Issue 9 Fall 2014 ISSN: 2241-438X

Maritime Interdiction Operations Journal TRAINING CENTER NATO MARITIME INTERDICTION OPERATIONAL NATO

1 C O N T E N T S NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational COMMANDANT'S EDITORIAL rediscovering the SUA Convention", by Matteo Del Chicca, World Training Center Maritime University Editorial by Ioannis Pavlopoulos MARITIME INTERDICTION 4 Commodore GRC (N) OPERATIONS Building a Maritime law Enforcement JOURNAL 31 Mentality, by Nikolaos Ariatzis, Lt INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Commander, GRC (N)

Implementing Maritime Security TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES Director 6 Measures, by Philip Holihead, Head of Djibouti Code of Conduct Commodore I. Pavlopoulos GRC (N) Implementation, IMO The role of new Technologies & Commandant NMIOTC 6th Annual 33 Policies concerning EU Maritime Security & Borders Surveillance, MARITIME SECURITY By Dr Pierluigi Massimo Giansanti, Manager, FINMECCANICA Group Executive Director Commander C. Campana ITA N Global Maritime Security the Director of Training Support Conference 7 "Thousand-Ship Navy" concept, by The Role of Non-Lethal Weapons in Corrado Campana, Commander 38 Maritime Operations, by Massimo ITA N Annati, Rear Admiral (retd) ITN, Chairman European Working Group on Non-Lethal Wapons Editor Introducing the Privatisation of Lt Commander N. Ariatzis GRC (N) 10 Maritime Security: Casual Factors, Transformation Staff Officer Implications and Trends, by Ioannis Chapsos, Research Fellow OPERATIONAL ISSUES in Maritime Security, CTPSR/ Coventry University NATO ongoing Naval Operations, Layout Production Manager 42 Maritime Security & Law Enforce­ Evi Sakellaridou CURRENT AND ment, by Eugene Diaz del Rio, Rear MWR Office ACADEMIC ISSUES Admiral (OF-6) ESP N

FUTURE Dartmouth Centre for Seapower Maritime Close Combat, by Kostas 14 & Strategy (DCSS), University of 44 Dervenis, Engineer Plymouth, by Prof Graeme Herd, Dartmouth Centre & Dr Fotios CHALLANGES Moustakis, Associate Professor & head of External Affairs of Darmouth NMIOTIC 5TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE Centre TO Building a Law Enforcement Culture LEGAL ISSUES 51 at Sea for a more Secure Maritime Environment ENERGY SECURITY The Military-Law Enforcement 17 Alliance to Combat Transnational HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS Organized Crime at Sea, by Pierre St. Hilaire, Director, Counter- IN THE Terrorism, Public Safety & Maritime VIP visitors to NMIOTC Security, ICPO-INTERPOL 56 The views expressed in this issue reflect the opinions of the authors, and do not necessarily represent MARITIME ENVIRONMENT Building a Law Enforcement Culture 21 at Sea, by José Nieves, Captain, NMIOTC TRAINING NMIOTC or NATO’s official posi- USCG tions.

Photos from NMIOTC Training All content is subject to Greek Distinguishing Law Enforcement 62 Activities 24 from Armed Conflict Paradigm in Copyright Legislation. International Law, by Panagiotis Pictures used from the web are not Sergis, Lt Cdr, GRC (N) MWR ACTIVITIES subject to copyright restrictions. 02-04 JUNE 2015 You may send your comments to: "Towards a more wide accepted Trips and Excursions [email protected].nato.int 27 definition of the Terrorism Crime: 75 2 3 Starting from the second semester of 2013 the initiatives NMIOTC took in support of 2014 as a “Legal Year” are as follows: 1. Establishing and delivering for the first time the Pilot Course 9000 “Legal Issues in MIO”, dealing with a variety of issues that arise during the planning and execution phase of Maritime Security and Maritime Interdiction Operations. 2. Establishing continuous and productive cooperation with key international players in law enforcement such as INTERPOL, EU- ROPOL, US European Command (EUCOM), US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the US Naval Criminal Investiga- tive Service (NCIS). We are including their valuable experience in our training products, with a focus on illicit trafficking at sea. 3. The establishment of continuous cooperation with outstanding academic institutions in the field of law, such as the University of South Africa, The Pantion University of Athens, and the University of Trace, which supported NMIOTC with the development of our Legal course. 4. With the assistance of the US EUCOM and the Hellenic Police SMEs we developed the module of “Evidence Collection”, which ensures that boarding teams effectively collect evidence from an crime scene in order to effectively prosecute suspects in court. 5. We established the training module “Collection of Biometrics in the Maritime Environment” (which also deals with proper dissem- ination), in order to ensure that Identity Operations are executed in accordance with Alliance Concepts and International Law. 6. Developing the new course illicit trafficking at Sea with the assistance of US EUCOM with focus on effective countering of illicit trafficking of drugs, people, weapons etc. 7. We are moving towards the concept of exploiting Non Lethal Weapons in order to neutralize adversaries. We are looking for ways to incorporate to our tactics and procedures this capability which even thought is used for a long time from law enforcement agencies it is something new for most armed forces. 8. We established a direct cooperation with Legal Authorities such as the Legal Prosecutor Office of Piraeus for piracy Issues and we included their valuable experience in our training products. 9. Not to forget also the key pillar of transformation which deals with the objective of achieving a law enforcement culture for mari- time forces contributing to the experimentation and development of solutions and equipment such as C3PO CEBOSS and video streaming of real time High Definition Video from boarding teams to motherships and to the Headquarters ashore for the timely assessment of findings and biometric data aimed to the evaluations of evidences and to the possible prosecution of the suspect- ed criminals. NMIOTC Commandant’s Editorial As everybody knows, theory that is not implemented is meaningless. After identifying the need to fill the gap on law enforcement culture, our response was immediate. Following our aim to develop a diverse and highly effective Maritime Security Operations workforce and to enhance integrations and improvement of interoperability on the High Seas, while forging at the same time a law enforcement culture, NMIOTC developed a wide range of actions to serve this goal and is making a strong and continuous effort to NMIOTC COMMANTDANT’S FOREWORD FOR ANNUAL CONFERENCE deliver the best and most effective training to NATO Forces and to support the International Maritime Community. The 3000-year long experience of Greeks at sea has shown that one on the few stable things at sea is the evolving a nature of mari- time threats. Maritime Cyber Security, for example, which is a primary concern today, was not even discussed twenty years ago. On Ioannis Pavlopoulos the contrary, Piracy at Sea, once a permanent menace for seafarers, almost disappeared during the twentieth century and reemerged Commodore GRC (N) in recent years in a totally new way. NMIOTC Commadant By examining some established trends, however, it is reasonable to take actions in order to prepare for the future. Taking into account that maritime trade consists of more than 80 percent of the worlds circulated goods and that it will continue to be the most cost-effective means to feed our national economies with goods and energy resources, it is safe to conclude that maritime security will continue to directly affect the world economy in the future. Thus the Sea is a valuable source of growth and prosperity and the global economy depends on open, protected and secure seas and oceans for economic development, free trade, transport, energy security, tourism and good status of the environment. Along the same lines, we can identify that: first, the global economy will increase its dependency on maritime trade; second, that the migration –both legal and illegal– will continue as result of globalization; and third, that together with increased global trade we will face the challenge of increased field of action for Maritime CriminalActivities including Transnational Organized Crime. Obviously maritime security today remains a focal point since it should be secured against a plethora of risks and treats in the global maritime domain. The required shielding can only be achieve in a cross-sectoral, and cost efficient way where all partners from civilian and military authorities and actors (such as law enforcement, border control, customs and environmental authorities, maritime administrations, navies, coast guards, intelligence services) as well as agencies and industry (shipping, security, communication and capability support) will cooperate with mutual benefit always in conformity with existing laws, treaties and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).. Keeping that in mind, it is necessary to maintain a balance. On one hand we have the necessity of uploading freedom of navigation and overseas trade. On the other hand we have an ethical and legal obligation to uphold International Law, International Maritime Law, Treaties, Conventions, and UN Security Council Resolutions when conducting Maritime Security Operations. Having identified, through delivered training to a variety of NATO member states and other partner navies a constant and growing need for proper legal training of all personnel involved in the planning and conduct of Maritime Interdiction Operations, we decided to dedicate the year 2014 to the study of legal issues arising during Maritime Security Operations (including the interaction with civilian seafarers and the need for proper evidence collection and crime scene preservation aboard vessels) and to the development of proper legal training to address these concerns.

4 5 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS MARITIME SECURITY

i mplementing m aritime s ecurity m easures by Philip Holihead Global Maritime Head of Djibouti Code of Conduct Implementation, IMO Security or the shipping industry maritime itime security, and thus to implement learned so far. Liaison between navies security perhaps means the ability full maritime security requires complete and merchant shipping should be contin- Ffor merchant ships to “pass on the buy-in by coastal States, and to achieve ued at the strategic level as a matter of the “Thousand-Ship seas upon their lawful occasions”. But the that requires capacity building efforts to course, so that emerging threats to securi- days when the naval balance ensured the occur. Experience from the western Indi- ty can be identified by those who regularly status quo are gone; navies are no longer an Ocean and Gulf of Aden area is that transit the oceans’ choke points and trou- Navy” concept deployed in sufficient numbers to ensure it is not just navies that require capacity ble spots, to those who might be required that sea lines of communication remain uplift, but in fact the whole mechanism of to police them. Navies and coastguards unthreatened unless specifically tasked to government and legislation so that States in coastal States should be encouraged to by Corrado Campana do so. Thus there is greater reliance upon fully understand why they need to be in- patrol their TTWs and EEZs within robust Commander ITA N local navies to be able to combat threats volved in securing the maritime space and regional frameworks in order to suppress to maritime security. the resources therein, and have the law local threats to maritime security. Estab- The key to effective maritime security is to act upon it. This whole of government lished navies should be used as diplomat- clear legislation and multi-organizational approach basing security decisions on the ic tools to influence in these matters and n the autumn of 2005, Admiral Mi- War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, purposes and precluding its use for others cooperation. This has been the key to value of maritime resources is required to to assist with local and regional capacity chael G. Mullen, the U.S. Navy’s Chief Admiral Mullen openly admitted to the that threaten national, regional, or global the effective suppression of piracy off the draw the small navies and coastguards building e.g. the mechanisms by which Iof Naval Operations, challenged the assembled chiefs of navy and their rep- security”. He had already expressed the coast of Somalia where a cooperative ef- out of their ports and create a presence NATO warships are able to meet at sea world’s maritime nations to raise what he resentatives from seventy-five countries idea a month earlier in an address to the fort by navies and merchant shipping has in areas such as fishing grounds, port ap- and both communicate and exercise to- called a “thousand-ship navy” to provide that “the United States Navy cannot, by students of the College, but he now elab- resulted in no successful piracy attacks proaches, tourism areas, offshore mineral gether against mutually held SOPs could for the security of the maritime domain on itself, preserve the freedom and security orated the concept: for over 2 years. Given the types of geo- and gas extraction areas etc. When they if exported be a significant enabler for es- a global scale in the twenty-first century. of the entire maritime domain. It must “Because today’s challenges are global graphical area in which piracy occurs and are all doing this, then their presence will tablishing regional coordinated maritime Speaking at the Seventeenth Internation- count on assistance from like-minded na- in nature, we must be collective in our the ability of regional forces to operate go a long way to suppressing criminal acts law enforcement capability. Politicians al Seapower Symposium at the Naval tions interested in using the sea for lawful response. We are bound together in our outside their TTWs, there will always be a such as smuggling, IUUF etc. from which should be encouraged to look upon such dependence on the seas and in our need case for a coordinated naval presence to piracy can develop. work as ‘conflict prevention’ rather than for security of this vast commons. This is suppress this threat when it arises. To implement maritime security in the aid, and invest accordingly. a requisite for national security, global sta- But piracy is not the only threat to mar- future we should build on the lessons bility, and economic prosperity. As navies, we have successfully learned how to leverage the advantages of the sea... advantages such as mobility, ac- Philip Holihead With 35 year’s service as a Warfare Officer in the Royal Navy, and vast experience of multi-national operations including cess, and sovereignty.... We must now as an Executive Assistant to a NATO Commander, command of UN maritime forces in Cambodia, and diplomatic postings leverage these same advantages of our as the UK Defence Attaché in Egypt and Yemen, Phil Holihead has a wealth of international, operational and planning profession to close seams, reduce vulner- experience. abilities, and ensure the security of the do- On leaving the Royal Navy in 2009 he worked temporarily for the European Union as an expert conducting needs anal- ysis for the Critical Maritime Routes programme. In April 2010 he was approached by the IMO to lead the newly-formed main, we collectively, are responsible for. Counter-Piracy, Project Implementation Unit. As we combine our advantages, I envision His job at IMO is to deliver capacity to counter piracy and other maritime security threats in the Gulf of Aden and Western a 1,000-ship Navy –a fleet-in-being, if you Indian Ocean in accordance with the Djibouti Code of Conduct, manage the IMO multi-donor trust fund, and run the will, made up of the best capabilities of all Counter-Piracy Project Implementation Unit. He is a regular speaker at international conferences on countering-piracy, and has both hands-on and strategic experi- freedom-loving navies of the world”. ence of delivering maritime capacity on a regional basis. The rationale for the thousand-ship navy Phil is married with 4 grown-up children and 3 grandchildren. (TSN), more generally referred to also as

6 7 Partnership a part of its current maritime strategy, and the lack of such official support for this concept has likely been interpreted by nations reluctant to partic- MARITIME SECURITY ipate as a sign of weakness in American commitment to the TSN/GMP; thus, this daring idea runs the risk of becoming the maritime equivalent of Woodrow Wilson’s For many poor The maritime security strategy needs League of Nations –the international orga- therefore to target and put pressure on the nization created after the First World War people, the outcomes organizers of maritime crime and to build to provide a forum for resolving interna- from illicit activities viable economic alternatives to coastal tional disputes, which was first proposed are so high, and the communities, who could help end mar- by US President Woodrow Wilson as part itime crime simply by refusing to protect of his Fourteen Points plan for an equi- licit alternatives so criminal interests. table peace in Europe, but of which US unrewarding, that To this aim, it is necessary to build more was never a member– that is, it will die, inclusive maritime security communities. and not because it was a bad idea but be- interdiction and Cooperation, interaction, common pro- cause the country that proposed it was not prison will not deter tocols and practices in the field of mari- committed to it. them from trying their time security will facilitate international We know that it is possible for the inter- or regional communities to take effective national Community to focus on a difficult luck again. The action in the long term, and the idea of and asymmetric security threat and mo- maritime security the Thousand-Ship Navy/Global Maritime bilize sufficient resources to specifically strategy needs there- Partnership seemed to aim to the right di- deal with it, as shown by the success- rection. ful reduction of Somali piracy in the last fore to target and put years. However, the increase of other pressure on the illicit activities such as the ‘irregular arriv- organizers of maritime als’ from Somalia to Yemen and a num- crime and to build the “Global Maritime Network” (GMN) or make clear that participation would be • Nations or navies having the capacity ber of recent heroin seizures in the Indian “Partnership” (GMP), emanated from the strictly on a voluntary basis and that the would be expected to help less capable Ocean illustrate that we are dealing with viable economic increased international maritime traffic goal was simply to meet the “compelling ones increase their ability to provide a “moving target”: criminals are opportun- alternatives to due to globalization and from the concept need” that emerged “for a global maritime maritime security in their own ports, ists and move between different areas of that promoting and maintaining the secu- security network, a Navy of Navies, to pro- harbors, territorial waters, and ap- illicit business depending on enforcement coastal communities, rity of the global maritime commons is a tect the maritime domain and to ensure proaches. and profitability. For many poor people, who could help end key element, because the freedom of the that the lifeblood of globalization –trade– • Nations or navies that need assis- the outcomes from illicit activities are so maritime crime simply seas is critical to any nation’s long-term flows freely and unencumbered”. tance would have to ask for it. high, and the licit alternatives so unre- economic well-being. Indeed, policing These public writings and statements • Each geographic region would devel- warding, that interdiction and prison will by refusing to protect and protecting the maritime commons established the guiding principles for the op regional maritime networks. not deter them from trying their luck again. criminal interests. against a wide spectrum of threats is a “Navy of Navies”: • To be effective and efficient, the Glob- high priority for all nations interested in • National sovereignty would always be al Maritime Partnership would have to the economic prosperity and security that respected. share information widely; classified mar- derives from a free and safe maritime do- • Nations, navies, and maritime forces itime intelligence would be kept to a main. would participate where and when minimum. Commander Corrado Campana The U.S. Navy used a series of maga- they have common interests. • This would be a long-term effort, Commander Corrado Campana attended the Italian Naval Academy from 1987 until 1991, when zine articles and speeches by various • The focus would be solely on security aimed at the security of the maritime he was commissioned as Ensign. He has achieved the qualification in Naval Artillery and Missile senior officers, including Admiral Mullen, in the maritime domain: ports, harbors, domain. Systems and the specialization in Naval Weapons Direction. He served onboard several Italian Navy ships such as the frigates Libeccio and Maestrale and the destroyers Ardito and Luigi Durand to explain and build support for the thou- territorial waters, maritime approach- Years after the bold proposal for a mul- de la Penne, and was appointed as Commanding Officer of the auxiliary ship Ponza and of the sand-ship navy. The TSN/GMP was envi- es, the high seas, and international tinational maritime force, little progress frigate Granatiere. He served in international staffs such as the Force HQ of the Multinational sioned as an international maritime force, straits, as well as the numerous ex- seems to have been made in constituting Force and Observers (M.F.O.) in El-Gorah (Sinai, Egypt) as Naval Advisor, and the EU Naval Force an aggregation of maritime entities, not ploitable seams between them. this “navy-in-being”, mostly because of OHQ in Northwood (UK) as ACOS CJ3 Operations within the anti-piracy Operation ATALANTA. He just of the world’s navies. It would also in- • While no nation can do everything, all the reduced resources –financial, opera- served in national staffs such as the Command in Chief of the Italian Fleet as Head of the Artillery clude the world’s coast guards, seaborne nations could contribute something of va­ tional and even intellectual– invested to and Missile Systems Section, the Command of Italian Maritime Forces in Taranto as ACOS N3 shipping enterprises (shipping lines, port lue. achieve the goal and because not all na- Operations and at the Italian Joint Operations HQ in Rome, as Head of Maritime Operations Section facilities, and other maritime-related enti- • The TSN/GMP would be a network of vies appear to fully appreciate the nature (J3). He attended the Italian Joint War College and the Course in International Humanitarian Law at the Centre for Defence High Studies in ties), and various governmental agencies international navies, coast guards, and the size of the challenges they face in Rome and also served as Tutor for the attendees. Commander Campana has achieved the Degree in Maritime and Naval Science at the and nongovernmental bodies. maritime forces, port operators, com- the global maritime domain. University of Pisa, the Degree in Political Science at the University of Trieste, and the Master in International and Military-strategic Studies at the L.U.I.S.S. University “Guido Carli” in Rome. Since the 1st August 2013 he is appointed at the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational In an effort to head off concerns about mercial shippers, and local law en- The U.S. Navy itself has not made the Training Centre in Souda Bay, Crete, Greece as Director of the Training Support and Transformation Directorate. sovereignty, the U.S. Navy attempted to forcement, all working together. Thousand-Ship Navy/Global Maritime

8 9 deployment of PMSCs on board merchant vessels, given the numerous ethical, op- erational and legal concerns stemming from their applied practices. However, the MARITIME SECURITY shipping companies are treating their use as the sole security provision through high risk areas and as the main guarantee for the security of both the seafarers and their state’s defence budget entailed in employ- Private Maritime Security Companies cargo. ing VPDs compared to the deployment There is evidence to support the notion of naval assets on the other side of the that states are still reluctant to intervene Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) globe clearly provide a convincing justifi- and pose restraints on the rapidly grow- The blurred distinction between state and cation for adopting these tactics. The de- ing, already booming and highly profitable private maritime security becomes even bate that emerged regarding this practice maritime security industry. On the con- murkier as a consequence of several was that states were desperately trying trary, they are also integrating PMSCs states’ common practice of deploying the not to completely abolish and outsource in their security provision structure; they so-called Vessel Protection Detachments their monopoly in security provision, while are expanding the privatisation trend in (VPDs). Through this, what was hitherto more business oriented analysts suggest the maritime domain and also gradually perceived as the state’s obligation has be- that states are just trying to take their outsourcing monopolies to them. Even come a private endeavour as well since share from the security provision pie, with- in states such as the Netherlands, which states are privately hiring armed military in the contemporary anti-piracy business are still reserved on this issue and ban teams to shipping companies for protec- model (Chapsos2013). the use of PMSCs on board vessels fly- tion of commercial vessels. On the one Yet, the reality is slightly different and ing their flag, there are 13 Dutch PMSCs Introducing the Privatisation of hand, the private sector’s high demand for this has been demonstrated in the cru- registered in their homeland1 (as of No- armed escorts at competitive prices and, ellest way possible. That is, through the vember 2013), which offer their services on the other, the guaranteed high level incident involving the two Italian marines in vessels flying foreign flags (although Maritime Security: training of military personnel, as well as deployed on board ‘Enrica Lexie’ (Baner- they may be managed by Dutch owners). the reduction of states’ armed forces bud- ji and Jose 2013). The death of the two An indicative study was released in Febru- get, offers great potential for both parties Indian fishermen, who were shot by the ary 2013, analysing the status of VPDs in Casual Factors, Implications and Trends to do business. The service is available marines after being mistaken for pirates, Europe and addressing the critical ques- by Ioannis Chapsos* to ships registered and flying the flag of highlighted the complexity of maritime tion: should state or private protection be the respective state, or even to compa- security issues and the murky framework used against maritime piracy (Van Ginkel Research Fellow in Maritime Security, CTPSR/Coventry University nies controlled by the state’s nationals. of its provision. This can partly explain et al. 2013). The report clearly reflects Given also the flexibility and legal status states’ reluctance to keep the monopo- the EU states’ preference in contracting of military personnel in terms of carrying ly of security provision, both ashore and PMSCs for the vessels flying their flag, weapons through transit ports and their offshore, since its expeditionary forces instead of deploying VPDs. The privatisation of security model income for the companies, and also for PMCs and PSCs are mainly contracted consequent better protection in case of have to operate in complex and hostile Still, regulation issues remain unclear; the The private security model has been the state in terms of taxation. by states, the main driver for PMSCs to prosecutions, many companies are in fa- environments. On the other hand, private IMO outsourced the regulation of PMSCs broadly applied, both ashore and at sea The dividing line between state and pri- mushroom largely comes from the ship- vour of contracting them (Brown 2012:9). security providers enable governments to to the flag states (IMO 2011a). In this and a mutually beneficial relationship be- vate security is even murkier in the mar- ping and offshore energy industry. Perhaps the practice of deploying VPDs avoid supervision, external (and internal) framework, and given states’ selective en- tween the state and the private sector can itime domain than it is ashore. The Inter- The private maritime security sector takes is the strongest evidence of the contem- legislative requirements, parliamentary in- gagement with PMSCs’ regulatory issues be identified in this. Through instituting national Maritime Organisation (IMO) in advantage of the unemployed, retired porary perception of security, which com- quiries or political cost when using force in terms of hard law, one could argue that this model, the state, on the one hand, its Circular 1405 (IMO 2011b:1), defines and well-trained military (or naval) per- pletely aligns national military power and and conducting controversial operations states are in favour of the soft law ap- reduces the defence expenditure budget PMSCs as “[p]rivate contractors em- sonnel to develop the already booming force projection with private commercial abroad. Thus, especially in the maritime proach to regulate the private maritime se- for providing security in the globalised ployed to provide security personnel, both and well-established business model, in interests. Hence, it could be interpreted domain, the responsibility is transferred curity industry; yet, this approach remains environment. On the other, it simultane- armed and unarmed, on board for protec- the same way as on land. At the same as an attempt to integrate the neo-liber- to the shipping companies and vessel broadly questioned, in terms of its appli- ously minimises the political cost from tion against piracy” and their armed em- time, the state gains a dual reward for the al model of security privatisation (Avant masters, both for the choice and contract cability, efficiency and effectiveness in the potential human casualties of its armed ployees as “Privately Contracted Armed defence budget expenditures that were 2008, Ortiz 2010, Abrahamsen and Wil- of the private security provider, as well maritime domain. Thus, regulation and forces caused by their deployment in de- Security Personnel” (PCASP). The land invested in their training: The allocation liams 2011), into the state-centric tradi- as for covering the cost of their own se- certification is clearly another major issue. stabilised countries, or even engagement base practice shows that governments of funding required for the deployment tional mechanisms of security provision, curity. The state retains only the right of The principles of the free market dominate in ambiguous operations in the territories primarily choose to utilise Private Mili- of naval assets on the other side of the as interpreted through the realist ap- regulation and control of the private secu- the private security industry, where non- of foreign sovereign states. The private tary (PMCs)/Private Security Companies globe is minimised whilst income is gener- proach. rity providers; however, practice indicates state actors are responsible for undertak- sector offers jobs to former well trained (PSCs) for political ends, regardless of ated in terms of taxation from the private However, deploying a VPD on board a that even these are following free market ing the essential issues of regulation and military personnel, and the profitable con- the financial motivations of the companies sector activities. Public opinion (at a glob- merchant vessel is incomparably cheaper principles and the states’ engagement re- certification. More important, since there tracts provide an attractive generation of (Mandel 2002:23). However, although al level) may be in favour or against the than deploying a frigate to patrol the In- mains rhetoric (Chapsos 2013). are no legal binding relationships between dian Ocean; the limited demands on the * Ioannis Chapsos is a Research Fellow in Maritime Security at the Centre for Trust, Peace & Social Relations (CTPSR) – Coventry University. He is a Cap- tain (ret) of the Hellenic Navy, who introduced Maritime Security as a new thematic area to Coventry University, after lecturing for five years at the Hellenic Supreme Joint War College. His research is focused on the global trend of privatisation of maritime security and the potential implications in international 1. This is the number of Dutch PMSCs registered in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers. See ICoC, available from http://www. security with specific emphasis in modern piracy, IUU fishing, and trafficking related crimes via sea. icoc-psp.org/[accessed 15 June 2014].

10 11 stead of interrupting the business model tax revenues should be allocated to de- with a more robust intervention in the ployed assets in faraway seas rather than global market. meeting social demands at home. MARITIME SECURITY All the issues raised above, highlight ma- MARITIME SECURITY The trends jor concerns that have to be addressed The need for merchant vessels to em- at international level in order to enhance ploy PMSCs or VPDs in order to provide maritime security so as to make the vast an additional layer of ship protection is oceans safer, as well as the concomitant different flag states’ legislations which –in domain. Down at the state level, individu- internationally accepted. In respect of promise of reward. They could also trig- several cases–i complicate even more the al countries could improve their regulation this, although international organisations, ger the international community in iden- already complex maritime security envi- and supervision of PMSCs. This, in turn, such as the IMO, recognise this reality, tifying an international organisation with ronment. This entity will also have toapply may enable them to use these services in they still need to provide a firm lead on the global jurisdiction to regulate, vet and different requirements and standards be- enhancing homeland maritime security in related issues such as regulation, training, certify private security providers. This tween land based and maritime operators, the near future and also address maritime and rules for the use of force. The regu- will perhaps overcome the plethora of due to the distinctiveness of the maritime threats other than piracy accordingly. lations of armed security providers do not include elements that provide minimum standards with respect to these services (regardless of their status as militaryor pri- vate). Moreover, there are no supporting globally recognised regulations in place to List of References ensure that all providers of these services ♦ Abrahamsen, R. and Williams, M. C. (2011), Security beyond the state: private security in international politics, Cambridge, UK; New York:Cambridge University are subject to comparable controls at in- Press. ternational level. Without such regulation, ♦ Avant, D. (2008), Private Security in Williams, P., ed. Security Studies: an introduction, New York: Routledge 438-452 and the concomitant checks and controls, ♦ Banerji, A. and Jose, D. (2013), Murder trial of Italian marines in India navigates murky waters, Reuters, [online] available from: http://in.reuters.com/arti- cle/2013/06/10/india-italy-marines-idINDEE95900B20130610 [accessed 10 June 2013]. the risk of sub-standard service raises ♦ Brown, J. (2012), Pirates and Privateers: Managing the Indian Ocean's Private Security Boom, September 2012, Sydney: LOWY Institute for International debates and breeds mistrust, as well as Policy. the likelihood of the inappropriate use of ♦ Chapsos, I. (2013), VPDs: States' Maritime Security Failures, Maritime Executive, 11(71) the regulating/certifying bodies and the many reasons. This provides the oppor- force, including lethal force. ♦ IMO (2011a), Revised Interim recommendations for Flag States Regarding the Use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel in the High Risk Area, MSC1/ companies, the whole process is based tunity to manage its own security, provide Whilst PMSCs already provide security Circ.1406, London: IMO. ♦ IMO (2011b), Revised Interim guidance to Ship owners, ship operators, and Ship masters on the use of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on board ships in on two factors. the required short term solutions and services to the offshore oil industry, con- the High Risk Area, MSC.1/Circ.1405, London: IMO. First, the prestige of a company is in- identify new business opportunities with sultancies to governmental bodies and ♦ Mandel, R. (2002), Armies Without States: the Privatisation of Security, Colorado; London: Lynne Rienner Publishers creased when it is certified from as many the states’ tolerance and encouragement. commercial companies, what we can ex- ♦ McMahon, L. (2013), UK gives go ahead for floating armouries, Lloyd's List, [online] available from: http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/sector/regulation/article427433. bodies as possible. This offers to the po- It can help to reduce unemployment rates pect to see is a rapid increase in the ex- ece#! [accessed 20 Sep. 2013]. ♦ Ortiz, C. (2010), Private armed forces and global security: a guide to the issues,Contemporary military, strategic, and security issues, Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger. tential clients the sense that its reputation with the creation of new security provision tent of their engagement in maritime secu- ♦ Van Ginkel, B., Van der Putten, F.-P. and Molenaar, W. (2013), State or Private Protection against Maritime Piracy? A Dutch Perspective, Hague: Netherlands Insti- is genuine, since it is certified by diverse companies (training, vetting, logistics, rity challenges other than modern piracy, tute of International Relations - Clingendael institutions, associations, standards or etc.) which support the main core of secu- such as IUU fishing and trafficking related even other private companies. rity operations, following the paradigm of crimes at sea. And given the current in- Second, as long as the relationship with equivalent companies ashore. What re- ternational economic restraints, it will be the regulators cannot possibly have le- mains to be realised is the extent to which perceived as more cost effective for states gal implications, being based solely on a the state will achieve the goal of managing and regional organisations (such as e.g. membership or paid assessment/vetting, and regulating this network, and whether the UN,NATO, EU) to contribute and should any wrong-doings become publicly it will retain the jurisdiction and control share the financial burden of contracting known this will only impact on the compa- over security and force projection. PMSCs to do the job, with a local or re- ny’s reputation in the market. Definitely, in So far, states have demonstrated a se- gional mandate/contract. This practice this competitive environment this is quite lective approach towards regulating the will alleviate the demand to allocate funds important, since it is the primary criteri- private maritime security industry. An from the already tight defence budget to on by which a client chooses among the indicative example is the stance of the deploy naval assets on the other side of hundreds of available companies offering UK government towards the controver- the globe in order to enhance maritime Ioannis Chapsos the same services. However, they are not sial issue of floating armouries; although security on behalf of fragile states. Even Retired Captain of the Hellenic Navy, researches the global trend of privatisation of international se- sufficient for regulating the companies in there is a major issue and debate around further, this rapidly increasing strategy will curity in general and maritime security in particular; he investigates the extent of the states’ actual terms analogous to those that used to be their deployment, acceptable/legitimate also provide the internal and external le- regulation and control over the maritime security industry -given the flag states’ responsibility and ju- imposed by states. A simple change in standards and use, the UK Department of gitimisation to fragile states to outsource risdiction- using the case study of PMSCs in anti-piracy operations off Somalia since 2005. Due to the the company’s name for example, could Business Innovation and Skills has issued sovereign rights to private security provid- globalised nature of the maritime domain, his research identifies the gaps and the risks stemming from the industry’s self-regulation and posed in international security in governance, strategy, policy, social overcome the effects of any potential re- 50 licences for such vessels, operating in ers to perform the tasks that they are in- and commercial terms. corded trespasses. the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden (Mc- capable of executing. Consequently, de- Ioannis Chapsos introduced Maritime Security to Coventry University, and subsequently, the online MA The private sector has established a pe- Mahon 2013). Hence, the state prefers a veloped states will not have to go through in Maritime Security course was launched by the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies (CPRS) ripheral commercial network around the tolerant approach, choosing to legitimise the internal struggle of persuading public research unit in January 2013. node of the state, which is booming for issues which are still under research in- opinion in this present financial crisis that

12 13 pertise in maritime affairs, strategic and defence studies as well as profes- sional military education. • Third, through teaching, research and ACADEMIC ISSUES dialogue activities the DCSS will pro- vide ‘through life learning’ to develop thought leadership abilities of profes- sional staff officers and practitioners and success at delivering educational op- There will also be strong linkages with the to enable them more efficiently and portunities to naval officer and NCO pro- School of Marine Science & Engineering effectively navigate an increasingly fessional training at the BRNC Dartmouth. (MSE) through CENORE, the Centre of complex and ambiguous strategic This development offered a number of Excellence in Naval Oceanographic Re- context. DCSS educational opportu- synergies for both institutions of which the search and Education, and its links to nities will be of high quality, accessible Department is one. The SSMW is capa- degree programmes in Oceanography and represent value for money. ble of offering tailored packages of educa- and Hydrography as well as its £3.9M tion to both students at Plymouth Univer- UAE Ocean project (which is for the De- Defense and Strategic Studies at Dart- sity and members of the UK armed forces. velopment of the Naval Ocean Monitor- mouth and Plymouth Today, the Department (Mark Grove, Phil ing and Forecasting Centre in the United The ten staff of the Dartmouth Centre for Grove, Dr Fotios Moustakis, Dr Simon Arab Emirates), in partnership with the Seapower and Strategy (DCSS) are facul- Murden, Dr Jane Harrold) in Dartmouth UAE Naval Advanced Solutions (NAS), ty members at the University of Plymouth under the leadership of Professor Alan CENORE, UoPEL, and Met Office. and are located either on the Plymouth Myers (Director of Military Education) pro- Alongside this the Hydrographic Academy Dartmouth Centre campus or at the Britannia Royal Na- vides initial officer education for all Royal is developing structured on-line learning val College (BRNC), Dartmouth. These Navy and Royal Marines officers as well to degree level in hydrography, in collab- members help deliver our teaching, dia- as courses for more experienced officers oration with FUGRO World Wide and in for logue, and research activities. in the Royal Marines. The courses en- partnership with IMarEst, the international The study of strategy and international af- compass the study of international history, professional body and learned society for fairs at the BRNC, can trace its roots back maritime and land warfare, command and all marine professionals. The full mission to the vision of the early twentieth century leadership, and contemporary strategic ship bridge simulator operated through the Seapower & Strategy (DCSS) naval reformer, Admiral Sir Jacky Fisher. issues. The Department also represents Navigation and Maritime Science subject As a part of Fisher's design for a modern a Ministry of Defence-wide academic area in MSE also offers very significant officer education –the so-called Selborne resource. Members of the Department training and joint exercise synergies with University of Plymouth Scheme– the Department of History and undertake policy-related and personal re- BRNC and their upgraded simulator. This English was established at the new naval search projects, and disseminate findings Academy is in the running to be named college in Dartmouth in 1905 to inculcate at various levels across UK armed ser- most Outstanding Employer Engagement by Prof Graeme Herd cadets with a deeper knowledge of their vices, as well as to foreign military orga- Initiative at the 2014 Times Higher Educa- service as well as of those broader quali- nizations and universities. tion Awards. Dartmouth Center ties which had produced the inspired lead- This experience is now complimented The ability to identify and understand link- & Dr Fotios Moustakis ership of Nelson. by Plymouth University’s newly created ages between science and technology, A long line of prominent naval historians School of Government (August 1st, 2013). business and trade, defence and strategic Associate Professor & Head of External Affairs of Darmouth Centre and other academics taught at Dartmouth, Staff in the Politics and International Rela- studies, societal values and norms and including Michael Lewis, Geoffrey Callen- tions Programmes at Plymouth include ar- environmental and maritime law, for ex- der, Christopher Lloyd, Edward Hughes, eas specialists that cover the Middle East ample, is entirely relevant in the education Mandate and Vision 2014 the UK Chief of General Staff not- and so economic prosperity and political Northcote Parkinson, Ruddick Mackay, and North Africa (Dr. Shabnam Holliday of naval officers today. The launch of the Dartmouth Centre for ed tensions in Ukraine were unforeseen stability. Philip Towle, Geoffrey Till, Eric Grove, and Dr. Chris Emery), Sub-Saharan Africa Seapower and Strategy (DCSS) is timely. and ‘confound our previous assumptions The Centre has three unique selling and Evan Davies. Many not only distin- (Dr. Karen Treasure and Dr. Rebecca Da- Activities of the Centre This independent, influential and inclusive about stability across Europe.’ Contem- points. guished themselves as academics, but vies), Europe (Professor Mary Farrell and The DCSS will undertake valuable teach- Centre meets a clear and growing need to porary strategic challenges –including the • First, Plymouth is Britain’s ‘Ocean also as practitioners, notably in the fields Dr. Patrick Holden) and Russia and Eur- ing and research. It will also help inform raise knowledge, awareness and under- resilience of global networks enabling en- City’ with a proud maritime and mili- of policy-advice, intelligence, and wartime asia (Professor Graeme Herd), as well as and shape security policy decision-mak- standing of strategic and defence issues ergy, food and water security, normative tary history and heritage and Dart- operational analysis. In 1982, under the UK foreign and security policy (Dr. Jamie ing by generating education and training as they relate to maritime affairs and the battles over regulating the use of the glob- mouth hosts the BRNC, the world’s then Head of Department, Louis Wre- Gaskarth). These two groups combined, opportunities, research, dialogue and de- utility of seapower in the 21st century. al commons, the rise in global maritime most prestigious naval college. ford-Brown, History and English evolved alongside Commodore (Ret) and Hon bate across the maritime domain. In late 2013 the UK Chief of Defence Staff trade, a shifting military and economic • Second, Centre’s staff consists of BR- into the Department of Strategic Studies Prof Jake Moores of the School of Gov- argued that the United Kingdom (UK) mil- strategic balance in the High North, and NC’s Dartmouth Strategic and Securi- and Maritime Warfare (SSMW), with its ernment and Dr. Harry Bennett and his Teaching itary risks having “exquisite weapons sys- the mobilization of Russia’s Black Sea ty Group with an established history of curriculum expanded to take-in contem- maritime-focused colleagues in History, The University of Plymouth has introduced tems” but a “hollowed out force” not fit for Fleet in Sevastopol in support of territorial excellence and success at delivering porary strategic thought, international bring together expertise in strategic and successfully in the last five years an in- purpose. In January 2014 a former US annexation of Crimea - highlight the de- educational opportunities to naval of- relations, maritime warfare and regional defence studies as well as experience in novative Masters in Applied Strategy and Secretary of Defence suggested that the pendence of island nations, such as the ficer and NCO professional training, studies. professional military education in contem- International Security. The programme, UK was in danger of losing full spectrum UK and Ireland, on seapower to maintain and Plymouth University’s staff in the Since July 1st, 2008, Plymouth Universi- porary and historical, national and interna- which is currently delivered in collabora- interoperability with the US. By March open lines of communication, connectivity, School of Government who have ex- ty has established a history of excellence tional contexts. tion with the Hellenic National Defence

14 15 an effective way to engage with the pub- lic. Staff at BRNC (particularly Dr. Jane LEGAL ISSUES Harrold and Richard Porter) already do ACADEMIC ISSUES excellent work in this respect. This is a means to inform the wider public on mar- itime issues. The first dialogue event consisted of a College in Athens to senior military officers international security, regional studies, panel entitled ‘Seapower in the Age of and officials in Greece, encompasses the and contemporary experiences of military Uncertainty’ which opened the ‘Britain The Military-Law study of strategy and contemporary secu- intervention. It offers students –especially and the Sea 3 Conference: Enriching rity issues, offering policy-focused cours- those working in the armed services, gov- Britain's Maritime Capabilities’, held at es and approach which gives students ernment service, aid, community, or me- Mast House 11-12 September 2014. We Enforcement an insight into the kinds of issues which dia - the kind of knowledge that may be of were privileged to have as panellists Pro- challenge Governments, armed services, direct professional use as well as the kind fessor Steve Haines, Professor of Public and international organizations. of personal and intellectual skills that are and International Law, School of Law, Alliance to Combat The programme utilises the expertise valuable to all. Greenwich University, Professor Gwy­ available at Dartmouth and Plymouth Uni- thian Prins, Emeritus Research Professor, versity, to give students an insight into the Dialogue and Research London School of Economics and Mem- study of strategy, contemporary security In terms of dialogue and public outreach, ber of the Strategy Advisory Panel, Chief Transnational problems, regional issues, and the pro- the Centre will create an “Admirals Fo- of the Defence Staff and of the Royal cess of policy-making. The programme rum”, with the view to utilising the exper- Marines Advisory Group, and Mr. Mark provides the knowledge and intellectual tise, skills and competencies, networks Grove, a Lecturer in Maritime Warfare, skills for employment in any profession, and social capital of retired senior officers Department of Strategic Studies and Mar- Organized Crime at Sea but especially in such fields as military, di- in the region to give guidance, mentoring itime Warfare, University of Plymouth at plomacy, journalism, public relations, risk course participants, aid capacity devel- BRNC. A second dialogue event will be analysis, security, and lobbying for either opment and act as DCSS Ambassadors. held at BRNC to celebrate the launch of by Pierre St. Hilaire* the commercial or NGO sector. “If only Plymouth knew what Plymouth the DCSS in Dartmouth. Director, Counter-Terrorism, Public Safety & The DCSS has a policy-focused ethos: knows” –we are in the process of auditing In research terms we aim to publish pol- Maritime Security, ICPO-INTERPOL emphasising contemporary foreign pol- the intellectual and experiential resources icy-relevant opinion pieces (School of icy and security problems, learning from and willingness of our retired or semi-re- Government Blog) and policy-briefs, as past experiences, and outlining possible tired population ready and willing to make well as more academic outputs informing policy solutions and strategies to man- their talent available for DCSS projects. our understanding of our dynamic global “The biggest impediment to all-source analysis –to a greater likelihood of connecting the age security problems. It encompasses Public lectures on contemporary maritime strategic context. dots– is the human or systemic resistance to sharing information”. the study of strategy, maritime warfare, affairs as well as history and heritage are The 9/11 Commission Report, at 416.

Professor Graeme P. Herd Introduction ings, firearms, migrant smuggling, illegal the military. In this, it is critical for naval He is founding Director of the School of Government and Associate Dean in the Faculty of Business, Plymouth The critical role played by international fishing and dumping, smuggling of illicit assets, as well as private actors travel- University, which he joined in September 2013. The School of Government has four degree programmes –Poli- tics, International Relations, Public Services and Sociology– with 443 undergraduate and postgraduate students naval forces in mitigating the threat of goods such as charcoal and ivory, and ing on the high seas, to report criminal and approximately 32 Faculty. From 2005-2013 Professor Herd was an international faculty member at the maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia other maritime crimes. Accordingly, law activity to the law enforcement communi- Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), where he served as Co-Director of its International Training Course cannot be overstated. The absence of enforcement agencies, by necessity, rely tyvia INTERPOL channels.As this article in Security Policy and Master of Advanced Studies, accredited by the University of Geneva. Before moving to any regional or international law enforce- on naval forces or other actors operating demonstrates, the experience gained by the GCSP in 2005, he was appointed Professor of Civil-Military Relations at the George C. Marshall Europe- ment agency on the high seas limits the in that environment to report such criminal naval forces during counterpiracy opera- an Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany (2002-2005) and a non-resident Associate ability of the law enforcement commu- activities. tions will prove invaluable in countering Fellow of the International Security Programme, Chatham House (2004-2007). Prior to this he was Lecturer in International Relations at both the University of Aberdeen (1997-2002), where he was Deputy Director of the nity on land to combat piracy and other To combat transnational organized crime or mitigating other threats in the maritime Scottish Centre for International Security (formerly Centre for Defence Studies) and Staffordshire University (1994-97) and a Projects Officer, forms of transnational organized crime, at sea will require more robust information domain. Department of War Studies, King's College London (1993-94). During his doctoral studies on 17th century Russian military and diplomatic including the illicit trafficking in human be- sharing between law enforcement and history he studied at the Institute of Russian History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (1991-1992) as a British Council Scholar. His own teaching and research interests have focused on diverse aspects of Russian foreign and security policy and Great Power relations. During his 21-year academic career he has written or edited nine books, written over 70 academic papers and has given over 100 academic I. Military-Law Enforcement Partnership to Combat Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia and policy-related presentations in 46 countries. In the course of combating piracy off the forces operation in the Western Indian NATO2, and CMF3 have forged a strong Dr Fotios Moustakis coast of Somalia, the three major naval Ocean and Gulf of Aden, EUNAVFOR1, working relationship with INTERPOL and He was awarded a MA Honours Degree in History and Politics from the University of Aberdeen and a MSc in European Policy, Law and Management from the Robert Gordon University. In 2000, he received my Doctorate in International Relations from the University of Aberdeen. He have worked as Research Fellow at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aberdeen and as Projects Officer at the Scottish Centre for International Security. He was also Module Convenor/Teaching Fellow at the University of Exeter where he taught * I would like to thank INTERPOL Criminal Intelligence Analyst Anita Gossmann for her valuable edits and comments. courses on Balkan Security, International Terrorism and International Security. In 2006 he was appointed Senior Associate Member at the 1. The first European Union Naval Force operation, Atalantacomprises up to five vessels and four aircraft and more than 900 personnel. See S.G. Report 623, Centre for South Eastern European Studies, St Antony’s College, Oxford University. He is also a visiting Professor at the Hellenic National p. 38, U.N. Doc. S/2013/623 (Oct. 21, 2013). Defence College. He currently work as a Senior Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, which is part 2. Operation Ocean Shield is NATO’s counter piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. NATO has been helping to deter and disrupt pirate of University of Plymouth attacks, while protecting vessels and helping to increase the general level of security in the region since 2008. The NATO operation Ocean Shield comprises

16 17 formation in connection with Operation Ocean Shield and thus entered into a Pilot Project on Information Sharing that has LEGAL ISSUES proven highly successful and beneficial LEGAL ISSUES for both organizations8. With a clear mandate and desire to have their actions result in a “legal finish,” these the law enforcement community at large4. not only the pirates captured at sea but naval forces have thus effectively func- and others navigating through the Gulf of law enforcement processes that will prove The law enforcement nature of the count- the leaders of the networks operating on tioned as law enforcement agencies on Aden and Western Indian Ocean. How- beneficial for the prosecution of other er piracy mandate was recognized early land, as urged by UN Security Council the high seas, including performing tra- forcement role effectively and contributed ever, in addition, these forces have simul- forms of crime at sea by regional or other by the European Union. On 7 Decem- Resolution 2020, p. 14, S.C. Res. 2020 ditional law enforcement functions such to the successful prosecution of hundreds taneously gained significant experience in states with jurisdiction to prosecute these ber 2010 the European Union issued an (21 Nov. 2011) (calling upon “all States, as the collection of physical evidence, of pirates who had terrorized seafarers civilian criminal judicial proceedings and offenses. Amended Council Decision that autho- and in particular flag, port, and coastal biometrics from suspected pirates, digital rized EUNAVFOR to share information States, States of the nationality of victim, exploitation, obtaining statements from collected during Operation Atalanta with and perpetrators of piracy and armed suspects and victims of piracy, and testi- II. Information Sharing to Counter Other Crimes at Sea INTERPOL5. That information includ- robbery, and other States with relevant fying in civilian criminal judicial proceed- ed personal data such as fingerprints of jurisdiction under international law and ings. However, this assumption of a law As mentioned above, there are numerous force to the likes of narco-traffickers cap- jurisdiction of regional or other states to suspected piratesas well as “data relat- national legislation, to cooperate in de- enforcement role by these naval forces types of crimes that occur on the high seas, tured on the high seas with a shipment of prosecutes smugglers and narcotics traf- ed to the equipment used by such per- termining jurisdiction, and in the inves- should not be understated, indeed, it is far from shore and out of the reach, sight heroin.Even in the absence of an arrest, fickers.Because the “legal finish” is not sons”6. [Decision 2009/907/CFSP, Decision tigation and prosecution of all persons nothing short of phenomenal. After all, ar- and territorial jurisdiction of law enforce- the information captured and exploited always self-evident to the naval vessels 2010/766/CFSP, Decision 2010/766/CFSP, responsible for acts of piracy and armed resting or “catching bad guys” for criminal ment and prosecution services. However, from those individuals are not shared with that encounter such criminal activity at Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP]. INTERPOL robbery off the coast of Somalia, including prosecution is not the traditional role of a although most of these international na- INTERPOL or law enforcement with the sea, either by virtue of the limited scope and EUNAVFOR have continued to ex- anyone who incites or facilitates an act of military force. Nevertheless, these naval vies have a mandate to collect and share regularity and frequency as it is with mari- of their mandate or other priorities, the change information on interdictions and piracy”)7. Similarly, INTERPOL and NATO forces, as well as those operating under information with the law enforcement com- time piracy interdiction. Information or ev- data is retained by the military and re- disruptions with a view toward identifying recognized that same need to share in- their national flag, performed this law en- munity on maritime piracy, that mandate idence of trafficking in narcotics and other ceives a heightened classification.In turn, has not been extended to include other illicit goods captured or detected during this classification prevents the sharing of forms of crime that occur in the maritime occasional VBSS (Visit, Board, Search that information with law enforcement and environment. Criminals thus captured on and Seize) by naval forces should rou- that information from entering the judicial up to five vessels that patrol the waters off the coast of the Horn of Africa and along the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor in the Gulf of Aden. the high seas enjoy a tremendous level of tinely be shared with the law enforcement process9. Criminal organizations are thus Operation Ocean Shield seeks to transfer any individual detained for acts of piracy to designated national law enforcement agencies. NATO’s role is to pro- impunity, similar to that enjoyed by Somali community for potential law enforcement able to exploit this judicial vacuum, and vide naval escorts and deterrencewhile increasing cooperation with other counter-piracy operations in the area so as to optimise efforts and tackle evolving pirates before navies started to arrest and action. floodour capitals with drugs and other illic- pirate trends and tactics. In June 2014, the North Atlantic Council extended this operation until the end of 2016. NATO is conducting counter-piracy activities in full complementarity with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. [See S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008),S.C. Res. 1838, U.N transfer them for prosecution. The term There are a number of reasons that such it products with little to no fear of effective Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct.7, 2008), S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008), See S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec.16, 2008), S.C. “catch and release”, which was often used information is not readily shared with law law enforcement interdiction or judicial Res. 1897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009), S.C. Res. 2020, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011)]. to describe the disruption and detention of enforcement, chief among these is the penalty. 3. Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) is one of three task forces operated by Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). In accordance with United Nations Se- Somali pirates at sea, applies with equal lack of a legal finish and questionable curity Council Resolutions, and in cooperation with non-member forces, CTF-151’s mission is to disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea, and to engage with regional and other partners to build capacity and improve relevant capabilities in order to protect global maritime commerce and secure freedom of navigation. [See S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008), S.C. Res. 1838, U.N Doc. S/RES/1838 (Oct.7, 2008),S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/ RES/1846Dec.2,2008), S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec.16, 2008),S.C. Res. 1897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov.30, 2009)]. 4. The European Union and other states have entered into formal transfer agreements with select regional and coastal states, notably Kenya, Seychelles, Tan- III. The Duty to Cooperate and Share Information zania and Mauritius, in order to facilitate the prosecution of pirates captured by navies in national courts. [See respectively Council Decision 2009/293/CFSP on criminal activities at sea of 26 February 2009, Council Decision 2009/877/CFSP of 23 October 2009, Council Decision 2014/198/CFSP of 10 March 2014, Council Decision 2011/640/ CFSP of 12 July 2011]. Some commentators have argued that, clear basis and framework for cooperation in conformity with the international law 5. INTERPOL is an international police organization linked to 190 countries via a secure communications network. As a result, information provided to INTER- under both UNCLOS (UN Convention on between law enforcement and the military. of the sea”. The Convention also estab- POL can be shared rapidly with law enforcement actors globally. The role of the organization and its value to victims of crime was described cogently in the the Law of the Sea) and the SUA Con- For example, the Convention against Illicit lishes jurisdiction over a drugs offence at Best Management Practices in respect of the investigation and prosecution of Somali piracy cases. BMP4 (Best Management Practices for Protection Against Somali Based Piracy, § 12 (2011)) included a new chapter on Post Incident Reporting and stressed the need to cooperate with and support law enforcement vention (Suppression of Unlawful Acts Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotro- sea even when that offence “is committed authorities in the investigation and prosecution of pirates captured at sea. As the BMP4 advised, “a thorough investigation is critical to ensure that potential Against the Safety of Maritime Naviga- pic Substances of 1988 (hereinafter the outside [the] territory [of a state] with a physical evidence, including electronic evidence, is not tainted or destroyed or potential witnesses overlooked.INTERPOL may be consulted to discuss the tion), there is a general duty to cooper- “Drugs Convention”) states that “the Par- view to the commission, within its territo- recommended best practices and protocols for the preservation of evidence or other physical clues that could be useful to law enforcement agents pursuing ate and share information10. There are ties shall co-operate to the fullest extent ry”. Art. 4, p.1. Thus, a State “Party which an investigation of the incident”. BMP4 § 12. 6. The data shared with INTERPOL has been entered in the INTEPOL Global Database on Maritime Piracy and analyzed. The finished analytical products have several other conventions that provide a possible to suppress illicit traffic by sea, has reasonable grounds to suspect that a been shared with EUNAVFOR and other naval forces as well as the law enforcement agencies in INTERPOL’s 190 member states. See S.C. Res. 2020, p. 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011) (commending “INTERPOL for the creation of a global piracy database designed to consolidate information about piracy off the coast of Somalia and facilitate the development of actionable analysis for law enforcement” and urging “all States to share such information with INTERPOL for use in the database, through appropriate channels”). In addition to the global piracy database, INTERPOL has 14 other databases, ranging 9. The challenges in information sharing between military and law enforcement is something that needs to be overcome if military and law enforcement are to from fingerprints, DNA, stolen vessels, to firearms. All of those databases are available to the naval forces via their national law enforcement authorities. form the formidable team required to defeat these sophisticated organized crime networks that exploit the ungovernable space in the maritime domain. As 7. To further strengthen the relationship between military and law enforcement, EUNAVFOR has made an important decision to second a Liaison Officer to cautioned by the 9/11 Commission “current security requirements nurture overclassification and excessive compartmentation of information among agencies,” INTERPOL. Such relationships naturally lead to increased information sharing and understanding of one another’s equities. and urged a transformation from a “need to know” culture of information protection to a “need to share” culture of integration. The process of declassification 8. SeeYaron Gottlieb, Combatting Maritime Piracy: Inter-Disciplinary Cooperation and Information Sharing, Case Western Reserve Journal of Int’l Law, 326 can prove difficult, hence every effort should be made to prevent over classification of information. The current relationship between EUNAVFOR and INTER- (2013) (“while the implementation of classified information rules is justified in the operations of navies during war time or in preparation for military activities, POL has worked effectively largely because each agency has a better understanding of each other’s equities. a different approach should govern the operations of naval forces when carrying out missions of a law enforcement nature such as counter-piracy activities.... 10. See Gottlieb, supra, at 323 (“Since piracy takes place on the high seas, and often very far from the shore, combatting piratical acts requires more than the withholding from law-enforcement agencies important information such as fingerprints of suspected pirates, can hardly serve the original purpose of classified typical police-prosecution cooperation, which is predominant in land-based ordinary law crimes such as theft or robbery. Notably, it calls for the involvement information”). of navies as the front-line entities that both prevent attacks and gather information to facilitate prosecution”). 18 19 and exploited so as to better tackle and counter organized criminal networks mak- ing use of sea routes to transport contra- LEGAL ISSUES band. Of course, whether it be drugs, ivory or other organized criminal activity, if evidence of that criminal activity is found by naval forces, those forces will always vessel exercising freedom of navigation Transnational crimi- have a willing and trusted partner in IN- in accordance with international law, and TERPOL to assist in the investigation and flying the flag or displaying marks of reg- nal enterprises exploit prosecution of criminal suspects detained istry of another Party is engaged in illicit the absence of law or arrested at sea. traffic may so notify the flag State, request confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, enforcement on the Conclusion request authorization from the flag State high seas to ship these The sharp decline of maritime piracy in to take appropriate measures in regard to the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian that vessel”. Art. 17, p. 3. That State Par- dangerous goods to Ocean, due in large part to the success of ty may also “seek authorization to: our capitals and this the naval forces operating in that theater, a) Board the vessel; represents a national assuming a law enforcement role, and b) Search the vessel; the regional states shouldering a large c) If evidence of involvement in illicit security threat to the responsibility to prosecute hundreds of traffic is found, take appropriate ac- international com- Somali pirates in their domestic courts, tion with respect to the vessel, per- presents an opportunity for law enforce- sons and cargo on board. Art. 17, p. munity. An effective ment and military to further build on this 4. alliance between law success to counter other threats in the The Drugs Convention is even more ex- enforcement and the region, including the continuing rise of plicit on the role envisioned for the naval heroin trafficking and the smuggling of il- forces: “the actions referred to above shall military forces that licit goods in the Indian Ocean to the local Building a be carried out only by warships or military patrol the oceans, states. Transnational criminal enterprises aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly exploit the absence of law enforcement marked and identifiable as being on gov- through robust infor- on the high seas to ship these dangerous Law Enforcement Culture at Sea ernment service and authorized to that mation sharing and goods to our capitals and this represents a effect”, (emphasis added)11. Thus greater national security threat to the international by José Nieves law enforcement and military cooperation joint training, is re- community. An effective alliance between Captain, USCG and information sharing in terms of crimes law enforcement and the military forces quired to defeat these that patrol the oceans, through robust in- at sea is not wholly new. Instead, this I. Maritime Law Enforcement space exists and needs to be expanded criminal networks. formation sharing and joint training, is re- quired to defeat these criminal networks. oday’s United States authority and capability to enforce national embarked on U.S. Navy ships and Allied Coast Guard is a direct and international law on the high seas, Nation vessels. descendant of the outer continental shelf, and shoreward The Coast Guard continues to pursue Revenue Cutter Service, from the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone testing and future acquisition of small created by the Secretary (EEZ) to our inland waters. unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) to of the Treasury (Alexander At the forefront of detection, monitoring, enhance its future interdiction capability. Hamilton) in 1790, to stem the flow of interdiction, and apprehension operations, During a recent patrol aboard one of our Tmaritime contraband into the newly- the US Coast Guard deploys a variety of formed Republic. While our missions and new National Security Cutters, the Coast offshore assets against drug traffickers Guard tested the ScanEagle Unmanned responsibilities have grown exponentially, in the transit zone, including major our anti-smuggling roots continue to be an Aircraft System (UAS), which proved to be cutters, long and medium range fixed- essential part of our service to the Nation. a superb force multiplier in two separate The US Coast Guard is the lead federal wing aircraft, Airborne Use of Force law enforcement cases, resulting in the maritime law enforcement agency, and the (AUF) capable helicopters, and Law removal of 570 kilograms of cocaine and only United States agency with both the Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) the detention of six suspected smugglers.

I. Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) and Inter-Service Cooperation­ 11. The information collected during such an operation can be communicated to law enforcement entities world-wide using INTERPOL channels. In Resolution 1 on Exchange of Information at the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Established in 1982 to serve as law duty USCG personnel to carry out drug enforcement activities in the US, LEDETs Substances, the drafters considered “the machinery developed by the International Criminal Police Organization forthe timely and efficient exchange of crime investigation information between police authoritieson a world-wide basis”, and thus recommended the “widest possible use should be made by police enforcement specialists, conducting interdiction operations from naval surface were tasked with operating aboard USN authorities of the records and communications system of the International Criminal Police Organization in achieving the goals of the United Nations Conven- training and local operations. In 1986, vessels provided by the Department of ships to investigate contacts and conduct tion against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. [See Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Conference for the Adoption of a US Public Law specifically authorized Defense (DoD). Since DoD personnel are boarding’s. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Resolution 1]. the establishment of positions for active prohibited from directly engaging in law In 1988, a new Public Law made it a

20 21 foreign nations’ territorial seas when law enforcement is in Pursuit. To take away this advantage from the LEGAL ISSUES smugglers, the Coast Guard developed LEGAL ISSUES and implemented via the US Department of State over 30 Bilateral counter-illicit trafficking Agreements with neighboring requirement that USCG law enforcement drugs entering the United States via the nations and with Cabo Verde off the coast Mediterranean may have to use more a rotating Armed Forces 1-star vice- personnel be assigned to each appropriate sea and did not have an adequate ability of Africa. These agreements cover a assets and other resources to protect director and a senior interagency civilian US Navy surface vessel that transits a to stop the go-fast threat (open hulled variety of subjects of which I will discuss their shore, but it behooves the nations deputy (currently filled by DEA). Its role drug interdiction area. While there were vessels with up to 5 250HP Engines). just the shiprider portion. to the North to contribute assets and is to conduct counter illicit trafficking some challenges initially as we became Spurred by these estimates, Admiral Shiprider agreements, by which U.S. other resources to help stop the flow operations, intelligence fusion and multi- accustomed to working together, over the James Loy, then-Commandant, directed Coast Guard personnel and foreign of people, drugs, weapons, etc. from sensor correlation to detect, monitor years the Navy and Coast Guard have the Coast Guard to develop a plan to maritime law enforcement officers ride on the south as these things only serve to and sometimes hand-off illicit trafficking worked together very well and now our counter the go-fast threat. each other’s ships, are at the core of our strengthen TOC organizations, increase targets. This is an excellent example of mixture of defense and law enforcement The Coast Guard developed the Helicopter­ global maritime law enforcement strategy. national corruption, impose social and Interagency and international cooperation. personnel on board the same ship works Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON). Through shiprider agreements, the U.S. medical costs as well as stressing law Another such example with a lesser seamlessly and our presence is often During this early proof of concept phase, Coast Guard and its partners extend their enforcement and other organization and tactical/intelligence role, but with a broad requested by Navy ships. HITRON intercepted and stopped all five legal authority and capability, and can of course stressing national budgets. Maritime Domain Awareness focus, is the The 1989 National Defense Authorization go-fasts they encountered, stopping 2,640 more effectively combat illegal activity at One way that nations can work together CHANGI Fusion Center in Singapore. Act designated the DoD as the lead pounds of cocaine, and 7,000 pounds of sea worldwide. aside from creating bilateral agreements It has law enforcement and military agency of the Federal Government for marijuana with a street value of over $100 While extensive, the Coast Guard’s II. Joint Intelligence and Operations (or through some form of EU process) representatives from numerous nations the detection and monitoring of aerial and million, with all 17 suspects arrested. This authority to enforce U.S. laws on the high Center is to create a regional Combined/Joint as well as international law enforcement maritime trafficking of illegal drugs into the 100% success rate represented a dramatic seas is not unlimited. In accordance with Finally, transnational organized crime Maritime Operations Center in order to personnel attached. It maintains the United States. increase in go-fast seizures, and resulted international law, the U.S. Coast Guard to include drug and human smuggling provide a coordinated response. The suspect vessel lists of some Asian Nations In turn, the Coast Guard was designated in a cultural change for Coast Guard avia­ typically takes law enforcement action is as the name implies transnational in United States has several of these, but and monitors traffic from great distances the lead agency for the interdiction and tion and set the stage for enhanced future against foreign-flagged vessels with the nature requiring a regional solution and a focus will be given on JIATF-South (Joint for anomalous behavior. It has the ability apprehension of illegal drug traffickers maritime drug interdiction efforts. consent of the flag state. Likewise, the coordinated regional response. Interagency Task Force-South) which to quickly respond through a network of on the high seas. In order to meet these While HITRON has been very successful Coast Guard engages in law enforcement Moreover one critical question is located in Key West, Florida. This center operations centers to maritime events. statutory responsibilities, the DoD deploys and today deploys on board Coast Guard, activities in the territorial sea of another emerging: How do we justify not using consists of representatives from all the surface assets to drug interdiction areas, Navy and foreign partner naval vessels, state only when that coastal state Defense assets to defend our nation U.S. Armed Forces, dozens of intelligence III. Conclusion making ships available for direct support its effectiveness is limited by the number authorizes the action. against Transnational Threats? Is the and law enforcement agencies, and about • The importance of effective policing of USCG law enforcement operations. of ships that can be deployed. To help Shiprider operations are particularly expectation that the nations buy more 15 international liaisons including the of international waters is critical to our Now the integration of Coast Guard in this endeavor, we are examining ways effective in littoral waters that smugglers ships for law enforcement, put up more United Kingdom, France, and Spain with global security. Working alone, no law enforcement and the DOD defense to base our HITRON helicopters on land often exploit with go-fast vessels. In a satellites to support them, put in place direct and quick connections back to their country can effectively govern its own mission was complete. near specific vectors of known smuggling. typical go-fast vessel case, there is very more technical intelligence collections country’s operations center. JIATF-S also waters while also providing an effective [Over the last five years, Coast Guard little time to obtain authorization from a processes etc. and increase cost at an has at its disposal a number of Coast presence offshore closer to where the Cutters and LEDETs operating in the Bi-Lateral Agreements coastal state to pursue a suspect vessel astronomical level or do we strike the Guard, Navy and foreign vessels that are threat initiates. The offshore threat offshore regions of the transit zone have The US Coast Guard’s Area of Operations into territorial seas. Even with expedited right fiscally prudent balance of existing shifted to them for Operational control for must be met: removed more than 500 metric tons of in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific procedures contained in many of the national assets to address all national a certain period of time ranging from days o Through joint operations and joint cocaine, with a wholesale value of nearly Ocean consists of well over 30 countries bilateral agreements, the master of a security concerns? or weeks to months. training $17 billion]. in the Caribbean, Central and South go-fast vessel might beach or sink the Nations do not have unlimited assets JIATF-S is a multi-service, multi-agency, o Through acknowledging that intera­ America. This involves a multitude of boat by the time a coastal state transmits and as such it is wise to share resources and international entity headed by a gency partners bring valuable Aircraft Use-of-Force Territorial Seas some only short distances authorization to pursue into its territorial and information. Certain countries in the US Coast Guard 2-Star Admiral with informa­tion to the table and joining In 1998, the Coast Guard estimated that it from each other affording traffickers the seas. with them in a team effort against was stopping less than ten percent of the opportunity to quickly enter any number of transnational organized crime o Through international relationships CAPT José Nieves codified in bilateral and shiprider Is the Executive Director, Joint Interagency Counter-Trafficking agreements or some other mecha­ Center at US European Command in Germany. He was nism. formerly the senior Coast Guard representative to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the 2014 Quadrennial Defense o Through the use of joint operations Review; Deputy Director, National Maritime Intelligence- center that are multi-service, multi- Integration Office/Director, National Intelligence; Staff Director, agency, and international White House Office of National Drug Control Policy; Senior o By training with our global partners Advisor to the US Interdiction Coordinator; and Commanding to increase capabilities to conduct Officer of a Coast Guard Cutter. He holds a bachelor’s degree unilateral and multi-lateral MLE ope­ in economics, a Masters degree in financial planning and is a rations graduate of the United States Naval War College.

22 23 minimum intensity. But subsequently, in the same paragraph of the judgment, the Appeals Champers changes significantly LEGAL ISSUES direction, and takes a different approach, LEGAL ISSUES by applying the intensity criterion both to international and non – international armed conflicts: “Applying the foregoing concept of armed b. engaged in fighting of some intensi- ulates that the ICRC should be informed conflicts to this case, we hold that the ty”7. when suspects are detained by EUNAV- alleged crimes were committed in the The first requirement obviously exists in FOR Units, and should be granted access context of an armed conflict… These an international armed conflict, being a to them while they are detained10. More- Distinguishing Law Enforcement from hostilities exceed the intensity require- confrontation between armed forces of dif- over, the UN Security Council, in the Res- ments applicable to both international and ferent states. The criterion of a minimum olution 1851, while authorizing land – op- internal armed conflicts. There has been intensity is the one that creates the major erations on Somali soil for the first time, it protracted, large-scale violence between difference with the ICRC’s approach. embraced the possibility that international Armed Conflict Paradigm the armed forces of different States and It is difficult to extrapolate clear-cut an- humanitarian law could be applicable in between governmental forces and orga- swers from state practice. In the maritime the context of antipiracy operations. nized insurgent groups”5. milieu although states were in most cas- In view of the present author, it would be in International Law Unfortunately, this confusion is intensified es unwilling to accept that they were en- more apt to focus on the mode of the con- by the different approaches found in legal gaged in armed conflict, they were eager duct of the opposing forces in relation with scholarship. to demand the protection accorded by in- human rights law and especially the right by Panagiotis Sergis* The ICRC, the organization which is gen- ternational humanitarian law to the victims to life as the decisive criterion for deter- Lt Cdr, GRC (N) erally regarded as the “guardian” of the of these minor engagements. For exam- mining whether an armed conflict exists, Geneva Conventions, accepts a very low ple, when the Iranians in 2007 detained international or non-international11. The threshold regarding the existence of an the crew of a British naval unit, allegedly difference between a law enforcement op- international armed conflict: inside Iranian territorial waters, although eration and an armed conflict lies in the * Any views or opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the Hellenic Navy General Staff or of the “A State can always pretend, when it com- none of the parties in the engagement in- modus operandi of the fighting forces. In Greek Government. mits a hostile act against another State, voked the existence of an armed conflict, the context of police actions, the use of Introduction with legal technicalities as did the defini- that it is not making war, but merely en- the spokesperson for the British Prime force is an exception. Governments tend Modern naval operations are primarily fo- tion of war”4. gaging in a “police action”, or acting in Minister claimed that the appearance of to use minimum force in order to arrest cused on the enforcement of public order The ICTY in the Tadić case dealt with the legitimate self-defence. The expression the sailors on the Iranian television was in the suspected criminals, while respect- at sea. War fighting at sea, seems almost existence of an “armed conflict” both of “armed conflict” makes such arguments violation of the Third Geneva Convention8. ing their right to life. On the other hand extinct, and this fact is manifested in the an international and a non – internation- less easy. Any difference arising between The blurring of the lines between “police during armed conflicts the use of force absence of serious interest regarding al character, and created a precedence two States and leading to the intervention action” and armed conflict exists also in is the norm. The need to overwhelm the law of naval warfare, the condition which was generally followed in the juris- of armed forces is an armed conflict…”6. situations where the application of law the adversary gives more latitude in the of which is often characterized as chao­ prudence of the international criminal The International Law Association (ILA) in enforcement paradigm seems straightfor- use of force, allowing for casualties even tic2. Despite this fact, it is very difficult to courts during the last two decades. Ac- its Final Report on the Meaning of Armed ward, because these do not involve con- among the civilians, if they are not dispro- distinguish between the law enforcement cording to the Appeals Chamber of the tri- Conflict in International Law takes a dia- frontation between naval units of various portionate to the concrete and direct mili- paradigm and armed conflict paradigm in bunal “an armed conflict exists whenever metrically different approach: states. In the context of the anti-piracy tary advantage anticipated. It is always a the maritime environment. The problem there is a resort to armed force between “As a matter of customary international operations taking place at the Horn of Af- possibility that a limited law enforcement lies, as it is going to be analyzed, in what States or protracted armed violence be- law a situation of armed conflict depends rica, although it is generally accepted that action escalates in a situation of an armed the term “armed conflicts” connotes. tween governmental authorities and or- on the satisfaction of two essential mini- the pirates are criminals and not combat- conflict. Real life situations are usually ganized armed groups or between such mum criteria, namely: ants9, the Detention Standard Operating not crystal clear and grey areas should be Existence of an "Armed Conflict" What is an “armed conflict” is not defined groups within a State”5. The decision a. the existence of organized armed Procedure (SOP) of the European Naval expected, where the two paradigms con- A logical and legal prerequisite for the ap- in the Geneva Conventions, in which the seems to treat differently international groups [and] Operation “EUNAVFOR Atalanta”, stip- verge. In this “gray area” the more restric- plicability of the armed conflict paradigm is term acquired for first time legal signifi- and non –international armed conflicts. the existence of an armed conflict, wheth- cance3, or in any other instrument of in- Whereas any armed confrontation be- er international or non-international. The ternational humanitarian law. The “omis- tween two states seems to suffice for the 6. Jean S. Pictet (ed), The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Commentary – Volume I’, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1952, at 32 (em- phasis added). The ICRC remains constant in this position. In an opinion paper titled: How is the Term ‘Armed Conflict’ Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, determination of its existence is a rather sion…was apparently deliberate, since it former, for the existence of the latter two of March 2008, published in ICRC website (http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf, visited 5th May 2014), it is stated that perplexed issue especially in the maritime was hoped that this term would continue cumulative criteria must be met: that of or- “An IAC occurs when one or more States have recourse to armed force against another State, regardless of the reasons or the intensity of this confrontation” environment. to be purely factual and not become laden ganization and more significantly that of a and confirms this view with reference to the Pictet’s Commentary mentioned above. 7. International Law Association, The Hague Conference (2010) Use of Force, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law’, at 32 (available in ILA website http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1022, visited 6th May 2014). 1. Emmanuel Roucounas, ‘Some Issues Relating to War Crimes in Air and Sea Warfare’ in Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (eds), ‘War Crimes in International 8. Matthew B. Stannard, What Law Did Tehran Break? Capture of British Sailors a Gray Area in Application of Geneva Conventions, San Francisco Chronicle, 1 April Law, Martinus Nijhoff’, Leiden, 1996, 275, at 279. 2007, available in http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/What-law-did-Tehran-break-Capture-of-British-2576880.php, visited 1st June 2014. 2. The introduction of the term served the purpose of the applicability of international humanitarian law without the existence of a formal state of war. 9. Douglas Guilfoyle, The Laws of War and the Fight against Somali Piracy: Combatants or Criminals, 11 Melb. J. Int'l L. (2010), 141, at 142. 3. Christopher Greenwood, ‘Scope of Application oh Humanitarian Law’, in Dieter Fleck (ed), The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford 10. SOP Legal 001 Dated 26 March 2009 (on file with the author). Although the provision in the SOP regarding the ICRC is maybe driven by political consider- University Press, Oxford, 1995, 39, at 42. ations, the involvement of the principal organization ensuring humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of war and armed violence, highlights the 4. Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para.70. absence of a sharp distinction between the concept of armed conflict on the one hand, and the law enforcement operations on the other. 5. Ibid. 11. Arne Willy Dahl & Magnus Sandbu, The Threshold of Armed Conflict, 45 The Military Law and the law of War Review, (2006), 369, at 374.

24 25 calm. Whereas, the current development of IHL regulating armed conflicts at sea leaves much to be desired, the law gov- LEGAL ISSUES erning “police action” is evolving quickly, LEGAL ISSUES through decisions of the ITLOS and hu- man rights bodies. This fact highlights the path that our navies are obliged to follow, tive law enforcement paradigm, should be Final Remark if they want to remain relevant in the cur- applicable by default. This notwithstand- In sharp contrast with the atrocities that rent circumstances of budget cuts. In or- ing, the actual behavior of the adversaries took place in the context of land warfare der to perform their invaluable traditional is the best indicator of which paradigm, during the ’90s, and fueled the rapid law, navies have no alternative but to be the law enforcement or the armed conflict, change of IHL and ICL concerning this as- directly involved in the law enforcement is relevant. pect of conflict, seas remained relatively business.

Lt Cdr, HN,Panagiotis Sergis, Professional Experience ▪ His sea duty assignments, as a junior officer, include various tours. He served mainly on Frigates as Navigations, Op- erations Officer and Law Officer. ▪ He served as the Commanding Officer of Greek Mine Hunter HS KALLISTO. ▪ As a senior officer he served as Legal Advisor and Head of the International Law Department at the Hellenic Navy General Staff. Career Profile ▪ Participated as an officer onboard ships of the Hellenic Fleet in many multinational operations like Enduring Freedom at the Persian (Arabic) “Towards a more wide accepted definition Gulf, Active Endeavour at the Mediterranean and Inas Bahr throughout the Arabic Peninsula. ▪ Served as the Legal Advisor of the first Force Commander of the Operation “ATALANTA”, being the only Legal Advisor that has been de- ployed by the Hellenic Navy. ▪ Participated as part of the Greek delegation at the activities of the PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative), of the UNICPOLOS (United Nations of the Terrorism Crime: Open-ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans and the Law of the Sea), of the CGPCS (Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia) and the IMO (International Maritime Organization). rediscovering the SUA Convention” by Matteo Del Chicca World Maritime University

he international crime of ter- multiple, and encompass also factors element of crime definition describes rorism has long since threat- not strictly related to legal arguments, the aim, the end, the motivation, of the ened (also) seafarers,for a such as political factors, or ethical fac- offender. very long time. The main tors. Anyway, one crucial reason of Now, about terrorism, the vexata­ Tlegal problem which plaguesthe re- such disagreement is a legal reason, quaestio is: how can be described the pression of such a crime is that ter- and it is the difficulty to find out an ap- subjective element of terrorism crime? rorism has no legally binding criminal propriate and suitable description of Scholars, legal experts, judges, law- law definition. To put it mildly, actually the “subjective element” of terrorism yers and politicians have tried to sug- there is no criminal law notion of terror- international crime. gest several solutions, but no criminal ism which is likely to reach a wide con- In this regard, it is well known that ev- law definition of terrorism mental ele- sensus among the whole international ery domestic crime, and every interna- ment has been largely accepted by community. Even nowadays, the in- tional crimeas well, are defined through international community, until now. ternational community often discuss an objective element (also known as And that is because no legal descrip- about the legal definition of terrorism material element), and trough a sub- tion of such mental element looks to international crime, with no valuable jective element (also known as mental encompass every possible mensrea, result achieved. In short, States do element, or mensrea). While the ob- every possible end or aim, which could not agree on a common definition of jective element included in a particular motivate the alleged offender to com- such heinous crime. crime definition describe which kind of mit a terrorist act. In fact, how can be The reasons of such divergences are material act is punished, the subjective confined and circumscribed the moti-

26 27 of influencing” Seychelles government Hopefully, the States “for political ends”; it was unable to en- LEGAL ISSUES compass all the motivations of the of- would rediscover the LEGAL ISSUES fenders, because they had also private wide powers granted ends in their mind (and not only politi- cal ends); and it resulted hard to give them by SUA Conven- evidence of it in the trial, because “it vation of a terrorist, in a precise, clear the High Court of the Seychelles in the tion in order to fight ment of this crime simply… blank.In above), for the creation of the 1990 is difficult if not impossible to procure and unequivocal, legal definition which ‘Topaz’ case (2009). writing the criminal offence of terrorism SUA Convention. direct evidence to prove the intention some heinous crimes perfectly and wholly corresponds to In the ‘Topaz’ case, a surveillance air- we only detail the objective element Basically, the SUA Convention details of an individual”. The end result of the reality of events, and which could craft observed a whaler, a floating base of the crime, without providing any only the material acts punished (at ar- all this was that every terrorism count (such as piracy), in a be safe to say belonging to the alleged of operations for pirates, towing two specific subjective element. In other ticle 3), without any reference to what- was dismissed. offender with legal certainty? All such skiffs in Seychelles Economic Exclu- near future. And they words: in writing the criminal offence ever aim, end, or motivations of the From this point of view, similar legal three requirements must be fulfilled sive Zone and radioed the location to of terrorism we only detail the mate- offender. Just the objective element of failures, identical in whole or in part would also follow the if we wish to find a correct definition the Topaz, a Seychelles Coast Guard rial acts punished, describing which the crimeis provided, leaving blank the to ‘Topaz’ case failures, can be found of the subjective element of terrorism warship. When the Topaz arrived on SUA Convention leg- actions, against whom and what, and space for the description of the subjec- in several other cases: always to stay crime: unequivocal wording; full corre- the scene, it came under attack from in which circumstances, are punished, tive element. In a nutshell, no dolus within the confines of maritime ter- islative technique in spondence to the reality; and possibili- the two skiffs, and subsequently sub- but without any reference at all to the specialis included, only the description rorism only, we could just recall the ty to provide evidence of that in a trial. dued and apprehended both skiffs. order to create more precise motivations, ends, or aims, of of the unlawful acts punished along ‘Canarias’ case (Audiencia Nacional If we look at the description of every The eleven accused were charged the perpetrator. with a generic willingness to commit de Madrid, 2011), the ‘Sherry Fishing’ efficient rules to crim- subjective element of every crime – in with five counts of committing terrorist Of course, a general willingness to them (dolus generalis) provided: “Any case (High Court of Kenya, 2011), the domestic criminal laws, and in interna- acts, aiding or abetting terrorist acts, inalize terrorism too, commit the act should be provided, but person commits an offence if that per- ‘Intertuna II’ case (Supreme Court of tional criminal law as well – we could and conspiracy, as well as counts for without detailing any specific aim of son unlawfully and intentionally [… Seychelles, 2010), going back up to without faltering at always find such three requisites per- piracy and aiding and abetting piracy. the offender. From a classical criminal here follows the detailed description the ‘Achille Lauro’ case (1988). fectly fulfilled. And that happens be- In such a trial, the High Court of the the subjective element law point of view, we could say that we of the material acts punished]” (SUA So the question is: could be found cause a certain precision is required Seychelles described the subjective shall provide only the dolusgeneralis, Convention, article 3). No “terroristic a description of the terrorism crime specification step. here, due to the requirements of the element of terrorism crime with the without any dolusspecialis. aims”, “for political ends” or similar subjective element which is unequivo- principles of criminal law, especially following words: “indiscriminate vio- Is this suggested solution only a mi- specific subjective elements of the cal, complete, and demonstrable in a the nullum crimen nulla poena sine lence with the objective of influencing crime definition problems then? How rage of (international) criminal law crime are provided. The criminal acts criminal proceeding? The answer, ac- praevia scripta lege poenali principle governments or international organi- can we prosecute, and eventually pun- making, or is it a viable route to follow? detailed in the SUA Convention are cording also to decades-old unfruitful (Latin, "[There exists] no crime [and] zations for political ends”. ish, a terrorist offender, if we are not On closer inspection, it is an already punished per se, and they are also efforts noted above, is: no!No feasible no punishment without a pre-existing Alas, such tentative description re- able to find out a feasible description sailedroute.In particular, it is a special punished severely (according to article description of the subjective element written penal law [appertaining]"), and sulted unable to fulfil anyone of three- of terrorism crime subjective element? legislative technique, already adopt- 5: “Each State Party shall make the of- of terrorism crime could be found out. the strict construction of penal stat- above addressed requisite: in fact,it The answer is: we can leave the de- ed in international criminal law after fences set forth in article 3 punishable Does this deficiency means that no utes. was equivocal, because the High Court scription space of the subjective ele- the ‘Achille Lauro’ case (just recalled by appropriate penalties which take Court is able to prosecute an alleged Unfortunately, every description of the was unable to say with legal certainty offender for terrorism crime count? No, terrorism crime mental element sug- how far the attack against the Topaz that is not true too. Which is the solu- gested until today does not fulfil one, warship was made “with the objective tion to such long-standing terrorism or all, such three requisites: because sometimes the suggested definition was equivocal; sometimes the sug- gested definition was not able to en- compass all the real motivations of the perpetrator; at other times it was hard to provide evidence of it in a trial. Even in the recent history of the inter- national community, there are so many examples of such terrorism mental el- ement legal definitions failures. Plenty of them both in theoretical debates, and in case law too. To stay within the confines of maritime terrorism only, take –for example– the suggested de- scription of the subjective element of terrorism crime recently provided by Topaz, a Seychelles Coast Guard warship

28 29 ooking back to the past, with the Dr. Matteo Del Chicca attacks of 11 September 2001, Obtained his and the consequent radical global LEGAL ISSUES LLM degree L LEGAL ISSUES changes, a new era began in the maritime at University security of the Alliance. Since then, chal- of Pisa (Law Department), lenges to maritime security have evolved with a final dis­ in complex ways, and maritime terrorism into account the grave nature of those out the entire SUA Convention. Why? sertation the­ has widened to encompass activities such offences”). Because the SUA Convention original sis focused on as piracy, smuggling of weapons of mass Protection of destruction and Chemical, Biological, As it is well known, the original States law makers did not want to confine and Cultural Heritage in International Law: such Parties of SUA Convention started to circumscribe the criminal acts provided thesis has been endorsed by UNESCO in Radiological or Nuclear material by sea, write the treaty after the ‘AchilleLau- in specific criminal offences categories, 2005. In 2013 he received his PhD degree threats to maritime critical infrastructure, ro’ case, so after a terrorism incident. which could limit their punitive powers. in International Law and in EU Law from Uni- and others. versity of Pisa (Law Department), with a final For over twelve years the Alliance has Not with standing the occasion leg In short: the original States Parties of dissertation thesis focused on Maritime Piracy. undertaken maritime security missions – is (the historical circumstances after SUA Convention wished to strike hard He has been Adjunct Professor at University in which maritime interdiction operations which SUA Convention was born), the any criminal offence committed against of Pisa –at Law Department and at Political Sciences Department as well– lecturing on and other law enforcement activities have ratio legis of the Convention went far the international customary law princi- several topics, including International Law, EU played a central and often vital part– in beyond such historical event (a ter- ple of the secure maritime navigation, Law, International Criminal Law, International support of NATO's core security objec- rorism incident). Indeed the original regardless any limitation. Humanitarian Law and International Coopera- tion Law. He supervised several LLM thesis, tives. Operations such as Ocean Shield States Parties of SUA Convention Unfortunately, the international com- and some PhD the sis as well. Actually he is a expanded awareness of the complexities wanted to strike every criminal act munity has made very little use of the Lecturer of International Law and of EU Law at of operating in or near strategic choke able to threat the maritime navigation special powers and of the wide possi- Italian Navy Academy. points and of the potential disruption of Building a Maritime Law at large, without any binding at all. bilities gifted by the SUA Convention, He is a member of several national and inter- national Research Projects, focused on dif- sea lines of communication, in particular For such reason they avoided any until today. ferent issues of International Law and of EU for energy resources. In addition, oper- limitation derivable if a specific sub- Hopefully, the States would rediscover Law, and he earned the prize as "Best 2008 ations such as Unified Protector exposed Enforcement Mentality jective element would be defined, the wide powers granted them by SUA Young Researcher" by Italian National Centre NATO forces to complex situations involv- for Research. ing the security of energy resources and by Nicolaos Ariatzis and for the same reason they did Convention in order to fight some hei- He published book chapters and several sci- not specify any namingfor the crimi- nous crimes (such as piracy), in a near entific papers on prestigious peer-reviewed plants ashore and in littoral waters, and Lt Commander GRC (N) nal offences provided. As an author future. And they would also follow the journals, mainly focused on international law humanitarian challenges at sea involving noted: “The term ‘terrorism’ is con- SUA Convention legislative technique of the sea and maritime security topics. Dr. the flow of refugees and economic mi- with public or private security forces em- ways be cognizant of national differences Del Chicca joined World Maritime Universi- grants. ployed on ships or platforms. As NATO in interpretation of international law and spicuously avoided throughout the in order to create more efficient rules ty (IMO) in 2014 and he has been involved Additionally, since the events of 11 Sep- entire IMO instrument” (Joyner). We to criminalize terrorism too, without fal- in PROMERC Project, aimed at finding new learned in OUP, however, maritime border the impact that may have on operations tember, the threat posed by international could add that also the word “piracy”, tering at the subjective element speci- measures to protect merchant ships from pi- security issues can impact military opera- or even bilateral relations. Maritime forc- rate attacks. terrorism has gained a new dimension. tions in ways that can affect the effective- es should maintain situational awareness or the words “armed robbery at sea”, fication step. Incidents such as the USS Cole and the ness and credibility of the mission. While of the lawful and legal boundaries and are conspicuously avoided through- Limburg attacks have demonstrated that not calling for NATO to assume a border demarcations of the seas, airspace and terrorists are interested in and capable of security role, there are areas where great- land territory claimed by coastal states. using the maritime domain to achieve their er engagement with border security enti- At the same time, the world’s oceans lethal objectives. Concurrently, over the ties could prove beneficial in conducting and seas are an increasingly accessible past ten years the expansion of off shore future law enforcement activities. environment for transnational criminal drilling or production platforms and the Of course, maritime law enforcement and terrorist activities. Potential maritime emergence of LNG shipping as a major activities must take international law into transnational criminal and terrorist threat means of energy transportation have cre- consideration. In accordance with rights includes attacks on seaborne facilities like ated rich potential targets in the maritime and jurisdictions recognized under inter- ships, platforms, and undersea cables. domain. Since 2001, preventing terror- national law, the preponderance of the Criminal activity in the maritime environ- ists from attacking at or from the sea and sea and airspace above it remains essen- ment includes pirate attacks, which raise from crossing maritime borders has thus tially neutral. Hence maritime forces may concerns about the safety of vessel crews become a major preoccupation for Euro- exercise unrestricted freedom of naviga- and private citizens. Global trade relies pean and North American governments, tion and over-flight in international waters upon secure and low-cost international as well as for international organizations and airspace. Maritime forces can legally maritime transportation and distribution such as NATO, the EU, the UN, and oth- operate close to the territorial waters of a networks, which are vulnerable to disrup- ers. Greater attention might now be given nation without prior approval of the gov- tion (even short interruptions would seri- to addressing the vulnerability to terrorist ernment concerned. ously impact international trade as well attacks to sea-based critical energy infra- We should note that nations may have in- as national economies). Any prolonged structure or to maritime flows of energy re- terpretations of international law that differ interruption of maritime transportation sources. A novel aspect of this challenge subtly or materially from those of allies, networks would undermine both indus- will be the need for maritime forces to deal partners or adversaries. We should al- trial production and most governments’

30 31 tion mindset impedes coherent interaction with civilian entities and hampers a com- TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES prehensive situational awareness of the LEGAL ISSUES civil environment. Maritime forces should consider these impediments and allevi- ate impacts by procedural conjunction of functions concerned with civil-military co- operation issues. Maritime law enforcement activities must The role of be able to tackle the threats I have outlined here as well as support nations and law enforcement organizations in dealing with new Technologies & Policies them. Information sharing and improved synergy are the key components of these relationships. Throughout the world’s his- concerning tory the maintenance of security at sea has its own uppermost significance due to the interdependent network of commer- cial, financial and political relationships. EU Maritime Security & Effective cooperation among all maritime security partners is the cornerstone for all well-based security architectures that Borders Surveillance serve to establish a common information environment, facilitate collaboration in by Dr Pierluigi Massimo Giansanti shaping a common understanding of the Manager, FINMECCANICA Group operating domain, and permit integrated planning, coordination and conduct of ac- tions in order to achieve the desired result  and the proper end state. Hence we can 1. Foreword Ongoing Maritime Legacy Surveil- all the National Information Management evaluate and assess needs beforehand This introduction explains the aim of this lance Systems Systems & Coordination Centres of EU  in order to understand what the full range article and the suggested way ahead for EU Programs for Maritime Security Agencies as well as NATO Bodies (NMI-  of possible responses is and whom to de- securing EU seas by a coordinated and New EU Policies & Political Approach- OTC, etc...) to combine, by a fully coor- pend on. It is imperative to tackle our ad- Integrated Comprehensive Network-Cen- es dinated and Integrated Comprehensive versaries. To this end, we must continue tric Approach. The strategic issue is to combine Mili- Network-Centric Approach, their different to forge cooperation among all relevant This goal is assured by the joint contribu- tary and Civil appropriate integration and Centralised and Decentralised Networks stakeholders, with the optimum use of re- tion of the following different domains: coordination on Maritime Security & Sur- & National Hubs.  gional agencies and enabling capabilities New Technologies & Technical Devel- veillance, Intelligence and Policing in the to inculcate the proper law enforcement opments Mediterranean Area, in order to foster 2. New Technologies and Technical culture at sea. Ensuring cohesion and Development for EU Maritime abilities to provide basic services to their safety are all consistent with our nation- effectiveness, we avail of the present in Surveillance populations. al security interests. While the ability of order to meet the future. The real importance of an efficient Mari- A key role for maritime power is to support maritime forces to conduct operations can In conclusion it’s worthwhile to mention time Surveillance is well understood by the international community in ensuring be severely impacted by environmental that NMIOTC is constantly pursuit to Member States to establish a Common that today’s “just in time” economy, now so conditions, training, skillful seamanship, providing the training tools as well as to Environment for Information Sharing. vital to the global economy as a whole, is and good tactics can often minimize these contribute towards a greater understand- EU Commission principal objective is to allowed continued, unhindered access to effects. Skilful seamanship, individual and ing on how to support the maritime law reach a Common Shared Maritime Picture sea routes free from friction, which would collective training, and a comprehensive enforcement activities that will reduce the among Member States around EU. increase the cost of goods to the consum- doctrine can help mitigate these effects, potential threats to the international mari- The principle is, first of all, to use exi­sting er and create unwanted critical shortages as can the acquisition of equipment de- time community. systems within Member States that al- in numerous areas. signed to operate in such a demanding ready have a picture of maritime activities Meanwhile, climate changes pose new environment. Navies traditionally deal in their proximity and to link these Legacy opportunities and challenges, which may with numerous civilian entities, and these Systems among themselves. On the basis allow new and economically attractive civilian entities have increased in number of this common approach, finally Member sea routes as well as improved access to and diversity. Furthermore these relation- States will be able to coordinate the use of resources. Maintaining freedom of nav- ships are not necessarily understood as their capabilities at sea, both Civilians and Lt Commander Nikolaos Ariatzis HN, is the NMI- Military Administrations (by a Comprehen- igation, sea-based trade routes, critical civil-military cooperation, but as integral to OTC Head of Transformation Section. infrastructure, energy flows, protection key maritime functions. Consequently, the Email your comments to: [email protected]. sive Network-Centric Approach). of marine resources, and environmental lack of a traditional civil-military coopera- nato.int In order to fit this goal it is mandatory to

32 33 EU Maritime Security apparatus should be linked and intelligence-led. Appropriate integration and coordination TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES of Maritime Surveillance, Intelligence and TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES Policing in the Mediterranean would re- quire an Information Management System designed in such a way that centralisation have New Technologies (New Coastal er fully Integrated Maritime Surveillance and decentralisation may occur simulta- EUROPOL is working closely together with So, it is very important, to face organised Radars, UAVs, E/O Satellites, LRIT, etc...) System managed by Italian Navy with the neously. its EU partners in order to strength its Net- crime and terrorism, developing: and New National and Regional Integrated Italian Presidency of Ministries' Council EUROPOL is working closely together with work. ▪ An European Intelligence Strategy for Maritime Surveillance Systems (i.e. Italian supervision. its EU partners in order to strength its Net- As Europe’s Criminal Information Hub, EU- Maritime Security in the framework of Navy DIISM or French Navy SPATION- DIISM system managed by CINCNAV equipped with specific antennas, even if work. ROPOL has analytical capabilities to sup- the Common Information Sharing En- AV) to obtain a real Maritime Situational (National HUB of Italian Navy for the Mar- progress remains to be made for cover- vironment (CISE) featuring Integrated Awareness (Vessel Traffic Service, Inte- itime Situational Awareness) is the Italian age of high traffic zones. ESA together and Coordinated Maritime Surveillance, grated Inter-Agency Surveillance System, National Centre in which all the meta-da- with certain Member States is studying Intelligence and Policing focusing pri- National Border Control Coordination ta coming from the other Administrations the possibility of placing a new Constel- marily on the Mediterranean Sea but Centre, etc...). (e.g. Guardia di Finanza, Coast Guard, lation of satellites in low orbit as early as also on the Black Sea, North Sea, Before information can be share, it must etc...) are together collected and merged 2015, offering Global AIS Coverage. Baltic Sea as well as the Atlantic and just be well collected. The whole area to obtain a Common Shared Recognised New technologies as well as the Integrat- Indian Oceans. to be monitored is almost four times the Maritime Picture. ed Network Systems have considerably ▪ EUROPOL’s analytical capabilities by entire surface of all 28 Member States In larger maritime areas, European Indus- increased in EU domain and in most im- sharing Maritime Intelligence on cri­ and is characterised by intense maritime try today can offer a wide range of mature portant Member States the volume of in- minal and terrorist threats to fill knowl- traffic as Straits of Gibraltar, Messina and solutions as the new shore-based Coastal formation available to obtain a real Mar- edge gaps and launch major operation­ Calais, where many hundred of container Radars. itime Surveillance and Maritime Borders al projects. ships, ferryboats, oil tankers daily used to Away from the coast, information collec- Protection. Both of these assets (New As Europe’s Criminal Information Hub, port major investigations by transforming ▪ Trust, meaningful collaboration and sail these areas. tion requires embarked naval or aerial Technologies & Integrated Network Sys- EUROPOL has analytical capabilities to large amounts of maritime target-related a shared Security Culture amongst all For such narrow areas, Land-based solutions. These can be Surveillance & tems) are necessary for a more Secure support major investigations by transfor­ data into actionable and timely intelli- Member States for the European Se­ means are generally efficient for Maritime Patrolling Aircrafts or UAV’s (Unmanned Maritime Environment and an Integrated ming large amounts of maritime target-re- gence for its EU Partners. curity and Military Networks (i.e. EU Security objectives. AIS (Automatic Iden- Aerial Vehicles), which can embark new Maritime Surveillance. It seems vital in or- lated data into actionable and timely intel- Data and information obtained from com- Agencies, MAOC-N, CECLAD-M, Na- tification System) signal reception Coastal maritime detection radars, AIS receptors der to enhance Maritime Security to take ligence for its EU Partners. mercial and free-access Maritime Da- Stations can collect information transmit- and also possible special novel elec- also a Multi-National Comprehensive Ap- Data and information obtained from com- tabases, Risk Analysis Systems, Earth ted by ships above 300 tonnes, accord- tro-optical captors. proach to Vessel Traffic Monitoring. mercial and free-access Maritime Data- Observation (e.g. SAT-AIS or EO Satel- ing to actual Regulations. However, it is bases, Risk Analysis Systems, Earth Ob- lites Constellation like Cosmos-SkyMed), known that AIS information is useful but servation (e.g. SAT-AIS or EO Satellites Aerial (Patrolling Aircrafts and UAVs) insufficient. It is commonly accepted that Constellation like Cosmos-SkyMed), Aeri- and Maritime Surveillance (e.g. Coast- data transmitted by this way is either in- al (Patrolling Aircrafts and UAVs) and Mar­ al Maritime Surveillance Systems vies, Coast Guards, Customs, Police complete or partially incorrect in 70% of itime Surveillance (e.g. Coastal Maritime and Vessel Traffic Centres, etc.) can and Border Guard Agencies as well as cases. Many ships do not get such AIS Surveillance Systems and Vessel Traffic easily be analysed by EUROPOL to derive FRONTEX). signals, either because their weight is be- Centres, etc..) can easily be analysed by meaning and assist in determining en- ▪ Cooperation with other International low 300 tonnes, or because their equip- EUROPOL to derive meaning and assist in forcement and intelligence priorities. Partners in the European Maritime In- ment does not work properly. It is thus determining enforcement and intelligence A Comprehensive European Policy Ap- telligence Network that play important necessary to merge these data with those priorities. proach on Maritime Security should ad- roles in the Worldwide Global Security collected by other sensors (actives and To be successful, a Network-Centric Ap- dress the need for Integrated and Coor- Therefore, it is hoped that the implemen- passives). These technologies are mature and both 3. Integrated Maritime Surveillance proach should be adopted in which the dinated Maritime Intelligence collection, tation of above topics will encourage a Coastal radars of VTS (Vessel Traffic Ser- the size and reliability of such equipment and Policing EU Maritime Security apparatus should analysis and dissemination. more active approach towards an Integrat- vice) National Centres able to remotely today allow a perfect format for the Naval In response to large-scale cocaine traf- be linked and intelligence-led. At present time, the knowledge on mari- ed Maritime Surveillance & Policing. interrogate ships, and even electro-optical Operations at sea, even launched from a ship. ficking by sea and air, the maritime cen- Appropriate integration and coordination time threats in the Mediterranean Sea and sensors able to precisely identify ships For very high seas, collecting Maritime tres of MAOC-N and CECLAD-M were of Maritime Surveillance, Intelligence and beyond remains still fragmented with a 4. New roles and priorities for when weather conditions and distances Information from Space can bring new set up to facilitate interdiction operations Policing in the Mediterranean would re- danger of overshadowing improvements are adequate, are generally utilised. responses. Two technologies can now in the Western Mediterranean and the European Navies quire an Information Management System in other key areas and limiting the effec- Existing EU Naval Networks are well de- Italian VTS National System is a typical ex- be fitted into one single satellite. Syn- Eastern Atlantic Ocean. They have been designed in such a way that centralisation tiveness of EU Policy on Maritime Security. ample of an EU Coordinated Large Sys- thetic Aperture Radars (SAR) can detect successful with several high profile ope­ veloped and have proven their value (i.e. and decentralisation may occur simulta- Therefore, the development of a Maritime Italian Navy DIISM, French Navy SPATION­ tem for Maritime Traffic Control and SAR both ships and layers of maritime pol- rations and seizures carried out. The neously. Shared Policy Intelligence capability at Operations managed by Italian Coast lution, even with cloud cover (e.g. Cos- effective coordination of intelligence and European level is mandatory in order to Guard with the Ministry of Transports and mo-SkyMed Constellation). operational capabilities are the hallmarks permit Member States to fight human traf- Infra-structures' supervision. The second technology is the AIS sig- of these Centres’ success. ficking, drugs and other illicit behaviours DIISM (Dispositivo Inter–Ministeriale Inte- nal receptor. Experience shows that AIS To be successful, a Network-Centric Ap- rendering the Mediterranean Sea a se- grato di Sorveglianza Marittima) is anoth- messages can be received by satellites proach should be adopted in which the cured space.

34 35 pean Defence. 5. Piracy as potential threat for Agency (EDA), the framework and the Maritime Routes of Mediterranean TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES capability to achieve progress and more Basin efficient use of the resources. European Although the Mediterranean Sea has TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES Union has recognised the importance of not been directly affected, piracy has in- Safety, Security and Defence at sea (Inte- grated Maritime Surveillance). Several Re­ gional Projects to improve the Maritime Sit- covered. The lack of military assets uational Awareness have been launched, and weakness of East African Coastal including the EU Pilot Projects for Mediter­ States lead shipping companies to im- ranean Maritime Surveillance. plement their own procedures and mea- The backbone of all projects is Maritime sures to prevent pirate attacks against Domain Awareness (MDA) and how to their vessels. achieve and improve it. Maritime Sur- For a ship-owner, having a vessel hi- AV, etc...) also through many naval exer- veillance is indeed the real foundation for jacked means that his crewmembers, cises and real-world Crisis Management carried goods and vessel remain for Operations. at least three months in pirate hands, An example is the NATO-led operation creased in the recent years significantly in bers. Somali pirates have conducted in which is the time usually needed to ne- ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR activated after 11 the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean these years many attacks far from So- gotiate with pirates with a loss of money September 2001 terrorist attacks in USA. with many problems for the Safety and mali coasts, targeting any kind of vessels and potential damage to vessels. This operation has achieved a very high Security of EU ship-owners crewmem- (sailing yachts, chemical tankers, bulk Financial impacts are very important degree of visibility at sea and it has been carriers, tankers, container ships, etc..), for a ship-owner, with the off-hire of the a strong contributor to a good Maritime Sit- and using previously hijacked vessels as vessel; the goods remaining onboard; uational Awareness in the Mediterranean mother-vessels for their operations. the potential damages suffered by the Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar. Military forces deployed in the area are vessel, while staying at anchorage Another Naval Force, the European Mari- insufficient with regards to the number off Somalia; ransom payment (see the time Force, EURMARFOR has contributed maritime endurance, especially in the of pirates and surface of the area to be above figure with parachuted payment). to operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, coor- Wider Mediterranean Area. dinated with NATO. EURMARFOR is the From the structural point of view, the exi­ European naval answer to the growing sting Command & Control Structure and importance of Security and Defence in the the existence of Standing and On Call Mediterranean Sea. Forces are a backbone for successful Another naval operation is the UN-led op­ naval operations. The ability to coordi- eration United Nations Interim Force in Leba­ nate and integrate non NATO/EU Naval non, UNIFIL, for weapons embargo oper- Forces must be improved and this can be ation. This Naval Operation launched to achieved through exercises and the fur- Dr. Pierluigi Massimo Giansanti Dr. Pierluigi Massimo Giansanti belongs to FINMECCANICA Group obtain a real Maritime Domain Awareness ther development of naval meetings like Safety, Security and Defence. It can be and he is the former Executive Vice President & Director Bruxelles at sea, was from the beginning one of the the Annual Meeting of the Maritime Com­ used as a key for the Maritime Domain Office – Business Governance & Policy Affairs for SES, a FINMEC- main tasks of both Naval Forces (NATO manders of the Mediterranean, as well as Awareness (MDA) and for the Common CANICA Company. Belonging to FINMECCANICA Group from and EU). commanders participating in Naval Op- Information Sharing Environment (CISE), 1989, he started his carrier in AGUSTA-WESTLAND, then in SEL- In these operations, the military task was EX Galileo and then in OTOMELARA. In 1998 he was appointed erations in the Mediterranean Sea or the developed by the EU Commission. This Executive Commercial Director for METEOR Missile Consortium in connected to political and diplomatic goals bi-annual Sea Power Symposium at Ven- matter will be an excellent example of how MBDA and he worked in Paris, for the development of new missiles and non NATO/EU Nations. ice by the invitation of the Italian Navy or to achieve a real MDA. The Mediterranean systems in EUROSAM Consortium as Director, Business Devel- From the technological point of view, there the Annual Meeting of the Mediterranean Sea will be a strategic region in the near opment. He was appointed Director of Operations and then Vice President, Business Intelligence are three domains in which future im- all events equally very future and its bridging function between – Business Development Department in SELEX Sistemi Integrati dealing with Commercial Strategy Coast Guards, and Business Diplomacy and Intelligence. In 2009 always working for SELEX Sistemi Integrati, he provements are mandatory for the Naval important to built trust and confidence East and West as well as South and was appointed Vice President, Director Institutional & Governmental Relations dealing with National and Maritime Awareness Networks: between the different Government Admin- North will remain crucial. Maritime Secu- and International Authorities and Governmental Military and Civil Organisations at worlwide level. ▪ Communication needs the whole istrations of Member States. rity in the Mediterranean will be achieved In 2011, he was appointed Senior Vice President - Director Italy/EU/NATO, Sales & Marketing for spectrum of available options: Military A Common European Approach for better through trusting Coordination, Cooper- SELEX Sistemi Integrati, dealing with the commercial strategy for selling large systems for Naval and Civil Connectivity – Interopera- and Maritime Domain, Air Defence Systems with C4I & Command & Control Centres, Maritime and technical standards and interoperability ation and Integration of EU Naval Forces Safety Integrated Systems and Smart Borders Systems. Dr. Giansanti has been graduated in Rome bility and the necessary bandwidth to is real necessary. The European Union and all other Maritime Services. in 1985, Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering and then he received a Master in Management and exchange all kinds of information. has, with the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro- A strong political willingness is needed, Business Administration in 1986, Polytechnic of Rome and a Master in Business Administration and ▪ Naval Platforms, Ships, Submarines indeed, to achieve a complete and effi- Technology (MIP) in 1988, Polytechnic of Milan. In 1989 he received the Master in Purchasing & and Naval Aviation must be able to cient through Material Management. In 2010 he was awarded with the Master in International Security Advanced Maritime Domain Awareness Studies, CASD (Military Centre for Defence High Studies) in Rome. Co-author for the development fight all the asymmetric threats at sea, a Comprehensive Integrated Shared Ap- and realization of various events for Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interiors - Ministry of Transports with a flexible high-low-mix. proach in order to maintain and improve & Infrastructures - Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, concerning Internal and Borders Security and ▪ must spend more time at sea and im- the Maritime Security in the Mediterra- Maritime Safety Control as well as European Med-Cooperation topics. prove their technological and logistical nean.

36 37 While remaining in the maritime domain, there is also a fourth potential area: the self-protection of merchant vessels against pirate attacks; but it is important TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES to highlight that, in this case, the require- ments and the solutions are evidently totally different from those used by na- val forces, for two main reasons. First, the main task is to avoid boarding rather than capture a fugitive. Second, there are severe legal limits on the carriage of firearms onboard a merchant vessel transiting within foreign territorial waters. Therefore the potential solutions should rely on non-weapon types, like barriers, water cannons, propeller entanglers, etc. Going back to the naval forces, we must observe that some basic tasks are par- tially in common across these fields. This means stopping a boat (either from approaching in Force Protection scenari- os, or from escaping in Law Enforcement scenarios) through escalation of force: first hailing and warning, then deterring (achieving voluntary compliance through The Role of Non-Lethal Weapons fear of more severe consequences, i.e. mostly anti-personnel NLW), and then dis- rorists. Long range acoustic hailing de- tisements and media reports, it should abling (i.e. regardless intention to comply vices (AHD) from different manufacturers be very clear that AHD are only commu- in Maritime Operations or not, i.e. mostly anti-material NLW). are available, with different features and nication devices, good to issue orders There are many available solutions and performances. They can deliver a clear and warnings; they are NOT weapons, others in different level of development. message across long ranges, several capable to influence the behavior through by Massimo Annati Hailing and warning is the very first step, hundred meters and, in some case, even pain or discomfort, at least not in the set and is a task common across all possi- up to one mile. Of course environmental of ranges expected in maritime scenarios. Rear Admiral (retd) ITN, ble missions, including also the case of conditions (wind, air temperature, humid- Acoustic communication should also be in- Chairman Europeran Working Group on Non-Lethal Wapons* self-protection of merchant vessels. It is ity, background noise) have a major influ- tegrated with optical means, supplement- of foremost importance also to avoid that ence on the outcome. Messages can be ing the action in case of some unfavorable careless tourists or fishermen could be pre-recorded in different languages. How- condition (cross wind, background noise, confused for threatening pirates or ter- ever, despite some over-optimistic adver- language barrier). Green laser beams can be visible at night-dusk several miles on-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Despite a common origin, there are many Speaking of naval forces, there are three away. In full daylight they are anyway vis- were initially developed for significant differences between maritime main areas of concern: ible at hundreds of meters. At night-dusk land-based operations both of and land-based NLW.  Afloat Force Protection in port or a laser beam can also provide some kind N of “offensive glaring”, temporary affecting military and police forces (riot control, The sea inherently provides freedom of choke points (i.e. when determining check point, etc), yet the evolution of the movement and there is no check point or intent is a pre-requisite before esca- normal vision (and therefore the capability current scenarios require NLW as well for road-bridge to block. Additionally is much lating); to drive a boat or to aim a weapon) with- naval operations. In this case we should easier to puncture a tire or to stop a ve-  Maritime Law Enforcement and MIO- out risking to cause any permanent eye keep in mind that there are two significant hicle than a propeller or a vessel. This, MSO (i.e. when the requirement is to damage. Today solutions are available gaps. First, naval personnel are not yet in turn, implies that the required range is arrest, not to kill); with 5W output power (LaserSec Medu- fully aware of the needs and roles of NLW. much longer.  Supporting a Boarding Team during sa), compared to the mere 250mW being Second, the lack of firm and well defined The sea is also an harsh environment and non-cooperative boarding (in this case used by many legacy systems, therefore requirements has, until now, slowed down additional precautions must be taken in with basic requirements not very dif- extending both range and effectiveness. both the development and the acquisition order to avoid unwanted casualties, on ferent from those of army and police Flash bang munitions are also a possible processes. both sides. forces). solution for navy-coast guard vessels. 40mm grenade launchers can fire a mu- nition set to explode at 300m from the vessel (Combined Systems Inc., JNLWM * The EWG-NLW is an organization composed of governmental bodies from 14 European countries: military, police, national research centers, universities. The 4090-3), producing a loud bang and a EWG-NLW acts as forum to exchange information and promote cooperation in this field; supports the EDA’s Non-Lethal Capability Project Team (NLC-PT) bright flash, yet without risk of undesired and the International Law Enforcement Forum (ILEF). 38 39 the US Navy-Coast Guard requirement and an opposed boarding requires care- called for 50m range) and was procured ful planning and potentially dangerous by the Singaporean Coast Guard Police. execution. The only possible available TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES The second, e2v Safe-Stop, offers similar solutions are, apparently, the use of trail- TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES performances, but the manufacturer says ing ropes to entangle the propeller, though it could achieve up to 200m range with fu- this is not an easy operation anyway. ture developments. The third, Diehl HPM The need and requirements for NLW Stopper, is currently being used by many equipping a boarding party are not very al waters is likely hard to be welcome in armies and police forces worldwide to pro- different from those experienced in their many countries. Some types of USV are tect convoys and check points. A study land-based counterparts. Batons-sticks, already being proposed with some non-le- for maritime use has been jointly carried pepper spray, and plastic handcuffs are thal armament, such as high-pressure out by Germany and the Royal Australian already frequently issued to the boarding water cannons, multiple 40mm grenade Navy over the last three years. Test results teams. Other possible solutions include launchers with non-lethal munitions, laser are expected by late 2014-early 2015. All flash-bang grenades and blunt-trauma dazzlers and acoustic devices. these equipments are quite comparable munitions (often a.k.a. rubber bullets or NLW can also have a role to deter under- in terms of weight, volume and power, baton rounds). The main difference with water intruders. Underwater loudspeak- though exploiting different technologies. land units is the need to strictly limit the ers, similar to those used in synchronized A possible game changer was announced, size and weight of any additional burden, swimming, are already available to deliver just few weeks ago: this is (could be) a sort as climbing a ladder with extra load could warning messages. In this case, howev- of man-portable rifle-shaped RF emitter become rather unpleasant… The Belgian er, the main problem lies on reliable de- designed by DefTech, said to be capable FN manufactures a scaled-down variant tection, rather than causing effects. to stop an engine at over 200m. During of its well-known FN-303 non-lethal ri- trials, in Slovakia, it achieved the result fle firing plastic bullets with a gas bottle, at 65 m using only 25% of the available rather than traditional cartridges. Its com- power. Again, some more reliable details pact design was especially developed for should be available soon. boarding parties, and in fact, is issued to Today there is no way to stop a larger the Belgian teams. Tear gas can also be craft or a vessel, if not firing warning shots a possibility but implies the use of gas across the bow, or firing disabling shots masks and its employment inside closed (possibly inert rounds)into the engines, or spaces must be carefully controlled to splinters or collateral damage. The mes- boat running in parallel course with ranges storming it with assault boarding team. All avoid reaching of dangerous concentra- sage delivered by a loud nearby explosion usually limited to 15-20m. A new solution the three possibilities have inherent risks: tions and risks of suffocation. (i.e. stop or else) is easily understood was recently announced extending the ef- warning shots can be ignored; disabling Among the future developments one across the entire spectrum of different fective range up to some 200 m. There fire can cause serious collateral damage; should include the integration of some languages and cultures. are ongoing studies to develop also a NLW within the Combat Management Most important the above systems solution deploying a floating anchor, with Systems, with remote control, stabili- (acoustic-optical-flash bang) can be easily a drag force of a couple of tons. zation, and so on. These could include arranged in sets to be moved between the The other possibility is to stop the boat by acoustic hailing devices, laser dazzlers, deployed units and even issued to small firing a slug into the engine block. This multiple grenade launchers. As frigates craft or to Vessel Protection Detachments. is possible, and the method is currently and other men-of-war are frequently be- If the warning proved insufficient, then used by the US Coast Guard and other ing used in MSO and MIO, the addition escalation of force becomes a priority. services, but of course poses some inher- of such a capability would seems a very He is a graduate of the Italian Naval Academy, which he According to the Rules of , Engagement, ent danger of causing collateral damages reasonable evolution. attended from 1972 to 1976, and has degrees from Genoa the available time-space margins, and and requires anyway to run parallel to the Unmanned surface vehicles (USV) can State University, as well as an MBA from the Bocconi Post- the tactical situation, then the command- escaping boat and fire at very short range offer a solution for some situations, es- graduate School in Milan. He attended the senior officer staff ing officer can either resolve to use other to achieve the much needed precision. pecially, though not limited to, harbor course at the Italian Naval War College. He served at sea from 1978 to 1983 on different units both of the Italian and non-lethal means, or step directly up to A much more technologically advanced and costal security. Most of the avail- U.S. navies (ITS Audace DDG 551; ITS Andrea Doria CLG lethal firearms. solution is instead going to reach the op- able methods to stop a boat require a 553; ITS Lupo FF 564; ITS Libeccio FF 572; USS Conyngham Stopping a boat without firing to kill and erators rather soon. Radio-Frequency close approach, with some potential risk DDG 17; and USS Biddle CG 34). As a weapon systems destroy is one of the most challenging (RF) engine stoppers can influence the for a manned patrol boat. An USV fitted engineer, he worked in the field of procurement of combat systems at different levels of responsibility, including the staff difficulties naval security forces are fac- electronics of any modern engine, caus- with somne kinds of NLW can solve the of the National Armament Director, Department of Policy of Ar- ing. Few solutions are available, though ing it to stop without any risk. Of course problem and avoid dangerous situations. maments, International Cooperation; head of the International effective range is still very limited. Some the method doesn’t work in case of old Additionally, an USV can even “bump” a Matters at the Naval Armaments Directorate; and the director services operate entanglers, these are carburetor engines. There are currently at suspect in order to stop it. The fitting of of a joint C4I agency. Since 1999, Annati has worked continuously in the field of non-lethal weapons. In pneumatic launchers with a sort of rope- least three different solutions being evalu- NLW on an unmanned platform is also March 2012, he became chairman of the European Working Group on NLW. Annati retired from active duty on March 1, 2011, but continues to be a constant contributor to many net capable to entangle the propeller(s) of ated, respectively made in US, in UK and more likely to be accepted by public opin- defense publications. He has authored a number of books and studies on defense-related matters, a escaping boat. They are quite effective, in Germany. The first, APElc Footlocker, ion and policy-makers, as the very idea of is frequently involved in lectures and presentations to both military and civilian education centers, and but should be launched from a chasing proved to be effective at 10-15m (though armed robots freely roaming in the coast- regularly takes part in international symposia and conferences.

40 41 OPERATIONAL ISSUES OPERATIONAL ISSUES

During ongoing NATO Navies are conducting, and will continue naval operations, the to take part in, MSO and Law Enforce- ment, andtherefore crews need to be ap- primary activities propriately trained. NATO ONGOING NAVAL OPERATIONS Maritime Security is based on two pillars: warships will under- ▪ The first is Maritime Situational Aware- ness which requiresan understanding take when conducting of what is happening at sea anda will- MARI­TIME SECURITY MSO operations are: Rear Admiral Eugene ingness to make decisions. Diaz Del Rio ▪ The second is Maritime Security Oper- friendly approach- He was born in Vigo, Spain ations. This involves the coordinated on October 11, 1961. He & joi­ned the Navy in 1980 use of civilian, naval and other military es, Maritime Securi- and in 1985 he graduated assets, along with cooperation with as Second Lieutenant of other forces and agencies. ty Awareness Visits the General Navy Corps. LAW ENFORCEMENT He served on several Navy After analyzing the Mission and Lines of (MSAV) and Board- units, Frigates, Corvettes and Patrol Boats and Operation of the two ongoing NATO naval- he was assigned to the Tactical and Training operations, and highlighting the point that ings. Any of these ac- Program Center of the Fleet being responsible now and in the futurenavies will continue for the "Principe de Asturias" aircraft carrier pro- by Eugene Diaz del Rio tivities could resultin a gram and to the Fleet Training Center (CEVA- Rear Admiral (OF-6), ESP N to conduct Maritime Security Operations, CO) as head of Above Water Warfare (AWW) COMSNMG2 considers the practical ele- branch. He also took part in the KUWAIT Liber- detention. ation War in 1990, as well as in deployments of ments of conducting these operations. NATO'S Standing Naval Forces (STANAVFOR- The warship has a peculiar status within When required, deten- LANT and STANAVFORMED). As a Lieutenant Rear Admiral Eugene Diaz del Rio is the former Commander of the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (COMSNMG2). During his Command he has executed he commanded fast patrol boat "Laya" and both NATO ongoing Naval Operations: Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) and Operation Ocean Shield (OOS). In OAE he has assumed duty as CTG440.03 to tionsare always con- served on board FFG "Reina Sofia" attending execute four deterrence SURGES. From December 2013 to June 2014 he has been responsible for commanding the NATO Counter-Piracy Operation –as CTF the training at the Royal Navy FOST in Portlant. 508– in the Indian Ocean. ductedin accordance He served as Chief of Staff of the 41st Frigate Squadron (Santa Marfa Class Frigates) and with national laws and he was Staff Operations Officer of the NATO'S The basis of the following article is the lecture of Rear Admiral Eugene Diaz del Rio during the 5th NMIOTC Annual Conference Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean regulations. Naval Sea (STANAVFORMED). He took Command of Corvette "Vencedora" with which he partici- n his lecture COMSNMG2 starts with Even though navies have to be prepared pated in operation"COHERENT BEHAVIOUR" crews are required to integrated in the EUROMARFOR. He was then a strategic approach to Maritime Se- for high intensity operations, the most like- assigned to the Military Cabinet of the Minister curity. He highlights the importance ly are those operations related to Maritime follow national ju- of Defense and was promoted to Commander I on July 1, 2004. Then, he was appointed to the of the High Seas as a Global Common, Security. dicial protocols and NATO Maritime Component Command (MCC) as well as the need to keep open the Sea The aim of Maritime Security is two-fold: the UNCLOS and other Protocols, giving Staff at Northwood (U.K.), in the N3 Division, Lines of Communications, one of the pri- ▪ To ensure legitimate activities at sea her the right to conduct visits to ships un- procedures. A strict where he dealt with all Nato Response Force mary ways for countries to continue devel- are allowed tocontinue without illegal issues, Operational Planning and Maritime Sit- der certain circumstances. During ongo- adherence to national uational Awareness, and in 2007 he took Com- opment and globalization. He also takes interference ing NATO naval operations, the primary mand of the Frigate "Mendez Nunez". During into account that most human beings live ▪ Toprevent the use of the seas for il- activities warships will undertake when regulations is vital to this Command he was deployed to the Indian inside 100 nm of a coastline, meaning that legal activities, whether at sea or en- Ocean integrated in the Royal Navy ORION-OB conducting MSO operations are: friendly conduct a detention Task Group. He also conducted antipiracy op- the majority of crises of the future will be- abled ashore from the sea. approaches, Maritime Security Aware- erations off the Somali Coast and took part in ing the littoral environment. Secondly Rear-Admiral Diaz del Rio ana- ness Visits (MSAV) and Boardings. Any of successfully. several NATO and national exercises. On April lyzes the strategic scenario from a naval 2009 he was posted to the Spanish Navy Gen- these activities could resultin a detention. eral Staff as Branch Head for Strategic Plans, stand point, and he highlights that: we are When required, detentionsare always where he was promoted to Captain. After the in a multipolar world, where it is impera- conductedin accordance with national Navy Evaluation process he was selected to tive to have access to, and the use of, the be promoted to Rear Admiral and designated laws and regulations. Naval crews are the Spanish Navy candidate to Command the Global Common. required to follow national judicial proto- SNMG-2 during the Spanish Rotation 2013- He also affirms that being in a complex, cols and procedures. A strict adherence 2014. He is specialist on Naval Combat Sys- changeable and uncertain environment, tems Software, Tactical Action Officer and he to national regulations is vital to conduct a graduated at the Naval War College. He is there are two scenarios for navies: detention successfully. married and he has five children. He is fond of ▪ Deterrence & Defence (high intensity) The main conclusion that the COMSN- dinghy sailing and flying radio controlled aircraft models. ▪ Maritime Security (low intensity). MG2 reaches in his lectureis:

42 43 and other weapons of opportunity, includ- ing firearms used as blunt weapons. Proficiency in close combat is one of the OPERATIONAL ISSUES fundamental and most difficult building OPERATIONAL ISSUES blocks for training the modern soldier. Archaeological studies have shown that the attrition rate of close-quarter clashes which characterized endemic tribal war- Moreover, one of the underlying principles or crew control during the inspection of a fare throughout human history produced used in developing the method of close suspect vessel, may limit the use of dead- casualty rates of up to 60%, far in excess combat described herein is that military ly weapons. Close combat training can of those typical in modern warfare1. Close personnel "must use the same type of save the lives of both soldiers and oppo- combat has not changed over the millen- movement and the same tactics, wheth- nents when an unexpected confrontation nia; a Roman legionary facing his oppo- er the practitioner is armed or unarmed, occurs. Maritime nent in a hand-to-hand encounter was armored or unarmored, whether battling subject to the same stress and terror as alone or in a group, fighting one opponent Patterns of Escalation and Related the modern combatant today. This dis- or many, whether on the battlefield itself, Countermeasures Close Combat tinction provides us with an opportunity for or in a civil disturbance"2. Under stress, Military personnel involved in interdiction study, as the historical and archaeological combatants will revert to their training, missions are faced with an array of vio- by Kostas Dervenis* records offer abundant material and evi- and thus such training must be applica- lence in their task, ranging from complete Engineer dence of the techniques chosen as most ble under all circumstances. This same compliance to lethal force. It is taken effective in close combat. philosophy can and must extend to every for granted that operators employing the Close combat on the ocean makes its own environment encountered, and thankfully methods outlined in this article may be Introduction lethal and non-lethal methods, or simple persons using, natural weapons (hands, particular demands: seawater and waves what is directly applicable to the maritime responding to, or investigating, a poten- Of the tactics and strategies of warfare, escape and de-escalation of the confron- fingers, elbows, knees, feet, teeth, etc). make for unsure footing, and freedom of environment is typically applicable to the tial threat that may represent a clear and close combat refers to a physical confron- tation, excluding the actual discharge of Armed techniques involve those applied movement is restricted to that offered by confines of urban battle as well. present danger to allied States, as defined tation between two or more persons that firearms. Unarmed techniques involve with, or against a person or persons us- hulls, bulkheads, walkways, and cramped Soldiers are by definition "violence pro- by international law and with the full au- may involve armed or unarmed fighting, those applied with, or against a person or ing, classical blunt and edged weapons compartments. Boats and skiffs present fessionals;" it is therefore crucial that thority of their mission. In addition, Homer unique challenges, and require specific military personnel begin their tenure by teaches us that the sight of weapons may methods of stability, motion, and secu- understanding the drivers and processes incite men to violence simply because of rity. In addition, ships today are almost involved in the escalation of force in the their physical presence3. Military person- by default fabricated from steel and other human animal. Moreover, different levels nel entering an arena bearing arms may metal alloys; as a result, the possibility of of force may be required in environments thus appear to subjects as the manifes- collateral damage increases exponentially where conflict may rapidly change from tation of aggression regardless of their in- in many circumstances, and extreme care non-lethal to lethal, or simply dissipates tent. Under this premise, the progression must be taken to prevent outcomes that over a matter of hours; many military op- of force may be arrayed as in Table 14. could unwittingly injure or kill due to un- erations, such as peacekeeping missions wanted impact. In short, the environment inherent to maritime close combat is one Level Description Actions the military operator must adapt to, much 1 Compliant Verbal Commands like any marine professional, whether fish- Resistant Verbal de-escalation, Physical de-escala- erman or captain of a merchant vessel. 2 (Passive) tion, Once again, however, the historicity of Physical relocation, Non-Lethal close maritime close combat offers an abun- combat techniques. dance of material that can be evaluated for the resolution or termination of a po- Resistant Non Lethal and submission close combat tential threat. Applicable techniques and 3 (Active) techniques, Physical de-escalation, Verbal tactics used in the 16th-18th centuries to de-escalation counter piracy and other maritime threats Assaultive Submission close combat techniques, have been carefully reviewed in relation 4 (Bodily Harm) Physical de-escalation, to modern-day needs and scenarios, and Verbal de-escalation the results applied to the method outlined 5 Combative Lethal close comat techniques in this article. (Deadly force) Table 1. The Progression of Force

1 Lawrence H. Keeley, War Before Civilization: the Myth of the Peaceful Savage (Oxford University Press, 1996). 2. Kostas Dervenis, presentation to NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre, 21/2/2014. * Kostas Dervenis is responsible for preserving and promoting Pammachon (traditional Greek close combat) under the Ministry of Culture’s Hellenic Federation 3. αυτός γάρ οφέλκεται άνδρα σίδηρος - steel itself draws men to violence, Homer, the Odyssey, Book 19. of Pankration Athlima, and works closely with the Hellenic Armed Forces and NMIOTC 4. Paraphrased from Close Combat, U.S. Marine Corps, (MCRP) 3-02B, 1999.

44 45 Today we are aware that the neurophy­ The triune brain theory is based on ex- siology involved in the progression of perimental data that seems to accurately force follows distinct patterns. Neuro- reflect the stages involved in the escala- OPERATIONAL ISSUES scientist Dr. Paul D. MacLean put forth a tion of violence7. However, the method of OPERATIONAL ISSUES sophisticated hierarchical theory known close combat outlined in this article goes as the “triune brain,” based on the as- one step beyond to utilize a “Quadrune sumption that the human brain actually Brain” model that contains Dr. McLean’s integrates three different layers, and that three main centers, but also includes the in conjunction with repetitive direct blows quarry, however, they will then back off each layer represents a specific evolution- autonomic nervous system as a separate and minimal use of tactics; violence and allow the animal to exsanguinate ary level ("triune" comes from Latin, tri + entity. The autonomic nervous system against violence and force against force in and weaken before consuming it. unus (one), and means "three in one")5. comprises the sympathetic, parasympa- other words. Much effort is expended on There is a simple, sound reason for MacLean’s three-brain model links the thetic, and enteric nervous systems, each increasing the endurance, strength, flexi- this: there are no hospitals in Nature. differences in behavior from each major of which have been found to have distinct bility, speed, skill, etc, of the practitioner. Despite being an apex predator of the functional area to the evolution of ani- effects in combat. The enteric nervous History teaches us, however, that veteran seas and having no natural predators, mal life, arguing that the brain effectively system is of particular interest, is capable soldiers are calm in battle, and that they the great white protects itself first and has three parts that are representative of of autonomous functions such as the co- utilize targeted attacks that expend a min- foremost. Military personnel must fol- their stage of evolution: the reptilian or ordination of reflexes, and can and does imum amount of energy and resources. low similar principles. Lethal combat old brain, the emotional centre or "limbic" operate independently of the brain and Why would anyone consider that hand-to- has two central identifying criteria: (“old mammalian”) brain, and the neocor- the spinal cord. For this reason it was hand combat is somehow different? all variables cannot be predicted with tex or "neomammalian brain". The lack of described as a "second brain" by its dis- While not belittling or disregarding the im- surety, and no living animal, including similar chemistry and anatomy of these coverer, and may in fact provide the “gut portance of increasing a soldier's capabil- man, will submit to lethal force without three evolutionary formations often gives feeling” all experienced military personnel ities for military operations, if ferocity, en- trying to damage its attacker as much rise to communicative conflicts between come to trust8. durance, and strength alone guaranteed as possible in the process. the systems (MacLean, 1977), and these In accord with the above, and to address survival, then the dominant species on the Let us provide some common exam- conflicts are important in understanding the escalation of violence outlined in the planet would have been the cave bear, not ples of things to avoid. A "boxer's frac- escalation and the type of violence mili- “Progression of Force” diagram, training homo sapiens. ture" is a fracture of the fourth and/or tary personnel will be faced with under for military personnel is delivered in com- The cave bear (Ursus spelaeus) was a fifth metacarpal bones from striking an specific circumsta­nces. partmentalized modules that target spe- species of bear that lived in Europe and object with a closed fist (typically a hu- The reptilian complex, the oldest of the cific applications. Thus, our instructional became extinct about 27,000 years ago. man skull). Boxer's fractures represent three, includes the brainstem and the ce­ method has distinct units for non-lethal It is likely that primitive man drove these over one half of all metacarpal injuries, rebellum; this center is activated in cas- combatives (centering on escape, move- bears to extinction. How did mankind and males are nearly fifty percent more es of pure survival, of lethal close com- ment, avoidance, and minimal physical face off against an angry predator roughly likely to sustain fracture from a punch bat. The limbic brain emerged in the first injury to opponents), submission com- ten times his weight and with far greater than females9. A boxer's fracture in mammals (MacLean coined the term from batives (centering on controlling resisting ferocity, endurance, strength, etc, within combat could result in the operator the Latin "limbus" or girdle, because its adversaries who may offer injurious but the limiting confines of a cave using Stone being unable to properly aim and fire components were wrapped around the less-than-lethal violence), and finally le- Age weapons? It is here, in our most his weapon, placing his entire squad brain stem). Its main structures are the thal combatives (centering on actual close primitive past, that we must seek for the at risk, and the statistical probability of hippocampus, the amygdala, fornix, and combat and rapid termination of the ad- basis of our close combat method. More- occurrence increases with each punch the hypothalamus; the limbic brain is in- versary). Each of these modules corre- over, professionals engaged in maritime thrown. volved with what has been termed “social sponds to a particular brain center: during interdiction in particular must adapt to the The same lesson must be applied to violence” and statistically does not end in non-lethal combatives, the neocortex is degree of violence they will encounter; re- every part of our anatomy. Eyes can death, but takes place with the goal of es- usually dominant; in submission combat- liance on a “ferocious response” may be be severely damaged by fingers claw- tablishing hierarchy within the pack6. Fi- ives, the opponent’s limbic system enters completely inappropriate for the situation ing in desperation. Groins and necks nally, the two large cerebral hemispheres into play; while for lethal combatives the at hand. The main principles of our meth- can (and have) been bitten through; the of the human brain (the neocortex) are oldest part of our nervous system, the rep- od are thus based on the following criteria: human jaw and teeth retain the capac- responsible for the development of lan- tilian brain, is dominant. ity to slice through muscle and flesh. guage, abstract thought, imagination, 1. Self-protection Although the human skull is relatively consciousness, science, culture, and civ- Main Tactical Principles Great white sharks are ambush pred- lightly built, Australian scientists found ilization – as well as tactical planning for Influenced by combat sports such as ators; their attack flows from a secure that our jaws are at least 40 percent combat, weapons design, and strategic mixed martial arts, many close combat position outside the line of sight of their more efficient than those of the chimp, concealment. methods popular today advocate a “fe- prey and then proceeds with single gorilla and orangutan10. rocious” response to the arbitrary attack, devastating impact. Having bitten their As a result, all tactics and techniques

5. MacLean, P.D., The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Functions, Springer; 1990 7. Wiest, Gerald, Neural and Mental Hierarchies, Front. Psychol., 26 November 2012 | doi: 10.3389/ fpsyg. 2012.00516 edition 8. Gershon, Michael, The Second Brain, Harper Collins, NY, 1998 6. Miller, Rory, Facing Violence: Preparing for 9. Jeanmonod, R. K., Jeanmonod, D., Damewood, S., Perry, C., Powers, M., and Lazansky, V. 2011. Punch injuries: Insights into intentional closed fist injuries. the Unexpected, YMAA Publication Center Western Journal of Emergency Medicine 12(1). (2011) 10. Stephen Wroe, Senior Research Fellow, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, Proceedings of the Royal Society. 46 47 curvature once again attempting to elephant seals with a large bite to the "straighten." hindquarters (which is the main source b. Employ diaphragmatic breathing of the seal's mobility) and wait for the OPERATIONAL ISSUES or deep abdominal breathing, marked seal to bleed to death before returning OPERATIONAL ISSUES by expansion of the abdomen rather to devour their prey. Wolves attack than the chest when breathing. This their prey in a similar manner. The type of breathing will allow great- pack attacks its quarry as a unit, tear- employed in close combat must, by Military personnel must become like er amounts of oxygen to enter the ing at its hindquarters and legs from the definition, leave no weak points vulner- the wolf, knowing that they are power- lungs and bloodstream using slower rear until it falls to the ground, where- able to attack. Military personnel must ful and maintaining that power through breathing rates. Moreover, if the op- upon the wolves proceed to immobilize operate from the standpoint that their constant exercise, but fully respecting erator is wearing anti-ballistic armor and then safely devour it. foe is armed, that hidden weapons and their prey and its capacity to injure such as a plate carrier, this method During close combat, the human body natural weapons can and will be de- them. will allow for much more relaxed is capable of sustaining incredible ployed, that tactical errors will occur, breathing and movement overall11. amounts of damage. The only safe and that no opening in the process of 3. Maintaining breath, stance, and If correctly employing these two meth- way for the soldier to engage a threat is threat negation can or will be permitted. mental calm ods, the operator will find that he can to prevent counter-tactics by incapac- Animals respond to threats in complex begin to place physiological respons- itating the opponent's foundation and 2. Avoiding hubris ways. The acute stress response is a es, normally exclusively associated disabling his structure. Military failures resulting from the fatal physiological reaction that occurs in re- with the autonomic nervous system, In practical terms, this could mean sim- flaw of hubris have profound costs, and sponse to an attack. under his conscious control. Agnostic ply breaking and controlling an oppo- combatant commanders must main- In human beings, the reaction begins in researchers and repeated laboratory nent's balance prior to the execution tain a continuous effort to detect and the sympathetic nervous system. Side testing have, over the past thirty years, of a particular technique, controlling prevent hubris in the course of tactical effects can include increased heart established that such capabilities lie the opponent's head, injuring an ag- decisions. rate and rapid breathing, tunnel vision, within our potential12. gressor's legs to disable his capacity The first line of defense against the per- bladder relaxation, shaking, dilated The operator must employ the above in to stand, disabling the delivery system ils of hubris is an understanding of its pupils, a cessation of the digestive pro- of a particular weapon (severely injur- conjunction with a balanced, centered Figure 1. Melee and natural weapons used in hand-to-hand combat 14 very existence as part of the larger con- cess, and hearing loss. None of these stance in which the hips bear the weight ing an elbow for example will prevent text of human character. Early Greek are desirable in the midst of a military of equipment and arms. He must learn use of a knife in that particular hand; civilization originally viewed hubris as a operation. to move smoothly so that wave motion breaking the collarbone will prevent an in the chest (and heart) and gone on to out the process; this involves very de- grave act centered on self-gratification, The parasympathetic nervous system and confined quarters do not limit his aggressor from lifting the related arm, terminate their foes (sometimes before liberate choices, angles of approach, such as Icarus flying too close to the works in opposition to return the body mobility or effectiveness on ships and etc), disabling sensory input (striking expiring themselves). This is why the and methods of engagement. In de- sun. In the course of military training, to homeostasis after fight or flight. boats. In short, he must move as if the eardrums or the eyes), and simi- previous step (disabling the opponent's veloping our method, we learned from soldiers are encouraged to think of Therefore augmentation of parasym- wearing medieval armor on the battle- lar tactics. The methodology through foundation and structure) is all import- nature, from the practice of hunters and themselves as "elite," "better than," etc, pathetic functions is a primary tool for field. Our method incorporates distinct which the operator employs any par- ant during close combat, and, as we butchers throughout human history, because only by retaining that mental the operator to "balance out" the burst drills and techniques through which this ticular close combat technique or tac- have seen, is the method that is unilat- and from the European record of close image will they eventually reach a point of energy brought into being by the type of movement can be learned. tic on an aggressor should follow this erally followed by all predators in nature combat over the past three millennia. where their capabilities reflect the ide- sympathetic nervous system under Each of the course modules (non-lethal sequence: 1) Displacement of the po- to secure their prey. Only an attack on als they are striving for. But in close stress. The operator can support this combatives, submission combatives, tential threat, 2) Arrest of the delivery the brain stem itself, or secondarily, on Epilogue combat, it is important that the soldier function and preserve a state of calm and lethal combatives) relate to a par- system, 3) Incapacitation of the Foun- the central nervous system, will result Combat within close quarters may in- not overestimate these same capabil- by maintaining a proper upright spine ticular brain center that is typically ac- dation, 4) Disablement of the Structure, in immediate threat termination. clude lethal and nonlethal weapons and ities. and utilizing deep breathing. tivated with regard to the progression 5) Execution. Given the physiological responses in- methods depending upon the restrictions Let us take another lesson from na- To counteract the effects of the fight- of force. During social violence, for ex- herent to the acute stress response, imposed by civilian law, military rules of ture. Wolves hunting in the wild are or flight response, military personnel ample, it is the limbic system that typi- 5. Attacking the opponent's central for example, an aggressor may not feel engagement, and personal ethical codes. very careful to choose the most nu- must: cally holds sway and submission of the nervous system pain in a particular limb or in a particu- It may result in a one-on-one duel (unlike- tritious food source available that is a. Roll their coccyx forward so that opponent that is the ultimate goal. Stu- Contrary to popular belief, individuals lar region of the body during combat. ly) or (typically) denigrate into a melee most easily obtained without danger to the lumbar vertebrae are "stretched dents are taught methods by which the engaged in lethal combat can sustain Enemy personnel have proceeded to as shown in Figure 1 from 1905, where themselves. Despite being apex pred- out," as if attempting to "straighten" neocortex, limbic system, and reptilian severely damaging wounds and still bite into a NATO soldier's genitals af- anything can happen at any time, and all ators, they will always attack the weak- the lumbar curvature. The same complex are kept in constant balance. continue to fight on, even successfully ter having had half their arm blown off weapons are used every time. Indeed, est prey at the most opportune time, in motion is simultaneously applied to delivering lethal force against their op- by a grenade and one eye gouged out the term for massed close combat derives such a fashion as to prevent exposure the cervical vertebrae, with the chin 4. Incapacitating the opponent's foun- ponents. Subject to the empowering during hand-to-hand combat13. The from the French mêlée (which comes from to that animal's defenses. In short, the pulling inwards, the crown of the skull dation/disabling structure boost of the hormones delivered during only secure method for attacking an the Latin miscēre, "to mix"), and refers to wolf lacks hubris. moving "upwards," and the cervical Great white sharks immobilize northern the acute stress response, police offi- aggressor's central nervous system is groups of warriors interlocked in close cers and criminals alike have been shot by retaining conscious control through- combat devolving into a chaotic scenario.

11. While traditionally associated with Zen Buddhism, this method of breathing was also used by Greek hoplite warriors wearing bronze breastplates in ancient times. Bronze armour is not flexible; a soldier wearing a tight-fitting metal cuirass was obliged to "breathe with his belly." 13. U.S. Army Staff Sergeant D.B. in Fallujah, Iraq, 2004, during Operation Phantom Fury. 12. 0http://www.icemanwimhof.com/science 14. Rencontre d'Apaches et d'agents de police sur la place de la Bastille, Bibliothèque nationale de France, 1905.

48 49 operating on a balcony or with our back to a guardrail. Careful tactical consideration of all these parameters is what can make 5TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OPERATIONAL ISSUES a method of close combat successful during maritime interdiction - or not.

In accord with the main tactical principles combat we employ must be fully function- Kostas Dervenis outlined previously, because anything can al under the conditions portrayed in Figure is an Engineer, and does happen during close combat, 1. Moreover, we must make these condi- corporate profes- because we cannot assume that there will tions even more threatening by entering in sional, and interna- be only one opponent, because we must the factor of armor: our opponents may be tionally-known martial assume that the opponent(s) is (are) carry- fully armored while we are not, or armor arts instructor. He is responsible for ing concealed and unconcealed weapons, may hinder our movements but not that of preserving and pro- because our mobility may be restricted by our opponents. We may have to contend moting Pammachon space and/or by the press of a crowd, and with the steel walkways and bulkheads of (traditional Greek close combat) under the finally because we must always prepare a ship pressing in upon us, or cold con- Ministry of Culture’s Hellenic Federation of Pankration Athlima, and works closely with for worst case scenarios in the course of crete under our feet and sharp glass at the Hellenic Armed Forces and NMIOTC. military operations, the system of close our sides in urban warfare. We may be

NMIOTC 5th Annual Conference Icebreaker

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Visit of the US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff , General Martin E. Dempsey

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NMIOTC 5th Annual Conference Reception to the Army Museum, Villa Clodio at Chromonastiri

NMIOTC 5th Annual Conference Excursion to Knossos

54 55 HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS

Visit of Foreign Defence Attachés, from Egypt, Albania, Belgium, France, U.A.E, U.S.A., Spain, Italy, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Turkey.

Visit of the NATO SNMG1 Commander, Commodore Nils Andreas Stensǿnes NOR (N)

Visit of the Australian Defence Attaché to Southern Europe, Captain Paul K. Mandziy RAN Visit of the Turkish Naval Attaché, Commander Halis Tunc (TUR (N) 56 57 HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS

Visit of the Director of the Multinational Logistics Coordination Centre (MLCC) Prague, Colonel Miroslav Pelican CZE (A)

Visit of the Defence Attaché of India accredited to Greece, Group Captain Pawan Kumar IND (AF)

Visit of the QATARI Delegation, consisted of Br. General (Sea) Tariq Alobaidli, Br, General (Sea) Hamad Al-Kuwari, & Lt Mubarak Visit of the Ambassador of VIET NAM to Greece, His Excellency Mr. Vu Binh Hassan Al-Mosllamani 58 59 HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS HIGH VISIBILITY EVENTS

Visit of the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples, Admiral Mark E. Ferguson III USN, Visit of the Chief of Italian Defence General Staff, Admiral Luigi Binelli Mantelli accompanied by the Chief of Hellenic Navy, Vice Admiral Evangelos Apostolakis GRC (N)

Visit of the Ambassador of INDONESIA, His Excellency Mr. Benny Bahanadewa, escorted by the Minister Counsellor Mr. Yayat Sugiatna 60 61 NMIOTC TRAINING NMIOTC TRAINING

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72 73 NMIOTC TRAINING MWR activities

Excursion for NMIOTC personnel and the families, in a pirate ship

74 75 T T T W 31 31 30 30 NMIOTC T M M W 30 30 29 29 Education and Training T S S M 29 29 28 28 S S S M 28 28 un un 27 27

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22 22 22 22 FORCES'DAY T ARMED HEL F S S 21 21 21 21 WK 21 WK T F F 1 W 20 20 20 20 Inport training phase Exercise phase training Exercise Inport 2015 NIRIIS Underway phase "Phoenix Express 2015" Express phase "Phoenix Underway DINA NOBLE "Phoenix Express 2015" (TBC) 2015" Express "Phoenix 05 - Jun) May (25 WK 33 WK T T T 1 2 3 W 19 19 19 19 WK 08 WK WK 46 WK T M 6 W W 18 18 18 18 S T T M 17 17 17 17

S S M M 16 16 16 16 MAY Day Mary's Virgin F S S S 15 15 15 15 AUGUST T F S S 14 14 14 14 National Holidays National NOVEMBER WK 20 WK T F F 1 W 13 13 13 13 FEBRUARY 3 WK 32 WK T T T W 12 12 12 12 WK 07 WK WK 45 WK T M 6 W W 11 11 11 11 10 S T T M 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 S S M M 8 8 8 8 F S S S 7 7 7 7 T F S S WK 19 WK 6 6 6 6 T F F 1 3 8 3 W Unit Training WK 31 WK 5 5 5 5 T T T W 1 WK 06 WK 44 WK 4 4 4 4 T M W W 10 11 3 3 3 3 S T T M

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NCB (HNGS) NCB NAB (NMIOTC) NAB Conference Annual NMIOTC FPC NOBLE DINA DINA NOBLE FPC First of May of First

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ACTIVITIES FEB MAY AUG NOV F S S 31 31 31 T T F F 3 30 30 30 30 Draft NMIOTC ProgramWork ofDraft 2015 NMIOTC 2015)(DNPOW T T W W 29 29 29 29

WK 31 WK National Day National WK 05 WK 18 WK 43 WK T T 2 W W 28 28 28 28 11 T T M M 27 27 27 27 S S M M 26 26 26 26 Conference - Meeting S S S S 25 25 25 25 F F S S 24 24 24 24 T T F F 23 23 23 23 WK 17 WK WK 30 WK T T W W 22 22 22 22 WK 04 WK 42 WK T T W W 21 21 21 21 T T M M 20 20 20 20 S S M M 19 19 19 19 Exercise S S S S 18 18 18 18 F F S S 17 17 17 17 T T F F 16 16 16 16 WK 16 WK 29 WK JULY T T W W 15 15 15 15 APRIL JANUARY WK 03 WK OCTOBER 41 WK

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10 Holy Water Rites Water Holy 6 6 6 6 T T M M 2 5 5 5 5 S S M M 4 4 4 4 S S S S Training 3 3 3 3 F F S S Updated 20 Oct. 2014 20 Oct. Updated During P.E. Phase15 Underway NMIOTC Officers will man CMOC Training Tuition Fees on NMIOTC 60-1 Dir WK 14 WK 27 WK

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Course 2000 - Boarding Team 2000 Boarding - Course Classroom (OPS-MA-3210) Issues Course 1000 - Command Team MIO Issues (OPS-MA-3110) 1000 Command - Course (OPS-MA-3110) Issues Team MIO Team 3000 Boarding - Course Practical(OPS-MA-4310) Issues 6000 Weapons - (OPS-MA-4610) Course in Destruction of MIO Mass Course in 7000 support - MIO of Counter (OPS-MA-4710) OPS piracy ► ► ► Course 5000 - Maritime Operational Terminology Course (OPS-MA-2520) Course 5000 MaritimeTerminology - Course Operational in the Maritime Domain 8000 - Course C-IED Course) (Pilot 9000 in - Course Legal Issues MIO Trafficking 10000 Illicit - Course (Pilot) at Sea ► JAN APR JUL OCT 2 1 3 5 6 4 7 8 9 COURSES NAMES (ETOC ID.) (ETOC NAMES COURSES Education and Training Education

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