EERI Special Earthquake Report — January 2003

Learning from Earthquakes Introduction Tectonic Setting and Preliminary At 11:32 am (local time) on October Earthquake Parameters 31, 2002, a magnitude Mw 5.7 (M5.4) earthquake struck the inland The 2002 Molise earthquake Observations l part of Molise, a small rural region sequence took place in the on the October 31- in the southeastern part of the Apennines foretrough. This is a Italian peninsula (see Figure 1). transition zone between the most November 1, 2002 The epicenter was located about external thrusts of the Apennines Molise, Italy, Earth- 220 km southeast of Rome, but the fold-and-thrust belt and its foreland, earthquake was felt as far away as locally represented by the Gargano quake Sequence Naples and the Italian capital. This promontory (the “spur” of the Italian earthquake caused widespread boot). While the Apennines and the Ten days after the Molise earth- damage in 50 villages and killed 30 Gargano are both characterized by quakes, EERI deployed a team of people, 27 of whom were children intense, destructive, and historically engineers and emergency man- trapped in the collapse of the well-documented seismicity, the agement experts to document the elementary school in San Giuliano area of the Molise events has geotechnical effects, the perfor- di Puglia. traditionally been regarded as a mance of buildings and lifelines, transition realm affected by small and the postearthquake emergency The next day, November 1, at 4:08 earthquakes. management by local authorities. pm (local time), an aftershock of

The EERI team, which was led by similar magnitude — Mw5.7 (Ml5.3) Thus, the Molise events were rather Paolo Bazzurro of AIR Worldwide, — hit the same area, with an epi- unexpected despite two foreshocks

San Francisco, CA, included struc- center about 10 km to the west of of Ml3.2 (01:25 am local time) and tural engineers Sandro K. Kodama the first event’s. The aftershock Ml3.5 (03:27 am local time) that of ABS Consulting, Seattle, Wash- seriously damaged many buildings preceded the main shock by a few ington; Joseph Maffei of Rutherford whose stability was already impaired hours and created great concern & Chekene, Oakland, California; by the main shock, but it did not among the populace. Joshua Marrow of Simpson Gum- cause any additional casualties. pertz & Heger, Inc, San Francisco, California; and emergency manage- ment expert Barbara Foster of Barbara Foster Associates, Sausa- lito, California. The EERI team joined a group of Italian engineers whose active support and enthu- siasm were critical for the success of this mission. The Italian team included Tito Sanò, formerly of the Italian Environment Protection Agency; Fabrizio Mollaioli of the Department of Architecture, Univer- sity of Rome “La Sapienza;” Agos- tino Goretti and Adriano De Sortis of the Italian National Seismic Survey, and Alessandro Rasulo of the Department of Mechanical, Struc- tural, and Environmental Engineer- ing, University of Cassino, Italy.

The EERI team and the publication Figure 1 - Epicenters of the two main events of this sequence (stars) and of of this Learning from Earthquakes the main historical earthquakes (hollow squares) in this region (from Italy’s report were supported by the CPTI catalog). The rectangles identify seismogenic sources from the INGV National Science Foundation database, while the dashed lines distinguish undifferentiated tectonic through grant #CMS-0131895. lineaments. The E-W fault on the Gargano Promontory is the Mattinata fault cited in the text. (Courtesy of INGV)

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depth. This depth has both tectonic and ground-shaking implications:

• The Molise earthquakes oc- curred in the metamorphic basement underlying the Apulia platform, an extensive, 10 km- thick carbonate deposit that underlies the Adriatic margin of the Apennines. Fault activity in this deep complex structure was not considered likely prior to these earthquakes. • The main shock was felt over a very large area (essentially along most of the peninsula down to Calabria), but the ground shaking in the epi- central region is thought to have been lower than that Figure 2 - Location of the epicenters and of the main known faults in the expected for shallower events area. (Courtesy of INGV) of the same magnitude.

The first few hours after the main shock were punctuated by many aftershocks (Figure 2). This se- quence culminated on November 1 with the shock comparable in size to the main shock. Significant aftershocks continued for about 10 days and then became very sporad- ic.

The occurrences of a discernible foreshock, of two similarly sized main shocks, and of the many rela- tively large-magnitude aftershocks make this unusual sequence more similar to a swarm than to a typical Apennines main shock-aftershock sequence. Similar behavior was observed during the May 5, 1990, Potenza (Basilicata region, southern

Italy) earthquake sequence (Ml 5.3).

Another interesting characteristic of the Molise sequence is its fo- cal depth (Figure 3). With most hypocenters falling in the range of 15-20 km deep, this sequence Figure 3 - Epicenters of the two main events and of the first sequence of differs substantially from typical aftershocks from November 3 until November 6. Focal mechanisms and Apennines sequences that normally hypocenter locations are also displayed. (Courtesy of INGV) take place in the uppermost 12-14 km of the crust. Again, the 1990 Potenza sequence had similar

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of the lineaments discussed above may have been activated in that earthquake. Unfortunately, current catalogues “collapse” it into a single, highly unrepresentative epicenter. Ground Motion Before the two events of October 31 and November 1, the seismometric network in this area was not very dense (see flags in Figure 4) and no ground motion recordings close to the fault rupture are available. The closest station was about 27 km southwest of the epicenter and recorded a PGA below 0.02g. The largest peak ground acceleration (PGA) recorded for the main shock is about 0.07g at the Lesina Station (Figure 4), about 40 km northeast of Figure 4 - Iso-PGA lines for the Mw5.7 of November 1. (Note: When comput- ing Iso-PGA lines, soil conditions are not taken into account.) “Non scattata” the epicenter. The orientations of the means not triggered. The PGA data are in gals. (Courtesy of SSN) iso-PGA lines, which are in agreement with the reported dam- age pattern after the main shock, seems to suggest a rupture that These two features may very well hence comprise instrumentally enucleated from the west and characterize the seismogenic fault- documented evidence of a relatively moved towards the east, causing ing in this portion of the peninsula recent change in tectonic regime significant forward directivity effects and they should be carefully con- (from NE-SW to NW-SE shortening). in the region east of the epicenter sidered in future seismic hazard despite the somewhat limited analyses of the region. Historical Seismicity magnitude.

The focal mechanism of the two Figure 1 shows that historical seis- No definite data are yet available to main shocks and the alignment of micity also failed to delineate the establish the direction of rupture of aftershocks (Figure 3) strongly sug- earthquake potential of the 2002 the November 1 event. More than gest that the earthquake rupture Molise source area. After the fact, 30 portable new stations were in- extends for 20-25 km E-W, on a however, the joint interpretation stalled after the November 1 event dominantly strike-slip fault. Although of historical and tectonic evidence and they were used to localize the the fault had not been previously reveals a consistent and somewhat aftershock hypocenters shown in identified in any of the existing “predictable” pattern. The active Figure 3. compilations of faults and seismo- faults in the Gargano promontory genic sources, INGV’s Database of have produced many earthquakes, Geotechnical Effects Italy’s Seismogenic Sources (Figure the largest of which (M~6.8 in 1627) 1) shows that the sequence falls on occurred in the western foothills. The ground motion triggered 111 the westward prolongation of the The evidence offered by the 2002 cases of ground failure on hill E-W Mattinata fault, the main active Molise earthquake suggests that the slopes, with final ground displace- tectonic element of the Gargano 1627 event might have been gener- ments ranging from an inch to about Promontory. ated by oblique (reverse and right- a foot. Such phenomena were ob- lateral) slip along a western buried served often on roads mainly These tectonic elements display a extension of the Mattinata fault. southeast of San Giuliano and north of Colletorto. Some known paleo- long-history of left-lateral activity, fol- The intensity pattern available for lowed by right-lateral activity since landslides triggered by the ground the catastrophic 1456 event, which shaking are thought to be partially Late Pliocene-Early Quaternary, in leveled a wide area, including three agreement with the fault kinematics responsible for aggravating the villages around the current location damage to buildings in the towns of shown by the focal mechanisms. of San Giuliano, suggests that some The 2002 Molise earthquakes would Ripabottoni, Castellino del Biferno,

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and Casalnuovo Monterotaro. A more spectacular and quite unex- pected slope failure--given the rela- tively large distance (34 km) from the epicenter—resulted from the second event near Trivento at Serre di Salcito. An existing landslide area with a front of about 0.5 km and a width of about 1.5 km moved down- hill by about a foot at some locations (see Figure 5) and threatened a few private buildings and one of the major local roads. As suggested by a preliminary study, soil amplification can be regarded as a significant cause of widespread damage in a very local- ized area of the badly hit town of San Giuliano. Most of the damage occurred along the main street which is located on a narrow hill-top ridge formed by a 10m-thick layer of talus and anthropic filling (shear

wave velocity, Vs, ranging from 110m/s to 300m/s) underlain by a much harder layer of clayey marls (Vs~550m/s) (Figure 6).

The aforementioned study, which uses both the empirical Nakamura’s microtremors approach confirmed by SHAKE amplification analyses, Figure 6 - Surface soil geology map of San Giuliano di Puglia. indicates that the soil formation Most of the damage was concentrated in soil formations 3 and underneath the main street has 4, while the medieval part of the town (soil formation 1) largely caused high amplification effects (to escaped damage. more than three times the bedrock motion) with peaks at 2Hz and phology of the narrow ridge may especially at 5Hz. Besides the effect have also intensified the surface of the soft soil formation, the mor- ground shaking.

Finally, as is usual for Italian earth- quakes, the fault ruptures did not Figure 5 - Ground break the ground surface and no failure at Serre di evidence of liquefaction was re- Salcito, 34 km west ported. of the epicenter of the November 1 event. Building Performance The Molise earthquake sequence damaged towns in the Campobasso Province in Molise and in the Foggia Province in Puglia. San Giuliano di Puglia, Bonefro, Santa Croce di Magliano, Ripabottoni, Castel- lino del Biferno, and Casalnuovo

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Monterotaro are the most affected towns. As of December 15, 2002, about 15,000 inspections had been made in Molise and about 2,000 in Puglia. In San Giuliano alone about 300 buildings have already been declared unsafe and will probably be demolished. Figure 7 - The observed The inspection survey considered damage measured by the six tagging conditions: A (usable Mercalli-Cancani-Sieberg with no restrictions), B (usable with (MCS) intensity measure. conditions); C (partially usable); (Courtesy of the Servizio D (to be inspected again); E (not Sismico Nazionale) usable); F (not usable because of damage to adjacent buildings). Tagging condition A can be associ- ated with a Green Tag; conditions B, C, and D with a Yellow Tag; and conditions E and F with a Red Tag. The preliminary breakdown of the inspections in the six most affected towns are shown in Table 1.

The damage is also shown in terms developments are often on looser is often vaulted either in stones of intensity levels in Figure 7. The materials. The building stock in this and mortar, or bricks of different scale used in Italy is the Mercalli- area is rather homogeneous, but types. The roofs have a wooden Cancani-Sieberg (MCS), which in the building types are significantly structure with joists and purlins this range of intensity can be ap- different in the medieval and the that often carry a grille of bamboo proximately translated into the more newer parts. The older buildings canes acting as roof sheathing for customary Modified Mercalli Inten- have stone bearing walls and are supporting clay tiles. sity (MMI) scale by subtracting a usually 2-4 stories high. The stone unit (thus, MCS VII = MMI VI) . walls are usually carefully crafted At the margin of the old towns, new with local materials; reinforcing developments arose mainly in the Building Stock: All the towns in details, such as iron tie-rods or 20th century. Most of the buildings this area are located on hilltops, buttresses, are often seen in the were constructed in the first part of ridges, and steep sloping hills. The facades of larger buildings. Small the century as one or, more rarely, older, medieval buildings are almost and far apart openings in the two-story bearing wall structures. always located on outcropping facades are common. The first floor The stones were often cut in small rock formations, while the newer regular blocks for the exterior and interior parts of the walls, while the middle was filled with loose mate- rial. The mortar is either absent or Comune Total A B C D E F scarce and of very poor quality. There are frequent cases of bear- S. Giuliano 590 160 55 11 21 298 45 ing walls of poorly cut 25-100 cm S. Croce 1453 1073 123 48 19 170 20 stones mixed with smaller irregular Ripabottoni 895 428 75 55 56 232 49 stone pieces and no mortar. Less Castellino 544 270 29 16 18 166 45 common are buildings with regular blocks of “tufa” or filled bricks. Bonefro 1203 740 143 20 5 245 50 After World War II one or two addi- Table 1 - Postearthquake building inspections in the tional stories were added to many most damaged towns. of these buildings. Often the addi- tions were made either by hollow brick bearing walls with elements of

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different shapes and dimensions, or by reinforced concrete frames with hollow brick infills with heavy pre-cast or cast-in-place ribbed slab with ribs at approximately 45-60 cm on center, and not more than 30 cm in depth with a flange depth of not more than 7-10 cm, with hollow clay tile infill between the ribs. Minimal or no provisions were made to ensure continuity with the already exist- ing story. These buildings of mixed construction proved to be extremely vulnerable, as shown below. Figure 8 - Two partially collapsed buildings in the older part of San Giuliano. Right: Note the tie-rods in the facade that prevented the total collapse of the The more recent structures are exterior wall. almost all engineered reinforced concrete frames with hollow brick partitions. Often the ground floor consists of pillars with no infill walls, a classic soft-story condition. The construction practice and materials used were observed to be fairly poor compared to modern standards, but, with a few exceptions, concrete buildings experienced minimal damage.

Stone Bearing Wall Buildings and Buildings of Mixed Construction: Better construction practices and, Figure 9 - San Giuliano. Failure of the exterior wall not properly connected probably, lower ground shaking with the slab. Left: Note the two different construction types at the first and made older buildings perform second story. Right: Note degraded mortar and poor construction material in relatively well, with many fewer col- foreground wall. lapses than more modern construc- tion. Some significant examples of damage to older buildings include out-of-plane failures of walls and failure of the roof-supporting struc- ture (Figure 8). Some interior dam- age, with partial detachment of the façade from the exterior wall, was also observed in the historical part of Casalnuovo Monterotaro. Some of the collapses in the older build- ings occurred in buildings that were abandoned and in an acute state of disrepair. Figure 10 - San Giuliano. Left: Detachment and rigid shift of the top story All the damage mechanisms typical in reinforced concrete from the stone wall at the bottom story. Right: of stone-wall and brick-wall build- Similar failure pattern, where the reinforced concrete structure supporting ings were observed in the relative- the roof rotated and shifted. ly newer structures located in the developments outside the old town. The figures from 9 to 13 show some typical examples. The failure

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mechanisms follow directly from the characteristics of such buildings dis- cussed in the previous section. Churches: The observed damage caused to the monumental heritage has confirmed, yet again, that churches are particularly vulnerable to seismic forces. The intrinsic vulnerability was often exacerbated by questionable recent retrofits that proved incompatible with the natural vibration mode of the origi- nal masonry walls. Roofs made of reinforced concrete or steel, and the Figure 11 - San Giuliano. Large diagonal shear cracks in the proximity of addition of very thick reinforced the large openings. The two stories above built more recently in reinforced concrete tie-beams and floors, concrete and hollow-brick infills are unscathed. The bottom story essentially dramatically increased the inertial acted as a base isolation system. The building is going to be demolished. forces that could not be accommo- dated by the original structure.

An emblematic case can be found in Santa Croce di Magliano, where the two recently retrofitted churches of Sant Antonio da Padova and San Giacomo suffered severe damage with partial collapses, while the abandoned Greek church, which was already cracked and in a bad

Figure 12 - Collapsed school in San Giuliano di Puglia. Note the very heavy slab of the second story and the roof that was supported by a first story bearing wall of poor-quality stone, now collapsed (foreground).

Figure 13 - Example of inadequate retrofit. The steel beam that has been added to support the vaulted slab is inserted directly in the stone wall. The hammering - San Giacomo church in of the beam against the Figure 14 Santa Croce di Magliano: the spire of bearing wall has severely the bell tower, recently reconstructed impaired the safety of this in reinforced concrete, has collapsed, building. leaving the original masonry bell tower below without any visible damage.

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state of maintenance, shows only a slight worsening of damage.

About 75 churches in the epicen- tral and surrounding areas were systematically inspected to single out the different collapse mechan- isms and the major causes of dam- age. The most common damage pattern includes cracking and col- lapse of the vaults (owing to their limited thickness and lack of tie rods); damage due to crushing and shearing of the masonry pillars (often because of the increased Figure 15 – Left: Two concrete frame apartment buildings in Bonefro. Con- weight from reinforced concrete tie struction of each building was identical, with the exception of the additional beams and slabs on the vaults); floor. The four-story building sustained major damage in the two events, damage due to sliding or overturning resulting in a substantial collapse hazard. Right: Extensive damage at the of the spires on the bell towers (as ground level of the four-story building after the the aftershock of November 1. a result of being more rigid and heavier); overturning of the gable roof of the façade; or damage in the apse (from reinforced concrete roofs).

Reinforced Concrete Frame Build- ings: Overall damage to reinforced concrete frame buildings was mi-nor throughout the region, with a lim- ited number of localized damage pockets in San Giuliano di Puglia and Bonefro. Damaged buildings were located on soft-soil basins in both of these regions.

Three concrete buildings in the surrounding regions were observed to have sustained structural dam- age, while approximately 50 con- crete frame buildings were observed to have had significant nonstructural Figure 16 – Left: Ground level, east face of four-story structure following damage to hollow-clay tile and the first earthquake. The structure shed one wythe of a two-wythe hollow plaster infill walls. clay tile wall during the first shock. The interior wythe remained substantially Concrete construction in this region intact. (photo: M. Mucciarelli and M.R. Gallipoli. Additional information is similar to that found in Turkey, available from http://www.mi.ingv.it/eq/021031/Molise/BonefroCA.pdf and consisting of poorly detailed, mildly http://www.mi.ingv.it/eq/021031/Molise/rilievo.html) Right: The same reinforced concrete columns, ground level wall after the second earthquake. These sequential damage beams, and slabs with hollow clay photos offer a rare glimpse at the time- dependent damage mechanism of masonry tile infill walls between the structure. The lack of a plastic hinge at the top of the column on the column lines. Concrete frame build- first floor indicates the existence of a diagonal compression strut action in ings suffered tremendous damage the hollow clay masonry wall. As the hinge forms during the second event, and collapse during the 1999 Izmit the compression strut shifts approximately two feet down the left column, Turkey earthquake, but the Italian resulting in a short column hinging failure at the top. Inset shows detail of concrete structures suffered little hinged failure. (photos: J. Marrow) damage, as they typically have fewer stories (four or less) and the

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along the Larino-Campobasso road after the earthquake sequence did not reveal any significant damage. The local cellular phone network and part of the land phone network were somewhat disrupted in the epicentral area after the main shock, but were soon fixed. The main re- gional lines of the telecommunica- tion network, consisting of coaxial cables running along main roads and point-to-point radio-bridges, were not affected by the quakes. No damage to the water supply or Figure 17 – Left: Hinged column failure of a reinforced concrete frame the sewage systems was reported. building in San Giuliano di Puglia. (photo: P.Bazzurro) Right: This modern concrete frame structure in San Giuliano di Puglia was under construction at the time of the earthquake. It had no structural damage, but the hollow clay Rescue, Relief, and tile infill walls were half built and not tied into the slabs above, and suffered Rehabilitation an out-of-plane toppling failure. (photo: J. Marrow) The impact of the earthquake se- quence (I MCS > V-VI) was felt in an area of approximately 1400 km2, with 66,000 residents in 33 towns. ground motions in the Molise events of vibration of this four-story struc- The most severe damage (I MCS> were substantially shorter and less ture (about 0.5s). Further study is VI-VII) was concentrated in 8 towns severe than those in Turkey. required to verify the exact cause of (see Table 1 and Figure 7) with failure. an estimated population of about Two buildings of particular interest 16,000. Thirty people were killed were a pair of concrete frame and 173 sustained injuries requiring residential apartment structures Lifeline Performance hospitalization. located in Bonefro (Figures 15 and No damage of any significance has The greatest losses were in the 16). The two buildings, constructed been reported to lifelines. The only town of San Giuliano di Puglia in 1984, were founded in a valley, at exceptions were the local gas distri- (population 1163), with 61 injuries the base of the historic portion of the bution system in San Giuliano di and all 30 fatalities. The fatalities town. Both structures were identical Puglia, where operations were dis- included 27 children and one in plan and structural composition, rupted after the events, and some teacher who were killed when the but varying in height, one with three local roadways around the same primary school building collapsed, stories and the other four. The four- town that developed cracks but and two elderly women who were story structure suffered substantial remained accessible to vehicles. structural damage at the ground killed in their homes by falling de- level, focused mainly along the east bris. No fatalities and relatively few The Larino substation of the electric elevation. The three-story structure injuries were reported in the other power distribution network, operated suffered no structural damage and towns. remotely by the utility company only minor cracking in the exterior TERNA, was on alert status during plaster finishes. The bulk of injuries and all of the the earthquake shaking. However, fatalities occurred following the initial the alarm did not shut down the The damage to the four-story struc- event on October 31, but another 56 substation. Some local power lines ture is likely due to the additional people were injured during panicked were slightly damaged and affected mass of the fourth floor level. Ital- evacuations following the second only a limited number of customers. ian researchers who studied these event on November 1. Following this structures following the quake have aftershock, the entire town of San theorized that the differential dam- The inspections undertaken by Giuliano di Puglia was evacuated age states can also be attributed to ANAS (the Italian company respon- by order of the Director of the Civil significant ground motion amplifica- sible for all roads other than high- Protection Department (DPC), and tion around the fundamental period ways) on bridge expansion joints approximately 4800 other individuals

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were evacuated from neighboring survivors and the dead. towns. At the local level (town and prov- None of the hospitals in the area ince), fire brigades began search was damaged and no public health and rescue operations and police or sanitation problems were report- provided access control. Pre-desig- ed. The most significant impact was nated, nine-member fire brigade on the school system. All schools in disaster response teams outside the region were immediately closed the impact area mobilized within 30 after the initial earthquake for as- minutes of the first event and arrived sessment of safety. Of the schools in the Molise and Puglia regions surveyed by the DPC, approximately within the first 24 hours. Members Figure 19 - Function 9 (Damage 20-30% were deemed unsafe and of the fire brigade were observed Assessment) in the COM. not scheduled to be re-opened with- shoring up private buildings in sev- out structural intervention. eral towns — not a common practice sites were installed in the impact in the United States (Figure 18). area within 48 hours. Given its agricultural nature, the area also contains a large number At the national level, pre-assigned Staff from the national DPC pro- of farm animals, many of which were personnel from the DPC in Rome vided overall emergency manage- housed in old barns and other struc- mobilized automatically and within ment and coordination at the prov- tures that collapsed or were serious- five hours of the earthquake estab- ince level. At the local or town level, ly damaged. lished a primary Mixed Operative five Community Operative Centers Center (Centro Operativo Misto, or (Centro Operativo Comunale, or Preliminary estimates of the econ- COM) in the town of Larino. A sec- COC), staffed by municipal staff and omic losses due to this quake range ond COM was established in San volunteers, provided emergency from $250-$350 million. Giuliano, and a third in Casalnuovo management services and logistical Monterotaro in the Puglia region. support. For example, the COC in Response: As so often occurs fol- Santa Croce scheduled which city lowing major disasters, response The location of the primary COM blocks were to be inspected by was both planned and emergent. (Larino) had been designated prior professional crews every day. Immediately following the initial to the earthquake, but telecom- event, all attention was focused on munications had not been installed. Both COMs and COCs are orga- the site of the collapsed school in Within two hours of activation, 15 nized around 16 emergency man- San Giuliano, where bystanders be- hard-wire telephone lines were agement functions, similar to the gan search and rescue until relieved installed, and 40 lines were in place Emergency Support Functions two hours later by the fire brigade within eight hours of activation. Five (ESF) utilized by the Federal Emer- that used rescue dogs to help locate additional wireless communication gency Management Agency in the United States. In accordance with existing emergency plans, three COM functions were implemented initially: fire brigade, police, engi- neers/technicians; emergency medical and local health services; and damage assessment.

On November 1, a state of emer- gency was declared in the impacted regions, allowing the use of all national resources to help in the emergency response. Ultimately, 5,000 emergency response person- nel (600 fire, 2800 police/military, and 1,600 volunteers) responded to the impact area. Advanced Mobile Figure 18 - Fire Brigade shoring a damaged building Medical Units, staffed by Red Cross and military personnel, responded

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and were still staged in the impact family and friends, rather than in a ages of material resources, in- area two weeks following the initial shelter. cluding generators and heavy equip- event. ment. The Interior Ministry maintains Ultimately, 22 outdoor emergency stockpiles of emergency supplies Relief Operations: Outdoor emer- shelters or “tent cities” (tendopoli) and equipment throughout the gency shelters were established were established. Road signs country and has contracts with pri- following the initial earthquake. throughout the region pointed in the vate firms for heavy equipment, There were not enough shelter beds direction of the nearest emergency chemical toilets, showers and other to accommodate all of the displaced shelter. The tendopoli (Figure 20) equipment. on the first night, so a number of included large tents for meals and people slept in their cars. The after- socializing, smaller, 8-bed sleeping As seen in other disasters, there shock of November 1 doubled the tents, and several campers for the was an abundance of volunteers number of displaced seeking emer- elderly and disabled. In cases where from the Red Cross and community gency shelter and exacerbated fears a sufficient number of campers were agencies. The Red Cross in Italy of more quakes and damage. not available, the elderly and dis- is affiliated with the military and to- abled were housed in hotels outside gether one of their missions is to set As the aftershocks continued, the the impact area. up the outdoor emergency shelters. number of displaced rose to an estimated 6,000. People were afraid Each tent was equipped with port- Rehabilitation Plans: The main to stay in their slightly damaged or able, generator-powered heaters short-term priority established by the undamaged homes. In some cases, and lighting, and with hard modular COMs for the initial recovery period tents were erected right next to grille floors. Public telephone booths is to provide temporary housing to individual homes so worried owners were also in-stalled at each shelter. the displaced. This involves moving could protect their property and Because people were not willing to the displaced whose homes are not belongings. Two weeks after the send their children back to schools, damaged back into their homes, and initial event, 60% of the displaced school tents were erected in the tent moving the homeless from the tent were still in emergency shelters. An cities. cities to more stable, temporary unknown number of the displaced The primary COM Logistics Chief housing. Prefabricated homes will chose to stay in a hotel or with indicated that there were no short- be provided for those families whose homes were destroyed, while re- building occurs. Alternatively, each family will receive a housing allow- ance of about $400/month toward temporary housing of their choice.

Two weeks after the earthquake, grading had commenced at some sites on which prefabricated homes will be located. Another COM priority is to provide temporary structures for schools that were deemed to be unsafe following the earthquake. Prefabricated buildings are being considered to replace the unsafe schools while retrofit measures take place.

According to a representative of the DPC, it takes the government of Italy four to six weeks to compile damage figures and document dam- age before repairs can be made. Of Figure 20 - Tent city at Montorio nei Frentani, about 8km north of San particular concern to officials of the Giuliano. DPC was how to restore essential services in San Giuliano on an inter- im basis, and how to keep residents

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Group of classifying this zone as Architecture, University of Rome “La moderately seismic, most of the Sapienza;” Giuseppe Naso, Paolo municipalities affected by these Galli, and Vittorio Bosi, of the Italian earthquakes were considered by National Seismic Survey (SSN); past and current building codes to Gianluca Valensise of the Italian be aseismic. National Institute of Geophysics and Vulcanology (INGV); Sergio Government officials have made Lagomarsino and Stefano Podestà public statements promising that all of the Department of Structural and new buildings, especially scholastic Geotechnical Engineering, Univer- buildings, will be built or retrofitted to sity of Genoa; Sergio Tropens- the latest known seismic standards. covino, consultant to the SSN; and Figure 21 - Parent and emergency However, until local jurisdictions de- Marco Mucciarelli, Mariarosaria worker talk in front of temporary cide to officially adopt more stringent Gallipoli, and Mauro Dolce of the school in a tent city design criteria for lateral loads, the University of Basilicata. performance level to which new from moving away permanently dur- buildings are designed will be left to We also appreciate the support ing the estimated three to four years the engineer and owner. those individuals received from it will take to rebuild damaged their institutions that enabled homes and businesses. Conclusions them to collaborate with us. For providing key information regarding On November 4, the Interior Ministry The extensive damage to buildings the emergency relief effort in made available approximately $50 observed in Molise can be attributed Molise, we are deeply indebted million for the initial and most ur- mostly to poor quality construction to the Director of Volunteer gent emergency initiatives. Donated practices and materials. Many of the Organizations and Institutional funds from public and private organi- buildings that suffered extensive Relations, A. Miozzo, Head of the zations will also play a significant damage or collapse (including the COM in Larino, Department of Civil role. For example, one of the major school) were not adequately engi- Protection (DPC), and to Geologist newspapers in the country raised neered to withstand the seismic Fabio Brondi and Architect Marina roughly $12 million, a portion of forces. The extensive damages to Mucciarella, also of the DPC. which went toward the construction poor quality, non-engineered build- of a temporary school structure in ings were caused by the lack of Finally, heartfelt grazie are due to San Giuliano. seismic regulations for construction the many citizens of the Molise in this region. Amplification of and Puglia towns who opened their Funds will be administered to repair ground motion due to soft soil condi- damaged houses for the EERI team any seismic-related damage for tions and topographic effects seems members to inspect. individual residences in the affected to have played an important role as areas. Since virtually no earthquake well. insurance is available to The older, medieval parts of towns individual homeowners in Italy, that were built on surface hard government and privately funded rock formations sustained much assistance programs are essential less damage. Another contributing to the restoration efforts. factor was the strong aftershock on November 1, which exploited the Pertinent to the reconstruction effort weaknesses of already damaged are the building codes in this area. buildings. The most current seismic hazard maps for Italy show the area affect- ed by the earthquake to be a seismi- Acknowledgments cally active area with PGAs (approx- imately equal to 0.15g-0.2g at the A number of people and organi- 10% probability of exceedance in 50 zations contributed to the success years level) similar to those in zone of the field trip, and furnished 2B of the 1997 Uniform Building critical material for this report. We Code. Despite the suggestions of are very grateful to the following: the 1998 ING-GNDT-SSN Working Luis Decanini of the Department of

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