A Common Search for Character: Virtue Ethics and the Values in Action Classification Dunuwille Eranda Ruwan Jayawickreme Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind SPM 490- Prof. John Campbell Graduation Date- May 2005 1 Submitted May 3rd 2005 A Common Search for Character: Virtue Ethics and the Values in Action Project I. Introduction This account will attempt a preliminary evaluation of two discourses that have significantly altered the landscape of their respective disciplines: the science of positive psychology, which rose to prominence at the end of the twentieth century as a reaction to the overemphasis on pathology in psychology at the expense of understanding the nature of productive and fulfilling lives; and virtue ethics, which re-emerged in the late 1950’s as an alternative to the dominant practical ethical theories of deontology, which has its roots in the work of the philosopher Immanuel Kant and utilitarianism, a tradition that descends from the works of the British philosophers Jeremy Bentham, and more famously, John Stewart Mill. Both positive psychology and virtue ethics entered their respective disciplines with corrective ideals in mind, and it is striking (although not completely surprising, given that the two disciplines remain closely linked) that both embody similar aims. On the one hand, positive psychology laments modern psychology’s continued focus on mental disease as opposed to mental health, and emphasizes a more “positive” approach, with a reorientation of the discipline towards work on how individuals can be lead “better” lives. Virtue ethics, on the other hand, focused attention on concepts that had long been neglected or insufficiently explained: moral wisdom and education, friendship, 2 deep conceptions of happiness, the role of emotions in our lives, and, vitally, the central questions of what the virtues are and how we should best live our lives. Virtue ethics concerns itself primarily with moral selves, as opposed to moral laws, and this has greatly expanded the horizons of contemporary moral philosophy. Indeed, attempts have been made to mold this discourse into a liberal political philosophy, which have gained the support of eminent philosophers, economists and other social scientists. The study of what can be termed “human strengths” has a long, if very checkered, history in psychology. However, the advent of the positive psychology movement, championed by such researchers as Martin Seligman, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi and Ed Diener, has meant that such research has become an important part of contemporary psychological research. This new field has as its goal the creation of “a psychology of positive human functioning…that achieves a scientific understanding and effective interventions to build thriving individuals, families and communities.”1 In short, it can be seen that both disciplines concern themselves with a question that the Greek philosopher Aristotle (and certainly many thinkers before him) struggled with more than 2500 years ago: how can we achieve the “good life”? How do we live well? In this sense, both discourses can be seen as prescriptive, in that they purport to offer some account of what is required for us to lead “good” lives. However, a project recently initiated in positive psychology has, in my opinion, opened up the possibility of effecting a valid and fruitful connection between these two discourses. In 2004, Christopher Peterson and Martin E.P. Seligman published a handbook, Character Strengths and Virtues, which attempted a preliminary classification 1 Martin Seligman, “Positive Psychology, Positive Prevention, and Positive Therapy,” in C.R. Snyder and Shane Lopez (eds), Handbook of Positive Psychology (Oxford University Press, 2002), 7. 3 of twenty-four character strengths under six central virtues. Their purpose was to initiate a process of research that would culminate in a comprehensive, empirically testable classification of capacities necessary for a satisfactory human existence. However, the authors have thus far refrained from proposing any theoretical underpinnings for their classification, holding that any such attempt should be attempted only following the completion of advanced work on the classification. It is interesting to note that they pay tribute to virtue ethics as offering support for the theory that the individual, rather than any prescriptive moral law, should be at the heart of any viable theory. I hope to show that virtue ethics has the potential to play two roles in the development of a robust psychological theory of character strengths and virtues. For one, the classification process employed by Peterson, Seligman and their colleagues at the Values In Action (VIA) Institute can be evaluated in light of conceptions of virtue and virtuous behavior adopted by the virtue ethics tradition, with a view towards assessing the conceptual adequacy of their definitions of virtues and character strengths. Secondly, virtue ethics could potentially form the basis of a valid and potentially robust theory of character. The potential benefits that each would bring to the other may be significant, and would represent a real possibility for genuine interaction between the fields of psychology and philosophy. Such an interaction would be most appropriate, since the positive psychology movement in general, and the VIA project in particular, does appear to represent an attempt by psychology to assert itself once more as a moral science. Such a conception is by no means a new one, and actors in the history of psychology as significant as John Dewey, Carl Jung and Gordon Allport have all attempted to incorporate considerations of 4 the “good” into psychology, although the advent of behaviorism during the middle years of the twentieth century all but put paid to their efforts. In this sense, positive psychology represents a “new dawn” in the evolution of psychology as a vital human science. However, any attempt at an understanding of the “good” must have solid moral underpinnings, and virtue ethics may well be the leading candidate for a viable and practicable conception of “flourishing” behavior and the “good life.” This account will open with an interpretive account of contemporary normative virtue ethics, as well as a number of the major objections raised against it. Given that significant objections have been raised against the theory by thinkers employing evidence from the social psychology literature in hand, these objects will be dealt with separately. The focus will then move on to a brief history of attempts by researchers and thinkers to conceive of psychology as a “moral science,” culminating in the rise of positive psychology. An analysis of the different arguments made against positive psychology and the VIA project will be attempted, followed by questions concerning the implications of a possible synthesis between the discourses of positive psychology and philosophy. Finally, I will conclude with a consideration of some of the issues that should animate future research in this area. It is hoped that pointers towards possibilities for a real symbiosis between the fields will emerge from this work, and I fervently hope for no more than that. 5 II. Virtue Ethics2 While interest in the virtue ethics tradition has increased drastically over the last 40 years or so, the field has its direct origins in the philosophical works of Plato and Aristotle during the 5th century BC. (Rosalind Hursthouse notes that a similar discourse was prevalent in Chinese philosophy even before that time.) It survived as the dominant tradition in Western moral philosophy until around the time of the Enlightenment; from that point onwards the emphasis shifted from moral character to moral rules or the consequences of actions. These foci are represented by the moral theories of deontology and consequentialism respectively, and I shall begin by offering a brief summary of the two accounts. Deontology can be described as emphasizing “right before good.” That is, any action can only be considered right if and only if it is done in accordance with the correct moral principle. Thus, the focus of such an account would be to define what these correct moral principles are. Such principles provide us with a “moral ought,” which has been famously characterized by Immanuel Kant as a “categorical imperative.”3 Consequentialism, on the other hand, is generally act-centered4, and thus stresses the “good before right.” That is, an act is right if and only if it has the “best” consequences. One would then have to elaborate on which states of affairs would be most desirable to 2 Much of this material is drawn from Rosalind Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics,” available at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/ and Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 3 Of course, one option here could be to rely on a non-Kantian deontology that rejects the categorical imperative. 4 Although note that rule-consequentialist accounts offer rules that are determined by effects on utility. 6 attain. In general, impartial actions leading to the well-being of as many people as possible is desired. While there is much to be argued as to the relative merits of these two accounts, it has been argued that neither account paid sufficient attention to the individual at the center of the moral action.5 Moreover, both traditions had at their heart a core obligation founded on a conception of a divine lawmaker. While this is not surprising,