To Live or To Die - The Struggle of Chinese Film Productions Going Global

Chwen Chwen Chen, PhD, China Media Observatory, University of Lugano, Switzerland. Corresponding author: [email protected]

Zhan Zhang, PhD candidate, China Media Observatory, University of Lugano, Switzerland

Vincenzo De Masi, PhD candidate, University of Zurich, Switzerland.

Gianluigi Negro, PhD candidate, China Media Observatory, University of Lugano, Switzerland

Abstract In recent years the Chinese film industry has experienced a real boom both in box office takings and the number of films produced each year. However, despite this domestic expansion, only a few Chinese productions have won over international – above all, western - audiences: Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000) and Zhang Yimou’s Hero (2002) are still the most internationally successful and profitable Chinese film productions. This phenomenon appears to be at odds with the huge investments the Chinese government has made in the film market in recent years with a view to promoting Chinese cultural products abroad under the going out strategy. There are two reasons why Chinese film productions have failed to penetrate international markets: on one hand, there are cultural problems such as the ‘cultural discount’ and the narrative/story-telling techniques; on the other, there are economic and production problems (e.g. marketing strategies). The indirect involvement of politics and propaganda in the production process can also help to explain the failure of Chinese film productions abroad. In this paper we adopt the case study approach and critical/historical analysis to explore and discuss the obstacles Chinese film productions face when they are exported. We also look at Chinese animation films to see whether and how animation film productions differ from feature film productions in their international approach.

Introduction

China's film industry is the third largest in the world, behind India and the US, both in terms of the number of films produced and box office takings. According to the latest data, takings in China reached RMB13.1 billion ($2.1 billion) in 2011, a growth of 29% over 2010. The number of films produced also increased, from 612 to 791 in one year (gov.cn, 2012). Since the structural reform of the film industry in 2003, on average the box office revenue has increased at the remarkable annual rate of 30% and there is still great potential for growth (Tang, 2011a). Alongside the impressive growth of the domestic film market, in recent years China has promoted its films in overseas markets under the so-called ‘going out’ (zouchuqu) policy of culture and media products. This has become a priority for China as it steps up its attempts to export its view of the world, recognizing the "soft power" prowess that US films and television shows wield. Indeed, Chinese filmmakers and the Chinese governmental groups that oversee the film industry believe that film and story-telling can be a powerful tool to introduce the Chinese people and culture to the outside world. However, with a few high-profile exceptions, such as Ang Lee’s 2000 Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, and Zhang Yimou’s 2002 Hero, Chinese films have not made an impact on the world stage, especially with western audiences, and have struggled to meet the challenge of Hollywood productions at home since the first Hollywood blockbuster, The Fugitive, was screened in China in 1994, despite the current quota system of just 20 foreign films allowed for import per year. Chinese films encounter problems of financing, production, distribution, and screening when they are exported and in being recognized in foreign mainstream theaters. It is clear that when Chinese films take to the global stage they are hampered by a bottleneck created by factors that have their roots in the Chinese film industry itself. In this paper we adopt the case study approach and critical/historical analysis to explore and discuss the obstacles that Chinese film productions face as they go abroad. Firstly, we will provide an overview of the changes China’s film industry has undergone in the past 30 years and its role in China’s soft power strategies. Secondly, we will discuss the barriers that could hinder Chinese films as they try to conquer the international and, in particular, the western audience, when released in the US film market. Besides a deficiency of artistic creativity, an inadequate professional marketing strategy, and cultural difference and stereotype barriers, political involvement is another important factor that needs to be taken into consideration when looking at the export of Chinese films and, especially, when considering the trend of film theory which is moving from “understanding the relationship between the moving image and the social world as privileged towards seeing this automatic relationship as politically suspect”, a relationship that “may be understood in retrospect with reference to a great world divide.” (Gaines, 2008). Conclusions will follow in the final part.

The Chinese film industry between propaganda, marketization and soft power

Film productions have deep political, ideological and cultural connotations in Chinese society. They inform cultural policies, which in turn shape the cultural environment in general and market structure in particular. Film production in China is seen as one of several “culture markets” and has always been deemed a product of “the political, economic, military and cultural invasion of the West”, and thus viewed as carrying with it “a deep colonial branding” (Wang, 2003:61). It has therefore always been the government and Communist Party’s mission to indigenize and nationalize the film industry. Following the Communist revolution in 1949, China started to build its own “independent national film system” and banned US films entirely in 1950. Consequently, the protection of the film industry still has a high priority in China’s cultural policies. From the 1950s to the late 1970s films served as the Party-state’s propaganda tool, responding to the Party’s political agenda. In these years film policies were deeply informed and managed by a specific concept of Chinese cinema and Chinese nation. The Ministry of Culture and an entire administration were tasked with overseeing the nationalization of the studios in order to maintain better state control in terms of content and economic production. Mainly targeted at a domestic audience, Chinese films in this phase typically focused on the figure of the gongnongbing (worker – peasant – soldier); this is one of the clearest examples of how the Ministry of Culture communicated a broader policy: the endorsement of clear moral plots, in which figures such as workers, peasants and soldiers were positive while landlords and capitalists were portrayed negatively. In this period the cinema was a medium which conveyed the message that in the People’s Republic of China not all of the citizens were of the “people” (Berry, 1998). During the reform era in the 1980s, the artistic function of films was exalted by the creative Fifth Generation directors (e.g. Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige). As the industry began to face economic pressure, Chinese cinema policies also moved from a planned economy to a more market-oriented one; consequently, entrepreneurs began to invest new resources in this sector which had become profitable. The film industry’s high profit margins and ideological importance meant that the sector was subject both to commercial investment and state control (Wan&Kraus, 2002). The consequence for Chinese filmmakers in this second phase was that creativity could be expressed better also thanks to the easing of political control over culture but some problems also emerged: thanks to the economic reform Chinese consumers had more entertainment choices and the role of films as the leading form of entertainment was significantly eroded. However, with the launch of ‘Main Melody’ films on a large scale after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the function of films as the conveyor of official ideology came to the fore once again. Although the Chinese government has embraced market reforms since the open doors policies were introduced in the late 1970s, these reforms did not extend to the political or cultural arena until the early noughties. In 2002-2003, one year after China joined the World Trade Organization, the Chinese government undertook a wide range of reforms in the film industry. The first move was to end the 50-year monopoly of the state-owned China Film Group, which was transformed into the China Film Group Corporation. At the same time, private film production and distribution companies were allowed to operate. The reforms also allowed foreign film production companies to set up joint ventures and partnerships in China, albeit not independently as they had to forge partnerships with state-owned film production companies and were not allowed to own more than 49% of a joint film production corporation. On the distribution side, in June 2003 the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) granted a trial distribution license to six private companies, breaking the state monopoly of the China Film Group in film distribution. These distributors are the only companies authorized to distribute films in China and only distributors authorized to distribute films nationwide are allowed to distribute foreign films too. All these reforms came into effect in an attempt by the government to reorganize a disastrous distribution system that had been in place for two decades. Indeed, the market had to find solutions to the absence of the old distribution system which was extremely important until the late 1970s because it allowed workplaces and unions to buy blocks of tickets to distribute to workers. After the market reforms, group tickets sales declined dramatically from 70% of the total in the early 1980s to just 20% in 1988. The number of filmgoers in China kept on dropping too, decreasing by more than 30% in 1993. With the aim of boosting the domestic film market, the first Hollywood blockbuster The Fugitive was released in China in 1994 under a revenue-sharing based agreement between the China Film Export and Import Corporation and Warner Bros, and other blockbusters were screened in the following years. Hollywood films quickly made up for the poor performance of the domestic film market, to the detriment of Chinese films which were mostly propaganda-oriented and therefore recorded low box office takings. The nine American films screened in 1995 represented a tiny share of the 269 films screened in Beijing, but they accounted for 40% of the city’s box office takings of $11.4 million. Still today, Hollywood blockbusters hold a lion’s share in the Chinese film market, accounting for between 40% and 45% of the total domestic box offices, despite the quota system of just 20 foreign films on a revenue-sharing basis authorized in China under the WTO agreements. The reforms in the film industry are part of a broader program to transform the culture industries implemented by China in 2003. The state called for the emancipation of culture productions and the development of a ‘socialist advanced culture’. It later borrowed Harvard Professor Joseph Nye’s concept of ‘soft power’ in 2006 to refer to the significance and influence of Chinese culture industries. The government, indeed, hoped to enhance Chinese cultural power and facilitate China’s strong global presence by expanding its cultural influence, compatibly with its economic power. Under the ‘going out’ policy, Chinese media and cultural organizations have been encouraged to go global thanks to huge state economic incentives and investments. The huge effort the Chinese Government has put into its soft power strategies in recent years is clearly demonstrated by the Twelve-Year Plan issued after the 2011 National People’s Congress that confirmed a new economic development model for Chinese economic development. In 2009, China began to implement its economic reform to free itself from its dependence on cheap bulk export productions. In that same year the State Council issued a plan to rescue ten industries, including the “Plan to Boost the Culture Industry” in which the culture industry is seen as one of the most important for China’s economic growth, along with other strategic sectors such as the creative industry, publishing, advertising, cultural exhibitions, digital animated cartoons, filmmaking and entertainment. Moreover, the Twelfth Five-Year Plan officially recognized for the first time the culture industry as a “pillar” industry; however, to accomplish this result the culture industry must grow at a double digit rate and contribute 5% to the country’s GDP by 2015 (Guo, 2010). The internationalization of Chinese films is not a recent trend, nor a characteristic of the ‘going out’ policy. It is acknowledged that the most important period for the Chinese film industry’s internationalization dates back to the so-called Fifth Generation, to which Zhang Yimou belongs, and which undertook a rigorous artistic experiment where the political codes are divorced from the ideological practices of the state and are transformed into signs of cultural identity. Hero’s success comes under the umbrella of what Chen Xiaoming defines “postpolitics” in the Chinese film industry, where “everything is political and nothing is political at one and the same time. Politics is everywhere, and yet it subverts itself at any moment” (Chen et al., 1997). If in the past art served politics, today politics serves art; this is what Chen Xiaoming really means by “postpolitics”, a concept which, according to the author, should be reviewed if China intends to implement a successful and comprehensive soft power strategy, also in the international film industry arena.

Hero, a benchmark for Chinese films going global

Hero, the 2002 film directed by Zhang Yimou, is to date the only mainland China film to reap success both domestically and with Asian and western audiences, and still continues to be the subject of analysis and study of Chinese film studies academics, professionals and policy-makers in terms of its artistic, cultural, aesthetic, social, and political values and implications, as well as its commercial success, in an attempt to imitate and replicate its formula in the more recent Chinese blockbusters pursuing international recognition. ‘Hero’, starring the Chinese film star Jet Li and based on the story of Jing Ke’s assassination attempt on King of Qin in 227 BC, was released in China in October 2002 and at that time it was the most expensive film and highest grossing motion picture in Chinese film history. Indeed, it sold very well, grossing RMB2.5 billion of the RMB9 billion total takings for all films in that year; its box office in the United States and worldwide was excellent too, reaching $170.5 million. According to Rawnsley and Rawnsley (2010), these results were driven by Zhang’s goal to produce a culturally specific and technically sophisticated film that would appeal to both Eastern and Western markets. Hero implemented a strategy oriented both to the global and local market, creating a film that could become a model of a Chinese blockbuster. Zhang used martial arts to unequivocally communicate the Chinese tradition with an undeniable international currency; in other words, he studiously constructed the film’s blockbuster features starting with the cast which included prominent stars famous both in China and abroad such as Jet Li, Tony Leung (best actor award, Cannes Film Festival, 2000), Maggie Cheung (Best Actress award, Berlin Film Festival, 1991, Best Actress Award, Cannes Film Festival, 2004) and Zhang Ziyi (main character in Crouching Tiger). A key role was also played by the crew that worked with Zhang Yimou which included Chris Doyle as cinematographer, already famous for his work with Hong Kong director Wong Kar-Wei; Emi Wada as costume designer, Oscar winner for costumes for the film Ran (1985); Tony Chiung Siu Tung as choreographer, fight choreographer of Crouching Tiger and other famous martial arts films set in Hong Kong; and Tan Dun as music composer, Oscar winner in music composition for Crouching Tiger (2000)1. Not only did Hero record a box office success in mainland China and abroad, it was also a highly “cultured” Chinese film which explored Chinese history with a martial arts theme and expounded on Chinese thought and aesthetics. Some scholars and critics argue that Zhang’s idea to create a Chinese blockbuster was inspired by the success of Ang Lee’s masterpiece Crouching Tiger, but it should be noted that Zhang himself said that: “We began first, and now they say we try to imitate [Ang Lee]2”.

Barriers to Chinese films going abroad

In this section we will discuss the three main broad categories of barriers that hinder the entry of Chinese films into international markets: cultural/artistic, economic and political. These three factors are certainly intertwined and overlap each other but, for the purposes of this study, we will analyze each one separately.

Cultural and artistic barriers

1 J. K. Wah Lau, Hero: China’s response to Hollywood globalization, Jump Cut, No. 49, spring 2009, pag. 5 2 Monkey Peaches 31st March 2002 One characteristic of films - and of media products in general - is that they suffer a cultural discount when traded across international boundaries (Hoskins et al., 2000:127). Cultural discount intervenes when viewers of one territory or culture find it difficult to understand or identify with the content, themes or values of the imported cultural goods because they have a different culture or language, or for other factors (for example, bad translations and dubbing can jeopardize the understanding of foreign films). Differences in cultural values and social norms may also reduce the appeal of foreign films for a local audience. These differences also include technical aspects such as the narrative, or storytelling, which reflects the cultural values intrinsic to local films. Cultural discount, when substantial, reduces the revenue-generating potential in the foreign market and hence hinders trade. From the narrative point of view, Chinese films are typically characterized by long sequences of dialogue, long silences and stills, all elements foreign to Western films whose target is an all-embracing audience. For instance, the latest 2011 Zhang Yimou blockbuster The Flowers of War attempted to meet the international audience’s taste by using a style which is very close to the western one and starring the Oscar-winning actor Christian Bale as the main character. Although from an aesthetic point of view the film follows the artistic evolution of the well-known Chinese director (frames created with care, close-ups used patiently to analyze the characters’ feelings, and the presence of dark places in the interior scenes to highlight an atmosphere of uncertainty and claustrophobia), it is nevertheless characterized by long silences and stills. In addition to long dialogues, humor is another element that makes Chinese films difficult for foreign viewers. Jiang Wen’s 2010 blockbuster Let the bullets fly (Rang Zi Dan Fei), which grossed RMB659 million ($104.2 million) at the box office, can be considered a Chopstick Western3 (or Chopstick Eastern) as its style recalls that of the spaghetti western: in fact, the director Jiang Wen pays clear homage to spaghetti westerns in the scene where the outlaws steal the “railroad car”, a clear allusion to the film A Fistful of Dynamite directed by Sergio Leone (Giù la testa, 1971). Released in the US in March 2012, Jiang’s film took only $60,040 in one month of screening because the long dialogues in the film are an impediment for the international blockbuster audience. Although these dialogues are useful for the development of the plot, they create a sort of gap in the narration for the blockbuster audience. Dialogue is a typical and distinctive element of Chinese films, unlike spaghetti westerns which, on the contrary, are considered silent films and use images and action more than words (Frayling 2006). Another important feature of this film is its sense of humor: it was treated as a comedy in mainland China and, more specifically, a black comedy. “To comment on the black-humor of Let The Bullets Fly means saying that the story itself is not only ridiculous, funny and laughable, but also with some other deep-meaning implications, including the criticism on the messy society during the Northern Warlords era (1911-1928), and the introspection of the negative side of the national character of the Chinese” (Hu, 2010).

3 Chopstick Western (or Chopstick Eastern) is a term which refers to all those films and productions shot in Asia and that are very close to, expressly or implicitly, the sub-genre of Spaghetti Western.. Chopstick Western is a nickname for a wide sub-genre of Spaghetti Westerns also known as Italo-Western or Western all'italiana. There are many examples of Chopstick Western such as Sukiyaki Western Django (Sukiyaki Uesutan Jango) directed by the Japanese director Takashi Miike in 2007. http://cinemaandtvterm.blogspot.jp/2012/05/chopstick-western.html Unlike the British comedy production Mr. Bean, which was a huge success throughout the world and is based on the actions of Mr. Bean in all kinds of embarrassing situations without cultural divide, Let The Bullets Fly’s humor is mainly based on conversation (dialogue), and conversation in dialect above all. But this kind of language-based humor is too difficult for the international audience as, on one hand, the translation weakens the original flavor of the humor and, on the other hand, the humor is created within the context of the Chinese language and culture and so can only be understood by people with that background knowledge.4 Feng Xiaogang’s blockbuster Aftershock (Tang Shan Da Di Zhen, 2010) is another interesting film in artistic and technical terms. This film, the first in IMAX, broke the box-office record for a Chinese film in the domestic market (before the success of Zhang Yimou’s Flowers), taking RMB532 million ($78.6 million) in two and a half weeks of screening in mainland China. However, its commercial success was poor even in countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and New Zealand where it was released. The story is about a family’s reunion after the terrible earthquake in Tangshan, Hebei province in 1976. This was one of the most painful pages of Chinese history in the 1970s as the earthquake killed 2.4 million people and completely destroyed Tangshan city. It is because of this background that the film can easily attract the attention of the Chinese audience as most Chinese (including Chinese living overseas) know the story; however, the need for this background knowledge created a barrier for foreign audiences who do not share the same memories as the Chinese and who know nothing about that period of history. Another cultural barrier of this film is created right at the outset of the story: when the mother had to choose which of her twins should be saved from the rubble, she gave up her daughter and chose her son. This was a brutal choice, but it is understandable for Chinese as the son-favored society has been rooted in Chinese culture for thousands of years; the plot of the “family reunion” is also understandable for Chinese as Chinese culture is based on family roots. But for foreign audiences who do not belong to this culture it is difficult to be persuaded or become involved in the film and the story of the long- awaited reunion of this broken family. In a 2002 book entitled Globalization and the Fate of Chinese Film and Television about possible strategies that China’s film and television industries could adopt to fight Hollywood hegemony under the WTO conditions Chinese scholars agreed that multiculturalism and universality were the main cultural reasons for Hollywood’s global success. It was argued that one key for Chinese films’ success could be the adoption of universally appealing themes and the common concerns of human beings such as life and death, love and hatred, humankind and nature, war and peace, etc. (Su, 2011:196).

Economic factors

4 From the news report, one of the top 5 Hollywood companies was willing to buy the adaptation-right of the original story, and also invited director Jiang Wen to direct the Hollywood version of Let The Bullet Fly. With the involvement of Hollywood screenwriters and an international crew, the new production may ideally overcome those shortcomings and have greater success worldwide in the near future. (Hollywood is looking for, 2010)

The success of a global strategy hinges on a stable distribution system and Hollywood’s early emphasis on distribution and exhibition has largely contributed to its dominance of the global film industry (Wang, 2003:1). The central role held by the distributor is due to the fact that it is the distributor who controls the flow of information to both the consumers (through marketing, promotion, branding, and positioning) and the investors (Hoskins et al., 1997). This role is especially significant in a global economy as it links the global and the local and brings about major cultural, economic, and political implications and consequences. From this perspective it is understandable why Chinese films face obstacles when they approach international (Western) audiences in a distribution and exhibition system which is presently dominated by the Hollywood majors. Moreover, China lacks distribution channels overseas and the existing ones have little influence over the majority of the western audience. To overcome these obstacles the Chinese government has adopted two parallel strategies. The first is to form specific organizations aimed at facilitating the entry of Chinese films into foreign markets. One of these is the state-run China Film Export & Import Corporation under the SARFT-controlled China Film Group Corporation, which was established in the late 1990s with a view to promoting and distributing Chinese films overseas according to the guidelines and aims of the Chinese government. The other is China Lion Entertainment, a Sino-Australian joint venture which was established in 2010 to promote and distribute Chinese language films in North America, New Zealand and Australia. China Lion has distribution agreements with a number of China’s leading producers including Huayi Bros, Shanghai Film Group and PolyBona, in addition to an exclusive exhibition agreement with leading US cinema chain AMC theaters in the US and Toronto and Cineplex in Vancouver (China Lion, 2012). At the time of writing, AMC is said to be talking about selling the company or a significant stake in it to Wanda Group, one of China’s largest theater owners. If the deal goes through a new phase will begin in China’s push into the global film industry, greatly increasing its leverage with Hollywood and creating the first theater chain to have a commanding presence in the world’s two largest film markets, as well as creating a pipeline for Chinese films in the United States (Entgroup, 2012). The second strategy is international co-production which involves partners from other countries. The fact that international co-productions have become increasingly important is not surprising since the major advantage of co-production is the financial pooling that enables the partners to rely on a large budget and thus diversify and reduce the economic risk of film production, as well as facilitate access to partners’ and third-country markets (Hoskins et al., 1997). Since Ang Lee’s Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon, the 2000 martial-arts movie and most internationally commercially successful Chinese film to date, for Chinese filmmakers co-productions have become an increasingly powerful instrument for homemade films not only to enter overseas markets but at the same time to import and assimilate foreign experience and results (SARFT, 2007:79). There are two main reasons for the boom in co-production. Firstly, China's movie market is growing rapidly. Domestic box office revenues hit a new high of RMB13.1 billion ($2.1 billion) in 2011 and foreign filmmakers are finding new opportunities in this expanding market. Secondly, China has further relaxed rules and regulations on film cooperation. For example, movies can now receive subsidies from both China and their home countries and also be distributed as domestic films in both markets. "Co-production is the best way to create business value for films," says Han Sanping, Chairman of China Film Group Corp. "Co-production can provide more distribution channels for a film. Chinese companies can distribute the film on the mainland, in Hong Kong and in Taiwan while foreign partners can sell the film to international markets. So co-produced films bring more profit and gain for both sides. In addition to commercial films, many directors of artistic films are trying to attract investment and produce with the help of overseas partners” (Tang, 2011b). Although the learning curve of Chinese filmmakers has been significantly accelerated by partnerships and co- productions, according to film industry experts the scarcity and lack of influence of marketing and promotion tools are other challenges Chinese films have to face when they attempt to go overseas. As Ryan (1991) argues, one important role of marketing in the management of cultural goods is to reduce the uncertainty associated with the audience’s reaction to creative efforts in the consumers’ recognizable conceptual space of stars and styles. Brand loyalty may to a greater or lesser extent be attached to the actor, or director. In China there is a lack of commercial directors and a shortage of younger Chinese film stars that travel internationally, are bankable and that can act as a ‘brand’ of China (Hunt, 2011).

The “political factor”

As Chinese productions attempt to win over the international audience, they face a strange political dilemma because of “political implications” which impedes and at the same helps to promote Chinese films’ awareness and reputation worldwide. From this point of view, Zhang Yimou’s latest production Flowers of War provides interesting insights into how the “political” factor stopped Chinese films from entering overseas markets. This “political” dilemma is, indeed, not new to Chinese films when they go abroad as it characterizes, albeit with different patterns, the early films of the Fifth Generation directors and underground productions (Sixth Generation directors). Flowers of War set several records for production in mainland China: it is the film with the highest budget ($94 million); it is the first Chinese film starring a big Hollywood star; and it is a Chinese story in which 40% of the dialogue is in English. All these factors led the media to consider it an international film production: mainland Chinese films have struggled to catch on in Europe and America but this wartime epic, with its sense of spectacle, its schmaltzy story of redemption and its classic Hollywood feel, may offer one of the better chances for success. Indeed, "it's not the only film that's a collaboration of the East and the West, but in none of the other films is the collaboration as organic," Zhang (Weiping, the producer) said of the film (Zeitchik, 2011). The makers of Flowers of War asked DDA Public Relations, the leading provider of international marketing services to the film industry, to be the PR agency for the film’s marketing in North America and promotion in Hollywood before the Academy Awards. The makers were so optimistic about the success of Flowers of War worldwide that Zhang Weiping said “We would like to take the chance to make it the most influential and top- grossing Chinese film in the world” (Zeitchik & Pierson, 2011). Everything was seemingly going in the right direction - towards this predicted success - until the “political” factor was dragged into the interpretation of Flowers of War by the media. According to producer Zhang Weiping, the media reaction in North America was fairly good at the beginning but suddenly all the voices turned negative and dwelt mainly on two aspects: 1. It denied that the Nanking massacre took place; 2. It denied the commercial interests of the film and treated it as a national propaganda production (Zhang Weiping talk about, 2012). DDA explained to Zhang Weiping that the thing they worried about most was that Flowers of War would ignite political debate, since the theme of the film is obviously anti- Japan and, when Japanese film companies began to manipulate the Hollywood media by playing the card of politics, DDA warned Zhang Weiping they were running a huge risk. While the media began to criticize Flowers of War, something else happened to heighten this political tension. Christian Bale, the star of the film and whose participation made Zhang Yimou and Zhang Weiping even more confident about their success in the international market and at the Academy Awards, went to Shandong province to visit the blind lawyer Chen Guangcheng5. No one knows why Bale chose to visit Chen at that moment although he himself said “what I really wanted to do was to meet the man, shake his hand and say what an inspiration he is” (Jacobs, 2011). DDA, however, suggested to Zhang Yimou and Zhang Weiping that the reason Bale went to Shandong was to distance himself from the political criticism of Flowers of War in Hollywood (Zhang Weiping talk about, 2012). If Japanese film companies’ intervention in Flowers of War in Hollywood was an invisible political hand, Bale’s visit to Chen Guangcheng was a visible one which shed the “political” mask by making international headlines. The media followed quickly, criticizing how the Chinese government dealt with Bale’s visit. The first article about Flowers of War in the New York Times after its report on the “63 films on the long list for the Foreign- Language Oscar” in October was “Christian Bale Attacked by Chinese Guards” (Jacobs, 2011), published on the same day as Bale’s trip to Shan Dong. The only article about Flowers of War in the Times last year was “Hired heavies stop Batman star from meeting dissident kept under house arrest” (Lewis, 2011). Agence France Presse published an article on December 11th entitled “Christian Bale says his Chinese film not

5 Mr. Chen is a civil rights activist in China who drew international attention to human rights issues in rural areas. He was placed under house arrest from September 2005 to March 2006 after talking to Time magazine about the forced abortion cases he investigated in Linyi Prefecture, Shandong Province. Authorities formally arrested him in June 2006, and on August 24, 2006 Chen was sentenced to four years and three months for "damaging property and organizing a mob to disturb traffic". After serving his full sentence, Chen was released from prison on September 8, 2010 but remains under house arrest or "soft detention" at his home. Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chen_Guangcheng propaganda” (Landreth, 2011) declaring that “anyone who used the word propaganda to describe Zhang's film would be wrong”. Some days later other two articles headlined “Actor Bale attacked during trip to China dissident” and “China pulls red carpet from under actor Bale” immediately forced the media discourse on Flowers of War into embarrassment. Therefore, the concern over Flowers of War moved from artistic discussion to political discussion and the story itself was seen by the foreign media/audience as a nationalistic patriotic film manipulated by the Chinese government portraying a distorted history:

“Early reviews of Flowers of War criticized its poor plot, commercial vulgarity, wooden acting and propagandist message. Released just days after the anniversary of the 1937 Nanking Massacre, the film looks set to stir up nationalist passions, both over the country's historical grievances and its modern cultural ambitions. There is no more sensitive subject in modern Chinese history than the "Rape of Nanking" as the massacre become known in the west. Dramatisations of the killings have been a staple of Chinese films since the black‐and‐white propaganda epics of the Mao era. But the new big budget production adds racier dialogue, image makeovers and hi‐tech gore.” (Watts & McCurry, 2011).

“It's something you'd think only the crassest of Hollywood producers would come up with, injecting sex appeal into an event as ghastly at the Nanjing massacre— but it's an element central to The Flowers of War, a contrived and unpersuasive look at an oft‐dramatized historical moment." (McCarthy, 2011).

“There’s nothing that says the atrocity blockbuster has to be a disaster in its own right; films like “Gone With the Wind” and “Gallipoli” have their good points. But long before its two and a half hours are up, “The Flowers of War” is sunk by the disproportion between the events being portrayed and Mr. Zhang’s distanced, strangely frivolous treatment of them — in essence, his refusal to take a point of view on one of the most gruesome chapters in Chinese history (Hale, 2011).

As a result of all this, Flowers of War was a failure; it was quickly eliminated from the Academy’s long list and had to change its marketing strategy: from focus on North America to Southeast Asia and other international markets. Data from IMDB shows that at April 8th, 2012 the total box-office takings of Flowers of War in the US market was just $6.4 million, just 1/9 of Hero’s takings in America in 2005 ($53.5 million). “Politics eventually influenced the market of Flowers of War, as well as the possibility of winning an award.“ (Flowers of War suffered, 2012) This is the latest but also the most strident case of how “politics” hampered a Chinese film’s international success even although the film embraced “international” factors in its production and marketing plan: once it was associated with political factors, all the previous efforts turned to ash. When Zhang Yimou’s Hero set the record for Chinese films’ foreign box office takings ($155million) there was also a lot of discussion about its political implications in addition to the recognition of its aesthetic achievement and cultural representation. “Despite online discourses that have criticized Hero for serving as propaganda for the People’s Republic of China, satisfying both political requirements and the need for global expansion, a national discourse arose that corresponded to the state’s agenda without undermining the movie’s market potential. The film in this case represents a popular text that the state can harness for propaganda purposes. But such a text has to be carefully packaged, so that it appears non-confrontational on the one hand, and shows no obvious signs of pandering to authority on the other” (Larson, 2010). This “careful package” is not easy to achieve, no matter how hard Zhang Yimou tried to raise the theme of Flowers of War to the universal question of how human beings respond in situations of crisis instead of anti-Japan propaganda, nationalism and patriotism, as it shows too many obvious signs and these signs drew people’s attention and prevented them from believing and understanding the real theme the director wanted to express. Zhang Yimou has always been aware of the use of the “political” factor as he is one of the most important representatives of the so-called Fifth Generation directors who began to attract the attention of western audiences in the 1980s. As the first batch of college students graduated after the turmoil of the 10-year Cultural Revolution, early productions of the Fifth Generation directors (Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige, Tian Zhuangzhuang, etc.) were all concerned with how they saw and responded to that unique era, inspiring them to explore China’s national culture and its political/social structure using different forms of expression. Although film commentators and scholars have subscribed to the idea that the Fifth Generation directors, with Zhang (Yimou) arguably its most famous member, are less concerned with politics than their predecessors and are more interested in aesthetics and experimenting with the medium (Chen, Liu and Shi, 1997;Zhang, 2004), the Fifth-generation directors’ early success worldwide is inevitably linked to the political/social criticism in their storytelling. Other two films by Zhang Yimou won nominations at the Academy Foreign Film Awards besides Hero: Ju Dou and Raise The Red Lantern, which were both stories about paternity and the old social order of China. “Even although the setting in both films is China in the twenties before the rise of Communism, both films very much annoyed the ageing leadership of Communist China and were censured (Ju Dou was actually banned), ostensibly for moral reasons, but more obviously because of the way it depicted elderly men in positions of power.” (Littrell, 2002). There is a similarity between Fifth Generation directors and Sixth Generation directors in China in that their early productions all became internationally well-known because they were politically sensitive and were banned in mainland China. While for the Fifth Generation, Zhang Yimou’s Huo Zhe (To Live), Chen Kaige’s Ba Wang Bie Ji (Farewell My Concubine), Tian Zhuangzhuang’s Lan Fengzheng (The Blue Kite) were all stories about the cultural revolution (one of the most politically sensitive topics in China); for the Sixth Generation, Jia Zhangke’s Xiao Wu, Wang Xiaoshuai’s Shi Qi Sui de Dan Che (Beijing Bicycle), Zhang Yuan’s Beijing Za Zhong (Beijing Bastard) and Dong Gong Xi Gong (East Palace West Palace) were stories about grass-roots groups of people and their struggles in real life which was set and controlled by political power. All these films won international film prizes but have all been banned from theaters in mainland China. Thus, we can find two ironic equations here: politically sensitive/offensive (against the government/social order) Chinese films = internationally acknowledged/acclaimed Chinese films; politically implicated/supportive (pro-government/social standards) Chinese films = internationally slighted/disliked Chinese films. One genre of Chinese films has been created on the basis of the two equations: underground films, which are mostly made by the Sixth Generation directors together under the belief that all new and interesting talent in the Chinese film industry must necessarily be ‘underground’ (Donald & Voci, 2008). “The ‘underground’ quality appears in many cases to be a question of style rather than substance, and again skeptics allege that some young filmmakers are not actually censored by the Film Bureau, but elect to bypass its official approval processes so that they can claim the status of being banned, dissident or underground and so enhance their recognition and credibility abroad. Selling a ‘banned’ film to a non-Chinese-speaking audience is easier than trying to persuade people that a mainstream film with subtitles might be educational and entertaining.” (Donald& Voci, 2008). These “underground” films in some way dominate the international stage because they always reflect the negative side of Chinese society which is considered to appeal to the international audience, while other “above-ground” film productions6 with a different type of storytelling have to struggle and use narration to persuade the international audience. And during this struggle the political factor becomes the weakest link. To examine the “political” relationship of “above-ground” Chinese films, Hu Ke (1998) said that “it is difficult for Chinese film producers to forget the “political” meaning of their films as their chronological overview has shown why ‘serving the nation’ has been the main concern and how cinema and nation can hardly be separated in the Chinese context.“ Similar comments are made by Chen Xihe, one of the first scholars to use contemporary theory to analyze Chinese cinema, who declared that “the social and instrumental values of films have been the main concern for the majority of directors. The realism that Chinese films strive to achieve has been conditioned most of the time by ideological and educational purposes which lie behind the faithful reproduction of reality” (Chen, 1990). Although the economic transformation of the film industry in recent years has promoted the role of “market” and played down the role of “politics” in all film productions, films produced in China still have as their first priority a domestic purpose; i.e. conquering the domestic market, supporting the government and maintaining the stability of the nation-state. Some “main melody” (Zhu Xuan Lv) films have been made specifically to promote these political messages, such as The Founding of A Republic (Jian Guo Da Ye, 2009) and Beginning of The Great Revival (Jian Dang Wei Ye, 2011). These two films were produced by the China Film Group for the 60th anniversary of the PRC and the 90th anniversary of the CCP respectively but were of course not intended for distribution in the foreign market as “they can actually harm China’s image overseas as censorship and propaganda are hot-button issues for Americans.” (Chau, 2010). Even although films like Flowers of War or Aftershock (Tang Shan Da Di Zhen, 2010) are not “main melody” films, as long as they are branded “nationalist” or “patriotic” this “political” aura will put off international audiences unless they can package the political messages in a more careful way as Hero managed to do.

6 “above ground” films here is defined as films that can be distributed in mainland China compared to “underground“ films which cannot be released in mainland China.

Animation film industry

The most distinctive characteristic of animation is that the characters cannot be “pigeonholed” or “discriminated” from a cinematic point of view due to the characters’ physiognomy and somatic characteristics. Indeed, in animation films the most famous characters are typically “humanized” animals such as Mickey Mouse, the panda, the elephant, the lion and so on. Conversely, in traditional films these features can be really “discriminating”, not owing to a form of “racism” but because the audience finds it difficult to identify with characters of different origins. Of all the animation films made in China, the ones based on the popular Chinese animation TV series Pleasant Goat and Big Big Wolf (Xi yangyang yu hui tailing) are the most successful at the domestic box offices. Created in 2005, this animation series has now broken the record of 800 episodes aired in China on 40 local TV stations across the country, with audience ratings reaching 17.3%. This series is also aired in Hong Kong, India, Taiwan and Singapore. The series has so far given birth to four animation feature films that have all been successful in China. The commercial success of Pleasant Goat is even more impressive if we consider that the first three films, produced by Beijing-based Creative Power Entertaining, were low budget productions (a total of just RMB 6 million (Euro 652,746). The first film episode is The Super Snail Adventure that took in around RMB90 million (Euro9.8 million) at the box office in 2009. The second episode Pleasant Goat and Big Big Wolf — The Tiger Prowess took in RMB130 million (Euro14.142 million) in 2010. The third episode, Pleasant Goat and Big Big Wolf - Moon Castle: The Space Adventure, which premiered in Chinese theaters in February 2011, broke the record for an animated film, taking in RMB143 million (Euro16 million) at box offices throughout the country.7 The fourth and last film of the series, Pleasant Goat and Big Big Wolf - Mission Incredible: Adventures On The Dragon's Trail, which was released in April 2012, has also been successful domestically. Moreover, unlike the other three, this episode was co-produced with Hong Kong-based Imagi Studio, which also bought the screen rights. The Imagi Studio is well-known throughout the world for its vocation to produce animated audiovisual products for the international market (e.g. TMNT - Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles 4 - and the 2009 Astro boy). The partnership with Imagi Studio is strategic in allowing the fourth film of Pleasant Goat to be distributed overseas thanks to a distribution agreement entered into in 2011 with Walt Disney Studios Motion Picture: under this agreement Walt Disney will distribute the film worldwide and on Disney Channel in 46 countries, translated into 20 different languages8. Disney is also licensed to distribute the film on other media platforms such as TV, internet and mobile in mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. The agreement also envisages an income sharing policy with Disney for a three year period starting from October 2011. In addition to the box office revenue, advertising income and consumer products licensing income from the main

7 Ibidem 8 Disney to air more Chinese cartoons, http://gbtimes.com/news/disney‐air‐more‐chinese‐cartoons at. Accessed on 22 March 2012. characters of the fourth Pleasant Goat film, the income sharing agreement with Disney will generate revenue for Imagi over the three year period from sales of licensed merchandise featuring the film’s new character Xiao Long (Screen Daily, 2011).

Conclusions and discussion In this paper we investigated and discussed the main factors that could prevent Chinese films from being successful internationally (in the West) within the framework of the ‘going out’ policy and China’s soft power strategies. Cultural discount is one of the main barriers, not only due to the background knowledge needed to appreciate the film, but also the way the story is told to the audience. From an artistic point of view, Chinese films are fond of dialogue, especially in films related to Chinese history (Aftershock) or films based on linguistic humor (Let The Bullet Fly): this technique is difficult for western audiences to understand as their storytelling is usually based on action. The involvement of western distributors, public relations companies and foreign co- producers may provide Chinese films with a practical advantage in knowing the western market better in order to guide their global marketing strategies; however, the careful package of political information is also needed mainly because, in the case of Chinese films, “everything is political and nothing is political at one and the same time. Politics is everywhere, and yet it subverts itself at any moment” (Chen et al., 1997). Chinese filmmakers also fall into a trap when they believe that the more international factors they include in the film production, the more international (western) acceptance they will gain. The truth is that international (western) audiences still want to see Chinese films within the context of China, not an international hybridization. It may have been the political implications that lost The Flowers of War its Oscar nomination this year, but if we look at the winner of the best foreign-film, ‘A Separation from Iran’, which is also a politically sensitive country for the West, one of the reasons why this Iranian film won the Oscar is because it touches on traditions, justice, and male-female relationships in modern Iran; it is a film about Iran without favoring the West within a western installation. Director Asghar Farhadi said while accepting the Oscar that "at a time of talks of war, intimidation and aggression being exchanged between politicians, the name of their county, Iran, is spoken here through her glorious culture, a rich and ancient culture that has been hidden under the heavy dust of politics" (Grover,2012). This comment may be useful for Chinese filmmakers: a great Chinese film that may be appreciated worldwide should be raised above the dust of politics, it may need strategic marketing assistance, it may need to create a platform for universal understanding (both as regards the theme and the storytelling techniques), but the most important thing is not whether there are enough “international” factors in the film, but whether it is depicts Chinese culture enough within the context of China. With the extraordinary growth of the box office takings in the film market in China, many Chinese filmmakers have lost their way, pursuing box office revenues instead of artistic creation. The lack of audience study and analysis also shows an increase in the gap between the film producers’ market interest and audience’s taste, preferences and habits. This inefficiency leads not only to a slump in audience satisfaction and box office revenues in mainland China but also to the misunderstanding and misperception of foreign audiences’ acceptance. China’s film industry can and should offer much more than “Kung fu” and ancient history; the need to understand modern China in its transition and the influence of different walks of life in Chinese society is strongly felt worldwide. It is the duty of Chinese filmmakers to provide a variety of film productions which cover different aspects of China and it is very important for them to improve their own creative skills and maintain their core cultural spirit beyond the practice of advanced film technology and market strategy along the lines of the Hollywood production model. To solve the problems of Chinese films going abroad, coproduction (both fiction and animation) might be a short-cut but, in the long run, understanding audience acceptance (Chinese audience, Chinese overseas audience, foreign audience) in a scientific and structured way might be a good starting point. Only when international acceptance of Chinese films has been built can Chinese film productions become another valuable tool of soft power to improve China’s image worldwide.

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