sense, both discourses can be seen as prescriptive, in that they purport to offer some account of what is required for us to lead “good” lives.

However, a project recently initiated in positive psychology has, in my opinion, opened up the possibility of effecting a valid and fruitful connection between these two discourses. In 2004, Christopher Peterson and Martin E.P. Seligman published a handbook, Character Strengths and Virtues, which attempted a preliminary classification

1 Martin Seligman, “Positive Psychology, Positive Prevention, and Positive Therapy,” in C.R. Snyder and Shane Lopez (eds), Handbook of Positive Psychology (Oxford University Press, 2002), 7.

3 of twenty-four character strengths under six central virtues. Their purpose was to initiate a process of research that would culminate in a comprehensive, empirically testable classification of capacities necessary for a satisfactory human existence. However, the authors have thus far refrained from proposing any theoretical underpinnings for their classification, holding that any such attempt should be attempted only following the completion of advanced work on the classification. It is interesting to note that they pay tribute to virtue ethics as offering support for the theory that the individual, rather than any prescriptive moral law, should be at the heart of any viable theory.

I hope to show that virtue ethics has the potential to play two roles in the development of a robust psychological theory of character strengths and virtues. For one, the classification process employed by Peterson, Seligman and their colleagues at the

Values In Action (VIA) Institute can be evaluated in light of conceptions of virtue and virtuous behavior adopted by the virtue ethics tradition, with a view towards assessing the conceptual adequacy of their definitions of virtues and character strengths. Secondly, virtue ethics could potentially form the basis of a valid and potentially robust theory of character. The potential benefits that each would bring to the other may be significant, and would represent a real possibility for genuine interaction between the fields of psychology and philosophy.

Such an interaction would be most appropriate, since the positive psychology movement in general, and the VIA project in particular, does appear to represent an attempt by psychology to assert itself once more as a moral science. Such a conception is by no means a new one, and actors in the history of psychology as significant as John

Dewey, Carl Jung and Gordon Allport have all attempted to incorporate considerations of

4 the “good” into psychology, although the advent of behaviorism during the middle years of the twentieth century all but put paid to their efforts. In this sense, positive psychology represents a “new dawn” in the evolution of psychology as a vital human science.

However, any attempt at an understanding of the “good” must have solid moral underpinnings, and virtue ethics may well be the leading candidate for a viable and practicable conception of “flourishing” behavior and the “good life.”

This account will open with an interpretive account of contemporary normative virtue ethics, as well as a number of the major objections raised against it. Given that significant objections have been raised against the theory by thinkers employing evidence from the social psychology literature in hand, these objects will be dealt with separately.

The focus will then move on to a brief history of attempts by researchers and thinkers to conceive of psychology as a “moral science,” culminating in the rise of positive psychology. An analysis of the different arguments made against positive psychology and the VIA project will be attempted, followed by questions concerning the implications of a possible synthesis between the discourses of positive psychology and philosophy. Finally,

I will conclude with a consideration of some of the issues that should animate future research in this area. It is hoped that pointers towards possibilities for a real symbiosis between the fields will emerge from this work, and I fervently hope for no more than that.

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II. Virtue Ethics2

While interest in the virtue ethics tradition has increased drastically over the last

40 years or so, the field has its direct origins in the philosophical works of Plato and

Aristotle during the 5th century BC. (Rosalind Hursthouse notes that a similar discourse was prevalent in Chinese philosophy even before that time.) It survived as the dominant tradition in Western moral philosophy until around the time of the Enlightenment; from that point onwards the emphasis shifted from moral character to moral rules or the consequences of actions. These foci are represented by the moral theories of deontology and consequentialism respectively, and I shall begin by offering a brief summary of the two accounts.

Deontology can be described as emphasizing “right before good.” That is, any action can only be considered right if and only if it is done in accordance with the correct moral principle. Thus, the focus of such an account would be to define what these correct moral principles are. Such principles provide us with a “moral ought,” which has been famously characterized by Immanuel Kant as a “categorical imperative.”3

Consequentialism, on the other hand, is generally act-centered4, and thus stresses the

“good before right.” That is, an act is right if and only if it has the “best” consequences.

One would then have to elaborate on which states of affairs would be most desirable to

2 Much of this material is drawn from Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics,” available at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/ and Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 3 Of course, one option here could be to rely on a non-Kantian deontology that rejects the categorical imperative. 4 Although note that rule-consequentialist accounts offer rules that are determined by effects on utility.

6 attain. In general, impartial actions leading to the well-being of as many people as possible is desired.

While there is much to be argued as to the relative merits of these two accounts, it has been argued that neither account paid sufficient attention to the individual at the center of the moral action.5 Moreover, both traditions had at their heart a core obligation founded on a conception of a divine lawmaker. While this is not surprising, given that contemporary moral concepts owe much to the Hebraic-Christian tradition, it does mean that modern morality was consequently grounded in an archaic system of values that society had perhaps outgrown. If belief in God can no longer be a priori given, what would the moral system have left to stand on? Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, and Mill were concerned about this, and their discussions on the possibility of a secular ethic stems from this question.

While the German philosophers Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche had separately put this argument forward in the 19th century, it was not until 1958 that the field of moral philosophy as a whole was made categorically aware of the dilemma at the heart of the prevailing moral theories. The English Catholic philosopher Elizabeth

Anscombe launched a scathing attack on moral theory in her article “Modern Moral

Philosophy,” in which she argued that each of the two theories sought legitimacy through a grounding in legalistic conceptions such as obligations: however, if no lawgiver is assumed, then the theories become void. As she points out:

The concepts of obligation, and duty- moral obligation and moral duty, that is to

say,- and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of ‘ought,’

5 One could argue that Kant’s work on good will and Mill’s focus on moral sentiment following Hume contradicts this claim. Such a discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

7 ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible; because they are

survivals, or derivatives of survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which

no longer generally survive, and are only harmful without it.6

Her reasoning is simple, if contentious: “Naturally it is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in God as a law-giver; like Jews, Stoics and Christians…it is as if the notion ‘criminal’ were to remain when criminal law and criminal courts has been abolished and forgotten.”7

Her article initiated wide-ranging responses in the moral philosophy community.

Part of this response was a renewed interest in virtue ethics. Before turning to contemporary accounts of virtue ethics, however, one should consider the account of virtue offered by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics.

Perhaps the greatest advantage claimed for virtue ethics over other ethical theories is that the psychology employed by virtue ethics seems to fit in greatly with how humans actually reason and act. Moreover, some have claimed that the psychology required by virtue ethics ties in closely with recent work in neurobiology.8 Such congruence is important, as John Sabini and Maury Silver have pointed out, since “ethics is otiose if it prescribes behavior that people cannot perform—or, more generally, if it urges people to be the sorts of people they cannot become.”9 Some philosophers advocating other moral standpoints, however, have argued that such psychological considerations should be morally irrelevant. The utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer, for example, has argued that

6 G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” in Judith Thomson and Gerald Dworkin (ed.), Ethics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1968), p. 186. 7 Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, p. 193. 8 See for example William Casebeer, “Moral cognition and its neural constituents,” Nature Reviews: Neuroscience 4 (2003), p. 841- 846, and the discussion in Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph, “Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable Virtues,” Daedalus (Fall 2004), 9 John Sabini and Maury Silver, “Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued,” Ethics 115 (April 2005),

8 biological factors should not influence how we conceive our morality.10 However, such disregard for psychological constraints have played themselves out in criticisms of utilitarianism11, as well as virtue ethics.12

Aristotle employs three concepts that remain in use in modern versions of virtue ethics, and, as one of virtue ethics’ most prominent contemporary advocates, Rosalind

Hursthouse, notes, a clear understanding of these concepts is vital to a proper understanding of the theory. These concepts are arête (which translates roughly as virtue or excellence), phronesis (practical wisdom) and eudaimonia (flourishing).

One of the major complaints against traditional accounts of ethics was that human intentions and actions were frequently described in language that did not sufficiently convey the individual’s underlying motivations. Virtue ethics attempts to correct this problem by subscribing to “thick evaluative concepts”; thus, to possess a virtue is not merely to have a general tendency to act in one way rather than another. Hursthouse writes: “[T]he disposition in question, far from being a single track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest actions for certain reasons, is multi-track. It is concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities.”13 Thus, to be in possession of a virtue is to have a particular kind of complex mindset. It follows from this that to be fully virtuous is to possess all the virtues. One cannot be a kindhearted murderer and also be seen as virtuous in some respect.

10 See Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. 164. 11 In his 1972 article “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” for example, Singer claims that we should have obligations to help those suffering in other countries far from where we live, as well as reduce suffering whenever possible. However, once one is committed to an obligation to help all the disadvantaged in the world, it would seem that, given the huge amount of suffering in the world, it would almost certainly seem that one would be obliged to give one’s whole life to helping them. Is such a generalized concern psychologically possible? 12 See Section III. 13 Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics.”

9 A virtuous person, therefore, is someone who accepts a particular range of motivations as sufficient reason for acting. Such a person would act in light of a particular virtue because of her belief in the value “for its own sake” of the virtue in question. Her belief in that virtue, moreover, would influence all relevant actions and emotions. Obviously, the full possession of virtuous capacities is rare, and the vast majority of people would be virtuous at most only to a particular degree. Moreover, many would find that their rational desire to be virtuous might conflict with their emotional reactions, causing inner tension. Aristotle thus distinguishes between the fully virtuous individual; the “continent” person, who act in light of the virtuous, but only following a struggle with one’s emotions; the “incontinent” person, who fails to act virtuously despite a similar struggle; and the “vicious” person who takes pleasure in wrong action.

However, it is not enough to be committed to act in light of the virtues; one must be aware of the appropriate situation and context in which to exercise virtuous action.

The philosopher John McDowell employs a “practical syllogism” to explain the virtuous person’s behavior. The major premise is the virtuous person’s conception of how to live virtuously, while the minor premise is comprised of the salient features in the environment that prompt the appropriate actions from her. This explanation, which descends directly from Aristotle, highlights the importance of being aware of one’s situation in acting appropriately, for it is impossible to act in a virtuous manner if one cannot perceive the morally salient aspects of a situation.14 This facility is termed practical reason, or phronesis. Such wisdom is developed with increased life experience, which in turn increases one’s powers of salience.

14 Although this is not sufficient for virtuous action, as a continent person acts for the same reasons.

10 If an individual has a complete grasp of the virtues, and moreover acts in a manner befitting practical reason, we may say that she has a grasp of what it means to lead a flourishing life; that is, she understands the concept of eudaimonia. Eudaimonia, best translated as “flourishing,” can be best described as the type of human happiness that we should aspire to, so that we gain the best benefit from our lives. Given that this is essentially a normative distinction, there is much debate as to what eudaimonia actually consists of. What most thinkers commonly accept in this regard is the fact that living virtuously plays a vital role in achieving eudaimonia.

One feature of virtue ethics is that it is not founded on an ethical position based on independent moral properties. Thus, McDowell argues that there can be no universal moral principles that are constant across situations, and that claims about how one should live can only be derived from practical reasoning. One would derive objective truths from internal reflection on the beliefs we happen to have, followed by their enactment through practice. This view is close to that of pragmatists such as John Dewey and Hilary Putnam

(and echoes the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whom McDowell and Putnam both acknowledge). This connection will be shown to be important later on in this work.

One major objection15 to virtue ethics has been advocated by a group of philosophers who have taken research in the social and personality psychology literature

15 Hursthouse has noted five other objections that have been raised against virtue ethics. The first was the claim that by focusing too much on the concept of good character, virtue ethics did not offer a list of codifiable principles that would assist individuals in making specific decisions. However, it is part of virtue ethics’ logic that no universally applicable list can be drawn up, and that practical reason is in any case at least as vital in performing the appropriate action as is any code of rules. Additionally, as Hursthouse shows in her article “Virtue Ethics and Abortion,” it is possible for virtue ethics to tell individuals how they should act in particular circumstances. Virtue ethics also has at hand a richer vocabulary to explain behavior than the rule-based theories of the past. Cultural relativism is the second charge: do different cultures adopt different virtues? Is the (potential) definition of eudaimonia different across cultures? As can be seen from above, McDowell would brush off this claim with the reply that virtue ethics makes no claim to any universal principles. Indeed, while cultural relativism is a problem for all ethical theories to some extent, some thinkers have argued that virtue ethics is actually less affected by this problem than others. The third challenge is the “conflict problem”: what is the “right” action when different virtues conflict in the same situation? However, Anscombe argues that such thought experiments are conceived in over-simplistic terms (“either kill one person now, or potentially risk the lives of hundreds later”); a deeper analysis will almost always reveal the apparent conflict to be an illusion.

11 as evidence against the existence of virtues, thus rendering any talk of virtue ethics redundant. Given the fact that this challenge to virtue ethics has its basis in psychology, it shall be discussed in greater detail.

Can virtue ethics justify or ground its beliefs? Is it possible to see virtue ethics as providing objective truths? Metaethicists have grappled with such questions with regards to all ethical theories, and virtue ethics is no exception. Most virtue ethicists (such as McDowell, Hursthouse, Bernard Williams and Phillipa Foot) have refused to ground their ethics in any external foundation, but have instead-as noted above- their grounding in the type of beings that we are, and falling back on our inherited moral natures. As Aristotle himself said: “Organizing our metaphysics around the idea of transcending historicity is profoundly suspect…we have only our own lights to go on, and they are formed by our particular position in the history of inquiry” The fifth objection is the deeply flawed argument from psychological egotism. The argument is that the virtuous person does what she does because she wants to do it, and is thus not virtuous, but in reality selfish. Alternatively, one may act virtuously with the selfish intention of achieving eudaimonia. However, this claim can be easily refused with the clarification that being virtuous entails acting out of the belief of the intrinsic value of the virtue in question, which may conceivably lead to heroic, life-endangering acts, which cannot be said to be necessarily self-benefiting.

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III. The Psychological Challenge to Virtue Ethics16

Recently, a number of philosophers, chiefly among them Gilbert Harman and

John Doris, have claimed that a number of experiments reported in social psychology present a significant challenge to virtue ethics.17 This section will evaluate some of the arguments that have been presented by both philosophers and psychologists, and attempt an analysis of three different responses. I will pay particular attention to evaluating their understanding of the challenge posed and whether they give too much to the claims in the social psychology literature in defending their position.

This challenge against virtue ethics originally stems from the controversy over trait theories in the personality psychology literature in the late 1920’s, when the ability of such theories to consistently predict people’s behavior was questioned. (The work of

Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May was crucial in provoking this debate).18 The personality psychologist Walter Mischel, who argued that situation-specific behavior was the rule rather than the norm, challenged other psychologists in the late 1960’s to provide evidence to the contrary.19 A number of experiments conduced in the early 1970’s seemed

16 Some of the material in this section is adapted from a final paper written in Bennett Helm’s Philosophy 361 class on Moral Psychology. Thanks to Bennett Helm for comments on this section. 17 Gilbert Harman, “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1999), pp. 315-332; John Doris, “Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics,” Noûs 32 (1998), pp 504-530; and Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 18 Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May, Studies in the Nature of Character, vol 1: Studies in Deceit. (Macmillan, 1928) 19 Daryl Bem and Andrea Allen, “On Predicting Some of the People Some of the Time,” Psychological Review 81 (1974), pp. 507.

13 to support Mischel’s claims20, and these experiments were subsequently invoked more than twenty years later by philosophers as proof of the inadequacy of virtue ethics as a suitable moral theory. As Doris writes: “This notion of character (as destiny) is both venerable and appealing, but it is also deeply problematic. For me, this judgment is motivated by reflection on a longstanding ‘situationist” research tradition in experimental social psychology.”21

To summarize Doris’ argument,22 he claims that were virtue theory to be true, a virtuous individual would elicit the appropriate virtue in the vast majority of relevant virtue-eliciting situations, and one would moreover be able to predict the behavior of that individual as a result of this consistency of behavior:

Apparently, character is expected to have regular behavioral manifestations: we

believe that the person of good character will behave appropriately, even in

situations with substantial pressures to moral failure…this interpretive strategy

presupposes that the attribution of a character trait allows us to predict an

individual’s behavior in novel circumstances.23

However, the experiments carried out in social psychology seem to show that standard personality constructs do not stand up to empirical investigation.24 These experiments thus have significant implications for virtue ethics, since traits understood as dispositions similar to virtues have very little cross-situational consistency, and thus little

20 For example, see John Darley and Daniel Batson, “’From Jerusalem to Jericho’: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 74 (1973), pp. 100-108; and A. Isan and P. Levin, ‘Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 21 (1972), pp 384-388.These experiments will be discussed further later in this paper. 21 Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior, p. 1. 22 For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on Doris’ moderate account of the challenge, as opposed to Harman’s more extreme account. 23 Doris, “Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics,” p. 505. 24 Doris, “Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics,” p. 504

14 consistency or predictive value. Doris further writes: “[T]rait attribution is often surprisingly inefficacious in predicting behavior in particular novel situations, because differing behavioral outcomes often seem a function of situational variation more than individual disposition.”25 This puts the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist into a dilemma since, as Doris writes, virtue theory explicitly calls for “an integrated association of robust traits.”26 For him, situationism is more supportive of a system of local character traits, which are temporally stable and situation-type specific, as opposed to the broad trait categories of the neo-Aristotelian.27

This claim from situationism has not gone unchallenged in the psychological literature, however. David Funder and Daniel Ozer, for example, have argued that the fact that the empirical evidence show that dispositional factors have low predictive power

(that is, a person’s disposition to act in a particular manner does not necessarily lead to that individual acting consistently in that manner) does not necessarily mean that situational factors have a higher degree of predictive power.28 They argue that any meaningful psychological undertaking to understand human behavior needs to combine multiple predictors of behavior, as the prediction of single actions from single variables is an unfeasible task.29

Others have argued that the claims of situationism are in fact not as compelled as one may be led to believe. John Sabini and Maury Silver argue that the true implication of situationism is not that our characters are heavily influenced by “subtle situational forces,” but that our commonplace dispositions are in many cases helpless in the wake of

25 Doris, “Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics,” p. 506. 26 Doris, “Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics,” p. 506. 27 This paragraph is adapted from a short paper written in Bennett Helm’s Philosophy 361 class on Moral Psychology. Thanks to Bennett Helm for comments on this section 28 David C. Funder & Daniel J. Ozer, “Behavior as a Function of the Situation,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 44 (1983), pp. 107-112. 29 Funder & Ozer, “Behavior as a Function of the Situation,” p. 111.

15 the pressures of a resolute authority or a unanimous group of people who happen to see the world in a different way from us.30 Thus, what situationism teaches us is not that we are perennially vulnerable to situational factors under our control, but that we should stay away from or be especially mindful when in situations when one confronts individuals or groups with different worldviews and “slippery-slope” moral situations.31

Were one to take seriously the claims of the Doris/ Harman variant of situationism, one philosophical response would be abandon neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in favor of a virtue theory that is more accommodating of the apparent validity of situationism; a approach preferred by philosophers interested in constructing a more empirical foundation for their work. Maria Merritt argues in “Virtue Ethics and

Situationist Personality Psychology”32 that the primary ways in which ideals of virtue guide us in our thought and behavior is not so much in deliberations over specific actions, but in the matter on how one should live,33 and how we should focus our thoughts on being consistently responsive to the relevant goods that one should pay attention to in various situations.34 As a result, for a virtuous person to accommodate the claims of situationism, such a person must fulfill three conditions. S/he must

1. undertake to follow in practice the theory’s recommendation to have the virtues, where that includes taking to heart its normative ideal of the recommended qualities;

2. accept a descriptive moral psychology that seems, in light of the evidence, to be closest to the truth; and

30 Sabini and Silver, “Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued,” p. 21.

31 Sabini and Silver, “Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued,” p. 22. See also Rachana Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character,” Ethics 114 (April 2004), pp. 490-491. 32 Maria Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (2000), pp. 365-383. 33 Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” p. 370. 34 Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” p. 371.

16 3. succeed in living as one should live by the lights of the theory.35

For Merritt, the most significant challenge for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics is the fact that a better explanation is at hand to explain human action; the situation-specific trait account. This account is a potentially better account because it acknowledges what she calls the sustaining social contribution to character.36 Assuming that traits are limited in being situation-specific in character, the particular social relationships and settings connected with that trait become important in that particular situation-specific trait, or disposition. From this perspective, one’s ability to function as consistently ethical actors is socially sustained. 37

In contrast, Merritt claims that neo-Aristotelian virtue theory has at its heart an overarching commitment to the ideal of motivational self-sufficiency of character (or

MSC).38 This ideal holds that a motivational structure of virtue should be self-sufficient, and work independently of situational factors. Writing of neo-Aristotelian virtue theory,

Merritt notes:

The ethical philosophy of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics advances a very

strong ideal of MSC. Aristotle requires that genuine virtues be firmly secured in

one’s own individual condition, in such a way that one’s reliability in making

good practical choices depends as little as possible on contingent external factors.39

However, were one to accept situationist psychology as the “descriptive moral psychology closest to the truth” mentioned in point 2 above, then a virtuous person would find it very difficult to fulfill point 3, given the tension existing between points 1 and 2.

35 Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” p. 371. 36 Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” p. 374. 37 Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” p. 374. 38 Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” p. 374. 39 Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” p. 375.

17 For example, if one is committed to MSC, then one will end up focusing on ensuring that situational factors do not play a role in his actions, at the expense of the main task of being salient to relevant factors in one’s environment. Additionally, given the important role of social relationships in the construction of one’s character (as shown by the accepted moral psychology), then such a focus on self-sufficiency may even seem unwise.

It is for this reason that Merritt claims that we should abandon neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics in favor of a more Humean conception of virtue. This is because as opposed to the Aristotelian normative ideal of virtue, the Humean ideal is “the figure of someone with whom it would be reasonable to want to live in every kind of cooperative social relation.”40 Such a conception ties up easily with the truth of situationist psychology, which Merritt claims justifies her Humean position.

Is Merritt justified in seeing a categorical rejection of neo-Aristotelianism as the only possible response to the situationism challenge? In order to evaluate this, it would be useful to focus on her evaluation of the Aristotelian stance. Is she correct about the rigidity she ascribes to it?

Christian Miller would disagree. In his paper “Social Psychology and Virtue

Ethics,”41 he doubts that the arguments posited by Harman and Doris cause serious concern for the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicist. In particular, he offers an account of

Aristotle that presents him in a less inflexible light:

The life of progression to full virtue is one of continuous struggle and in

overcoming character defects and external obstacles. For the Plato of the

40 Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” p. 379. 41 Christian Miller, “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics,” The Journal of Ethics 7 (2003), pp.365-392.

18 Republic, true virtue can be achieved through participation in a long and

demanding educational process out of which very few ever emerge successfully.

Similarly for Aristotle, the virtues are traits that must be habituated in children

and positively reinforced in adults over extended periods of time.42

It does seem that Merritt’s extreme characterization of Aristotle gives an aura of implausibility to virtue theory that is not true of the account. By focusing solely on

Aristotle’s requirement that the truly virtuous person “proceed from a firm and unchangeable character,”43 she ignores the more nuanced account of the virtues presented elsewhere in the Ethics (at least the account provided by Miller), which emphasizes the importance of the social milieu for the development, honing, expression and exercise of the virtues. Indeed, the difference between Merritt and Miller’s response to the situationism challenge seems to be little more than their interpretation of Aristotle.

For Miller, “it has rarely been part of the view that possession of a virtue is an all or nothing phenomenon.”44 Aristotle’s emphasis on the gradual acquiring of the virtues through social interaction thus enables a virtue ethicist to claim, “There is not widespread full possession of the virtues.”45 Having made this point, he then offers an account of global trait possession that is faithful to both contemporary findings in social psychology and virtue ethics. He begins by agreeing with Doris (and most of the findings in the social psychology literature) over the prevalence of local, situation-specific character traits, and proceeds to build a contemporary personality theory founded on such traits, Walter

42 Miller, “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics,” p. 378. 43 Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics, tr. David Ross, revised by J.L Ackrill and J.O. Urmson (Oxford University Press, 1988), 1105a, quoted in Maria Merritt, “Virtue Ethics and Situationist Personality Psychology,” p. 375-376. 44 Miller, “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics,” p. 378. 45 Miller, “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics,” p. 379.

19 Mischel and Yuichi Shoda’s Cognitive-Affective System Theory.46 This theory hold that local behavior-situation patterns define personality much more satisfactorily than unifying trait theories, and that the consistent behavior patterns one holds are thus tied up with particular situations.47

Under this theory, an individual would have a local character trait of honesty for a particular type of situation S that would enable him/her to act honestly in every S-type situation, and would furthermore enable one to predict his behavior in such situations.

However, one can imagine that his cognitive states about those S-type situations are not isolated from one another, but exist “in various relations both to themselves and to the remainder of the agent’s personality.”48 Such interconnectedness could be termed one’s personality network for S-type situations, and one would decide to act in a particular way and in a particular situation as a result of the features of a particular situation interacting with this network of cognitive states. The network would play a vital role in alerting the individual to certain features of the situation as opposed to others. Therefore, it can be argued that it is the manner in which the system focuses on particular aspects of the situation, and not the situation per se, that determines action.

He argues that one can conceivably “train” one’s personality system in order to live in accordance with the virtues, and that Mischel and Shoda accept the possibility of such training. For them, such training would “occur when purposeful interventions to encode social stimuli in new ways and to activate a new pattern of cognitions… begin to

46 Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda, “A Cognitive-Affective System Theory of Personality: Reconceptualizing Situations, Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality Structure,” Psychological Review (1995), pp.246-268. 47 Yuichi Shoda, Walter Mischel, and J. Wright, “Intra-individual stability in the organization and patterning of behavior: Incorporating psychological situations into the idiographic analysis of personality,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67 (1994), pp. 674-687. 48 Miller, “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics,” p. 383.

20 reroute and modify the pathways of activation in the mediating network.”49 Therefore, an

Aristotelian moral education could increase one’s sensitivity to relevant factors in a variety of situations to the extent that one would exhibit cross-situational behavior. In this context, the dime-helping experiments50 can be explained by the fact that the participants' salience levels were not sufficiently low, and they had to be further stimulated by the event of finding a dime in the coin-return.51

This proposal, as Miller himself writes, “goes beyond (Doris’) view in still preserving a modest role for global traits in a way that also satisfies his demand for consistency with the latest findings in social psychology.”52 However, the fact that it so closely tied up with Doris’ view is its main weakness. Doris could easily accept the possibility of individuals being trained to exhibit cross-situational behavior, but would claim that this is not the real issue at hand. The real issue is that empirical evidence points to the fact most people actually do not exhibit the cross-cultural behavior presumed by trait and virtue theory. As he writes, “character-based approaches are subject to damaging empirical criticism.”53 He would thus concede that one could accept the conceivability of Miller’s view, but reply that the evidence does not back it up.54

Miller may differs from Merritt in that he does not immediately raise the white flag on Aristotelian virtue ethics; however, as noted above, he also aligns with Doris on the primary importance of local character traits, and adherence to the social psychology literature. However, others have responded to Doris by questioning the validity of these

49 Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda, “A Cognitive-Affective System Theory of Personality: Reconceptualizing Situations, Dispositions, Dynamics, and Invariance in Personality Structure,” p. 264. 50 In particular A. Isan and P. Levin, ‘Effect of Feeling Good on Helping: Cookies and Kindness.” 51 Miller, “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics,” p. 385. 52 Miller, “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics,” p. 386. 53 Doris, “Persons, Situations and Virtue Ethics,” p. 520. 54 However, see Miller’s discussion of this evidence: “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics,” pp. 389-392.

21 findings for virtue ethics in the first place.55 Thus, while Miller and Merritt both accept

Doris and Harman’s assertion that the findings in social psychology are relevant to the validity of virtue ethics, Gopal Srinivasan focuses his argument on whether assuring such a connection is in fact warranted and concludes that the evidence in the social psychological literature “does not really engage the assumption one way or the other.”56

In refuting Doris’ claims, Srinivasan asserts that one’s guilt in committing the fundamental attribution error- our bias towards attributing behavior to inner dispositions rather than situational influences- is irrelevant to whether global character traits really exist: “The issue is whether there is, in fact, warrant to attribute traits and not whether the trait attributions that people commonly make are actually warranted.”57 He makes a point similar to Miller concerning the fact that the empirical data do not rule out the fact that a minority of people are virtuous (and exhibit cross-situational behavior), and proceeds to make three criticisms of such studies. To summarize his criticisms, he argues that a properly operationalized study of behavior should

1. Specify a response that represents a central (or paradigm) case of what that trait requires (for example, lying in order to protect someone else, a situation used in the

Hartshorne and May study58, cannot be described as a paradigm case of lying);

2. Not have any features that could defeat the reason on account of which the specified trait required the appropriate response (as what can be argued happened in

Darley and Batson’s Good Samaritan experiment59- for example, one’s desire to be

55 Gopal Sreenivasan, “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,” Mind 111 (January 2002), pp. 47-68. 56 Sreenivasan, “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,” p. 48. 57 Sreenivasan, “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,” p. 54. 58 Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May, Studies in the Nature of Character, vol 1: Studies in Deceit. 59 Darley and Batson, “’From Jerusalem to Jericho’: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior.”

22 conscientious and arrive at a talk on time could defeat the inclination to help the stricken person on the side of the road);

3. Have characterizations of the specified situations and responses that are not

“objective” measures from the experimenter’s viewpoint, but are agreed upon by both the subject and the experimenter.

For example, were requirement (2) to fail, then the study would not operationalize one’s normative sensitivity- why one chooses to behave in one particular way rather than another- properly.60

Given the fact that experimenters such as Hartshorne and May have not properly operationalized their studies to test the validity of virtue ethics, Srinivasan concludes that while a theory of virtue is open to empirical falsification, it has not even been tested yet.61

However, he notes that those experiments that have taken the considerations above into account have actually shown evidence of cross-situational consistency. In a famous 1982 study, Mischel and Philip Peake found that people who perceived themselves as highly consistent in their conscientiousness had significantly higher mean temporal stability coefficients as a group than individuals who saw themselves as less consistent in their conscientiousness.62 Here, Mischel and Peake used behavioural measures that the subject population had rated as more prototypical or less prototypical of the trait

“conscientiousness.” This study explicitly fulfilled requirements (1) and (3), and showed that the subjects exhibited cross-situational consistency for a limited number of prototypical measures. Thus, while Harman claims that the psychology literature backed

60 Sreenivasan, “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,” p. 61-62. 61 Sreenivasan, “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,” p. 63-64. In addition, he claims that many of the studies measure traits that are not relevant to virtue ethics. (Sreenivasan, “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,” p. 57, n.11) 62 Walter Mischel and Philip Peake, “Beyond Déjà Vu in the Seach for Cross-Situational Consistancy,” Psychological Review 89 (1982), pp. 730-755.

23 his claim that character traits do not exist, in reality the valid experiments in the literature actually back up Srinivasan. 63

What is one to make of these rebuttals to the claims of Doris and Harman?

Having laid out these three arguments in some detail, I shall offer some brief comments.

In particular, I shall ask whether Miller is still correct in attempting to align virtue ethics with the findings in situationist psychology, and whether one would be acting too hastily in rejecting Merritt’s defeatist account (especially in the light of Srinivasan’s argument).

Despite the fact that situationist experiments do in fact hold little direct relevence for virtue ethics, Srinivasan does claim that situationism can nevertheless give it two valid lessons; cross-situational character traits will be narrower in scope than we commonly imagine; and the models for a particular virtue will have to be seen in relation to some “normal background” range of situations, since it would be unrealistic to expect one’s behavior in every situation to be consistent with one’s paradigm.64 Miller acknowledges the first of these points, and claims that her account complements

Srinivasan’s concerns about the possible limitations of a workable theory of virtue.65 One could therefore argue that situationism does still present virtue ethics with sufficient concerns to necessitate Miller’s enterprise of tying up virtue theory with a contemporary account in social and personality psychology.

However, this writer is hesitant, for a number of reasons, about accepting the connection that Miller makes. For one, the theory is silent on the possibility of continent and incontinent behavior; there is no discussion of conflict within the system.66 In addition, an important part of the cognitive-affective view of motivation is that people

63 Sreenivasan, “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,” p. 67. 64 Sreenivasan, “Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution,” p. 66. 65 Miller, “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics,” p. 366. 66 Lawrence Pervin and Oliver John, Personality: Theory and Research (John Wiley & Sons, Inc, 2001), p. 490.

24 work towards goals with a view to achieving a particular standard; one is motivated to act as a result of an existing discrepancy between performance and that standard. However, this would preclude the possibility of people pursuing goals for other reasons, and particularly achieving goals for their own sake.67 Indeed, this is the point of virtue ethics; to account for why we behave for reasons other than those resulting form instrumental reasoning, or the need to satisfy a particular desire, or attain a particular standard. As

Srinivasan has made clear, the implication of the findings in the social psychology experiments are irrelevant for virtue ethics. Virtue ethics should be tested on its own account, given the different type of explanations they offer for human action. Miller may allow for this distinction through a remodeling of the cognitive-affective theory, yet it is my view that the theory itself needs to evolve further before one can decide whether any meaningful and concrete connection with virtue ethics can be attempted.

Turning to Merritt’s argument, it seems at first glance that her overall thesis- that we should abandon an Aristotelian conception of virtue ethics in favor of a Humean one- is overly hasty, especially in light of Srinivasan’s denouncement of the apparent implications of the situationist experiments for virtue theory. However, let us consider her claim that Aristotle’s requirement that a fully virtuous person should have a “firm and unchangeable character.” It may be true, as Miller has noted, that Aristotle gives an important role to social interaction in the development of character; however, one may ask; given that a fully virtuous person achieves a firm, self-sufficient state of character, does this mean that he is no longer sensitive to the pressures of a situation? Given that

67 Pervin and John, Personality: Theory and Research, p. 490.

25 s/he may have been so in the past, how would he be able to stop? At what point in his/her education would he be able to conclude that he had no more use for social cues?68

Here, it seems that the only answer to this claim is to invoke Miller, who writes that one needs to drop such a strong claim to a virtuous character in order to meet the situationist challenge:

(The situationist challenge) will count against the virtue ethicist only if her view

is committed to an extremely strong account of character traits according to which

an agent has a particular global trait T only if he attempts to perform the relevant

T-sortal act in every T-eliciting circumstance. But I can see no reason why any

virtue ethical theorist should be saddled with such an implausible account. (my

emphasis)69

Thus, as noted earlier, Merritt may be mistaken in holding to such a strong interpretation of Aristotle- one which is unnecessary for a neo-Aristotelian conception of virtue ethics.

I believe that in the light of the above arguments, two conclusions can be drawn.

First, it is unclear (and unlikely) that situationism presents a significant challenge to trait theories and virtue ethics, since (as Sabini and Silver point out) the lessons to be learnt are much smaller than the Doris-type situationist would claim. Second, even if situationism were to have potentially significant implications for virtue ethics, the empirical evidence at hand has no bearing on the existence or non-existence of the

68 Maria Merritt makes a similar point in her talk “Aristotelian Virtue and the Social Contribution to Ethical Character,” delivered at the Rocky Mountain Virtue Ethics Summit, University of Colorado at Boulder, April 3-5, 2004; available at http://spot.colorado.edu/~emason/merritt.htm. 69 Miller, “Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics,” p. 378.

26 virtues, as they are conceptualized in a manner very different from that of psychological traits.

IV. Positive Psychology and the Values In Action Project

The emergence of the field of positive psychology at the turn of the 21st century presents an insight into the future direction of the science and practice of psychology.

While psychology has generally concerned itself with healing- with fixing what is wrong or malfunctioning with individuals-, a number of psychologists have argued that equal emphasis should be placed on the factors contributing to healthy human functioning.70

This new field, which is now at the cutting edge of psychological research, has as its goal the creation of “a psychology of positive human functioning…that achieves a scientific understanding and effective interventions to build thriving individuals, families and communities.”71

This new sub-discipline was revealed to the academic community in a special millennial issue of American Psychologist in January 2000, edited by Seligman and

Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. It is worth comparing the hope for positive psychology’s role in the 21st century with John Dewey’s hope for the field of psychology when he delivered the 1899 Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association. Dewey

70 The personality psychologist Gordon Allport was among the first to propose such a venture; see Gordon Allport, Pattern and Growth in Personality (Holt, Rinehart, & and Winston, 1961) 71 Seligman, “Positive Psychology, Positive Prevention, and Positive Therapy,” p. 7.

27 believed that psychology as a discipline should be able, in its unique position as a social science committed to the comprehension of human behavior, to contribute to the value of human life. Psychological practice for Dewey should be judged “by the contribution which they make to the value of the human life,72” and assist in the development of flourishing communities. Such sentiments are clearly echoed 100 years later by Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi:

(In this millennium), the social and behavioral sciences can play an enormously

important role. They can articulate a vision of the good life that is empirically

sound while being understandable and attractive. They can show what actions

lead to well being, to positive individuals, and to thriving communities.

Psychology should be able to document what kinds of families result in children

who flourish, what work settings support the greatest satisfaction among workers,

what policies result in the strongest civic engagement, and how people’s lives can

be most worth living.73

As Seligman, the field’s most prominent researcher, has written, “we will learn how to build the qualities that help individuals and communities not just endure and survive but also flourish”74 through the evaluation of positive human traits. The question of assessing the positive traits than facilitate human flourishing was a task taken up by

Seligman, who asserted that two fundamental questions needed to be at the heart of any assessment program: how can one define the concept of a human “strength” and “highest potential”; and, how can one tell that a positive youth development program utilizing this

72 John Dewey, “Psychology and Social Practice,” Psychological Review 7 (1900), 121. 73 Martin Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, “Positive Psychology: An Introduction,” American Psychologist 55 (2000), 5. 74 Martin Seligman, “Positive Psychology, Positive Prevention, and Positive Therapy,” 8.

28 new approach has succeeded in meeting its goals- that how does one know is the approach has worked?

It was with this in mind that Peterson and Seligman decided to attempt a scientific classification of human strengths. The Values in Action (VIA) Institute was set up with the assistance of the Manual D. and Rhonda Mayerson Foundation in 2000 with Seligman as its scientific director and Christopher Peterson as the project director. The fruit of the

VIA Institute’s first three years was the publication in 2004 of a preliminary classification of character strengths and virtues, Character Strengths and Virtues.

This manual represents a first attempt to scientifically classify human strengths and virtues, and is to a significant extent influenced by the Diagnostic and Statistical

Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). The classification itself is intentionally modeled on the Linnaean classification of species75, and is divided into three conceptual levels: virtues, character strengths, and situational themes. The text deals primarily with the first two levels.

Virtues are defined as the central characteristics that have been valued moral philosophers and religious thinkers worldwide. Six central virtues were defined following extensive historical studies: wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence. In this account, virtues are seen as universal traits possibly grounded in biology through an evolutionary process that selects the best traits for solving the most important tasks at hand.76

Character strengths are the means that one may employ to exhibit a particular virtue. While each of these strengths requires the acquisition and use of knowledge, and

75 Christopher Peterson & Martin Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2004), 13. 76 Peterson & Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues, 13.

29 are intimately (though not exclusively) connected with a particular virtue, they are distinct from one another. Generally, a virtuous individual would only exhibit one or two strengths from a particular virtue group. 24 distinct strengths have been thus far identified, although this number is very much a provisional one; the VIA projects envisages having a near-exhaustive list in the near future. These strengths were also derived from extensive cross-cultural and historical investigations, and repeated reductions of larger trait lists. The 24 selected were deemed to have satisfied most of the following ten criteria:

1. A strength contributes to various fulfillments that constitute the good life, for

oneself and for others. Although strengths and virtues determine how an

individual copes with adversity, the focus is on how they fulfill an individual.

2. Although strengths can and do produce desirable outcomes, each strength is

morally valued in its own right, even in the absence of obvious beneficial

outcomes.

3. The display of a strength by one person does not diminish other people in the

vicinity.

4. Being able to phrase the “opposite” of a putative strength in a felicitous way

counts against regarding it as a character strength.

5. A strength needs to be manifest in the range of an individual’s behavior-thoughts,

feelings, and/or actions- in such a way that it can be assessed. It should be trait-

like in the sense of having a degree of generality across situations and stability

across time.

30 6. The strength is distinct from other positive traits in the classification and cannot

be decomposed into them.

7. A character strength is embodied in consensual paragons.

8. This feature probably cannot be applied to all strengths, but an additional criteria

where sensible is the existence of prodigies with respect to the strength.

9. Conversely, another criterion for a character strength is the existence of people

who show-selectively- the total absence of a given strength.

10. The larger society provides institutions and associated rituals for cultivating

strengths and virtues and then for sustaining their practice.

With these criteria in mind, the 24 strengths were identifies and classified under their respective virtues as follows:

1. Wisdom and knowledge

• Creativity

• Curiosity

• Open-mindedness

• Love of learning

• Perspective

2. Courage

• Bravery

• Persistence

• Integrity

• Vitality

3. Humanity

31 • Love

• Kindness

• Social Intelligence

4. Justice

• Citizenship

• Fairness

• Leadership

5. Temperance

• Forgiveness and mercy

• Humility/ Modesty

• Prudence

• Self-regulation

6. Transcendence

• Appreciation of beauty and excellence

• Gratitude

• Hope

• Humor

• Spirituality

Each of these 24 strengths is expounded upon with substantial detail, with information on behavioral definitions of the strengths, the theoretical and research traditions that have studied them, existing individual difference measures, correlates and consequences of their possession, their life-span development in the individual, factors that facilitate or hinder their growth, information on cross-gender, cross-cultural and

32 cross-national differences, as well as on successful intervention programs to foster the strengths, unknown aspects, and a up-to-date bibliography.

Finally, situational themes refer to the specific habits that lead individuals to manifest particular character strengths in a given situation. An assessment of themes needs to be made setting by setting, and thus far only the workplace has been studied in significant detail. In Peterson and Seligman’s views, any socio-cultural variation can be explained primarily at the level of situational themes, thus increasing the cross-cultural validity of the classification.

While the project’s view of character descends from the personality psychology tradition, and trait theory in particular, an attempt is made to ground the classification in the virtue ethics tradition. As Peterson and Seligman write:

Virtue ethics is the contemporary account within philosophy to strengths of

character, and we believe that virtues are much more interesting than (moral)

laws, at least to psychologists, because virtues pertain to people and the lives they

lead. Said another way, psychology needs to downplay prescriptions for the good

life (moral laws) and instead emphasize the why and how of good character.77

Indeed they refer to their project as the “social science equivalent of virtue ethics, using the scientific method to inform philosophical pronouncements about the traits of a good person.”78 However, the extent to which this classification is really grounded in virtue ethics is a relevant question.

The VIA project have also made substantial progress on developing assessment tools for the empirical study of character strengths. With a preliminary objective of

77 Peterson & Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues, 10. 78 Peterson & Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues, 89.

33 creating a multi-method strategy that can be employed among English speakers in the contemporary Western world, four measures are currently in different stages of development: the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IA), the Values in

Action Rising to the Occasion Inventory (VIA-RTO), the Values in Action Inventory of

Strengths for Youth (VIA-Youth), and the Values in Action Structured Interview. Of these, the VIA-IA has been revised five times, and has been administered to over 150,000 subjects. It is a 240-item face-valid self-report questionnaire, and all scores obtained from it have had substantial test-retest correlations (>.70) and satisfactory alphas (>.70).

Interestingly, despite the fact that the VIA inventory has been developed primarily to be administered to Western populations, a cross-cultural study of 123 members of the

Kenyan Maasai, 71 seal hunters in Northern Greenland, and 519 students from the

University of Illinois found that while there was a high rate of agreement about the existence, desirability, and development of these strengths. Despite these strong similarities, however, there were differences between and within cultures based on gender, the perceived importance of specific virtues (such as modesty), and the existence of cultural institutions that promote these strengths.79

This study has subsequently been followed up by a series of worldwide correlation studies comparing recognition of the strengths in the USA with other nations.80

These studies have generated very high correlations, lending credence to Peterson and

Seligman’s claim that these strengths are potentially ubiquitous on a global scale.81

Despite the fact that positive psychology has its roots in questions that have animated researchers since the founding of psychology as a discipline, both the new sub-

79 Robert Biswas-Diener & Ed Diener, “From the Equator to the Artic: A Cross-Cultural Study of Strengths and Virtues,” at http://www.viastrengths.org/index.aspx?ContentID=51 80 Martin Seligman, presentation at the Rutgers Moral Psychology conference, April 2005. 81 However, some of the problems associated with this method of validation will be touched on briefly later.

34 field and the VIA classification have been subjected to substantial criticism from both psychologists and philosophers. Given the varied nature of the charges leveled, I think that a summery of these accounts would both clarify the full range of possible caveats with the study of the “positive” in psychology and offer substantial insight into how the field can develop while remaining salient to these criticisms. An evaluation of these critiques shall thus constitute the following section of this work.

35

V. Virtue Ethics, Values in Action and the Conception of the “Good Life”- a

Common Goal?

What’s with the “Positive” in Positive Psychology?

While the concept of positive psychology has had a long history-- Abraham

Maslow first used the term in Motivation and Personality (1951), and the notion that psychology should help cultivate the good among humans goes back to John Dewey’s work at the Chicago school and William James’ work on subjective experience-- psychology’s role as “positive” science has always been heavily disputed. This section will look at some of the criticisms that have been levied at positive psychology and its

“scientific” focus on the cultivation of human strengths and virtues, both from the perspective of scientists who hold that psychology is no place to talk of values to those who claim that positive psychology does not have a proper understanding of its subject matter because of its “scientific” (positivistic) commitments.

Kendler and the Positivists

"Hygiene is the corruption of medicine by morality. It is impossible to find a

hygienist who does not debase his theory of the healthful with a theory of the

36 virtuous. The true aim of medicine is not to make men virtuous; it is to safeguard

and rescue them from the consequences of their vices." - H. L. Mencken.

The above quotation refers to medicine, yet many psychologists would agree with its underlying principle; that it is no job of psychologists or other scientists to offer advice on living the “good life.” Howard Kendler, one such psychologist, offers a defense of the positivist conception of science in his article “The Role of Value in the World of

Psychology.”82 His article may be said to constitute a warning to those who attempt to fudge the fact/value distinction-which constitutes one of the hallmarks of scientific psychology- with the claim that psychology can play a role in the identification of moral facts.

Kendler writes that the notion of science as reflecting objective knowledge was interpreted by some as being barren and sterile, given its inability to reflect the moral foundation and cultural aspirations of a particular society. This reaction was seen particularly in Germanic culture, with such figures as Goethe and Hegel attaching primacy to subjective experience. This intellectual reaction led in time to a holism that manifested itself in Gestalt psychology. However, Kendler dismisses Gestalt psychology, and especially its philosophical-ethical dimension, as suffering from a terminal

“vagueness.” However, many psychologists became preoccupied with the attempt to find values in the physical world, culminating with the humanistic psychology movement initiated by Abraham Maslow in reaction to behaviorism and psychoanalysis. Kendler heavily criticizes Maslow’s conception of “self-actualization,” as well as attempts to give psychological science a socio-political role, which he sees as compromising its scientific

82 Howard Kendler, “The Role of Value in the World of Psychology,” American Psychologist, 54 (10), pp. 828-835.

37 integrity. Indeed, Kendler argues that the holistic tradition has provided justification for psychologically demanding morality underpinned by Nazi and Communist ideologies.

He concludes that, given the logic of the fact-value dichotomy as well as the fact that a plurality of moral systems with equal validity exist in the world, psychology cannot serve as a provider of moral truths. At best, it can analyze the efficiency of competing social policies with a view towards facilitating the choosing of the best option. For

Kendler, the one moral obligation psychology has to fulfill is its commitment to the objective epistemological standards of the natural sciences, while respecting the ethical obligations of citizens.

In an article in an American Behavioral Scientist special issue on virtue ethics and the behavioral sciences, Alan Tjeltveit also questions positive psychology’s normative bent, although for slightly different reasons.83 He writes that empirical science cannot

“find” moral facts, and claims that the majority of positive psychology projects, with their strong emphasis on scientific method, make this precise mistake. In his view, values cannot be drawn from empirical investigation, and even if positive psychologists do make ethical assumptions, they never spell them out. However, Tjeltveit does call for an explicit recognition of virtues in the behavioral sciences. He writes that four factors- a misunderstanding of the term virtue; the perceived irrelevance of virtues in the light of empirical studies, as well as a belief that the sciences should be dealing with the descriptive, not the prescriptive (as argued by Howard Kendler, and before him by

Gordon Allport); an overemphasis on the self, as seen in the humanistic psychology tradition; and postmodern/individualist skepticism concerning the validity of virtues-

83 Alan C. Tjeltveit, “Implicit Virtues, Divergent Goods, Multiple Communities: Explicitly Addressing Virtues in the Behavioral Sciences,” American Behavioral Scientist 47 (4), pp. 395-414.

38 have lead to an apprehension on the part of behavioral scientists to explicitly accept virtues as a vital part of their work. However, a closer look at most work in the field reveals at least an implicit adherence to concepts of virtue.

One reaction to the positivistic rejection of positive psychology’s mission has been offered by Steven Sandage and Peter Hill, who call for an “affirmative postmodernism” to replace positivism.84 Sandage and Hill attempt to build on the foundations of a positive psychology set down by Seligman by claiming a pivotal role for virtue as a construct in the new field. They note the common ground between philosophical accounts of virtue and positive psychology, such as the prescription of positive health and human flourishing, and connection to healthy character and community well-being, the developing of human strengths, and a deep understanding of the meaning of life, as well as the value of wisdom.

In particular, they note six dimensions in the definition of virtue that they hold resonate strongly with the goals of positive psychology. Virtues integrate ethics and health in human flourishing, represent embodied traits of character, are sources of human strength and resilience, are embodied within a cultural context and community, are linked to a sense of meaningful life purpose, and are grounded in the cognitive capacity for wisdom. These dimensions arise from a general appraisal of virtues across traditions.

The writers proceed to call for a “postmodern positive psychology” founded upon an “affirmative postmodernism.” For them, affirmative postmodernism combines postmodernist critique with more optimistic attempts to construct new worldviews to replace the old. Five possible rapprochements between affirmative postmodernism and

84 Steven J. Sandage & Peter C. Hill, “The Virtues of Positive Psychology: the Rapprochement and Challenges of an Affirmative Postmodern Perspective,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 31 (3), pp. 241-260.

39 positive psychology can be discerned. Certain affirmative postmodernists have called for theories that are focused more on strengths, as positive psychology is. They also call for an explicit recognition of the implicit values underlying theories; the values underlying positive psychology are very clear. Moreover, they have stressed the connection between health and ethics, and positive psychology can develop paradigms that make this connection clear. Affirmative postmodernists place significant emphasis on human purpose, as does positive psychology. Finally, they call for the development of stronger, more resilient communities-- just as positive psychology has done.

Another, more radical alternative to positivism is offered by Svend Brinkmann.85

He uses John Dewey’s work- among others- as the inspiration for an attack on the prevailing methodological paradigm in psychology, which he claims is rooted in a positivist metaphysical worldview that, by means of the fact/value dichotomy, excludes values from the natural world. He argues that the world indeed has moral properties, and that as a result it is impossible for one to adequately describe the world without describing values.

Brinkmann holds that the world is best perceived as a moral ecology; that is, as “a meaningful world that presents us with genuine moral demands and moral reasons for action.86 Such a model is particularly important with regards to (psychological) explanations for human actions, since in his (and Aristotle’s) view, all descriptions of human action is teleological, since they are made with some reference to what an individual should do in that particular circumstance. Moreover, we can understand this ecology through our actions within it; such actions, or practices, can only be described

85 Svend Brinkmann, “The Topography of Moral Ecology,” Theory & Psychology 14 (1), pp. 57-80. 86 Brinkmann, “The Topography of Moral Ecology,” p. 59.

40 through “thick,” evaluative concepts, and such concepts can be potentially action guiding.

John Dewey’s view of psychology as a “moral science” is touched upon; Dewey believed that psychology was a unique science in that it not only reflected the moral ecology, but also shaped it. Thus, Brinkmann argues that this fact lends credence to the view that psychology should be reconceptualized as a normative activity.

He also argues for an “anthropomorphic moral realism,” holding that the moral ecology we interact with is a human one, and that the moral properties we perceive are distinctly human properties. This does not mean that these properties are any less real; it is just that without our being in the world (to borrow Heidegger’s term), human properties would not exist. A minimal theory of human nature would be required, however, so that one could identify practices as being good in themselves. Brinkmann elsewhere makes much of Dewey’s desire that the social sciences somehow contribute towards the betterment of society, and it is easy to see a parallel between Dewey’s call for a “Great Community” and Seligman’s assertion that psychology should concern itself with the fostering of healthy communities.87

Criticisms- Positive Psychology as “Positivistic”

A second charge that has been leveled against positive psychology is that it has not sufficiently addressed the theoretical implications of becoming a “prescriptive” discipline (Whether positive psychology is indeed prescriptive is a subject of some debate, and will be addressed shortly). That is, positive psychology has attempted to remain positivistic while breaking the positivistic fact/value dichotomy. This point is

87 Svend Brinkmann, “Psychology as a Human Science: Aspects of John Dewey’s Psychology,” History of the Human Sciences, 17 (1), pp. 1-28.

41 central to arguments made against the field by members of the humanistic psychology community, who reacted angrily to the dismissal of their field as “unscientific” in the

2000 American Psychologist article on positive psychology. In the article Seligman and

Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi write that the “third way” of humanistic psychology, while holding “enormous promise,” “did not attract much of a cumulative empirical base,” and

“emphasized the self and encouraged a self-centeredness that played down concerns for collective well-being.”88 These comments led to much criticism from humanistic psychologists such as Arthur Bohart and Thomas Greening, who wrote:

We wish that Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) themselves had done a more

scholarly job of investigating humanistic psychology. Neither the theory nor

practice of humanistic psychology is narrowly focused on the narcissistic self or

on individual fulfillment. A careful reading of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow

would find that their conceptions of self-actualization included responsibility

toward others (Maslow's list of actualized people, presented as exemplars of his

theory, were mostly people with a heightened sense of social responsibility).

According to Wispé (1987), Rogers was also the one primarily responsible for the

modern interest in empathy. Additionally, one of the last things Rogers worked on

was the attempt to develop processes for forming large democratic and

interdependent group relationships. The other project he spent his last years on

was trying to develop methods to foster world peace. Both of these were based on

his theory of growth-producing interpersonal relationships.89

88 Martin Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, “Positive Psychology: An Introduction,” American Psychologist 55 (2000), p. 7. 89 Arthur Bohart and Thomas Greening, “Positive Psychology and Humanistic Psychology,” American Psychologist 56 (2001), p. 81.

42 In the face of such criticism, however, Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi reiterated their view that the humanistic tradition was somehow scientifically “lacking” as a tradition in a “Reply to Comments”: “We are, unblushingly, scientists first. The work we seek to support and encourage must be nothing less than replicable, cumulative, and objective.”90 Csikszentmihalyi reiterates this points in another article, claiming that positive psychology is committed to the current scientific paradigm “for better or for worse”.91

However, in a paper that mostly focuses on refuting the charges against humanistic psychology, Eugene Taylor also argues that in both committing positive psychology to the current paradigm of “reductionistic experimental determinism” and calling for a new field of study that considers alternate evidence, hypotheses and interpretations, Seligman seems to undercut himself. Taylor notes:

Conservative scientists will continue to maintain the superiority of scientific

determinism even as Seligman calls for experimental psychologists to consciously

choose between different types of scientific evidence, different kinds of

hypotheses, different types of interpretation, and different types of application if

one is to emphasis the positive. His theory correctly, in my opinion, places the

discriminating person above the blind dictates of science. Yet, to do so violates

the basic rule of reductionistic determinism, namely, the alleged neutrality of

science. Seligman is injecting a value judgment into an allegedly value-free

90 Martin Seligman and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, “Reply to Comments,” American Psychologist 56 (2001), p. 89-90. 91 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, “Legs or Wings? A Reply to R.S. Lazarus,” Psychological Inquiry 14 (2003), p.115.

43 system, a theoretically contradiction that will not be without pragmatic

consequences.92

Even though Seligman is “well-placed among his own community,”93 Taylor acknowledges that it may take a radical alteration in the way psychology sees itself for positive psychology to finally establish itself (a point Brinkmann would undoubtedly agree with).

However, it is not clear what Taylor means by the “reductionistic determinism” that he claims holds sway over the sciences. Indeed, given that the phrase itself may be an oxymoron (since the truth of determinism can be doubted at the molecular level), it is possible that the “reductionistic experimental determinism” of this paper may be no more than a “straw man” all too easily skewed by humanistic psychologists.94

Perhaps two of positive psychology’s most trenchant critics have been Barbara

Held and the late Richard Lazarus. Held’s article on “The Negative Side of Positive

Psychology,” one of the most read psychological articles of 2004, attempts to show that the focus on the field of positive psychology exhibits what she calls a “negative tendency.”95 While reiterating many of the arguments made by humanistic psychologists, she also makes a clear distinction between what she terms the “first-wave” and “second- wave” messages adopted by positive psychologists. She notes that the views of the

“second-wave” or non-dominant message adopts the “dialogical impulse for the integration, holism, dialectic, realism, engagement, and contexuality that characterizes

92 Eugene Taylor, “Positive Psychology and Humanistic Psychology: A Reply to Seligman,” Journal of Humanistic Psychology 41 (2001), p. 25-26. 93 Taylor, “Positive Psychology and Humanistic Psychology: A Reply to Seligman,” p. 26. 94 Thanks to Anthony Chemero for this point. 95 Barbara Held, “The Negative Side of Positive Psychology,” Journal of Humanistic Psychology 44 (2004), p. 10.

44 the responses of humanistic psychologists to positive psychology’s dominant, separatist

Message of polarization.”96

The main articulator of the dominant Message, in her view, is Seligman, She contrasts his essay on “Positive Clinical Psychology” with the other “second-wave” contributions that appear in Aspinwall and Staudinger’s “A Psychology of Human

Strengths: Fundamental Questions and Future Directions for a Positive Psychology.”97

Seligman (with Peterson) writes: “In this chapter we shall discuss changes that a science of positive psychology, if successful in becoming a discrete approach within the social sciences, would likely wreak on the field of clinical psychology.”98 This type of

“separatist” claim seems to be exactly the type of hyperbole that C.L. Snyder and Shane

Lopez warn against in the concluding chapter of their “Handbook of Positive

Psychology”: “Contrary to the ‘breakthrough’ mentality…science typically advances in the context of slow, incriminating increases in knowledge…when one positive psychologist makes an unwarranted claim, this undermines the trustworthiness of all positive psychologists and the ‘movement’ more generally. Accordingly, we must carefully monitor both our colleagues and ourselves.”99 While Held hopes that the

“second-wave” message soon becomes the dominant one, Seligman’s view still holds primary status in the movement.100

Lazarus’s critique, which was the focus of a special issue of Psychological

Inquiry, elicited a number or sharp responses (both in favor and against it) from the positive psychology movement. While his article can been seen as a deliberate attempt to

96 Held, “The Negative Side of Positive Psychology,”p.13. 97 L. G. Aspinwall & U. M. Staudinger (2003), A Psychology of Human Strengths: Fundamental Questions and Future Directions for a Positive Psychology. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association. 98 M.E.P. Seligman & C. Peterson. (2003). “Positive Clinical Psychology.” In Aspinwall & Staudinger (2003), A Psychology of Human Strengths: Fundamental Questions and Future Directions for a Positive Psychology, p. 305. 99 Snyder & Lopez, Handbook of Positive Psychology, p. 754-755. 100 Held, “The Negative Side of Positive Psychology,” p.18.

45 incite strong reactions either way, his basic criticisms are—by his own admission— relevant to the whole of psychology. He identifies four central problems at the heart of psychological research in general and emotion research in particular: limitations in cross- sectional correlation research (such research cannot prove causal relationships nor distinguish between states that are either stable or in flux); a tendency to assign emotions either positive or negative emotions without an adequate grounding of what that emotion really consists of; lack of focus on individual differences, and limitations in current methodologies of assessing emotions.

However, while he goes on to show how these problems have implications for the findings in positive psychology, Lazarus also spends much time dismissing the field as an ephemeral sub-field that represents nothing but the latest “fad” in psychology. One striking feature of his argument is his conceptualization of positive psychology as focusing on positive emotions and concerned only with the positive side of existence.

While some psychologists—especially those sympathetic to hedonistic theories of well- being, such as Ed Diener and Danial Kahneman—would conceptualize of positive psychology in this manner, it is certainly not a view that is universally shared.101

Commentaries on the VIA project

This writer will now address some of the initial (largely philosophical) reactions to the Values in Action classification of human strengths and virtues. I shall focus on three commentaries: Martha Nussbaum’s comparison of the VIA project with ancient

Greek virtue ethics, Barry Schwartz’s argument for the primacy of practical reason, and

101 Seligman made this point clearly at the Rutgers Moral Psychology conference.

46 comments on the VIA project provided at a Moral Psychology workshop held at Rutgers in April 2005.

Nussbaum, while supporting Seligman’s classification as a worthy endeavor, uses a comparison with Greek virtue ethics to pose eight questions which she believes proponents of the VIA project should engage. One of her concerns is the extent to which a social science classification can meaningfully contribute to an account of the virtues that people should live by. She argues that an “elaborate theoretical picture of the flourishing life”102 can be the only criteria against which virtues can be assessed, and the place of a virtue should be determined through “good critical argument.” Thus, while positive psychology can play a preliminary role is assessing what constitutes a good life, normative argument within a particular theoretical framework is essential for filling out the whole picture.

The psychologist Barry Schwartz makes a similar point, noting that a richly developed positive psychology cannot avoid offering prescriptions on what a good life entails:

Shoulds imply claims that are prescriptive rather than descriptive, and

psychology, as a positive rather than a normative social science, has tried to steer

away from shoulds. I believe that if psychologists are serious about turning

psychology’s power to developing a theory of optimal functioning, they can no

longer avoid shoulds. I think that a richly developed psychology must do more

than teach people how to do things—it must do more than teach people effective

102 Martha Nussbaum, “Positive Psychology and Ancient Greek Virtue Ethics” paper presented at “The Philosophical History of the Virtues” conference, University of Pennsylvania, September 2004.

47 techniques for what they want out of life. It must also tell them something about

what they should be trying to get.103

Seligman replied to this criticism at the Rutgers conference by noting that questions of what people should be striving for in their lives may very well be a focus of an applied positive psychology that would founded on a normative theory of right living and right action. Such a theory would be invoked in questions of practice and would be strongly informed by scientific work that should, in his view, be value-free.

Nussbaum also worries that Seligman makes too much of a virtue (sic) of self- control in his conception of the virtuous person. While Seligman seems to fall in line behind a Kantian conception of self-control of emotions and desires, the virtue ethicist would see such an individual as merely continent, and not virtuous. A virtuous education

(whatever that may be) could educate the emotions, so that they would be “in-tune” with one’s actions.

Both Nussbaum and Schwartz also note that Seligman’s claim that one should identify and develop one’s signature strengths implies that there is no central list of virtues necessary for a flourishing life, which they both argue is incorrect. Nussbaum writes that the Greeks believed in the unity of the virtues- that is, an individual needs all the virtues in order to be truly virtuous. The virtues are thus “unified, mutually supportive, and interentailing [sic] (meaning that) you just really don’t have one unless you have the others.” Schwartz makes a similar point: If one ‘cultivates ones signature strengths,’ one may not even realize that more than one strength might be called for in a given situation. As the old saying goes, ‘if all you have is a hammer, everything is a

103 Barry Schwartz, “Self-Determination—The Tyranny of Freedom”, American Psychologist 55 (2000), p. 87.

48 nail.”104 He points out, as does Nussbaum, that the Aristotelian perspective holds that the all the virtues are integrated, not independent, and that a “mean” of a particular strength is desirable, as opposed to an unimpaired “cultivation” of individual strengths that

Seligman advocates. Those who decide to optimize their signature strengths could very well leave “a good deal of human wreckage in their wake.”

Nussbaum also raises questions of what should constitute “positive” emotion. She defines Seligman’s conception of positive emotion as “those that feel good.” She expresses concern that such a conception derives itself partly from the “happilogy” that dominates American mainstream culture, which promotes “feeling good” over all else.

She holds that experiencing negative emotion is essential to a positive life, and that striving to increase the experience of positive emotion trivializes the complex interactions between positive and negative emotion:

I’d like to see positive psychology talk more about positive pain, that is, the grief

that expresses love, the fear that expresses a true sense of a threat directed at

something or someone loves, the compassion that shares the pain of a suffering

person, the anger that says, ‘this is deeply wrong and I will try and right it.’

Nussbaum’s critique seems to be levied primarily against the strong elements of hedonistic psychology, of which the positive psychologists Ed Diener and Daniel

Kahneman are the chief proponents. However, Seligman has stated that he does not think that positive psychology is simply hedonic “happilogy”- as Diener has claimed (and

Lazarus has charged- and he has stated that he does not see positive psychology as simply concerned with the promotion of “good feeling.”

104 Barry Schwartz & Kenneth Shape, “Practical Wisdom: Aristotle Meets Positive Psychology” manuscript to be published in the Journal of Happiness Studies.

49 A similar concern animates Nussbaum’s discussion of what she calls the hubristic disposition. She cites Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “Emile,” where Rousseau writes that the nobles of pre-revolutionary France are incapable of feeling sympathy for the common man as they feel themselves above the common sufferings of human life. Nussbaum compares this situation with that in present-day United States, where the affluent frequently fail to understand and empathize with those who have not been fortunate to enjoy similarly affluent lives. She writes:

Seligman‘s diagnosis of Americans is that they are too anxious and unhappy, and

so he proposes the focus on happiness in part as a corrective. I am not so sure. I

think that Americans can’t stand to be unhappy, can’t stand to grieve, can’t stand

to look at poverty or the real damages of war. I feel that this is a larger problem

than the problem of excessive happiness. Does positive psychology risk pushing

already hubristic Americans in the direction of even greater hubris?

This consideration also factors into the question of the types of lives that positive psychology should encourage. Given the injustice and inequality in the world that would require that individuals committed to justice to devote their lives to the greater good for better or for worse, the question arises: should one prefer a life of guaranteed happiness or one of struggle, which carries a very high risk of reversal and misery? Nussbaum believes that positive psychology seems to come down on the side of the former: “I believe that positive psychology gives the following advice: to the extent that a career offers secure prospects of happiness, and still contains some valuable activity, that career should be preferred to the career that has such a huge risk of reversal and misery.”

50 This is clearly an important consideration, but the extent of its direct relevance as a critique to positive psychology remains unclear. Given the youthful nature of the movement- and especially the relative paucity of research on positive communities (one of Seligman’s “three pillars” of positive psychology) it seems premature to criticize the field on this point, although it is one that should certainly be kept in mind. That said, it is important that attention be paid to whatever implicit values inform positive psychology.

While Seligman writes that happiness is the result of both positive emotion and valuable activity, Nussbaum argues that a more nuanced definition of happiness, which defines the exact relation between the two and explains which emotions and actions are indispensable for it, is necessary. She notes the example of the “happy warrior,” who goes into battle acting completely in accordance with his virtues, but without the prospect of a positive experience.

Schwartz also claims that the VIA classification needs to focus more on the

“master virtue” of practical wisdom, which he believes is inadequately represented or fleshed out. Tying in with his criticism of Seligman’s unbalanced “signature strength” views, Schwartz argues that a virtuous individual should have a balance among all the virtues, and that practical wisdom is vital for achieving this balance. The virtue that can be most closely associated with practical wisdom is “wisdom and knowledge,” yet he contends that this virtue needs to be fleshed out further, and made into a “master virtue” essential for the proper exercise of the other virtues. It is interesting that Schwartz makes a similar comment about the self-absorbed nature of American society, arguing that positive emotion and “feeling good” are not true markers of happiness. However, he is

51 more generous with Seligman, acknowledging that his view sees happiness as a by- product of a engaged and meaningful life.

The discussion of the VIA classification that Seligman gave to the Rutgers Moral

Psychology group in April 2005 further complicates the possibility for a complete understanding of the role of virtue in the project. For one, Seligman claimed that he was not really invested in the term “virtue,” that he was using the term in a different manner from the philosophers (he equaled “virtue” with “trait”), and that he would not lose too much by abandoning the term altogether. This is a surprising statement, especially given the care Seligman and Peterson took in defining their classification as a “social science version of virtue ethics,” and Seligman’s equation of virtues with traits opens him to the

Michel/ Harman/ Doris attack on the type of cross-situational behavior that traits/virtues would require.

Perhaps the most serious issue that Seligman’s discussion of the VIA project threw up was with regards to the data from the cross-cultural studies that seemed to validate the ubiquity of the central virtue. Valerie Tiberius has pointed out that since the questionnaires administered in the studies ask only whether a particular virtue is recognizable in a culture’s context, and not the value attributed to it, the data may not be as useful as one may think, as we know little about the real “weight” attached to each of the virtues and strengths.

An additional point of discussion was Seligman’s prescriptive/descriptive distinction. He had previously identified himself as being of the same opinion as Howard

Kendler, telling this writer “I believe that PP can be purely descriptive, without an element of prescription. Describing what is prescribed. ‘Positive’ can I believe be defined

52 descriptively.”105 Seligman articulates this most clearly in an extended footnote in his book

Authentic Happiness. He writes that positive psychology is “not a morality or a worldview; it is a description.” He “strongly believes that science is morally neutral (but ethically relevant)” (what he means by ethically relevant here is unclear- does he mean that it could inform our conception of ethical theory?) Positive Psychology “describes what the pleasant life, the good life, and the meaningful life are. It describes how to get these lives and what the consequences of living them are. It does not prescribe these life for you, nor does it, as a theory, value any one of these lives above the others”106. At a purely scientific level, Seligman wants to resist all talk of the possible complication of the is/ought distinction.107

If Seligman’s sole initial consideration is to scientifically examine the components that go into a positive life from a descriptive perspective, then it does seem that Nussbaum and Schwartz may have been unduly harsh on him in demanding strong normative commitments from the field. One claim that Seligman could make is that questions of what people should be striving for in their lives may very well be a focus of an applied positive psychology that would founded on a normative theory of right living and right action. Such a theory would be invoked in questions of practice and would be strongly informed by scientific work that would be value-free.

However, it does seem obvious that a number of questions remains about the status of the VIA classification. Is the strict fact/value dichotomy that Seligman advocates defendable? How could virtue ethics and positive psychology fit together meaningfully? Which would depend on which? Are the VIA virtues the same as those

105 Martin Seligman, personal correspondence, 3/27/2005. 106 Martin Seligman, Authentic Happiness (The Free Press: 2002), p. 303 107 However, John Doris challenged Seligman over the distinction, arguing that goods that are “not-contestably normative” can easily be studied as a valid part of science. What he meant exactly by “not-contestably normative,” however, is unclear.

53 discussed in virtue ethics? Is someone who tests highly for all the VIA strengths and virtues really a “virtuous” person? Is s/he moral? To what extent would the classification be affected by the Harman/Doris claims?108

The Question of Values and Objectivity

Seligman’s preference for a strong distinction between fact and value may in many respects represent a knee-jerk defense of psychology as an “objective” science: that is, as a value-free examination of features in the natural world. However, such a view finds little support among most scientists today, as it represents the logical positivist standpoint, which has been largely discredited. It has become widely accepted that science cannot be considered a value-free endeavor in totality, a fact that can be defined as the “value dilemma.” Peter Machamer and Gereon Wolters thus write of the dilemma:

Real science from its beginnings (choice of research topic) to its practical uses is

replete with value evaluations, and these accrue in such a way that they cannot be

eliminated for reasons of principle. Yet science ought to be objective, that is,

independent of the personal or group preferences and idiosyncrasies (values

included) of the people who conduct it. To put the value dilemma differently, on

the one hand, in our world the logico-empiricist ideal of value free science cannot

exist, and, on the other, the unavoidable value-ladenness of science, for strictly

observing logical empiricists, makes science a basically empirical activity,

lacking exactly the epistemic value, objectivity, that made for its success. 109

108 Amusingly, Doris and Harman refrained from pushing Seligman on this issue at the Rutgers conference. 109 Peter Machamer & Gereon Wolters, “Science, Values and Objectivity,” in Peter Machamer & Gereon Wolters (ed.) (2004), Science, Values and Objectivity (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), p. 8.

54 For Machamer and Wolters, the problem with the logico-empiricist ideal is its reliance on an extreme conception of rationality. In the real world, we are incapable of being completely rational: the best that we can hope for is to push the objective- subjective continuum as close to objectivity as possible. However, once we recognize the fact that we do bring values to the scientific table, we should carefully examine which values we choose to adopt.

This point fits in well with of Barry Schwartz’s concerns with positive psychology, which have been noted earlier. If a richly developed positive psychology is to become a meaningful intervention-based endeavor, then it should question some of its research focuses and choice of experiments, as the findings of such experiments may carry with them an implicit commitment to a particular manner of existence. For example, Schwartz has noted that the main thrust of research in positive psychology may encourage positive interventions that seek to make people “happier” in inhospitable conditions minimizing their attention of the world as opposed to actually making the world a better place.110 In short, there may be a sense in which Seligman’s adherence to the fact/value distinction may be misguided.111

Trying to Fit Psychology and Virtues Together

Any meaningful discussion of the interpenetration of virtue ethics and positive psychology must answer two questions of the type posed by Lawrence Kohlburg in an

110 See Barry Schwartz, “Pitfalls on the Road to a Positive Psychology of Hope,” available on line at http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/bschwar1/srp.html 111 There is another question that may be asked here; whether the fact/value dichotomy makes sense in the first place. See Brinkmann’s comments above, and Chemero & Jayawickreme, “Ecological Moral Realism,” (forthcoming).

55 essay published on the naturalistic fallacy112: what can the psychological study of moral behavior tell us about the philosophy we choose to adopt, and what philosophical commitments do we need to engage in the psychological study of moral behavior in the first place? In my view, the nature of the answers to these questions could provide the answer to how virtue ethics and positive psychology could meaningfully interact.

One manner in which proponents of a nativist moral realism (that is, the notion that our moral preferences have been at some fundamental level programmed in by evolution) have attempted to connect virtue ethics with psychology has been to make connections between biological-based modules and sociological facts about behavior through discussion of the virtues. One such quasi-nativist account is offered by positive psychologists Jon Haidt and Craig Joseph, who argue that many of our decisions

(particularly our moral ones) are made through our intuitions, which are built-in processing short-cuts, or heuristics, that enable us to make rapid and effortless decisions.

They note that “recent research has shown that the responses to (moral) dilemmas mostly emerge from the intuitive system: people have quick gut feelings that come into consciousness as soon as a situation is presented to them.”113 This intuitive ethics, as they define it, can form the basis for a more complete theory of moral functioning, and they further argue that virtue theory is the most psychologically sound ethical approach within this framework.

One reason for the compatibility of virtue ethics with nativist moral accounts such as Haidt and Joseph’s is that Aristotelian conceptions of virtue sees morality as

112 Lawrence Kohlburg, “From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development”. In L. Kohlberg, Essays on moral development, Vol. I: The philosophy of moral development (pp. 101-189). San Francisco: Harper & Row. 113 Jonathan Haidt and Craig Joseph, “Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable Virtues,” Daedalus (Fall 2004), p.57.

56 embedded within the structure of the self, and not merely as one of the activities of the self. 114 Moreover, a true moral education involves the recognition that morality is both innate and the result of social construction, and would thus involve the “linking up” of the innate intuitions that we already possess with skills that we believed should be learned. Such an education would also be a sustained and comprehensive affair involving constant feedback, so that one’s “patterns of perception, emotion, judgment and action” as John Dewey defined the virtues, would become suitably sensitive to the relevant features in the environment. Indeed, they claim that the modules of intuitive ethics they propose “are in a sense a pursuit of (an) Aristotelian project.”115 Furthermore,

As philosophers and cognitive scientists have recently been arguing, with respect

both to morality and to cognition more generally, this kind of learning cannot be

replaced with top-down learning, such as the acceptance of a rule or principle and

the deduction of specific responses from it. Interestingly, this aspect of virtue

theory shows Aristotle to have been a forerunner of the current application of the

neural network theory of morality that is being developed by Paul Churchland,

Andy Clark, and others. In this model, the mind, like the brain itself, is a network

that gets tuned up gradually by experience. With training, the mind does a

progressively better job of recognizing important patterns of input and of

responding with the appropriate patterns of output.116

Therefore, one may argue that this is one manner in which virtue ethics and positive psychology may be said to interact: given our biological make-up, virtue seems to be the best way in which we can describe our natural moral inclinations, and while

114 Haidt and Joseph, “Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable Virtues,” p. 61. 115 Haidt and Joseph, “Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable Virtues,” p. 63. 116 Haidt and Joseph, “Intuitive Ethics: How Innately Prepared Intuitions Generate Culturally Variable Virtues,” p. 62.

57 virtues are socio-cultural achievements, they are achievements that are built on and constrained by the particular ways in which we are hard-wired. Thus, future researchers should be able eventually to connect the VIA strengths with an evolutionary account of how we came to embrace such virtues and strengths.

How much merit is there in this quasi-nativist argument? It is obvious that our moral mechanisms have biological preconditions, and as I have noted earlier (in part through the comments of Gopal Srinivasan) the proper scientific understanding of how we behave will have implications for the feasibility of the ethical theory that we use to frame our behavior. At least in this sense, then, the nativist group seems to be on the right track.

The problem, however, arises with the claim that a preferred morality has a biological foundation. It is unclear how exactly one could defend a particular moral viewpoint from a biological/evolutionary viewpoint. For example, is it correct to deduce any moral weight from one’s feeling a sense of visceral disgust at seeing two gay men holding hands? Is this sense of disgust sufficient grounds for ascribing moral value?

Moreover, is the claim that a normative belief system does not fit perfectly with our evolution-influenced intuitions sufficient grounds for rejecting that system as being incompatible with human nature? Could one not claim instead that the imperative should be to alter and adapt our “human nature” in order to fit in with the belief system? Again, it is very unclear how biological-based intuitions could make overruling normative claims. This does seem to be an instance where the naturalistic fallacy is clearly apparent.

58 Given the problematic nature of justifying the application of virtue ethics through a nativist theory, the question remains: how could an interpenetration of virtue ethics and positive psychology (and the VIA classification in particular) be best justified?

The Problem of Correlation: What Does the “Ubiquity of the Strengths” Really Mean?

At the Rutgers conference, Seligman made much of the extremely high correlations across cultures of the central VIA strengths, which in his view gave substantial cross-cultural validity to the project. However, one concern about the VIA classification that Valerie Tiberius has pointed out is the fact that the ubiquity of the VIA strengths have been deduced through correlation measures.117 Moreover, given that the question posed in these surveys was whether a particular strength was recognizable by individuals in a particular culture (as opposed to whether they attached value to that strength) it seems unclear exactly what the correlation studies prove other than the fact that everyone in the world has a word for transcendence or love. As Stephen Stitch pointed out, what if one were to find similarly high correlations for a set of “weaknesses” as opposed to strengths? Should not a classification of weaknesses then become a valid area of study?118

In this writer’s view, it is obvious that the cross-cultural validity of the VIA classification cannot be determined until strong evidence that the strengths tested are widely valued is collected. While correlation-based problems are ubiquitous in psychology, one way in which such surveys can be improved would be to change the type

117 Conversation with Valerie Tiberius, Rutgers Moral Psychology Conference, April 2005 118 Steven Stitch, Commentary on Martin Seligman’s presentation, Rutgers Moral Psychology Conference, April 2005

59 of questions being asked, so that types of questions such as “Do you recognize the concept of good,” which say little about their value commitments, are avoided.

VI. Conclusion: Some Preliminary Questions and Suggestions on the

Interpenetration of Virtue Ethics and Positive Psychology

This paper has been largely an attempt to flesh out as completely as possible the following claim:

60 Virtue ethics is the contemporary account within philosophy of strengths of

character, and we believe that virtues are much more interesting than (moral)

laws, at least to psychologists, because virtues pertain to people and the lives they

lead. Said another way, psychology needs to downplay prescriptions for the good

life (moral laws) and instead emphasize the why and how of good character.119

Peterson and Seligman’s classification has the significant merit of attempting to draw together contemporary discourse in philosophy and psychology together with a view towards reconceptualizing the discipline. However, one might hope that this paper has shown that this enterprise is an extremely complicated and difficult one. This writer cannot offer definitive answers to the many questions encountered in the course of this discussion, and can only offer a summary and some comments on the field of positive psychology as it stands today.

One will begin with a word on the Doris/Harman debate. Seligman had expressed surprise that much of the debate seems to be based on experiments and theories that have been shown to be either largely irrelevant or discredited.120 However, while this debate is increasingly becoming a straw-man issue (as section III would have borne out), it is worth noting that the empirical study of the relevant eliciting of the virtues is a valid empirical project that would have implications for how we understand the practical implementation of virtue ethics.

That said, one must pause to make a few qualifications. For one, it may be that psychology has to reassess its definition of character, and move beyond the simplistic disposition to react in a particular stereotypical manner in a given situation, which is how

119 Peterson & Seligman, Character Strengths and Virtues, 10. 120 Martin Seligman, personal correspondence, 3/27/2005.

61 traits have been largely defined in the psychological literature. It is worth quoting

Rachana Kamtekar’s differentiation between definitions of character in situationist psychology and virtue theory here:

[T]he so-called character traits that the situationist experiments test for are

independently functioning dispositions to behave in stereotypical ways,

dispositions that are isolated from how people reason…By contrast, the

conception of character in virtue ethics is holistic and inclusive of how we reason:

it is a person’s character as a whole (rather than isolated character traits), that

explain her actions, and this character is a more-or-less consistent, more-or-less

integrated, set of motivations, including the person’s desires, beliefs about the

world, and ultimate goals and values.121

Moreover, it does seem that Peterson and Seligman need to acknowledge that their classification of strengths and virtues must have normative underpinnings if positive psychology is to have a real impact on the quality of people’s lives. If they insist that the classification remains purely descriptive, it is unclear how useful cross-cultural studies validating the apparent ubiquity of the VIA strengths and virtues would be in informing the conception of a “good life”. Describing cross-culturally recognizable virtues may be an interesting and valid anthropological project, but I am in agreement with Schwartz’s claim that a fully-functioning, richly-developed positive psychology must ultimately offer pronouncements on the types of lives we should be striving for.

It also seems clear that the advent of the positive psychology movement should compel researchers to think deeply about the vital role that values play in the sciences, and in psychology in particular. It is important to note in this regard that in practice

121 Kamtekar, “Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character,”p. 460,

62 psychology has indeed developed as a “negative’ science (as Seligman would say) with paradigms, theories, and experiments that reflect psychology’s overriding concern with pathology. A reevaluation of the field with a view to focusing more attention on optimal human functioning could very well show up significant limitations in the way psychology has been conceptualized, which would necessitate an overhaul of the field itself. Of course, the study of positive psychology would continue hand in hand with “negative” psychology, but a clear space cleared for the new field.

One way in which virtue ethics could play a vital role is through reconsidering how one conceives the terms we use to discuss character. The philosopher Bernard

Williams has argued that much of our discussion of character is conducted using “thick ethical concepts”: notions that have both descriptive and prescriptive definitions built into them.122 Perhaps one manner in which a real interpenetration between virtue ethics and the

VIA classification could be made is through a recognition of the “thick” nature of character strengths and virtues at the heart of the VIA project.

Such recognition, however, would blur the fact/value distinction in a manner that both Howard Kendler and Seligman would disapprove of. That said, it might very well be that the type of Dewey-inspired reconceptualization of psychology Brinkmann calls for may become a desirable alternative at some point in the future.123

In this regard, positive psychology would benefit greatly from a “positive” philosophical endeavor that is carried out simultaneously with work in positive psychology.124 The two fields would inform each other, and together strive to offer a

122 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 129-31, 141-42. 123 Of course, Brinkmann’s method is only one option. Another option would be to adopt the Gibsonian perspective based on affordances. I hope to articulate such an account in “Ecological Moral Realism” (with Anthony Chemero, forthcoming). 124 One example is Valerie Tiberius’ interdisciplinary work on well-being: see Valerie Tiberius, “Cultural Differences and Philosophical Accounts of Well-Being,” Manuscript to appear in the Journal of Happiness Studies.

63 complete picture of what it truly means to live a good life. An arguably superficial interpenetration of this kind has already been achieved by virtue ethics and the VIA classification, but it is clear that such an interpenetration should proceed at multiple levels. In many ways, this would require many psychologists to reevaluate how they see the field. The implicit conservatism that continues to dominate the thinking of many psychologists needs to be confronted and altered.

Perhaps the most challenging task of such a collaborative endeavor would be to justify virtue ethics as the moral theory of choice for positive psychology. Nussbaum notes that while strong arguments against deontological and utilitarian accounts of ethics exist, one task of a richly developed positive psychology would be to defend its position in favor of virtue ethics.125 While I think that virtue ethics is a sound moral theory that can potentially shape the future direction of positive psychology, more work needs to be done in this area.

What is perhaps most refreshing about the initial years of the positive psychology movement has been the fostering of interdisciplinary discourse, While this paper has shown that such discourse is a much harder task than it may first seem, such a dialogue provides rich debate, and a field can only grow as a result of the fostering of such debate.

Many questions remain to be answered about the place of virtue ethics in positive psychology, and the manner in which it has inspired the VIA classification, but I hope that this paper has set some of the conditions and considerations on how this debate should proceed.126

125 Nussbaum, “Positive Psychology and Ancient Greek Virtue Ethics” 126 Thanks to Gizem Arslan, John Campbell, Tony Chemero, Nuwan Jayawickreme, Bennett Helm, David Merli, Michael Penn, and Martin Seligman for comments, critiques and support.

64

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