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The General Staff ResearchBook Review Forum command that includes headquarters, military districts, and other functions, and to try to explain how it learns, plans, and functions. The book includes four chapters of test cases. Each chapter concludes with a summary and the author’s recommendations, which are intended to help the IDF General Staff avoid the difficulties and errors presented in the chapter. In the fifth chapter the author presents his main insights and his recommendations for improving the work of the General Staff. The General Staff: Management Methodology and Decision Making The book presents a comparative analysis of the General Staff’s performance with regard to four Gal Perl Finkel roles and challenges: the planning processes in the General Staff, including multi-year planning The Israeli General Staff for force buildup, operational planning for by Meir Finkel wartime, and planning during wartime; various Modan, Maarachot Publishing 2020 learning processes of the General Staff, including lessons learned from war, learning from foreign 504 pages [in Hebrew] armies, and processes of change; patterns of At the outset of World War II, “the results of the organizing in the face of evolving challenges, German General Staff’s thinking and decision including the establishment of new staff bodies making on the battlefield outdid those of its and the direct management of the General Staff; French counterpart” (p. 11). This is what Chief of and chiefs of staff coping with a General Staff Staff Aviv Kochavi wrote in the preface to a new that opposed the outlook and changes they book about the IDF General Staff by Brig. Gen. sought to implement, and with differences of (ret.) Dr. Meir Finkel. Kochavi here underscores approach within the General Staff. the importance of the General Staff and its Although the study is not a historical ability to influence a campaign, in the present documentary, it was based on material from the and in the future. Thus, he continued, “The IDF’s History Department and on biographies, General Staff must be a body that specializes media publications, and interviews the author in management and decision making for the conducted with senior officers who served in immediate, short, medium, and long term, and the General Staff over the years. Although each especially in time of war, which is its greatest period was marked by different challenges and test. It requires training, knowledge, skill, contexts, there are similar characteristics that teamwork and a critical attitude, and curiosity can instruct about the recurring challenges, and creativity” (p. 11). responsibilities, and roles of the General In this book, the author, formerly commander Staff. At the same time, and as the author of an armored brigade and head of the Dado insisted, it is difficult to examine the periods Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies, comparatively, since each period entails its continues his previous book, The Chief of particular challenges and strategic context. Staff, and the effort to analyze thoroughly The book’s analysis is detailed and systematic and fundamentally the roles and challenges and offers enlightening insights. For example, of the General Staff, which is the IDF’s strategic in the chapter describing operational planning 152 Strategic Assessment | Volume 24 | No. 2 | April 2021 the General Staff conducted through the Central An operational plan is designed to enable Command in the first year of the second intifada. development of the required knowledge, to The General Staff was faced with the dilemma form the basis for a common language and the of whether to continue defensive preparations "compass" for force buildup...The nature of or to transition to an offensive that included operational plans change when moving from large-scale infiltration of forces into the heart plan to command in light of context. Therefore, of the refugee camps—a move that entailed the Chief of Staff emphasized that the plan is a possible achievements in the form of harming means. The planning process, force buildup of the senior members of terrorist organizations and operational capabilities, and the readiness of the the destruction of weapons and ammunition, forces—those are the important things. as well as considerable risk, since it included fighting in urban areas and in the heart of a (planning for war), which is the principal civilian population. process that the General Staff executes in the The author quotes Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora field of force, the author outlines the main Eiland, then-head of the Planning Directorate: characteristics of the General Staff planning process, including the nature of the plan and Those who led to the approval of the its basic assumptions, the need for modular operations were the commanders of and flexible planning, and the creation of the infantry brigades. At that time, the coordination and synchronization between the IDF was blessed with four of the best General Staff, the command, and the operational brigade commanders it has ever had: branch (p. 97). Despite this, the author notes the Aviv Kochavi from the Paratroopers, analysis of former chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot: Chico Tamir from Golani, Imad Fares from Givati, ​​and Yair Golan from Nahal. An operational plan is designed to The commanders, and especially Aviv enable development of the required and Chico, persuaded the commander knowledge, to form the basis for a of the Central Command, Itzik Eitan, common language and the “compass” and the chief of staff to approve for force buildup...The nature of the operations. The operational operational plans change when achievements of these raids were moving from plan to command in light partial, but the fact that the operations of context. Therefore, the Chief of Staff were carried out with a minimum of emphasized that the plan is a means. casualties—among both the soldiers The planning process, force buildup of and the civilian population—gave the the operational capabilities, and the assurance that it would be possible, readiness of the forces—those are the when necessary, to enter and take over important things. (p. 103) West Bank cities. One or two months later, the time for this did come [as Indeed, throughout the chapter the emphasis part of Operation Defensive Shield]. is on the need for mental flexibility, planning, (p. 228) force buildup, and formulated responses that can be adapted to a changing reality. Although this is a fascinating example, A particularly fascinating chapter describes it might have been better to include in the how the General Staff learns during combat, book another test case that has not yet been including through friction with the enemy (pp. thoroughly investigated, and to examine the 219-234). An example is the learning process that learning process conducted by the General Gal Perl Finkel | The General Staff: Management and Decision Making 153 Staff and the Southern Command in 2006-2008. refrains from describing it in detail, as well as The commander of the Gaza Division at the the process that preceded it—from the division time, Brig. Gen. (ret.) Moshe “Chico” Tamir, a to the command and to the General Staff. The veteran of the Golani Brigade, initiated “constant successful result of the operation, Tamir stated, friction” with the enemy through raids carried was “due to the combination of ground forces out by infantry and armored battalions, as well with air forces.” They identified targets, he said, as elite units (interview with M. Tamir, March 22, maneuvered with confidence, and hit enemy 2020). These raids were necessary, according to operatives (interview with M. Tamir, March 22, then-Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, due to the 2020). need to “handle terrorist activity on the other side of the fence,” including frequent firing of Qassams on the city of Sderot and other Focusing on this level means a constant and localities. “We did not have an ‘Iron Dome,’ systematic need for an up-to-date interpretation of reality, finding appropriate methodologies for we did not have a good answer, and we had developing a response to the new challenges, and to take action against this thing, in order to establishing command and method mechanisms restore security” (interview with G. Ashkenazi, for IDF coordination and synchronization. February 21, 2021). According to Tamir, these operations were preceded by “very orderly and very didactic Insights preparation,” which built confidence in the The central and first component of the General ability of the forces to perform among the Staff’s uniqueness, Finkel states, “is the strategic senior command levels that were required to level that it oversees. Focusing on this level approve them (interview with M. Tamir, March means a constant and systematic need for an 22, 2020), among them Southern Command up-to-date interpretation of reality, finding General Yoav Gallant, a veteran of Shayetet appropriate methodologies for developing a 13 (Lamm, 2008) and Chief of Staff Ashkenazi, response to the new challenges, and establishing who acknowledged their contribution since command and method mechanisms for IDF his days as a company commander in Golani coordination and synchronization” (p. 461). “to the capabilities and self-confidence of Moreover, the fact that the General Staff the commanders” and their influence on the interfaces with the political echelon requires it enemy (interview with G. Ashkenazi, February to adopt its language as well as the language of 21, 2021). Battalion commanders, including the military—and the world and considerations Yaron Finkelman from the Paratroopers (Harel, of the political echelon are different from those 2020) and David Zini from the Golani Brigade, of the military. “Building and maintaining a then led raids across the fence in the Gaza Strip common language with the political echelon, and struck terrorists in their territory (Pollak, especially if it changes, is a task that requires a 2015).
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