Sri Lanka OGN v3.0 Issued 19 June 2006
OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE NOTE
Immigration and Nationality Directorate SRI LANKA Immigration and Nationality Directorate
CONTENTS 1. Introduction 1.1 – 1.5 2. Country assessment 2.1 – 2.11 3. Main categories of claims 3.1 – 3.5 Former members, supporters or opponents of the LTTE fearing reprisals from 3.6 LTTE Fear of persecution by the Sri Lankan authorities 3.7 Prison conditions 3.8 4. Discretionary Leave 4.1 – 4.2 Minors claiming in their own right 4.3 Medical treatment 4.4 5. Returns 5.1 – 5.3 6. List of source documents
1 Introduction
1.1 This document summarises the general, political and human rights situation in Sri Lanka and provides information on the nature and handling of claims frequently received from nationals/residents of that country. It must be read in conjunction with any COI Service Sri Lanka Country of Origin Information at:
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/country_reports.html
1.2 This document is intended to provide clear guidance on whether the main types of claim are or are not likely to justify the granting of asylum, Humanitarian Protection or Discretionary Leave. Caseworkers should refer to the following Asylum Policy Instructions for further details of the policy on these areas:
API on Assessing the Claim API on Humanitarian Protection API on Discretionary Leave API on the European Convention on Human Rights
1.3 Claims should be considered on an individual basis, but taking full account of the information set out below, in particular Part 3: main categories of claims.
1.4 With effect from 23 July 2003, Sri Lanka is a country listed in section 94 of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Asylum and human rights claims must be considered on their individual merits. However if, following consideration, the claim made on or after 23 July 2003 is refused, caseworkers should certify the claim as clearly unfounded unless satisfied that it is not. A claim will be clearly unfounded if it is so clearly without substance that it is bound to fail. The information set out below contains relevant country information, the most common types of claim and guidance from the courts, including guidance on whether cases are likely to be clearly unfounded.
1.5 A full list of source documents cited in footnotes is at the end of this note.
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2 Country assessment
2.1 Following independence from Britain in February 1948, the political scene has been dominated by two parties: the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which is now part of the People’s Alliance (PA). The SLFP was founded by S W R D Banadaranaike, who was Prime Minister until he was assassinated in 1959 by a Buddhist extremist. His widow, Sirimavo Banadaranaike, became leader of the SLFP and served as both Prime Minister and leader of the opposition.1
2.2 A republican constitution was adopted in 1972 and the ruling coalition, led by Sirimavo Banadaranaike, gave itself an extra two years in power. The UNP returned to power in 1978 and adopted a new constitution based on an executive presidency. It introduced for the first time elections based on proportional representation. The presidential election in 1988 was won by the UNP's Ranasinghe Premadasa, who ruled until his assassination in 1993.2
2.3 The SLFP became part of the People’s Alliance (PA) coalition which, headed by Mrs Chandrika Kumaratunga (the daughter of S W R D and Sirimavo Bandaranaike), won general elections in August 1994. Mrs Kumaratunga then went on to win a landslide victory in the Presidential election in November 1994. The PA also won the next Parliamentary elections in October 2000. Although there were reports of violence, intimidation and voting irregularities, the EU Election Observation Mission acknowledged that the result overall reasonably reflected the opinion of the people. In 2001, less than a year after being re- elected, the PA lost their majority and new elections were held in December 2001. The United National Front coalition, lead by UNP Ranil Wickremasinghe, won with 109 seats and the President’s PA came second with 77 seats, which led to an arrangement of political cohabitation between two rival parties, with the PA’s leader as President and the UNP’s leader as Prime Minister.3
2.4 In November 2003, President Kumaratunga suspended parliament, sacked three key ministers taking over their portfolios (including defence) and declared a state of emergency (which was lifted a few days later). This was done on the grounds of national security, and the actions were within her Constitutional powers. No agreement on working arrangements was reached between the President and Prime Minister, and in January 2004, the SLFP signed an alliance with the JVP forming the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA). In February, the President dissolved Parliament and called general elections in April.4
2.5 The elections in April 2004 produced a new political order with the victory of the UPFA. Support for the traditional parties dropped, and smaller parties - JVP, TNA and JHU - gained significant numbers of seats. The UPFA formed a minority government. In September 2004, the Ceylon Workers' Congress (CWC – representing Indian-origin Tamils) with 8 seats joined the government giving it a small majority. In June 2005 the JVP left the Government after the President’s decision to sign a post-tsunami funding arrangement with the LTTE.5
2.6 Presidential elections on 17 November 2005 resulted in the election of President Mahinda Rajapakse of the UPFA to a six year term. According to the preliminary report of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM), the election was generally conducted in a professional and impartial manner and was deemed an improvement over the 2004 election.6 The final report of the mission however noted a very different scenario in the North and East where the LTTE controlled or exercised influence, where there was little tangible evidence that an election had taken place; political campaigning was non- existent and voters were prevented from exercising their franchise because of an enforced
1 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka: 18 May 2006 2 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka: 18 May 2006 3 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka: 18 May 2006 4 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka: 18 May 2006 5 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka: 18 May 2006 6 USSD 2005 Introduction & COIS Sri Lanka Bulletin 1/2005 para 2.01 Page 2 of 20 Sri Lanka OGN v3.0 Issued 19 June 2006
boycott by the LTTE and its proxies.7 The Prime Minister of Sri Lanka is appointed by the President and on 21 November 2005 Ratnasiri Wickremanayake was sworn-in as Prime Minister.8
2.7 The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has been going on for over 20 years as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) fight for an independent homeland and during this 20 year period some 70,000 people are estimated to have been killed and some one million displaced.9 The number of killings in Sri Lanka in the two years preceding the ceasefire of 22 February 2002 was 5,973 in 2000 and 1,822 in 2001. Fifteen people were reported killed in 2002; 59 in 2003; 108 in 2004, 330 in 2005 and 652 in 2006 up to 11 June 2006.10 In a statement dated 2 June 2006 the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) reported that the recent escalation in violence had resulted in the deaths of over 500 people in the current year (2006) over half of whom are civilians. The SLMM notes that while it was set up to monitor the ceasefire it does not have the mandate or resources to enforce security as most of the killings this year have gone unpunished and the perpetrators remain at large, the SLMM is unable to rule on most of these individual cases due to lack of evidence, therefore the numbers of ruled violations in recent times does not reflect the real level of committed violations.11 In March 1999 the Sri Lankan Army launched two major offensives in the Vanni (jungle areas in the North) and captured over 800 sq kms of territory from the LTTE. Fighting in the North intensified in late 1999 and the Vanni fell to the LTTE after some of the fiercest fighting since the conflict began. In April 2000 the LTTE carried out a major assault which led to the withdrawal of Sri Lankan troops from Elephant Pass (which links the Jaffna peninsula to the rest of Sri Lanka). With control of Elephant Pass, the LTTE continued further attacks into the Jaffna Peninsula. Fighting continued until December 2001 when the announcement of a new ceasefire by the LTTE was reciprocated by the newly-elected UNF government. A Ceasefire Agreement was signed in February 2002 by the government and LTTE.12 On 21 April 2003 the LTTE suspended participation in the peace talks in protest at the handling of "critical issues", but said that they had no intention of breaking the cease-fire.13 Since then there has been no large-scale fighting on land, although there have been at least 14 two clashes between the Navy and the LTTE’s Sea Tigers.
2.8 During the April 2004 election campaign, the LTTE stated their willingness to negotiate with any party which had a mandate for talks. The government, for their part, have said that restarting the peace talks is a priority for them and renewed the mandate of Norway as peace facilitators. Despite energetic shuttle diplomacy there has been no agreement on a resumption of talks and little progress made in the second half of 2004. Although it was initially hoped that the tsunami would present an opportunity for the two sides to return to the negotiating table, both the Government and the LTTE have put the peace process to 15 one side while they deal with post-tsunami reconstruction.
2.9 There has been an intensification of violence since the beginning of December 2005. After the initial period of violence in December 2005 and January 2006 the two sides agreed to direct talks in Geneva on 22 to 23 February 2006. The talks resulted in commitments by both sides to uphold the Ceasefire Agreement, and to ensure acts of intimidation and or violence cease. The LTTE committed itself to end attacks on the Government’s security forces and the Government of Sri Lanka committed to prevent armed groups from operating. Both parties asked the Swiss to host a further round of talks in April 2006. 16 However this did not happen as large-scale violence resumed in April.
7 EU Election Observation Mission Press Release 10 March 2006 8 COIS Sri Lanka Bulletin 1/2005 para 2.04 9 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka; 18 May 2006 10 Institute for Conflict Management: “Fatalities District Wise 2005 and 2006” & “Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Sri Lanka” 11 Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission: Violations of the Ceasefire Agreement 2 June 2006 12 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka; 18 May 2006 13 COIS Sri Lanka COI Report Sept 2005 para 4.104 14 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka: 18 May 2006 15 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka: 18 May 2006 16 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka: 18 May 2006 Page 3 of 20 Sri Lanka OGN v3.0 Issued 19 June 2006
2.10 Figures recorded by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) based on complaints reported to them covering the period 1 February 2002 to 28 February 2006 indicate that there have been just under 1,700 abductions of adults and children of which just over 800 have been ruled as violations by the SLMM. In the same period SLMM figures show 161 complaints of assassination against the LTTE and 21 against the government. (See section 2.7 with regard to the most recent statement from SLMM on cases ruled by them as violations.)17 During 2005 an increase in politically motivated killings by the LTTE was noted as was an increase in the numbers of armed clashes between the LTTE and the armed forces and between the LTTE and the Karuna group. The SLMM recorded 92 assassinations imputed to the LTTE during 2005 (12 ruled as violations and 1 as no violation)18. Separate figures produced by the South Asia Terrorism portal based on information from various media reports indicate a total of 330 fatalities in 2005 and 586 in 2006 up to 3 June 2006 of which 230 are recorded as being civilians, 153 members of the security forces and 203 terrorists. The vast majority of the fatalities are recorded as taking place in the north or east of the country with 18 being recorded as taking place in the district of Colombo.19 Further figures from the British High Commission in Colombo record a total of 98 security force personnel, and 35 LTTE members killed from December 2005 to March 2006.20 In January 2006 Human Rights Watch estimated 200 Tamils had died, for apparently political reasons, since the beginning of a ceasefire between the government and the Tamil Tigers in February 2002. Most of the killings have been attributed to the Tamil Tigers.21
2.11 On 18 August 2005, following the killing of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadigarmar, the government enacted emergency regulations. These permit arrests without warrant, and non-accountable detentions for up to one year without trial, and grant the power of arrest to members of the armed forces who are required to turn suspects over to the police within 24 hours. Extending the state of emergency on 21 March 2006 Prime Minister Wickremanayake told parliament that in the previous month the number of killings and attempted killings had reduced but the state of emergency needed to be extended to continue this trend.22
2.12 As noted above there has been an intensification of violence since December 200523 and some of the more notable recent events are noted in this paragraph. In mid-April 2006 an increase in violence in the port town of Trincomalee in north-eastern Sri Lanka was reported with attacks against security forces and rising tensions between Tamil and Sinhalese communities. The LTTE refused to take part in peace talks due later in the month saying their decision came after a recent escalation in violence in Tamil-majority areas.24 Later in April 2006 a suicide bomb attack on the Sri Lankan army headquarters killed at least eight people and seriously injured the head of the army Lt Gen Sarath Fonseca.25 Following the bomb attack Sri Lankan military forces carried out air strikes on suspected Tamil Tiger rebel bases. The strikes were the first official military action since the 2002 ceasefire.26 On 28 April 2006 UNHCR reported that the situation seemed to have stabilised following fighting earlier in the week but UNHCR remained concerned about the displacement of thousands of people in the Trincomalee district.27 However in early May at least five people were killed in a mine attack in Trincomalee apparently aimed by the Tamil Tiger rebels at a Navy
17 Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission: Summary of recorded complaints and violations. 18 COIS Sri Lanka Bulletin 1/2006 para 2.09-2.11 19 Institute for Conflict Management: “Fatalities District Wise 2005 and 2006” 20 COIS Sri Lanka Bulletin 1/2006 para 2.12 21 Human Rights Watch Report: January 2006 22 COIS Sri Lanka Bulletin 1/2006 para 6.01-6.02 23 FCO Country Profile: 18 May 2006 24 BBC News Violence hits Sri Lanka port town 25 BBC News Bomb targets Sri Lanka army chief 26 BBC News Fresh strikes on Sri Lanka rebels 27 UNHCR Briefing Notes-Despite apparent stabilisation, UNHCR remains concerned for thousands of employees Page 4 of 20 Sri Lanka OGN v3.0 Issued 19 June 2006
patrol.28 On 11 May 2006 Reuters reported Sri Lankan airforce planes dropped bombs on LTTE territory near their northern stronghold of Kilinochchi. The raid was launched after the LTTE sea arm attacked a troop transporter ship carrying hundreds of servicemen and sank two Navy fast attack boats. The attack was reported to be the most serious military confrontation since the 2002 truce.29 Violence on the navy controlled island of Kayts near the northern town of Jaffna resulted in the death of 13 civilians in mid May 2006. Ceasefire monitors were investigating the killings which the Tamil Tigers blamed on the Government and the Government blamed on the Tigers.30 Later in May the BBC reported the death of a senior figure in the LTTE named as Ramanan a commander in the district of Batticaloa, it is unclear who was responsible for this killing. It was also reported that there had been continuing attacks on humanitarian workers in the north and east.31 On 23 May 2006 Louise Arbour UN High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concern over mounting violence in Sri Lanka including the killing of civilians and threats against staff of humanitarian agencies which she said were not only ceasefire violations but serious breaches of international human rights and humanitarian law.32 In late May 2005 the European Union listed the LTTE as a banned terrorist organisation. It was reported that more than 280 soldiers, civilians and rebels have been killed in the attacks including suicide bombings and naval clashes which have taken place since February.33
2.13 The Sri Lankan government have taken steps to improve its very poor human rights record of the 1980’s and 1990’s. Significant improvements have been made, but problems do remain. There are continued reports of rape and torture in custody, although these have fallen since the ceasefire. The LTTE are responsible for continuing serious human rights abuses including assassinations of political opponents, recruitment of child soldiers, abductions and extortion. There have been incidents of attacks on religious minorities. Sri Lanka is a signatory to all six core human rights instruments.34
2.14 Child recruitment by the LTTE continued to be a problem and it was reported that 543 children were forcibly recruited by the LTTE in 2005, however it also released 202 children of which 96 were again recruited. However credible sources also indicated that the number could be higher than 543 and that at the end of 2005 more that 1,339 children remained in LTTE custody. It was reported that children were used in battlefield support and in combat. UNICEF figures documented 139 cases of child recruitment in July 2005 the highest monthly figure since late 2003. However the figure for December 2005 was 27, January 2006 42, February 2006 31 and March 2006 32.35
2.15 Sri Lanka was severely affected by the tsunami on 26 December 2004 which killed some 40,000 people and displaced 400 – 500 thousand people along two thirds of the north-east, south and south-west coastline. Half the fishing fleet was destroyed, and a quarter of hotels in the affected areas sustained serious damage. 36
2.16 Presidential elections took place on 17 November 2005. The campaign was generally peaceful but there was violence in the north and east and the LTTE enforced a boycott of the polls in Tamil areas under their control or which they strongly influence in the north and east. This resulted in extremely low voter participation in these areas. Mahinda Rajapakse (SLFP) was elected President with 50.3% of the vote. UNP candidate and Leader of the Opposition, Ranil Wickremesinghe took 48.4%. The President appointed a new ministerial team on 23 November. The JVP and JHU which supported Rajapakse’s candidature 37 decided not to join the Government. The SLFP will therefore be a minority administration.
28 BBC News Sri Lankan explosion kills five. 29 Reuters Foundation AlertNet S Lanka air force bombs area near rebel stronghold 30 BBC News Probe into “slaugher” of Tamils 31 BBC News Senior rebel killed in Sri Lanka 32 Reuters Foundation AlertNet UN official decries Sri Lanka civilian killings 33 Reuters Foundation AlertNet Sri Lanka hopes EU ban will push rebels to talks 34 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka: 18 May 2006 35 COIS Sri Lanka Bulletin 1/2006 para 8.01-8.07 36 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka: 18 May 2006 37 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka: 18 May 2006 Page 5 of 20 Sri Lanka OGN v3.0 Issued 19 June 2006
3 Main categories of claims
3.1 This Section sets out the main types of asylum claim, human rights claim and Humanitarian Protection claim (whether explicit or implied) made by those entitled to reside in Sri Lanka . It also contains any common claims that may raise issues covered by the API on Discretionary Leave. Where appropriate it provides guidance on whether or not an individual making a claim is likely to face a real risk of persecution, unlawful killing or torture or inhuman or degrading treatment/ punishment. It also provides guidance on whether or not sufficiency of protection is available in cases where the threat comes from a non-state actor, and whether or not internal relocation is an option. The law and policies on persecution, Humanitarian Protection, Discretionary Leave, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation are set out in the relevant API's, but how these affect particular categories of claim are set out in the instructions below.
3.2 Each claim should be assessed to determine whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the claimant would, if returned, face persecution for a Convention reason - i.e. due to their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. The approach set out in Karanakaran should be followed when deciding how much weight to be given to the material provided in support of the claim (see the API on Assessing the Claim).
3.3 If the claimant does not qualify for asylum, consideration should be given as to whether a grant of Humanitarian Protection is appropriate. If the claimant qualifies for neither asylum nor Humanitarian Protection, consideration should be given as to whether he/she qualifies for Discretionary Leave, either on the basis of the particular categories detailed in Section 4 or on their individual circumstances.
3.4 This guidance is not designed to cover issues of credibility. Caseworkers will need to consider credibility issues based on all the information available to them. (For guidance on credibility see para 11 of the API on Assessing the Claim)
All APIs can be accessed via the IND website at:
http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/laws___policy/policy_instructions/apis.html
3. 6. Former members, supporters or opponents of the LTTE fearing reprisals from LTTE.
3.6.1 Many claimants will claim asylum based on ill treatment amounting to persecution at the hands of the LTTE due to their past involvement with, and/or opposition to the mainstream LTTE. Some - particularly those who have aligned themselves with the Sri Lankan army military intelligence units – state that they are targeted by the LTTE because they are perceived as “defectors”, whilst others fear being targeted because of their association with the breakaway “Karuna” faction of the LTTE or because of their association with or links to the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP). Others express a fear of being attacked by the LTTE in Colombo because they have engaged in - or are perceived by the LTTE to have engaged in - activity which is seen as ‘disloyal’ to the LTTE.
3.6.2 Treatment. An announcement was made on 22 February 2002 that the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had signed an agreement on the cessation of hostilities. The agreement committed the parties to put an end to hostilities and to restore normalcy for all Sri Lankans. The February 2002 agreement between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE required both parties to abstain from hostile acts against the civilian population, including such acts as torture, intimidation, abduction, extortion and harassment. The parties also agreed that search operations and arrests under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) should not be made. The LTTE opened political offices in government-held areas (under the terms of the cease-fire agreement LTTE members are able to engage in political activity in areas outside their control provided they are unarmed and out of military-style uniforms). On 21 April 2003 the LTTE suspended participation in the
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peace talks in protest at the handling of "critical issues", but said that they had no intention of breaking the cease-fire.38
3.6.3 In March 2004 the LTTE’s eastern commander, Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan - known as Colonel Karuna – broke away from the mainstream LTTE taking with him some 6,000 troops. In April 2004 thousands of LTTE troops moved into the east to engage Colonel Karuna and his supporters in battle. After fierce fighting and substantial casualties, the main faction of the LTTE defeated the breakaway group and regained full control of eastern areas.39
3.6.4 During 2004 Karuna’s group are alleged to have subsequently killed 26 LTTE members, including S. Senathirajah, the LTTE political leader for Batticaloa. Karuna’s group are also alleged to have killed 7 civilians, including LTTE supporter, journalist Aiyathurai Nadesan, who was killed in Batticaloa on 31 May 2004. There were reports that the Government provided protection and military aid to Karuna and his group to assist them in their fight against the mainstream LTTE.40
3.6.5 During 2005 Karuna’s group are alleged to have killed 27 LTTE members including the LTTE political leaders for Batticaloa and Trincomalee. Karuna’s group are also believed to have killed 20 civilians including the divisional secretary of Thirukkovil and a newspaper distributor. There continued to be reports that the government provided protection and military aid to Karuna and his associates in their fight against the LTTE but the government denied any association to Karuna or his associates.41 Incidents continued during 2006 with reports of the deaths of 50 LTTE members at the hand of the Karuna group up until 26 May 2006. The same 42 report shows 26 fatalities of Karuna faction members during this period.
3.6.6 During the April 2004 election campaign, the LTTE stated their willingness to negotiate with any party which had a mandate for talks. The government, for their part, have said that restarting the peace talks is a priority for them and renewed the mandate of Norway as peace facilitators. Although it was initially hoped that the tsunami would present an opportunity for the two sides to return to the negotiating table, both the Government and the LTTE put the peace process to one side while they deal with post-tsunami reconstruction. A 'no peace, no war' scenario continues to prevail. The ceasefire agreement remains in place but is under pressure due to ongoing violence in the East, including political assassinations and paramilitary activity (including by the Karuna LTTE breakaway group).43 The first session of Ceasefire Talks was finally held in Switzerland on 22 and 23 February 2006, however despite a reaffirmation from both sides on respecting and upholding the Ceasefire Agreement, and commitments from both sides to eradicate violent acts and hold further 44 45 talks in April , these did not in fact take place.
3.6.7 Members of the LTTE have committed serious human rights abuses, involving both Tamils and Sinhalese and have been responsible for politically motivated killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, harassment, abduction, disappearances, extortion, and detention.46 The number of killings in Sri Lanka in the two years preceding the ceasefire of 22 February 2002 was 5,973 in 2000 and 1,822 in 2001. Fifteen people were reported killed in 2002; 59 in 2003; 108 in 2004, 330 in 2005 and 652 in 2006 up to 11 June 2006.47 Most incidents having taken place
38 COIS Sri Lanka COI Report Sept 2005 para 4.82-4.83 & 4.104 39 COIS Sri Lanka COI Report Sept 2005 para 4.45 - 4.58 40 COIS Sri Lanka COI Report Sept 2005 para 6.132 41 COIS Sri Lanka Bulletin 1/2006 para 2.05 42 Institute for Conflict Management: “Incidents of violence between LTTE and Tamil National Front” 43 FCO Country Profile on Sri Lanka: 18 May 2006 44 COIS Sri Lanka Bulletin 1/2006 para 7.01 45 BBC News Tamil Tigers dismiss early talks 46 COIS Sri Lanka COI Report Sept 2005 para 6.03 47 Institute for Conflict Management: “Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Sri Lanka” Page 7 of 20 Sri Lanka OGN v3.0 Issued 19 June 2006
in the in the north and east of Sri Lanka.48 From February 2002 up to February 2006, there had been 1,225 abductions of adults and 321 abductions of children reported to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) attributed to the LTTE. Of these 595 for adults and 212 for children have been certified by the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) as violations of the ceasefire agreement by the LTTE.49
3.6.8 During 2004, there was credible evidence that, in addition to the 120 cadres and civilians killed in fighting between LTTE factions in March, the LTTE killed more than 81 members of anti- LTTE Tamil political groups, LTTE cadres loyal to Karuna, alleged Tamil informants for the security forces in the north, the east, and Colombo, and civilians. Both current and former members of anti-LTTE Tamil political parties were targeted by the LTTE. During the year, 10 current and past anti-LTTE Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) members were killed. Credible sources indicated that after the fighting in March, the LTTE killed an additional 43 members of breakaway military leader Karuna’s group. The LTTE also targeted alleged Tamil informants to the military, killing 10 during the year.50
3.6.9 During 2005 there were credible reports that the LTTE killed 68 members of the police and military, more than 106 members of the anti-LTTE Tamil paramilitary groups, LTTE cadres loyal to the Karuna faction, alleged Tamil informants for the security forces, and civilians. The LTTE targeted both current and former members of the anti-LTTE Tamil political parties. During 2005 18 current and past anti-LTTE Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) members were killed. Credible sources reported that the LTTE killed 45 members of the breakaway military leader Karuna’s group. There was also credible evidence that the LTTE killed 15 members of the military intelligence apparatus in a targeted campaign.51
3.6.10 Both Amnesty International(AI) and Human Rights Watch(HRW) have highlighted the increase in politically motivated killings during 2005 and the worsening human rights situation in 2005 taking into account these killings. They note that Tamils in opposition to the LTTE are particular targets reportedly of the LTTE but the Karuna group in particular and other Tamil armed groups are also believed to be responsible for some of these. AI particularly note the that although the LTTE reportedly continued to kill those it viewed as opponents since the signing of the ceasefire agreement the scale and scope of these killings has risen dramatically since the April 2004 split in the LTTE. AI further report that the range of people being targeted appears to be expanding; following the split most of those killed had clear links to either the LTTE or the Karuna faction but increasingly those killed are civilians with little or no evident connection to armed activity including journalists, academics, teachers and farmers as well as former members of the Tamil armed groups who have not been involved in armed activities for a long time. AI also report that the area in which the killings are taking place has expanded 52 from Batticaloa to Ampara, Trincomalee in the east and Jaffna and other areas in the north.
3.6.11 The Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) is a Tamil political group formed on 1986, which has fought against the LTTE since 1990. It supports the People’s Alliance and won one seat at the April 2004 elections for the National Assembly.53 As members of a rival Tamil party which refuses to accept the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil people members of the EPDP have been targeted by the LTTE. Killings of EPDP members in 2004 attributed to the LTTE included a journalist member in charge of media affairs, a committee member and a member. 54 The US State Department reports indicate a total of 10 current and past EPDP members were killed in 2004 and 18 in 2005. It is also indicated that there are reports that
48 Institute for Conflict Management: “Fatalities District Wise 2005 and 2006” & “Prominent Tamil political leaders assassinated since the Ceasefire Agreement” & “Incidents of violence between the LTTE and Tamil National Front” 49 Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission Summary of recorded complaints and violations 50 COIS Sri Lanka COI Report Sept 2005 para 6.131 51 COIS Sri Lanka Bulletin 1/2006 para 2.04 52 COIS Sri Lanka Bulletin 1/2006 para 2.07,2.08 and 2.10 53 COIS Sri Lanka COI Report Sept 2005 Annex B 54 COIS Sri Lanka COI Report Sept 2005 para 6.18, 6.130 and 6.143 Page 8 of 20 Sri Lanka OGN v3.0 Issued 19 June 2006
armed paramilitary groups including the EPDP which are suspected of being linked to the 55 government or security forces participated in armed attacks during 2005.
3.6.12 The EPDP itself records some 57 attacks against its members from 1 November 2002 to 24 April 2006, fifteen of which took place in 2005. The majority of these incidents are recorded as taking place on the east coast or in the far north for example in Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Jaffna. The EPDP describes many of the victims as political activists, organisers or otherwise having some profile within the organisation. Only four of the attacks are recorded as having 56 taken place in or near Colombo.
3.6.13 Sufficiency of protection. The Ministry of Internal Security controls the 66,000-member police force, which is responsible for internal security in most areas of the country. The Ministry of Defence controls the 112,000-member Army, the 27,000-member Navy, and the 20,000-member Air Force. Home Guards, an armed militia of more than 20,000 members drawn from local communities and who are responsible to the police, provide security for Muslim and Sinhalese communities located near LTTE-controlled areas. The police force includes the 6,000-member paramilitary Special Task Force which is the para military arm of the Sri Lanka Police, and deployed essentially for counter Terrorist and Counter Insurgency operations within the country. They are also deployed in the close protection Units providing security for VIP’s and at Key Installations.57
3.6.14 In June 2003 there were reports of some large-scale arrests in Colombo City and Western Province during joint police/military operations against the LTTE in response to a spate of killings and other crimes, including the slaying of intelligence operatives. This was part of an initiative by the Ministry of Defence and the Interior Ministry to launch a comprehensive security operation with the deployment of military and intelligence services to render the city safe from criminals and hit squads. Most of those detained were released after a maximum of several days, but some detentions extended to several months and 65 persons were charged under the Prevention of Terrorism Act.58
3.6.15 In late 2005 the Sri Lankan authorities launched a number of “cordon and search” operations. The largest of these in Colombo on 31 December 2005 involved the arrest of about 1,000 people most of whom were detained briefly and released after finger printing and photographing. When asked by the Human Rights Commission (HRC) to explain these arrests the police indicated they were aimed at ordinary criminals. However the HRC noted that the ethnic balance of the suspects, mostly Tamil, indicated that this was a security operation. The HRC also noted that if the arrests were part of a security operation then the police had to inform the HRC within 48 hours even if the suspect had been released in the interim.59
3.6.16 As noted above violent attacks by the LTTE on its opponents and former members continue to take place which the Sri Lankan authorities have been unable to stop. There is no evidence that the Sri Lankan authorities do not investigate and seek to prosecute those who commit violent acts within Sri Lanka and they have responded to the recent increase in such political killings attributed to the LTTE as noted above. It can therefore be considered that there is a sufficiency of protection for those individuals who oppose the LTTE but whose level of opposition has not brought them to the specific attention of the LTTE. However it is clear that the LTTE are able to seek out and take action against some particular individuals generally of higher profile than ordinary members and for people in this category there will not be a sufficiency of protection.
3.6.17 Internal relocation. The Sri Lankan Constitution grants every citizen “freedom of movement and of choosing his residence” and the Government generally respected these rights in practice. The war with the LTTE prompted the Government to impose more stringent checks on travellers from the north and the east and on movement in Colombo,
55 USSD 2004 and 2005 56 EPDP news-heroes report 57 COIS Sri Lanka COI Report Sept 2005 para 5.26-5.27 58 COIS Sri Lanka COI Report Sept 2005 para 6.96 – 6.97 59 COIS Sri Lanka bulletin 1/2006 para 6.06 Page 9 of 20 Sri Lanka OGN v3.0 Issued 19 June 2006
particularly after dark. However since 2003, Tamils were no longer required to obtain police- passes to move around the country. Limited access continued to certain areas near military bases and High Security Zones, defined as areas near military emplacements, camps, barracks, or checkpoints where civilians could not enter. Some observers claimed the High Security Zones were excessive and unfairly affected Tamil agricultural lands, particularly in Jaffna. The LTTE limited travel on the road connecting Jaffna to the rest of the country.60 Following fighting in the north and east in April 2006 a number of access roads were closed however by 9 May 2006 it was reported that these had been re-opened.61
3.6.18 Claimants who fear persecution at the hands of the LTTE in LTTE dominated areas are able to relocate to Colombo, or other Government controlled areas and it would not normally be found to be unduly harsh for claimants to relocate in this way.
3.6.19 Caselaw.
[2002] UKIAT 04427 The IAT held that whilst the claimant had a real risk of persecution at the hands of the LTTE in his home area against which the Sri Lankan authorities could not protect him, it was not unduly harsh for him to relocate to Colombo.
[2003] UKIAT 00150 SN (Sri Lanka) CG (Scarring - Bribes - LTTE - Reprisals) The Appellant feared the LTTE and the Sri Lankan authorities. He claimed that he was forced to give information to the Sri Lankan authorities and as a result of this the LTTE came looking for him. The Tribunal found that it was unlikely that the LTTE would look for him on his return as if that were the case "it would impact on the circumstances of probably thousands of young Tamil men who had been forced by the authorities to identify LTTE members in the past in similar circumstances." The Appellant would be returned to Colombo where there was a sufficiency of protection.
Oppilamani [2004] EWCH 348 (Admin). The claimant feared reprisals from the LTTE because she joined and worked for the EPDP for a year and a half and because of her husband’s defection from the LTTE. The claimant assisted in promoting the EPDP by organising meetings, recruiting members and making pro-EPDP speeches. She was not considered to be a high-profile political opponent. Also it was concluded that, on the facts of the case, there was a sufficiency of protection.
Mylvaganam [2005] EWHC 98 (Admin). The claimant was found not to be a true high profile opposition activist to the LTTE. The claimant was a member of the SLFP and chief organiser in the Batticaloa district, a member of a human rights task force in 1998 and appointed as a member of Batticaloa General Hospital Committee in 1999. He contested elections in Batticaloa in 2000 on behalf of the SLFP. This case is fact specific but it demonstrates what the courts take into account when considering whether an individual has a high political profile.
PS [2004] CG 00297 The Tribunal: