Seleucid Mounted Troops: a Reassessment of the Organisation and Operation of the Seleucid Cavalry and Its Unconventional Units

SELEUCID MOUNTED TROOPS: A REASSESSMENT OF THE ORGANISATION AND OPERATION OF THE SELEUCID CAVALRY AND ITS UNCONVENTIONAL UNITS

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

2020

SILVANNEN R. GERRARD

SCHOOL OF ARTS, LANGUAGES AND CULTURES CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS ...... 6

ABSTRACT ...... 7

DECLARATION ...... 8

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... 10

INTRODUCTION ...... 11 0.1. Focus ...... 11 0.1.1. Challenging the Current Scholarly Climate ...... 11 0.1.2. A Tripartite Infrastructure ...... 14 0.1.3. Combined Arms Theory...... 17 0.1.4. Definitions and Boundaries ...... 19 0.2. The Sources ...... 23 0.2.1. Approaching the Ancient Evidence ...... 23 0.2.2. Reconstructing Battles ...... 31 0.3. Outline ...... 36

CHAPTER 1 UNDERSTANDING THE HORSES OF THE SELEUCID EMPIRE ...... 39 1.1. Introduction...... 39 1.2. Features and Characteristics ...... 41 1.3. Ancient Horse ‘Types’ ...... 48 1.4. Conclusion ...... 57

CHAPTER 2 A TRIPARTITE MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE: THE CASE FOR MILITARY SETTLEMENTS ...... 59 2.1. Introduction...... 59 2.2. The Structure of the Seleucid Army ...... 60 2.2.1. Traditional Bipartite Approaches ...... 60 2.2.2. A New Tripartite System ...... 62 2.3. Military Settlements...... 65 2.3.1. A Large Standing Army? ...... 65

2.3.2. Evidence ...... 69 2.3.3. Workings and Implications ...... 80 2.3.4. The Guard ...... 87 2.4. Conclusion ...... 92

CHAPTER 3 SELEUCID MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE: THE ORGANISATION OF THE CAVALRY ...... 97 3.1. Introduction...... 97 3.2. A Tripartite Division of the Cavalry ...... 98 3.2.1. The Cavalry Guard ...... 100 3.2.2. ‘Non-Regular’ Cavalry ...... 108 3.2.3. Reserve Cavalry ...... 117 3.3. Infantry:Cavalry Ratios ...... 122 3.4. Studs and Other Logistics ...... 135 3.4.1. Stud Locations...... 136 3.4.2. Other Cavalry Logistics ...... 150 3.5. Conclusion ...... 154

CHAPTER 4 BATTLE TACTICS: THE SELEUCID CAVALRY IN OPERATION ...... 158 4.1. Introduction...... 158 4.2. Cavalry Positions on the Battlefield ...... 162 4.2.1. The Flanks: A Standard Battle Arrangement ...... 162 4.2.2. The Centre ...... 170 4.2.3. Cavalry Held in Reserve ...... 175 4.2.4. The Tripartite Structure and Cavalry Placement ...... 178 4.3. The Role of Cavalry on the Battlefield ...... 181 4.3.1. Charge and Pursuit as an Offensive Strategy ...... 184 4.3.2. Sham Retreat ...... 189 4.3.3. Harassment of the Enemy ...... 194 4.3.4. The Tripartite Structure and Cavalry Tactics ...... 197 4.4. Conclusion ...... 199

CHAPTER 5 COMBINED ARMS: THE USE OF UNCONVENTIONAL TROOPS ...... 203 5.1. Introduction...... 203 5.2. Elephants...... 207 5.2.1. Battlefield Position ...... 210

5.2.1a. In Front of the Main Line ...... 212 5.2.1b. Integrated Within the Main Line ...... 222 5.2.1c. Behind the Main Line ...... 227 5.2.1d. Summary ...... 232 5.2.2. Tactical Role ...... 233 5.2.2a. Engaging Other Elephants ...... 234 5.2.2b. Blocking Other Units ...... 238 5.2.2c. Psychological Warfare ...... 240 5.2.3. Evidence of Combined Arms? ...... 245 5.3. Scythed Chariots ...... 248 5.3.1. Battlefield Position ...... 253 5.3.2. Tactical Role ...... 255 5.3.3. Evidence of Combined Arms? ...... 258 5.4. Camels ...... 260 5.4.1. Battlefield Position ...... 261 5.4.2. Tactical Role ...... 263 5.4.3. Evidence of Combined Arms? ...... 264 5.5. Conclusion ...... 265

CONCLUSION ...... 269

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 275 Ancient Sources ...... 275 Modern Scholarship ...... 280

APPENDIX 1 POTENTIAL ‘NON-REGULAR’ CAVALRY CONTINGENTS ...... 308 Table 1.1. Achaemenid Cavalry Contingents ...... 308

APPENDIX 2 INFANTRY:CAVALRY RATIOS ...... 313 Table 2.1. Seleucid Ratios ...... 313 Table 2.2. Other Hellenistic Ratios ...... 315 The Diadochi ...... 315 Ptolemies ...... 316 Greece and Macedon ...... 317 Carthage ...... 319 Others ...... 320

Table 2.3. Alexander’s Ratios ...... 321 Table 2.4. Classical Greek Ratios ...... 322 Table 2.5. Achaemenid Ratios ...... 328

APPENDIX 3 AN OVERVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF SELEUCID MOUNTED TROOPS IN THEIR BATTLES ...... 332 Table 3.1. Battlefield Positions and Tactics of Seleucid Mounted Troops ...... 332

APPENDIX 4 SELEUCID CAVALRY TACTICS ...... 342 Table 4.1. Cavalry Tactics Summary ...... 342 Table 4.2. Visible Evidence of the Tripartite Division ...... 343

APPENDIX 5 UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ...... 344 Table 5.1. Battle Checklist ...... 344 Table 5.2. Evidence of Combined Arms? ...... 345 Table 5.3. Ratios ...... 346 Tables 5.4-6. Seleucid Battle Tactics ...... 348 Table 5.4. Elephants ...... 348 Table 5.5. Scythed Chariots ...... 350 Table 5.6. Camels ...... 351 Tables 5.7-9. Comparative Battle Tactics ...... 351 Table 5.7. Elephants ...... 351 Table 5.8. Scythed Chariots ...... 356 Table 5.9. Camels ...... 357

Word Count: 79,655

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations of papyri follow Oates, J.F. and Willis, W.H. (2011) Checklist of Editions of Greek, Latin, Demotic, and Coptic Papyri, Ostraca, and Tablets, available at: http://papyri.info/docs/checklist. All websites were last accessed in March 2020.

B.M. British Museum

BCHP Babylonian Chronicles of the Hellenistic Period

CT Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum

Dpd Achaemenid Royal Inscriptions: Darius I, Persepolis

IG Inscriptiones Graecae – available at: https://inscriptions.packhum.org

LSJ Liddell, H.G., Scott, R., Jones, H.S., and McKenzie, R. (1968) A Greek-English Lexicon, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

MNE Museo Nazionale Etrusco

OGIS Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae – Dittenberger, W. (1903) Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae, Supplementum Sylloges Inscriptiones Graecarum, Apud S. Hirzel, Leipzig.

PBS University of Pennsylvania, The Museum, Publications of the Babylonian Section

PF Persepolis Fortification Tablets – Hallock, R.T. (1969) Persepolis Fortification Tablets, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

SEG Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum – available at: https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/supplementum- epigraphicum-graecum

TL Tituli Lyciae lingua Lycia conscripti – Kalinka, E. (1901) Tituli Asiae Minoris: Conlecti et Editi Auspiciis, Caesareae Academiae Litterarum Vindobonensis, Volumen 1: Tituli Lyciae lingua Lycia conscripti, Hölder, Vienna.

UCP University of California Publications in Semitic Philology

Wells RC Wells, C.B. (1934) Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period: A Study in Greek Epigraphy, Yale University Press, London

ABSTRACT

This thesis establishes the importance of the Seleucids’ mounted troops. In contrast to previous scholarship the analysis presented here argues that Seleucid cavalry did not decline in quality or battlefield significance in comparison to its Macedonian predecessors, nor did Hellenistic warfare witness a stagnation of tactics. Through the application of modern military theory this thesis reassesses the battles of the Seleucid Empire, demonstrating that the Seleucids’ unconventional units of war- elephants, scythed chariots, and camel-archers were intended to operate in conjunction with the standard cavalry through combined arms warfare. This offers a new way of approaching Hellenistic battles, and refutes the persistent scholarly dismissals of these unconventional troops’ tactical value and the misguided notion that their use was a symptom, or even cause, of Hellenistic cavalry decline.

This thesis also addresses the lack of more recent systematic studies of the Seleucid army. Refuting the standard, but crucially flawed, ethnically-based dichotomy of Greco-Macedonian ‘regulars’ vs. ‘national’ levies, this thesis establishes a new tripartite military infrastructure of standing troops, reserve troops, and ‘non-regular’ troops, directly centred on the military status of the men involved. Reaffirming the existence of a Seleucid military settlement system, the analysis illustrates how this three-way organisation operated within the Seleucids’ mounted corps, offering greater clarity to our understanding of the intricate workings of this vast Empire. This thesis also presents a careful assessment of the ‘types’ of horses available, the effects of their physiognomy on their military capabilities, and the range of potential stud locations throughout the Empire. These aspects are often neglected, and yet prove invaluable for understanding the logistical underpinnings of the Seleucids’ mounted force. Similarly, this thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the Seleucids’ infantry:cavalry ratios in comparison to those of their contemporaries and predecessors. This material is likewise broadly unstudied in existing military scholarship, leading to crucial misunderstandings of the infantry- cavalry relationship in ancient warfare. This thesis corrects this, demonstrating that the Seleucids maintained a flexible and high-quality mounted force that remained tactically significant throughout the Hellenistic period.

DECLARATION

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

i. The author of this thesis (including any appendices and/or schedules to this thesis) owns certain copyright or related rights in it (the “Copyright”) and s/he has given The University of Manchester certain rights to use such Copyright, including for administrative purposes.

ii. Copies of this thesis, either in full or in extracts and whether in hard or electronic copy, may be made only in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended) and regulations issued under it or, where appropriate, in accordance with licensing agreements which the University has from time to time. This page must form part of any such copies made. iii. The ownership of certain Copyright, patents, designs, trademarks and other intellectual property (the “Intellectual Property”) and any reproductions of copyright works in the thesis, for example graphs and tables (“Reproductions”), which may be described in this thesis, may not be owned by the author and may be owned by third parties. Such Intellectual Property and Reproductions cannot and must not be made available for use without the prior written permission of the owner(s) of the relevant Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions. iv. Further information on the conditions under which disclosure, publication and commercialisation of this thesis, the Copyright and any Intellectual Property and/or Reproductions described in it may take place is available in the University IP Policy (see http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/DocuInfo. aspx?DocID=24420), in any relevant Thesis restriction declarations deposited in the University Library, The University Library’s regulations (see http://www.library.manchester.ac.uk/about/regulations/) and in The University’s policy on Presentation of Theses.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Throughout this PhD I have been fortunate to have the support of many friends and colleagues. First and foremost, this thesis would not have been possible without the support of the Arts and Humanities Research Council, and I am grateful to all those who helped me secure this funding. The work presented here has greatly benefitted from the insightful comments and suggestions of my supervisor Dr Andy Fear, and the other members of my supervisory team: Professor Polly Low, Dr Peter Liddel, and Dr Ruth Morello. I offer them my sincerest thanks for their support and guidance throughout the PhD process, and indeed my time at the University of Manchester as a whole.

I also extend my thanks to the various members of the Classics and Ancient History department, both past and present, for making my time here a truly enjoyable experience. In particular, I am incredibly lucky to have been able to count Dr Jules Abad del Vecchio as my friend throughout my nine years at Manchester. I also wish to thank my fellow PhD (and post-PhD) students – Matt Ingham, Dr Joely Black, Laura Chambers, Serena Cammoranesi, Dr Rosie Jackson, Matteo Dessimone Pallevera, Tom Clements, and Dr Owen Rees – for their friendship and support. Special thanks also go to Dr Guy Williams for offering to proofread my thesis, and for his helpful (and often humorous) comments.

Above all, my humblest and most heartfelt thanks are owed to Kat Mawford for her companionship and unwavering support throughout the PhD. Our weekly coffees have kept me sane, and I am eternally grateful to her for proofreading my thesis and answering my many questions!

The last eighteen months have been made bearable due to the Graduate School’s ‘final year’ and ‘submission pending’ office schemes, and I offer my thanks to Emma Tollefsen, George Bickers, Lois Stone, and, especially, Eva Mosser and Imi Durant, for their company and encouragement throughout this period.

Several of my friends away from the University also deserve special mention. Thank you to Philippa Lee, Alex Russell, Simone Patrick, and Savannagh Bland for reminding me that life does exist outside of the PhD. I promise to catch up with all of you more often!

Finally, but most importantly, this PhD would have been extremely difficult without the incredible support of my parents Janet and Steven Gerrard, and my brother Alex Gerrard, each of whom have acted as a sounding board for many of my ideas, proofread my work, and patiently listened to me talk about ancient sources on numerous occasions. Thank you for everything.

INTRODUCTION

0.1. Focus

0.1.1. Challenging the Current Scholarly Climate

Wedged between the great Classical age of Greece and the rise of the Roman

Empire, the Hellenistic period has traditionally been characterised as one of decline and transition, a footnote to the dominance of Alexander.1 When Augustus visited

Alexander’s tomb in Egypt, Suetonius records that he allegedly dismissed the suggestion that he might look on those of the Ptolemies, claiming “my wish was to see a king, not corpses”.2 Recently, however, scholars have begun to challenge the ideas of Hellenistic decadence and deterioration, and a growing appreciation of the period as one of continuing development and sophistication is becoming common.3

Whereas earlier scholars tended to emphasise the Hellenising drive of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid Empires, the arrival of Sherwin-White and Kurht’s seminal work, From

Samarkhand to Sardis in 1993, detailing the significance of the period’s cross- cultural interactions and developments, illustrated the need for a new approach. Since its publication, Seleucid scholarship in particular has flourished, witnessing a wide range of monographs and articles on various topics, from the administration of individual cities, to the development and portrayal of royal ideology.4

Despite this shift in attitudes, the study of Hellenistic military history continues to lag behind. There remains a persistent idea in modern scholarship that although the

Hellenistic period was one of great technical innovation and experimentation,

1 Erskine (2005) 1-2; Bugh (2006) 1-2; Bennett and Roberts (2009) xiv. 2 regem se voluisse ait videre, non mortuos, Suetonius, Augustus 18.2. 3 Erskine (2005) 2ff. 4 E.g. Chapdetrey (2007); Aperghis (2004); Grainger (1997), (1990), (2002); McKenzie (1994); Cohen (2013); Ma (1999); Kosmin (2014); Gruen (1996), (1993); Erickson (2018), (2009).

11 militarily it suffered from an overall stagnation in tactics and a decline in quality.

This is particularly prevalent in assessments of Hellenistic cavalry. As Tarn noted in

1930, it was common in Hellenistic battles for opposing cavalry contingents to neutralise each other, leaving the outcome to be decided by the heavy infantry in the centre of the field.5 From this, Ducrey declared that the cavalry ‘gradually lost its importance as a tactical arm’ following Alexander,6 an idea with which both Sekunda and Serrati concur,7 and which remains implicit in many works on Hellenistic warfare. It was the infantry, remarks Sabin, which remained ‘queen’ of the battlefield.8 For Ducrey and Serrati, in particular, a fundamental aspect of this perceived decline was the sustained use of unconventional weapons, most notably war-elephants.9 Indeed, scholars have frequently characterised this period’s fascination with unusual weapons as a hindrance, their contributions dismissed as nothing more than novelties whose effects soon wore off.10 Not only do such arguments underappreciate these troops, but they also do significant injustice to the complex nature of this period’s warfare.

In light of the dominant role of cavalry in Alexander the Great’s spectacular success, scholars have often judged the Hellenistic world by the same standards.

Disappointed by a perceived lack of decisive cavalry action in comparison, they have dismissed the generalship of this period as derivative and stale, dependent solely on numerical superiority rather than tactical innovation. However, such approaches ignore the vital fact that Alexander’s opponents were not the same as those faced by

5 Tarn (1930a) 26-7, 68. 6 Ducrey (1986) 103 = (1985) 105. 7 Sekunda (2007) 374; Serrati (2013) 191. 8 Sabin (2007) 425; also: Gaebel (2002) 261-2; Anderson (1961) 153; though cf. Adcock (1957) 52. 9 Ducrey (1986) 103 = (1985) 105; Serrati (2013) 191. 10 Cf. Appian, Hispanica 46; Asclepiodotus, 1.3; Serrati (2013) 191-3; Ducrey (1986) 103-8 = (1985) 105-10; Glover (1948) 3, 11, (1950) 3, 6-8; Gaebel (2002) 222, 296; Sabin (2007) 421; Edwards (2001) 902; Trautmann (2015) 230, 260; Epplett (2007) 220.

Hellenistic rulers. Whereas Alexander’s Macedonians enjoyed superior training and equipment in comparison to their enemies, opposing Hellenistic armies were typically composed of similar units, their commanders operating under the same tactical premises. The asymmetry that had been so important to Alexander’s victories was lost. It is thus unsurprising that Alexander’s battlefield dominance was not replicated in this period, and it is unreasonable to expect it to be so.11

This thesis challenges this attitude. Rejecting the notions of decline and stagnation, it reassesses Hellenistic cavalry on its own terms, focusing on what commanders hoped and expected it to achieve, how it was used, and the effects its actions had on the outcome of battles. This is not to imply that a reassessment of

Hellenistic infantry is not also required, but since the accusations of decline have been made specifically with regards to the cavalry, and since it was these troops which the use of unconventional weapons allegedly disrupted, it is necessary first to re-evaluate the mounted arm in order to understand properly the developments of

Hellenistic warfare. Furthermore, it is important to address the overall neglect of cavalry horses themselves in previous military scholarship. As Willekes notes, despite the works of Anderson, Azzaroli, and Hyland, many scholars fail to consider the fundamental characteristics and abilities of horses, assuming that they are all the same.12 It is therefore imperative that we correct this misunderstanding; only by comprehending the horse’s basic features and limitations, and how the varieties available in the ancient world affected their military capabilities can we analyse the tactical use of Hellenistic cavalry effectively.

11 Cf. also: Gaebel (2002) 216, 227-8, 261-2, 301, 307-10. 12 Willekes (2013) 10, 18-23; Anderson (1961); Azzaroli (1985); Hyland (1990), (2003), (2013).

In particular, this thesis considers the organisation and operation of the Seleucid

Empire’s cavalry in conjunction with its use of unconventional weapons (namely, war-elephants, scythed chariots, and camels) to demonstrate the continuing importance of mounted troops in this period. Whilst a fresh study of the warfare of the Hellenistic world as a whole would be of great benefit, I have chosen to focus on the Seleucid Empire in particular for several reasons. Not only was the Seleucids’ variety and quantity of cavalry unrivalled, but, with borders spanning the Aegean to

India, this vast kingdom functioned as a cross-roads of different cultures and traditions, meaning that it also saw the most sustained and diverse use of unconventional weapons. Additionally, whilst the works of Sekunda and Grainger in particular have helped to shed new light on various important aspects of the Empire’s forces, it is notable that there has been no systematic and detailed consideration of the organisation and operation of the Seleucid army since that of Bar-Kochva in 1976.13

Although Bar-Kochva’s theories are by no means universally accepted,14 his work has fundamentally shaped the way that we approach Seleucid military history, and he is commonly regarded as the authority on these matters by more general works without question.15 This thesis therefore addresses the gap, reassessing the internal workings of the Seleucid army and their effects on the operation of its mounted arm.

0.1.2. A Tripartite Infrastructure

As we shall see in Chapter 2, the lack of more recent detailed assessments of the Seleucid army has led to misunderstandings about the nature of the Empire’s military infrastructure. The majority of previous scholarship has envisaged the

13 Sekunda (1994); Grainger (1997); also: Houle (2015). 14 See: Markle (1978a); Errington (1977); Taylor (1992). 15 E.g. Grainger (1997) 797-801, 803-4, 807, 809, 811, 816; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 54; Sekunda (2007) 334; Esposito (2019) 85, 91; Bennett and Roberts (2009) 22.

Seleucid army as being organised around a two-way split between ‘regulars’ (i.e. the

‘Macedonian’ regiments directly inherited from Alexander, such as the phalanx,

Argyraspides, Companions, and Agema) and what are ambiguously called ‘national’ levies. Such an arrangement is unsatisfactory. Not only is the term ‘national’ problematic in a world that did not have a concept of a ‘nation state’,16 but it also implies a dichotomy between ‘Greco-Macedonians’ and ‘others’. Given the cultural diversity of the Seleucid Empire it is highly doubtful whether such a strict ethnic divide was always the case, and the use of ‘Macedonian’ itself as an ethnic label in the Hellenistic period is far from simple.17 Furthermore, by dividing the army purely on artificial ethnic boundaries, this bipartite structure provides no real indication of the size of the Seleucids’ standing army. Ascertaining the size of this force is a fundamental aspect of understanding the Empire’s military infrastructure, and offers significant insight into the military attitudes of Seleucid rulers.

I therefore propose a new tripartite structure specifically centred on the military status of the men involved. Following the highly professional armies of Philip,

Alexander, and the Diadochi, it is not unreasonable to expect the Seleucids to have likewise maintained a large standing army. However, since they also inherited just as much from the Achaemenid Empire as they did from their Macedonian predecessors, it is possible (at least as far as the indigenous population was concerned) that a military organisation similar to the Persians’ ‘feudal’ system was adopted, in which the king maintained only a small permanent corps and would simply order his satraps to supply him with a given number of men whenever he went to war.18 Such an

16 I suggest that we identify these levies as ‘subjects’ instead. 17 See Chapter 2.2.1. 18 Sherwin-White and Kurt (1993) 1-2, 18, 38-9, 42, 53, 91; McKenzie (1994) 62; Bar-Kochva (1976) 20; Sekunda (1992) 53 and Briant (1986) 35-6 have also suggested the existence of military settlements in the Achaemenid Empire, however, cf. the caution in Charles (2016) 400-1.

15 approach would be in keeping with Alexander’s general policy of assimilation, and the overall maintenance of the satrapal administrative system.19 Initially, Seleucid rulers were very much ‘an alien element in the area’ with no immediate ‘local powerbase’.20 Therefore, a Macedonian-Achaemenid hybrid with regards to recruitment would arguably not have been unexpected. Additionally, there have been various scholarly debates over whether the Seleucids also maintained a military settlement system similar to that of the Ptolemies within their Empire.21

As Chapter 2 demonstrates, when we consider which types of contingents made up the Seleucid army in line with these differing traditions of troop recruitment, and reassess the evidence for the Empire’s maintenance of a military settlement system, it is clear that their forces should be separated into three main categories:

1) Standing troops (those on continual military duty, such as the Guard),

2) Reserve troops (those not on permanent duty but with military obligations to

the king),

3) ‘Non-regulars’ (those without military obligations, serving only during a

general mobilisation).

This new tripartite structure not only illuminates the strength and composition of the

Seleucids’ standing army, but offers greater clarity for our understanding of the fundamental workings of their overall military infrastructure. This three-way division forms the theoretical framework for the thesis, underpinning the analysis of the organisation and operation of the Seleucids’ mounted arm.

19 E.g. Arrian, Anabasis 1.17, 1.24, 7.4, 7.6, 7.23.3; Quintus Curtius, 10.3; Sherwin-White and Kurt (1993) 15, 17-8, 38, 42-6, 121; McKenzie (1994) 63-5; Fingerson (2007) 107, 120; Grainger (1997) 811. 20 Bar-Kochva (1976) 201. 21 See Chapter 2.3.

0.1.3. Combined Arms Theory

The dismissive attitudes towards unconventional weapons have similarly created a crucial misunderstanding of their use in Hellenistic warfare. Given the symmetry of Hellenistic armies, it seems reasonable to assume that the period’s fascination with ‘unusual’ contingents was an attempt by commanders to regain an edge over their opponents, an ‘arms race’ aimed at discovering a new ‘super- weapon’.22 However, rather than viewing these troops purely as one-off innovations, it is necessary to explain their sustained use; war-elephants especially were a constant feature on the battlefield for over 150 years.23 Whilst there has lately been a rise in studies on war-elephants, following Scullard’s (still definitive) 1974 work,24 there has nonetheless been a lack of serious effort to analyse the ways in which these animals

(and, indeed, all unconventional weapons more broadly) were integrated into the theoretical framework and tactical operations of the armies that employed them. Such units did not operate in a vacuum, and so consideration of the benefits these troops presented to the army as a whole is needed.

Here Wrightson’s recent work is the notable exception.25 Drawing on the military theory of combined arms, Wrightson offers a new approach to understanding ancient warfare:

The model of combined arms warfare… serves as a way of analysing battles from a tactical perspective. It is very useful in detailing the intricacies of battle… Combined arms allows historians the means of comparing the tactical efficiencies of armies and commanders throughout the history of warfare.26

22 Trautmann (2015) 217, 226, 249, 265; Spinage (1994) 265; Gaebel (2002) 296. 23 See Appendix 5, Tables 5.1, 5.7. 24 E.g. Schneider (2016); Trautmann (2015); Nossov (2008); Charles (2008b), (2007); Epplett (2007); Kistler (2007); Edwards (2001). 25 Wrightson (2019), (2015). 26 Wrightson (2019) 4.

An integral part of the modern warfare of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, combined arms theory is ‘the basic idea that different combat arms and weapons systems must be used in concert to maximize the survival and effectiveness of the others. The strengths of one system must be used to compensate for the weaknesses of others’.27 Although one may object to the application of a modern theoretical concept to the ancient world, it is important to note that although the actual term

‘combined arms’ is itself relatively new, the concept of integrated warfare is not.28

Throughout history good commanders have always strived to employ the various components of their army to best effect, the only difference is in the degree of their success and the level of diversity in their armies. The simplest use of combined arms can be achieved by an army with only basic infantry and cavalry provided that their actions are coordinated to complement each other most effectively. However, the greater the variety of troops available, the greater the level of tactical sophistication needed to implement combined arms warfare successfully.29 By analysing ancient Greek battles via combined arms theory, Wrightson traces the development of this tactical sophistication from the Archaic Greek period to the rise of Alexander and his Successors. Significantly, however, his analysis goes no further than Ipsus (301 B.C.), claiming that ‘few new tactics involving combined arms occur’ after this battle.30 As we shall see in Chapter 5, the Allies’ actions at Ipsus were indeed an example of combined arms warfare par excellence. Nevertheless, simply dismissing the battles and generalship of the following period as lacking without analysing them in equal detail is not only untenable, but also perpetuates the mistaken idea that Hellenistic warfare experienced stagnation and decline.

27 House (2001) 4, (1984) 2. 28 Cf. Wrightson (2019) 4; House (2001) 34, (1984) 1. 29 Wrightson (2019) 7-9. 30 Wrightson (2019) 1.

It is necessary to rectify this. Since diversity in armies was greatly increased with the rising use of unconventional weapons in the aftermath of Alexander the

Great’s conquests (especially in the Seleucid Empire), the application of combined arms theory is an invaluable corrective to the existing misunderstandings of these troops. The analysis presented here goes beyond Wrightson’s work, reassessing the

Seleucids’ battles and demonstrating that, contrary to standard opinion, the

Hellenistic world showed a greater receptiveness to military coordination than scholars have previously recognised. Alongside Ipsus, the battles of Raphia (217

B.C.) and Panion (200 B.C.) are particularly significant in this regard.31 Through the application of combined arms theory, the analysis presented here provides a much needed reassessment of unconventional weapons, and offers a new understanding of the tactical integration of the individual components of the Seleucids’ mounted corps.

Rather than considering unconventional troops to be mere novelties, the Empire’s use of these contingents supplemented and supported the traditional cavalry units in order to increase their battlefield efficacy. I thus reject the arguments of Ducrey, et al., by demonstrating that there was no decline in the quality of Hellenistic cavalry (at least in the Seleucid Empire), and that Seleucid commanders remained open to tactical experimentation.

0.1.4. Definitions and Boundaries

As explained above, this thesis is concerned solely with the Seleucid Empire’s mounted troops. Here it is important to note that ‘mounted troops’ will be used as an overarching category that includes the Seleucid Empire’s standard cavalry units as well as their unconventional contingents of war-elephants, scythed chariots, and

31 Chapter 5.2.3.

19 camel-archers. As Asclepiodotus’ contemporary military work makes clear, the classification of ‘mounted troops’ (ὀχηματικὴ δύναμις) in this period comprised three sub-groups: the traditional horse-based units of the cavalry, chariots, and war- elephants.32 Admittedly, Asclepiodotus makes no mention of the Arabian camel- riders in his treatise, but this should not surprise us due to the infrequency of their use by the major military powers of the Hellenistic world. This is not to imply that

Seleucid commanders made no distinction between these different units; it is clear that war-elephants were fundamentally different to horses. Nonetheless, the inclusion of these less conventional weapons under the heading of ‘mounted troops’ is justified because the basic concept of riding an animal into battle is essentially the same, whether elephant, camel, or horse.

A further clarification of terminology is relevant: when discussing the use of unconventional units in the Hellenistic period, several scholars have identified these, particularly the war-elephants, as ‘exotic’ troops.33 Broadly this term indicates any unit that was not already part of the Macedonian army prior to Alexander the Great’s invasion of the Achaemenid Empire, and was specific to the armies of the ‘East’.

Since this thesis is concerned with the development of Seleucid mounted forces following Alexander, there is an appeal in accepting this. However, by characterising these contingents as ‘exotic’ there is a danger of adopting a Eurocentric perspective.34

In particular, it is debatable how far the use of this term is consistently appropriate for the Seleucid Empire, which encompassed many different cultures and military traditions. Moreover, beyond the literary topos of the marvels of India, there is little

32 κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὴ καὶ τῆς ὀχηματικῆς δυνάμεως τρεῖς εἰσι διαφοραί· ἡ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἱππική, ἡ δὲ δι᾿ ἁρμάτων ἐπιτελεῖται, ἡ τρίτη δὲ δι᾿ ἐλεφάντων, Asclepiodotus, 1.3, also 7-9; cf. Wrightson (2019) 22-3. 33 E.g.: Sabin (2007) 399, 417, 421; Sekunda (2007) 347; Serrati (2013) 192-3; Bar-Kochva (1976) 205; Trautmann (2015) 92, 104; Epplett (2007) 213. 34 Cf. Vlassopoulos (2007) 2-3, 8-9, 221.

20 indication in the sources that the ancients themselves conceived of these troops as

‘exotic’. Although it is reasonable to set up a contrast between what we can more readily conceive of as ‘conventional’ battlefield units (i.e. infantry and cavalry) and those that are more specialised in either their use or location, it is important to remain aware of the implications of our terminology. Therefore, I shall classify the war- elephant, scythed chariot, and camel contingents of the Seleucid army under the more neutral heading of ‘unconventional’ troops.

Beyond the focus on the Seleucids’ mounted corps, an important boundary is one of chronology. Although the analysis presented here is concerned with the

Seleucid Empire, an entity that formally spanned nearly 250 years from Seleucus’ re- conquest of Babylon (312 B.C.) to Pompey’s annexation of Syria (64 B.C.), this thesis focuses only on a period of 141 years between the battles of Ipsus (301 B.C.) and Elasa (160 B.C.). I have taken Ipsus as my start date since it was the Allies’ victory in this battle which brought an end to Antigonus’ bid for dominance, and the acquisition of much of Antigonus’ Asian territory (along with those settled there) allowed Seleucus to reorganise the infrastructure of his Empire and army. The significance of this is explored in more detail in Chapter 2. Furthermore, following

Babylon’s recapture, Seleucus spent much of the period prior to Ipsus campaigning in the east. Since our sources for these events (mostly limited to Diodorus and several of

Plutarch’s biographies) are predominantly interested in the chaotic developments in the west, we know very little of Seleucus’ activities in this intervening period.

Similarly, there is a general lack of details regarding individual battles following

Elasa; often we know little more than the existence of a particular engagement.35

Moreover, from the 150’s B.C. onwards, the Seleucid Empire became increasingly

35 E.g. B.M. 34645; Sachs and Hunger (1996) 86-7; Grainger (2015b) 64-5.

21 unstable as the kingdom suffered from disruption and fragmentation caused by civil wars and external interference. A separate assessment of the Empire’s internal structure would be needed at this point, especially after the collapse of Seleucid authority in Media in 147 B.C.36 The loss of this rich satrapy would have been seriously detrimental not only for the recruitment of the Seleucid army (especially its cavalry), but also for the supply of horses in particular. The importance of this region is highlighted in Chapters 1 and 3. I have therefore taken the battle of Elasa (160

B.C.) as an appropriate terminus for my analysis.

Within this time frame, this thesis considers eleven of the Seleucids’ battles in detail. These are:

- Ipsus (301 B.C.),

- Cyrrhestica (285 B.C.),

- The ‘Elephant Victory’ (ca. 270’s B.C.),

- The battle against Molon (220 B.C.),

- Raphia (217 B.C.),

- Tapuria (ca. 208 B.C.),

- Panion (200 B.C.),

- Thermopylae (191 B.C.),

- Magensia (190 B.C.),

- Beth-Zechariah (162 B.C.),

- Elasa (160 B.C.).

The battles chosen are those for which we have detailed evidence of the involvement of at least one element of the Seleucids’ mounted troops. Therefore, although we have battle accounts for conflicts at the Porphyrion pass (218 B.C.) and Mt. Labus (210

36 Justin, 41.66-8; Grainger (2015b); Bivar (2003) 33.

B.C.),37 for example, the restriction of the action solely to the army’s infantry contingents due to topography precludes these engagements from this study. Other battles, such as Ankyra (246 B.C.),38 the ‘Beautiful Victory’ (245/4 B.C.),39 or Adasa

(161 B.C.),40 remain little more than names, whilst no doubt many more are completely lost to us. The analysis here endeavours to be as comprehensive as possible within the confines of the available evidence. To this end, I also make some reference to comparative examples where appropriate, especially regarding the unconventional troops considered in Chapter 5, in order to assess the Seleucids’ use of these units within the wider Hellenistic context.41 This comparative material will be subject to the same considerations as the Seleucid evidence.

0.2. The Sources

0.2.1. Approaching the Ancient Evidence

Scholars have often lamented the state of the ancient evidence for the Seleucid

Empire. Our literary sources especially leave much to be desired. Many local

Seleucid works, such as those by Megathenes, Berossus, and Posidonius, survive only in fragments, whilst much Hellenistic historiography is lost. Although we know that there was a wide range of contemporary historians (e.g. Hieronymus, Phylarchus,

Duris, Timaeus, Zeno), many of whom wrote consecutive accounts spanning much of the period, the loss of the vast majority of this work means that there are often large silences in our narratives. Even Polybius’ history, invaluable for the reign of

Antiochus III, is fragmentary after Book 5. The accounts of I and II Maccabees are

37 Polybius, 5.68.9-69, 10.29.3-31 respectively. 38 Trogus, Prologues 27; Polyaenus, 8.61; Porphyry, FGrH 260 F 32.8; Plutarch, Moralia 489a-b; Coşkun (2018) 204-10, 215-6. 39 Porphyry, FGrH 260 F 32.7-8; Coşkun (2018) 215-23. 40 I Maccabees 7.39-50; II Maccabees 15.20-36. 41 See Appendix 5, Tables 5.7-9.

23 concerned only with the Seleucids’ interactions with the Hasmonean Jews, and, although they are useful for the events of the Jewish uprising, are problematic in their approach. Other literary sources are typically late and sporadic, mostly centred on either the wars of the Diadochi, or the reigns of Antiochus III and IV. Even here,

Diodorus’ account (which contains some invaluable summaries of earlier works) is fragmentary from Book 21 onwards. Only Appian’s Syriaca and Justin’s epitome of

Pompeius Trogus attempt to provide a synopsis of Seleucid history as whole. Neither is straightforward and both are highly selective in their details.

Our literary sources are supplemented by various iconographic, numismatic, epigraphic, papyrological, and archaeological material. This evidence is particularly valuable as it provides a direct window into the issues and concerns of the time period from a range of perspectives that our extant literary sources often do not convey. The wealth of cuneiform texts especially offers a non-Greek view of the Empire. This is significant given the cultural and linguistic diversity of the region, although much of the surviving contemporary evidence relevant to this thesis is typically limited to

Babylonia.42 Here, the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries are the most notable, allowing us to fill in some of the gaps in our main literary accounts, such as the arrival of 20 elephants from Bactria in 275 B.C.,43 or the existence of a battle between

Demetrius and Alexander Balas in 150 B.C.44

Similarly, the extensive range of epigraphic material offers insights particularly into the status of various cities/settlements and the people within them, and their relationship with the king and their neighbours (e.g. the decree between Magnesia and Smyrna in OGIS 229, or the soldiers’ dedication at Thyateira in OGIS 211). This

42 Though, note Dpd 6-8 from Persepolis. 43 B.M. 92688.12-3. 44 See footnote 35.

24 evidence is particularly valuable for the analysis of the Empire’s military settlement system, although, unfortunately, much of it is restricted to Asia Minor, potentially distorting our view of the Empire’s institutions.45 There are, however, some important finds from elsewhere, such as the third century B.C. inscriptions from Ikaros on the shores of the Arabian Gulf,46 as well as some later inscriptions from the Parthian period, such as SEG 7.13 from Susa. Although this evidence postdates the Seleucid

Empire, it retains many ‘Seleucid’ features (notably written in Greek), and since the

Parthians were known for their philhellenism, it provides an interesting insight into the degree of cultural and administrative continuity between the two Empires.47

Additionally, there are a range of parchments from Avroman and Dura-Europos, very similar in nature to the epigraphic material, that are particularly useful for balancing the heavily western focus of much of the written evidence.48 P.Dura 12 especially, although uncertain in date,49 possibly records part of the original lex coloniae of the settlement, shedding important light on the administration of the Seleucid Empire.50

The depictions of horses on reliefs such as the Apadana frieze at Persepolis, as well as a range of archaeological finds, such as the Oxus Treasure and various clay and gemstone seals, are also particularly valuable, granting a glimpse into the different ‘types’ of horses available within the geographical expanse of the Seleucid

Empire.51 Although much of this evidence is Achaemenid in date, we should not

45 See Chapter 2.3; the western focus of our extant literary sources further compounds matters. The loss of much of Megasthenes’ work from his time at the Indian court of Chandragupta as Seleucus I’s ambassador is particularly unfortunate. 46 SEG 12.556, 35.1476. 47 Bar-Kochva (1976) 21, 32; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 167; Griffith (1968) 160; Tuplin (1987) 226; Billows (1995) 176; Fraser (1996) 195. 48 Minns (1915); Cumont (1926). 49 Estimates range between 100 B.C. (Griffith (1968) 157) and the third century A.D. (Cohen (1978) 51; Houle (2015) 11). 50 Griffith (1968) 157; Cohen (1978) 51. 51 As we shall see in Chapter 1.3, ‘type’ denotes ‘a horse that fulfils a particular purpose’ based on its physical conformation (Edwards (2016) 351). It is therefore more accurate than the term ‘breed’, the application of which is problematic for the ancient world.

25 dismiss it out of hand, as it is reasonable to assume that a similar range of horses existed within the Seleucid Empire, and this material complements the various literary passages (particularly from Strabo’s Geography) that detail several of the places and horse ‘types’ of note within the Empire.52

The spread of horses on the Seleucid numismatic evidence is similarly instructive.53 The propagandistic value of numismatic images has long been recognised, and it is significant that horses appear on coins minted across the Empire throughout the reigns of its various kings. Of these, the horse’s head (typically horned) is the most common, and, as Erickson notes, functioned ‘as an official symbol of the empire’.54 Some scholars initially identified this image with

Alexander’s famous warhorse Bucephalus, although this is now largely discounted following the reassessment of Miller and Walters.55 Alternatively, others have focused on both the Greek and Near Eastern importance of the horned motif, indicative of divinity.56 The fact that Seleucid horns were always those of a bull, an animal with a long symbolic history in Mesopotamia is particularly significant.57 By combining various cultural resonances and motifs within an official symbol of the

Empire, Seleucid rulers blended the various traditions of their kingdom into an effective statement of power.58 Additionally, the prevalence of the feeding horse motif on Median coinage, along with the mare and suckling foal (a motif unique to

Ecbatana), marks this region’s horse-raising potential.59 The symbolic value of horses

52 Cf. Willekes (2013) 210; Strabo, 11.13.7, 11.14.9; see Chapters 1.3 and 3.4. 53 See Seleucid Coins Online (http://numismatics.org/sco/ [March 2020]). 54 Erickson (2009) 68. 55 Miller and Walters (2004) 49-56; Erickson (2018) 43-5, (2009) 69. 56 Oates (1979) 41; Erickson (2018) 29, 41-2, 45, (2009) 69. 57 Ornan (2001); van Dijk-Coombes (2018); Erickson (2018) 41-2; though cf. Appian, Syriaca 56. 58 See Erickson (2009) 69. 59 Seleucid Coins Online (http://numismatics.org/sco/ [March 2020]), s.v. ‘foal’.

26 in the Seleucid Empire should thus not be understated, particularly when assessing the importance of their mounted arm.

This thesis therefore makes use of a wide range of different types of evidence, particularly in Chapters 1-3. However, since Chapters 4 and 5 directly challenge the prevailing notion that there was a qualitative decline in Hellenistic cavalry, the analysis presented there is, of necessity, focused on the battle accounts found in our literary sources. As noted, I consider eleven of the Seleucids’ battles between 301 and

160 B.C. Given the fragmented nature of our literary sources, our evidence for these engagements comes from a range of authors, each with their own interests and agenda, spanning several different genres and centuries.

Our most important source is Polybius. Writing in the second century B.C.,

Polybius was a contemporary of many of the events in his Histories, and the extant parts of his narrative provide accounts of four of the battles considered here (the battle against Molon, Raphia, Tapuria, and Panion).60 His work was also the main source for the versions of Thermopylae and Magnesia found in Livy and Appian.61

On the whole, Polybius enjoys a relatively favourable reputation for reliability in modern scholarship, and his first-hand military experience was no doubt valuable to him in making sense of the various battles fought in this period.62 This is not to imply that his battle accounts are without fault, as we shall see, his version of Panion is particularly problematic.63 Moreover, Davidson has noted the complex nature of the gaze and the levels of narrative in Polybius’ work,64 and there has been much discussion on Polybius’ conception of τύχη (‘Fortune’), his attitude towards history

60 Polybius, 5.53-4, 5.79-85, 10.49, 16.18-9 respectively. 61 Livy, 36.15-19, 37.39-42; Appian, Syriaca 17-20, 32-5 respectively. 62 Davidson (2009) 132; Hau (2011) 183; Whitby (2007) 71; Bar-Kochva (1976) 77; Sterling (2007) 241. 63 See Chapter 4.2.1, 5.2.1a. 64 Davidson (1991).

27 and his predecessors, and his concern to explain the rise of Rome.65 Interpretation of

Polybius’ work must therefore be handled with care; nonetheless, he remains our best surviving source for the history of the Hellenistic period.

Connected to Polybius are, as noted, the accounts of Livy and Appian. Neither, however, was a contemporary of our period, with Livy writing under Augustus, and

Appian in the second century A.D. Livy in particular was a patriotic historian who wrote from a distinctively moralising viewpoint and happily embellished his material for emotional effect.66 Significantly for the focus of this thesis, it is important to note that ‘his battle scenes are often stereotyped’,67 whilst his occasional misunderstandings of Polybius’ account, especially on military details, are well documented.68 Appian was also capable of making similar mistakes (his description of the elephant deployment at Magnesia is clearly incorrect),69 and he greatly compressed the material presented in his work.70 Despite this, the ability to compare the narratives of both authors for Thermopylae and Magnesia is particularly useful, allowing us to establish a general outline for both battles.

For the earliest engagements of our period (Ipsus, Cyrrhestica, and the

‘Elephant Victory’) we must rely on a mix of sources. At first glance, the most obvious source for this period would appear to be the first century B.C. history of

Diodorus, whose narrative of the wars of the Diadochi summarises the contemporary account of Hieronymus. Unfortunately, Diodorus’ work frustratingly breaks off on the eve of Ipsus, leaving us only a single fragment, albeit a significant one, of the

65 E.g. Walbank (2007), (2002); Hau (2011); Lenfant (2005); Maier (2012); Farrington (2015). 66 Briscoe (2012) 852-3; Sabin (2000) 3; Levene (2007) 285; Potter (1999) 116; Whitby (2007) 71. 67 Briscoe (2012) 853. 68 E.g. Cynoscephalae: Livy, 33.8.13-4, cf. Polybius, 18.24.9; Whitby (2007) 71; Potter (1999) 111; Sabin (2007) 399-400. 69 Appian, Syriaca 32. 70 Bucher (2007) 454-5; Rich (2015); Brodersen (2012) 126.

28 events of this battle.71 Consequently, we must turn to Plutarch’s biography of

Demetrius. Although Plutarch’s works are very important for filling in the gaps in

Diodorus’ account, it is important to note that he was not interested in writing history, something that he himself emphatically states at the beginning of his Life of

Alexander.72 Nor are his biographies straightforward; constructed as a series of parallel lives, various characteristics or events were potentially manipulated to facilitate his comparisons. As a biographer, Plutarch was only interested in events that were significant to his subjects. His account of Ipsus is therefore militarily unsatisfactory, restricted solely to Demetrius’ cavalry manoeuvre and Antigonus’ final moments, although it does preserve some useful tactical details.73

Sadly, Plutarch’s account of Cyrrhestica is of little use, compressed as it is to a few sentences.74 Here an entry in Polyaenus’ Strategemata helps to shed light on at least one aspect of this battle.75 Although it is notable that Polyaenus’ work is specifically military in focus, it is also highly selective, dedicated to narrating fascinating or unusual battlefield tricks. Often these are detached from their historical context, rendering them interesting but broadly unhelpful for investigating the tactical developments of ancient warfare. Fortunately, the coexistence of Plutarch’s (albeit brief) summary of Cyrrhestica allows us to reinsert this particular entry back into its appropriate context. Nevertheless, many details about this engagement remain uncertain. Finally, for Antiochus I’s so-called ‘Elephant Victory’ we have a brief passage in the second century A.D. writer Lucian.76 However, the rhetorical nature of his Zeuxis (specifically concerned with the importance of novelty), in which the

71 Diodorus, 21.1.2. 72 Plutarch, Alexander 1. 73 Plutarch, Demetrius 28-30; cf. Stadter (2007); Rutherford (2007) 513-4; Gaebel (2002) 224-5. 74 Plutarch, Demetrius 49.1-3. 75 Polyaenus, 4.9.3. 76 Lucian, Zeuxis 8-11.

29 account of the ‘Elephant Victory’ forms only a small part, along with Lucian’s own distance from the events he is describing, means that we must treat the details of his account with caution.77

Similar considerations are also necessary for the final two battles of our period:

Beth-Zechariah and Elasa. Our sources are three Jewish writers, I and II Maccabees and Josephus. Of these, Josephus is the latest, writing in the first century A.D.

Interestingly, his Bellum Judaicum and Antiquitates Judaicae both narrate the events of Beth-Zechariah, each with subtle differences, although the later account in

Antiquitates Judaicae is clearly based on I Maccabees.78 The author of I Maccabees was a contemporary of the events he narrates, with some scholars arguing that he was actually a participant at Beth-Zechariah.79 Originally writing in Hebrew, although the text survives only in Greek, he was specifically concerned with narrating (and exalting) the struggles of the Hasmonean Jews, creating a quasi-religious history.

Consequently, there are strong Biblical parallels throughout this work. In particular, the story of David and Goliath is a prominent intertext to the account of Beth-

Zechariah, especially in the author’s linguistic choices.80 A similar focus is present in

II Maccabees’ epitome of the work of Jason of Cyrene, which adopts a highly emotional style of writing, although there is slightly less concern for Judas

Maccabaeus himself in this narrative.81 Both Maccabaean authors naturally present partisan accounts, and specific details, especially numbers, are often suspect.82 Even

Josephus, whose work is usually viewed as more reliable than that of the Maccabees,

77 Coşkun (2012) 64; Anderson (1976) 23-40. 78 Cf. Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.369-75 and I Maccabees, 6.28-47; Bar-Kochva (1976) 176, (1989) 190-1; Nodet (2015) 507, 529; Gafni (1989) 116. 79 Bar-Kochva (1989) 144, 158, 378, 403, though cf. (1976) 175; Horbury (1990) 382; contra Tropper (2017) 13 n.52. 80 Sterling (2007) 241; Tropper (2017) 8, 13-5; Bar-Kochva (1989) 73, 151-70, 315, 398, 621-34. 81 Sterling (2007) 241; Bar-Kochva (1989) 170-85. 82 Bar-Kochva (1976) 12-5; see Chapter 3.3.

30 was not above invention for dramatic effect.83 As Sterling notes, ‘ancient Jewish historians were far more creative in recreating the past than we would permit’,84 which raises important questions of historical accuracy and reliability.

0.2.2. Reconstructing Battles

‘The question of the validity of a narrative… has always been a feature of the western historiographic tradition’.85 This is especially true of battle narratives, where issues of accuracy and realism are both important but do not always match.86 It is well documented that our modern conceptions of historical accuracy are not the same as those of ancient authors. This is not to say that ancient writers were unconcerned with issues of reliability. Indeed, many historians make explicit statements about their efforts to establish the truthfulness of their narratives and criticise their predecessors for carelessness or inaccurate reporting.87 But for them, history was a form of rhetoric, style was paramount. Histories were meant to persuade and entertain as well as educate, creating tension between their claims for historical accuracy and their efforts to produce an ‘artistically pleasing’ narrative.88

Regardless of the reliability of individual authors, every battle account presents problems, some more than others. Not least is the question of how an overall narrative of a battle should be constructed. Here the concept of realism is particularly relevant. Both Hammond and Ash note that an important task for historians was to simplify ‘the complexity of individual events and motives to manageable

83 Bar-Kochva (1989) 44, 192; Feldman (1984) 221, (1994) 66-7. 84 Sterling (2007) 232. 85 Potter (1999) 9. 86 van Gils (2018) 2. 87 E.g. Polybius, 1.15, 2.56, 12.3-28a; 16.14-20; Diodorus, 1.3-4; Thucydides, 1.20-2; cf. Cicero, De Oratore 2.63; Marincola (2007) 3-4; Schepens (2007) 49; Gowing (2010) 390; Potter (1999) 12, 15-8; Comber (1997) 43; Farrington (2015). 88 Marincola (2001) 7; also: Nicolai (2007) 14; van Gils (2018) 2-3.

31 proportions’,89 usually done by compressing the roles of ‘middle ranking commanders’ and focusing only on the major players and any tactically significant details.90 Ancient battle narratives (at least set-piece battles) therefore tend to follow predictable patterns, typically providing an overview of the troops and battle formations of each side and the various pre-battle speeches, before a description of the main events themselves. We must therefore remain aware of literary topoi in our battle accounts, and scholars have noted the various patterns of how battles were meant to play out and how commanders were meant to act that stalk the narratives.91

In particular, Ash has highlighted the ‘cross-fertilisation’ of epic and history,92 whilst Lendon and Whitby discuss the ‘grammar’ of war, since ‘conceptions of what matters in battle’ differ between writers.93 ‘Authors with military experience may have shaped their narratives to demonstrate the operation of what they regarded as significant in warfare’,94 whilst those without first-hand knowledge were capable of misunderstanding. Related to this issue is the problem that many of our literary sources are chronologically distant from the battles they narrate and run the risk of anachronism. However, even eye-witness accounts are not automatically reliable, since participants may only remember certain aspects, in what Whitby identifies as the ‘Whatley’ problem. Moreover, the significance of certain actions may only be apparent in light of later events.95

The validity of the numbers recorded in ancient battle accounts is likewise particularly problematic. Reported figures are frequently rounded estimates, and there

89 Hammond (1993) 12, as quoted in Ash (2002) 261. 90 Ash (2002) 262. 91 Cf. Lendon (2005). 92 Ash (2002). 93 Lendon (1999) passim; Whitby (2007) 62. 94 Whitby (2007) 62. 95 Whitby (2007) 67; Whatley (1964); cf. Polybius, 2.28.11; Farrington (2015) 40.

32 was a tendency of both eyewitnesses and writers with particular political/religious agenda to underestimate the number of their own forces whilst exaggerating the size of their opponents.96 As Rubincam notes, we must remain aware of the extent to which the ‘rhetorical patterns’ of individual authors influenced their presentation of numerical data.97 This is particularly common in the two Books of the Maccabees, which, as noted, had a strong interest in emphasising the heroic nature of the

Hasmoneans’ struggle against their Seleucid rulers.98 We must therefore utilise ancient figures with caution, and compare them to those reported by other historians wherever possible. Where only one account of a particular military event has survived, it is necessary to establish their historical context, ensuring that they are congruent with the political and military realities of the time.99

It is thus clear that we must take great care when attempting to reconstruct the events of specific battles. Tropper has recently dismissed the ability of the Jewish histories to provide any reliable details for Beth-Zechariah, claiming that ‘the sources teach much about the literary construction of the battle but little about the battle itself’.100 Reassessing I Maccabees’ account in particular, Tropper argues that, far from simply detailing the events of the battle, the narrative is split into two interconnected parts (battle preparations (6.32-41) and the action itself (6.42-7)) whose structures consciously mirror each other: ‘Both parts open with Judah’s audacious approach and both close with his men’s reaction to the size and might of the Seleucid army’. Whilst part one emphasises the strength of the Seleucid Empire and the central role of the war-elephants within their formations, part two ‘spotlights

96 Rubincam (2003) 457, 462; Bar-Kochva (1976) 7-19; Whitby (2007) 80. 97 Rubincam (2003) passim. 98 Bar-Kochva (1976) 12-15; Goldstein (1976) 259. 99 Rubincam (2003) 449; Bar-Kochva (1976) 9-10, 13-6. 100 Tropper (2017) 1.

33 the rebels’ ideal of self-sacrifice’ in its account of Eleazar’s attack on the lead pachyderm.101 Moreover, he highlights how the author’s linguistic style deliberately creates strong biblical resonances ‘designed to underscore the gross mismatch between the Jewish and Seleucid forces’.102

Overall, Tropper draws a sharp contrast between what he identifies as the

‘traditional historical method’ of previous scholarship (which he claims assumes ‘that most ancient historians ultimately relied on genuine and credible eyewitness testimonies’ and can therefore broadly be trusted, except where there are ‘any local or immediate reasons for doubt’), and what he describes as a ‘new historical method’.103

Tropper’s ‘new historical method’ emphasises the literary nature of our ancient sources, arguing that since ancient historians ‘did not try to represent the past faithfully and accurately, as we understand these terms’, it is necessary to recognise the liberties they took with their source material and the rhetorical devices used to fashion their narratives, and assess them purely as literary constructions. We should therefore not seek to reconstruct historically accurate details of specific events from the testimony of a particular text, but rather should analyse what their portrayal can tell us about its literary context and the goals of its author.104

Tropper’s ‘new historical method’ links to a wider shift in historiographical theory following what is broadly known as the ‘linguistic turn’.105 In particular, those scholars of the ‘linguistic turn’ who adopt a postmodernist approach have questioned

‘the possibility that historiographical discourse can legitimately claim to represent an external reality’, and have instead focused on ‘the techniques of linguistic

101 Tropper (2017) 12. 102 Tropper (2017) 12; also: see footnote 80. 103 Tropper (2017) 12-3, 17. 104 Tropper (2017) 17. 105 Dewald (2007) 90; Clark (2004); Potter (1999) 6.

34 analysis’.106 From this, there has been an increase in literary assessments of ancient historiographical texts, although scholars still tend to be divided between ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ schools of thought.107

The concerns raised by these new approaches are significant, and Tropper makes a convincing case for doubting some of the features of I Maccabees’ account as purely literary invention. Nevertheless, we should be wary of pushing such arguments too far. Whilst the growing awareness and appreciation of our historical texts as deliberately crafted literary works is important, there is a danger that if we approach all of our sources with the view that they do not impart much about actual historical events, rather only their constructions as individual texts, we risk concluding that we know very little about the history of the ancient world. Indeed, as

Meeus remarks, ‘as extremely helpful as it is – a literary analysis alone cannot explain historiographical texts’,108 whilst Marincola points out that ‘the very real debates in… historians over the accuracy of their predecessors and whether something happened in this way or that shows… that there was some underlying and pre-existing reality that they were trying to recapture and represent’.109 Therefore, although proponents of this historiographical shift are right in their insistence that it is necessary to assess the various rhetorical strategies employed by ancient authors in order to understand their works, we should not regard this as dismissing the historical quality of their narratives as a whole.

With this in mind, I shall carefully analyse the surviving battle accounts in order to assess which parts of their narratives are the products of literary topoi or authorial manipulation, which details are corroborated by other evidence, and whether

106 Potter (1999) 7. 107 Cameron (1989) 1; Marincola (2001) 3-7, (2007) 4. 108 Meeus (2018) 12. 109 Marincola (2007) 4.

35 the tactical manoeuvres recorded are in accordance with each unit’s basic abilities.110

Where there are gaps or complications in our ancient sources, I shall attempt to offer some solutions by considering what would be the most plausible scenario based on the specifics of the situation. Here it will be necessary to assess a commander’s personality and tactical proficiency, the abilities and limitations of the various troops involved, and what may reasonably be expected in light of comparative Hellenistic evidence. Since it is important to remember that commanders do not always act logically, nor do battles always play out according to theory, such suggestions can only function as possibilities. As Whitby notes, ‘our reconstructions of ancient warfare must always be tentative and recognise the significant gaps in our understanding’.111 Nevertheless, the analysis presented in here demonstrates that there is still much that we can glean about the tactical operation of the Seleucid mounted corps.

0.3. Outline

This thesis is split into five chapters, followed by a conclusion and several supporting appendices. Whilst the first chapter stands alone, providing an overview of the necessary background detail to the consideration of mounted warfare, Chapters 2 and 3, and 4 and 5 form two sets of coordinated chapters, focused on the organisation and tactical operation of the Seleucid mounted corps respectively.

Chapter 1 addresses the most essential aspect of the cavalry – the horse. This is the logical starting point for any discussion of mounted warfare, since we must first understand this animal’s abilities to assess its tactical use effectively. In particular,

110 Cf. Whitby (2007) 54. 111 Whitby (2007) 81.

36 this chapter considers what ‘types’ of horses were available in the Seleucid Empire, and how this affected the military capabilities of the cavalry units formed from them.

By comparing this to the ‘types’ of horses available to their Macedonian and

Achaemenid predecessors, it demonstrates that, contrary to persistent scholarly opinion, there was no decline in the quality (or variety) of horses available to

Seleucid rulers.

In light of the need to reassess the organisation of the Seleucids’ military infrastructure, Chapter 2 establishes the tripartite framework of standing troops, reserve troops, and ‘non-regulars’. In particular, this chapter reviews the existence of the Seleucids’ military settlement system, concluding that the settlers in this system formed the core of the Seleucid army as the Empire’s invaluable reserve troops.

These conclusions demonstrate the necessity of the tripartite structure and form the theoretical framework for the rest of the thesis.

Chapter 3 is the counterpart of Chapter 2, and assesses how the application of the Seleucids’ tripartite infrastructure translated specifically to the organisation of their cavalry. Here, the issues raised in Chapters 1 and 2 are brought together through an exploration of how the ‘types’ of horses available affected the variety of cavalry contingents the Seleucids employed, and to which of the three branches of the army these belonged. Additionally, this chapter considers the army’s infantry:cavalry ratios in order to assess how much emphasis the Seleucids’ placed on their mounted troops, as well as how the tripartite organisation and available horse ‘types’ interacted with the Seleucids’ stud and supply system. Previous scholarship has greatly neglected these issues. It is necessary to correct this.

Having established the necessary foundations of the Seleucid mounted corps,

Chapter 4 considers this organisational framework in relation to the operation of the cavalry on the battlefield. This chapter investigates both the theoretical and actual battlefield positions and functions of the Seleucid cavalry based on the testimony of our literary sources. By adopting the approach outlined above, it reconstructs the details of Seleucid battles in accordance with the understanding of equine behaviour provided in Chapter 1, demonstrating that the Seleucid cavalry was consistently utilised in a variety of ways throughout our period, and that there was no decline in their abilities. Furthermore, these variations show the willingness of Seleucid commanders to experiment, directly refuting claims of Hellenistic tactical stagnation.

Chapter 5 is the complement of Chapter 4. Building on the established operation of the cavalry, it assesses the Seleucids’ use of unconventional mounted units. In order to facilitate comparisons between each of the Seleucids’ mounted contingents, this chapter’s structure deliberately mirrors Chapter 4, with each of its three main sections (war-elephants, scythed chariots, and camels) divided between considerations of battlefield placement and tactical operation. Through the application of combined arms theory, it challenges the arguments of Ducrey et al., demonstrating that, rather than being a sign or cause of decline, the use of these unconventional contingents was intended to supplement and support the standard cavalry. By reassessing how we approach these troops, this chapter concludes that even beyond

Ipsus, the potential for combined arms remained a significant feature of Hellenistic warfare.

CHAPTER 1 Understanding the Horses of the Seleucid Empire

1.1. Introduction

The first issue that we must address when approaching the cavalry is the nature of horses themselves. Only once we understand their basic abilities, characteristics, and limitations, and how these translated to ancient warfare can we begin to assess the tactical operation of the Seleucid cavalry. Moreover, although every horse obeys the fundamentals of their species, they are crucially not all the same. Some are light and nimble, built for speed; or small and hardy, excelling in endurance; others are large and powerful weight-carriers. Their military abilities are thus dictated by their physical form (conformation); ‘any attempt to force the equine body to do something for which it is not designed is to court disaster’.112 This in turn was determined, as

Willekes notes, by environmental conditions; a horse that developed in lush, fertile meadows was very different from one that hailed from a mountainous region, or one of climatic extremes.113

By setting out the physiognomy of these ‘types’, it is therefore possible to see how various environmental conditions produced horses suitable for different styles of cavalry warfare. Through this, we are able to gain a deeper understanding of the developments of particular armies (either in response to their own horse ‘types’, or in order to combat those of their enemies), along with an awareness of why certain styles of warfare (such as the hit-and-run tactics of the Scythians, or the heavily- armoured cataphracts of the Near East) were not typically replicated outside of their native regions. This has further significance since the extent of a ruler’s interest and

112 Willekes (2013) 326. 113 Willekes (2016) 30, 93-190, (2013) 12, 156-324.

39 dependence on mounted warfare was contingent on the availability and quality of horses within his land (or at least that of his allies/enemies). It is thus necessary to establish how these varying environmental factors affected the distribution of horse

‘types’ within the Seleucid Empire. Given the Empire’s access to an exceptional range of different cavalry styles, I shall show that the Seleucids were able to create one of the most versatile mounted forces of the ancient world.

As the direct descendant of both the Macedonians and Achaemenids, the

Seleucid Empire inherited two dominant cavalry traditions. The Macedonians, following Philip II’s reorganisation of the army in the fourth century B.C., specialised in heavy shock-cavalry, designed to deal a decisive blow by charging into any gaps its infantry had created in the enemy’s formation. The two arms worked in concert as a devastating force on the battlefield.114 In order to achieve this, the Macedonians needed versatile horses capable of carrying an armoured rider and his weapons, whilst also being nimble enough for rapid action. Alternatively, the Achaemenids employed a greater variety of cavalry units: from different groups of mounted archers and javelin-men (e.g. the Scythians, Sogdians, and Sacae), which needed light and fast horses; to heavier, armoured cavalry (e.g. the Bactrians and Massagetae) mounted on powerful, bulky chargers.115 The combined use of such disparate styles of cavalry warfare was a direct consequence of the vast size of the Achaemenid Empire and its varying environmental conditions. In both armies, the cavalry formed an integral and prestigious part of their forces. It is particularly notable that the elite Macedonian and

Achaemenid cavalry units were identified by titles which implied close relationship

114 Wrightson (2019) 159-221; Gaebel (2002) 157, 180-1, 191-3, 286-7; Heckel (2008) 25-8; Willekes (2015) 48-9. 115 See Appendix 1, Table 1.1.

40 with the king (ἑταῖροι (‘Companions’) for the Macedonians; συγγενεῖς

(‘Kinsman’) for the Achaemenids).116

It is therefore natural to expect the Seleucids to have been interested in mounted warfare and the horses of their Empire. As we shall see in Chapter 3, despite the arguments of Hellenistic decline, the Seleucids continued to maintain a strong emphasis on their cavalry, effectively blending the different contingents and fighting styles of their Macedonian and Achaemenid predecessors into their tripartite military infrastructure. This was only possible, because, as Hyland and others have noted, ‘to

Seleucus fell the best horses of the ancient world’.117

This chapter reviews the fundamental features of ancient horses in order to provide a necessary foundation to the consideration of the organisation and operation of Seleucid cavalry. After first analysing the various characteristics, abilities, and limitations of horses as a species, I shall assess the different ‘types’ of horses that were available in the geographic expanse of the Seleucid Empire, and how this affected the military capabilities of the units formed from them. Here I shall build upon Willekes’ recent work, and challenge the view that the quality of Seleucid cavalry declined over time.

1.2. Features and Characteristics

Despite its domestication sometime around 4,000 B.C. on the Eurasian steppe, the basic features and characteristics of the horse (Equus Caballus) have changed

116 It is worth noting that συγγενεῖς is a Greek translation of an original Achaemenid term (possibly huvaka), which demonstrates the Greeks’ perceptions, at least initially, of Achaemenid titles and social relations; see Head (1992) 12. 117 Hyland (2003) 163; also: Bar-Kochva (1976) 77; Anderson (1961) 152.

41 little over the years.118 Having evolved to live on vast open plains as prey animals that can outrun predators, horses naturally possess strong flight impulses and are exceptionally sensitive to their surroundings. In particular, their large eyes provide a panoramic view, ‘emphasising any motion toward the edge of the field of vision’.119

This is of great value for wild horses, but can become problematic in warfare. Easily startled by sudden movements, horses will instinctively veer to the side, or pull up short, of something seen as a threat, potentially overturning chariots, and increasing the chance of thrown weapons going wide, or charges failing to reach their target.120

Such behaviour can also extend to interactions with other animals (especially elephants) with which individual horses are unfamiliar,121 something that was particularly important for the Seleucids’ use of unconventional troops, as we shall see in Chapter 5.

On the surface, these natural instincts appear to discount the possibility of any kind of offensive participation in battle. If we accept that horses will naturally flee or avoid anything that they perceive as dangerous, then ‘we must also accept that they would avoid… everything found on a battlefield’.122 And yet, it is no exaggeration that this animal’s use in combat has been its most dominant role throughout history; only the relatively recent mechanisation of warfare has put an end to its battlefield presence. We can explain the horse’s continual military use through two factors.

118 Hyland (2003) 1-8, 33, (2013) 493; Willekes (2013) 324; Azzaroli (1985) 5; Simpson (1972) 3-5, 25-9, 98; Borton (1990a) 4-5. 119 Simpson (1972) 11; also: Evans and Borton (1990) 120-3; Budiansky (1997) 109-11. 120 Hyland (2003) 6. 121 E.g. Xenophon, Cyropaedia 7.1.27, 7.1.48; Herodotus, 1.79; Arrian, Anabasis 5.15.6; Quintus Curtius, 8.14.22-3; Polyaenus, 4.21; Lucian, Zeuxis 8-11; Hyland (2003) 112, 119, (2013) 500. 122 Sears and Willekes (2016) 1032; also: Willekes (2016) 135.

Beyond a proclivity for flight, horses are also herd animals with strong social characteristics and detailed hierarchies of dominance.123 This desire to remain part of a group is linked to survival: on the open plain there is protection in numbers.

Therefore, although horses may instinctively wish to avoid the chaos of battle, the fear of being separated from the group is arguably stronger.124 Whilst some horses can be excessively herd-bound, potentially limiting a cavalryman’s ability for independent action,125 this remains an important factor behind their military use. In addition, all horses engage in some degree of allelomimetic behaviour – ‘horses in a group are likely to run because another horse is running’.126 Here too, the hierarchy of the herd comes into play, with the dominant mare leading the herd, and the dominant stallion following behind keeping the more submissive animals in check.127 Hence,

Hyland notes that ‘once committed to a charge, speed would have excited the horses’, temporarily nullifying any immediate fear.128 If commanders were therefore to exploit this behaviour, whilst simultaneously replicating herd dominance structures within their own cavalry formations, they could plausibly override the equine instinct of flight, making the horse useable on the battlefield.129

The second factor involves mental conditioning and the importance of extensive training. Horses are tractable animals with the ability to learn, meaning that is it possible to train them to act contrary to their ‘innate preferences’.130 The exploitation

123 Budiansky (1997) 82-91; Goodwin (1999) 15; Sears and Willekes (2016) 1032; Hyland (2003) 64. 124 Sears and Willekes (2016) 1032-3; Hyland (2003) 17. 125 Willekes (2016) 19; cf. Xenophon, Peri Hippikes 7.18-9. 126 Potter and Yeats (1990) 676; also: Miller (1996). 127 Goodwin (1999) 17; Hyland (2013) 525; Budiansky (1997) 96. 128 Hyland (2003) 65. 129 Cf. the Thessalians’ rhomboid formation, and the Macedonian’s adoption of the Scythians’ wedge formation (Asclepiodotus, 7.2-9; Aelianus Tacticus, 18-9; Willekes (2013) 319; Worley (1994) 157; Gaebel (2002) 118, 181-2); the shapes of Seleucid cavalry formations are typically unspecified, but it is reasonable to assume a continuation of fourth century B.C. Macedonian practice. 130 McGreevey and MacLeen (2007) 108; also: Simpson (1972) 33; Potter and Yeats (1990) 656, 671- 2; Borton (1990a) 10-2; Hyland (2003) 63.

43 of this innate trait is something that is particularly central to Xenophon’s works on horsemanship,

he must be tested in all the particulars in which he is tested by war… With teaching, use and discipline [he] will perform all these exercises well.131

Although Xenophon’s works were written prior to our period, scholars widely praise both his Peri Hippikes and Hipparchikos for their accurate equestrian details,132 and these texts are invaluable for understanding ancient horsemanship. In particular,

Xenophon emphasises the need for constant drill,133 and whilst the extent of each army’s training varied, all cavalry units would need some practice beforehand in order to achieve cohesion. As we shall see in Chapter 3, although detailed Seleucid evidence on this matter is lacking, Strabo’s comment that the Seleucids kept ‘colt- breakers and instructors in heavy-armed warfare, and all those who were paid to teach the arts of war’ in Apamea alongside the war-office suggests some degree of centralised training.134

Moreover, by practicing battle manoeuvres in an environment where the horses were uninjured, a commander could build their confidence, and establish a pattern which they would recognise on the battlefield.135 Since war-elephants were an integral part of the Seleucids’ mounted corps (and also featured in various other

Hellenistic armies),136 this was an essential part of their military preparation. Without prior training, horses will not approach elephants, rendering any sort of battlefield

131 ληπτέον πεῖραν ἁπάντων, ὅσωνπερ καὶ ὁ πόλεμος πεῖραν λαμβάνει… μαθόντες δὲ καὶ ἐθισθέντες καὶ μελετήσαντες καλῶς ἂν ταῦτα πάντα ποιοῖεν, Xenophon, Peri Hippikes, 3.7-8, also: 7.11-9, 8.1-11; for a similar idea in ancient India, cf. Kauṭilya, Arthśastra 2.33. 132 Hyland (2013) 516, (2003) 19, 33; Willekes (2013) 40-1, (2016) 13; Clutton-Brock (1996) 87-8, (1992) 110. 133 Anderson (1961) 102. 134 ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ πωλοδάμναι καὶ ὁπλομάχοι καὶ ὅσοι παιδευταὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἐμισθοδοτοῦντο, Strabo, 16.2.10; cf. also the Seleucids’ use of cataphracts; see Chapter 3.2, 3.4.2. 135 Sears and Willekes (2016) 1033-4; Hyland (2003) 63-5. 136 See Appendix 5, Tables 5.1, 5.7.

44 coordination impossible. The fact that ‘the same horses went again and again into battle’,137 and performed a wide variety of tactical manoeuvres in conjunction with unconventional troops (as we shall see in Chapters 4 and 5), illustrates the success of this mental conditioning and the horse’s overall military versatility once its natural flight instincts were tempered.

Other equine features with military appeal are strength, speed, and stamina. Not only can horses carry/pull weights in excess of human capabilities, but they can do so at greater speed and for much longer periods.138 Whilst mules, camels, and donkeys were more likely to be used as baggage animals,139 the military value of cooperative animals that could carry a man, along with any weapons and armour,140 without particularly sacrificing their speed is clear. With their compact body, elongated legs, and effective muscle placement, horses in optimum condition are capable of reaching

25-30 mph (40-48 kph), whilst the fastest time recorded for a modern race horse is

43.97 mph (70.76 kph).141 Although they cannot sustain their top speeds indefinitely, their stamina has meant that horses have ‘few equals… over long distances’;142 whereas a mule or donkey will refuse to move once it gets tired, horses can be made to run until they drop dead. Whilst this is potentially problematic, the military advantages are evident, as such tractability and persistence has made possible some remarkable cavalry accomplishments.

137 Hyland (2003) 65. 138 The exact amount is, however, dependent on an individual horse’s build, along with the duration, velocity, and conditions in which the horse is expected to work; cf. Smith (1898), (1896); Engels (1978) 14, 128-9; Azzaroli (1985) 35; Anderson (1961) 108. 139 E.g. Plutarch, Alexander 37.4, 39.3, 42.7, Crassus 21.6, 25.1, Moralia 790b; Diodorus, 17.2, 17.71.2, 17.105.7, 19.55.1, 20.73.3; Pausanias, 6.5.4; Polybius, 3.55.7. 140 Similarly, the amount of armour is dependent on the conformation of the horse. A light horse cannot carry the full armour of the cataphract, for example. 141 Hyland (2013) 516; Simpson (1972) 8; Borton (1990a) 13, (1990b) 152, 171. 142 Budiansky (1997) 15.

Alexander the Great’s pursuit of Darius III (330 B.C.) is a particularly notable example. According to Arrian, when operating alone, or occasionally with small detachments of infantry, Alexander’s cavalry not only travelled from Ecbatana to

Rhagae (ca. 200 miles/322 km) in eleven days,143 but often averaged between 33-40 miles (53-64 km) per day.144 One notable 46-mile (74 km) stretch in Comisene was accomplished in only 12 hours.145 The fact that Alexander’s cavalry went mostly without adequate food or water, and were still expected to fight if the occasion arose, makes these numbers particularly impressive.146 Horses were thus ideal for quickly traversing the vast expanse of the Achaemenid, and later Seleucid, Empire. Indeed, such speed enabled the cavalry to provide valuable messenger duties, and the establishment of the ‘Royal Road’, which ran from Susa to Sardis, shows that the rulers of this region exploited these abilities to their advantage.147

Furthermore, the horse’s speed granted cavalrymen the ability to harass the infantry on the battlefield, and run down any survivors during a rout, as Chrysantas notes in his support of Cyrus I’s decision to introduce cavalry into his army: “if I become a horseman I shall be able to overtake a man though he is as far off as I can see him”.148 The large open plains of the Seleucid Empire were particularly ideal for this style of warfare, as we shall see in more detail in Chapter 4. The speed which cavalry could attack infantry forces also introduces an aspect of psychological warfare.149 Here the horse’s comparatively greater height further adds to its military utility. Not only does the rider benefit from a better view of his surroundings

143 Arrian, Anabasis 3.20. 144 Arrian, Anabasis 3.15.5, 3.25.6, 4.6.4. 145 Arrian, Anabasis 3.21.9. 146 Engels (1978) 153-6; Hyland (2003) 122, 158-9, 190 n.6, (2013) 502. 147 Herodotus 5.52-4, 8.98. 148 ἢν δ᾿ ἱππεὺς γένωμαι, δυνήσομαι μὲν ἄνδρα ἐξ ὄψεως μήκους καθαιρεῖν, Xenophon, Cyropaedia 4.3.16. 149 E.g. Thucydides, 2.79.6, 4.96.5.

(particularly useful for reconnaissance) as well as a physical advantage over opponents on foot, but it is also basic human psychology to fear something larger than oneself. Indeed, although horses will avoid colliding with people if possible, standing against a charge of thousands of mounted soldiers, the impact of which would shake the ground, was undoubtedly a daunting experience even for veterans.150

Although it was unlikely that a well-trained force would break before the initial impact, it would be easy for less disciplined men to flinch, creating a gap in the line through which the enemy could then charge. Additionally, the sudden appearance of cavalry in an infantry unit’s vulnerable flank or rear may have been enough to induce surrender, as was possibly the case in Antiochus III’s battle against Molon (220

B.C.).151 The horse’s physical features therefore allowed cavalrymen to present a formidable appearance on the battlefield.

Despite this, various modern scholars claim that ancient horses were much smaller than their modern counterparts.152 In particular, Clutton-Brock states that ‘the

Greek horse was... only the size of a modern pony’.153 On the surface this may seem to negate some of the horse’s potential for psychological warfare. However, we must not forget that size is relative (ancient people were likewise typically shorter than we are today). Furthermore, the actual specifics of the height of ancient horses are complex, varying between individuals as well as ‘types’. Typically, modern horses stand between 14-18 hands high (4.6-6 ft/1.4-1.8 m), with anything shorter than 14.2 hh (4.8 ft/1.5 m) considered a pony. Willekes, however, notes that this classification is arbitrary, and there seems to have been little distinction between horses and ponies

150 Cf. the observations of a British officer at Waterloo: Tomkinson (1895) 280; Willekes (2016) 161- 3, (2013) 244; Sidnell (2006) 40-2, 48, 125; Gaebel (2002) 91. 151 See Chapter 4.2.3. 152 Clutton-Brock (1996) 87, 90, (1992) 109; Hyland (2013) 494, (2003) 11; Azzaroli (1985) 170-1; Anderson (1961) 15, 82. 153 Clutton-Brock (1996) 87, also: (1992) 109.

47 in antiquity.154 Moreover, there are various archaeological examples that contradict the generalisations of the scholarship. Indeed, Azzaroli has noted the skeletal remains of an Achaemenid horse which stood at 16 hh (5.3 ft/1.6 m).155 Considering that the highly renowned modern Arabian horse stands only between 14-15 hh (4.6-5 ft/1.4-

1.5 m), it is unlikely that Seleucid horses especially were overly small.

Additionally, although often linked in popular thought, an animal’s strength, bulk, and endurance are not automatically dependent upon its height.156 Clutton-

Brock’s subsequent claim that because of their short stature ancient horses could not carry heavy enough armour is therefore unfounded (as well as being demonstrably untrue).157 Consequently, although possessing taller horses was desirable for psychological warfare, smaller horses did not present any serious military disadvantages.158 Far more important from a military perspective was the style of mounted warfare each horse suited and the various functions they could best fulfil.

This was dictated by ‘type’.

1.3. Ancient Horse ‘Types’

Having established the essential features of horses as a species, and the ways this affected or enhanced their military use, we must now consider how these characteristics were maximised in particular ‘types’, which ‘types’ were available to

154 Willekes (2016) 6. 155 Azzaroli (1985) 177; also cf. the Buhen horse (ca. 1675 B.C.), supposedly 15 hh, Hyland (2013) 495, (2003) 97; Clutton-Brock (1974) 95-6; cf. Liepe (1958) 17-9 as quoted in Engels (1978) 127. 156 Cf. Smith (1898); the horses of the heavily-armoured medieval knights are also good examples of this, rarely exceeding 15 hh: Clutton-Brock (1996) 97, (1992) 123-4, 156; Hyland (1998) 9-10; Clark (2004) 22-32; Davis (1989) 21-3. 157 Clutton-Brock (1996) 87, (1992) 109; most notably the cataphracts; also, cf. Xenophon, Peri Hippikes, 12.1-11; Thucydides, 2.100.5; Arrian, Anabasis, 2.11.3, 3.13.4; Quintus Curtius, 3.11.15, etc. 158 Indeed, personal experience led one British cavalry officer to declare that ‘the merits which... make a useful horse for campaigning are infinitely more common in small horses than big ones’, Gilbey (1900) 3; Frederick the Great (1712-86 A.D.) likewise allegedly favoured smaller horses, Sears and Willekes (2016) 1028; Gaebel (2002) 21-2.

Seleucid rulers in comparison to their Macedonian and Achaemenid predecessors, and how this affected the military capabilities of any units formed from them. The most significant modern classification of horses is by breed, ‘an equine group bred selectively for consistent characteristics over a long period, whose pedigree is entered into a studbook’.159 For the horses of the ancient world, however, this term is flawed.160 Whilst numerous brandings are recorded in fourth/third century B.C.

Athenian cavalry records as a way of classifying horses from a particular stud,161 and various writers frequently compare the horses of particular regions,162 there was little concern for the same sort of specialised breeding witnessed today. A horse may have been considered ‘Thessalian’ merely because it came from Thessaly.163 Therefore, ‘to use the term ‘breed’ to classify the horses of antiquity is both anachronistic and artificial’.164

One suggestion has been to draw a distinction between ‘hot-blooded’, light and fast oriental horses, and ‘cold-blooded’, large and heavy occidental horses.165

However, although this division broadly fits modern stereotypes of large European horses (e.g. the Shire horse) in comparison to the light and swift Arabian and Akhal

Teke, it is not entirely accurate. As Azzaroli notes, ‘not all occidental horses were heavy, whilst at least two different strains were developed in the ancient eastern world’.166 As an alternative to ‘breed’, Markman and Willekes have each proposed a different approach centred on horse ‘type’. ‘Type’ is a much broader term, implying

159 Edwards (2016) 348. 160 Anderson (1961) 38; Azzaroli (1985) 163; Willekes (2016) 7, (2013) 30; contra Donaghy (2014) 161 Braun (1970); Kroll (1977); Hyland (213) 493. 162 E.g. Grattius, Cynegeticon 497-542; Nemesianus, Cynegeticon 240-80; Oppian, Cynegetica 159- 367; Apsyrtus, Hippiatrica Berolinensia 115.1. 163 See: Varro, De Re Rustica 2.7.6; Anderson (1961) 38. 164 Willekes (2016) 7 = (2013) 30. 165 Azzaroli (1985) 170; Simpson (1972) 40-1; Anderson (1961) 1. 166 Azzaroli (1985) 170.

49 nothing about the breeding circumstances of individual horses, referring instead ‘to a horse that fulfils a particular purpose’ based on its physiognomy.167

Markman identifies three general categories of horses on the basis of ancient literature. The first is the small and shaggy ‘European’ horse from north of Thrace, which is mentioned in Herodotus.168 The second: the ‘highly mixed’, large, and swift

‘Asiatic’ horse, which Markman appears to identify with the famous Nisaeans.169

Finally, the third: the strong and swift ‘Western’ horse, suitable for racing and war, which he claims originated in North Africa but quickly spread to Sicily and Magna

Graecia.170 However, Markman’s three-way split remains unsatisfactory. Most notably, his ‘Asiatic’ category mistakenly conflates the Near East’s light, quick horses with the stronger and bulkier Nisaeans. As we shall see, this region produced two very different ‘types’ of horses, and despite the common misconception stemming from Aristotle’s implication that Nisaeans were particularly fast, along with their description as ὤκιστοι in the Suda, these larger horses were crucially not built for speed.171 Additionally, the term ‘European’ to describe the horses of the

Eurasian steppe is misleading, and it is unclear which of his categories Markman believes was present in mainland Greece.

Alternatively, Willekes proposes four ancient ‘types’: the ‘Central Asian’, of the northern steppe, the ‘Nisaean’ and ‘Turanian’ of the Near East, and the

‘Mediterranean’, based not only on ancient literary and iconographical evidence, but also the varying environmental conditions of each region and their effects on the

167 Edwards (2016) 351. 168 Markman (1943) 4-7, 11; Herodotus, 5.9.2. 169 Markman (1943) 7-8, 11; Herodotus, 7.40.2-4; Aristotle, Historia Animalium 632a; Strabo, 11.13.7; Arrian, Anabasis 7.13. 170 Markman (1943) 8-11; Pindar, Pythian 4.1; Strabo, 17.3.21. 171 Aristotle, Historia Animalium 632a; cf. Suda, Ν.425; Markman (1943) 7; Balme (1991) 405 n.a; Rawlingson (1881) 33 n.6; Willekes (2016) 156, (2013) 236.

50 natural development of horses raised there. Although these broadly overlap with

Markman’s three categories, Willekes’ combination of the ancient evidence with an understanding of basic ecological requirements allows for a much more accurate identification of ancient horses.

Hailing from the Eurasian steppe, a harsh, open environment of climatic and topographic extremes that offered little shelter, ‘Central Asian’ horses were small and hardy animals, suited to the nomadic lifestyle of their owners.172 Not only could they perform consistently at speed regardless of the actions of their riders,173 but their well-sprung ribs offered plenty of room for the heart and lungs, meaning that these horses excelled in endurance.174 As Arrian notes, steppe horses would keep running long after others had given up.175 This stamina, along with their sure-footedness, made these horses particularly ideal for the Scythians’ hit-and-run archery tactics.176

Conversely, they were unsuitable for close-combat on account of their smaller size, and the fact that, as a consequence of steppe husbandry practices (where all animals were kept together in large herds), most warhorses were geldings, meaning that they naturally lacked the aggression of other equines.177 As noted above, Scythian archers featured in Achaemenid armies, and, although the evidence is less clear, it is possible that the Seleucids also employed them, given their continuation of many Achaemenid practices.178 Additionally, since the Galatians (who served in the Seleucid cavalry at

172 Herodotus, 4.28, 4.46.3, 4.127.1-2; Willekes (2016) 93-107, (2013) 156-95; Anderson (1961) pl.12b-c. 173 See: Ammianus, 31.2.6. 174 Willekes (2016) 104-5, (2013) 179-80; Donaghy (2014) 137. 175 Arrian, Cynegeticus 23.2-4. 176 E.g. Herodotus, 4.46.2-3, 4.126-7.3; Arrian, Anabasis 4.5.4-5; Willekes (2016) 147-54, (2013) 184- 93. 177 Strabo, 7.48; Ammianus, 17.12.2; Willekes (2016) 99-100, 153-4, (2013) 189-93; Hyland (2003) 35; cf. Xenophon, Cyropaedia 7.5.62. 178 It is notable that Strabo, 11.8.2 identifies the Dahae, a unit present in the Seleucid army at Magnesia, as ‘Scythian’, although whether they rode ‘Central Asian’ horses, or rather ‘Turanians’, is uncertain; see Chapter 3.2.2, and pp.53-4 below.

Magnesia) migrated from this region into Asia Minor, it is plausible that they too, at least initially, made use of ‘Central Asian’ horses.179

In contrast, the complex and varied environment of the Near East, featuring arid plains, fertile meadows, mountain ranges, and deserts, made this area notable for being home to two distinct horse ‘types’.180 Of these, the most famous was the

‘Nisaean’, renowned in ancient literature for its magnificent appearance and luxury status; as Oppian declares: ‘in beauty, the most supreme of all horses is the

Nisaean’.181 Originating predominantly from the fertile plains of Media, although they were also found elsewhere,182 the wealth of iconographical evidence demonstrates that ‘Nisaeans’ were robust animals (‘the best and largest’ according to

Strabo),183 ideal for carrying heavy weights, thanks to a diet that was rich in alfalfa.184

Although it is important to question the accuracy and intentions of an artist and the expectations of his audience when dealing with pictorial representations,185 the frequent depiction of striking physical characteristics (e.g. the iconic heavy ram’s head and ‘Roman’ nose, along with a bulky well-muscled body) is particularly consistent across a range of Achaemenid evidence. As noted, contrary to the claims of

Aristotle and the Suda, the heavy mass of these horses made them unsuitable for endurance and anything more than short bursts of speed.186 Rather, they were ideal for heavily-armed close-combat, especially the full-armoured cataphract which

179 Livy, 37.40.13; see Chapter 3.2.2. 180 Willekes (2016) 107-23, (2013) 196-255. 181 κάλλεϊ δ’ ἐν πάντεσσι πέλει πανυπείροχος ἵππος Νησαῖος, Oppian, Cynegetica 1.311-2; also, e.g. Herodotus, 3.106.2, 7.40.2-3; Strabo, 11.13.7, 11.14.9; Diodorus, 17.110.6; Arrian, Anabasis 7.13.1; Ammianus, 23.6.30; Athenaeus, 5.194e. 182 Strabo, 11.13.7, 11.14.9; this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.4.1. 183 ἀρίστοις… καὶ μεγίστοις, Strabo, 11.13.7. 184 Apadana Frieze, Schmidt (1953) pl.35, 52; B.M. 123947; Willekes (2016) 119-20, 156, (2013) 20, 216-25, 236, 255; Hyland (2003) 30-1; Anderson (1961) 18; Donaghy (2014) 184-90. 185 Markman (1943) passim, but especially pp.15, 18; Willekes (2016) 8-12. 186 See footnote 171.

Antiochus III adopted from the Parthians in the late third century B.C.187 As Willekes notes, ‘for sheer strength and presence, the Nesaean… outclassed every other horse of antiquity. The advantages of size came with a price, however’.188 Not only were these horses easily outdistanced by other ‘types’,189 but their robust form was directly dependent on their high-protein diet, making them expensive to maintain.190

Tuplin dismisses the military significance of ‘Nisaean’ horses, claiming that

‘the normal associations of Nisaeans in Greek literature are with luxury and prestige: they are the possession of kings… or the object of sacrifice to the gods, not the state- of-the-art tool of groups of hundreds or thousands of fighting men’.191 However, this argument overlooks two crucial aspects. Firstly, luxury status and military ability are not mutually exclusive. Secondly, and most significantly, any attempt to utilise heavy cavalry in the Near East (especially cataphracts), required this ‘type’ of horse, regardless of its prestige. As we shall see, the other Near Eastern horse ‘type’ was unsuitable for carrying heavy armour. Therefore, since we have ample evidence of armies from this region (whether Achaemenid, Seleucid, or Parthian) possessing heavy cavalry,192 it is clear that ‘Nisaeans’ were frequently used as military horses.193

The second ‘type’ native to the Near East was the lighter ‘Turanian’ (sometimes known as the ‘Southern Steppe’) horse. This animal had a lean, sleek appearance, and was best suited to arid conditions.194 The physical differences between this ‘type’ and the heavier ‘Nisaeans’ are particularly evident in the depictions of various Near

187 Livy, 35.48.3, 37.40.5; Polybius, 16.18.8, 30.25.9; Appian, Syriaca 32; Willekes (2016) 157-66, (2013) 238-48; see Chapter 3.2. 188 Willekes (2016) 166. 189 Cf. Quintus Curtius, 3.11.15; Arrian, Anabasis 2.11.3. 190 Willekes (2016) 155-6, 172, (2013) 236, 255; see Chapter 3.4. 191 Tuplin (2010) 141-2. 192 E.g. Arrian, Anabasis, 2.11.3, 3.13.4, Quintus Curtius, 3.11.15; Polybius, 16.18-19; Livy, 37.40.5-6, 37.40.11; Plutarch, Crassus 25.4. 193 Nevertheless, they may still have been limited to select groups; see Chapter 3.2 for their use by the Seleucid Guard and reserve branches. 194 Willekes (2016) 120-3, (2013) 225-33.

Eastern horses on the Apadana frieze at Persepolis, although there are also other notable examples from the Oxus Treasure, as well as several hunting scenes on fifth/fourth century B.C. seals.195 In particular, ‘the neck, shoulder and leg conformation’ of this ‘type’ gave it ‘a loose, free-flowing stride’ which required ‘less energy than other types’.196 This made these horses highly versatile, and whilst, as noted, their lighter frame meant they were unsuitable for the heavy armour of the cataphract, they were ideal for skirmish-based or moderately armed cavalry,197 and excelled in quickly covering long distances, as Herodotus’ praise for the ‘Royal

Road’ indicates.198 As we shall see in Chapter 3, many of the Seleucids’ ‘non-regular’ cavalry contingents utilised these lighter horses.199

Somewhat similar in build is the final ancient ‘type’ that Willekes’ identifies: the ‘Mediterranean’.200 It is these animals that we most commonly encounter in

Greco-Roman works, such as Xenophon’s descriptions of what to look for when buying a horse.201 Idealised examples are also found in sculpture, most notably the

Parthenon frieze.202 Hailing from a generally mountainous region, not particularly suited to horse-raising (albeit with some notable exceptions, such as Thessaly,

Arcadia, and Macedon, etc.), ‘Mediterranean’ horses were typically sure-footed,203 and were slender, yet muscular animals, suggestive of good athletic ability.204 Whilst they were no match for ‘Nisaeans’ in terms of weight-bearing, nor did they excel in

195 Cf. Schmidt (1953) pl. 29b, 35, 37, 42b-3, 45, 48, 52; B.M. 89816, 123923, 123925, 123945 (contra B.M. 123947); Boardman (1970) pl. 904, 927, 929; Afshar and Lerner (1979) 44. 196 Willekes (2016) 122. 197 E.g. Herodotus, 7.61ff.; Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8.6-9, Hellenika 3.4.14, Cyropaedia 4.3.9, 6.2.16, 8.8.22; Arrian Anabasis 1.15.2; Willekes (2016) 122, 168-73, (2013) 232-3, 250-4. 198 See footnote 147; Willekes (2016) 168, (2013) 250-4. 199 See Chapter 3.2.2. 200 Willekes (2016) 123-34, (2013) 256-323. 201 Xenophon, Peri Hippikes 1; also: Varro, De Re Rustica 2.7.1-6; Columella, 6.29.2-4. 202 Spence (1993) pl.1-4, 7-13; Anderson (1961) pl.15-6, 18-20, 25, 29-31. 203 Xenophon, Peri Hippikes 8.1-6, Hipparchikos, 8.3 notes the necessity of training horses across all sorts of ground. 204 Willekes (2013) 257-83, (2016) 124-34; Donaghy (2014) 95-9; cf. the Artemision horse sculpture (pl. 9), etc.

54 endurance like those of the steppe, these horses were suitable for a range of military duties: from the skirmishing and reconnaissance roles of light cavalry, to relatively heavy close-combat.205 Indeed, it was more as a result of their high cost (which in turn made them into status symbols) given the topographic unsuitability of much of their home, rather than their specific conformation, which limited the battlefield use of these horses. Only after Philip II reorganised the Macedonian army, placing greater emphasis on cavalry as the decisive element, did this attitude begin to change.206

It is possible, however, that Macedonian horses were more robust than those of

Greece, since Justin records that Philip allegedly acquired ‘20,000 noble mares’ (XX milia nobilium equarum) from the Scythian king, Atheas.207 Although the number of horses here is questionable, given that Philip also ‘took 20,000 boys and women’ (XX milia puerorum ac feminarum capta), this passage potentially hints at a separate

‘Macedonian’ horse ‘type’. By crossbreeding ‘Central Asians’ with ‘Mediterraneans’,

Philip could have produced tougher horses, possessing both endurance and the ability to bear armoured riders in close-combat.208 If this is accepted, the creation of this new horse ‘type’ adds another dimension to the Macedonian cavalry’s effectiveness in the fourth century B.C.

Hyland has argued that Justin’s use of the adjective nobilis here suggests that the horses that Philip received were not ‘stocky steppe ponies but high quality mares capable of producing weight carriers with size and speed’.209 Such argument, however, is problematic. First, the Scythians could not have offered any horses other

205 E.g. Thucydides, 2.79.6, 7.4.2, 7.11.4; Xenophon, Hipparchikos 4.4-5, 7.14-15, Hellenika 7.1.21; Diodorus 12.70, 13.88.1, 15.85; Willekes (2016) 173-90, (2013) 299-323; Spence (1993) 49, 87, 103, 126-63; Anderson (1961) 149. 206 Willekes (2016) 190, (2013) 322; Hyland (2003) 145-7; Budiansky (1997) 73. 207 Justin, 9.2.16. 208 Evidence of this is potentially visible on Philip II’s coins, see Anderson (1961) 153, pl.26a; also cf. Alexander’s pursuit of Darius (p.46 above). 209 Hyland (2003) 149; also Donaghy (2014) 137.

55 than the ‘stocky steppe ponies’ native to their region. As we have seen, the harsh environment of this area, something which Justin himself acknowledges in this passage (inclementiam caeli et terrae sterilitatem),210 dictated the physical characteristics of all horses raised there. It is therefore not possible for these Scythian mares to have been anything other than ‘Central Asian’ horses, unless they originally came from elsewhere, and there is no evidence to support this.

Second, the description of these horses as nobilis is not necessarily an indication of their physical appearance. Given the stock-phrase quality of the description, Justin may simply have added the epithet nobilis based on preconceived notions of royalty, or to indicate their royal ownership/transferral.211 Alternatively, it is possible these ‘noble mares’ merely represented the best of Atheas’ stock; however, since ‘high quality’ and ‘stocky’ are not mutually exclusive, this does not prove anything about their physical appearance. Indeed, Hyland’s comments unfairly dismiss the ‘stocky steppe ponies’ of the ‘Central Asian type’. As noted, despite their less graceful appearance and short stature, these horses excelled in speed and endurance. Therefore, regardless of the size or quality of Philip’s Scythian mares, crossbreeding this ‘type’ with his own ‘Mediterraneans’ would still create a tougher

‘Macedonian’ horse ideal for his heavy Companion cavalry.

Having explored the physiognomy of these various ancient horse ‘types’, we can see how different regional conditions dictated the specific abilities of particular horses. As a consequence of their geographical position, the Seleucids, just like the

Achaemenids, had immediate access to both the ‘Nisaean’ and ‘Turanian’ horse

‘types’, offering them a significant degree of flexibility in the military capabilities of

210 Justin, 9.2.7. 211 Cf. the use of βασιλικός for Seleucid horses in Chapter 3.4.1.

56 their cavalry. Although they would not have had direct possession of the Scythian- influenced ‘Macedonian’ horses, the quality of their native horse ‘types’ (especially the ‘Nisaean’) more than compensated for this. Indeed, it is notable that throughout his campaigns, Alexander was able to continue using his rapid, shock-charge style of cavalry warfare, despite regularly needing to resupply his cavalry with local horses.212

Moreover, it is not inconceivable that the Seleucids could have potentially acquired some ‘Central Asian’ and ‘Mediterranean’ horses themselves either through trade or conquest, or through the various allied/mercenary contingents of their army.213 As we shall see in Chapter 3, the variety of horses available within the extent of their Empire allowed the Seleucids to utilise a wide range of cavalry styles, from the traditionally

‘Macedonian’ Agema and Companions of the standing Guard, the exceptionally heavy, Parthian-inspired cataphracts of the reserve, and the array of (typically light) units, such as the Dahae horse-archers, within the ‘non-regulars’. Confined by very few physical limitations, the Seleucids were able to create a considerably diverse mounted force.

1.4. Conclusion

An awareness of basic equine psychology and physiognomy is thus essential for any assessment of Seleucid cavalry. By understanding the characteristics and physical abilities/limitations of ancient horses, we are in a much better position to analyse and understand their tactical use on the battlefield. Although a flight animal by instinct, the horse’s tractability and herd mentality enabled commanders to overcome this, whilst its greater strength, speed, and height in comparison to the infantry allowed for a variety of military uses. By adopting Willekes’ model of the four horse ‘types’

212 Cf. Arrian, Anabasis, 1.26.3, 2.14.7, 3.30.6; Quintus Curtius, 5.1.21; Hyland (2003) 150-5. 213 Cf. Chapter 3.2.2, and pp.51-2 above.

(‘Central Asian’, ‘Nisaean’, ‘Turanian’, and ‘Mediterranean’), along with Philip II’s hybrid ‘Macedonian’ horses, we are further able to understand how the environment of a particular region influenced a horse’s basic conformation and how this in turn dictated its military capacity. This allows us to assess the range of horses available to the Seleucid Empire and the theoretical military abilities of its cavalry much more accurately.

As we have seen, ‘on account of its immense geographical variation’, the Near

East benefitted from an environment conducive to producing two different horse

‘types’: ‘Nisaeans’, physically impressive and ideal for the close-combat of heavy cavalry; and ‘Turanians’, versatile animals built for rapid and sustained movement.214

From this, we can conclude that the Seleucid Empire was able to capitalise on an unrivalled variety of high-quality animals. Heirs to two dominant, but distinct, cavalry traditions, this natural diversity allowed the Seleucids to create a varied and flexible cavalry force that blended and developed the fighting styles of their

Macedonian and Achaemenid predecessors.215 There was thus no deterioration in the quality or military capabilities of the horses available to Seleucid rulers compared to those of Alexander. We must therefore assess how the Seleucids utilised these horses on the battlefield and their effectiveness against their opponents. Before we can do this, however, we must first ascertain the nature of the Seleucids’ military infrastructure, and how this affected the organisation and operation of the Empire’s mounted corps.

214 Willekes (2016) 172 = (2013) 254. 215 See Chapters 3.2 and 4.3.

CHAPTER 2 A Tripartite Military Infrastructure: The Case for Military Settlements

2.1. Introduction

Chapter 1 detailed the fundamental characteristics and abilities of Seleucid horses; we must now establish the military infrastructure of this vast Empire. As noted in Introduction 0.1.2, this is an issue which has suffered from scholarly misunderstandings due to a lack of more recent detailed assessments of the Seleucid army. The organisation of the Empire’s military infrastructure is of vital importance, since only by understanding how each element interacted with the rest, can we effectively begin to assess the operation and importance of the Seleucids’ mounted corps. We must remember that the mounted arm was only one part of a much larger whole, and consequently set it in context. This chapter will reassess the military infrastructure of the Seleucid Empire, demonstrating that the typical bipartite approaches of previous scholarship are unsatisfactory. Instead, I shall propose a new tripartite structure of standing troops, reserve troops, and ‘non-regular’ troops. By basing this directly on the military status of the men involved, I shall show that a three-way structure is not only logical, but also illuminates the workings of the

Seleucid Empire more clearly. This will form the theoretical framework of the thesis, underpinning the analysis of the organisation and operation of the Empire’s mounted arm.

In order to do this, I shall first assess whether the Seleucids maintained a large standing army, before focusing in particular on the troublesome issue of military settlements. Although Seleucid scholarship has traditionally accepted this system, in which men were given land in return for military obligations, based on a close

59 parallel with Ptolemaic Egypt, both Aperghis and Fischer-Bovet have objected to its existence in the Seleucid Empire.216 As we shall see, the maintenance of a military settlement system was fundamental to the reserve branch of the Seleucid army. It is therefore necessary to assess the evidence for this system, and its implications for the

Seleucids’ military infrastructure. Although much of this evidence is uncertain, I shall demonstrate that the Seleucids did maintain a system of military settlements and that its men formed an integral part of the Empire’s military organisation. Furthermore, I shall show that, despite any potential drawbacks, the Seleucids’ tripartite system ensured the constant availability of troops, and in some places, at least in part, survived beyond the dynasty that established it.

2.2. The Structure of the Seleucid Army

2.2.1. Traditional Bipartite Approaches

Given the joint Macedonian and Achaemenid inheritance of the Seleucid

Empire, scholars have traditionally proposed a bipartite structure for the Seleucid army. Whereas the Macedonian armies of Philip, Alexander, and the Diadochi maintained professional soldiers, the Achaemenids typically adopted a ‘feudal’ system, in which the king maintained only a small permanent Guard and would supplement this with troops from his satraps whenever he went to war.217 In light of this, scholars have often conceptualised Seleucid troops along the same lines:

‘regular’ troops, such as the phalanx and heavy cavalry (i.e. the ‘Macedonian’ regiments of Alexander the Great), and the more ambiguously titled ‘national’

216 Aperghis (2004) 95-201; Fischer-Bovet (2014) 83, 238-43, 297. 217 See Introduction 0.1.2, footnote 18.

60 levies.218 Both this approach and the terminology it employs are problematic, and despite it being commonplace in Seleucid scholarship, the ancient sources never explicitly mention this sort of division. As noted, the use of ‘national’ is inappropriate for the ancient world, and implies a misleading dichotomy between the Empire’s militarily superior Greco-Macedonians, and their lesser indigenous peoples.219 Even if many of the army’s core units were initially Greco-Macedonian, Seleucus’ recruitment of local people after retaking Babylon (312 B.C.),220 along with the presence of Thracians, Galatians, and Babylonian Jews within the military settlement system, which formed the core of the Seleucid army,221 demonstrates that such a strict ethnic divide was not the case.

Moreover, the term ‘Macedonian’ has itself been a subject of great debate, especially in relation to the infantry. Whilst Bar-Kochva argues that, given the origin of Alexander’s phalanx, the majority of the Seleucid heavy infantry was composed of

Greco-Macedonian military settlers,222 others have suggested that, paralleling

Ptolemaic developments, the term ‘Macedonian’ became merely a pseudo-ethnic label meaning nothing more than ‘the phalanx’.223 Since the sources sometimes describe similar heavy infantry units as ‘armed in the Macedonian manner’,224 this argument is plausible, and it is highly unlikely that the Seleucid phalanx was ethnically homogenous. Nevertheless, we should not dismiss the significance of

218 Bar-Kochva (1976) 21, 40, 45-84, 96, 202; Griffith (1968) 143-6, 164-70; Grainger (1997) 798-9, 811; Sekunda (1994) 19, 22; McLeod (1977) 70. 219 See Introduction 0.1.2. 220 Diodorus, 19.91.5-92. 221 Diodorus, 19.27.5; Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.119, 12.147-53; Polyaenus, 4.16, 7.39; The Inscriptions of the Sultan Daği I, 393; see 2.3.1 below. 222 Bar-Kochva (1976) 21, 24, 44-5, 56, 99, 202; also: Griffith (1968) 143, 148, 161; Grainger (1997) 799. 223 Launey (1949) 321-2; Cohen (1978) 31; Houle (2015) 2, 5, 21-2, 33, 38; Griffith (1968) 41; Sekunda (1994) 13; Billows (1995) 155-6. 224 E.g. καθωπλισμένοι δ᾿ εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον, Polybius, 5.79.4, also: 2.65.3, 5.65.8, 5.82.4; Josephus, Bellum Judaicum 5.460; Aelianus Tacticus, 2.7; cf. Livy’s use of ‘Syrians’ for the Seleucids as a whole (Chapter 3.2.1).

61 ethnic designations in an Empire as culturally diverse as the Seleucids’. As we shall see throughout this thesis, many units (e.g. the ‘Cadusians and Carmanians’ under

Aspanius at Raphia or the ‘Pisidians’ at Magnesia) were identifiable primarily through their ethnic labels.225 It is therefore worth reassessing which contingents made up the Seleucid army, and the nature of their individual roles within it.

2.2.2. A New Tripartite System

In contrast to traditional approaches, I propose a new military infrastructure for the Seleucid Empire, directly based on the military status of its men. Within the

Seleucid army were the following basic contingents: the Guard (whose duty was to protect the king at all times);226 ‘regulars’ (the units without which the king would not go on campaign, whether ‘Macedonians’ or otherwise); subject levies (those under

Seleucid rule, but without any specific pre-existing military duties); allies; mercenaries; and permanent garrisons. These contingents each had different levels of military obligations, allowing us to divide them into three distinct branches.227

Since the permanent garrisons and Guard were on continual active duty, these form the first branch of the Seleucid army: the ‘standing troops’. Regardless of the type of army the Empire maintained, it would be absurd to suggest that it did not keep a small core of permanent soldiers stationed alongside the war-office at Apamea, or on important borders of the Empire, ready to defend the ruler and his interests.228

Conversely, in light of the Achaemenid precedent, it seems very likely that the

225 Polybius, 5.79.7; Livy, 37.40.13 respectively; see Chapter 3.2.2 in particular. 226 I shall discuss the composition of the Guard in more detail subsequently (see section 2.3.4). Whilst they were technically a subset of the ‘regulars’, their permanently active nature, and differing military obligations and roles justifies categorising them separately. 227 Since the navy has little bearing on this thesis, this chapter shall concern the land forces only. I assume that a portion of the navy would have remained active (at least seasonally) in important places, such as the Persian Gulf, and was supplemented as necessary during campaigns or other periods of naval activity; cf. Aperghis (2004) 199. 228 See footnote 253.

62 subject levies, allies, and mercenaries, were only mustered in times of war.

Consequently, they form the second branch: the ‘non-regulars’ (i.e. men who had no military obligations during peacetime). It thus remains to determine where to place the ‘regulars’. This is far from simple. In particular, although prevalent in the scholarship, the term ‘regular’ is problematic. Despite illustrating that these troops were the core of the Seleucid army, with some sort of military standing that separated them from the ‘non-regulars’ (something that is not disputed), this term also conveys the misleading impression that these contingents comprised part of the standing forces. Whilst they were certainly connected to the Guard, as we shall see subsequently,229 they were crucially not on permanently active duty.

Following Bickerman’s 1938 Institutions des Séleucides, scholarly consensus has argued that Seleucid ‘regulars’ were part of a complex system of settlements that owed direct military obligations to the king.230 This suggestion is based on the well- documented Ptolemaic system of military cleruchs, where settlers were given a plot of land (κλῆρος) in return for a hereditary obligation of military service. They would then work their land until called upon for war, and sometimes served a couple of weeks a year in a garrison.231 These troops thus constituted a ‘reserve army’, essential to the military strength of the Empire, with some martial responsibilities even during peacetime, but crucially not kept continuously on active duty. The suggestion that such a system also operated within the Seleucid Empire is reasonable. Indeed, some places in the Achaemenid Empire, especially Babylonia, seem to have operated under

229 Section 2.3.4. 230 Bar-Kochva (1976) 20, 45-6; Griffith (1968) 148, 162; Cohen (1991) 41; Errington (1977) 210; Gichon (1978) 168; Austin (2006) 553; Walbank (1992) 131; Esposito (2019) 83. 231 UPZ I.110; Fischer-Bovet (2014) 6, 13, 74, 118-22, 199-263, 366-7; Crawford (1971) 40, 53-8, 71, 75-85.

63 a similar system,232 whilst the military foundations of Alexander and Antigonus helped to establish a basis for such a scheme in Asia Minor prior to Seleucus.233

There is also some scattered evidence for the existence of Seleucid military settlements.234 I therefore argue that the Seleucid ‘regulars’ were military settlers who formed the third distinct branch of the army as ‘reserve troops’. Unlike the previous two-way split of the scholarship, this tripartite system, focused directly on the military status of each unit, avoids dividing the army along artificial ethnic boundaries, and offers greater clarity regarding the organisation and operation of the

Seleucids’ military infrastructure.

Nevertheless, Aperghis and Fischer-Bovet, who both champion Bickerman’s earlier theories, have challenged the acceptance of a Seleucid military settlement system. In contrast, they argue that the Seleucids permanently garrisoned their

‘regulars’ during peacetime, significantly bolstering the number of standing troops within the Empire.235 Since my proposed tripartite military infrastructure directly relies on the existence of military settlers for the reserve army, ascertaining the accuracy of this alternative is of vital importance. Despite the many previous works on military settlements, uncertainty still remains, and it is something that we cannot ignore if we hope to understand how the Seleucid army operated. We must therefore reassess the case for Seleucid military settlements in order to demonstrate that, although much of the evidence is open to interpretation, the traditional acceptance of this system should still stand.

232 E.g. CT 22.74; cf. Xenophon, Cyropaedia 8.8.20; also Elephantine: Cowley (1923), Porten (1968); Stolper (1985) 24-7; Nefedkin (2006) 7; Tuplin (2010) 124-6; Head (1992) 12-4; Sekunda (1992) 53; Briant (1986) 35-6. 233 Quintus Curtius, 9.7.1, 10.2.8; Arrian, Anabasis 4.4.1, 4.24.7, 5.27.5, 5.29.3; Diodorus, 17.83, 20.47.5; Griffith (1968) 24, 26, 149-50, 153; Fingerson (2007) 107-8, 112; Sekunda (1992) 53-4. 234 See 2.3.2 below. 235 Aperghis (2004) 89-91, 96, 194-7, 199-201, 205; Fischer-Bovet (2014) 82-3, 296-98, however, cf. (2012); Bickerman (1938) 53-5, 77-88.

2.3. Military Settlements

2.3.1. A Large Standing Army?

Given the high military professionalism of the fourth century B.C., and the continual presence (or at least the threat) of military action throughout the Hellenistic period,236 an argument in favour of a large Seleucid standing army appears reasonable. Indeed, the ‘garrison theory’ of Aperghis and Fischer-Bovet is an interesting counterargument to the traditional view of the scholarship. Neither scholar, however, provides much evidence beyond what is presented in Bickerman.

Aperghis does produce an elaborate, albeit very modernist, model of the Seleucid economy to demonstrate how the Seleucids were able to afford such a large standing army,237 but this alone is not enough to be convincing, and both Holt and Ma have urged caution.238 Nevertheless, Griffith, although largely a proponent of the traditional military settlement view, has also made two separate points suggesting the existence of a substantial standing army.

His first claim, one which Aperghis and Fischer-Bovet support, is that whilst the abilities of Ptolemaic military settlers who farmed their land declined over periods of inactivity, the Seleucids always maintained high levels of military proficiency.239

Skill level alone, however, does not prove the existence of a large standing army, and it is unclear what criteria Griffith uses to judge such qualities.240 Furthermore, it is likely that the Seleucids’ reserve troops did undergo some sort of military training

236 Austin (1986) 457; Griffith (1968) 142, 165 n.1, 168; Ma (1999) 108. 237 Aperghis (2004) 201-7, 211, 297-303; positively received by: Tuplin (2007), Brodersen (2007), and Boiy (2007). 238 Holt (2006/7); Ma (2007). 239 Griffith (1968) 117, 148, 164; Aperghis (2004) 194-5; Fisher-Bovet (2014) 82, 86, 297; Houle (2015) 9-10; contra Bar-Kochva (1976) 47. 240 The Ptolemaic army still defeated the Seleucids at Raphia, despite its qualitative decline prior to the battle (Polybius 5.62.7-63, 5.85; Griffith (1968) 123-4).

65 within the settlements to maintain their skills.241 Indeed, their cavalry’s continual ability to perform complex battlefield manoeuvres,242 and also field substantial units of cataphracts (which required specific riding techniques) from the late third century

B.C. onwards,243 indicates that they did not suffer from a qualitative decline, and so must have had some sort of regular training. Additionally, considering the Ptolemaic parallel,244 it is possible that they also served several weeks a year in a garrison and otherwise provided custodial duties for their local area.

Griffith’s second point draws on a passage in Josephus concerning the reign of

Demetrius II (ca. 145-125 B.C.). This details how

when Demetrius saw that there was peace everywhere… he disbanded the greatest part of his army, and diminished their pay, and funded only those foreigners who came up with him from Crete, and the other islands. However, this incurred enmity and hatred from the soldiers; for whom he no longer provided anything, whilst the kings before him used to pay them in peace so that they might have their good-will, and be very ready to undergo the difficulties of war if there was ever the need.245

The same episode is also recorded in the earlier account of I Maccabees, which also notes that the soldiers were dismissed ‘each to their own place’ (ἕκαστον εἰς τὸν

ἴδιον τόπον).246 Griffith argues that this indicates that the soldiers were on permanent active duty, and were typically billeted together. He thus suggests that the

241 Although specifics are unclear, various scholars have suggested that some form of military training may have occurred through institutions such as the ἐφηβεία and the γυμνάσιον, cf. II Maccabees 4.9; Jonnes and Ricl (1997) 3-5, 15; Cohen (1978) 36; Chaniotis (2005) 47, 50; Portier-Young (2011) 93, 95; Fischer-Bovet (2014) 283. 242 See Chapter 4.3, especially Panion and Elasa. 243 Julian, Orationes 1.38.c-d; Willekes (2013) 247; see Chapter 3.2.3. 244 UPZ I.110; Fischer-Bovet (2014) 118-9, 226, 242, 262, 282-3. 245 ὁρῶν δὲ ὁ Δημήτριος εἰρήνην οὖσαν… διέλυσε τὴν στρατιὰν καὶ τὸν μισθὸν αὐτῶν ἐμείωσεν, καὶ μόνοις τοῦτον ἐχορήγει τοῖς ξενολογηθεῖσιν, οἳ συνανέβησαν ἐκ Κρήτης αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων νήσων. ἔχθρα τοιγαροῦν αὐτῷ καὶ μῖσος ἐκ τούτου γίνεται παρὰ τῶν στρατιωτῶν, οἷς αὐτὸς μὲν οὐδὲν οὐκέτι παρεῖχεν, οἱ δὲ πρὸ αὐτοῦ βασιλεῖς καὶ ἐπ᾽ εἰρήνης χορηγοῦντες αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως διετέλουν, ἵν᾽ εὐνοοῦντας ἔχωσιν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀγῶσιν εἰ δεήσειέν ποτε προθύμους, Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 13.129-30. 246 I Maccabees, 11.38.

Seleucid troops were ‘the nearest approach to a standing army... that [occurred]... between the army of Philip and Alexander and that of the Roman Empire’.247

However, we should note that these soldiers had just been on campaign. This was now over, and there was no longer any need to keep all of the army in one place.

Griffith’s claim that Seleucid soldiers were typically billeted together even in peacetime is highly unlikely, and neither Josephus nor I Maccabees actually state that this was the case. Moreover, when Achaeus and Molon revolted at the start of

Antiochus III’s reign, they were both able to assemble armies large enough to pose a threat, each of which conceivably contained ‘regular’ contingents such as the phalanx.248 Indeed, Molon defeated several of Antiochus’ generals before forcing the king himself to intervene.249 At least some soldiers were therefore scattered around the Empire, in line with the proposed military settlement system.

The anger of these men towards Demetrius following their dismissal was not simply because they had previously been on continual active duty, but was rather a case of injured pride that Demetrius was still keeping his mercenary army, which implied that they were less valuable or trustworthy. Furthermore, I Maccabees’ remark that Demetrius dismissed these soldiers ‘each to his own place’ seems more at ease with the traditional military settlement view than the alternative ‘garrison theory’, since it is hard to see how this model would work in these circumstances.

Josephus’ comment about pay ‘even in peace’ (καὶ ἐπ᾿ εἰρήνης) is striking, although it is important to note that there is no mention of pay in I Maccabees’ parallel account. Whilst we know that all Seleucid soldiers received wages when on

247 Griffith (1968) 164. 248 Polybius, 5.43-54, 5.57. 249 Polybius, 5.45.5, 5.46.5.

67 campaign,250 one of the advantages of maintaining a reserve army was not otherwise having to pay for their upkeep. Moreover, since the implication of this event is that

Demetrius also dismissed the traditional standing Guard (‘he disbanded his whole army’, ἀπέλυσεν πάσας τὰς δυνάμεις αὐτοῦ),251 who, given their permanent military duties, would have received continual pay, it seems likely that Josephus is guilty here of conflating the different branches of the Seleucid army.

A final passage that potentially supports an argument for a fully professional standing army comes from Strabo’s discussion of the important Seleucid city of

Apamea, where the Empire’s war-office (λογιστήριον), Guard, royal stud, and war- elephants were stationed.252 Strabo claims that it was here that Seleucus I, followed by later kings, kept ‘the greater part of his army’.253 At first sight this appears to support the idea of a permanent standing army, and suggests that it was stationed here. However, not only was it unwise to keep large numbers of soldiers together in one place for prolonged periods, but we also know that there were troops scattered throughout the Empire. Nevertheless, we should not discount the military importance of this city. Indeed, the presence of the Guard, war-office, training schools,254 royal horses, and elephants, indicates its significance. Moreover, it was often here that the bulk of the army gathered at the start of a campaign.255 It is thus possible that Strabo, likely influenced by the writings of the local Apamean philosopher, Posidonius,256 merely exaggerated the permanent number of soldiers in this city. In light of this lack

250 E.g. I Maccabees, 3.28; Polybius, 5.50.1-7; Bar-Kochva (1989) 228. 251 I Maccabees, 11.38. 252 Strabo, 16.2.10; Grainger (1997) 688, (1990) 59, 115; Bar-Kochva (1976) 28, 202; Cohen (1978) 20; Sekunda (1994) 27. 253 ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ ὁ Νικάτωρ Σέλευκος τοὺς πεντακοσίους ἐλέφαντας ἔτρεφε καὶ τὸ πλέον τῆς στρατιᾶς, καὶ οἱ ὔστερον βασιλεῖς, Strabo, 16.2.10. 254 ὁπλομάχοι καὶ ὅσοι παιδευταὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἐμισθοδοτοῦντο. 255 E.g. Polybius, 5.45.7, 5.50.1, 5.58-9; Livy, 37.18.6; though see Livy, 36.43.9-10; Grainger (2018) 171. 256 Lowe (2017) 73; Biffi (2002) 189, 192; Lightfoot (2017) 253.

68 of secure of testimony for the Seleucids’ maintenance of a large standing army, we must assess the evidence in favour of a Seleucid military settlement system.

2.3.2. Evidence

It is important to note that the terminology that our sources use to describe the military settlements is problematic and difficult to interpret. The word that the scholarship most frequently emphasises is κατοικία, which broadly means

‘settlement’, but came to acquire a more technical sense when designating Ptolemaic military colonies in the second century B.C.257 Despite Cohen’s caution that the term is actually not found in any contemporary Seleucid source, and is confined almost exclusively to Asia Minor,258 scholars often use this same word to describe the military settlements of the Seleucid Empire.259 Furthermore, there is direct evidence for the identification of Seleucid settlers as κάτοικοι.260 Although this word can simply mean only ‘settler’ or ‘inhabitant’, and Cohen has argued that it does not necessarily carry any specific military connotation by itself,261 there are instances of its use in a military context.262

The important, yet complicated, Seleucid inscription OGIS 229 is particularly illuminating. This inscription details the city of Smyrna’s grant of citizenship both to the settlers in Magnesia and those at Palaimagnesia towards the end of the Third

Syrian War (246-241 B.C.), and it is one of the most significant pieces of evidence in

257 LSJ s.v. κατοικία A.I.2; Grenfell (1902) 545-50; Bar-Kochva (1976) 22; Sekunda (1994) 13; Errington (1977) 210; Cohen (1978) 4. 258 Cohen (1978) 4, 9-10, 87, (1991) 42-9. 259 E.g. Bar-Kochva (1976) 22-39, 44; Cohen (1978) 4, (1991); Sekunda (1994) 13; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 167; Griffith (1968) 153, 157, 163; Houle (2015) 10; Walbank (1992) 131-2, (1979) 451. 260 E.g. OGIS 229, 338.15; Diodorus, 19.27.5, 33.4a; Strabo, 14.2.25; Ι Maccabees 3.36. 261 Cohen (1978) 4 n.13, (1991) 43-4, 49. 262 LSJ, s.v. κάτοικος, A.I.1.

69 support of the Seleucid military system. Throughout the inscription the settlers at

Magnesia are consistently referred to as ‘the κάτοικοι in Magnesia, namely the cavalry and infantry in the city263 and those in the camp, and the other inhabitants’ (οἱ

ἐμ Μαγνησίαι κάτοικοι οἵ τε κατὰ πόλιν ἱππεῖς καὶ πεζοὶ κα[ὶ οἱ] ἐν τοῖς

ὑπαίθροις καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἰκηταί).264 The repeated article οἱ immediately following

κάτοικοι in this line in particular strongly indicates that the cavalry and infantry in both the city and the camp were part of the κάτοικοι. This is further supported by the syntax of the other uses of this phrase throughout the inscription, especially line 49:

τῶ[ν] παρ’ αὐτοῖς κατοίκων ἱππέων και πε[ζῶν, τῶν τε κατὰ πόλιν καὶ

κατὰ τὰ] ὕπαιθρα τασσομένων.265 The sustained use of the genitive here again illustrates that ἱππέων και πεζῶν stands in apposition to κατοίκων.

One could argue that since the cavalry and infantry in this inscription (both in the city and the camp) undeniably form some sort of recognisable military units, given that they are specifically distinguished from ‘the other inhabitants’ (i.e. civilians),266 we should treat them as garrison troops rather than military settlers.267

Nevertheless, their repeated identification as κάτοικοι makes this unlikely. Despite this, the καί of line 14 (πρὸς τοὺς ἐμ Μαγνησίαι κατοίκους καὶ πρὸ[ς] τοὺς

ὑπαίθρους ἱππεῖς καὶ στρατιώτας) does appear to separate the ‘cavalry and

263 An alternative reading is ‘arranged by city’. However, I favour ‘in the city’, in line with Austin’s (2006) translation and the general scholarly consensus regarding this passage. Furthermore, they are directly contrasted with the ‘men in the camp’ (ὕπαιθροι, literally ‘men under the open sky’, LSJ s.v. ὑπαίθρος A.I.1). 264 OGIS 229.35, also cf. vv.14, 21, 36-7, 43-7, 49-50, 59, 73-4, 92-3. 265 Cf. Bar-Kochva (1976) 22-3. 266 Cf. τοῖς ἄλλοις τ[οῖς ο]ἰκοῦσιν ἐμ Μαγνεσίαι ὅσοι ἄν ὦσιν [ἐ]λεύθεροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες, OGIS 229.45, also vv.50-1; Austin (2006) 320 n.11. 267 Cf. Chapdetrey (2007) 164; Ma (1999) 118.

70 soldiers in the camp’ from ‘the κάτοικοι in Magnesia’. This, combined with the more formal nature of their organisation, and their juxtaposition with those ‘in the city’, potentially indicates that the ‘men in the camp’ were in fact on active duty.268

However, this contradicts the syntax of the various other lines where these men are mentioned.269 Furthermore, the repetition of the preposition πρὸ[ς] in this line, along with the curious absence of both any identification of these κάτοικοι in Magnesia, or

τε κατὰ πόλιν which typically accompanies this,270 suggests that this line has possibly suffered from saut de même au même.271 Thus, the ‘men in the camp’ should not been seen as different from the other κάτοικοι.

The only certain garrison troops in this text are those sent under Timon and

Omanes to the χωρίον at Palaimagnesia in the third part of the inscription.272 Not only does the decree state that Smyrna decided ‘to take over’ this place with the precise intention ‘of making a garrison out of it’,273 but the men sent there were explicitly to remain there,274 whilst their rations and pay would be provided from the royal treasury.275 This is a strong indication that these men were on active duty.

Conversely, it is much more uncertain what the status was of those previously living in the χωρίον of Palaimagnesia.276 Some scholars have suggested that they were part of an original garrison sent here;277 however, this relies on a strong reading of

268 Cf. Billows (1995) 174 n.82. 269 See footnote 264. 270 Cf. OGIS 229.35, 44, 46, 49-50, 59, 73-4. 271 Langslow, D. (2017) personal communication. 272 OGIS 229.89-100. 273 νομίζω[ν] δὲ [ἀ]ναγκαῖον εἶναι τῆι πόλει παραλαβεῖν καὶ τὸ χωρίον Παλαιμαγνησίαν καὶ ποιήσασθαι τὴν φυλακὴν δι’ αὐτοῦ, OGIS 229.93-4. 274 OGIS 229.104. 275 OGIS 229.106-7. 276 OGIS 229.95. 277 Bar-Kochva (1976) 22, 58; Griffith (1968) 156; Billows (1995) 175; contra Tuplin (1987) 227.

χωρίον as ‘fort’,278 and furthermore clashes with the statement that Smyrna decided

‘to make a garrison out of’ Palaimagnesia (ποιήσασθαι τὴν φυλακὴν δι’ αὐτοῦ).

That this was necessary indicates that if the people already living here were part of an original garrison, they were no longer capable of guarding the area.279

Additionally, we should note that some of these people already had their own

κλῆροι, whilst the decree granted special κλῆροι to those without.280 Conversely, it is unclear whether the new garrison troops under Timon and Omanes were also included in this provision, though they did share in the same benefits of citizenship and exemption from taxation.281 Considering that the king was already paying and providing for these active troops, it seems unlikely that they were also granted land, although it is hard to be certain. Therefore, I suggest that the pre-existing community living at Palaimagnesia were simply ordinary settlers. Nevertheless, the designation of the extra land as ‘a cavalryman’s κλῆρος’ (κλῆρο[ν] ἱππικόν) demonstrates the link between κλῆροι and the army.282

Therefore, although the Palaimagnesia section of the inscription complicates the picture presented in the first two parts of the decree, the evidence in OGIS 229 clearly illustrates the use of κάτοικοι in a military context, supporting the argument for the

Seleucids’ maintenance of a military settlement system. The fact that garrison troops operated alongside settlers at Palaimagnesia and Magnesia also proves that, contrary

278 The scholarship typically translates χωρίον as ‘fort’ (Bar-Kochva (1976) 58; Griffith (1968) 155; Walbank (1992) 131; Billows (1995) 175; Ma (1999) 50, 118; Austin (2006) 319; Houle (2015) 24); however, whilst χώρα can have military connotations (LSJ, s.v. χώρα, A.I.3), it has a somewhat vague quality to it, generally meaning simply ‘place’ or ‘district’. 279 Griffith (1968) 156; Billows (1995) 175. 280 OGIS, 229.100-3. 281 OGIS 229.103-5. 282 However: Cohen (1978) 61-2.

72 to much of the scholarship, these two systems were able to coexist,283 illustrating how the different branches of the Seleucids’ military infrastructure could work together to form an intricate whole.

Josephus’ Antiquitates Judaicae preserves another important passage about the

Seleucid military settlement system. This reports an alleged letter from Antiochus III to Zeuxis, his governor (στρατηγός) in Asia Minor, concerning the resettlement of

2,000 Babylonian Jews and their families in Phrygia and Lydia following several revolts in this area.284 Despite Grainger’s description of this as ‘a measure of desperation’,285 this is a significant piece of evidence, providing one of the clearest accounts of how a Seleucid settlement was conceivably founded.286 Although the rather favourable presentation of the Jews and their ‘piety towards God’ potentially casts doubt on this letter’s authenticity,287 there are several direct parallels, such as the earlier Achaemenid settlement of Jews at Elephantine to guard the border against invasion,288 and Herod’s later resettlement of Babylonian Jews in Trachon, with the intention of stabilising the region.289 Additionally, Schalit has provided a convincing assessment of this letter’s structure, style, grammar, and content to illustrate its authenticity.290 Furthermore, even if it was a forgery, it would need to reflect actual

Seleucid practice, at least to some degree, to be believable. Therefore, as Walbank notes, regardless of its authenticity, this letter ‘provides a convincing account of how a military katoikia might be set up’.291

283 Cf. Fingerson (2007) 110; Griffith (1968) 161. 284 Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.149-53. 285 Grainger (2015a) 83. 286 Walbank (1992) 131-2; Cohen (1978) 6, 30; Schalit (1960); Billows (1995) 160-3. 287 τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐσέβειαν, Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.150; Schalit (1960) 298-302. 288 Schalit (1960) 296-7, 318; Cowley (1923) passim, especially p. xvi; Porten (1968). 289 Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 17.23-32; Cohen (1972); Schalit (1960) 309. 290 Schalit (1960). 291 Walbank (1992) 132; also Cohen (1978) 6.

Although there is nothing explicitly martial in content in this letter, several scholars have noted that the context of this relocation, along with Antiochus’ comment that Zeuxis was to move the ‘2,000 Jewish families with their effects from

Mesopotamia and Babylonia to the strongholds (φρούρια) and most strategic places

(ἀναγκαιοτάτους τόπους)’,292 is suggestive of their military potential.293 Indeed, the Jews were known for their service in the Seleucid army.294 Their location in

φρούρια, as well as the claim that they would be ‘well-disposed protectors’ (εὔνους

φύλακας),295 at first glance seems to favour the ‘garrison theory’ of Aperghis and

Fischer-Bovet. However, the inclusion of their families and slaves, as well as the explicit instruction that Zeuxis was to ‘give them each a place to build a house and land to farm and plant vines, and grant them exemption from taxes on agricultural produce for ten years’,296 illustrates that Antiochus was anxious to found actual settlements. Therefore, far from being a ‘measure of desperation’ as Grainger claims,

I propose that this letter supports the Seleucids’ military settlement system.

Other supporting evidence comes from a brief note in Diodorus, which states that the men in Larissa-ad-Orontes, who were originally settlers (ἀποίκους) from

Thessaly, and had served as allies (συμμάχους) in the cavalry from the reign of

Seleucus I onwards, ‘had received their settlement (κατοικίαν) here as a reward for

292 ἔδοξεν εἰς τὰ φρούρια καὶ τοὺς ἀναγκαιοτάτους τόπους τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Μεσοποταμίας καὶ Βαβυλωνίας Ἰουδαίων οἴκους δισχιλίους σὺν ἐπισκευῇ μεταγαγεῖν, Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae, 12.149. 293 Billows (1995) 170 n.73, 176; Cohen (1978) 8-9, 88; Schalit (1960) 289, 306; Houle (2015) 11; Ma (1999) 117; contra Bickerman (1938) 85-6; Sekunda (1994) 13. 294 E.g. Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.119, II Maccabees 8.20; Bar-Kochva (1976) 11, 29, 52, 83, 213 n.8; Cohen (1978) 7. 295 Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.150. 296 εἴς τ᾽ οἰκοδομίας οἰκιῶν αὐτοῖς δώσεις τόπον ἑκάστῳ καὶ χώραν εἰς γεωργίαν καὶ φυτείαν ἀμπέλων, καὶ ἀτελεῖς τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς καρπῶν ἀνήσεις ἐπὶ ἔτη δέκα, Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.151.

74 their brave conduct’.297 Despite calling these men ἄποικοι (literally, ‘those living away from their homeland’), a term which Cargill and Moreno note was commonly used (at least in fifth century B.C. Athens) to make a distinction from the clerouchy,298 along with their identification as σύμμαχοι, the note that their settlement was a κατοικία, granted presumably by the king, and their inclusion in

‘the first ranks of the cavalry’,299 suggests that these men were in fact military settlers.300

Likewise, an earlier passage in Diodorus, concerning Eumenes’ army during the wars of the Diadochi, mentions the ‘Thracians from the settlements (κατοικῶν) of the upper country’ (i.e. Media and other eastern satrapies),301 as well as ‘800 cavalry from those settled (κατοικούντων) in the upper country’.302 Although it is unclear how comparable the wars of the Diadochi (a period of intense conflict and uncertain power) are to the policies of a more stable Seleucid Empire, the clear military roles of these men, along with their identification as κάτοικοι, favours the development of a military settlement system from Alexander’s original colonies of veterans, and there is no reason to suppose that this was discontinued under the Seleucids.303

297 τοὺς περὶ τὴν Λάρισσαν διωνομασμένους ἐπ’ ἀνδρέιᾳ καὶ τὴν ἐνθάδε κατοικίαν εἰληφότας δι’ ἀνδραγαθίαν, ἀποίκους δὲ ὄντας τῆς Θετταλικῆς Λαρίσσης, καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Σελεύκου τοῦ Νικάτορος βασιλεῦσι γεγονότας συμμάχους κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἄγημα τῆς ἱππικῆς δυνάμεως, Diodorus, 33.4a. 298 Cargill (1995) xxi-ii; Moreno (2009) 215; it is possible that the meaning of this term had changed by the Hellenistic period, or the time that Diodorus was writing. Alternatively, Diodorus may have been inexact in his use of terminology, cf. Bar-Kochva (1976) 29; the same is possible for the Thessalians’ designation as ‘allies’. 299 τὸ πρῶτον ἄγημα τῆς ἱππικῆς δυνάμεως; see Chapter 3.2.1. 300 Cf. LSJ s.v. ἄποικος A.II.1; Chapdetrey (2007) 162; Cohen (1978) 29, (1972) 88; Bar-Kochva (1976) 28-9, 39. 301 Θρᾷκες ἐκ τῶν ἄνω κατοικῶν, Diodorus, 19.27.5. 302 καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἄνω κατοικούντων ὀκτακοσίους, Diodorus, 19.29.3. 303 See footnote 233.

Another piece of evidence worth considering is the dedication from a group of

‘Macedonian’ soldiers at Thyateira to the king (ca. 281 B.C.).304 Scholars often quote this inscription in assessments of military settlements;305 however, there is nothing in the text itself to confirm this. All that is certain is that there were soldiers in

Thyateira, who formed some sort of recognisable unit.306 Since Strabo identifies

Thyateira as a κατοικία,307 it is not impossible that it was a military settlement, although caution is advisable.308

Similarly, care is necessary when considering OGIS 338, an Attalid inscription from Pergamum detailing a citizenship decree following the death of Attalus III (133

B.C.). Admittedly, this is not a Seleucid inscription, but it does come from an area that was originally Seleucid, and near to the heavy concentration of Seleucid settlements in Phrygia and Lydia.309 Thus, it is not unreasonable to expect certain practices to have been similar. The significant part of this inscription is lines 13-19, which extend the grant of citizenship to

the soldiers (στρατιωτῶν) who are settled (κατοικοῦσιν) in [the city] and the countryside, and similarly to the Macedonians and [Mysians] and to the settlers (κατοίκοις) who are registered in the citadel (φρουρίωι) and in [the] old [city], and to the Masdyeni and ... and to the garrison (παραφυλακίταις) and to the other mercenaries

304 Βασιλεῖ Σελεύκω[ι] τῶν ἐν Θυατείροις Μακεδόνων οἱ ἡγεμόνες καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται, OGIS 211. 305 Billows (1995) 150, 167 n.61, 177; Chapdetrey (2007) 159, 161-4; Tuplin (1987) 226 n.194; Ma (1999) 35; Cohen (1991) 46-7, (1978) 55, 77, (1972) 88; Fischer-Bovet (2012) 3712; Bickerman (1938) 84; contra Houle (2015) 20. 306 Cf. SEG 7.4 for a similar situation; Billows (1995) 151 n.18, 176. 307 Θυάτειρα, κατοικία Μακεδόνων, Strabo, 13.4.4. 308 Cf. Bar-Kochva (1976) 29. 309 E.g. OGIS 211, 229; Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.149-53; Bar-Kochva (1976) 22-39, 43-5; Cohen (1978) 4, 9-10, 87, (1991) 42-9; Aperghis (2004) 96; Chapdetrey (2007) 159-60, 166; Ma (1999) 35.

(ἐ[πικού]ροις)310 who are settled (κατοικοῦσιν) or own property in [the city] or the countryside, and similarly to their wives and children.311

The use of the verb κατοικοῦσιν for the soldiers and mercenaries parallels the

‘cavalry and infantry’ of OGIS 229, supporting a military dimension to the settlement system.312 Alternatively, I suggest that the κάτοικοι registered in the φρούρια and the old city were civilian settlers. Although the martial connotations of the term

φρούρια suggest some sort of military presence, the lack of further identification for these settlers, in contrast to the military terminology (στρατιωτῶν,

παραφυλακίταις, ἐ[πικού]ροις) describing the other bodies in this inscription implies their non-combatant status. Therefore, as with OGIS 229, this inscription illustrates the potential dual civilian-military nature of Hellenistic settlements.

Whilst the inclusion of mercenaries in the κάτοικοι may initially seem odd, since a state conceivably kept mercenaries only for as long as they were actively needed, this settlement may have been a reward for previous military service.313 It is possible that they were actually on active duty, albeit with some sort of permanent city residence, but it is unclear how they worked with the garrison already stationed in the city if this was the case. In contrast to the other soldiers in Pergamum, the

παραφυλακῖται were undisputedly active troops. Their presence alongside the

310 I follow Dittenberger’s reconstruction here ((1903) 536; also: Austin (2006) 431); previous suggestions have given ἐ[μφρού]ροις (‘garrison’), but since there is already a reference to garrison troops in this line (παραφυλακίταις), I agree with von Prott and Kolbe (1902) 109 n.1 that this alternative is unlikely. 311 καὶ τῶν στρατιωτῶν τοῖς κατοικοῦσι ν [τὴμ πό]λιγ καὶ τὴγ χώραν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Μακεδόσιν καὶ Μυσ[οῖς] καὶ τοῖς ἀναφερομένοις ἐν τῶι φρουρίωι καὶ [τῆι πόλει τῆι] ἀρχαίαι κατοίκοις καὶ Μασδυηνοῖς κα[ὶ — — —] καὶ παραφυλακίταις καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐ[πικού]ροις τοῖς κατοικοῦσιν ἢ ἐνεκτημένοις ἐν τῆ[ι πόλει]ἢ τῆι χώραι, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ γυναιξὶγ καὶ παισ[ίν]. 312 Cf. I Maccabees, 3.36. 313 Cf. Diodorus, 33.4a.

77 ordinary settlers parallels the situation at Palaimagnesia in OGIS 229. However, whereas in OGIS 229 the majority of military settlers were in Magnesia, technically separated from the active garrison troops at Palaimagnesia, here the two groups explicitly existed side by side.

Another possible example of such coexistence comes from Ikaros (Failaka), an island situated within the Arabian Gulf. Strategically located, this island received military expeditions at least from the time of Alexander the Great.314 Along with the archaeological remains of the settlement, there are two inscriptions of note. The first

(SEG 12.556) concerns a dedication from a group of soldiers, very similar to OGIS

211, whereas the second (SEG 35.1476) details the relocation of a sanctuary and the measures put in place to protect the indigenous population from the Seleucid settlers.315 Although Cohen, Billows, and Hannestad suggest that the Seleucid colonists of SEG 35.1476 were possibly military settlers,316 whilst others favour

Ikaros having a garrison (or at least acknowledge this possibility),317 there is nothing specifically martial in this text. Indeed, despite the soldiers’ dedication in SEG

12.556, the military nature of Ikaros remains unclear, and a passing expedition could easily have made this dedication, rather than a more permanent military settlement or garrison.318

Ikaros’ fortified nature, along with its strategic location, does suggest some sort of military presence.319 However, excavation has revealed that, unlike the typical

314 Arrian, Anabasis 7.20.3-5; Roueché and Sherwin-White (1985) 6-9; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 167-8. 315 Rourché and Sherwin-White (1985); Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 166, 168, 174-7; Chapdetrey (2007) 162. 316 Cohen (1978) 68-9; Billows (1995) 151, 177; Hannestad (1994) 593-4. 317 Chapdetrey (2007) 163; Rourché and Sherwin-White (1985) 9-10, 34, 38; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 173; Aperghis (2004) 39; Grainger (2015a) 77. 318 Roueché and Sherwin-White (1985) 7-9. 319 Roueché and Sherwin-White (1985) 9-10, 32, 34, 36; Chapdetrey (2007) 163; Billows (1995) 151; Cohen (1978) 76; Hannestad (1994).

78 uniform plan of most Hellenistic garrisons, Ikaros’ fortifications and settlement layout were haphazard and small, complicating the military character of the settlement.320 Was it simply a small or informal garrison, or even only a temporary one? Or were the walls merely a fortification for a (possibly military) settlement? On its own the evidence here is not enough to answer these questions satisfactorily.

Therefore, although the scholarship often classifies this settlement as an active

Seleucid garrison, an element of uncertainty remains.

A further blurring of the two groups is found in SEG 7.13, a Greek inscription from Susa, dating to 2 A.D. that records a poetic dedication of a statue to the satrap

Zamaspes, for his irrigation of the land. Although this evidence is from the Parthian period, Susa was originally an important Seleucid city (Seleucia-ad-Eulaeum), and since the Parthians were notable for their philhellenism and their maintenance of some Greek/Seleucid administrative systems,321 several scholars have suggested that a degree of continuity between Seleucid and Parthian Susa is plausible.322

Interestingly, this inscription notes that the guards (φρουροί) of the acropolis also possessed κλῆροι. Since it is likely that these φρουροί formed a permanently active garrison, the possession of such allotted land is curious, raising questions about how this land was maintained if the soldiers were continually on active duty. Indeed, the identification of these men as κάτοικοι, or the coexistence of such a group alongside the φρουροί, would have been the most natural expectation, given the other

320 Roueché and Sherwin-White (1985) 32; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 175; Lawrence (1979) 176-9. 321 Fraser (1996) 32-3, 195; Dąbrowa (2011) 123-7, 153-63; See Introduction, footnote 47; cf. the Avroman parchments, Minns (1915). 322 Billows (1995) 176; Bar-Kochva (1976) 21, 34-5; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 55-6; Tuplin (1987) 226.

79 examples above. 323 However, in the absence of further evidence, the exact status of these men under the Parthians, and the military implications of this, remains uncertain.

In light of the frequent ambiguity of much of our evidence, we must remain wary of assuming that every place containing soldiers was straightforwardly a military settlement rather than a garrison, or vice versa.324 Nevertheless, the re- evaluation presented above demonstrates that, despite the objections of Aperghis and

Fischer-Bovet, there is clear evidence for the Seleucids’ maintenance of a military settlement system. Since this system formed the backbone of the reserve branch of the Seleucid army, we must now analyse how it conceivably worked, and what implications this had for the Seleucids’ tripartite military infrastructure.

2.3.3. Workings and Implications

Based primarily on analogy with the Ptolemaic system, scholars have normally assumed that military settlers received land in return for a hereditary obligation of military service.325 In particular, a frequent suggestion is that, following a similar military settlement model under the Achaemenids, Alexander, and the later Roman army, military colonies were actually composed of retired veterans.326 As with the men from Larissa-ad-Orontes, in some cases these settlements may have been a reward for previous military action.327 Nevertheless, the identification of the settlers

323 Cf. Billows (1995) 176; Cohen (1978) 5 n.15, 51; Griffith (1968) 160. 324 As we have seen, it was possible for some places (such as Magnesia/Palaimagnesia) to have both, and there is no reason why two branches of the Seleucid army (standing troops and reserve troops) could not coexist in the same place. 325 Bar-Kochva (1976) 21, 29, 41, 45, 201; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 56-7; Griffith (1968) 155, 159 n.2; Houle (2015) 9-10; Grainger (1997) 799; Sekunda (1994) 13, (1992) 54. 326 E.g. Arrian, Anabasis 4.24.7, 5.29.3; Appian, Bellum Civile 1.104, 2.10; Tacitus, Annales 1.17.3, 14.27.2; Griffith (1968) 148; Houle (2015) 9; Cohen (1978) 4-5, 29, 35, (1991) 41; Sekunda (1994) 13, (1992) 54; contra Walbank (1992) 132. 327 Diodorus, 33.4a.

80 in OGIS 229 as ‘the cavalry and infantry in the city and those in the camp’, suggests their continual participation in the army, whilst Antiochus III’s letter to Zeuxis above illustrates that in some cases such settlements were established from militarily active colonists.328

Given the distinction in OGIS 229 between ordinary κλῆροι and a κλῆρος

ἱππικός, the land typically granted to settlers in return for military service likely varied in size depending on their social and military status; a cavalryman’s κλῆρος was presumably larger to accommodate his horse.329 As Antiochus’ letter indicates, a typical κλῆρος conceivably consisted of three distinct elements: a house, agricultural land suitable for grain, and a vineyard (or occasionally an orchard).330 These would not necessarily be next to each other since, as Billows and Grainger note, the successful production of vines and grain needed different types of soil.331

Presumably, the settlers worked this land until either rotational military duties/other forms of military training, or a general mobilisation required them to fight.332

Alternatively, based on OGIS 229, Sherwin-White and Kurht argue that the local population worked the κλῆροι for the military settlers.333 Although there is actually nothing in the inscription to this effect, the suggestion that settlers may not have worked all of the land themselves is plausible. Whilst those with only small allotments would conceivably not have needed extra help, except when called away on duty, it is unlikely that those with particularly large estates could work this land on

328 Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.149-52. 329 OGIS 229.102-3; see Chapter 3.4.1; cf. Cohen (1978) 61-2; actual Seleucid sizes are very hard to tell; Ptolemaic: Fischer-Bovet (2014) 120-1, 208, 212-8, 254-6; Crawford (1971) 55, 59, 62-3; Attalid: Welles, RC 51; Fischer-Bovet (2012) 3712; also: Austin (2006) 553; Grainger (1990) 112-3. 330 Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.151; also, cf. Welles, RC 51; Codex Vaticanus Arabicus 286. 331 Billows (1995) 160-2; Grainger (1990) 112-3. 332 Bar-Kochva (1976) 46, 61, 202; Cohen (1978) 24, 45, 87; Tarn and Griffith (1952) 146; Houle (2015) 10; Fingerson (2007) 111; Grainger (1997) 799. 333 Sherwin-White and Kurt (1993) 57.

81 their own. There are also many Ptolemaic examples of settlers leasing their κλῆροι to other farmers, or hiring extra hands.334

It is perhaps in this light that we should read the evidence of P.Dura 15. Dating to ca. 190 B.C. from Dura-Europos, a Seleucid city strategically located ‘on the eastern route from Palmyra and Antioch near… the Euphrates’,335 this parchment details the mortgaging of part of ‘the κλῆρος of Conon’ (τῶι Κόνωνος… κλήρωι) by a man called Aristonax.336 That Aristonax was seemingly able to dispose of this

κλῆρος has led Cohen to argue: ‘it is difficult to see how one can posit a military obligation for land which was, or had become, alienable’.337 There are two counterarguments to this. First, it is possible that this κλῆρος was not military; beyond the strategic location of Dura-Europos, there is nothing specifically military in nature about the text. Second, the fact Ptolemaic parallels demonstrate a similar

‘alienability’suggests that military obligation came may have with the land itself, and was simply passed on to the new owner.338 Alternatively, given that several of the early settlers in Palaimagnesia did not initially have κλῆροι, in addition to the fact that some settlers may have pursued non-agricultural trades, it is possible that military obligations rested solely with the settlers themselves, regardless of any land that they may happen to have been granted.339 Scholars have thus questioned the nature of

Seleucid recruitment.

334 P.Tebt. 105, 106, 107; P.Hib. 81, 112.8, 30, 41, 53, 118.8-10; Fischer-Bovet (2014) 215, 238-42, 259-60; Crawford (1971) 76-9, 84; Austin (2006) 553. 335 Griffith (1968) 156. 336 P.Dura 15.1-2. 337 Cohen (1978) 51; also: Griffith (1968) 157. 338 See footnote 334. 339 OGIS 229.102-3; Cohen (1978) 46, 51 n.41, 60-1.

Although we must take care when comparing very different empires, the assumption that Seleucid military settlements operated similarly to those of the

Ptolemies via hereditary obligations is plausible, and is something that Bar-Kochva in particular staunchly favours.340 Not only would hereditary military obligations ensure a consistent supply of manpower for the reserve branch of the Seleucid army, but the very practicalities of sustaining a military settlement system imply its probability.

The evidence of the parchment P.Dura 12 is further suggestive. Late, albeit uncertain, in date, P.Dura 12 potentially preserves part of the original lex coloniae of the settlement established under Seleucus I.341 Given the evident continuity of Seleucid settlements elsewhere, this is quite possible,342 although, as Sherwin-White and Kurht have cautioned, we should remain aware of the potential for change over time.343

Despite its fragmentary state, P.Dura 12 provides an extensive list of the order of inheritance for κλῆροι at Dura-Europos, and, although we should not assume uniformity of practice across the Empire, it is possible that similar systems were found elsewhere.344 Whilst there is, once again, nothing specifically military in content within this text, the strategic nature of the place favours a military presence.345 Admittedly, this parchment does provide for the inheritance of women, something which at first sight would appear to be an issue if military obligations were directly tied to individual κλῆροι,346 though when compared with similar Ptolemaic

340 Bar-Kochva (1976), especially pp. 40, 225-6 n.97. 341 See Introduction 0.2.1, footnotes 49-50. 342 See footnote 322. 343 Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 4. 344 Cumont (1926) 310-1; Griffith (1968) 157-9; Houle (2015) 11; Sherwin-White and Kurt (1993) 57; Cohen (1978) 51. 345 Griffith (1968) 156, 159. 346 Griffith (1968) 158; Cohen (1978) 51; cf. Houle (2015) 11.

83 practice, this is not necessarily as problematic as previous scholars have argued,347 and leaves us with several possibilities:

a) The Seleucid army simply accepted the military loss, or the military

obligation was put on hold until the next male heir could take it up;

b) The heiress was required to supply someone to fulfil the military obligation

for her;

c) These κλῆροι were not military;

d) Military obligation was not tied to the receipt of land.348

Since the text is incomplete, it is possible that the original law did in fact detail the conditions of female inheritance.349 Moreover, there is nothing in this text that would specifically preclude its application in a military context, and, as noted, it is quite possible that military obligations belonged to the individual settlers rather than the land itself.

Other scholars favour a process of regional recruitment, where men were enlisted by virtue of living within a military settlement.350 This is an interesting idea, but it struggles to explain OGIS 229’s clear division between ‘the cavalry and infantry in the city and those in the camp’, and ‘the [other] inhabitants’ (i.e. civilians) at Magnesia.351 As we have seen, civilians were able to live alongside military settlers in the same community, and the Seleucid army must have had some way of

347 P.Köln XI 442.11, 442.21, 445.16; BGU 6.1261 = 8.1734; SB 8.9790; Fischer-Bovet (2014) 225, 228-9, 232, 236; Crawford (1971) 57; Billows (1995) 177; contra Griffith (1968) 158-9, 162; Van’t Dack (1977) 88. 348 Cf. Griffith (1968) 158-9; Houle (2015) 12; Cohen (1978) 51. 349 Griffith (1968) 159. 350 Bickerman (1938) 76-8; Cohen (1978) 51; Houle (2015) 13; Griffith (1968) 164. 351 OGIS 229.35 etc.

84 distinguishing between those with obligations who made up the reserve, and those without who potentially contributed to the ‘non-regulars’.352

Sekunda has proposed that the κάτοικοι of Seleucid military settlements paralleled μέτοικοι and περίοικοι elsewhere, arguing that we should understand them ‘in relation to the nearby civic community’ as ‘dwellers about’. This suggestion accords with his theory that in the Seleucid Empire, the term ‘Macedonian’ was purely an indication of legal status rather than strict genealogical identity. Therefore, although Sekunda emphasises the lack of evidence for tying land to military service, he supports the theory of hereditary obligation, claiming that it was membership in the legal category ‘Macedonian’, a status ‘passed on from father to son’, that dictated military service.353 This is an interesting suggestion, however, beyond the identification of the men of the phalanx as ‘Macedonian’ (a term typically indicative of their fighting style, rather than any legal status), there is little secure evidence for this.354 The application of this theory to the military settlers who contributed to the cavalry also creates further complications. As we shall see, although ‘Macedonian’ is sometimes applied to the Companions of the Guard, this does not appear to have been the case with the cavalry reserve themselves.355 Moreover, it is notable that the cavalry settlers of Larissa-ad-Orontes are specifically identified as ‘Thessalians’.356

Alternatively, Cohen suggests that the men of a κάτοικια formed a sort of

‘military association’ (κοινόν) within the settlement and that military obligations came with membership of it. Such ‘associations’ he argues were likely based on small

352 OGIS 338.10-9; Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.149-52; Sekunda (1994) 13-4; Houle (2015) 13; Griffith (1968) 155; Cohen (1978) 77; Bickerman (1938) 82. 353 Sekunda (1994) 13-4, 23-4. 354 Cf. καθωπλισμένοι δ᾿ εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον, Polybius, 5.79.4; see p.61; though possibly cf. OGIS 211. 355 See Chapter 3.2.1, 3.2.3. 356 Diodorus, 33.4a.

85 pre-existing military sub-units, providing cohesiveness to the colony.357 The settlement of a complete military unit, or group of units, is plausible regardless of the method of recruitment. Here Crowley’s emphasis on the importance of a soldier’s

‘primary group’ – a ‘psychological concept’ dependent on the close association of its members, the maintenance of which is essential to the soldier’s effective participation of the battlefield – provides an interesting parallel.358 Although Crowley’s work focuses specifically on the Classical Athenian hoplite, and ‘primary groups’ themselves work only at a small, intimate level, the unifying force of collective identity remains applicable even on a larger scale. The fact that the soldiers making dedications in OGIS 211 and SEG 12.566 identify themselves as a collective group

(e.g. ‘the commander and soldiers of the Macedonians in Thyateira’) demonstrates their communal unity.359 Instances where this group identified themselves by a specific ethnic title, such as the Thessalians in Larissa-ad-Orontes, further suggest their settlement as complete military units.360 Therefore, Cohen’s emphasis on the communal nature of Seleucid military settlements is attractive, although this need not exclude the possibility of hereditary obligation.

Although the uncertainty of the scant evidence means that it is impossible to refute existing arguments completely, or to suggest new ones with absolute certainty,

I propose that individual military settlers did have hereditary obligations to the king, but that the communal nature of the military settlement and their participation within its collective identity was also very important. The scholarship surrounding these issues has long seen individual obligations and regional conscription as distinct and

357 Cohen (1978) 4-5, 51-2, 72-8, 87; also: Tarn (1966) 8; Bickerman (1938) 82. 358 Crowley (2012) 7ff.; Cooley (1910) 23. 359 τῶν ἐν Θυατείροις Μακεδόνων οἱ ἡγεμόνες καὶ οἱ στρατιῶται, OGIS 211.2-5; also cf. SEG 7.4. 360 Diodorus, 33.4a; also cf. OGIS 143; Houle (2015) passim; Billows (1995) 176-7.

86 seemingly incompatible, but I doubt that this was necessarily the case, at least in practice. If κατοικίαι were formed from existing military units, whose members each had an obligation to serve, it is conceivable that during a general mobilisation the king would call up these units as a whole, but this may have been subsequently implemented individually at a local level by satraps or other officials.

With equal emphasis on both the individual and the communal, this more nuanced suggestion illustrates the workings of the proposed tripartite division of the

Seleucid army. Having its basis in regional conscription, the process of mustering military settlers paralleled that proposed above for the subject levies.361 Although uniformity of practice across the Empire is highly uncertain, this parallel, with its roots in Achaemenid and feudal practice, is plausible. Nevertheless, the individual obligations of military service, passed down from father to son, separated the military settlers of the reserve from the more general subject contingents of the ‘non-regulars’.

Additionally, although the obligation to serve linked the military settlers to the

Seleucids’ standing troops, such as the Guard, the fact that they were not on continual active duty illustrates their essential difference. We can therefore see that the

‘regulars’ of the military settlements bridged the gap between the ‘standing’ and

‘non-regular’ branches of the Seleucid army, forming an intermediary, yet crucially important, third branch as a military trained reserve.

2.3.4. The Guard

Despite the significant difference in terms of military duties, Bar-Kochva has argued that the recruitment process for the permanent standing Guard was

361 See pp.60, 62-3.

87 fundamentally linked to the military settlement system.362 Although we must determine the accuracy of this, it is reasonable to suggest that, since scholars traditionally describe Seleucid military settlers as the army’s ‘regulars’, a term indicating those troops without which a king would not go to war, the Guard were technically a subset of this. Furthermore, one could argue that the Guard were simply elite versions of those units formed from the military settlers.

Whereas the ‘regulars’ of the military settlements typically formed the standard phalanx and heavy cavalry units (notably the cataphracts),363 the scholarly consensus is that the Guard comprised the elite infantry contingent, the Argyraspides (which

Bar-Kochva claims was 10,000 strong);364 along with the elite Companions and

Agema of the cavalry (1,000 horse each).365 These units originated in the Macedonian army of Philip and Alexander.366 The typical view is therefore that the Seleucid

Guard comprised ca. 12,000 men, whose primary job was to protect the king,367 although Markle and Errington have disputed the claim that the Argyraspides ‘usually numbered 10,000’.368 Bar-Kochva’s suggested strength is not unreasonable, and parallels the Achaemenids’ decimal military structure, as well as their ‘Immortals’,369 although we should remember that this number is nowhere explicitly stated for the

Argyraspides.

Regarding the recruitment process of the Guard, Bar-Kochva’s unique suggestion that it was directly tied to the military settlements is interesting. A staunch

362 See footnote 370 below. 363 See Chapter 3.2.3. 364 Bar-Kochva (1976) 41, 60-3, (1989) 98, 413-31. 365 See Chapter 3.2.1. 366 E.g. Diodorus, 17.57.2; Arrian, Anabasis 3.14, 4.24.1; though (other than in Diodorus) Alexander’s infantry Guard were known as Hypaspists rather than Argyraspides; Tarn (1948) 79, 116-8, 138-9, 148-67. 367 Cf. Livy’s identification of the Argyraspides and the Companions as the regia cohors (37.40.7) and regia ala (37.40.10) respectively. 368 Markle (1978a) 409; Errington (1977) 210. 369 Herodotus, 7.83; Sekunda (1992) 6; Charles (2015) 14, 17.

88 proponent of the traditional military settlement view, Bar-Kochva proposes the following theory: the Guard comprised settlers’ sons, who served on permanent military duty whilst their fathers worked the land and served in the reserve. Upon inheriting this land, the son returned home, becoming a reservist, and another recruit replaced him in the Guard. Consequently, almost all military settlers served in the

Guard at some point, where they received their initial training, accounting for their loyalty and military skill.370 In particular, Bar-Kochva points to Polybius’ description of the Argyraspides at Raphia as ‘selected from every part of the kingdom’ (ἐκ

πάσης ἐκλελεγμένοι τῆς βασιλείας).371 Scholars have welcomed this neat

‘conveyor-belt’ theory, describing it as ‘acceptable’,372 and even ‘ingenious’.373 Even

Markle, who is a strong critic of Bar-Kochva’s work on the organisation of the

Seleucid army, calls it ‘persuasive’.374 If this is correct, it would suggest a complex interconnected relationship between two of the Seleucid army’s branches.

However, whilst it is likely that the elite regiments were drawn from loyal military settlers, the above quotation from Polybius is insufficient proof on its own.

Furthermore, Bar-Kochva’s theory appears to be based on only two other pieces of evidence. The first, relevant to the cavalry Guard, comes from a peculiar anecdote in

Diodorus concerning the hermaphrodite Hieraïs, whose father (‘a Macedonian by descent’) was a military settler according to Bar-Kochva.375 Upon turning into a man and taking the name Diophantus, s/he enrolled into the cavalry, which Bar-Kochva and Sekunda believe was specifically one of the Guard contingents because of the

370 Bar-Kochva (1976) 46-7, 60-1, 70-2, 94, 202, (1989) 425-6, 430-1. 371 Polybius, 5.79.4; Bar-Kochva (1976) 21, 60. 372 Sekunda (1994) 14. 373 Briscoe (1978) 307; Esposito (2019) 84-5 accepts this theory without comment. 374 Markle (1978) 409. 375 τὸ δὲ γένος Μακεδών, Diodorus, 32.10; Bar-Kochva (1976) 61-2, (1989) 426.

89 unit’s accompaniment of the king (Alexander Balas) in his withdrawal to Abae.376

However, the actual military details here are sparse, and I am cautious about basing

Bar-Kochva’s ‘settlers’-sons’ theory on this rather odd story in Diodorus.

Furthermore, since Alexander Balas was at war with Demetrius II at this time, it is not entirely certain that the cavalry unit in question was actually part the official

Seleucid Guard.

Bar-Kochva’s second piece of evidence concerns the infantry Guard, and comes from Polybius’ account of the Daphne parade (165 B.C.), where he describes the

5,000 men armed ‘after the Roman fashion’ as ‘in the prime of life’.377 Bar-Kochva argues that we should count these 5,000 men among the Argyraspides due to their highly specialised nature, ‘the training of the ‘Roman’ contingent in the new style and their classification as picked troops suggests’ that they were not ‘ordinary settlers’, but rather part of the Guard.378 This reasoning is plausible, and it is notable that there are otherwise only 5,000 Argyraspides in the parade.379

Despite this, the Daphne parade is problematic. It is crucially not an account of a battle, and given the ceremonial nature of the event,380 and the symbolic abundance of gold among the armour of various contingents,381 it is highly likely that it was more concerned with emphasising the Seleucids’ grandeur than presenting a realistic depiction of the army. Moreover, this passage is preserved only in Athenaeus

(5.194c-195d), and as such lacks much of its original context, complicating issues of

376 Diodorus, 32.10.2-8; Bar-Kochva (1976) 61, (1989) 426; Sekunda (1994) 23. 377 καθηγοῦντό τινες Ῥωμαϊκὸν ἔχοντες καθοπλισμὸν ἐν θώραξιν ἁλυσιδωτοῖς, ἄνδρες ἀκμάζοντες ταῖς ἡλικίαις πεντακισχίλιοι, Polybius, 30.25.3. 378 Bar-Kochva (1976) 60, (1989) 416; cf. Sekunda (1994) 16; Houle (2015) 48. 379 Polybius, 30.25.5. 380 Polybius, 30.25.1; Diodorus, 31.16.1; Erskine (2013) 55; Eckstein (2006) 209-10; Gruen (1984) 660; Walbank (2002) 86-7; Bell (2004) 140-3. 381 Polybius, 30.25.4-8, 30.25.11; Erskine (2013) 43.

90 its reliability.382 Therefore, although the ‘Roman’ contingents of the Seleucid army are arguably authentic,383 I question how far Polybius’ description of these men as ‘in the prime of life’ (ἀκμάζοντες ταῖς ἡλικίας) is accurate. Whilst I accept that the

Guard would likely comprise soldiers at the peak of their physical condition, this description has a stock-phrase quality. Polybius notably applies this description only to these 5,000 ‘Roman-armed’ men, not the Guard as a whole.384 Indeed, it is particularly curious that the rest of the Argyraspides are stationed with the phalanx in the parade, away from this ‘Roman’ unit. Furthermore, the identification of this description specifically with the sons of military settlers rest solely on Bar-Kochva’s argument that one did not become a reservist until he inherited his father’s land.385

I thus doubt whether the recruitment of the Guard was this complicated. Was age the only criterion for service in the top regiment; what about excellent veterans?386 Similarly, is it not possible that picked men continually served, to be replaced with promising soldiers of unspecified age on their death/retirement, in a manner comparable to Herodotus’ description of the Achaemenid ‘Immortals’?387 It is true that Bar-Kochva’s theory is attractive, but it is, unfortunately, based primarily on plausibility. Therefore, although we should not ignore the link between the permanent standing Guard and the military settlers of the reserve, their division into

382 Gorman and Gorman (2007) 39-41, 45, 49; Pelling (2000) passim; Walbank (2000) 165, 168; Erskine (2013) 38-40, 52. 383 Cf. I Maccabees, 6.36-9; Bar-Kochva (1976) 126, 129, (1989) 315-6. 384 There are also issues regarding the interpretation of this line, see Sekunda (1994) 14; Walbank (1979) 450. 385 For our purposes, however, we should discount Diodorus, 19.41 on the old age of the Argyraspides. Not only does this passage describe the army of Eumenes during the wars of the Diadochi, but it also, as Houle (2015) 16-7 points out, plays into the myth that this famed regiment was ‘nigh immortal’. 386 It is perhaps possible to counter that excellent veterans would have been promoted to the officer corps (Bar-Kochva (1976) 202), but whilst plausible, it remains uncertain and cannot have happened in every case. 387 See footnote 369.

91 separate branches of the army remains significant for the organisation and operation of the Seleucids’ tripartite military infrastructure.

2.4. Conclusion

It is clear that the traditional approach, which attempted to split the Seleucid army between ‘regulars’ (without distinguishing between settlers or the Guard) and subjects, based on artificial ethnic boundaries, is incomplete and unsatisfactory.

Rather, having demonstrated that, despite the uncertainties of the evidence and the objections of Aperghis and Fischer-Bovet, the Seleucid ‘regular’ troops did not constitute a standing army stationed in garrisons, but formed the Empire’s reserve troops based on an elaborate system of military settlements and hereditary obligations, we can now see that the adoption of a tripartite organisation is the most natural approach that accords with the ancient evidence. Based directly on the military status of the individuals within it, the Seleucids’ tripartite military infrastructure included:

1) Standing troops (the continually active Guard, and permanent garrisons);

2) Reserve troops (drawn from the military settlers, who were the mainstay of

the army);

3) ‘Non-Regulars’ (the subject levies, allies, and mercenaries, who were only

mobilised during times of war, and had no other military obligations).

The Seleucids, therefore, did not emphasise their standing army at the expense of other types of troops. Consisting of the 12,000 strong Guard, along with an

92 unknown number of men in permanent garrisons,388 the Empire’s permanently active soldiers potentially totalled ca. 25,000-30,000. Although this may seem considerable, these men formed only a fraction of the Seleucid Empire’s complete military potential. Despite the need to exercise caution when assessing the numbers recorded in ancient sources,389 an overview of the available evidence demonstrates that the

Seleucids’ typical battlefield strength was ca. 70,000-80,000.390 These figures, however, do not include the permanent garrisons, the fleet, or any troops that were not mobilised. Indeed, for the battle of Raphia in particular, the troops of Asia Minor, where many military settlements were located, were not present due to Achaeus’ revolt, whilst in the wake of Molon’s uprising in Media, it is likely that some eastern troops were not called up.391 Taking this into account, the Seleucids’ complete military potential seems to have been over 100,000 men.392 The standing troops therefore constituted around a quarter to a third of the Empire’s forces. In comparison, since the military settlers formed the phalanx and standard cavalry units

(especially the cataphracts), we can conclude that the typical battlefield strength of the reserve was comparatively ca. 20,000-24,000 based on the troop designations for

Raphia and Magnesia.393 Again, this figure does not include any units which were not called up. It is thus possible that the total potential of the military settlements was ca.

30,000-35,000.394

388 Aperghis (2004) 77, 200-1 estimates that these totalled ca. 20,000 men. Whilst this is highly uncertain, when we consider the size of the Seleucid Empire and the volatility of some of its borders (especially in Coele-Syria), this figure is not unreasonable. 389 See Introduction 0.2.2. 390 See Appendix 2, Table 2.1; see Chapter 3.3 for a discussion of the issues surrounding these figures. 391 Polybius, 5.54.8, 5.77; Bar-Kochva (1976) 18, 41-2; Aperghis (2004) 191; Fischer-Bovet (2014) 77-8; Griffith (1968) 143-44. 392 Cf. Justin, 41.5.7 (Chapter 3.3); Aperghis (2004) 190-1; Fischer-Bovet (2014) 76; cf. the Achaemenid army at the battle of Issus (333 B.C.), Quintus Curtius, 3.2.4; Bar-Kochva (1976) 52. 393 Polybius, 5.79; Livy, 37.40; the number of reserve cavalry present at Raphia is uncertain, however, due to Polybius’ ambiguity, see Chapter 3.2. 394 Cf. also: Aperghis (2004) 190-1; Fischer-Bovet (2014) 76; Bar-Kochva (1976) 41-3 alternatively suggests a much higher number, ca. 53,000 (cf. (1989) 37), although his calculations (especially

The Seleucids gained several benefits from organising their army in this way.

Notably, despite Josephus’ comment above,395 their military expenditure in peacetime was theoretically less than that involved in maintaining a large standing army.

Moreover, the settlement system ‘allowed the ruler to spread his military apparatus throughout his territory and avoid a dangerous concentration of soldiers’ in one place.396 Additionally, by placing the ‘regular’ soldiers in individual communities, often with allotments of their own, Seleucid rulers both strengthened their soldiers’ loyalty to themselves, and enabled these settlers to develop close ties to the land, thereby fostering a desire to defend it.397

There were, of course, two main disadvantages to maintaining a significant part of their forces as a reserve via military settlements. The first is that, since they were primarily concerned with the cultivation of their land (or other source of income), the reserve was potentially not as well-trained as a fully professional army, and risked a decline in military ability over time. This seems to have been the case in Ptolemaic

Egypt.398 This would, however, depend on how often settlers were required to perform military duties. Although evidence is scarce, I suggest that some sort of duties (however informal) would have been in place. Indeed, the reserve cavalry must have undergone some sort of training to perform as a unified whole that was able to execute complex manoeuvres.399 Contrary to previous scholarly opinion, the Seleucid cavalry did not experience a qualitative decline in this period. Since OGIS 229 establishes that some places had both cavalry and infantry settlers, there is little

concerning Raphia and Daphne are problematic), and he includes the 12,000 Guard within this, see Chapter 3.2.3. 395 Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 13.130. 396 Fischer-Bovet (2014) 199. 397 Fischer-Bovet (2014) 122, 199. 398 Cf. Polybius, 5.62.7-63; Fischer-Bovet (2014) 6, 51, 86, 199, 226, 291; Bar-Kochva (1976) 201; Griffith (1968) 109-41. 399 See p.66 above, Chapter 3.2.3, and Chapter 4.3.

94 reason why training would not have also extended to the infantry reserve.

Furthermore, by settling individual military units together, emphasising the communal nature of the military settlements, Seleucid rulers could plausibly strengthen the underlying structures of the soldiers’ collective identity, making them into a more effective fighting force.400

The second disadvantage is that scattering the core units of the army throughout the Empire made mobilisation slower and more difficult.401 This, however, depended to some degree on the organisational system of the military settlements themselves.

Since it would take some time anyway to muster subject levies, allies, and mercenaries for the ‘non-regulars’, this was not necessarily a major problem.

Moreover, for certain localised conflicts, this system was potentially beneficial, as military settlers in/near the affected area would conceivably be quicker to respond than centrally located forces.

The framework outlined above therefore sheds new clarity on our understanding of the Seleucid Empire. Through the implementation of a tripartite organisation of standing troops, reserve troops, and ‘non-regulars’, the Seleucids adopted a sophisticated and flexible military infrastructure which blended the recruitment methods of both their Macedonian and Achaemenid predecessors, and catered to the different people and regional circumstances within their Empire.

Moreover, the reserve’s hereditary obligations ‘ensured the constant availability of troops’,402 without the expense of a full standing army. Regardless of any potential disadvantages, the Seleucids created a military infrastructure which, ‘despite territorial setbacks and heavy losses’, was able to maintain itself ‘as a viable force’

400 See p.86 above. 401 Fischer-Bovet (2014) 199, 226; Bar-Kochva (1976) 43, 47; Griffith (1968) 165; contra Cohen (1978) 51; Crawford (1971) 54, 85; Briant (1986) 36. 402 Griffith (1968) 162.

95 throughout much of the Hellenistic period,403 and in some places lingered long after the Empire’s disintegration.404 We must now ascertain how this tripartite military infrastructure specifically affected the organisation and logistics of the Seleucid cavalry, and the quality of its performance on the battlefield.

403 Bar-Kochva (1976) 20. 404 Cf. SEG 7.13; Griffith (1968) 162.

CHAPTER 3 Seleucid Military Infrastructure: The Organisation of the Cavalry

3.1. Introduction

This chapter is the counterpart to Chapter 2. Having established the tripartite division of the Seleucids’ military infrastructure, we can now assess how the application of this system translates specifically to the organisation of their cavalry.405

Additionally, we must also synthesise this with Chapter 1’s analysis of how the varying environmental conditions of the Seleucid Empire determined the ‘types’ of horses available. In this way we can gain a much clearer picture of the individual contingents of the cavalry, its military capabilities, and the logistical system that maintained it; only by understanding the importance of this arm to the organisation of the Empire’s military infrastructure can we effectively challenge the misguided notions of Hellenistic cavalry decline.

To do this, I shall first assess the ambiguities surrounding the Seleucid cavalry in our sources, the various units that can be identified despite this, and how these contingents fit within the tripartite division of the army. Each branch (standing troops, ‘non-regulars’, and reserve) will be analysed turn to distinguish its composition and characteristic features. Beyond the military status of the men involved, I shall show that each branch made important contributions to the fighting potential of the Seleucid mounted arm.

I shall then review the numerical data given in various battles for the Seleucid army to ascertain the Empire’s infantry:cavalry ratio within its various engagements.

405 Although this tripartite structure is applicable for the mounted corps as a whole, this chapter focuses only on the organisation of the standard cavalry units. See Chapter 5 for assessments of how the Seleucids’ unconventional mounted troops were integrated into this tripartite system.

Although these numbers are often contentious, this evidence is important for understanding how much emphasis Seleucid rulers placed on their mounted forces in comparison to their rivals and predecessors. Previous assessments of the Seleucid army have broadly neglected this evidence, or have dealt with it only in very general ways, leading to misleading claims that, as well as a qualitative decline in Hellenistic cavalry, there was a decline in its numerical importance following Alexander. A re- evaluation of this data demonstrates that although the proportion of cavalry in

Seleucid armies varied depending on the needs of individual engagements, the mounted arm remained numerically significant throughout the Hellenistic period.

Finally, I shall analyse the logistical system that underpinned the organisation of the mounted arm, focusing particularly on the location of the stud farms and how this interacted with the ‘types’ of horses available, before concluding with an assessment of other logistical issues, and their implications for the operational use and efficacy of the Seleucid cavalry. This again is an area that previous scholarship has typically neglected.

3.2. A Tripartite Division of the Cavalry

As Chapter 2 illustrated, the Seleucid army was structured around a three-way division of standing troops, reserve troops, and ‘non-regulars’. These categories acted as ‘vertical divisions’ of the military infrastructure. However, this is not the only way in which the army can be divided. Another method of classification is a ‘horizontal division’ between infantry, mounted troops, and the navy.406 These vertical and

406 Again, we shall leave the navy to one side.

98 horizontal divisions intersect, with each branch of the army’s tripartite structure theoretically containing elements of the infantry, cavalry, and navy, and vice versa.

Any attempt to understand the composition of the Seleucid mounted corps, however, faces complications. First, we are hampered by the lack of detailed lists of which units served in the Seleucid army. On only three occasions (Raphia, Magnesia, and the Daphne parade) do we find a detailed overview of the individual contingents present. These accounts are limited to a 52-year window between 217 and 165 B.C., and we must therefore be aware that this data may not necessarily be consistently applicable to the Seleucid army throughout the Hellenistic period. Moreover, as noted, it is unlikely that the Daphne parade, with its emphasis on grandeur and prowess, reflects the practical military realities of actual Seleucid battles.407

Additionally, in his account of Raphia, Polybius unfortunately refers to the Seleucid cavalry merely as ‘the cavalry’ (τῶν ἱππέων) without any further qualification.408

This tendency to treat the cavalry as a homogenous collective is frustratingly common,409 though it does not mean that all Seleucid cavalry units were exactly the same. Whilst evidence exists beyond these three events, including other literary narratives of various Seleucid battles, and epigraphic and archaeological data, often this tells us of no more than a particular unit’s existence, or the alleged strength of the mounted corps. Consequently, much remains open to speculation and interpretation.

Nevertheless, with careful analysis, we can piece together this scattered evidence to provide a general outline of the Seleucid cavalry’s contingents and explore how these fit within the Empire’s tripartite military infrastructure. To do this, I shall first

407 See Chapter 2.3.4. 408 Polybius, 5.79.12. 409 E.g. Polybius, 5.53, 5.79.13, 10.49.1, 16.18.4, 21.10.2; Livy, 36.18.4; I Maccabees, 9.2; Bar- Kochva (1976) 40, 74; Griffith (1968) 143; cf. Charles (2015) 15 n.8.

99 determine which units comprised the standing and ‘non-regular’ troops, as these are the most clear, before attempting to identify the more nebulous reserve cavalry.

3.2.1. The Cavalry Guard The two cavalry units for which we have extensive evidence, and about which we can be most confident, are the Companions and the Agema. As noted in Chapter

2.3.4, these contingents (1,000 horse each) formed the 2,000 strong mounted arm of the Guard.410 Since the cavalry especially was heavily influenced by the organisation of the Macedonian army, these figures possibly stem from Alexander’s eventual adaptation of the 1,000 strong hipparchies, and later chiliarchies.411 They also parallel the Achaemenids’ decimal military structure.412 The identification of the

Companions and Agema as part of the Guard is evident not only from the fact that it was they, specifically the elite ‘royal squadron of the Companions’ (later renamed the

Agema), that had this function under Alexander,413 but also in their positions around the Seleucid king on the battlefield,414 and the terminology used to describe them.

The Seleucid Companions were variously called ‘Companions’ (ἑταῖροι)415 or

‘Companion cavalry’ (ἴππος ἑταιρική),416 as well as the ‘royal squadron’ (ἴλη

βασιλική).417 The appearance of these terms in the same position on the battlefield

410 E.g. Polybius, 30.25.7-8; Livy, 37.40.5, 37.40.10. 411 Arrian, Anabasis 3.27.4, 6.21.3; cf. Diodorus, 18.3.4; Tarn (1948) 159, 161, 164-7; Bar-Kochva (1976) 67, 72; Griffith (1963). 412 Herodotus, 7.40-1, 8.133; Charles (2015) 17, 21, 26; Head (1992) 16. 413 τὴν βασιλικὴν ἵλην τὴν τῶν ἑταιρων, Arrian, Anabasis 3.1.4, also: 1.18.3, 2.5.9, 3.11.6, Plutarch, Alexander 33; τῶν ἱππέων τὸ ἄγημα, Arrian, Anabasis, 4.24.1, also: 5.12.2, 5.13.4, 6.21.3; Tarn (1948) 138-9, 161; Bar-Kochva (1976) 67-8. 414 Polybius, 5.85.12, 10.49.7, 16.18.7; Livy, 37.40.6, 37.41.1; Appian, Syriaca 33. 415 Polybius, 30.25.7. 416 Appian, Syriaca 32. 417 Polybius, 5.84.1, 5.85.12; Polyaenus, 4.9.6; Livy, 37.40.11.

100 across various authors demonstrates that they were all the same unit.418 The appearance of the ἴλη βασιλική alongside the Agema but in different places in the tactical formation illustrates that in the Seleucid army these two units were distinct; this stands in contrast to Alexander’s army, where the Agema evolved into an elite subgroup within the Companions.419 The frequent inclusion of the royal title in the identification of the Seleucid Companions, along with their role as the king’s bodyguard, indicates their esteemed status within the Seleucid army, despite their sometimes less prestigious deployment on the left-hand side of the battle-line (in contrast to the Agema).420

Since Seleucus only had 200/300 horsemen with him when he retook Babylon

(312 B.C.),421 Bar-Kochva has argued that the Companions were not introduced into the Seleucid army until after the victory at Ipsus (301 B.C.), and were mostly drawn from the Greco-Macedonian settlers situated in what was previously Antigonid Asia

Minor.422 Given that this victory secured the borders of the Seleucid Empire and provided a greater reservoir of manpower, it is plausible that the army was reorganised at this point. However, since Seleucus’ mounted forces steadily increased during his eastern campaigns before 301 B.C., it is debatable whether he would have waited this long to introduce such a core element of Alexander’s army into his own.

The inclusion of the royal designation in the title of the Companions, which cannot have occurred until after the assumption of royal status in 306 B.C., could easily have been added to the already existing unit.

418 E.g. at Magnesia: ἵππον ἑταιρικήν, Appian, Syriaca 32, regia ala (= ἴλη βασιλική), Livy, 37.40.11; also see Polybius, 5.53.4 ,5.84.1, 5.85.12, 16.18.7, 30.25.7; Polyaenus, 4.9.6. 419 Livy, 37.40.6, 37.40.11; Appian, Syriaca 32; Polybius, 30.25.8; Bar-Kochva (1976) 68. 420 E.g. Livy, 37.40.5-6, 37.40.11. 421 Diodorus, 19.91.5; Appian, Syriaca 54. 422 Bar-Kochva (1976) 72.

101

However, given the drama at Opis (324 B.C.) when Alexander attempted to introduce eastern contingents within the Companions,423 Bar-Kochva’s claim that those in the Seleucid army were predominantly Greco-Macedonians, merits consideration. In his account of Magnesia, Livy states that ‘the royal squadron… were mostly Syrians mixed with Phrygians and Lydians’.424 As Chapter 2 illustrated, there is a range of evidence suggesting that many Seleucid military settlements were located in Phrygia and Lydia. Although we should not whitewash the ethnicity of those within what was likely a fluid and evolving system, it is possible that many military settlers (at least initially) were Greco-Macedonian in origin. Additionally, scholars have noted that Livy often pejoratively refers to Seleucids as a whole as

‘Syrians’.425 This dismissive attitude, especially in light of his willingness to specify the ethnicity of other Seleucid mounted contingents,426 further strengthens this suggestion. In particular, Livy notes that the Agema comprised ‘Medes… with a mixture of horsemen from many other nations of that region’.427 Therefore several scholars have proposed an ethnic divide between the two regiments of the Seleucid cavalry Guard.428

Whereas the Companions were known as the ἴλη βασιλική, the Agema was frequently characterised by the high quality of its horsemanship. At Magnesia, both

Livy and Appian describe the unit as ‘picked (horse)men’ (lecti viri; ἱππεῖς

ἐπίλεκτοι),429 whilst in the Daphne parade, Polybius calls them ‘the most powerful

423 Arrian, Anabasis, 7.6. 424 regia ala… Syri plerique erant Phrygibus et Lydis immixti, Livy, 37.40.11. 425 Houle (2015) 44-5; Bar-Kochva (1976) 69-70; Briscoe (1978) 307, (1981) 350; Sekunda (1994) 23. 426 Livy, 37.40.5, 37.40.8-10, 37.40.13-4. 427 Medi erant… et eiusdem regionis mixti multarum genitum equites, Livy, 37.40.6. 428 Bar-Kochva (1976) 33, 68-72; Briscoe (1981) 349-50, (1978) 307; Sekunda (1994) 22-4; Esposito (2019) 84. 429 Livy, 37.40.6; Appian, Syriaca 32.

102 cavalry corps’ (κράτιστον... σύστημα τῶν ἱππέων).430 This emphasis, along with the prestige of the Agema under Alexander, and its position on the esteemed right wing of the Seleucid army at Magnesia (in contrast to the Companions on the left), illustrates the squadron’s elite status.431 Nevertheless, the absence of the royal appellation is striking. If we accept that they were recruited from the Empire’s eastern population, it is possible that the lack of a royal designation was intended to avoid insulting the Greco-Macedonians in a repetition of Opis, who now formed only the

‘secondary’ unit of the Guard.

Bar-Kochva claims that the Agema evolved from Seleucus’ initial 200/300 horsemen and gradually changed in ethnicity due to his campaigns and subsequent recruiting in the east.432 That the size of Seleucus’ cavalry force in 312 B.C. was comparable to Alexander’s Agema makes it possible that Seleucus (at least initially) thought of it as his own Agema. Its gradual transition to an eastern composition is plausible, especially given the contemporaneous parallel with Eumenes’ cavalry,433 and the high quality of Median horsemanship.434 Additionally, Bar-Kochva argues that the Agema’s absence from Polybius’ account of the battle against the rebel satrap

Molon is further proof of its Median origin since, as satrap of Media, Molon, drew upon the forces of this region for his own army.435 However, this contradicts the fact that the Guard were permanently stationed at Apamea (something Bar-Kochva

430 Polybius, 30.25.8; the inclusion of 1,000 ἐπίλεκτοι directly in front of the Agema here is striking. Given Appian’s terminology, it is possible they were actually the same unit (contra Sekunda (1994) 24); cf. I Maccabees’ loose use of ἐπίλεκτοι to describe ‘the whole of the Seleucid infantry at Beith- Sour (4.28; cf. 12.41) and… the whole cavalry at Beith-Zecharia (6.35)’, Bar-Kochva (1976) 73; see Martin (1887) 419 for the association of ἐπίλεκτοι with the ‘Tarentines’. 431 See footnote 420; nevertheless, both units frequently operated together: e.g. Polybius, 5.82.9, 5.84.1, 5.85.12, 10.49.7, 10.49.13. 432 Bar-Kochva (1976) 71; Diodorus, 19.91.5-92. 433 Plutarch, Eumenes, 4, 7.1; Diodorus, 18.30.5. 434 See 3.4.1 below; Bar-Kochva (1976) 32-3, 44, 69-72, 202; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 18, 55, 121-3; Fingerson (2007) 113, 120; Grainger (1997) 798, 800; however: Walbank (1979) 451. 435 Bar-Kochva (1976) 70.

103 himself argues for).436 Whilst Antiochus may have deliberately left the Agema behind, considering a Median unit to be unreliable in the circumstances, it is notable that they are similarly absent in Polybius’ later account of Panion.437 Since there is no reason why the Agema should not have participated in this battle, it is possible that

Polybius is guilty of conflating the two squadrons of the cavalry Guard. Furthermore, it is notable that during the battle against Molon, Antiochus explicitly stationed his

Companions on his left, whilst he himself took command of the right wing.438 This separation from the royal cavalry unit would be striking if the Agema were actually absent.

Alternatively, others reject the claims of the Agema’s eastern composition.

Despite the fact that both Livy and Appian drew on Polybius for their accounts of

Magnesia, Appian states that the Seleucid Agema was composed of Macedonians,439 leading Bickerman to assume an error on Livy’s part.440 Appian’s juxtaposition of the

‘Macedonian’ Agema directly with the ‘Galatian cataphracts’ (Γαλάται τε

κατάφρακτοι) emphasises this ethnic designation. Bar-Kochva’s attempt to argue away this passage by claiming that ‘it seems more likely that Appian is only presenting the Seleucid agēma as the successors of Alexander’s celebrated agēma without referring necessarily to their nationality’, is not particularly convincing, and even he weakly concludes ‘if Appian really meant to indicate the nationality of the troops, he may well have found Makedones in his [manuscript]’.441

436 See Chapter 2.3.4. 437 Polybius, 16.18-9. 438 Polybius, 5.53.4, 5.53.7. 439 τὸ λεγόμενον ἄγημα τῶν Μακεδόνων, Appian, Syriaca 32. 440 Bickerman (1938) 59; cf. Grainger (1997) 807, although he curiously cites Livy rather than Appian. 441 Bar-Kochva (1976) 237-8 n.56.

104

Nevertheless, Appian’s battle-order is problematic. In particular, his identification of the Galatians as κατάφρακτοι is questionable in light of Livy’s specification that there were ‘1,500 Gallograecian infantry’ and ‘3,000 mailed horsemen, whom they call cataphractos’ next to the Agema.442 Similarly, Appian’s claim that the Agema was split between the two wings appears unlikely as this squadron usually operated as a single unit. Since the Companions were also stationed on the left, it seems preferable to locate the Agema on the right following Livy’s account, especially in light of their esteemed status.443 However, Livy’s own account of Magnesia is not completely error free. In particular, scholars have typically rejected his claim that the full complement of armoured horse and ‘auxiliaries’

(auxiliis et cataphracto equitatu) charged only four turmae of Roman cavalry.444 Bar-

Kochva favours Justin’s alternative, albeit brief, version that, much to Rome’s disgrace, Antiochus actually routed an entire legion.445 Briscoe, however, objects to this, claiming that it is more likely that the Seleucid cavalry charged the Latin ala which the Romans stationed on the flank of the two legions in the centre and that

Justin simply confused the two units.446 Since Bar-Kochva’s reconstruction rests on a false belief that the Seleucid centre faced only one Roman legion and the right-wing

Seleucid heavy cavalry faced the other, I follow Briscoe’s correction.447 Regardless,

442 ad latus dextrum phalangitarum mille et quingentos Gallograecorum pedites opposuit. his tria milia equitum loricatorum – cataphractos ipsi appellant – adiunxit, Livy, 37.40.5; see pp.113-5. 443 Further problems in Appian’s account arise with the absurd number and placement of the Seleucid elephants; again, Livy’s account is preferable, see Chapter 5.2.1b. 444 Livy, 37.42.7-8 (it is unclear which unit(s) Livy means by auxiliis; Briscoe (1981) 355 suggests that it refers to the Agema, but, given their very similar armour to the cataphracts, this is uncertain); Bar- Kochva (1976) 170; Houle (2015) 42; contra Gaebel (2002) 252, 255 445 Justin, 31.8; Bar-Kochva (1976) 170. 446 Briscoe (1981) 355. 447 According to Livy (37.39.7-12) the Roman centre comprised: two legions, flanked on each side by Latin alae, whilst in the Seleucid centre were: 16,000 phalangites (divided into ten sections, each flanked by two elephants on either side), as well as 1,500 Galatian infantry on both sides (37.40.1-9). Additionally, on the right wing were 3,000 cataphracts, the Agema, Argyraspides, and the Dahae (the location of the skirmishers is debated, see Chapter 4, footnote 741). Following Polybius’s note (18.30.6) that a legionary required 3 ft/91 cm, Bar-Kochva (1976) 166-7, (1989) 567-8 claims that

105

Livy’s narrative for the army’s battle-order as a whole is preferable given its greater detail regarding the numbers present, and Appian’s more frequent inaccuracies.448

Further complications regarding the ethnicity of the Agema come from

Diodorus’ account of Tryphon’s rebellion (142 B.C.). At the start of Tryphon’s rise to power, Diodorus notes that the Thessalian-descended settlers of Larissa-ad-Orontes in

Syria served in ‘the first agema of the cavalry’.449 Since the Thessalians had long held a high reputation for horsemanship, it is not improbable that they too found employment in the elite cavalry Guard. Consequently, Bar-Kochva and Sekunda have suggested that these Larissans were part of the Agema, although only following the

Parthian conquest of Media (147 B.C.), given the context of this passage.450

Alternatively, it is possible that we should not take this comment to mean the actual Agema itself, but rather the first regiment of the cavalry in general, since

ἄγημα in its basic sense simply means ‘the leading regiment’.451 Indeed, Walton merely translates this line as ‘the first ranks of the cavalry’, without any indication that they constituted the elite Guard squadron.452 Additionally, Diodorus’ use of

πρῶτον is rather odd if this squadron was the Agema itself. As Larissa-ad-Orontes

each legion and ala needed ca. 1,476 ft/450 m, creating a front ca. 5,906 ft/1,800 m long. Alternatively, he claims that the Seleucid centre required only ca. 2,132 ft/650 m, roughly ‘a legion and a half’ (the phalangites, 32 ranks deep, with 3 ft/91 cm per man (Polybius, 18.29.2) totalling 1,476 ft/450 m, and the elephants: ca. 656 ft/200 m). However, Bar-Kochva’s calculations do not allow enough space for the 22 Seleucid elephants and their light guards that were interspersed within the phalanx. It was standard practice to station each elephant ca. 100 ft/30 m from another, with ca. 50 guards per elephant, presumably 25 on each side (Scullard (1974) 68, 246; Sabin (2007) 419; Bar- Kochva (1976) 82, 167). The Seleucid phalanx was thus ca. 3,700 ft/1,128 m wide. To this, we must add the Galatians, whose width is less certain. Since this is roughly comparable to the length of both Roman legions and one ala, I propose that the cataphracts and Agema of the Seleucid right wing did not face a Roman legion, but rather the remaining ala; cf. Grainger (2002) 326. 448 Cf. Rich (2015); contra Houle (2015) 42-3. 449 τὸ πρῶτον ἄγημα τῆς ἱππικῆς δυνάμεως, Diodorus, 33.4a. 450 Bar-Kochva (1976) 70-1, 238 n.58-9; Sekunda (1994) 24; contra Esposito (2019) 84-5. 451 LSJ, s.v. ἄγημα, AI; cf. Bar-Kochva (1976) 72. 452 Walton (1967) 11.

106 was a military settlement, it is likely these men formed part of the reserve cavalry,453 although, given the uneven distribution of the evidence and its general vagueness towards cavalry regiments in general, such suggestions remain inconclusive.

Therefore, whilst I am tentatively willing to accept a division between the ‘eastern’

Agema and the more typically ‘Greco-Macedonian’ Companions, we should not push this too far. As with the title ‘Macedonian’ for the phalanx,454 it is best to allow some fluidity in the ethnicity of these units’ members.

Regarding the armament of the Agema and Companions, it is reasonable to assume that they were heavily armed like their infantry counterparts. This appears to have been the case for the Agema, given its position and joint action with the cataphracts at Magnesia.455 The Companions, however, Appian states were ‘light armed’ (ὡπλισμένη κούφως), whilst Livy notes that they had ‘lighter armour for themselves and their horses’ (levioribus tegumentis suis equorumque).456 Despite this, since Livy also positions this unit next to one of the cataphract contingents, both

Sekunda and Bar-Kochva have suggested that the description of their ‘lighter armour’ was meant only in comparison only to these heavily-armoured horsemen.457 Given that the Companions and Agema frequently operated as a single entity, I support this reasoning. Since both Livy and Appian make similar claims, it is possible there was some confusion in Polybius’ account. Moreover, Livy’s comment that both the

Companions and their horses still had some armour, despite this armour being

‘lighter’, as well as the qualification that they were ‘otherwise not unlike the rest’

(alio haud dissimili habitu), further suggests that they were relatively heavy. The

453 Chapter 2.3.3. 454 Chapter 2.2.1. 455 Livy, 37.40.5-6; also: Polybius, 30.25.9. 456 Appian, Syriaca 32; Livy, 37.40.11. 457 Sekunda (1994) 23; Bar-Kochva (1976) 69, 75; however: Grainger (1997) 800, 803.

107 ability of their horses to carry both their own armour and that of their riders indicates that these animals belonged to the prestigious, heavy ‘Nisaean type’.458

3.2.2. ‘Non-Regular’ Cavalry Composed of various subject levies, allies, and mercenaries, the ‘non-regulars’ form the second branch of the Seleucid cavalry. Whilst we can be relatively confident of the participation of the Companions and Agema in most engagements, due to their role as the king’s permanent Guard, the tendency of ancient authors to treat the cavalry simply as a collective means that it is unwise to attempt to read more into generalising statements than what the immediate context reveals. Even so, we can discern the existence of several different ‘non-regular’ contingents, particularly in the battle-order at Magnesia. These contingents are usually distinguished by ethnic labels

(e.g. ‘Dahae’ or ‘Galatians’) rather than official titles. Although, as we have seen with the Agema and Companions above, we must treat such labels with care, these ethnonyms possibly carry more weight than those of the more standardised contingents, since, by their very nature, these troops consisted of the many varied communities of the Seleucid Empire, which were likely raised locally by satraps and other officials.459 The matter is not without its complications, and the possibility remains that some designations gradually evolved into nothing more than pseudo- ethnic labels.

One of the easiest units to identify is the Dahae. A nomadic people from the region near the Caspian Sea, whom Strabo identifies as ‘Scythian’, the Dahae specialised in light, missile cavalry.460 Given this geographical location and

458 See Chapter 1.3. 459 Cf. Houle (2015). 460 Strabo, 11.8.2; Grainger (1997) 709; Head (1992) 49.

108 specialisation, the Dahae possessed ‘Turanian’ (or possibly ‘Central Asian’) horses.461 Both Livy and Appian identify the participation of these mounted archers

(equites sagitarii; ἱπποτοξόται) at Magnesia. Livy claims that they numbered 1,200, and locates them next to the Argyraspides on the Seleucid right wing.462 Conversely, in keeping with the less precise nature of his account, Appian simply includes them alongside the Mysians, Elymaians, and Arabians as part of a list of mounted archers, though he does note that there were also 200 unspecified mounted archers next to the

Argyraspides.463 Given that Livy places the Dahae next to the elite infantry, it is likely that Appian’s 200 ἱπποτοξόται are the same unit, and that the number ‘200’ is merely a mistake (along with his erroneous identification of the Argyraspides as cavalry).464

The actual role the Dahae played in the battle itself, however, is less certain.

Neither author refers to them again,465 and, as noted above, further complications stem from the confusion in Livy’s account regarding Antiochus’ charge on the right wing. Their position next to the Argyraspides on the extreme edge of the wing implies that they were primarily intended as the standard cavalry defence for the infantry’s vulnerable flanks.466 Moreover, their light equipment and missile weapons also enabled them to harass the enemy from a distance and operate as a potential

‘mobile reserve force’ for the Seleucid right wing.467

461 See Chapter 1.3. 462 Livy, 37.40.8. 463 Appian, Syriaca 32. 464 ἱππεῖς ἀργυράσπιδες, Appian, Syriaca 32; Viereck and Roos (1962) 382 n.2; Briscoe (1981) 350; Rich (2015) passim. 465 The narratives of Florus, Epitomata 1.23.15-8, Zonaras, 9.20, and Justin, 31.8 are of little help since none specify the Seleucid contingents present at the battle. 466 See Chapter 4.2.1. 467 Bar-Kochva (1976) 168-70.

109

The other contingents that Appian lists as mounted archers alongside the Dahae at Magnesia are also worth considering.468 The first are the Mysians, who originated from north-west Asia Minor, and possessed a somewhat ambiguous status in the

Seleucid Empire depending on the strength of Seleucid control over this region at any particular time.469 However, whereas Appian identifies this contingent as part of the mounted archers on the right wing of the Seleucid army, Livy describes them only as archers, with no reference to whether they were on horseback or not. Whilst this alone does not contradict Appian, Livy’s grouping of them in the midst of 7,000 light- infantry, consisting of Cretans, Trallians, and Cyrtaian slingers, is suggestive of their infantry status,470 and there is little record of the Mysians providing cavalry for the

Seleucids on other occasions.471

The second contingent is the Elymaians. Since Elymais was located in south- western Iran, next to Media (which was renowned for its high quality horses), and since Herodotus notes the presence of horsemen from this region in the Achaemenid army,472 it is possible that the Elymaians provided cavalry for the Seleucid Empire.

Should one accept the ethnic division of the cavalry Guard, the Elymaians may possibly have been part of those that Livy claims comprised the Seleucid Agema.473

Nevertheless, as with the Mysians, Livy places this unit among the other light-armed infantry, and I tentatively prefer to accept this version and identify them as infantry

468 For the Arabians, see Chapter 5.4. 469 Grainger (1997) 755. 470 tum levis armatura, trium milium, pari ferme numero, pars Cretenses, pars Tralles; duo milia et quigenti Mysi sagitarii his adiuncti erant. Extremum cornu claudebant quattuor milia, mixti Cyrtii funditores et Elymaei sagitarii, Livy, 37.40.8-9; Herodotus, 7.74 likewise refers to them only as infantry; it is notable that whilst Bar-Kochva (1976) 166 objects to Livy’s placement of this vast number of light-infantry here in the Seleucid battle-line, he does not reject the inclusion of the Mysians within this group; in contrast to Bar-Kochva’s objection, see Briscoe (1981) 350. 471 Cf. Launey (1949) 438; 5,000 Mysians do curiously appear as part of the infantry in the Daphne parade, however (Polybius, 30.25.3). 472 Herodotus, 7.62. 473 Livy, 37.40.6; alternatively, they may have formed part of the reserve cavalry.

110 rather than cavalry.474 Grainger claims that ‘mounted archers from Elymais fought in the Seleucid army at Raphia’, however, since Polybius does not distinguish the individual cavalry contingents here, there is no secure evidence of this.475 Therefore, although we should not dismiss the possibility of Elymaian archers serving within the

Seleucid ‘non-regular’ cavalry, this remains uncertain, and their presence at Magnesia is unlikely.

A more easily identifiable group are the so-called ‘Tarentines’, who were present at both Panion (stationed in the centre of the battlefield, behind the elephants),476 and Magnesia (occupying the left flank, next to 2,500 Galatian horsemen).477 Although Livy does not specify the strength of this contingent at

Magnesia, modern scholars, following Kromayer, typically suggest that it numbered

500 in an attempt to account for Livy’s overall figure of 12,000 Seleucid cavalry.478

The ‘Tarentines’ are an interesting unit as they were not limited solely to the

Seleucids. First recorded under Antigonus at Paraitakene (317 B.C.),479 they quickly spread to various Hellenistic armies.480 Consequently, although no further details are forthcoming for either Panion or Magnesia,481 we are able to analyse their armament more confidently than many of the other Seleucid ‘non-regular’ cavalry units.

According to Arrian and Aelianus Tacticus, the ‘Tarentines’ were a group of

ἱππακοντισταί – armed, as their name implies, with a pair of javelins (and, occasionally, a sword), and a shield – who specialised in rapid skirmishing from a

474 Also, cf. Livy, 35.48.5. 475 Polybius, 5.79-85; Grainger (1997) 715. 476 Polybius, 16.18.7. 477 Livy, 37.40.13. 478 Livy, 37.37.9; Kromayer (1907) 211 n.2; Bar-Kochva (1976) 227 n.106; Aperghis (2004) 190; see section 3.3 below. 479 Diodorus, 19.29. 480 E.g. Diodorus, 19.82.2; Polyaenus, 3.7.1; Polybius, 4.77.7, 11.12.6-13.1; IG.II2.958.56, 960.33, 961.34, IG.VII.2466, IG.IX.2.509; Griffith (1968) 246-7; Launey (1949) 601-3; Bugh (1988) 197-9. 481 Appian’s account of Magnesia omits them.

111 distance before closing for close-combat.482 As Sekunda notes, the ability of the

‘Tarentines’ to wield two spears (one for throwing, the other for close-range fighting), requiring riders to transfer the second spear from one hand to the other whilst charging, indicates a high degree of training.483 Therefore, although we cannot say much about their use at Panion and Magnesia beyond their roles as protection for the elephants and flank of the heavy cavalry respectively, the flexibility of their roles on the battlefield would have been particularly attractive to commanders, and is likely the reason for their appearance in various armies across the Hellenistic world.

However, in light of their widespread use, whilst the ‘Tarentines’ initially originated as mercenaries from Tarentum in Italy, various scholars have claimed that the contingent’s name evolved into merely a pseudo-ethnic title signifying their particular fighting style.484 Given the complications of the title ‘Macedonian’ highlighted in Chapter 2.2.1, this is possible. The flexibility of the ‘Tarentines’ means that they must have possessed horses capable of multiple battlefield functions. As

Chapter 1.3 demonstrated, the ‘Mediterranean’ was most suited for this style of warfare, although it is plausible that the Seleucids’ native ‘Turanians’ also performed these roles.485 Nevertheless, horse ‘type’ alone is not indicative of the ethnicity of a unit’s men, and, in the absence of further evidence, this matter is far from certain.

Other uncertainties arise with the Galatians. Present at Magnesia, they are the last of the readily identifiable ‘non-regular’ cavalry contingents. The Galatians

(Gallograecians/Gauls in Latin sources) were a group of Celtic tribes who migrated to northern Asia Minor during the third century B.C., where they frequently fought with

482 Arrian, Tactika 4.6; Aelianus Tacticus, 2. 483 Sekunda (1994) 20. 484 Griffith (1968) 246-50; Sekunda (1994) 20; Launey (1949) 602-4; Bugh (1988) 191, 197-8, 205; Martin (1887) 418-23. 485 Chapter 1.3.

112 local rulers (including the Seleucids), before eventually settling there.486 They are recorded within the Seleucid army on several occasions, and it is possible that a few possessed κλῆροι as military settlers,487 although the majority were typically allies or mercenaries.488

At Magnesia, three separate units of Galatians, possibly from different tribal groups,489 were present. Unfortunately, the troop dispositions of Livy and Appian disagree, and, moreover, there are further complications within the manuscript tradition of Livy’s text. Most modern editions have Livy state that on the right-hand side of the Seleucid phalanx there were: ‘1,500 Gallograecian infantry. To these

[Antiochus III] joined 3,000 mailed horsemen, whom they call cataphractos’.490

Despite this, the manuscripts from which these modern editions derive all read

Gallograecorum equites rather than pedites, following an emendation by the late sixteenth century scholar, Sigonius.491 The accuracy of this alteration is vitally important, as it affects both our understanding of the Seleucid cavalry’s composition, and the relative numbers of horsemen present in the army. The change brings Livy into agreement with Appian, who claims that the Galatians stationed next to the

Seleucid phalanx were κατάφρακτοι.492 Indeed, Sigonius based his emendation on

486 Grainger (1997) 720; Coşkun (2011) 87-95, 99, 102, (2013) 73-4. 487 Coşkun (2011) 99 n.57; The Inscriptions of the Sultan Daği I, 393; Jonnes and Ricl (1997) 8-12; Schuler (1999) 127; Launey (1949) 525-6; also possibly: SEG 24.637, however, cf. Lampini (2013) 54 n.122. 488 Polybius, 5.53.3; Livy, 37.8.4, 37.18.7, 37.38.3; Appian, Syriaca 6; Justin, 27.2; Coşkun (2011) 95, 100-3, (2013) 75, 83; Griffith (1968) 166; Rich (2015) 81; Bar-Kochva (1976) 51, 132, 215 n.21. 489 Coşkun (2011), (2013). 490 ad latus dextrum phalangitarum mille et quingentos Gallograecorum pedites opposuit. his tria milia equitum loricatorum – cataphractos ipsi appellant – adiunxit, Livy, 37.40.5. 491 Codices Bχ, see: Briscoe (1991) 474, n.5, (1981) 349; Walsh (1999) 102, n.7; Weissenborns and Müller (1907) 70, n.5. 492 τοιοῦτον μὲν ἦν τὸ πεζὸν Ἀντιόχου, ἱππεῖς δ’ ἑκατέρωθεν αὐτοῦ παρετατάχατο Γαλάται τε κατάφρακτοι, Appian, Syriaca 32.

113 this alternative account.493 Although this is a neat solution to the otherwise conflicting testimony of both ancient authors, complications remain.

First, there is no textual basis for changing pedites to equites – Sigonius’ emendation is based purely on Appian. As Briscoe notes, this alone is not a secure reason for abandoning Livy, whose account is generally the better of the two, despite

Bar-Kochva’s arguments to the contrary.494 Moreover, as noted, Appian is wrong to identify the Galatians as κατάφρακτοι.495 Not only does this conflate the two units

(Galatians and cataphracts) which Livy indicates were separate, but it is also uncertain that Galatian cavalry were ever this heavy.496

Since cataphracts required both riders and horses to be fully armoured, not only were they expensive to employ, but they also required robust ‘Nisaean’ horses.497

Although we cannot discount the possibility of some Galatians possessing this ‘type’ of horse, the environmental conditions of the Seleucid Empire meant that they were more typically found in the highly fertile plains of Media, as well as Parthia and

Armenia.498 Given that the Galatians migrated from the north, it seems more likely that their initial cavalry style was based around the very different ‘Central Asian’ horse ‘type’, though we should not discount developments over time. Moreover, cataphracts were a continual feature of the Seleucid army following their introduction after Antiochus III’s campaigns against the Parthians (210-206 B.C.), and overall they enjoyed enduring success (though their performance was somewhat mixed at

493 Briscoe, J. (2018) personal communication. 494 Briscoe, J. (2018) personal communication; Bar-Kochva (1976) 166. 495 See 3.2.1 above. 496 Cf. Plutarch, Crassus 25.7. 497 See Chapter 1.3; a relief from the temple of Athena Polias Nikephoros in Pergamum, along with archaeological finds from Aï Khanoum, and a Syrian figurine (now in the Louvre), reveal interesting details about the armament of Seleucid cataphracts, see Mielczarek (1993) fig.15, 16; Grenet (1980) 60-3; Anderson (2016) 38. 498 See 3.4.1 below.

114

Magnesia itself).499 Furthermore, special training was needed to perform as a cataphract, as the horse needed to become accustomed to wearing and moving with the extra armour, whilst the rider had to adjust his riding style to accommodate for the weight.500 Therefore, it is more likely that this force was composed of military settlers who owed direct obligations to the Seleucid king rather than a potentially unreliable and less well-trained allied/mercenary population.501 Given Appian’s other inaccuracies in his account of Magnesia, as well as his tendency to mistake details such as names,502 it is plausible that he is wrong here. If this is accepted, Sigonius’ emendation cannot stand and the 1,500 Gallograecorum pedites stationed to the right of the phalanx should remain pedites. This also holds for the other unit of 1,500

Galatians on the phalanx’s left.503

The final Galatian unit recorded at Magnesia is the 2,500 strong cavalry unit which Livy places alongside the ‘Tarentines’ on the Seleucid left wing.504 Although

Appian’s account does not mention this unit, he likewise omits the ‘Tarentines’, and in light of his confusions and inaccuracies, his silence alone is not decisive.

Moreover, there is no contention surrounding Livy’s Latin (Gallograecorum equitum duo milia et quingenti) here either in the manuscript tradition or modern scholarship.

Similarly, we know that Galatian cavalry served in the Seleucid army prior to this battle.505 We can therefore be fairly certain of their presence at Magnesia. Given their position alongside the ‘Tarentines’ on the flank of the army, it is possible that these

Galatians were intended to operate in a similar role – as light, flexible cavalry support

499 Livy, 35.48.3; Polybius 16.18.8; Sekunda (1994) 21; Bar-Kochva (1989) 12, (1976) 74; Grainger (1997) 800; Anderson (2016) 30-4, 41; see Chapter 4.2.1, 4.3.1, 5.3.2. 500 Willekes (2013) 246-7; Mielczarek (1998) 104; cf. Julian, Orationes 1.38.c-d. 501 Also: Bar-Kochva (1976) 40, 42, 74; Sekunda (1994) 21; Anderson (2016) 39. 502 Rich (2015) 68, 97, 111; footnote 429. 503 Livy, 37.40.10-11. 504 Livy, 37.40.13. 505 Livy, 37.38.3.

115 for the left wing (a further rejection of Appian’s identification of the cataphracts as

‘Galatian’). Their joint use with the Dahae and other mounted archers to attack the

Roman camp guards prior to the battle supports this suggestion,506 as does their position as the outermost cavalry unit.507

Beyond these securely known contingents, we can say little else with certainty for the ‘non-regular’ cavalry of the Seleucid Empire. However, given that the

Seleucids continued many Achaemenid practices,508 and their Empire on the whole comprised the same peoples, it is reasonable to suggest that many of the contingents present in the cavalry of the Achaemenid Empire also played similar roles under the

Seleucids.509 These contingents came from a variety of peoples across the Empire, and whilst authority over some regions was soon lost,510 many others, particularly those renowned for their cavalry prowess or possession of land suitable for horse- raising (e.g. Bactria, Parthia, Armenia, Cappadocia, and Media),511 are likely to have continued to provide cavalry during the Hellenistic period. Indeed, since Media (and the surrounding regions) potentially formed a base for the Seleucid Guard and reserve cavalry,512 it is not impossible that some ‘non-regular’ contingents also originated from this area. Additionally, although both Bactria and Parthia soon became independent, recent scholarship suggests that these regions maintained a loose quasi- client-kingdom status with the Seleucids, meaning that, depending on the state of relations at any given time, some cooperation was possible.513 The types of weapons

506 Livy, 37.38.3; cf. Plutarch, Lucullus 28.2-3, Crassus 25.7. 507 See Chapter 4.2.1. 508 Most notably: the satrapal organisation, matrimonial alliances with non-Greek dynasts, and the peripatetic court; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993); Sherwin-White (1991) 85-6; Gruen (1993) 4-6, (1996) 121-5; McKenzie (1994) 61-5; however, cf. Tuplin (2008). 509 Cf. Appendix 1, Table 1.1. 510 E.g. Strabo, 15.2.9. 511 See 3.4.1 below. 512 See 3.2.1. 513 Wenghofer (2018); Strootman (2018) 131-2, 137-40.

116 these ‘Achaemenid’ units employed varied greatly,514 although the literary and artistic evidence suggests a general preference for either javelins or spears, with the possible addition of a shield, along with a gradual trend towards increasingly heavier cavalry over time.515 How far this was replicated in the Seleucid ‘non-regular’ cavalry, however, remains less certain given the ambiguity of our sources, and it is unwise to generalise too far beyond what they tell us.

3.2.3. Reserve Cavalry The final branch that we must investigate is the reserve. Given the reassessment of the military settlement system in Chapter 2.3, it is likely that, just as with the infantry, the reserve cavalry was composed of military settlers. Indeed, the repeated reference in OGIS 229 to ‘the κάτοικοι in Magnesia, namely the cavalry and infantry in the city and those in the camp’, as well as the description of the κλῆροι given to those previously without land as a ‘cavalryman’s lot’ (κλῆρο[ν] ἱππικόν),516 shows that Seleucid military settlements consisted not only of infantry, but also comprised cavalry. Similarly, Diodorus’ claim that the Thessalians of Larissa-ad-Orontes comprised ‘the first agema of the cavalry’ highlights another element of the reserve cavalry.517 As explained in section 3.2.1 above, this does not indicate the Agema of the Guard, but rather the leading unit of the cavalry in general. Whilst their designation as ‘Thessalians’ initially suggests their allied/mercenary status, their prestigious role on the battlefield, combined with the fact they were settled in Larissa-

514 The Sagartians, for example, had lassos, Herodotus, 7.85, although see Tuplin (2010) 165. 515 E.g. Herodotus, 7.61-88; Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8, Hellenika 3.4.14, Cyropaedia 4.3.9, 6.2.16, 7.1.2; Arrian Anabasis 2.11.3; Tuplin (2010) 114-6, 119, 124-6, 158, 164-71; Boardman (1970) pl.864, 881, 883; Sekunda (1992) 23-9; Head (1992) 31-9; Nefedkin (2006) 6-16; cf. Potts (2007) 154-6. 516 See Chapter 2.3.3, and footnote 263. 517 Diodorus, 33.4a.

117 ad-Orontes (τὴν ἐνθάδε κατοικίαν εἰληφότας), illustrates that they were reserve cavalry.518

However, if we attempt to go beyond this, the identification of the individual units of the cavalry reserve is particularly ambiguous. Unlike the ‘non-regulars’ (who are typically identified by an ethnic label), and the Guard (usually designated by their official titles), the ‘regular’ cavalry of the reserve often lack any additional attribute.

This lack of specification was not as problematic with the Seleucid infantry (which are also more frequently detailed in the sources), since the reserve generally comprised the phalanx and are easily recognisable by their role on the battlefield. In contrast, the tendency to treat the cavalry as an unspecified homogenous block makes it much more difficult to extend the same level of certainty to the cavalry reserve.

One possible approach is to take the battles where the individual cavalry contingents are detailed and deduct the Guard and ‘non-regulars’ from this list. Thus, for Magnesia, once the Companions, Agema, Dahae, ‘Tarentines’, and Galatians are removed, we are left solely with the two cataphract contingents (3,000 each) stationed on either wing. As noted, given the cataphracts’ heavy armour and specialised training, their continual appearance in the Seleucid army following their introduction

(they are also recorded at Panion and Daphne),519 and their enduring success, it is highly likely that they were composed of reservists with defined military obligations to the king.520 However, this approach only works for those few occasions where the individual contingents of the cavalry are actually detailed.

518 See Chapter 2.3.3; cf. Diodorus, 19.29.2. 519 Polybius, 16.18, 30.25.9. 520 The same is also likely with the 1,000 Nisaean horsemen present in the Daphne parade (Polybius, 30.25.6; see Mielczarek (1993) 22), though their separation from the cataphracts is curious; contra Tuplin (2010) 141-2.

118

Further complications stem from the fact that of the three occasions where

Seleucid units are described in detail, the Daphne parade is, as noted, crucially not an account of an actual battle.521 The authenticity of some of the contingents present, beyond the Argyraspides, phalanx, cavalry Guard, and cataphracts, is therefore uncertain. In particular, the inclusion of the 1,000 ἐπίλεκτοι (‘picked troops’) immediately preceding the Agema, seems to be a mistake on the part of Athenaeus, who preserves this fragment of Polybius,522 whilst the 1,000 φίλοι (‘friends’) were likely nothing more than a ceremonial unit, since this label did not have any military connotations in the Seleucid Empire, but specifically designated those close to the king at court.523

The 3,000 πολιτικοί cavalry are particularly interesting, although the ambiguity of translating their title complicates their identification. Since πολιτικοί is a word with typically strong connotations of citizenship as well as civic/political behaviour,524 some scholars have suggested that these 3,000 men were citizen cavalry.525 In particular, Paton, in his translation of Polybius, describes this unit as being ‘from Antioch itself’,526 an idea Bickerman also supports, although he classifies this unit in a slightly more nebulous manner as ‘horse militia’ (‘la milice à cheval’).527 Given the geographical proximity of the sanctuary at Daphne to Antioch, this suggested origin is not unreasonable. Conversely, Bar-Kochva rejects this idea, suggesting instead that the unit may have come from a variety of cities under

521 See Chapter 2.3.4. 522 Athenaeus, 5.194e; see footnote 430. 523 Polybius, 30.25.8; Bar-Kochva (1976) 73; Sekunda (1994) 23; Walbank (1957) 581, (1979) 451. 524 LSJ, s.v. πολιτικός, A.I-V. 525 Sekunda (1994) 24; Bar-Kochva (1976) 30; Olson (2007) 443. 526 Paton (2012) 159; interestingly, Olson’s parallel translation of this passage in Athenaeus (5.194e) makes no reference to Antioch, identifying them only as ‘citizen cavalry’ (Olson (2007) 443). 527 Bickerman (1938) 59.

119

Seleucid control.528 Since πολιτικοὶ could also be translated simply as ‘those from the cities’, along with the significant number of men in this unit, and its lack of any particular ethnonymn, this is another plausible possibility.

Considering the high probability of their citizen status, this group’s inclusion within the military settlement system and reserve cavalry seems natural. However, as

OGIS 229 (which granted citizenship to ‘the κάτοικοι in Magnesia, namely the cavalry and infantry in the city and those in the camp, and the other inhabitants’) indicates, the status of individual military settlers was not dependent upon also obtaining the privilege of citizenship.529 Moreover, for this suggestion to work, there would need to be some sort of centralised conception of a ‘Seleucid citizen’. Given that the grant of citizenship recorded in this inscription was one made by the city of

Smyrna to those in Magnesia, which the king merely approved,530 rather than a grant of some wider ‘Seleucid citizenship’, we can see that, for the Seleucids, ‘citizenship’ meant only enfranchisement within a particular city that itself was in the bounds of the Empire, rather than any centralised collective status intrinsically bound up with military obligations. Likewise, the inclusion of ‘the other inhabitants’ (οἱ ἄλλοι

οἰκηταί) within OGIS 229 shows that it was equally possible to be a citizen without any attendant obligations of military service. It is therefore unlikely that the 3,000

πολιτικοί cavalry recorded at Daphne were members of the reserve cavalry, although there is nothing to imply that this unit was not otherwise militarily operational.

528 Bar-Kochva (1976) 30. 529 καὶ τὴμ πολιτείαν ἔδωκαν Σμυρναῖοι τοῖς ἐμ Μαγνησίαι κατοίκοις τοῖς τε κατὰ π[ό]λιν ἱππεῦσι καὶ πεζοῖς καὶ τοῖς ὑπαίθροις καὶ τοῖς [ἄλλοις τοῖς] οἰκοῦσι τὴμ πόλιν, OGIS 229.35-7, see Chapter 2.3.3. 530 OGIS 229.13-41.

120

Sekunda alternatively suggests that, rather than comprising ‘Macedonian’ citizens, whom he argues contributed to the Companions, the πολιτικοί cavalry were actually rich Greeks, who, although citizens of various cities within the Empire, did not share the legal status that came with the title ‘Macedonian’, and so were not directly part of the Seleucids’ military settlement system. Rather, their cities had

‘treaties of alliance’ with the Empire, ‘which bound them to supply contingents to the army’.531 This is an interesting suggestion, although, as I have shown, Sekunda’s argument that Seleucid military settlers were identified under the legal title of

‘Macedonian’ is problematic.532

A different approach for identifying the Empire’s reserve cavalry comes from

Bar-Kochva. Based on the numerical evidence for Achaeus’ expedition against Selge

(218 B.C.),533 Raphia, Magnesia, and Daphne, he suggests that the ‘regular’ cavalry of the Seleucid military settlements (in which he also includes the Companions and

Agema) were roughly 8,000-8,500 strong, which he then divides into 500 for the settlements in Asia Minor, 3,500 for Syria and Mesopotamia, and 4,000-4,500 for the eastern provinces.534 If correct, this would give an estimated strength of 6,000-6,500 for the reserve cavalry, which we could apply to the Seleucids’ various military engagements to shed light on which branches of the cavalry were present, and how strong they were. Given the proportion of this 6,000-6,500 to the cavalry Guard (ca.

33%), such numbers initially appear reasonable.535 Furthermore, they accord with the cataphract contingents present at Magnesia, who are the only Seleucid cavalry unit recorded here that do not belong to either the Guard or ‘non-regulars’. However,

531 Sekunda (1994) 24; cf. Chapter 2.3.3. 532 Chapter 2, p.85; cf. the ‘Thessalian’ military settlers of Larissa-ad-Orontes, Diodorus, 33.4a. 533 Polybius, 5.71.3. 534 Bar-Kochva (1976) 41-2. 535 In comparison, the Argyraspides were about half the size of the phalanx.

121 when we compare these figures to those given for the phalanx (ca. 16,000-20,000) they appear too high.536 Similarly, their application to Raphia is problematic since this would imply that only the Guard and reserve cavalry were present, which is otherwise unprecedented. It is possible that these figures do not represent the reality of the battlefield, but rather the total military potential of the Seleucid reserve cavalry in theory, which would give a rough infantry:cavalry ratio of ca. 4:1 for the military settlers, but even here, uncertainty remains.537

3.3. Infantry:Cavalry Ratios

Considering an army’s infantry:cavalry ratios for their various military engagements is an important aspect of understanding how much emphasis commanders placed on each arm. Cavalry forces are traditionally much smaller than infantry, though the exact proportions of these two arms can vary. By tracking the development of these ratios across the Seleucids’ battles, and comparing them to the infantry:cavalry ratios of both their contemporaries and predecessors we are able to assess whether there was a decline in the numerical importance of cavalry in the

Hellenistic period. Unfortunately, detailed analysis of this evidence is typically lacking in previous scholarship, leading to misrepresentations of Hellenistic warfare.

Only Aperghis and Mielczarek mention such figures, and even here only in passing.

Aperghis, in a sweeping generalisation, states that ‘the normal ratio’ in this period was typically 10:1.538 This parallels scholarly claims that traditional Classical Greek

536 See Chapter 2.4. 537 Chapter 2.4 suggested that the military settlers’ total military potential was ca. 30,000-35,000 (including cavalry). If we deduct the suggested 6,000-6,500 cavalry, we are left with 23,500-29,000 infantry, giving an average infantry:cavalry ratio of 4.2:1. 538 Aperghis (2004) 194; Mielczarek (1993) 23.

122 ratios were likewise ca. 10:1,539 although it differs from both Achaemenid ratios, which vary much more noticeably (ranging from 32:1 to almost 1:1 depending on the engagement and the reliability of the sources),540 and those of Alexander’s army, which were ca. 6:1.541 This greater emphasis on cavalry under Alexander is understandable following Philip II’s reorganisation of the Macedonian army where the mounted troops now acted as the decisive force on the battlefield. If accepted,

Aperghis’ generalisation would appear to support the notions of Hellenistic cavalry decline by demonstrating a fall in numerical importance. On the other hand,

Mielczarek, in just four sentences, briefly considers Seleucid proportions, noting that although present on occasion, a 10:1 ratio was by no means the rule.542 Indeed, as we can see from Tables 2.1-2 (Appendix 2), although there are indeed several examples throughout the Hellenistic period where a 10:1 infantry:cavalry ratio is correct, this is crucially not the case in every instance. It is therefore imperative that we reassess the numerical data for the Seleucid army in detail.

As noted in the Introduction, the problematic nature of battlefield figures in ancient texts (which are typically only rounded estimates even in the more reliable sources) complicates such analysis.543 Consequently, although the raw data is presented in Table 2.1 (Appendix 2), we must assess each entry’s reliability and congruence with its historical contexts. Additionally, there are many battles for which the sources provide no numbers, meaning that even within the partial coverage of the evidence, our picture is not a full one. Similarly, with the exception of Magnesia, the typically vague treatment of individual cavalry units prevents us from suggesting the

539 Tuplin (2010) 151; Gaebel (2002) 152 n.26; cf. Appendix 2, Table 2.4, as we can see, there is actually more variation than scholars typically allow. 540 Appendix 2, Table 2.5. 541 Appendix 2, Table 2.3. 542 Mielczarek (1993) 23. 543 See Introduction 0.2.2.

123 average proportions of each branch within the Seleucid cavalry.544 Nevertheless, despite these complications, it is possible to discern a general numerical framework for the Empire’s infantry:cavalry ratio, thereby shedding interesting light on the

Seleucids’ use of cavalry.

As Table 2.1 demonstrates, there are ten military engagements within our period where the Seleucids’ infantry and cavalry numbers are recorded. However, of these, only eight are relevant for our assessments of the army’s typical infantry:cavalry proportions. In particular, we should discount the 12:1 ratio provided in Polybius’ account of Achaeus’ march against Selge, since Achaeus, who was in revolt against Antiochus III, only had access to the troops in Asia Minor.545 Given that it is likely that the majority of the Seleucids’ cavalry came from eastern satrapies, this possibly disproportionately affected the infantry:cavalry ratios of individual regions of the Empire. Therefore, although this ratio is not far from Aperghis’ suggested 10:1, it is not comparable to the Seleucids’ typical set-piece battles where the full army was present.

The applicability of the numbers recorded for Antiochus’ defence of

Thermopylae is similarly questionable. Although both Livy and Appian state that

10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry were present (a ratio of 20:1),546 we should note the special circumstances surrounding Antiochus’ Greek expedition. Not only was

Antiochus in a hurry to cross over into Greece, and so could not wait to mobilise the whole Seleucid army, but ‘if all the troops had been transported to Greece, defeat

544 For Magnesia the cavalry Guard contributed just over 16% of the total Seleucid cavalry present, the reserve ca. 49%, and the ‘non-regulars’ ca. 34%. The infantry proportions are a little more complex since it is unknown how many camp guards there were, and which branch of the army these belonged to (see pp.126-7 below). 545 Polybius, 5.72.3. 546 Livy, 36.15.3; Appian, Syriaca 17.

124 would have been tantamount to suicide’.547 Antiochus had also been hoping to join forces with Philip V.548 Furthermore, it is notable that both Livy and Appian frequently repeat these figures: Antiochus’ landing force at Pteleum allegedly consisted of 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry; similarly, despite losses over the winter, the Seleucid king deployed 10,500 troops at Thermopylae; finally, in the aftermath of the battle, the Romans captured 10,000 Seleucid prisoners, whilst Antiochus escaped with only 500 horse.549 This is highly suspect, though the figures may not be necessarily wrong in every instance. Therefore, given that Antiochus’ army was not at full, or even desirable, strength, we cannot securely compare the numerical data provided here to other Seleucid engagements.

Of the eight remaining engagements, it is fair to say that Raphia and Magnesia are the clearest examples of a ‘typical’ Seleucid set-piece battle. One could therefore argue that, theoretically, the infantry:cavalry ratios of these two engagements illustrate the Seleucids’ ideal battlefield proportions. However, it is notable that these two occasions provide very different results. On the one hand, Polybius records that

62,000 Seleucid infantry and 6,000 cavalry (producing an infantry:cavalry ratio of ca.

10:1) fought at Raphia against 70,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry (a ratio of 14:1) under Ptolemy IV.550 There is some suggestion in modern scholarship that Polybius drew his information for Raphia from a pro-Ptolemaic source, suggesting that the

Seleucids’ numerical disadvantage seems more reliable, but this remains uncertain.551

Walbank has alternatively proposed that the Seleucid total may be larger than

Antiochus’ actual army for this battle, though he does not dismiss Polybius’ figures

547 Bar-Kochva (1976) 15; Antiochus’ transportation of his forces by sea (Appian, Syriaca 12; Livy, 35.43.3) also potentially discouraged the inclusion of large numbers of cavalry (cf. Athens’ initial cavalry force for the Sicilian Expedition (415 B.C.), Thucydides 6.43). 548 Appian, Syriaca 12, 16; Livy, 35.43.4-6, 36.7-8, 36.15.5; Bar-Kochva (1976) 15-8, 158. 549 Livy, 35. 43.6, 36.15.3, 36.19.11; Appian, Syriaca 17, 20. 550 Polybius, 5.79. 551 Bar-Kochva (1976) 128-9; Momigliano (1929) 189; cf. Walbank (1957) 607.

125 outright.552 In particular, Bar-Kochva suggests that, given the unrest in the east following Molon’s uprising, it is possible that some cavalry contingents from these satrapies were deliberately ‘left behind to garrison the country’.553 This is plausible, although we do not know how comprehensive this decision was.

On the other hand, an extensive Seleucid army confronted the Romans at

Magnesia. Appian claims that Antiochus’ force totalled 70,000, whilst Livy initially notes 60,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, producing a ratio of 5:1, significantly different to the 10:1 of Raphia,554 although Griffith has claimed that Livy’s cavalry figures are ‘greatly exaggerated’.555 Whilst Livy initially states that there were 12,000

Seleucid horse, his description of the individual contingents themselves adds up only to 11,700 plus an unspecified number of ‘Tarentines’.556 As noted above, scholars have often suggested that the ‘Tarentines’ were 500 strong,557 bringing the overall figure to 12,200, just slightly higher than Livy’s initial 12,000. Since recorded

Seleucid cavalry figures rarely exceed 10,000, Griffith’s objection is not unreasonable. Nevertheless, Magnesia was a particularly important battle for

Antiochus; it is therefore not inconceivable that he could have mobilised this many cavalry troops, intending to overawe the Romans with the impressive extent and variety of his army.

Other complications potentially arise, however, with Livy’s infantry figures. In contrast to his stated 60,000 prior to the battle, his list of individual contingents adds up only to 55,200.558 Despite this, Livy’s description of the Seleucid army makes no

552 Walbank (1957) 607. 553 Bar-Kochva (1976) 42; contra Griffith (1968) 143. 554 Appian, Syriaca 32; Livy, 37.37.9. 555 Griffith (1968) 145. 556 Livy 37.40. 557 See 3.2.2. 558 No actual number is given from the Argyraspides, but they were usually 10,000 strong.

126 mention of the light-infantry elephant guards (usually ca. 50 men per elephant,559 giving a total of 2,700 to protect the 54 Seleucid elephants), nor those troops who were presumably left to guard the Seleucid camp (possibly ca. 3,000 men).560 When these contingents are included, the Seleucid infantry comes to ca. 60,900, again just slightly higher than Livy’s rounded 60,000. It is possible that the number of camp- guards was not quite 3,000 (which is only an estimated figure), bringing the overall total closer to Livy’s initial claim; indeed, Bar-Kochva and Kromayer accept the total of 60,000.561

Therefore, whilst the Seleucid army at Raphia appears to support Aperghis’ claim that Hellenistic infantry:cavalry ratios were typically 10:1, its formation at

Magnesia stands in strong contrast, placing even more emphasis on the cavalry than

Alexander. Furthermore, it is particularly interesting that both of these battles occurred under Antiochus III’s reign, within 27 years of each other. Given this disparity, it is clear that, despite representing ‘ideal’ Seleucid battles, these two engagements alone cannot illuminate the Seleucids’ typical infantry:cavalry proportions. It is thus necessary to assess the other instances where Seleucid battlefield figures are recorded in order to set the ratios of Raphia and Magnesia in context and determine whether either are anomalies, or alternatively part of a bigger

Seleucid pattern, and whether this pattern continued or developed between 301 and

160 B.C.

559 Sabin (2007) 419; Bar-Kochva (1976) 8, 82, 167; Scullard (1974) 246. 560 Kromayer (1907) 211-2 n.5; Bar-Kochva (1976) 8; Aperghis (2004) 190 n.3; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 54. 561 Bar-Kochva (1976) 9, 167; Kromayer (1907) 211; alternatively, Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 54 propose a total of 59,200, whilst Aperghis (2004) 190-1 and Fischer-Bovet (2014) 75 suggest 60,200. These alternative figures, however, rely on miscalculations of the number of elephants/elephant-guards (Sherwin-White and Kurht suggest only 1,000 elephant-guards (ca. 18-19 men per elephant) which is too low, whilst Aperghis and Fischer-Bovet erroneously acknowledge only 50 Seleucid elephants), and we should treat them with caution; cf. Grainger (2002) 321-3.

127

The first military engagement of our period is Ipsus. Despite this battle’s importance for the wars of the Diadochi, the only full surviving account is from

Plutarch’s Demetrius, who was not interested in writing a purely historical or military narrative.562 We must therefore analyse the details of Plutarch’s account carefully, especially given his tendency simply to leave things out of battle descriptions.563 In particular, although Plutarch records that the Allies (Seleucus and Lysimachus) had

64,000 infantry and 10,500 cavalry (‘500 more horse than Antigonus’),564 giving an infantry:cavalry ratio of ca. 6:1, there are complications with this cavalry figure. 565

Just before the battle, Diodorus notes that, whilst wintering in Cappadocia, Seleucus alone had ‘almost 12,000 cavalry’.566 It is possible that Seleucus did not bring his full complement to Ipsus, but this seems highly unlikely given the importance of the battle and the size of Antigonus’ opposing force (over 70,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry, hence a ratio of ca. 7:1). Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume that

Lysimachus also had some cavalry of his own. Bar-Kochva has proposed that the

Allied cavalry figure at Ipsus was actually closer to 15,000. Indeed, he suggests that rather than πεντακοσίους, Plutarch’s Greek should read πεντακισχιλίους, pointing to another occasion where Plutarch’s Demetrius and Diodorus disagree between 500 and 5,000.567 If Bar-Kochva’s emendation is accepted, the Allied infantry:cavalry ratio would be ca. 4:1. However, whilst there is a slight issue concerning Plutarch’s πεντακοσίους in the manuscripts, this concerns only

562 Plutarch, Demetrius 28-9; see Introduction 0.2.1. 563 Gaebel (2002) 235; Bar-Kochva (1976) 105. 564 ἱππεῖς δὲ πεντακοσίους τῶν ἐκείνου πλείονα, Plutarch, Demetrius 28.3. 565 His figure for the Allied elephants (400) is also highly debated, see Chapter 5.2.2b. 566 ἱππεῖς… περὶ μυρίους δισχιλίους, Diodorus, 20.113.4. 567 Bar-Kochva (1976) 107, 247 n.11; Plutarch, Demetrius 5.2; Diodorus, 19.85.3.

128

Lindskog’s emendation of the dative (πεντακοσίοις) to the accusative.568 I suggest that we adopt a middle ground, yielding a ratio of ca. 5:1.

Regardless, it is immediately clear that the Allies’ infantry:cavalry ratio parallels that recorded for Magnesia, in contrast both to Raphia and Aperghis’ claim of typical Hellenistic ratios. The battlefield proportions of both armies in this engagement are also similar to those of Alexander, although this is perhaps unsurprising, given that the Diadochi themselves served under Alexander and adopted his tactics. Although one could object that the Allied force at Ipsus was not composed solely of Seleucid troops, meaning that it is debatable how far we can accurately compare these figures to other Seleucid battles, its status as the first battle of our period nevertheless allows it to act as a benchmark against which we can track the development of Seleucid practice.

Almost a century later (ca. 212-206 B.C.), Antiochus embarked on his momentous eastern expedition, for which he attained the title ὁ Μέγας (‘the

Great’).569 Unfortunately, Polybius’ (rather fragmentary) account does not explicitly state the size of Antiochus’ army, merely describing it as particularly large (δυνάμει

τηλικαύτῃ).570 Despite this, in a passing comment, Justin notes that when Antiochus marched against Arsaces of Parthia, he had 100,000 foot and 20,000 horse (a ratio of

5:1).571 Naturally, the enormity of these figures, along with Justin’s questionable reliability, has led to their general dismissal.572 However, Bar-Kochva and

(significantly) Aperghis argue against rejecting them. Given the scale and importance

568 Ziegler (1971) 31. 569 Appian, Syriaca 1; SEG 41.1003; Aperghis (2004) 193; Ma (1999) 272-6, documents: 9-10, 18. 570 Polybius, 10.28.1. 571 Justin, 41.5.7. 572 Pédech (1958) 73 n.1; Debevoise (1938) 17 n.69; Walbank (1967) 236.

129 of recovering the Empire’s eastern territories, as well as the west’s relative stability following the Fourth Syrian War (219-217 B.C.), they argue that it is not impossible that the army exceeded its typical 60,000-80,000 battlefield strength, especially in light of Polybius’ description of them as ‘so large a force’ (δυνάμει τηλικαύτῃ).573

Additionally, Polybius notes that the ‘cavalry... light infantry, and 10,000 peltasts’ accompanied Antiochus on his forced night-march to Tapuria.574 Although the overall figures of these troops are unknown,575 the fact that this was only a small force selected for its manoeuvrability, and yet still comprised over 10,000 infantry, supports the claim that the full army’s total was significant. Furthermore, Aperghis notes that the mint output at Seleucia-ad-Tigrum at this time vastly exceeded its usual peacetime production, suggesting ‘very high military expenditure’.576 It is therefore reasonable to accept that Justin’s figures are not completely outrageous, even if it is plausible that they were rounded up.577 Since this expedition came immediately in the wake of Raphia, this 5:1 ratio challenges any impression of the cavalry’s numerical decline following Ipsus, and combined with Antiochus’ similar ratio at Magnesia, questions the typicality of his 10:1 proportion in 217 B.C.578

A ratio of ca. 5:1 is once again seen for the battle of Ammaus (165 B.C.).

However, here the validity of the numbers becomes much more problematic.

According to I Maccabees, Lysias initially set out with 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry; additionally, the night before the battle, Gorgias (one of Lysias’ commanders) took 5,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry to make a surprise attack on the

573 Bar-Kochva (1976) 10; Aperghis (2004) 193. 574 αὐτὸς δ᾿ ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς ἱππέας καὶ τοὺς εὐζώνους, ἅμα δὲ πελταστὰς μυρίους, προῆγε νυκτός, πορείᾳ χρώμενος ἐνεργῷ, Polybius, 10.49.3. 575 Contra Bar-Kochva (1976) 10. 576 Aperghis (2004) 193, 239-42. 577 Bar-Kochva (1976) 10; Aperghis (2004) 193. 578 Also: Mielczarek (1993) 23.

130

Jewish camp.579 Despite this, both Bar-Kochva and Aperghis dismiss these figures,580 especially since the same source states that at least half of the Seleucid army was currently campaigning in the east under Antiochus IV.581 Although it is not impossible for a force of 47,000 to have comprised only half of the Seleucid army, we should remember that, following the Treaty of Apamea (188 B.C.), the Seleucids (at least officially) lost access to the manpower of Asia Minor.582 Indeed, the evident posturing and desire to emphasise the numerical might of the Seleucid Empire in this passage (‘[Antiochus] gathered all the forces of his Empire, a very powerful army’),583 introduces an element of doubt. Additionally, although no total figure is given for the Seleucid force, it is notable that II Maccabees claims that it was ‘not less than 20,000’,584 suggesting that I Maccabees’ exaggerated his numbers.

Similar concerns appear for Beth-Zur in the following year, for which I

Maccabees states that the Seleucid force (still no more than half of the army) consisted of 60,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry (a ratio of 12:1), whereas II

Maccabees claims that there were 80,000 infantry, and ‘thousands of cavalry’

(χιλιάσιν τῶν ἱππέων).585 Naturally, we cannot accept these figures (which fit better with a Seleucid army at full strength), although the falling infantry:cavalry ratio is intriguing.

Despite the general pattern of a 5:1 infantry:cavalry ratio for the Seleucid army, the final two battles of our period re-establish a 10:1 ratio similar to Raphia, although even here the accuracy of the evidence is complex. For Beth-Zechariah, we have

579 I Maccabees, 3.39, 4.1. 580 Bar-Kochva (1976) 13; Aperghis (2004) 192. 581 I Maccabees, 3.37. 582 Livy, 38.38.4-5; Polybius, 21.42.5. 583 συνήγαγεν τὰς δυνάμεις πάσας τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ παρεμβολὴν ἰσχυρὰν σφόδρα, I Maccabees, 3.27. 584 οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν δισμυρίων, II Maccabees, 8.9. 585 I Maccabees, 4.28; II Maccabees, 11.2, 11.4.

131 three different sets of numbers. Firstly, I Maccabees (and Josephus’ Antiquitates

Judaicae) record 100,000 Seleucid infantry and 20,000 cavalry.586 Although this gives a ratio of 5:1, these figures are vastly exaggerated, and (other than potentially

Antiochus III’s eastern expedition) there is no other known instance of the Seleucids ever employing this many cavalrymen in a single engagement. Alternatively, II

Maccabees claims that there were 110,000 infantry and 5,300 cavalry (a ratio of just over 20:1).587 Once again, the infantry figure is impossible. However, the moderate

5,300 for the cavalry is worth considering.

Unlike the 20,000 of I Maccabees, this lower figure is much more acceptable, and accords with other Seleucid cavalry totals. Furthermore, it finds an interesting parallel with the cavalry number recorded in Josephus’ Bellum Judaicum, which provides our third set of figures: (a much more plausible) 50,000 infantry, and 5,000 cavalry.588 Although Josephus closely follows I Maccabees in his Antiquitates

Judaicae, his earlier version of the battle presented in the Bellum Judaicum was clearly based on a different source, possibly Nicholas of Damascus.589 Why he did not synthesise the two narratives in his later account remains open to debate.

Nevertheless, the credibility of this final set of numbers, which are much more comparable with those of other Hellenistic engagements,590 and the similarity of the cavalry total to the notably specific figure of II Maccabees, suggests that they, and the 10:1 infantry:cavalry ratio they provide, are relatively correct.591

Similarly, a 10:1 ratio is also evident two years later at Elasa, for which I

Maccabees records 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry under the command of

586 I Maccabees, 6.30; Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.366. 587 II Maccabees, 13.2. 588 Josephus, Bellum Judaicum 1.41. 589 Bar-Kochva (1976) 14. 590 See Appendix 2, Tables 2.1-2. 591 Also: Bar-Kochva (1976) 14, 177; Aperghis (2004) 192.

132

Bacchides.592 Despite the unreliability of I Maccabees’ figures elsewhere, these comparatively low numbers do not appear unreasonable. Bar-Kochva suggests that

‘the author… did not exaggerate the number of the Seleucid army in this case because he gave the extremely low figure of only 800 men for the Jews’, allowing him ‘to supply an excuse for the death of Judas Maccabaeus’ and amplify Judas’ bravery, since he fought against the Seleucids until the end, despite the odds against him.593

This is plausible. Moreover, considering the state of the Empire in 160 B.C., the suggestion that there were only 20,000 Seleucid infantry and 2,000 cavalry at Elasa gains further credibility.

After a period of enforced exile as Rome’s hostage, following the terms of the

Treaty of Apamea, Demetrius I landed at Tripolis in Syria in the late 160’s B.C., where he swiftly organised the deaths of the current king (his nephew, Antiochus V) and the regent, Lysias.594 Despite the general acceptance of Demetrius, Timarchus – the satrap of Media – refused to acknowledge him as king, and seized this province, as well as Babylonia.595 Although Demetrius had suppressed Timarchus’ rebellion by

160 B.C., many eastern satrapies remained unstable, and their troops potentially untrustworthy. Consequently, despite his desire to end the Hasmonean problem,

Demetrius could not have given Bacchides many more than the 22,000 troops that I

Maccabees records. Thus, as with Beth-Zechariah, we should accept this 10:1 ratio for the Seleucid army, which differs from the frequent 5:1 ratio of many of the engagements analysed above, but accords with the proportions of Raphia, and earlier

Classical Greek battles. Whether this indicates an increasing emphasis on infantry in

592 I Maccabees 9.3. 593 Bar-Kochva (1976) 15. 594 Appian, Syriaca 45, 47; Justin, 34.3; Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.389-90; I Maccabees, 7.2- 4; II Maccabees 14.1-2. 595 Diodorus, 31.27a; Appian, Syriaca 47; Bar-Kochva (1976) 15; Grainger (2015b) 43-7, (1997) 39.

133 the later Seleucid period, however, remains uncertain, and would require further analysis into the military engagements beyond the scope of this thesis.

Therefore, despite the pervasive uncertainties of the sources, we can see that neither the 10:1 infantry:cavalry ratio of Raphia nor the 5:1 of Magnesia are uncharacteristic of Seleucid practice. Rather than strictly conforming to the typical battlefield proportions of Classical Greece or Alexander, the Seleucids varied their practice depending on the engagement, in a similar manner to the Achaemenids

(although Seleucid ratios do not vary quite as wildly as those of their eastern predecessors). Overall, these fluctuations are not too dissimilar from other Hellenistic infantry:cavalry ratios, although the evidence demonstrates a more consistent degree of flexibility in the Seleucid army beyond the wars of the Diadochi.596 That the

Seleucids at times placed more emphasis on their cavalry than their rivals is logical given the size of their Empire and the fame of several of its regions for producing two distinct, high-quality ‘types’ of horses. Consequently, Aperghis’ sweeping generalisation about ‘the normal ratio’ of Hellenistic infantry and cavalry is not entirely correct (at least regarding the Seleucids) and ignores the important nuances of each battle. From this, we can see that there was no decline in the numerical importance of the Seleucid cavalry. Furthermore, this variation of the emphasis placed on each arm demonstrates the willingness of Seleucid commanders to experiment and adapt their battlefield strategy according to circumstance. Such practice highlights the continued sophistication of Hellenistic military thinking, refuting scholarship’s general dismissal of this period as one of stagnation and deterioration.

596 See Appendix 2, Tables 2.1-2; cf. Mielczarek (1993) 23.

134

3.4. Studs and Other Logistics

Regardless of the nature of its army, if a state was serious about a regular use of cavalry, the maintenance of some sort of stud and supply system was crucial.597 Even if a king could simply demand that those possessing horses serve in his cavalry during times of war, this could only have applied to the ‘non-regular’ troops; the hereditary military obligations of the reserve, and the continually active nature of the

Guard, demonstrate that this was not how the core of the Seleucid army operated.

Therefore, as well as understanding the basic organisation of the Seleucid military infrastructure, it is essential that we appreciate the logistics that maintained the cavalry, especially the stud farms. Although the relevant surviving evidence is sparse, and offers only glimpses, with very few specifics,598 there are a few scattered references of particular importance, which, when combined with careful use of comparative evidence, demonstrate a long-standing concern for the adequate provision of cavalry horses throughout the Seleucid Empire.

Unfortunately, very little of this evidence directly concerns the Seleucids. Much comes from the Achaemenid period, or occasionally the Roman Empire, so there are always questions of how far circumstances and institutions remained the same or were replicated in our period. Nevertheless, as noted, the Seleucids broadly continued many pre-existing Achaemenid practices.599 Furthermore, the location of stud farms was very much dependent on the environmental conditions of the region; as Willekes

597 Though cf. the problems the British Army faced in the nineteenth century, Moore-Colyer (1992), (1995); also: Davies (1969) 431, 434, 453-4. 598 Despite Xenophon’s Peri Hippikes and Hipparchikos, the literary evidence typically pays little attention to ‘mundane’ matters such as horse supply, whilst the archaeological material is fragmented, and quite often lacking; cf. Davies (1969) 429-30, 453 for a similar problem regarding the Roman army. 599 See footnote 508.

135 notes: ‘stud farms on a large scale were feasible only in certain areas’.600 The number of suitable locations was thus limited in both the Achaemenid and Seleucid periods.

Therefore, it seems likely that, unless some major change occurred in a region’s climate and topography, the Seleucids would have maintained many of the

Achaemenids’ stud practices.

With this in mind, various ancient sources (the most prominent being the first- century A.D. geographer Strabo) mention several regions which were particularly distinguished for their horse-raising capacities. These are Media, Apamea, Armenia, and Mt. Ida in particular, as well as Cilicia, Cappadocia, Babylonia, Bactria, and

Parthia. The regions around Persepolis, and Dura-Europos are also potentially of note. I shall assess the evidence for each of these locations in turn, before addressing wider issues of logistics, such as fodder, the provision of horses for various types of cavalrymen, and numbers.

3.4.1. Stud Locations The most famous region in the Seleucid Empire for horse-raising was Media.

Polybius in two separate passages specifically notes that ‘all the royal herds of horses

[were] in the charge of the Medes’,601 ‘owing to the excellence of the pastures’.602

Similarly, Strabo writes: ‘a certain meadow there is called ‘Horse-pasturing’

(Ἱππόβοτος)’ and, ‘it is said that 50,000 mares were pastured in it in the time of the

Persians, and were the king’s stud’.603 That Polybius still mentions the royal stud

600 Willekes (2013) 210, also: (2016) 114. 601 τά τε γὰρ ἱπποφόρβια πάντα τὰ βασιλικὰ Μήδοις ἐγκεσχείρισται, Polybius, 5.44.1. 602 τὰ βασιλικὰ συστήματα τῶν ἱπποτροφιῶν Μήδοις ἐπιτετράφθαι <διὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων> εὐφυΐαν, Polybius, 10.27.2-3. 603 καλεῖται δέ τις καὶ λειμὼν Ἱππόβοτος... ἐν ᾗ πέντε μυριάδας ἵππων θηλείων νέμεσθαί φασιν ἐπὶ τῶν Περσῶν, εἶναι δὲ τὰς ἀγέλας ταύτας βασιλικάς, Strabo, 11.13.7; cf. Arrian, Anabasis, 7.13.1.

136 during his accounts of both Molon’s power base and Antiochus III’s expedition against Arsaces in the third century B.C., illustrates that, at least in Media, the

Seleucids maintained the system which Strabo identifies as ‘Persian’. This emphasis on the high quality of the Median plain is something both ancient and modern writers often note, at least in passing.

It was here that the highly nutritious alfalfa (‘Median grass’) grew. This provided a nutritional yield of 20% as opposed to the 7-10% yield (at best) of other types of grain,604 making the area highly attractive for raising large numbers of healthy livestock. The majority of ‘Nisaeans’ were therefore bred here, a ‘type’ which, as noted, was dependant on alfalfa for its robust form.605 Indeed, Strabo’s claim that at least part of this area was named Ἱππόβοτος indicates its importance for horse-raising. Similarly, both Diodorus and Arrian note that it was ‘a land which could support enormous herds’ where, allegedly, there used to be 150,000/160,000 horses (even if during Alexander the Great’s visit there were only 50,000/60,000, ‘for most of them had been seized by robbers’).606

The actual location of the ‘Median Plains’, however, is uncertain. Diodorus states that after thirty days in this region, Alexander marched for seven days until he reached Ecbatana.607 According to Engels’ calculations, Alexander’s average daily march with his entire army was ca. 15 miles/24 km per day.608 Thus, the ‘Median

Plains’ should be ca. 105 miles/169 km from Ecbatana (modern Hamadān). This

604 Willekes (2013) 235; Hyland (2003) 30; Gabrielli (2006) 25. 605 See Chapter 1.3. 606 τινα χώραν δυναμένην ἐκτρέφειν ἀγέλας παμπληθεῖς ἵππων, ἐν ᾗ τὸ παλαιὸν ἔφασαν ἑκκαίδεκα μυριάδας ἵππων γεγονέναι φορβάδων κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου παρουσίαν ἓξ μόναι μυριάδες ἠριθμήθησαν, Diodorus, 17.110.6; εἶναι δὲ πάλαι μὲν ἐς πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας τῶν ἵππων, τότε δὲ Ἀλεξανδρον οὐ πολὺ πλείονας τὼν πέντε καταλαβεῖν· πρὸς λῃστῶν γὰρ διαρπαγῆναι τὰς πολλάς αὐτῶν, Arrian, Anabasis 7.13.1. 607 Diodorus, 17.110.6. 608 Engels (1978) 153-6.

137 would place the plains in the modern Iranian provinces of Kermānšāh (near the

Zagros Mountains) or Lorestan. In light of a reference to ‘Bagistanê’ (the district of

Bisotun) in Diodorus,609 most scholars locate the Nisaean Plains near here,610 or ‘on the road between Ḥolwān [Sarpol Zahab] and Hamadān’, possibly near Eslamabad-e

Gharb.611 Indeed, there were several fertile valleys notable for their pastures in this region,612 though it is impossible to tell whether all of these, or only certain ones, were identified as the ‘Median Plains’ in antiquity.

Due to this imprecision, the exact extent of the ‘Median plains’ is likewise impossible to determine. If we accept the figures provided by Diodorus and Arrian for the Achaemenid royal stud’s original size, we can at least calculate the minimum area necessary. The British Horse Society recommends that for permanent grazing grounds (i.e. without stabling the horse) a single horse requires a minimum of 1-1.5 acres.613 A stud of 150,000/160,000 horses would therefore require a minimum of

150,000-240,000 acres (ca. 234-375 sq. miles/607-971 sq. km). Although such measurements initially seem quite considerable, they comfortably fit into the total area between Holwān, Eslamabad-e Ghab, and Bagistanê (ca. 992 sq. miles/2,568 sq. km).614

It thus seems reasonable that the royal studs were kept here, and, given the assertion of the Assyrian king Sargon II that he ‘imposed on [Media] a yearly tribute of horses’,615 this appears to have been a long-standing association. The region’s

609 Diodorus, 17.110.5. 610 Schmitt (2002). 611 Shahbazi (1987) 726; also: Marquart (1905) 159; however, Herzfeld (1968) 8-9, 13, 15-8 favours Lorestan; also cf. Hanslik (1936) 713; Dandamayev and Medvedskaya (2006); Donaghy (2014) 154. 612 Rahmati (2018) 74-7; Barthold (1984) 198-9. 613 Though this is also dependent on various factors, see British Horse Society (2019) 2. 614 Measurements are from Google Maps. I have taken these three points as a base since it is broadly in this area where the majority of the scholarship favours locating the ‘Median Plains’. Should one prefer an alternative location, the measurements would change accordingly. 615 Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia, Volume II, 58; Willekes (2016) 114, (2013) 211.

138 continued importance under the Seleucids is further indicated through the prevalence of images of feeding horses, and especially the mare and suckling foal, on the coins minted at Ecbatana.616 Whilst, as noted, the motif of the horned horse’s head became a generic Empire-wide Seleucid symbol, and therefore does not indicate anything in particular about a specific region, the emphasis on feeding, and the raising of foals (a motif unique to the mint at Ecbatana), illustrates the Seleucids’ recognition, and even advertisement, of the value and fame of the horses raised here.617 Although Polybius’ further claim that this region supplied ‘nearly all of Asia’ with its horses is clearly hyperbolic,618 the claim nevertheless testifies to Media’s significance for the provision of Seleucid horsepower.

However, this was not the only important region for Seleucid horses. Indeed,

Strabo alternatively claims in Book 16 that the royal stud was in fact located at

Apamea: ‘here, too, were the war-office (λογιστήριον) and stud farm

(ἱπποτροφεῖον), which consisted of more than 30,000 royal mares and 300 stallions. Here, too, were colt-breakers (πωλοδάμναι)’.619 Although this may initially seem to contradict his earlier claim in Book 11 and those of Polybius, the location of a royal stud in Apamea was logical as it was here that the Guard were stationed, and the Companions and Agema would have required access to replacement horses more frequently than the reserve and ‘non-regulars’. Given that

616 Seleucid Coins Online (http://numismatics.org/sco/ [March 2020]), s.v. ‘foal’. 617 See Introduction 0.2.1. 618 τοῖς γὰρ ζῴοις τούτοις σχεδὸν ἅπασαν χορηγεῖ τὴν Ἀσίαν, Polybius, 10.27.2. 619 ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ τὸ λογιστήριον τὸ στρατιωτικὸν καὶ τὸ ἱπποτροφεῖον, θήλειαι μὲν ἵπποι βασιλικαὶ πλείους τῶν τρισμυρίων, ὀχεῖα δὲ τούτων τριακόσια: ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ πωλοδάμναι, Strabo, 16.2.10; a stud of ‘more than’ 30,300 horses would require at least 30,300- 45,450 acres (ca. 47-71 sq. miles/123-184 sq. km). Added to this were the Guard’s 2,000 horses, although since these were meant for active military duty, they were probably frequently stabled and so would not need more than ca. 1 acre each. This gives a rough minimum of 32,300-47,450 acres (ca. 50-74 sq. miles/130-192 sq. km). To this, however, we must also add the pasturage needed for the war- elephants, though how they were kept remains uncertain.

139 the Guard were typically heavily-armed, it is likely that these horses were ‘Nisaeans’, although this may have required importing some alfalfa from Media. It is also possible that some lighter ‘Turanians’ were kept for light cavalry or messenger duties.

The presence of ‘colt-breakers’ here, in the military centre of the Empire, also suggests some concern on the part of the state with the rearing and training of such horses.620

Nevertheless, we should not see this as diminishing Media’s prominence.

Although Apamea was the military centre of the Seleucid Empire, we do not see the same abundance of praise for its horse-raising potential as we do for Media. It is therefore likely that the Seleucids did not exclusively have just one royal stud, but rather drew upon a range of locations throughout their Empire, of which the Median

Plains were simply the most famous.621 Given that the Seleucids utilised both the

‘Turanian’ and ‘Nisaean’ horse ‘types’ native to the Near East, which were suitable for different military functions and required different environmental conditions, it is natural that they also maintained various different stud locations.

Another region that the ancient sources often note for its long-standing association with horses is Armenia. As Strabo notes: ‘this country is so very good for

‘horse-pasturing’, not even inferior to Media’.622 This favourable mention of Armenia in connection with Media, a comparison which echoes his earlier comments at

11.13.7, ‘[Media], as well as Armenia, is an exceptionally good ‘horse-pasturing’ country’,623 indicates the region’s ideal horse-raising qualities.624 Furthermore, in both passages, Strabo notes that the highly valued ‘Nisaeans’, for which Media was

620 See 3.4.2 below. 621 See Sekunda (1992) 54; Tuplin (2010) 143. 622 οὕτω δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἱπποβότος σφόδρα ἡ χώρα καὶ οὐχ ἧττον τῆς Μηδίας, Strabo, 11.14.9. 623 ἱππόβοτος δὲ καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶ διαφερόντως καὶ ἡ Ἀρμενία. 624 The Armenian plateau remains fertile today, although horses are no longer as common, Hewsen (2007) 33, 40-2.

140 so famous, were also bred in Armenia. The general consensus has treated these horses as a slightly smaller variety of this ‘type’, since Xenophon, who passed through

Armenia in his Anabasis, claims: ‘the horses of this region were smaller than the

Persian horses, but much more spirited’;625 furthermore, the Median alfalfa did not grow here (or at least not as abundantly).626 Others have challenged this interpretation, however, on the grounds that it is unclear if Xenophon means the

‘Nisaean’ ‘type’ here.627 In particular, Willekes believes that Xenophon’s description identifies these horses alternatively as ‘Turanians’.628 However, since Strabo observes that it was possible to equip Armenian horses as cataphracts,629 a function for which, as noted, the ‘Turanians’ were unsuitable,630 this argument cannot stand.

That the prestigious ‘Nisaeans’ were also bred in Armenia possibly implies the presence of a royal stud, although there is no explicit testimony of this as there is for

Media and Apamea. There is some interesting Assyrian evidence from the reign of

Sargon II (721-705 B.C.),631 but the official status of the region in the Hellenistic era remains uncertain. Strabo states that the Armenian satrap ‘used to send to the Persian king 20,000 foals every year’,632 and this vast number633 indicates large-scale horse- raising operations both here and wherever they were sent. Xenophon, likewise, provides instances of this region rearing horses as tribute for the king.634

625 ἦσαν δ᾽ οἱ ταύτῃ ἵπποι μείονες μὲν τῶν Περσικῶν, θυμοειδέστεροι δὲ πολύ, Xenophon, Anabasis 4.5.36. 626 Hyland (2003) 30-1; Anderson (1961) 22; Shahbazi (1987) 726; Gabrielli (2006) 26-7. 627 Willekes (2013) 250; Tuplin (2010) 142. 628 Willekes (2016) 168, however, cf. (2013) 236. 629 Strabo, 11.14.9. 630 See Chapter 1.3. 631 Royal Correspondence of the Assyrian Empire, Part II, 757; Willekes (2013) 212; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 16. 632 καὶ ὁ σατράπης τῆς Ἀρμενίας τῷ Πέρσῃ κατ᾿ ἔτος δισμυρίους πώλους τοῖς Μιθρακίνοις ἔπεμπεν, Strabo, 11.14.9. 633 Hyperbole is very likely, although, since this number represents ‘a great many’, I feel that the point stands. 634 Xenophon, Anabasis, 4.5.24, 4.5.34; the implication of these passages, however, is that these horses do not all come from a single stud farm.

141

Nevertheless, given Strabo’s identification of the horses raised in Media and Apamea as ‘royal’ (βασιλικός), the lack of such an adjective in his description of Armenia is notable.635 It is therefore worth considering whether the identification of horses as

βασιλικός is at all significant. Here a passing comment in Plutarch, who notes that

‘when Eumenes came upon the royal herds (βασιλικοῖς ἱπποφορβίοις) pastured about Mt. Ida, he took as many horses as he wanted and sent a written statement to the overseers (ἐπιμεληταῖς)’,636 is particularly interesting. The status of this region in the Seleucid period is uncertain, but there is no immediate reason why it should not have continued as a royal stud for as long as it was under their control. The fact that

Eumenes wrote to the ‘overseers’ (ἐπιμεληταί) offers an interesting glimpse into the administration of this system, even if the identity of these men is unclear.

On a purely technical basis, one could argue that the use of βασιλικός to describe the horses of a particular region implies that they were under the direct control of the king, and thus these overseers would have reported immediately to him.

Therefore, just like the war-office and the Guard, studs described as βασιλικός would form a permanent feature of the Seleucid military infrastructure; the king could theoretically always be sure of the availability of these horses for his army. The fact that the ‘royal mares’ (ἵπποι βασιλικαί) of Apamea in particular were part of the state-controlled war-office supports this suggestion. In contrast, any stud farms with only an annual tribute obligation would still belong either to the satrap or private individuals. Although the king’s tribute would conceivably work in a manner similar

635 That Polybius also describes Media as βασιλικός weakens arguments that Strabo is simply being imprecise in his terminology. 636 ἐπεὶ δὲ Εὐμένης τοῖς βασιλικοῖς ἱπποφορβίοις περὶ τὴν Ἴδην νεμομένοις ἐπιτυχὼν καὶ λαβὼν ἵππους ὄσων ἔχρῃζε τοῖς ἐπιμεληταῖς τὴν γραφὴν ἔπεμψε, Plutarch, Eumenes 8.3.

142 to the military settlements (i.e. a guaranteed military obligation), the availability of other horses from these studs (similar to various subject/allied contingents of the

‘non-regulars’) was potentially less certain.

However, as we saw in Chapter 2, in reality, there was likely some degree of fluidity between various categories of administration. Indeed, although Strabo identifies Media as the home of a royal stud under the Achaemenids (εἶναι δὲ τὰς

ἀγέλας ταύτας βασιλικάς), he also notes that the region was liable to a system of horse tribute similar to that in Armenia.637 Given the satrap’s power ‘over royal and central government resources within his satrapy’,638 it may be better to think of satrapal tribute as merely ‘royal-supply-at-one-remove’, meaning that a ‘royal’ stud’s overseers also fell under the local satrap’s jurisdiction. Whilst terminology can be important, we should be aware that it may not always be possible, or even desirable, to draw too firm a distinction.639 The use of βασιλικός to describe a particular region may simply indicate its prestige and primacy for the provision of horsepower, rather than any specialised structural category compared to places like Armenia.

Similar considerations affect the regions of Cilicia, Cappadocia, and Babylonia, each of which also delivered a fixed tribute of horses to the Achaemenid king.

Regarding Cilicia, Herodotus notes that the Cilicians ‘rendered 360 white horses, one for each day of the year’ to Darius I.640 This number is not particularly high, although given the interjection ‘one for each day of the year’ (ἑκάστης ἡμέρης εἷς

γινόμενος), and the fact that white horses held symbolic and religious significance,

637 Strabo, 11.13.8. 638 Cuyler Young (1988) 90. 639 See Vogelsang (1995) 67 for the varying powers of Achaemenid satraps. 640 ἀπὸ δὲ Κιλίκων ἵπποι τε λευκοὶ ἑξήκοντα καὶ τριηκόσιοι, ἑκάστης ἡμέρης εἷς γινόμενος, Herodotus, 3.90.3.

143 these 360 horses were probably intended as a sacrifice to the sun god, Mithra.641

However, although it is highly unlikely that they represented the entirety of equines bred in Cilicia,642 the evidence itself is vague concerning the wider horse-raising potential of this area in the Achaemenid and Hellenistic periods. Herodotus’ hint at the existence of an Achaemenid mounted guard in this region does not necessarily imply anything about the origin of these men, or the Seleucids’ utilisation of Cilicia for the cavalry logistics of their Empire.643

In contrast, Nemesianus and Oppian praise the quality of the neighbouring satrapy of Cappadocia,644 a region which may have produced some ‘Nisaean’ horses.645 Strabo notes that the Cappadocians ‘paid the Persians yearly, in addition to the silver tax, 1,500 horses, 2,000 mules, and 50,000 sheep’.646 Although the number of horses here is significantly smaller than that proposed for the Armenian tribute

(less than one-tenth), the continuous ability to supply this many animals shows the region’s fertility and horse-raising potential. There are also some suggestions of the region’s continued importance for the provision of horsepower in the Later Roman

Empire.647 Therefore, it seems likely that Cappadocia was also significant for the cavalry logistics of the Seleucid Empire, even if this region possibly held a quasi- client-kingdom status during this period.

641 See Herodotus, 1.189, 7.40.4, 7.113.2; Xenophon, Cyropaedia 8.3.12; Quintus Curtius, 3.3.11; How and Wells (1957a) 282-3; Tuplin (2010) 139-40 n.158. 642 Although possible, it is unlikely that only white horses were bred here: Sponenberg and Bellone (2017). 643 Herodotus, 3.90.3; however, Donaghy (2014) 158, 161. 644 Nemesianus, Cynegetica, 204ff.; Oppian, Cynegetica 170ff. 645 Anderson (1961) 21; Donaghy (2014) 152. 646 τῆς γὰρ Καππαδοκίας παρεχούσης τοῖς Πέρσαις κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν πρὸς τῷ ἀργυρικῷ τέλει ἵππους χιλίους καὶ πεντακοσίους, ἡμιόνους δὲ δισχιλίους, προβάτων δὲ πέντε μυριάδας, Strabo, 11.13.8. 647 Davies (1969) 453; Jones (1964) 671; Toynbee (1973) 168; see Theophylact Simocatta, 3.1.

144

In an effort to demonstrate the power of Babylonia, Herodotus observes that

‘Tritantaechmes, son of Artabazus, governing the province by the king’s will… besides warhorses, kept 800 stallions, and 16,000 brood mares’.648 Even if these numbers are exaggerated, they suggest a sizeable stud, particularly given the proviso

‘besides warhorses’ (πάρεξ τῶν πολεμιστηρίων). Although the text appears to indicate the satrap’s private ownership of these horses (ἵπποι δὲ οἱ αὐτοῦ ἦσαν

ἰδίῃ), it is probable that, as with Armenia, these were merely part of a system of

‘royal-supply-at-one-remove’. The claim that Tritantaechmes also maintained an unspecified number of warhorses, presumably also originating from this stud, which

(at least indirectly) would have been under the king’s command, further supports this.

Additionally, there is some cuneiform evidence that may indicate a degree of central

Achaemenid involvement in the care of horses, although the specifics of this and its extent are highly uncertain.649 There are also numerous instances of Babylonians serving (either as individuals or as full units) in both Persian and Seleucid cavalry.650

Therefore, although the region’s fertility and climate varied,651 we can see that some areas were conducive to horse-raising. Furthermore, given the wealth and long- standing importance of the region, it is likely that it remained important for the military potential of the Seleucid Empire.

The eastern satrapies of Bactria and Parthia were also particularly famous for their horses and their ability to field large units of high-quality cavalry.652 The 10,000

648 Τριτανταίχμῃ τῷ Ἀρταβάζου ἐκ βασιλέος ἔχοντι τὸν νομὸν… ἵπποι δὲ οἱ αὐτοῦ ἦσαν ἰδίῃ, πάρεξ τῶν πολεμιστηρίων, οἱ μὲν ἀναβαίνοντες τὰς θηλέας ὀκτακόσιοι, αἱ δὲ βαινόμεναι ἑξακισχίλιαι καὶ μυρίαι, Herodotus, 1.192. 649 E.g. PBS 2/1 189; see Stolper (1985) 84, 88-9, 95-6; Tuplin (2010) 127-8. 650 E.g. CT 22.74; Quintus Curtius 5.1.23; Diodorus, 19.91.5, 19.92; Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 17.23-31. 651 Barthold (1984) 199; Shahbazi (1987) 726; Newell (1978) 217; cf. Xenophon, Anabasis 1.5.5; Polybius, 5.51.7. 652 Cf. Appendix 1, Table 1.1.

145

Bactrian cavalry under Euthydemus during Antiochus III’s eastern campaigns are particularly notable,653 and the city of Bactra was also known as Zariaspa (‘Golden

Horse’).654 Similarly, the Parthians were a formidable cavalry power with a reputation that persisted well into the Roman period, and, as noted, it was Antiochus’ campaigns against them in the late third century B.C. that inspired the Seleucids’ use of cataphracts. We can therefore assume that both Bactria and Parthia possessed fertile pastures enabling them to maintain large studs of horses. In particular, Azzaroli suggests that Bactria was another home for the famous ‘Nisaeans’,655 and the cataphract’s origin in Parthia indicates that they too possessed these horses. The fact that Bactria also provided some contingents of mounted archers for the

Achaemenids,656 and the Parthians were known for the archery technique, the

‘Parthian shot’, means that it is likely that these regions also produced some

‘Turanian’ horses as well.657 It is thus probable that the Seleucids drew upon these regions for the logistical needs of their cavalry for as long as they were under their control. Furthermore, given the conclusions of recent scholarship that both Bactria and Parthia maintained loose quasi-client-kingdom relationships with the Seleucid

Empire,658 it is not impossible that even after they each claimed independence, mercenary or allied units continued to serve in the Seleucid army.

Complications arise with the region surrounding Persepolis. Like Babylon,

Persepolis had long been an important city – the ceremonial capital of the

Achaemenid Empire. To the right of the citadel’s gate (the gate of Darius) was a set of four cuneiform inscriptions from the reign of Darius I. In the first inscription,

653 Polybius, 10.49. 654 Strabo, 11.11.2; Hyland (2013) 495, (2003) 22. 655 Azzaroli (1985) 85; cf. Donaghy (2014) 142 for ‘Ferghana’ horses in Bactria. 656 E.g. Arrian, Anabasis 4.5.4-9. 657 Cf. Plutarch, Crassus 24.5-6; Julian Orationes 2.57c; Livy, 35.48.4; Willekes (2016) 170-2; it is not impossible that these regions also had some access to ‘Central Asian’ horses. 658 See footnote 513.

146

Darius proclaimed that the ‘country of Pārsa [Persis]’ is ‘beautiful, possessing good horses’.659 The fact that this inscription was placed next to the gate indicates that it was something Darius intended people to see as they entered or exited the citadel. It is therefore clear that the message inscribed on it was important to him in terms of propaganda.660 Not only was the declaration a sign of a prosperous country, but it also illustrates the horse’s symbolic resonance. Notable examples of this significance include the inclusion of the word for horse (aspa) in Achaemenid nomenclature,661 as well as the story surrounding Darius I’s selection as Persian king due to his horse being the first to neigh at sunrise.662 Nevertheless, Xenophon states in his Cyropaedia that ‘in Persia [Persis]’ it was ‘difficult to breed horses and practice horsemanship’; therefore, it was ‘a very rare thing even to see a horse’.663 This does not mean that horses were absent from this region, but rather that it was rare to see large quantities of equines in the same way that one might come across them, like Alexander the

Great did, in places such as Media. Hyland has thus suggested that Darius’ claim to possess ‘good horses’ is potentially a reference to ‘Median imports’ rather than indigenous stock’.664 If this is correct, Darius may have deliberately assimilated the two areas to highlight the power of the Achaemenid Empire.

Therefore, it seems unlikely that there were any large-scale horse-raising operations in the region surrounding Persepolis during the Achaemenid or Seleucid periods, although it is clear that the image of the horse remained useful for

659 Dpd, 6-8. 660 Shahbazi (2012). 661 Hyland (2003) 110; Tuplin (2010) 129 n.116. 662 Herodotus, 3.84-8; Ctesias, Persika F13.17; Tuplin (2010) 144-5. 663 ἐν Πέρσαις γὰρ διὰ τὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ τρέφειν ἵππους καὶ ἱππεύειν ἐν ὀρεινῇ οὔσῃ τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ ἰδεῖν ἵππον πάνυ σπάνιον ἦν, Xenophon, Cyropaedia 1.3.3. 664 Hyland (2003) 110.

147

Achaemenid rulers as a means of displaying prestige and power.665 The fact that the

Persian’s postal system (the ‘Royal Road’) ran through this region, however, along with the survival of various documents within the Persepolis Fortification Tablets which specify the types of rations for the horses employed in this system,666 indicates the presence of some horses in this area and an interest in maintaining them, although it is more likely that these horses were kept in state-owned stables, either within the city itself, or outside of its walls, probably only as a small-scale enterprise.667

Although, as Willekes notes, it was ‘difficult, expensive and unnatural’ to keep equines stabled, especially within urban centres,668 we can also safely assume that any city where cavalry units were present (either as a garrison, or as a military settlement) would, out of necessity, maintain some horses. Indeed, we know from

OGIS 229 that this was the case for the κατοικία at Magnesia during the third century B.C.,669 and was presumably also the case for the Thessalians in Larissa-ad-

Orontes.670 Depending on the size of the military presence and the importance of the city, the size of its stables could vary.671 However, since ‘the best possible environment for horses is [for them] to be kept in the open’, it is likely that any city that was able to do so kept their horses in surrounding pastures.672 Indeed, the

665 Whilst many different nations present horses to the Persian king on the Apadana Frieze, these are merely visual representations of the normal tribute of these regions, rather than indication of a Persepolis-based stud. 666 PF 1635-1704; Hallock (1969) 47, 451-67; Tuplin (2010) 130-39; Willekes (2016) 118. 667 See Willekes (2013) 267. 668 Willekes (2013) 208; also: White (1970) 290. 669 See Chapter 2.3.2. 670 Diodorus, 33.4a. 671 Willekes (2013) 265-8 (2016) 128-31; White (1970); cf. Columella, 6.30.2; Wilber (1937) notes the remains of stables at Takht-i-Sulayman, from either the Parthian or Sassanian periods; the third century A.D. Roman documents surviving from the cohors XX Palmyrenorum miliaria equitata stationed at Dura-Europos provide an interesting comparative for the existence of an extensive centrally-controlled stabling system in this region (see P.Dura 56, 58, 97; Davies (1969)). Although, this evidence cannot explain the military infrastructure of the Seleucid Empire, Dura-Europos’ status as a Hellenistic military settlement (see Chapter 2.3.3) means that it is likely that the Seleucids also stabled some sort of mounted force here. 672 White (1970) 290; cf. Columella, 6.272.11.

148 identification of some of the κλῆροι in OGIS 229 as κλῆροι ἱππικοί suggests that the military settlement system (at least theoretically) ensured that cavalrymen had larger plots of land, suitable for maintaining their horses.673

Even if the surrounding areas of these cities were able to support large-scale studs, it would still have been necessary to keep the majority of active military horses under some sort of stabling system, since it would have been logistically unwise to keep any animals intended for regular military service alongside breeding stock.

Despite the arguments of several modern scholars that ancient military horses were typically stallions, conforming to contemporary social ideas of strength, masculinity, and prestige,674 it is inconceivable that every horse used in ancient warfare was male.

Therefore, given that the gestation period of horses is eleven to twelve months, during which time the mare should avoid heavy work and excessive exercise, and since the foal should not be weaned for at least six to ten months, any horse used as a brood mare would be unavailable for service for a minimum of one and half to two years.675

Willekes, similarly notes that even stallions can ‘lose quite a lot of conditioning during the breeding season, making them unfit for hard work’.676 Keeping military horses alongside breeding stock could therefore have potentially disastrous consequences for the operational efficacy of Seleucid cavalry contingents. This issue is particularly important for the regions of Media and Armenia, and especially the

673 See footnote 329. 674 Hyland (2013) 500, (2003) 35, 41, 45; Anderson (1961) 38; however: Willekes (2013) 190, 270; Xenophon, Cyropaedia 7.5.62 and Ammianus, 17.12.2, note the possibility of gelding vicious stallions to make them more tractable, though cf. Varro, De Re Rustica 2.7.15. Strabo’s identification of such practice as a peculiarity (ἴδιον) of the Scythians, however, implies its infrequency: ἴδιον δὲ τοῦ Σκυθικοῦ καὶ τοῦ Σαρματικοῦ παντὸς ἔθνους τὸ τοὺς ἵππους ἐκτέμνειν εὐπειθείας χάριν, Strabo, 7.4.8; for the potential negative impacts of overly aggressive horses, see Xenophon, Hipparchikos 1.15. 675 Davies Morel (2005) 120, 193-4; Pliny, Naturalis Historia 8.66, Varro, De Re Rustica 2.7.7, 2.7.10; Davies (1969) 454, however, following Varro, De Re Rustica 2.7.12, suggests not weaning until the foal is two years old, meaning that the mare would be unavailable for a minimum of three years. 676 Willekes (2013) 191.

149 military centre of Apamea. In particular, it is reasonable to assume that the Seleucids’ maintenance of their cavalry horses mirrored the tripartite division of their army, with those of the permanent Guard and military settlers more actively kept apart from breeding herds than those of the ‘non-regulars’.

3.4.2. Other Cavalry Logistics Similar obscurity affects other aspects of Seleucid cavalry logistics. For example, although we can attempt to estimate how much food and water Seleucid horses needed each day,677 details about its provision are sorely lacking. Naturally, horses kept in places which prided themselves on their rich pastures would have been able to graze in the fields.678 Similarly, wherever possible, armies on campaign would have preferred routes where pastures were sufficient for at least some of their animals’ nutritional needs.679 Alternatively, those kept in poorer areas or predominantly urban environments would not have had the same grazing opportunities, and would thus require additional sources of fodder. As Willekes notes, this made the upkeep of city-dwelling horses more expensive, though it would have been easier to control the horse’s diet, which could have had military benefits if the

677 Calculating precise figures is highly complex since the amount needed can vary significantly depending on height, weight, ‘type’, climate, and the work horses were expected to do. Rations would include a balance between some sort of grain (e.g. barely or oats), dry matter (e.g. hay or straw), and pasturage, as well as water. Although we do have Polybius’ figures (6.39.13-14) for the Roman cavalry, Roth (1999) 63 notes that interpretation of these numbers is problematic. Whilst it is possible to compare modern army rations, we should not forget the conformational differences between modern and ancient horses (see Chapter 1.2). Furthermore, as Roth (1999) 62 points out, these figures represent only the ‘optimum ration under ideal conditions’. For further details and suggested amounts, see: Roth (1999) 61-79; Gabrielli (2006); Engels (1978) 126-9, (2013) 354-6; Hyland (2003) 122-3, (1990) 90; Kissel (1995) 36; Toynbee (1973) 340-3. 678 As noted above (Chapter 3.4.1), the exact extent of these pastures is uncertain since there is typically very little specification in the sources, and their translation to modern places is only possible in the broadest sense. Only in a few instances is there enough information to calculate a potential minimum area. 679 Cf. Engels (1978) for Alexander’s provision of animals whilst on campaign, albeit with the alterations of Gabrielli (2006); also: Maffre (2006) 378-9; Huyse (2008) 45-6.

150 state was interested in cultivating a particular ‘type’ of cavalry.680 Furthermore, it is conceivable that even in highly fertile areas officials would have needed to maintain at least some reserve supplies of fodder.

Although concerned with the Achaemenid Empire rather than that of the

Seleucids, Diodorus’ note that during the reign of Artaxerxes III (358-338 B.C.) the

Sidonians burnt ‘the fodder for the horses which had been stored up by the satraps for the war’ is striking.681 Whilst the provenance of this fodder is unclear, this comment illustrates both the city’s capacity to maintain horses and provides a glimpse into the

Achaemenids’ military infrastructure. Indeed, the claim that the fodder had been stored ‘by the satraps’ (ὑπὸ τῶν σατραπῶν) suggests some sort of central organisation. The use of the plural here is particularly interesting, implying that this was not merely a local peculiarity, but rather a much wider initiative. The fact that fodder from multiple satraps had been stored in one place specifically ‘for the war’

(εἰς τὸν πόλεμον) possibly indicates special circumstances, although Xenophon mentions other stores of fodder in Assyria, which were seemingly maintained even in peacetime.682 Similarly, the extensive lists in the Persepolis Fortification Tablets indicate the state’s concern (or at least that of the satrap of Persepolis) for the proper maintenance of horse rations, though Gabrielli notes that these figures alone are insufficient for the healthy maintenance of horses, and would have needed to be supplemented with grazing.683

680 Willekes (2013) 208. 681 ἔπειτα τὸν ἠθροισμένον ὑπὸ τῶν σατραπῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον τοῖς ἵπποις χόρτον ἐνέπρησαν, Diodorus, 16.41.5. 682 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.4.31; Kurht (1995) 245-6; also cf. Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia, Volume I, 374; Willekes (2013) 213. 683 Gabrielli (2006); also: Tuplin (2010) 130.

151

It is therefore plausible that the Seleucid military infrastructure showed a similar concern for the maintenance of centrally-controlled supplies of fodder. In particular, I suggest that the state was concerned at least with the maintenance of the standing troops, and possibly to some extent the reserve, though this may have been on a more informal basis, given the nature of the military settlements. In contrast, it seems likely that the ‘non-regulars’, at least when not on campaign, were broadly expected to see to their own horses.

Similarly, it is unclear who was responsible for providing the horses of individual cavalrymen, although the presence of Seleucid ‘royal’ (i.e. state-owned) studs suggests some sort of central distribution.684 As with fodder, it is possible that, at least concerning the Guard, the state was interested in the provision of its horses, or potentially any necessary remounts, whilst the ‘non-regulars’ provided for themselves, though it is equally possible that every cavalryman was expected to obtain his own mount and supplies, or at least pay for them from the war-office.685

The importance of the Guard for the Seleucid Empire does, however, make some sort of state concern logical. The fact that Strabo observes that as well as the royal stud there were also ‘colt-breakers’ (πωλοδάμναι) in the military centre of Apamea is particularly suggestive,686 as their presence shows a concern for some degree of centralised training for the horses reared here. Given the additional presence of

‘instructors in heavy-armed fighting and all those who were paid to teach the arts of

684 As noted in footnote 670, the Romans in third century A.D. Coele-Syria appear to have adopted some form of centrally-controlled supply system, though, given the significant organisational differences between the two Empires, we cannot assume that the Seleucids did the same. 685 It is similarly unclear whether the state provided the cataphract armour to the military settlers, or whether they were expected to purchase it themselves as a condition of their military obligations. 686 Strabo, 16.2.10.

152 war’ at the Apamean war-office as well,687 it seems likely that the 2,000 men of the cavalry Guard also underwent extensive training.

The inclusion of the military settlers of the reserve in the centralised training programme at Apamea is more complex, unless we accept Bar-Kochva’s interesting

(but overly complicated) ‘settlers’ sons’ theory.688 Nevertheless, as noted, their performance as unified cataphract contingents,689 as well as their ability to execute complex cavalry manoeuvres,690 indicates some level of formal training. Whether this was implemented centrally or at a more local level, however, is unclear. Conversely, with regards to the ‘non-regular’ cavalry, it is likely, given the informal nature of their military requirements, that any training (except perhaps immediately before major campaigns) was left to the discretion of the individual or possibly a local official. The simple fact of owning a horse may have been enough to make a man eligible for ‘non-regular’ service.

Other complications arise regarding the larger logistics of the Seleucid military infrastructure, such as how many horses were necessary to make the army as a whole work. Here the evidence is lacking, and although we can provide a broad estimate for the amount of Seleucid cavalry used on the battlefield,691 such figures do not include any Seleucid cavalry contingents that were absent, or take into account any animals assigned to commanders and infantry units, remounts, or baggage animals. The second/third century A.D. Roman military manual De Munitionibus Castrorum states that, in the cavalry of the Roman Empire, an ala quingenaria (512 men) had at least

687 ὁπλομάχοι καὶ ὅσοι παιδευταὶ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἐμισθοδοτοῦντο. 688 See Chapter 2.3.4. 689 See Chapter 2.3.1, and p.115 above. 690 See Chapter 4.3. 691 See Chapter 3.3 above; Appendix 2, Table 2.1.

153

64 extra horses for its junior officers (i.e. Decurions and lower orders) alone.692

Although we must be cautious about comparing the composition of Roman and

Seleucid contingents, this illustrates the fallacy of assuming that the number of cavalry operational on the battlefield directly equals the number of horses present in the army. Additionally, whilst the ancient sources occasionally suggest numbers for some of the probable stud locations, it is not possible to state how many breeding horses the Seleucid Empire as a whole maintained. Nevertheless, its ability to support significant units of cavalry throughout the Hellenistic period demonstrates its crucial role in the organisation of both the mounted corps, and the broader military infrastructure of Empire in general.

3.5. Conclusion

Despite the uncertainties of the sources, we therefore can suggest a broad outline for the organisation and theoretical importance of the Seleucid cavalry. Whilst there are many occasions where the individual contingents of the cavalry are unspecified, this does not indicate homogeneity within the Seleucid cavalry as a whole, or that Seleucid rulers were unconcerned with their mounted corps. Rather, a reassessment of the evidence demonstrates that the cavalry was an integral part of the

Seleucid army.

Having demonstrated the existence of a tripartite military infrastructure, we can now see how individual cavalry contingents fit within this system. As suggested in

Chapter 2.3.4, the Seleucids maintained a 2,000 strong permanent cavalry Guard, composed of the Companions and the Agema. Their frequent deployment around the

692 De Munitionibus Castrorum, 16; Davies (1969) 429-30; Toynbee (1973) 341, 413 n.30; also: Roth (1999) 64.

154 king, unlike their infantry counterparts whose battlefield position could vary, illustrates not only their individual importance, but also the lingering prestige of the cavalry commander from the days of Alexander the Great. It is therefore unsurprising that the Seleucids’ most prestigious cavalry units – the Companions and the Agema – directly evolved from the core of Alexander’s own army. As the different terminology for these contingents (ἰλη βασιλική or ἑταῖροι for the Companions, and either ἄγημα or something similar to ἱππεῖς ἐπίλεκτοι for the Agema), and their varying battlefield positions demonstrates, it is clear that these two units were distinct. This contrasts to Macedonian precedent, although the Agema remained the more prestigious of the two, despite lacking any royal attribute. The suggestion of an ethnic divide between the two Guard units (Greco-Macedonians for the Companions and a generally eastern composition for the Agema) is possible, though remains uncertain. Indeed, strict adherence to a bipartite division between ‘Greco-

Macedonians’ and ‘others’ for the army as a whole, without any qualification, is problematic.693

Nevertheless, many of the ‘non-regular’ contingents often possessed ethnic labels (e.g. the ‘Dahae’, or ‘Galatians’), since they were typically recruited from specific regions in times of war. However, even here we must remain aware of the possibility that some units’ titles may have evolved over time into pseudo-ethnic labels indicating only their fighting style. Given the Seleucids’ maintenance of various pre-existing practices, it seems likely that many of the units present in the

Achaemenid cavalry also served under the Seleucids.694 Conversely, the Seleucids’ reserve cavalry did not possess any official or ethnic title, and attempts to identify its

693 See Introduction 0.1.2; Chapter 2.2.1. 694 Appendix 1, Table 1.1.

155 individual contingents are often frustrated due to the tendency of the sources simply to brand the mounted force as a whole as ‘the cavalry’. Despite this, given the significance of the cataphract contingents following their introduction in the late third century B.C., and their use of high-quality ‘Nisaeans’ and expensive armour, it is likely that they were composed of military settlers, who had formal obligations to the king.

The fact that many ‘Nisaeans’ belonged to the royal stud at Media in particular, and that other ‘royal studs’ were kept elsewhere in the Empire, especially alongside the war-office at Apamea, illustrates that Seleucid rulers were concerned with the upkeep and provision of their main cavalry forces. As we have seen, the testimony of the ancient sources demonstrates that their Achaemenid predecessors in particular took a keen interest in various stud locations around their Empire, and it is highly likely that the Seleucids kept many of these systems in place. Although it is not entirely clear how the Seleucids’ stud and supply system worked on a day-to-day basis, the presence of royal horses in Apamea, where the Companions and Agema were stationed, along with ‘colt-breakers… and all those who were paid to teach the arts of war’, strongly suggests some sort of state provision at least for the cavalry

Guard. Whether the state provided horses for the permanent troops at its own expense, or those serving were expected to buy them from the royal stud, however, remains unclear. Similarly, it is unknown how far this system extended to the military settlers of the reserve. Nevertheless, the importance of the Empire’s logistical system cannot be understated, and the analysis presented in this chapter sheds more light on this typically neglected area.

Similarly, the reassessment of the Seleucid army’s numbers presented here allows us to draw more detailed conclusions about the numerical importance of

156

Seleucid cavalry and compare this to other armies with greater accuracy. Although it is not always possible to quantify the strength of the Seleucid cavalry, we can see that, with only a few exceptions (Ipsus, Antiochus III’s eastern expedition,

Magnesia), the Seleucid cavalry rarely numbered more than 10,000.695 This broadly parallels other Hellenistic figures, though the Seleucids did generally possess a numerical advantage over many of their opponents (at least in the west) as a consequence of the geographical expanse of their Empire and their fortune in possessing two different ‘types’ of horses. Comparing Seleucid cavalry figures to those of the infantry, we can see that, whereas Alexander’s infantry:cavalry ratio was generally ca. 6:1, the Seleucids’ adopted a more variable practice, with their proportions typically varying between 10:1 and 5:1.696

Whilst a 10:1 ratio initially implies that Seleucid cavalry declined in importance following Alexander, corresponding to Aperghis’ claim that Hellenistic proportions mirrored those of Classical Greece, and the dismissals of this period’s cavalry by

Ducrey et al., this is counterbalanced by the lower ratio. Indeed, as we have seen, the frequency of their 5:1 ratio demonstrates that the Seleucids continued to place significant emphasis (even more than Alexander) on their mounted forces, whilst the fluctuation in their proportions illustrates their willingness to experiment depending on a given battle’s circumstances, refuting suggestions of Hellenistic tactical stagnation. It is therefore clear that the maintenance of a strong, well-supplied cavalry arm was very important to Seleucid rulers. We must now explore the tactics of

Seleucid cavalry warfare (both in theory and in practice) in order to understand how the organisation outlined above played out on the battlefield, and its effects on the military performance of the Seleucid army as a whole.

695 This figure does not represent the total cavalry potential of the Seleucid Empire, however. 696 Appendix 2, Table 2.1.

157

CHAPTER 4 Battle Tactics: The Seleucid Cavalry in Operation

4.1. Introduction

The previous chapters have demonstrated how the Seleucid army in general, and its cavalry in particular, were structured around a tripartite division of standing troops, reserve troops, and ‘non-regulars’. Additionally, the analysis presented in

Chapter 3.3 has shown that although the battlefield strength of the Seleucid cavalry rarely numbered more than 10,000, the fluctuations of the Seleucids’ average infantry:cavalry ratio (between 10:1 and 5:1) indicate the continued importance of their mounted arm, as well as their tactical flexibility. We must now assess the

Seleucid cavalry’s operation on the battlefield to ascertain its tactical importance to the Seleucid army, and the extent to which the Empire’s tripartite organisation influenced this. Whilst there exists a pervasive idea in the scholarship that Hellenistic cavalry experienced a decline in both its importance and operational efficacy in comparison to its decisive role under Alexander the Great,697 such arguments misunderstand the realities of Hellenistic warfare. It is important to remember that

Alexander’s battlefield conditions were not the same as those faced by Hellenistic commanders. This chapter will therefore reassess the operation of the Seleucid cavalry on its own terms, in order to demonstrate that, contrary to received opinion, the Seleucids’ use of their mounted forces continued to have a significant and valuable impact on the battlefield.

This chapter comprises two sections. In the first, I shall assess the battlefield deployment of the Seleucid cavalry. Here I shall consider standard Hellenistic battle

697 Ducrey (1986) 103 = (1985) 105; Serrati (2013) 191; Sekunda (2007) 374; Sabin (2007) 425; Tarn (1948) 26-7, 68; Gaebel (2002) 261-2; Anderson (1961) 153.

158 dispositions, with the preference for the phalanx in the centre of the field and the cavalry on the flanks in conjunction with the Seleucid evidence. In particular, I shall show that although many of the Seleucids’ engagements conformed to the standard formations of the period, scholars have often overlooked the details of Raphia,

Panion, and Beth-Zechariah which demonstrate the Seleucid rulers’ ability and willingness to add small, but significant, variations to this. Moreover, a careful reassessment of the deployments of Magnesia and the battle against Molon reveal further levels of experimentation, directly refuting claims of tactical stagnation. I shall investigate the reasons behind these formations and the impact they had on the cavalry’s functions and success. Additionally, this section will examine how the different branches of the Seleucid cavalry affected their deployment in the battle-line.

The second half of the chapter will build upon these considerations, assessing the various roles that the Seleucid cavalry performed on the battlefield. In particular, I shall evaluate how the Seleucids combined the standard roles of the cavalry to charge opposing contingents and pursue a fleeing enemy into an offensive strategy designed to remove enemy units from the battlefield at Raphia and Magnesia. Despite the ultimate failure of these battles, both events prove the crucial importance of maintaining a cavalry presence on the battlefield. Additionally, I shall compare the impressive cataphract manoeuvre at Panion to illustrate that the cavalry tactics at

Raphia and Magnesia had the potential to be devastatingly successful, and that their failure crucially does not indicate any decline in the cavalry’s military abilities, but rather a mistake in Antiochus’ tactical execution. This section will then evaluate the opposite tactic of sham retreat, which the Seleucids utilised effectively at Ipsus and

Elasa, as well as the use of light (typically ‘non-regular’) cavalry to harass enemy

159 formations. Finally, I shall consider the close relationship between Seleucids’ tactical use of cavalry and its tripartite organisation.

The analysis of these sections will draw on a selection of battles for which we have detailed accounts of the Seleucid cavalry’s participation. These are:

- Ipsus (301 B.C.),

- The battle against Molon (220B.C.),

- Raphia (217 B.C.),

- Tapuria (ca. 208 B.C.),

- Panion (200 B.C.),

- Thermopylae (191 B.C.),

- Magnesia (190 B.C.),

- Beth-Zechariah (162 B.C.),

- Elasa (160 B.C.).698

These were not the only battles in which the Seleucid cavalry was important,699 but the sources for other instances are too sparse to make any firm assessments of the tactics employed. Consequently, with the exception of Ipsus, the bulk of the evidence for this chapter is confined to a sixty-year period between the reigns of Antiochus III to Demetrius I (mid/late-third century to the mid-second century B.C.). Nevertheless, by comparing the progression of events at Ipsus with the Seleucid tactics witnessed in later battles, we can measure the development of the cavalry’s importance over time.

As noted in the Introduction (0.2.2), any assessment of ancient battle narratives is complex. Not only must we consider the individual reliability of the authors of each

698 For an overview of the cavalry manoeuvres in each of these nine battles, see Appendix 3, Table 3.1; Cyrrhestica (285 B.C.) and the ‘Elephant Victory’ (ca. 270’s B.C.) are not included in this chapter due to a lack of secure details for the cavalry’s involvement; cf. Introduction 0.1.4. 699 Cf. Ammaus (165 B.C.): I Maccabees, 3.38-4.25, II Maccabees, 8.8-36; Adasa (161 B.C.): I Maccabees, 7.39-50, II Maccabees, 15.20-36; Azotos (148 B.C.): I Maccabees, 10.74-85; etc.

160 account, but we must also remain aware of the various literary topoi prevalent within them. In particular, the recent ‘linguistic turn’ in historiographical theory has highlighted the importance of viewing our sources from a literary perspective.

Tropper especially proposes his ‘new historical method’, claiming that, since ancient historians had different conceptions of accuracy and what a good history was meant to achieve compared to the ideals of modern scholars, we should not seek to reconstruct historically accurate details from their accounts, and should instead engage with them purely as literary constructions.700 However, although Tropper’s assessment of Beth-Zechariah is very important for our evaluation of the Seleucids’ unusual deployment in this battle, we should not push his ‘new historical method’ too far. Whilst proponents of the ‘linguistic turn’ are right to recognise the rhetorical devices of ancient authors, we should be wary of dismissing everything in their works as unhistorical.701

Therefore, I shall carefully analyse the various accounts of the battles relevant to this chapter to assess which parts of their narratives we can accept and which do not hold up under scrutiny. Where there are gaps or complications in our sources, I shall attempt to offer solutions by considering the most plausible scenario based on the specifics of the situation. Overall, this chapter will prove that, rather than showing tactical stagnation or qualitative decline, the Seleucids’ use of their cavalry forces demonstrates the continued importance of mounted contingents in the developing and complex circumstances of Hellenistic warfare.

700 Tropper (2017) 17. 701 See Introduction, pp.34-5.

161

4.2. Cavalry Positions on the Battlefield

4.2.1. The Flanks: A Standard Battle Arrangement

The most common deployment of cavalry in the ancient world was on the flanks of an army’s battle-line. This was not only standard in the Hellenistic era, but had remained unchanged since the growing prominence of cavalry warfare in

Classical Greece.702 The reasons for this are a consequence of the general nature of both mounted forces, and the heavy phalanx-based infantry dominant in these periods. As Chapter 1.2 illustrated, horses are naturally swift animals, prized for their speed and manoeuvrability. They thus require a reasonable amount of open space to operate effectively. In contrast, although formidable ‘for direct frontal attack’, formations of heavily-armoured hoplites/sarissa-equipped phalangites crucially lacked this flexibility.703 Dependent on the maintenance of its compact formation, it was difficult for the phalanx to alter its offensive direction once formed, and practically impossible to do so once engaged. Consequently, the greatest danger was the possibility of an attack on its unprotected flanks whilst fighting another opponent, creating ‘the absolute need’ for generals ‘to protect the flanks and rear’.704 Although a commander could theoretically exploit battlefield topography to achieve this, the success of this strategy was dependent on an opponent’s armament, and the commander’s ability to dictate the battlefield; it also restricted his army’s movements.

The use of flexible contingents such as cavalry (and also light infantry) to protect the vulnerable flanks of the phalanx was therefore natural and rapidly became a standard

702 E.g. Thucydides, 4.93.4, 4.94.1, 5.67.1, 6.67.2, 7.6.2; Xenophon, Hellenika 5.2.40; Diodorus, 15.85.2, 17.19.4-6, 17.57.1-61; 19.27.2-29, 19.40, 19.82; Arrian, Anabasis 1.14, 2.8.5-9.4, 3.11-10; Quintus Curtius, 4.12.6-12, 4.13.26-32; Polybius, 5.82.3; for the Seleucids see Appendix 4, Table 4.1; however, cf. the placement of cavalry in front of the main lines at Leuktra (371 B.C.), Xenophon, Hellenika 6.10; also: Asclepiodotus, 7.10. 703 Gaebel (2002) 69-70; see Polybius, 18.31-2. 704 Gaebel (2002) 69.

162 feature of warfare. Moreover, such a deployment allowed the cavalry to support the infantry whilst also providing the space needed to capitalise on its speed and manoeuvrability. Even with the development of heavier, more offensive cavalry, which in turn required protection from lighter cavalry units, mounted contingents were still typically located on the wings.

It is therefore unsurprising that the Seleucids likewise placed their cavalry here in practically every battle for which we have sufficient details.705 The clearest examples are the battle against Molon, Raphia, and Elasa, but we can also infer this from the progression of events at Ipsus,706 as well as at Panion and Beth-Zechariah.

This adherence to standard battlefield formations is not, however, a sign of tactical stagnation. Beyond its logical employment, a close assessment of Raphia, Panion, and

Beth-Zechariah shows that Seleucid commanders diverged from this formation for different tactical purposes.

Although the position of the cavalry on either flank of the army at Raphia is clear, the Seleucid right wing exhibited an interesting tactical variation. Out of the

6,000 cavalry present, Antiochus III stationed 4,000 on the right under his command,

2,000 of which were presumably the Companions and Agema of the Guard.707 The strengthening of one wing (typically the right, which was traditionally more

705 See Appendix 3, Table 3.1, Appendix 4, Table 4.1; only Tapuria (Polybius 10.49) and Thermopylae (Livy, 36.18.4) record a cavalry arrangement that did not feature any horsemen on the army’s flanks. Immediately, however, the less conventional nature of these battles should warn us of the complexities of using them as examples (Tapuria did not feature the full Seleucid army and happened whilst Antiochus was still on the march, whilst the topography of Thermopylae was unsuitable for cavalry, see section 4.2.3). Magnesia is also unusual, but more complex, see 4.2.2 below. 706 It is clear from Demetrius’ pursuit of Antiochus that the Allies positioned cavalry on their left. Plutarch, much more interested in the exploits of his hero and Antigonus’ tragic fate, does not mention the Seleucid right wing. However, since Seleucus subsequently utilised mounted skirmishers to attack Antigonus’ unprotected phalanx, it is reasonable to assume that the Allied right wing similarly had some cavalry, Plutarch, Demetrius 29. 707 Polybius, 5.82.9; Polybius notes that 2,000 of the right-wing cavalry were under Antipater’s command. This likely reflects the division of the cavalry on this wing into two equal blocks (indicated by the deployment in oblique formation). However, since Antiochus himself was also on this wing, it is probable that, although nominally under Antipater’s command, in reality they followed their king.

163 prestigious) at the expense of the other is not particularly unusual.708 What is interesting about this wing’s formation at Raphia is Polybius’ comment that

Antiochus stationed 2,000 horse behind the elephants, and the other 2,000 ἐν

ἐπικαμπίῳ (‘at an angle’).709 It is unclear whether this angle projected forwards or backwards from the main line, and the subsequent narrative of this wing’s headlong charge and pursuit does not offer many technical details.710 An earlier parallel with

Alexander’s formation at Gaugamela (331 B.C.), however, where Alexander angled both wings back in response to the Achaemenids’ much longer battle-line, possibly suggests the latter.711 By refusing the flank(s) in this way, both Alexander and

Antiochus offered their forces greater protection against encirclement. At the same time, this deployment supported Antiochus’ intention of driving back the opposing

Ptolemaic cavalry. Regardless of the outcome of Antiochus’ right-wing charge,712 the application of this formation in conjunction with the standard battlefield template, and its echo of Alexander’s earlier practice, illustrates the continuing flexibility and abilities of the Seleucid cavalry.

Another instance of the Seleucids’ willingness both to vary and maintain traditional battlefield practices is evident at Panion. Unfortunately, Polybius’ account, consisting of only two chapters in Book 16, in which he criticises the inconsistencies in the earlier work of the Rhodian historian Zeno, is unsatisfactory.713 Taken at face

708 The strengthened formation of the forces deployed here often resulted from a desire to protect the commander, who typically led the army from the (right) wing (see footnote 764); counter the strength of the enemy formation directly opposite; or provide greater momentum to the wing’s attack; nor are these reasons mutually exclusive. 709 Polybius, 5.82.9; Griffith (1947) 77 n.3. 710 Gaebel (2002) 240 favours a backwards angle, whilst Bar-Kochva (1976) 134 notes only that they were ‘in advance of the battle line’. 711 Diodorus, 17.57.5; Arrian, Anabasis 3.12.4; LSJ, s.v. ἐπικάμπιος, A.I.1; cf. Diodorus, 19.82.1. 712 See 4.3.1 below. 713 Polybius, 16.18-19; Bar-Kochva (1976) 149-52; Meister (1975) 177-8; Lenfant (2005) 198-200; Walbank (1967) 523; Gaebel (2002) 244; also: Wiemer (2013).

164 value, Polybius’ account of Zeno’s narrative is full of contradictions,714 in what was most likely a deliberate ploy to diminish the work of his predecessor.715 It thus tells us little more than the Seleucids’ victory. Bar-Kochva, and more recently Grainger, propose an interesting reconstruction, suggesting that the battle actually took place simultaneously in two separate arenas: the north (where the main Seleucid force under the king was stationed), and the south (featuring a smaller force under

Antiochus’ son, intended to protect the Seleucid troops in the north from the

Ptolemies’ Aetolian mercenaries, who were better adapted at fighting on uneven ground).716 Given that Antiochus III supposedly sent his son ‘with a portion of the forces to occupy the parts of the hills which commanded the enemy’, whilst he ‘took the rest of the army across the river which separated the two camps’,717 I accept this suggestion.

Within this deployment, the cataphract contingent in the northern arena, in what is their first recorded appearance in the Seleucid army, was placed on the right wing of the main force, under the command (at least nominally) of Antiochus’ younger son.718 That the Seleucids’ first use of this Parthian-inspired, very heavy cavalry unit saw them utilise a standard placement on the army’s flank illustrates how common this deployment was for mounted forces, whilst, at the same time, the cataphracts’

714 E.g. the location of the Seleucid elephants simultaneously in front and behind the phalanx (Polybius, 16.18.7, 16.19.1; see Chapter 5.2.1a, 5.2.1c), or the fact that the Aetolian cavalry was simultaneously defeated, unbroken, and scared off by the elephants (Polybius, 16.19.4-5). 715 Lenfant (2005) 199; Wiemer (2013) 281-2. 716 Bar-Kochva (1976) 149-52; Grainger (2010) 358. 717 τὸν δ᾿ Ἀντίοχον ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν ἑωθινὴν ἐκπέμψαι φησὶ τὸν πρεσβύτερον υἱὸν Ἀντίοχον ἔχοντα μέρος τι τῆς δυνάμεως, ἵνα προκαταλάβηται τῆς ὀρεινῆς τοὺς ὑπερκειμένους τῶν πολεμίων τόπους, τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν δύναμιν ἅμα τῷ φωτὶ διαβιβάσαντα τὸν ποταμὸν <τὸν> μεταξὺ τῶν στρατοπέδων, Polybius, 16.18.5-6. 718 There is some debate over which of Antiochus’ sons this was. Zeno claims that both of Antiochus III’s sons were present, and that it was the youngest son who commanded the cataphracts (Polybius, 16.18.6, 16.18.8). Polybius, however, objects to this, stating that only the eldest son was present (16.19.9). Nevertheless, the proposed reconstruction, along with the fact that Antiochus’ eldest son was in command of the forces across the river, favours Zeno’s version; Bar-Kochva (1976) 148-9, 155; cf. Walbank (1967) 523-4; Lenfant (2005) 199; Gaebel (2002) 245; see section 4.2.2 below for the more unusual deployment of the ‘Tarentines’ and the cavalry Guard.

165 resounding success demonstrates that its tactical suitability was not limited solely to lighter, more manoeuvrable cavalry contingents.719 Therefore, despite the complications of Polybius’ account, we can see that, once again, the Seleucids were willing to experiment with variations of the typical battlefield deployment.

Furthermore, the innovation, and success, of the cataphracts demonstrates that

Seleucid cavalry did not suffer from a qualitative decline.

The battle of Beth-Zechariah also presents topographical and literary complications. Our main narrative comes from Chapter 6 of I Maccabees (followed by Josephus’ Antiquitates Judaicae), supplemented by a short passage in Josephus’

Bellum Judaicum.720 As noted in Chapter 3.3, the numbers presented in the latter

(50,000 infantry, ca. 5,000 cavalry)721 give the most likely strength of the Seleucid army in this battle. The engagement itself appears to have taken place somewhere in the mountainous region just south of Beth-Zechariah, although its exact location is unknown.722 According to our accounts, Lysias supposedly distributed his elephants

‘among the phalanxes’ (εἰς τὰς φάλαγγας), stationing 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalry alongside each animal.723 Bar-Kochva, in his reconstruction of this battle, therefore believes that this shows that the Seleucid army was divided into eight ‘mini- formations’, with the phalanx and cavalry unusually split around the elephants (500

719 Polybius, 16.18.8. 720 I Maccabees, 6.28-47; Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.369-75, Bellum Judaicum 1.41-6; although II Maccabees, 13.1-26 describes Lysias’ Judaean expedition, this account makes no mention of Beth-Zechariah. 721 Cf. II Maccabees 13.1. 722 Contra Bar-Kochva (1978) 177-9, (1989) 126-7, 129; Wibbing (1962) 162-3; Williams (1990) 372. 723 διεῖλον τὰ θηρία εἰς τὰς φάλαγγας καὶ παρέστησαν ἑκάστῳ ἐλέφαντι χιλίους ἄνδρας τεθωρακισμένους ἐν ἁλυσιδωτοῖς καὶ περικεφαλαῖαι χαλκαῖ ἐπὶ τῶν κεφαλῶν αὐτῶν καὶ πεντακοσία ἵππος διατεταγμένη ἑκάστῳ θηρίῳ ἐκλελεγμένη· οὗτοι πρὸ καιροῦ οὗ ἂν ᾖ τὸ θηρίον ἦσαν καὶ οὗ ἐὰν ἐπορεύετο ἐπορεύοντο ἅμα οὐκ ἀφίσταντο ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, I Maccabees, 6.35-6; Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.371

166 infantry and 250 cavalry on each side).724 Josephus’ Antiquitates Judaicae then tells us that these ‘mini-formations’ were drawn up in a column ‘since they could not be placed side by side in an extended line because of the narrow space.’725 From this,

Bar-Kochva has suggested a two stage manoeuvre from the Seleucids, who initially marched in a visually impressive, extended line where the valley was wide enough, before reforming into a column at the mouth of a defile.726 The accuracy of this, however, is doubtful.

First, there are no explicit indications of such a manoeuvre in the sources themselves. Second, various scholars have noted that Josephus’ claim that the battle took place in a ‘narrow space’ (στενοχωρία),727 rests solely on an early mistake in I

Maccabees’ text which claimed that the Seleucid elephants were distributed among the ‘defiles’ (φάραγγας) rather than the ‘phalanxes’ (φάλαγγας).728 Since

φάλαγγας is commonly accepted as the correct reading, there is no secure evidence for Josephus’ claim. Furthermore, Tropper has recently reassessed I Maccabees’ account of this battle from a literary perspective, demonstrating that the author deliberately crafted his narrative so that the structure of the battle preparations (6.32-

41) mirrored that of the action (6.42-7) – both parts focus on the elephants, and open and close with the Jews’ approach and reaction to the Seleucids’ strength.

Additionally, much of the language creates strong parallels to the biblical story of

David and Goliath.729 He therefore rejects this narrative’s ability to provide any

724 Bar-Kochva (1976) 181, 204, (1989) 127; I accept Bar-Kochva’s suggestion ((1976) 177, (1989) 307) that the Seleucids had only eight elephants in this battle, see Chapter 5.2.1b. 725 καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐλέφαντας ἐποίησεν ἀλλήλοις ἕπεσθαι, διὰ τὴν στενοχωρίαν οὐ δυναμένων αὐτῶν ἐπὶ πλάτος τετάχθαι, Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.371. 726 Bar-Kochva (1976) 179-81, (1989) 127, 159, 192, 324. 727 Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.371, cf. Bellum Judaicum 1.41. 728 I Maccabees, 6.35; Grimm (1853) 99; Marcus (1943) 193 n.c.; Goldstein (1976) 320-1; Tropper (2017) 20-1; cf. Nodet (2015) 524. 729 Tropper (2017); see Introduction pp.33-4.

167 historically accurate details beyond the Seleucids’ victory, arguing that we can examine it only as a literary construction.

Nevertheless, although Tropper’s analysis of I Maccabees’ rhetorical features and internal structure is convincing, and, as we have seen, ancient Jewish historians sometimes operated with considerable creative licence,730 I am wary of dismissing everything within the battle account as fiction. In particular, the ‘mini-formations’ of elephants, infantry, and cavalry are so unusual (as far as our patchy sources permit, there is no other known instance of this arrangement in the Seleucid army), that it is worth questioning whether the author of I Maccabees would deliberately invent something so unique as to call attention to it.731 If we accept that these ‘mini- formations’ are at least possible, we are presented with a striking Seleucid combination of tactical tradition and innovation. By theoretically forming each division with the phalanx flanked by cavalry, Lysias could recreate a typical

Hellenistic battle arrangement in miniature,732 presumably with the intention of providing greater flexibility to the standard Seleucid battle-line. Only the position of the elephants in the centre of the phalanx conflicts with typical practice, and even here there is a Seleucid parallel at Magnesia.733

Beyond the 4,000 horsemen deployed in these ‘mini-formations’, Lysias also allegedly stationed his remaining cavalry on the extreme flanks of the army, offering another standard element to his innovative battle-line. Whether these were directly

730 Introduction, footnote 84. 731 Indeed, it is particularly notable that Josephus happily copies this formation in Antiquitates Judaicae. Given that his earlier version in Bellum Judaicum is silent about this, it is reasonable to expect that Josephus would possibly have commented here if the proposed arrangement did not at least seem possible for a Hellenistic battle; however, cf. Gafni (1989) 117; Tropper (2017) 21; Feldman (1984) 221. 732 Bar-Kochva (1989) 127-8, 317, 330-1. 733 See Chapter 5.2.1b.

168 next to the main formations as I Maccabees implies,734 or alternatively sent along the surrounding ridges with other skirmishing troops to prevent Judas Maccabaeus ambushing the main force as Josephus states, is uncertain,735 especially in light of

Josephus’ earlier mistake about the battle’s topography. Regardless, this position on the army’s extreme flank, along with the joint use of skirmish troops, strongly suggests that these remaining mounted contingents comprised relatively light cavalry.736

Our understanding of these remaining cavalry forces, however, is complicated by the extant Greek translation of the (now lost) original Hebrew of I Maccabees,

6.38, which states that they were ‘stationed on both sides of the army in order to harass the enemy whilst protected by the phalanxes’.737 Although the passive participle καταφρασσόμενοι is attested in all the surviving manuscripts, it is illogical to propose that the purpose of the heavy troops in the centre was to protect the cavalry, since a major reason for the cavalry’s standard position on the edge of the formation was precisely the reverse.738 It is possible that the initial Greek translator misread the verb in the original Hebrew, mistaking it for passive, ‘no doubt under the influence of the passive form of the same verb in verse 36’.739 We can thus see that, through their standard flank positions, these remaining cavalry contingents were intended to protect whatever formation Lysias had adopted in the centre. Therefore,

734 I Maccabees, 6.38. 735 Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.371. 736 Bar-Kochva (1989) 323 737 καὶ τὴν ἐπίλοιπον ἵππον ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν ἔστησεν ἐπὶ τὰ δύο μέρη τῆς παρεμβολῆς κατασείοντες καὶ καταφρασσόμενοι ἐν ταῖς φάλαγξιν. 738 E.g. Bar-Kochva (1989) 323-5; Goldstein (1976) 321; Grimm (1853) 101-2. 739 Bar-Kochva (1989) 323-4; alternatively, Goldstein (1976) 321 suggests that, since ‘a very old misreading’ originally had φάραγξιν instead of φάλαγξιν, just like the similar mistake in line 35, ‘a very early scribe who had the reading kataphrassontes tas pharangas’ simply ‘picked the wrong way to correct the reading’, changing the active participle to a passive. The accuracy of this suggestion, however, is questionable, since there is no textual basis for suggesting that the Greek participle was originally active; also: cf. Bar-Kochva’s objections ((1989) 323 n.54).

169 as the examples of Raphia, Panion, and Beth-Zechariah demonstrate, whilst the

Seleucids typically stationed their cavalry on the flanks of their army, they remained willing to experiment with variations of this standard battlefield practice, refuting the claims of tactical stagnation.

4.2.2. The Centre Another variation of the standard battle-arrangement is visible at Magnesia. As the previous chapter showed, the battle of Magnesia is particularly important for understanding the nature of the Seleucid cavalry. Not only is it one of the few instances where Seleucid contingents are detailed, consequently providing us with one of the clearest examples of the Seleucid tripartite division in action,740 but it is also a battle where a complex assortment of tactics were planned in a manner quite at variance with the claims of stagnating Hellenistic practice. Although Appian initially claims that ‘[Antiochus’] horse were stationed on either wing’,741 a close inspection of the Seleucid battle-line shows that, whilst the phalanx was still positioned in the centre, a more complicated tactical variation of the standard battle arrangement was envisaged.

Of the two Seleucid wings at Magnesia, the left is the simplest to understand, beyond the debated position of the several thousand skirmish troops which Livy claims were on the extreme edge of the army.742 Next to the heavy infantry in the centre, there were 1,500 Galatian infantry, 2,000 Cappadocians, and 2,700 auxiliaries,

740 See Appendix, 4, Table 4.2. 741 ἱππεῖς δ᾿ ἑκατέρωθεν αὐτοῦ παρετετάχατο, Appian, Syriaca 32. 742 Livy, 37.40.13-4, also: 37.40.8-10 on the right; Bar-Kochva (1976) 166-7, (1989) 567-8 rejects Livy’s placement of these troops on the grounds that it makes little sense to position so many archers ‘a few kilometres away from the battle line’, and that instead we should locate them in front of the main line. Briscoe, however, both in his review of Bar-Kochva’s work ((1978) 301) and his commentary on Livy ((1981) 350) challenges this reconstruction. Bar-Kochva’s suggestion is possible, but remains speculative.

170 followed by 3,000 cataphracts and the 1,000 Companions, the ‘Tarentines’, and 2,500

Galatian horsemen.743 The deployment of the heavy, less manoeuvrable cavalry first, with the lighter cavalry on the edge conforms to expectations, capitalising on the relative strengths and limitations of each contingent. Even the possible inclusion of numerous light troops on the flank of the ‘Tarentines’ and Galatians does not necessarily conflict with the apparent typicality of this wing’s arrangement since their function as skirmishers would complement the flexible roles of these two cavalry units.744 A parallel situation is potentially evident with the 1,200 mounted archers of the Dahae and the mass of light infantry similarly stationed on Antiochus’ far right.745

In contrast, the main divergence from the standard battlefield arrangement of heavy infantry in the centre and cavalry on the wings comes with the position of the

3,000 cataphracts and 1,000 Agema on the Seleucid right wing. Although their deployment on the flank of the phalanx and Galatian pedites is not unusual, the decision to separate the Argyraspides from the main body of the infantry by placing them between these heavy cavalry units and the Dahae is surprising,746 and there is no other instance where it is clear that the Seleucids adopted this formation. Indeed, this arrangement sandwiched the heavy cavalry next to the centre of the battle-line, whilst simultaneously creating the impression of a mini-formation in the appearance of the right wing, which now featured the Guard infantry surrounded by various cavalry units. The tactical intention behind this strikingly untypical placement for the

Argyraspides is perhaps clearer in light of the opposing formation of the Roman left.

Once again, Livy and Appian disagree. Whereas Livy records that the Roman line featured two legions in the centre, flanked on each side by Latin alae, with 3,000

743 Livy, 37.40.9-12. 744 See Chapter 3.2.2. 745 Livy, 37.40.8. 746 Livy, 37.40.5-8.

171 auxiliary troops, 3,000 cavalry, and 1,000 skirmishers on their right, and only four turmae on the left, due to the protection of the river,747 Appian claims that it was the left wing which featured the 3,000 auxiliary troops, whilst the four turmae are unmentioned.748 In light of the other inaccuracies in Appian’s account,749 along with the topographical conditions of the river, I prefer to follow Livy’s account. Given the space each unit required, Antiochus’ right wing faced the Latin ala and the 120 horsemen of the four turmae.750 Since we know that Antiochus routed the infantry directly opposite his right wing,751 Bar-Kochva has suggested that the unusual deployment of the Argyraspides and the heavy was done so that Antiochus could

‘drive a wedge’ in the Roman line, allowing ‘each part [to] be outflanked separately’.752 Given that Livy notes that the Romans had begun their deployment before the Seleucids,753 it is possible that Antiochus deliberately altered his typical formation to counter his opponents. Additionally, since the cataphracts and Agema would conceivably act as a hinge between the two heavy infantry contingents,

Antiochus may have used this unusual formation to provide greater flexibility to his battle-front.754

The suggestion that following the Romans’ victory at Cynoscephalae (197

B.C.),755 as well as his own failed defence of Thermopylae,756 Antiochus was deliberately ‘trying to use something new to disconcert the enemy’ who may ‘have

747 Livy, 37.39.7-12. 748 Appian, Syriaca 31. 749 See Chapter 3.2.1. 750 See Chapter 3, footnote 446. 751 See pp.105-6. 752 Bar-Kochva (1976) 203. 753 Livy, 39.5-6. 754 Cf. the positions of the elephants at intervals within the phalanx, see Chapter 5.2.1b. 755 Polybius, 18.18-27. 756 Livy, 36.15.3-19.11; Appian, Syriaca 17-20.

172 been expecting… conventional Hellenistic tactics’ is plausible.757 Indeed, the formation of the right wing is not the only unusual feature of the Seleucid battle-line at Magnesia.758 Whilst this attempt to vary his battlefield practice was ultimately unsuccessful, and it is possible that traditional methods would have been more effective given the ideal nature of Magnesia for phalanx-based warfare,759 we should note that had Antiochus not pursued the retreating enemy too far from the battlefield, and instead turned back into the now exposed Roman flank, this tactic could have been devastating.760

This is precisely the manoeuvre that the cataphracts under Antiochus’ son executed ten years earlier at Panion. Having defeated the opposing cavalry, they turned back to aid the elephants in surrounding the Ptolemaic phalanx in the centre.761

The ability of the Seleucids’ heavily armoured, and crucially less flexible, cavalry to maintain its cohesion whilst performing this manoeuvre indicates a high level of training, directly refuting any suggestion of qualitative decline. Their spectacular success further demonstrates the significant impact that the Seleucid cavalry could have on a battle’s outcome when properly employed. Therefore, there was no reason why the unusual cavalry position next to the centre of the army at Magnesia could not have been successful.

The northern arena at Panion provides another example of Seleucid cavalry deployed in the centre rather than the wings. According to Zeno, Antiochus took up position with the Companions and infantry Guard behind the elephants and

757 Bar-Kochva (1976) 172. 758 See the defensive formation of the elephants (Chapter 5.2.1b) and the striking use of scythed chariots (Chapter 5.3). 759 Appian, Syriaca 37; Bar-Kochva (1976) 172-3; Gaebel (2002) 255; cf. Polybius, 18.31.3. 760 See 4.3.1 below. 761 Polybius, 16.19.5, 16.19.10.

173

‘Tarentines’ in the centre.762 There are several things to note here. First, whilst it was generally unusual to station cavalry directly in the centre of the battlefield, it is significantly only the Companions and ‘Tarentines’ that are recorded here. Since

Antiochus III himself was in the centre of the field, it is unsurprising that the

Companions, a unit which traditionally fought around the king, were stationed alongside him.763 The apparent absence of the Agema in the battle account is notable, but, as discussed in Chapter 3.2.1, it is unlikely that they would have been absent.

Antiochus’ decision to position himself in the centre, rather than with the main cavalry on the wings, however, is striking and stands in contrast to typical Hellenistic practice.764 This is significant, implying a lingering conception in the minds of

Hellenistic rulers not only of the prestige which cavalry forces enjoyed, but also of their continuing potential for decisive action, although there were some Hellenistic precedents for the king’s decision to command the centre.765 Grainger’s suggestion that Antiochus (and also his opponent Scopas) did not actually participate in the fighting, but rather remained apart ‘in order to direct the battle’ is particularly interesting, although highly unusual for Hellenistic warfare, and without further details is impossible to say for certain.766

762 Polybius, 16.18.7. 763 See Chapter 3, footnote 413. 764 By far the most standard approach following Alexander was for generals to command the cavalry on one of the wings, most typically the right; e.g. Polybius, 5.53.6, 5.82.12; Livy, 37.41.1; Appian, Syriaca 32; though cf. Ptolemy at Raphia (Polybius, 5.82.7) and Judas Maccabaeus at Elasa (I Maccabees, 9.14). 765 In particular, Antigonus at Ipsus (Plutarch, Demetrius 29). Strikingly, Antigonus’ son, Demetrius, commanded the right-wing cavalry here, just as Antiochus’ son (at least nominally) commanded the cataphracts at Panion. 766 Grainger (2010) 260; cf. Polybius, 16.19.7; it is, however, perhaps a little more likely in Scopas’ case since, much to Polybius’ outrage, Zeno allegedly claims that he first commanded the Ptolemaic phalanx in the north, before later retreating with the Aetolians in the south (Polybius, 16.19.10-11). It is hard to see how Scopas extricated himself from the heavy fighting in the Ptolemaic centre to withdraw to the southern arena unless he did not personally lead the attack; see Bar-Kochva (1976) 156-7.

174

With regards to the ‘Tarentines’, given their mixed armament and fighting style,767 it is likely that they were intended both to harass the Ptolemaic centre as mounted skirmishers, as well as act as a mobile protective force for the elephants stationed alongside them. Indeed, it was standard practice for armies to deploy skirmishers in front of the main lines for the opening stages of the attack.768 Since mounted troops were theoretically more effective than their infantry counterparts, able to ‘carry large quantities of arrows’, with advantages of height and speed,769 it is reasonable to assume that the Seleucids also utilised some of their light cavalry units in this way.770 Therefore, although the Seleucids often followed convention, placing their cavalry on the flanks, this was not always the case, and Antiochus III especially seems to have been open to alternative tactical arrangements.

4.2.3. Cavalry Held in Reserve A final Seleucid variation to the standard battlefield practice is the use of cavalry as an offensive reserve in the battle against Molon. As mentioned above, this was a battle where the Seleucids deployed their main cavalry force in the standard position on the flanks, and notably even this cavalry and infantry reserve were distributed ‘between the two wings’.771 What is particularly significant, however, is that Antiochus ordered them to ‘encircle the enemy, as soon as the battle had begun’, effectively making them part of the main offensive.772 Therefore, although the decision to position these troops on the wings of the army accords with general

767 See Chapter 3.2.2. 768 E.g. Thucydides, 6.69.2; Onasander, 17, 19; Arrian, Tactika 15; Asclepiodotus, 7.1; Aelianus Tacticus, 17; Bar-Kochva (1976) 134, 166, 203, (1989) 6, 10, 15, 22; Pritchett (1991) 61-5, (1985) 51- 2; Rawlings (2007) 86. 769 Bar-Kochva (1976) 25. 770 In particular, cf. Elasa (I Maccabees, 9.11), and Azotos (148 B.C., I Maccabees 10.789-83); also cf. the Arabian camel-archers at Magnesia (see Chapter 5.4). 771 τὰ δ᾿ ἐπιτάγματα τῶν πεζῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππέων ἐπὶ τὰ κέρατα μερίσας, Polybius, 5.53.5. 772 κυκλοῦν παρήγγειλε τοὺς πολεμίους, ἐπειδὰν συμβάλωσι.

175

Hellenistic practice, as does the use of cavalry to outflank the enemy, this combination of reserve troops with the explicit intention of using them to attack is notable. The troops involved in this manoeuvre are unknown, though it is highly likely that the infantry force at least were light so that it could keep pace with the cavalry.773

A further interesting feature of this battle is that, unlike the others analysed above, it pitched Seleucid forces against each other (although conflicts with rebellious satraps and opposing members of the royal family were certainly not unknown in Seleucid history, despite the frequent lack of details).774 However, whilst

Antiochus won the battle, Polybius’ account of the engagement is very brief. After a description of both sides’ deployment, he simply tells us that

Molon’s right wing remained faithful and vigorously engaged Zeuxis’ force, but the left wing, as soon as they closed and came in sight of the king, went over to the enemy, upon which Molon’s whole force lost heart… Molon, aware of what had happened and already surrounded on every side… put an end to his life.775

It is therefore hard to tell with certainty what effect this offensive reserve had on the overall battle.

It is not impossible that the majority of Molon’s forces surrendered to

Antiochus without much fighting, especially given the tripartite structure of the

Seleucids’ military establishment, which meant that many of Molon’s heavily-armed

773 See Willekes (2015) 50. 774 E.g. ‘War of Brothers’ (239-236 B.C.): Justin, 27.2, Strabo, 16.2.14; Achaeus (221 B.C.): Polybius, 5.57; Timarchus (160 B.C.): Diodorus, 31.27a, Appian, Syriaca 47; Demetrius and Alexander Balas (150-145 B.C.): Justin, 35, Appian, Syriaca 67; Tryphon (142 B.C.): Diodorus, 33.4a, Appian, Syriaca 68, Strabo, 16.2.10. 775 τὸ μὲν δεξιὸν κέρας τοῦ Μόλωνος διετήρησε τὴν πίστιν καὶ συνέβαλε τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ζεῦξιν ἐρρωμένως, τὸ δ᾿ εὐώνυμον ἅμα τῷ συνιὸν εἰς ὄψιν ἐλθεῖν τῷ βασιλεῖ μετεβάλετο πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους· οὗ γενομένου συνέβη τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὸν Μόλωνα διατραπῆναι… ὁ δὲ Μόλων συννοήσας τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ πανταχόθεν ἤδη κυκλούμενος, λαβὼν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὰς ἐσομένας περὶ αὑτὸν αἰκίας… προσήνεγκε τὰς χεῖρας ἑαυτῷ, Polybius 5.54.1-3.

176 troops in particular, specifically the phalanx, but also various cavalry units (whose location in Molon’s satrapy of Media was ideal),776 had military obligations to the

Empire and owed their military settler status directly to the king.777 A similar instance of continuing loyalty to the legitimate king is evident in Achaeus’ abortive attempt to march against Antiochus not long after this battle.778 Nevertheless, several scholars have suggested that Polybius’ account was based on sources hostile to Antiochus’ main advisor Hermeias, who had strongly opposed Antiochus’ participation in suppressing Molon’s revolt. Therefore, we should treat the miraculous effect of the king’s appearance with caution.779

In particular, Bar-Kochva has argued that even if Polybius’ account is right, and the simple appearance of the king persuaded the enemy to surrender, Antiochus could not have relied on this as a military strategy. He therefore suggests that, in light of the battlefield’s hilly location,780 it is likely that Antiochus initially stationed his reserve troops out of sight, and that it was their encircling manoeuvre which caught Molon’s forces off-guard and won the day.781 Although speculative, this suggestion is plausible, as the psychological impact of the sudden appearance of troops on the army’s vulnerable flank was similarly enough to cause Demetrius’ mercenaries to surrender at Cyrrhestica.782 Onasander also recommends this tactic in his advice to commanders.783 Therefore, although the exact details are unclear, we can see that

776 See Chapter 3.2.3, and 3.4.1. 777 See Chapter 2.3; that Molon’s army consisted of a reasonable number of such troops is clear not only from his previous success against several of Antiochus’ generals and his ability to face Antiochus in a set-piece battle, but also from Polybius comment (5.53.9) that he possessed ‘heavy armed troops’ (τὰ βαρέα τῶν ὅπλων), which were most typically military settlers of the reserve. 778 Polybius, 5.57.6. 779 Bar-Kochva (1976) 121; Brown (1961) 187-95; Pédech (1964) 144; Schmitt (1964) 178-9. 780 Polybius, 5.52.5-7. 781 Bar-Kochva (1976) 122-3. 782 Polyaenus, 4.9.3; see Chapter 5.2.1a, 5.2.2c. 783 Onasander, 22; also: Vegetius, Epitoma Rei Militaris 3.17; cf. Arrian, Anabasis 3.12.1-2; see Chapter 5.2.1c, 5.2.2b for the elephant reserve at Ipsus.

177

Antiochus’ decision to vary his battlefield formation by utilising some of his infantry and cavalry as an offensive reserve had the potential to be decisive.

The only other (known) instance in which the Seleucids positioned their cavalry behind their main line is at Thermopylae. Here, in contrast to the battle against

Molon, both Livy and Appian note that there were no cavalry at all on the wings of the army. Rather, it was the war-elephants which Antiochus decided to station on his army’s flank in this battle, whilst his cavalry were placed behind them.784 Moreover the battlefield was completely unsuitable for cavalry warfare. Both the hills on one side of the army and the marshy ground on the other prevented the cavalry from being able to operate effectively, meaning that they thus played no role in the actual fighting. Unlike his engagement against Molon twenty-nine years earlier, it was not deliberate tactical planning that determined the battlefield position of Antiochus’ cavalry here, but rather necessity. Despite this, Antiochus’ ability simply to adapt his formation and use his war-elephants to perform the cavalry’s standard role of protecting the flank, demonstrates the Seleucid army’s flexibility, and its commanders’ sensitivity to the individual needs of specific engagements.

4.2.4. The Tripartite Structure and Cavalry Placement From this analysis, although in practically every battle for which we have sufficient detail the Seleucids conformed (at least in some way) to the standard template, placing cavalry on the wings as both an offensive force and protection for the phalanx’s more vulnerable flanks in the centre, this was not the extent of their tactical abilities. Rather, as the use of oblique formation at Raphia, the dual arenas at

Panion, and the potential ‘mini-formations’ at Beth-Zechariah show, the Seleucids

784 Livy, 36.18.4; Appian, Syriaca 18; see Chapter 5.2.1b.

178 frequently varied this standard formation to achieve different effects. Additionally,

Antiochus III’s striking deployment at Magnesia, and his use of an offensive reserve against Molon further demonstrate Seleucid innovation in contrast to previous scholarly claims of tactical stagnation.

The extent to which the Seleucid army’s tripartite division affected this deployment, however, is less certain, not least because attempts to identify this structure in the ancient battle accounts (other than at Magnesia) are often frustrated by the lack of any detailed specification of which cavalry contingents were present.785

Despite this, we can clearly see in at least four of our narratives (Raphia, Tapuria,

Panion, and Magnesia) that the Seleucid cavalry Guard normally fought around the king.786 Since the king typically chose to command the cavalry forces personally from the right wing,787 it is reasonable to assume that the Companions and Agema were also stationed here, although they could occasionally be split between the two wings, as Magnesia shows.788 The rare appearance of the king in the centre of the field at

Panion likewise led to the Guard’s alternate placement.789 The only notable exception is the battle against Molon, where the Companions were explicitly not stationed alongside the king.790 However, since the Agema is curiously absent in Polybius’ account (similarly at Panion), it is not entirely certain that Antiochus’ position away from the Companions was overly unusual.791

785 See Appendix 4, Table 4.2. 786 Polybius, 5.82.12, 10.49.7, 16.18.7; Livy, 37.40.6, 37.41.1; Appian, Syriaca 33; see Chapter 3.2.1. 787 See footnote 764. 788 Livy, 37.40.6, 37.40.11; Appian, Syriaca 32. 789 Polybius, 16.18.7. 790 Polybius, 5.53.4, 5.53.6. 791 See Chapter 3.2.1 for an assessment of the argument against the Agema’s inclusion in this battle; it is notable that there is no mention of either the Agema or Companions being present at Elasa. However, despite Bar-Kochva’s arguments to the contrary ((1976) 199, (1989) 395-6), since the royal Guard customarily fought alongside the king, and since Demetrius was currently occupied with trying to ensure the stability of his Empire, and so had merely sent Bacchides in his place, it seems likely that

179

Similarly, we can glimpse the positions of some of the ‘non-regular’ cavalry units due to the fact that, as Chapter 3.2.2 demonstrated, it is likely that the majority of these contingents were light cavalry. The high manoeuvrability of light cavalry, along with their typical missile weaponry, made them ideal for deployment either on the far edges of the wings (such as the Dahae at Magnesia), or occasionally in front of the main line as a supplement to the other skirmishers that were a standard part of ancient armies (such as the ‘Tarentines’ at Panion). Through this, the Seleucids were simultaneously able to employ fast-paced harassment of the enemy whilst also providing flexible protection for their other forces.

Conversely, prior to the introduction of cataphracts on the right flank at Panion, the identification of reserve cavalry on the battlefield remains complex. In the battle against Molon, Polybius notes that Antiochus positioned himself on the right wing alongside the ξυστοφόροι cavalry.792 As noted, given the influence of Alexander’s own practice, the parallel of the heavily-armed infantry reserve, and the subsequent cataphract developments, Seleucid military settlers plausibly contributed to the army’s heavy cavalry units.793 Since ξυστοφόροι (‘lance/spear bearers’) implies that this unit was relatively heavy, it is possible that this is a reference to the mounted reserve. Overall, we can therefore infer that the reserve cavalry typically occupied the flanks of the army, although the unusual deployment of the cataphracts next to the centre at Magnesia shows that Seleucid commanders could occasionally vary this, depending on their overall battle strategy.

neither the Argyraspides nor the Companions and Agema of the standing Guard participated in this battle. 792 Polybius, 5.53.2, 5.53.6. 793 Chapter 3.2.3.

180

In light of this analysis, I propose that we can see some indications of the

Seleucids’ tripartite organisation within the arrangement of their cavalry forces.

However, with the exception of the standing Guard, these battlefield dispositions were not necessarily dictated primarily by individual military status, but were rather a response to tactical necessity and the characteristics of each unit’s composition. Since each branch of the Seleucid army appears to have typically suited different tactical functions, it is clear that the two were interconnected. We must now analyse the

Seleucid cavalry’s various battlefield roles. Just as the previous section demonstrates a continuing tactical development in Seleucid battle arrangements, contradicting claims of Hellenistic stagnation, so does a close assessment of our battle accounts refute the persistent notions of cavalry decline in the scholarship.

4.3. The Role of Cavalry on the Battlefield

From the Classical Period onwards, the majority of battles were typically won by penetrating the enemy’s phalanx and subsequently slaughtering the formation and/or causing a rout. Initially, it was the infantry that provided the pivotal action, whilst the cavalry merely performed simple skirmishing duties and protected the army’s flanks. However, with the development of heavier, more aggressive cavalry under Philip II, mounted troops acquired a more decisive role.794 This is not to say that no one had ever used cavalry in this way prior to the Macedonians, but generally, as Willekes notes, ‘until the mid-4th Century BCE, Greek cavalry traditionally operated independently from the infantry on the battlefield... It was only with the ascendancy of Macedonia that the full potential of a combined attack was realised’.795

794 Gaebel (2002) 63-4, 154; Spence (1993) 27; Hyland (2013) 512-3; Sekunda (2010) 451. 795 Willekes (2015) 48; cf. Gaebel (2002) passim; also see Wrightson (2019); Introduction 0.1.3.

181

Where the Macedonians differed from their predecessors was their use of their own infantry forces, now armed with longer sarissae, to pin the opposing phalanx in place and attempt to open up a gap in its lines through which the cavalry could then charge.796 Thus, the hammer blow intended to crush the enemy infantry now came from the cavalry. Where it was not possible to open up a gap in the infantry line, a standard flank attack was often sought, as it was not feasible for cavalry to attempt a frontal charge against an unbroken phalanx.797 Since it was typical practice to station cavalry on either side of the phalanx to protect against such attacks, neutralising the enemy’s mounted forces became a necessity. Here the Macedonians’ developments to their cavalry’s offensive capabilities were of great value.798 Given the speed at which mounted warfare operated, along with the fact that ‘success in the centre did not secure victory because the infantry was still open to cavalry attack in the wings’,799 cavalry typically engaged first, a convention which we can see in all of the Seleucids’ battles for which we have detailed evidence, with the notable exception of Elasa.800

However, in the Hellenistic period, which saw the rise of armies composed of very similar contingents and commanders who possessed the same tactical mind-set,

796 Willekes (2015) 48-9; Gaebel (2002) 157, 180-1, 191-3, 286-7; Heckel (2008) 25-8. 797 Horses will not willingly charge a wall of spears (cf. Chapter 1.2). Nevertheless, Sears and Willekes (2012) argue that the Macedonians were able to accomplish this at Chaeronea (338 B.C.) through the adoption of the Scythians’ wedge formation, which allowed them to exploit the horse’s herd instincts. Whether this actually occurred at Chaeronea remains a matter of debate (see Gaebel (2002) 155-6; Markle (1977) 337-9, (1978b) 490-1 Rahe (1981); cf. Keegan (2004) 153-9). However, even if such an attack was theoretically possible, it was not without great detriment to the cavalry as a whole and was best avoided. Furthermore, it was no use against a sarissa-bearing phalanx, since the increased length of their weapons (which allowed up to four ranks to attack the enemy simultaneously) meant that the infantry would skewer the horses long before their riders reached their target. Bar-Kochva (1976) 170 suggests that the more heavily-armoured cataphracts had greater success in a frontal assault, though our only known evidence of this comes from Magnesia and the confusion surrounding Antiochus’ right-wing charge against the Latin ala, whose spears were crucially not as long as Hellenistic sarissae. 798 E.g. Arrian, Anabasis 1.15-6, Tactika 16.6-9; Aelianus Tacticus, 18.3; Asclepiodotus, 7.3; Diodorus, 16.3.1-2. 799 Bar-Kochva (1976) 198. 800 See Appendix 3, Table 3.1; Appendix 4, Table 4.1.

182 the asymmetry which had been so decisive for Philip and Alexander was lost.801

Therefore, although the basic aim of neutralising the enemy’s cavalry and outflanking the phalanx remained the same, it was not unusual for the now very similarly armed opposing cavalry forces simply to cancel each other out, leaving the remaining infantry to decide the issue in a manner very reminiscent of the Classical period.802 It is therefore unsurprising that scholarship has typically characterised Hellenistic warfare as suffering from a decline in the cavalry’s quality and significance, as well as a stagnation of tactics.803 Indeed, scholars have often noted that frequently battles seem to have dissolved into separate fights between the cavalry and infantry forces, implying a lack of the battlefield coordination which had been the ‘mainstay of

Alexander’s combat strategy’.804

Nevertheless, such claims ignore the complex developments of Hellenistic warfare. As Gaebel points out, the close symmetry of Successor armies following

Alexander often thwarted tactical intentions, providing ‘less opportunity than previously for combined arms directed against a specific weak spot in the enemy line’.805 Crucially, however, this does not mean that there was no attempt to exploit similar levels of integrated warfare; rather, Hellenistic commanders were simply forced to develop new ways of achieving successful battlefield coordination.806

Moreover, it is certainly not the case that Hellenistic cavalry was ineffective or insignificant. This section will therefore assess the Seleucids’ various cavalry tactics evident in our surviving sources to demonstrate the vital impact the Seleucid cavalry had on the battlefield; these are: charge and pursuit as a deliberate manoeuvre

801 Gaebel (2002) 191, 216, 227-8, 261-2, 290, 301, 307. 802 Tarn (1930a) 26-7, 68; Gaebel (2002) 101, 261-2 301; Sabin (2007) 374; Anderson (1961) 153. 803 See footnote 697; Introduction 0.1.1. 804 Willekes (2015) 48; also: Gaebel (2002) 205, 219, 226-9, 242, 260-2, 293, 301; Wrightson (2019) 1. 805 Gaebel (2002) 228. 806 See Chapter 5.

183 designed to remove enemy cavalry from the field; sham retreat; and the use of light

(‘non-regular’) cavalry to harass enemy formations.

4.3.1. Charge and Pursuit as an Offensive Strategy Beyond engaging with the opposing cavalry on the battlefield or charging into the flank, rear, or a gap in the infantry line, one of the cavalry’s fundamental roles was to pursue and kill a routed enemy. Here the horse’s natural abilities, notably its speed, stamina, and manoeuvrability, along with its potential psychological impact on opposing infantrymen, made it particularly ideal for this role.807 Such pursuits were a standard conclusion to the main engagement, as we can see in the aftermath of the

Seleucids’ attack at Tapuria.808 What is worth considering, however, is Antiochus’ decision at Raphia and Magnesia, and Demetrius’ parallel actions at Ipsus, to charge and pursue an enemy contingent as a deliberate part of the main offensive strategy in order to remove it permanently from the battlefield. In all three instances it was the king himself or his second in command who carried out this tactic,809 indicating its significance (at least theoretically) to the overall battle plan. This manoeuvre was far from unique in cavalry warfare;810 despite this, it is important to note the different intentions behind it in each instance, as well as its lack of success under Antiochus III and Demetrius.

Whilst the Seleucids’ deployment at Raphia was standard, the strengthening of the right wing (which was under Antiochus’ personal command), and the oblique formation of half of the cavalry stationed there, suggest that Antiochus intended this wing to deliver the main thrust of the Seleucid attack. That Ptolemy himself initially

807 Cf. Xenophon, Hellenika 5.4, Cyropaedia 4.3.16; Thucydides, 2.79, 4.96; see Chapter 1.2. 808 Polybius, 10.49.13, also cf. the Ptolemaic pursuit at Raphia (5.86.1). 809 Polybius, 5.85.7; Livy, 37.42.8-43.6; Appian, Syriaca 33, 36; Plutarch, Demetrius 29.3. 810 Cf. Alexander’s actions at Gaugamela (footnote 819); Bennett and Roberts (2009) 20.

184 commanded the wing directly opposite (before secretly joining the phalanx in the centre)811 further supports this. The battle opened with the customary clash of each side’s war-elephants, which resulted in the retreat of those stationed in front of the

Ptolemaic left, disrupting the other units behind them.812 Antiochus subsequently seized this opportunity to charge the disorganised Ptolemaic cavalry, whilst his mercenaries charged the enemy’s peltasts, causing a general retreat of the Ptolemaic left wing in a remarkable use of combined arms.813 Antiochus then continued his headlong charge, pursuing the retreating forces far from the main engagement. Not only did this expose the flanks of both phalanxes on this side of the battlefield, but it also meant that Antiochus was unaware of the developments elsewhere, which saw the defeat of his own left wing, and his phalanx’s gradual collapse in the centre.814

Therefore, despite this manoeuvre’s initial success, it ultimately contributed to the

Seleucids’ defeat.

Nevertheless, the fact that ‘the battle was won by Ptolemy because Antiochus and his cavalry were absent from the field’,815 illustrates the importance of maintaining a strong cavalry presence in Hellenistic engagements. Furthermore, it is worth considering what Antiochus had hoped to achieve by utilising this tactic.

Polybius’ judgement is particularly harsh: Antiochus, ‘still young and inexperienced… [supposed] from his own success that his army was victorious in

811 Polybius, 5.85.8. 812 See Chapter 5.2.2a. 813 Polybius, 5.84.2-10. 814 Polybius, 5.85. 815 Bar-Kochva (1976) 137; also: MacLeod (1977) 70; Gaebel (2002) 242.

185 other parts of the field too’.816 That it took an older officer to halt Antiochus’ charge and call his attention back to his retreating phalanx further supports this view.817

Despite this, Bar-Kochva questions the accuracy of Polybius’ verdict, since

Antiochus had already ‘proved himself’ in the battle against Molon, the ‘brilliant’ storming of the Porphyrion pass, and various other engagements in Coele-Syria prior to this battle, which both refute his ‘inexperience’ and indicate a reasonable ability for sound tactical judgement.818 Instead, he argues that Antiochus’ sustained charge was designed to kill Ptolemy, and so end the battle in a single stroke.819 This tactic was not uncommon in ancient warfare, and given the strengthened formation of the

Seleucid right wing, and the fact that Ptolemy was initially opposite Antiochus in the battle-line, I find Bar-Kochva’s proposal plausible. Furthermore, Antiochus’ actions parallel those of Alexander at Gaugamela (331 B.C.), where Alexander’s own pursuit of Darius was halted only when Parmenion’s messenger informed him of the struggling left wing.820 Whereas Alexander was fortunate, arriving in time to aid

Parmenion, and so cement his victory, at Raphia, Ptolemy managed to slip away from his retreating wing in order to command the infantry attack from centre; by the time

Antiochus realised what had happened, it was too late.

Although one might have expected Antiochus to have learnt from Raphia, we find a very similar situation twenty-seven years later at Magnesia. Once again, we see

Antiochus charge with his right wing and pursue the enemy off the field without realising what was transpiring behind him, ultimately leading to his army’s defeat.821

816 ὡς ἂν ἄπειρος καὶ νέος, ὑπολαμβάνων ἐκ τοῦ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸν μέρους καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παραπλησίως αὑτῷ πάντα νικᾶν, Polybius, 5.85.11. 817 Polybius, 5.85.12. 818 Bar-Kochva (1976) 137; Polybius, 5.54.1-6, 5.58-62, 5.66-71 respectively. 819 Bar-Kochva (1976) 138. 820 Diodorus, 17.60.4-6; Arrian, Anabasis 3.14.3-15.1; Quintus Curtius, 4.15.32-16.3 821 Livy, 37.42.8-43; Appian, Syriaca 36.

186

The difference here, however, is the tactical intent behind his charge. Unlike his actions at Raphia, Antiochus does not appear to have been aiming to kill the Roman commander with this manoeuvre, but rather, as the Seleucids’ unusual formation in this battle indicates, to create a gap in the enemy’s line, thus exposing it to a potentially devastating flank attack.822 Despite this, Antiochus did not turn his cavalry into the exposed side of the Roman infantry, but instead pursued those he had routed all the way to the Roman camp, possibly with the intention of seizing it,823 although the reason for this tactical change is unreported.824 Since seizing the enemy’s baggage was a well-known strategy which often induced opponents to surrender825 (indeed the threat to Antiochus’ own baggage at Thermopylae a year earlier was a contributing factor in his failure to defend the pass adequately),826 it is possible that, buoyed by his own success against the Latin ala, Antiochus decided in the spur of the moment to alter his objective.

Alternatively, since ‘speed would have excited the horses’ and encouraged their allelomimetic behaviour,827 and since ‘the faster a horse moves the more challenging it becomes [for the rider] to maintain control’,828 it is possible that it was simply necessity which forced Antiochus to continue his charge against the broken ala.

However, it is notable that Antiochus’ son successfully performed a very similar charge at Panion, where, as noted, the Seleucid cavalry were able to turn from their victory over the Ptolemaic horse into the now exposed phalanx as intended.829

Furthermore, a cavalry charge was often ‘a controlled affair, not a flat out gallop’,

822 See 4.2.2 above. 823 MacLeod (1977) 70; Bar-Kochva (1976) 172. 824 It additionally remains unclear whether all of the Argyraspides and Dahae which were also stationed on the right alongside Antiochus were also involved in this prolonged pursuit. 825 E.g. Diodorus, 18.40.6, 19.31.3, 19.42-3; Plutarch, Eumenes 16.5-17; cf. Quintus Curtius, 4.15.13. 826 Appian, Syriaca 19; Livy, 36.18.8; Bar-Kochva (1976) 8, 162, 205. 827 Hyland (2003) 65; see Chapter 1.3. 828 Willekes (2015) 50. 829 See 4.2.2 above.

187 and the ‘Nisaean’ horses of the heavily-armoured cataphracts and Agema on the

Seleucid right would not have been able to sustain high speeds for very long.830

Therefore, it is unlikely that this alternative was the sole reason for Antiochus’ prolonged pursuit.

It is important to remember that commanders do not always act logically on the battlefield. Given the parallel with Raphia, and the fact that the manoeuvre’s devastating success came only under the auspices of his son at Panion, I suggest that such costly tactical errors were due to Antiochus III’s own personality as a cavalry commander.831 That such a manoeuvre could be decisively successful indicates that, at least theoretically, there was nothing inherently wrong with Antiochus’ initial plan for his right wing at Magnesia, nor did his cavalry lack the ability to achieve it.

Rather, it was his execution of this in practice that floundered.

Regarding the comparable actions of Demetrius at Ipsus, Plutarch similarly points to Demetrius’ personal flaws for the failure of his charge and pursuit of

Seleucus I’s son Antiochus: ‘by pursuing him too fiercely and eagerly he threw away the victory’.832 In contrast to Antiochus III, however, Demetrius did show some awareness of the battlefield behind him, attempting to return, but he was unable to overcome the large number of war-elephants which Seleucus had moved in his way.833 Although this greater tactical awareness does not necessarily rule out rashness in pursuing the enemy off the battlefield, it is possible that the Seleucid cavalry were not sufficiently disrupted to allow Demetrius to return without fearing that they might

830 Willekes (2015) 50; see Chapter 1.3; the observation that the heavily armoured Achaemenid horses (notably not as heavy as cataphracts) quickly tired at Issus (333 B.C.) provides an instructive parallel, Arrian Anabasis 2.11.3; Quintus Curtius, 3.11.15; that the Seleucid cataphracts allegedly pursued the Romans to their camp further suggests a relatively controlled pace. 831 Also: Gaebel (2002) 241-2, 245, 254. 832 ἐν τῇ διώξει σοβαρᾷ καὶ φιλοτίμῳ παρὰ καιρὸν γενομένῃ τὴν νίκην διέφθειρεν, Plutarch, Demetrius 29.3. 833 See Chapter 5.2.2b.

188 rally and re-join the fight. This is not without merit, as a surprise return could potentially be disastrous.834 Bar-Kochva’s suggestion that Demetrius may have been attempting to capture the Allied baggage is possible, although I argue that his concern to return to aid his father, along with Antigonus’ continued hope that Demetrius would reappear,835 makes this unlikely. Alternatively, Tarn has proposed that

Antiochus may have deliberately tricked Demetrius into being drawn away from the battlefield, given the logistical difficulties that Seleucus would have faced in moving his elephants to block off Demetrius’ return effectively without creating chaos amongst his own lines (suggesting that this was not merely an opportunistic manoeuvre but rather a carefully planned operation).836

Therefore, although at Raphia, Magnesia, and Ipsus the use of charge and pursuit as a deliberate offensive strategy ultimately contributed to defeat rather than victory, this tactic demonstrates the crucial importance of maintaining a cavalry presence on the battlefield. Furthermore, it is important to note that in each instance, the cavalry themselves were actually victorious in their initial engagements, demonstrating that there was no decline in their military abilities. Rather, it was their commander’s subsequent use of them, along with their opponents’ manoeuvres, which negated this success.

4.3.2. Sham Retreat The opposite tactic to an offensive charge and pursuit is a sham retreat. Here, rather than aggressively driving off an enemy unit from the battlefield, a commander

834 Bar-Kochva (1976) 109; Gaebel (2002) 245; Tarn (1930a) 69; one could possibly suggest something similar for the Roman infantry at Magnesia, though the confusion of the sources prevents certainty. Furthermore, for the reasons given above, I prefer to attribute Antiochus’ prolonged pursuit more to his personality. 835 Plutarch, Demetrius 29.5. 836 Tarn (1930a) 68-9; also: Bar-Kochva (1976) 109-10; Gaebel (2002) 225-6; see Chapter 5.2.2a.

189 hoped to lure his opponent away by pretending to fall back from the enemy’s attack, before either countering or alternatively leading them into an ambush. Since pressing an advantage against a retreating enemy (whether deliberately as part of a conscious tactical plan or, more often, in the spur of the moment) is a typically instinctive feature of warfare, this tactic exploited the natural reactions of the opposing force.

Not only did it offer the advantage of potentially removing the enemy contingent from the field, but it was also quite normal for pursuing forces, in their eagerness, to lose their cohesiveness, leaving themselves open to a counterattack. Of course, maintaining one’s own formation whilst attempting a sham retreat was not without difficulty, but with careful planning this tactic could potentially be devastating.837

The extent to which Seleucus’ son actually employed this tactic at Ipsus is open to debate. Plutarch’s account is brief, telling us nothing more than:

After the armies engaged, Demetrius, with the largest and best part of the cavalry, clashed with Antiochus, the son of Seleucus; he fought brilliantly and routed his enemy, but by pursuing him too fiercely and eagerly he threw away the victory.838

As a biographer, Plutarch was far more concerned with the characterisation of his protagonist’s fatal error, which led to the tragic downfall of his father, than any accurate depiction of the battle manoeuvres.839 Therefore, any reconstruction of the stratagems employed, or the intentions behind them, remains speculative based on our understanding of the conventional practices of Hellenistic warfare.

837 Willekes (2015) 50-1; Gaebel (2002) 245; Bar-Kochva (1976) 109; Hyland (2003) 75. 838 γενομένης δὲ τῆς μάχης ἐν χερσὶ Δημήτριος ἔχων τοὺς πλείστους καὶ κρατίστους τῶν ἱππέων Ἀντιόχῳ τῷ Σελεύκου συνέπεσε, καὶ μέχρι τροπῆς τῶν πολεμίων λαμπρῶς ἀγωνισάμενος ἐν τῇ διώξει σοβαρᾷ καὶ φιλοτίμῳ παρὰ καιρὸν γενομένῃ τὴν νίκην διέφθειρεν, Plutarch, Demetrius 29.3. 839 The focus on Antigonus’ reaction and the pathos of his final words is particularly notable, Plutarch, Demetrius, 29.4-5.

190

The significance of Demetrius’ absence from the field, which crucially exposed the Antigonid phalanx’s right flank (in turn allowing Seleucus to harass it with his light cavalry and infantry, and ultimately causing the death of Antigonus), is worth considering. Although one could argue that Seleucus merely capitalised on a favourable situation, I favour Tarn’s suggestion that Antiochus’ retreat was a deliberate part of Seleucid tactics,840 given the Allies’ perfect combination of each element of their army.841 Regardless of Demetrius’ own tactical intentions at Ipsus, he was simply outmanoeuvred by his opponents.

The battle of Elasa offers another instance of the Seleucids’ use of a sham cavalry retreat. I Maccabees (and its paraphrase in Josephus’ Antiquitates Judaicae) notes that following the infantry engagement, which unusually preceded any cavalry movement on the wings, Judas Maccabaeus (having deliberately positioned himself opposite Bacchides) charged the Seleucid right wing and followed it to ‘Mount

Azotos’.842 Seeing this development, the Seleucid left-wing cavalry also joined the pursuit, trapping the Jews between the two forces and ultimately resulting in Judas’ death.843 That Judas Maccabaeus explicitly placed himself on the left wing of his army opposite Bacchides, along with his aggressive cavalry attack, suggests that his main objective was to kill the Seleucid commander.844 We might therefore draw a parallel between Judas’ charge and pursuit to Antiochus III’s actions at Raphia.

840 See Chapter 5.2.2b; however, cf. Bennett and Roberts (2009) 111. 841 Antiochus’ cavalry; the complex elephant manoeuvre (potentially ca. 300 elephants (see Chapter 5.2.1c) seem to have been deliberately placed behind the army in contrast to their conventional front- line position); and Seleucus’ use of light troops to attack Antigonus’ phalanx; see Chapter 5.2.3. 842 I Maccabees, 9.12-5; Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.427-9; the exact identification of this mountain/hill is unclear. Bar-Kochva’s commentary ((1989) 396-8), following the earlier proposals of Abel (1949) 162-3 and Grimm (1853) 135, et al., suggests that the Greek is garbled here following a potential mistake in the original Hebrew; cf. van Henten (1983). 843 I Maccabees, 9.16-8; Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.429-30. 844 Bar-Kochva (1989) 113-5, 393.

191

Nevertheless, it is Bacchides who was responsible for the tactical initiative of this battle.

Bacchides’ expedition to Judaea was intended to end the Jewish uprising. Since the surest way in which he could accomplish this was by capturing or killing their leader, Bacchides needed to entice Judas into a battle from which he could not escape if his army was defeated.845 It is therefore worth considering the unusual developments of this battle which saw the phalanx’s remarkable advance whilst the cavalry hung back. As noted, it was unusual to begin with an infantry attack since success in the centre did not necessarily equal victory if the enemy cavalry were still on the field.846 The fact that the order of attack was reversed at Elasa is thus significant, and Bar-Kochva has proposed that this reversal was a deliberate element of the Seleucids’ overall tactical plan.847

In particular, Bar-Kochva argues that had Bacchides attacked with his cavalry first, as expected, the high quality of his contingent may have quickly defeated the

Jewish force, but crucially would have allowed Judas Maccabeus to escape.848

Instead, by holding back, Bacchides was able to pressure Judas into attacking him or risk the superior Seleucid phalanx destroying his infantry.849 Moreover, he argues that the seeming ease with which Bacchides’ wing was ‘crushed’ (συνετρίβη), along with its ability to rally (something particularly difficult for a unit truly in retreat), and

845 Cf. Judas’ actions at Beth-Zechariah, I Maccabees, 6.47; Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.375; Bar-Kochva (1989) 113-4, 384, 393-4, (1976) 191-2, 198-9. 846 See p.162 above. 847 Bar-Kochva (1976) 198-200, (1989) 75, 113-5, 392-402. 848 I remain sceptical about Bar-Kochva’s claim that Bacchides’ cavalry comprised the Seleucid Guard, see footnote 791. 849 Bar-Kochva (1976) 199, (1989) 114-5, 393-4.

192 the remarkable assistance of the left wing, which trapped Judas Maccabaeus between the two Seleucid forces, suggests a carefully planned tactical manoeuvre.850

However, Taylor has contested Bar-Kochva’s analysis of this battle, claiming that any suggestion of a sham retreat is ‘entirely unsupported by the sources’.851

Similarly, in light of Tropper’s reassessment of I Maccabees’ account of Beth-

Zechariah, and his conclusion that the majority of this battle narrative is the product of literary invention, we must question how far we should accept I Maccabees’ subsequent account of Elasa. In particular, the ease with which Judas allegedly defeated Bacchides’ wing here notably parallels the earlier claim that the Jews immediately killed 6,000 men at the beginning of Beth-Zechariah.852 As a participant in the Hasmonean revolt, the author of I Maccabees was personally invested in Judas’ story.853 Since this was Judas Maccabaeus’ final battle, it is natural to expect that he deliberately crafted his account to distinguish his hero in his final hour.854

Although it is necessary to bear these objections in mind,855 we should remain wary of pushing them too far. The unusual tactical decision to open the battle with the heavy infantry, and the fact that the Seleucid left-wing cavalry also abandoned the field to follow Judas’ in his pursuit of Bacchides, trapping him between two Seleucid forces, is particularly striking. Moreover, Bar-Kochva’s reconstruction fits with the overall aims of Bacchides’ Judean expedition, and parallels the sophisticated Seleucid tactics at Ipsus, whilst also allowing for I Maccabees’ glorification of his hero.

Accordingly, although we must exercise caution in attempting to reconstruct the

850 I Maccabees, 9.15-7; Bar-Kochva (1976) 199, (1989) 397-9. 851 Taylor (1992) 209. 852 I Maccabees 6.42. 853 See Introduction, 0.2.1. 854 Also: Bar-Kochva (1993) 238, (1989) 377. 855 Cf. Sievers’ criticism of Bar-Kochva’s reconstruction of Ammaus ((1991) 141).

193 battles presented in I Maccabees, I propose that the claim that Bacchides’ cavalry performed a deliberate sham retreat should stand.

Therefore, despite the problems of our sources, we can see that – just as

Seleucid commanders sometimes utilised charge and pursuit as an offensive cavalry strategy – so too were they aware of its opposite potential. In each of the examples analysed above it is apparent that commanders were attempting to deliver the decisive blow via their cavalry in an echo of earlier Macedonian practice, demonstrating the continuing significance of mounted warfare in the Hellenistic period. Furthermore, it is notable that the implementation of a sham retreat at both Ipsus and Elasa directly resulted in Seleucid victory. That the utilisation of this tactic could have such a decisive impact on the battle’s outcome, effective both in 301 B.C. and in 160 B.C., testifies to the sustained quality and importance of the Seleucid cavalry.

4.3.3. Harassment of the Enemy Another important role that Seleucid cavalry performed on the battlefield was the harassment of enemy contingents (most often infantry) to disrupt their formations and create a gap in their line which other units could then exploit. This was typically performed by the army’s light units, not least because it required speed and manoeuvrability, as a well as a preference for missile weapons, to be effective.856 It was therefore commonly the Seleucid ‘non-regulars’ that fulfilled this function due to their generally more suitable arms and armour. Most often commanders employed such skirmishing tactics in the opening stages of the battle to ‘soften-up’ the enemy phalanx in particular before the main attack. It was thus standard to station many of

856 See p.175 above.

194 these lighter cavalry units in front of the army’s main line (as was the case at Panion and Elasa), or on the extreme flank (such as the Dahae at Magnesia).857

The Seleucids’ use of such skirmishing tactics was certainly not new. Nor did it utilise cavalry in unconventional ways, since harassment of enemy infantry via mounted archers and javelin-men, whilst also protecting one’s own infantry against similar attacks, was the standard role of cavalry in the Classical period.858 This does not imply, however, that Seleucid cavalry tactics suffered from stagnation. Rather, their use of such troops indicates sensitivity to the different abilities of their various units, whilst their combined use with heavier contingents demonstrates tactical sophistication. Moreover, beyond its typical supporting role, the use of cavalry harassment in the Hellenistic period was also capable of having a significant impact on the battlefield.

Unfortunately, the complex nature of the sources means that our understanding of the light cavalry’s actions at Panion, Magnesia, and Elasa is limited. Indeed, just as ancient authors often pass over mounted units as a whole in favour of the infantry, so too are accounts of the heavy cavalry’s exploits typically preferred over their lighter counterparts. Despite this, Plutarch’s account of Ipsus clearly shows the devastation that Seleucus’ relentless harassment of the Antigonid phalanx caused following

Antiochus’ sham retreat:

Seleucus’ men did not charge [the enemy infantry], but kept them in fear of a charge by continually riding around them, giving them an opportunity to change sides. And this was what came to pass. For a

857 Polybius, 16.18.7; I Maccabees 9.11; Livy, 37.40.8. 858 E.g. Thucydides, 2.79.1-6, 5.10.9, 5.58.4, 6.70.3; Xenophon, Hellenika 3.2.3, 3.4.13-4, 4.3.4-5, 4.8.18, 5.4.39, 5.4.52-3, 7.2.10; see footnote 768.

195

large body of them, having detached from the rest, voluntarily swapped sides, and those remaining were routed.859

The fact that the mere threat of a cavalry charge (even from more lightly-armed units) against an unprotected phalanx was enough to break them is testament to the psychological impact of this tactic and the vital importance of having mounted protection for the heavy infantry. Furthermore, Seleucus’ spectacular combination of his various mounted units in this battle to achieve this effect not only demonstrates his tactical prowess,860 but also the decisive impact of Hellenistic cavalry on the battlefield.

Another instance where the tactical use of light troops to harass the enemy was overwhelmingly successful was in the opening manoeuvres of Magnesia. Here

Eumenes, fighting on the Romans’ side, swiftly exploited the weaknesses of the

Seleucids’ scythed chariots by ordering his light infantry and cavalry to ‘spread out... and hurl their weapons at them from all sides at once’.861 This terrified the horses pulling the chariots, and their panic not only rendered them useless, but also spread to the camel-archers and cataphracts stationed next to them, quickly resulting in the disastrous collapse of the Seleucid left wing.862

There were of course occasions when such tactics were unsuccessful, such as at

Azotos (148 B.C.), where despite the brevity of I Maccabees’ account, we learn that

Apollonius’ cavalry were unable to break Jonathan’s forces.863 Nevertheless, despite paralleling the use of cavalry in Classical Greece, when mounted troops were

859 οἱ περὶ Σέλευκον οὐκ ἐνέβαλον μέν, ὡς δὲ ἐμβαλοῦντες ἐφόβουν καὶ περιήλαυνον, μεταβάλλεσθαι διδόντες αὐτοῖς· ὃ καὶ συνέβη. πολὺ γὰρ μέρος ἀπορραγὲν ἑκουσίως μετεχώρησε πρὸς ἐκείνους, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐτράπη, Plutarch, Demetrius 29.3-4. 860 See Chapter 5.2.3. 861 Cretenses sagittarios funditoresque et iaculatores cum aliquot turmis equitum non confertos, sed quam maxime possent dispersos excurrere iubet, et ex omnibus simul partibus tela ingerere, Livy, 37.41.9; cf. Appian, Syriaca 33. 862 Livy, 37.41.10-42.3; Appian, Syriaca 33-4; see Chapter 5.3.2. 863 I Maccabees 10.79-83.

196 typically not major players in the hoplite-dominated conflicts of this period, the events of both Ipsus and Magnesia demonstrate that, under the right conditions, such harassment tactics could have a devastating impact. Although they were not employed with the aggressive power of heavy cavalry in mind, such successes prove that even though their use was often only in a supportive capacity, skirmishing cavalry could still have significant offensive roles on the Hellenistic battlefield.

Furthermore, since it was the Seleucids’ ‘non-regular’ cavalry contingents that performed these harassment tactics, their utilisation illustrates the different branches of their army’s tripartite division more clearly, even when the sources do not specifically identify the troops within the Seleucid formation.

4.3.4. The Tripartite Structure and Cavalry Tactics The relationship between the Seleucid army’s tripartite structure and their cavalry tactics on the battlefield is naturally important for us to understand, although, as with the analysis of the cavalry’s deployment in the battle arrangement, it is not always visible in our ancient sources.864 However, by comparing the various roles that the Seleucid cavalry performed in the handful of battles where we have detailed evidence with the different types of cavalry contingents that we know the Seleucids employed,865 it is possible to make some tentative suggestions.

As noted, the importance of harassment and skirmishing tactics, which relied on speed, manoeuvrability, and often the capacity to fight from a distance, meant that it was necessary for the Seleucids to employ cavalry contingents suited to these functions. Since Chapter 3.2.2 suggested that it was the subject and allied contingents of the ‘non-regulars’ that most typically specialised in this style of warfare, it became

864 See Chapter 4.2.4.; Appendix 4, Table 4.2. 865 See Chapter 3.2.

197 natural for Seleucid rulers to integrate these troops into the tactical formations of their army. Beyond merely bolstering the numerical strength and diversity of their forces, the ‘non-regulars’ made a significant contribution to the Seleucid cavalry’s tactical ability. This is most notable in their use to break Antigonus’ phalanx at Ipsus, but is also evident from their sustained deployment in the Seleucids’ battle-line throughout the period.

On the other hand, the lingering impact of Alexander the Great’s conquests created a continued preference for the use of heavily-armed shock-cavalry intended to strike the decisive blow against opposing forces. The armament of both the Seleucid cavalry Guard and the military settlers of the reserve therefore reflected this,866 and many of the aggressive charges, especially those designed to destroy or remove enemy units from the field, such as at Panion, Magnesia, and most likely Raphia, generally (though not necessarily exclusively) featured these two branches of the

Seleucid cavalry.867 Similarly, attempts to lure a significant portion of the enemy’s forces away from the battlefield through the use of a sham retreat, as at Ipsus and

Elasa, also implies the participation of the Seleucids’ main heavy cavalry forces in order to make such a withdrawal convincing.

Therefore, I propose that the relationship between the Seleucids’ tripartite structure and their cavalry tactics was subtly interconnected, and that each element developed alongside the other. In many cases, at least initially, it was most likely tactical necessity which dictated the composition and structure of the Seleucid cavalry

866 See Chapter 3.2.1, 3.2.3. 867 As noted in Chapter 3.2.1 and 3.2.3, the fact that the Seleucid cavalry are undifferentiated in Polybius’ account of Raphia means that it is not possible to determine which units, beyond the Guard (Polybius, 5.85.13), were part of Antiochus’ right-wing charge against Ptolemy. Similarly, the lack of details for the battle against Molon makes it impossible to know which cavalry contingents Antiochus used in his unique offensive reserve, or indeed what roles (shock-charge or missile-based harassment) they were intended to play once they had encircled the enemy.

198 and its subsequent battlefield deployment. Nevertheless, as a consequence of the varying fighting styles favoured by the disparate peoples within the Seleucid Empire, and their natural division between the Guard, reserve and ‘non-regulars’, it is possible that the army’s organisation in turn had some influence on the tactics that Seleucid commanders employed. Just as the natural diversity of their horse ‘types’ theoretically enabled the Seleucids to blend the cavalry traditions of their Macedonian and Achaemenid predecessors,868 so did the maintenance of their tripartite military infrastructure encourage the combination of these distinct fighting styles in practice.

The complex interplay of heavy and light units at Ipsus in particular shows how commanders could utilise each element of their cavalry alongside the others to create a devastatingly successful effect. The careful integration of the Guard, cataphracts, and light cavalry869 in the battle formations of Panion and Magnesia are also notable examples of the dialogue between the army’s tripartite organisation and a commander’s tactical intention. As the Hellenistic period progressed, we can see that both the Seleucids’ tripartite structure and the battlefield roles of their cavalry complemented each other effectively, creating a system which ensured the tactical flexibility and operational efficacy of their mounted corps.

4.4. Conclusion

It is clear that the traditional claims of Hellenistic tactical stagnation and cavalry decline are incorrect. Just as the maintenance of a fluctuating infantry:cavalry ratio between 10:1 and 5:1 indicates the continued theoretical importance and

868 See Chapter 1.3. 869 ‘Tarentines’ at Panion; ‘Tarentines’, Dahae, and Galatians at Magnesia; for the Seleucids’ combined use of the cavalry with their unconventional mounted units, see Chapter 5.

199 flexibility of Seleucid cavalry, so too does a reassessment of the battle formations and cavalry tactics employed in their various engagements illustrate the reality of mounted warfare’s significance. Despite the limited nature of our evidence, and the complications of reconstructing some of the details in our sources, we can see that although the Seleucids’ battlefield deployment typically conformed to standard practice (cavalry on the flanks and the phalanx in the centre) throughout the

Hellenistic period, Seleucid commanders demonstrated a sustained ability to vary this subtly for different tactical effects, as the oblique formation at Raphia, the dual arenas at Panion, and the possible ‘mini-formations’ at Beth-Zechariah show. Moreover, the unique arrangement of Antiochus’ right wing at Magnesia, with its emphasis on the heavy cavalry as a hinge between the phalanx and Argyraspides, and the striking decision to position some of the cavalry behind the main lines as an offensive reserve in the battle against Molon illustrates a willingness for experimentation and innovation.

Of the nine battles for which we have detailed evidence, the outcomes of at least five were decisively affected by the actions of the Seleucid cavalry, three of which resulted in victory.870 In particular, the offensive power of the cataphracts’ charge at Panion proved devastating to the Ptolemaic force stationed in the northern arena, highlighting the value of their introduction into the Seleucid army, whilst their ability to turn from their victory over the opposing cavalry into the now unprotected phalanx is testament to their high quality and discipline. Likewise, Bacchides’ putative sham retreat at Elasa, supported by the cavalry stationed on his left wing, illuminates the cunning of Seleucid commanders in using their cavalry forces to

870 The battle against Molon could potentially be added to this list if we accept Bar-Kochva’s suggestion that it was the use of the offensive reserve which won the battle (see section 4.2.3 above); although Beth-Zechariah was also a Seleucid victory, the details, as noted (section 4.2.1), remain uncertain.

200 manipulate their opponent’s actions on the battlefield. This was also the case at Ipsus, and Seleucus’ combination of this manoeuvre with his use of light cavalry to psychologically harass the Antigonid phalanx, further demonstrates his tactical sophistication, as well as the decisive potential of skirmish-based warfare.871

Even the losses of Raphia and Magnesia exemplify the importance of Seleucid cavalry, since on both occasions the absence of Antiochus III’s right wing due to its prolonged pursuit of individual enemy contingents directly contributed to the

Seleucid defeat. Gaebel’s claim that Antiochus ‘overvalued’ the use of cavalry as ‘a striking force against a combined-arms army that was anchored by good infantry’ in these two battles, however, is questionable.872 Not only was Antiochus able to rout the Ptolemaic left-wing cavalry at Raphia, and one of the Latin alae at Magnesia, but, as the actions of his son at Panion demonstrate, his cavalry tactics could also be hugely successful when they were executed as intended and with consideration for the developments elsewhere on the battlefield.873

Therefore, whilst there were undoubtedly battles where the cavalry’s effects were somewhat muted,874 leaving the infantry to decide the issue in the centre in a manner reminiscent of the hoplite-dominated warfare of the Classical period,875 I strongly disagree with the suggestion that the cavalry declined from its period of dominance under Philip II and Alexander the Great. Not only had the nature of battle fundamentally changed, meaning that it is unreasonable to expect Hellenistic

871 For the important role of the Seleucid war-elephants in this manoeuvre, see Chapter 5.2.3. 872 Gaebel (2002) 242. 873 As we shall see in Chapter 5.2.3, although Gaebel’s subsequent comment that both of these battles also suffered from a lack of coordination between the various Seleucid units has some merit regarding the actions at Magnesia, its application to Raphia is incorrect. 874 The infantry’s arrival at Tapuria appears to have been responsible for carrying the day against the Bactrian cavalry (Polybius, 10.49.11), whilst, as noted, the cavalry played no role in the fighting at Thermopylae due to the unsuitability of the terrain for mounted warfare. 875 See footnote 697; Introduction footnote 5.

201 commanders to have replicated Alexander’s dominance, but we can see that the cavalry did remain vitally important to the Seleucids, both in terms of the resources they devoted to them,876 and their tactical operation on the battlefield.

Although a cursory glance appears to indicate little change in the overall battle positions and tactical roles of the Seleucid cavalry from the battle of Ipsus (301 B.C.) to Elasa (160 B.C.), a closer evaluation demonstrates that Seleucid commanders were capable of experimenting with different battle formations and tactics, often with significant impact. Furthermore, by integrating each element within their tripartite military structure, the Seleucids were able to achieve greater levels of battlefield coordination between their individual units than scholars have so far recognised. As we shall see, this was especially prevalent in their introduction and continued use of more unusual troops, such as war-elephants, scythed chariots, and camel-archers in conjunction with their standard cavalry units throughout the Hellenistic period. It is therefore necessary to consider how the Seleucids’ use of these unconventional contingents developed alongside the cavalry in order to assess the true potential of the

Seleucids’ mounted corps.

876 See Chapter 3.3-4.

202

CHAPTER 5 Combined Arms: The Use of Unconventional Troops

5.1. Introduction

The preceding chapters have analysed the various horse-based contingents of the Seleucid cavalry, assessing the ‘types’ of horses it possessed (Chapter 1), how it was organised within the Seleucids’ tripartite military infrastructure (Chapters 2-3), and its operation on the battlefield (Chapter 4) to refute misconceptions in the scholarship of its declining importance and tactical ability in the Hellenistic period.

However, these simple horse contingents were not the only mounted troops that the

Seleucids utilised in their army. An overview of the battles relevant to this thesis shows that war-elephants, as well as occasionally scythed chariots and camel-archers, also played significant roles within the mounted corps. Although the numerical data for their battlefield use gives rather underwhelming proportions for unconventional troops in comparison to the cavalry and infantry (with war-elephants, scythed chariots, and camels forming only ca. 0.2% of the army as a whole, and 1.6% of the mounted troops themselves), their sustained use throughout the Hellenistic period is testimony to their significance.877 As we can see in Table 5.1 (Appendix 5), war- elephants especially feature in almost every Seleucid battle for which we have detailed evidence. It is therefore necessary to reassess the tactical operation of these other mounted units to demonstrate how these troops worked in conjunction with the standard cavalry, and to provide a comprehensive assessment of the Seleucid mounted arm as a whole.

877 See Appendix, 5, Table 5.3; it is important not to be misled by these figures. Rather than indicating the unimportance of unconventional mounted troops to the army’s composition, they illustrate the extensive impact they were capable of achieving, so that only a small number of them were needed to be effective.

203

Given the symmetrical nature of Hellenistic warfare, scholars have typically assumed that the introduction of ‘unusual’ contingents in Hellenistic armies was simply part of an ‘arms race’ aimed at discovering a new ‘super-weapon’.878 They are thus typically dismissed as novelties whose effects soon wore off.879 Furthermore,

Ducrey and Serrati have explicitly linked their notions of a decline in Hellenistic cavalry to the sustained use of such unconventional troops throughout the period.880

However, this attitude crucially misunderstands and undervalues the roles of these contingents. This likely stems from the fact that, although there has been a recent growth in works on war-elephants in particular, many of these treat such troops only in isolation; there remains a significant lack of analysis on the integration of unconventional units within the organisation and operation of Hellenistic armies.881

This chapter rectifies this by assessing the Seleucids’ incorporation of their war- elephants, scythed chariots, and camel-archers into their tripartite military infrastructure, and demonstrating how their operation on the battlefield was intended to supplement the roles of the cavalry.

Wrightson’s recent work on the application of combined arms theory to the battles of the ancient world is particularly useful. Although a modern theoretical concept, Wrightson has demonstrated that ‘the basic idea that different combat arms and weapons systems must be used in concert to maximize the survival and effectiveness of the others’882 is applicable to the ancient world. His work provides a new approach for assessing the integration of different troops and their operation on the battlefield, allowing him to trace the development of tactical sophistication from

878 Trautmann (2015) 217, 226, 249, 265; Spinage (1994) 265; Gaebel (2002) 296. 879 Serrati (2013) 191-3; Ducrey (1986) 103-8 = (1985) 105-10; Glover (1948) 3, 11, (1950) 3, 6-8; Gaebel (2002) 222, 296; Sabin (2007) 421; Edwards (2001) 902; Trautmann (2015) 230, 260; Epplett (2007) 220. 880 Ducrey (1986) 103 = (1985) 105; Serrati (2013) 191; see Introduction, 0.1.1. 881 See Introduction, 0.1.3. 882 House (2001) 4, (1984) 2.

204 the Archaic period of Greece to Alexander the Great and his Successors.883

Significantly, however, his work goes no further than Ipsus, perpetuating the mistaken idea of the decline and stagnation of warfare in the Hellenistic period.884

This is most unfortunate, as the application of combined arms theory to the battles of this era offers an invaluable corrective to the misunderstanding of unconventional troops. The analysis here builds on Wrightson’s work by using this new combined arms approach to reassess the Seleucids’ use of war-elephants, scythed chariots, and camel-archers. I shall provide a much needed reassessment of these unconventional troops, offering a new understanding of their tactical integration within the Seleucids’ mounted corps. Rather than considering these contingents to be mere novelties, this chapter will prove that the Seleucid Empire’s use of unconventional troops both supplemented and supported their traditional cavalry units, demonstrating a greater receptiveness for military coordination than scholars have previously recognised.

In order to do this, I shall take each of the Seleucids’ unconventional mounted troops in turn, starting first with the war-elephants, before moving on to the scythed chariots, and finally the camel-archers, addressing them in order of their importance to the Seleucid army. Since war-elephants were an almost constant feature of the

Seleucid army, whereas scythed chariots are only (securely) recorded on four separate occasions, and camel-archers only at Magnesia, the main focus will naturally be on these animals and their impact on the Hellenistic battlefield.885 The structure of this chapter is deliberately intended to mirror that of Chapter 4 concerning the tactical operation of the Seleucid cavalry so that we can easily consider their use of unconventional troops alongside their standard cavalry units. Therefore, the

883 Wrightson (2019), (2015). 884 Wrightson (2019) 1. 885 See Appendix 5, Table 5.1.

205 individual analyses of the war-elephants, scythed chariots, and camel-archers will each be split into three sub-sections:

1) Battlefield Position,

2) Tactical Role,

3) Evidence of Combined Arms?

By structuring the chapter in this way, it is possible to assess our various battle accounts more thoroughly from a range of distinct but interconnected angles. Not only does this enable us to evaluate the specifics of how each unconventional contingent individually operated within the Seleucid army in its own right, but it also creates a clearer and more logical system that allows us to draw comparisons between the separate elements of the Seleucid mounted corps, creating a fuller understanding of the theoretical and tactical operation and significance of this arm.

With the exceptions of Tapuria and Elasa, I shall thus consider the same battles that were analysed for the cavalry in Chapter 4, with the addition of Cyrrhestica (285

B.C.) and the ‘Elephant Victory’ (270’s B.C.).886 Tapuria and Elasa will not be discussed since there is no evidence that war-elephants, scythed chariots, or camels participated in these engagements. Conversely, Cyrrhestica and the ‘Elephant

Victory’, which are notable for their recorded use of unconventional Hellenistic troops, did not form part of the previous chapter’s analysis because of the lack of any surviving details there regarding the operation of the Seleucid cavalry. As with the previous chapter, the assessment presented here will follow the same methodological approach to reconstructing ancient battle narratives.887

886 See Chapter 4, p.160. 887 See Chapter 4.1, also Introduction 0.2.2.

206

Overall, this chapter will refute the claims that the widespread use of unconventional weapons in the Hellenistic period was directly connected to, and in some cases responsible for, the gradual decline in the cavalry’s importance as a tactical arm. Rather, it will show that war-elephants, scythed chariots, and camel- archers each formed an integrated part of the Seleucid Empire’s military infrastructure that was intended to supplement and support their main cavalry units.

5.2. Elephants

As noted, the first, and most important, unconventional mounted troops that we must consider are war-elephants. Not only did the Seleucids consistently utilise these animals in nearly all of their battles, but they also made temporary appearances in every major Hellenistic army throughout the period.888 Having first entered into the

Greco-Macedonian military consciousness with Alexander’s conquests,889 the speed with which the Diadochi incorporated elephants into their armies is remarkable.890

Despite the frequent criticisms of their effectiveness,891 it is clear that of all unconventional units, war-elephants were the most significant and long-lived addition to the Hellenistic battlefield, even if some aspects of their nature occasionally made them a liability for commanders.

Hailing initially from India (and featuring extensively in warfare there throughout history), the war-elephants of the Diadochi, and subsequently the

888 See Appendix, 5, Tables 5.1, 5.7. 889 Arrian, Anabasis, 5.15.3-18; Diodorus, 17.87-9; Quintus Curtius, 8.14; the Greeks knew of elephants before this, notably in the fourth century B.C. writings of Ctesias and Aristotle, but Alexander’s was the first Greco-Macedonian army to face them in battle; Scullard (1974) 32-7, 51; Trautmann (2015) 220, 225; Spinage (1994) 265. 890 See Quintus Curtius, 10.9.12-4, 10.10.1; Diodorus, 18.25.6, 18.35, 18.39.7-40, 18.50.1-3; Photius, Bibliotheca, 92, 72b21-6; Trautmann (2015) 226. 891 E.g. Asclepiodotus, 1.3; Apian, Hispanica 46; Serrati (2013) 191-2; Ducrey (1986) 103 = (1985) 105; Sabin (2007) 421; Gaebel (2002) 296.

207

Seleucids, belonged to the Asian species (Elephas Maximus), averaging 6.6-11.5 ft/2.5-3.5 m in height.892 In general, elephants are typically peaceful animals, although they can become easily frightened in captivity. This, combined with their intelligence, meant that, like horses, extensive training was necessary to condition them for effective battlefield use.893 Even then, it was not always possible to control them, and on numerous occasions throughout the Hellenistic period elephants panicked, disrupting or trampling their own men.894 Moreover, even basic concerns, such as maintaining their number and keeping them well fed presented a logistical nightmare.895

Despite this, elephants possessed several military virtues, the most prominent being their imposing appearance, which effortlessly conveyed strength and prestige, making them a prevalent feature of contemporary, especially Seleucid, iconography.896 Not only did their height and bulk allow them to dominate the battlefield, but the formidable tusks of male elephants in particular were potentially lethal weapons; they could also seize men from the ground with their trunks, and

892 Conversely, the Carthaginians and Romans utilised the smaller ‘Forest’ elephants (Loxodonta Cyclotis, 6.6-8.2 ft/2-2.5 m) from North Africa. Convention has typically assigned the same variety to the Ptolemies, although a recent scientific study has challenged this (Schnieder (2016); Brandt (2014), see 5.2.2a below); whilst these distinctions may initially seem trivial, indicating merely the convenience or necessity of location, they could have significant military implications, determining where commanders placed their elephant contingents in the battle formation, and how many soldiers each animal potentially carried, see 5.2.1c, 5.2.2a below. 893 See Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra, 2.32; Kistler (2007) 9, 111; Scullard (1974) 22-3, 32; Nossov (2008) 4, 7; Spinage (1994) 269. 894 Appendix 5, Tables 5.4, 5.7; cf. Hasdrubal’s instructions to his mahouts to kill their own elephants if they became uncontrollable, Livy, 49.1-2. 895 Elephants require a considerable amount of food and water (see Trautmann (2015) 26, 54; Kistler (2007) 15-6, 42, 64-5, 111, 147; Scullard (1974) 20). They are also notoriously difficult to breed in captivity, and cannot be used for war until at least 15 years old (Gaebel (2002) 296; Trautmann (2015) 46, 56-9; Bar-Kochva (1976) 79; Epplett (2007) 224; Kistler (2007) 69). Although some suggest that the Seleucids attempted to breed their elephants at Apamea, it is unlikely that this was particularly successful, or even the Seleucids’ primary means of maintaining their war-elephant corps (cf. B.M. 92688.12-3; Smith (1924) 154-7; Polybius, 11.34.12). 896 Elephants are particularly frequent on Seleucid coins (B.M. BNK,G.808, B.M. RPK,p175A.10.SelI; Houghton and Lorber (2002) passim; Newell (1977), (1978)), see footnote 908 below; Pottier and Reinach (1887) pl. X; non-Seleucid: MNE 23.949; Scullard (1974) pl.X, XII, XVII-XXIV.

208 easily trample soldiers underfoot.897 Furthermore, their trunks and tusks especially added to the strange and potentially terrifying appearance of these unusual animals, and, as we shall see, the importance of their psychological impact on both men and horses was one of their most significant military advantages.898 Additionally, elephants are typically capable of moving ca. 3 mph (4.8 kph), covering up to 15-20 miles (24-32 km) per day.899 They can also carry heavy loads,900 and it soon became customary, following Pyrrhus’ campaigns in the early third century B.C., for

Hellenistic war-elephants to carry ca. 3-4 soldiers (armed with bows, javelins, and sometimes even sarissae), who were housed in towers strapped to their backs.901 In this way, both the height and offensive power of war-elephants were significantly increased.902

With regards to their integration into the Seleucids’ tripartite system, their classification is relatively simple, although here it is important to note that, unlike the

Seleucids’ other contingents, we are not dealing with a unit specific to a particular group of people who had a defined military status, but rather the animal mounts themselves. Since the Seleucid Empire was not an area that elephants were native to in this period,903 an extensive logistical infrastructure was needed simply to obtain and maintain these animals, let alone train and outfit them for war. Seleucid war-

897 Philostratus, Vita Apollonii 2.12; Aelian, De Natura Animalium 6.56; Aristotle, Historia Animalium 9.1; Pliny, Naturalis Historia 8.4; Scullard (1974) 16, 18; Nossov (2008) 4, 6; Trautmann (2015) 24; Kistler (2007) 12. 898 See 5.2.2c below. 899 Kistler (2007) 11; though note Antigonus’ forced march of ca. 287 miles (462 km) in seven days, Diodorus, 18.44.2. 900 Scullard (1974) 19, 22; Nossov (2008) 6; Trautmann (2015) 51. 901 Zonaras, 8.3; Polybius, 5.84.2; Livy, 37.40.4; Aelian, De Natura Animalium 13.9; Strabo, 15.1.52; Pliny, Naturalis Historia 8.22; Scullard (1974) 240-5; Nossov (2008) 18-24; Bar-Kochva (1989) 16, 317-22. 902 Height was also increased through the various headpieces attached to the animals, see Livy, 37.40.4. 903 Chandragupta quickly recovered Alexander’s Indian territories at the start of Seleucus I’s reign (Strabo, 15.2.9); elephants were once found in ancient Syria during the Assyrian period, Budge and King (1902) xlix, liii, 85-6, 139, 205; Lorber (2012); Trautmann (2015) 79.

209 elephant contingents were therefore not part of their ‘non-regular’, or reserve branches. Rather, I propose that this highly specialised unit formed part of the standing troops, with the main herd kept alongside the general war-office and royal horse-stud at Apamea.904 Although, as we shall see, this contingent did not operate in the same manner as the cavalry and infantry Royal Guard (it notably did not fight around the king),905 the inherent ability of war-elephants to convey prestige, as a symbolic embodiment of ‘the superlative character of kingship’,906 illustrates why a

Hellenistic king would choose to reserve them for himself.907 Just like the horned- horse, war-elephants became a royal Seleucid symbol,908 indicating their significance for Seleucid rulers. Given their consistent use of these troops throughout their battles, we must assess their operation and tactical integration with the other mounted units on the battlefield.

5.2.1. Battlefield Position Mirroring the analysis of Chapter 4, the first things that we must consider are where the Seleucids typically positioned their war-elephants in their battle-line; how

904 Strabo, 16.2.10; there is some suggestion that elephants were also kept (or could at least theoretically be kept) in cities such as Bactra and Babylon, especially in light of the Babylonian Astronomical Tablets which record the sending of 20 elephants from Bactra to Antiochus I via Babylon in 275 B.C. (B.M. 92688.12-13). The proximity of Bactra to India also makes it likely, as Epplett (2007) 212, 225 has suggested, that it acted as a way-station for elephants headed for Apamea. The fact that Euthydemus handed over an unknown number of elephants to Antiochus III during his eastern expedition also supports this (Polybius, 11.34.10). 905 We should dismiss the suggestion that the king was riding the elephant which Eleazar attacked at Beth-Zechariah (I Maccabees, 6.43-6; Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.373-4, cf. Bellum Judaicum 1.42-4). Not only is this episode as a whole problematic (see footnote 1049), but, Hellenistic rulers never rode their war-elephants into battle (cf. Hannibal (Polybius, 3.79.12; Livy, 22.2.10), although note the special circumstances here). It is possible, however, that the author of I Maccabees was unaware of this, or that this detail was invented to increase the symbolism and heroism of Eleazar’s attack; Hoover (2005); Tropper (2017) 16. 906 Trautmann (2015) 46. 907 For the importance of its symbolic value in relation to its sustained military use, see Gerrard (2016) 40-52. 908 In particular, see the numerous examples of Athena in an elephant quadriaga/biga on Seleucid coins following Ipsus (B.M. BNK,G.808; Houghton and Lorber (2002) passim, Newell (1977), (1978)); Nossov (2008) 22; Iossif and Lorber (2010); Hadley (1974) 60-2; Hoover (2005) 40-1; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 23.

210 this affected their tactical roles; and the extent to which it complemented or supported the battlefield positions of the main cavalry. Since war-elephants were not the sole prerogative of the Seleucid Empire (although their use far exceeded that of their

Mediterranean neighbours), it is also necessary to consider how far Seleucid deployments were comparable to other Hellenistic armies.909 Additionally, since the

Greco-Macedonians’ main experience of the military use of elephants came in

India,910 and as it was here that the Seleucids obtained their pachyderms, it is worth considering how comparable their use was to contemporary Indian practice.

Unfortunately, although there are several epic poems and religious texts (e.g. the Mahābhārata, Rāmāyana, and Ṛgveda), that describe aspects of elephant warfare, there are crucially no surviving Indian histories for this period, meaning that we know very little about the realities of ancient Indian battles. Nevertheless, we do have

Kauṭilya’s invaluable treatise on statecraft (roughly dating to the Mauryan Empire

(321-185 B.C.)), which, although only theoretical in nature, sheds some light on these matters.911 In particular, Indian military thought centred on the ideal of the caturaṅgabala (‘fourfold army’), relying on four separate elements: chariots, elephants, cavalry, and infantry.912 From this, rulers could deploy their army in a wide range of vyūhas (‘battle-arrays’), which placed a varying emphasis on each of the four arms, depending on climate, terrain, enemy formation, and overall tactical intention.

Within this system, commanders could (at least theoretically) place their elephants almost anywhere on the battlefield, whether this was at the head of the formation, on

909 Cf. Appendix 5, Tables 5.4, 5.7. 910 Arrian, Anabasis 3.8.6, 3.11.6 mentions elephants in front of the centre of the Achaemenid army at Gaugamela (331 B.C.), but these are not mentioned again until after the battle, when Alexander captured the Achaemenid baggage (Arrian, Anabasis 3.15.4, 3.15.6), and it is highly debated where they were actually positioned and what tactical role they were intended to perform; Charles (2008a). 911 Thapliyal (2010) 14, 229; Chakravarti (1941) i-xv; Trautmann (2015) 49, 144-5; parts of Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra in some ways parallel Xenophon’s Peri Hippikes and Hipparchikos. 912 Rāmāyana, 6.3.25; Mahābhārata, 5.19, 5.30, 7.16; Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra 10.4; Chakravarti (1941) ii, 2; Thapliyal (2010) 44, 402; Trautmann (2015) 107-11, 115, 160, 210.

211 the flanks, or at the rear.913 Additionally, Kauṭilya notes that standard practice stationed them some distance apart from each other, often with light supporting troops, something which the Seleucids and other Hellenistic armies in general also extensively replicated.914

We must therefore consider how far Hellenistic generals showed any awareness of contemporary Indian theory,915 and the extent to which there were any developments in their use of war-elephants throughout the period this thesis is interested in. In particular, this section will assess the Seleucids’ three main battle positions for their war-elephants (in front of their army; as an integrated part of the main line; and behind their formation), and demonstrate that, just as with their cavalry, whilst there was a standard Hellenistic arrangement for these forces, the

Seleucids, in over half of the battles for which we have detailed evidence, remained open to experimentation. Not only does this further illustrate the Seleucids’ tactical flexibility, but also, as we shall see, these variations allowed the elephants and cavalry to complement each other through their battlefield positions.

5.2.1a. In Front of the Main Line As we can see from Tables 5.4 and 5.7 (Appendix 5), by far the most common battlefield position for Hellenistic war-elephants was in front of the main line. Drawn up as a separate force in front of the flank(s), centre, or even across the full line, this position capitalised on the elephant’s striking appearance in a formidable display of a

913 Cf. the apratihata (‘invincible’), ariṣṭa (‘auspicious’), and acala (‘immoveable’) formations respectively, Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra 10.5-6; Thapliyal (2010) 63, 195-267. 914 Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra 10.5; cf. Livy, 36.18.4 (cum adsueto praesidio); Appian, Syriaca 18 (καὶ τὸ στῖφος ὃ μετ᾿ αὐτῶν ἀεὶ συνετάσσετο). 915 It is notable that, at least initially, Hellenistic armies typically recruited their war-elephants’ mahouts from India, suggesting some knowledge of basic Indian custom, even if this did not extend to wider tactical practice; cf. Polybius, 1.40.15, 11.1.12; Diodorus, 18.27.1; Aelian, De Natura Animalium 11.25; Scullard (1974) 130-1, 148-9; Nossov (2008) 8; Epplett (2007) 216-8; Charles (2008b) 341; Trautmann (2015) 239.

212 commander’s wealth and power. At the same time, the troops stationed behind them were provided with a defensive screen, offering protection and shielding their movements from the enemy. It is thus understandable that this deployment dominated

Hellenistic battles, especially since it was also the formation which the Indian king

Porus chose when he faced Alexander at the Hydaspes (327/6 B.C.).

According to Arrian, Porus drew up his elephants ‘on the front line, not less than 100 feet apart, both to form a line in front of the whole array of infantry, and terrify Alexander’s cavalry at all points’.916 This is significant as without prior training horses will not approach elephants, and Alexander had to devise an alternative strategy for engaging the Indian army.917 Quintus Curtius initially records a similar formation (‘behind [the elephants] he had stationed the infantry and the archers’),918 although he subsequently claims that the elephants were ‘distributed among the infantry’,919 before Porus later ordered that they ‘be put in front of his troops’.920 This division of the infantry between each pachyderm is something that

Diodorus and Polyaenus also note, stating that the Indian battle-line resembled a city wall, with the elephants acting as towers.921 Nevertheless, since Arrian records that the bulk of the infantry were stationed ‘not on the same front as the beasts, but in a second line behind them, so that the companies were fitted more or less into the

916 πρώτους μὲν τοὺς ἐλέφαντας ἐπὶ μετώπου, διέχοντα ἐλέφαντα ἐλέφαντος οὐ μεῖον πλέθρου, ὡς πρὸ πάσης τε τῆς φάλαγγος τῶν πεζῶν παραταθῆναι αὐτῷ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας ἐπὶ μετώπου καὶ φόβον πάντῃ παρέχειν τοῖς ἀμφ᾿ Ἀλέξανδρον ἱππεῦσιν, Arrian, Anabasis 5.15.5-6. 917 Arrian, Anabasis 5.10.2, 5.15; Quintus Curtius, 8.14.23; Polyaenus, 4.21, 8.23.5; Scullard (1974) 36, 66-9, 122, 240; Trautmann (2015) 230; Nossov (2008) 24, 40; Gaebel (2002) 227-8, 298-9. 918 post eos [elephantos] posuerat peditem ac sagittarios, Quintus Curtius, 8.14.10. 919 beluae dispositae inter armatos, Quintus Curtius, 8.14.13. 920 elephantosque ante agmen suorum agi iubet, Quintus Curtius, 8.14.22. 921 Diodorus, 17.87.5; Polyaenus, 4.3.22; cf. Quintus Curtius, 8.14.13.

213 intervals’,922 it seems that rather than actually integrating the elephants into the main line, Porus kept the two separate, but from a distance they appeared to merge together, creating an impressive display. It is, however, possible that there were some infantry stationed among the elephants as lightly-armed support in accordance with

Kauṭilya’s suggested Indian practice. Indeed, Diodorus describes the force between the elephants as ‘the rest of his infantry’ (τοὺς λοιποὺς ὁπλίτας), implying that the main infantry was positioned elsewhere.923

Although the Hydaspes was the only battle where Alexander’s men faced

Indian war-elephants, these animals had a lasting impact on the Greco-Macedonian mind-set.924 It is thus unsurprising that in 317 B.C. at Paraitakene (our first detailed account of a set-battle where the Greco-Macedonians themselves employed these troops), both Eumenes and Antigonus stationed their elephants across the front of their forces.925 It was not until Ipsus (301 B.C.) that commanders began to experiment with alternative formations, and even then, outside of the Seleucid army, these remained remarkably uncommon.926 I propose that (at least initially) unaware that there were many other ways they could usefully deploy their elephants, and influenced by the imposing appearance of a formation fronted by elephants,

Hellenistic commanders simply echoed Porus’ practice at the Hydaspes, believing that this was the correct way to deploy them.

922 οἱ πεζοὶ αὐτῷ ἐτετάχατο, οὐκ ἴσον τὸ μέτωπον τοῖς θηρίοις ἐπέχοντες, ἀλλ᾿ ἐν δευτέρῳ μετώπῳ μετὰ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας, ὅσον ἐς τὰ διαλείποντα ἐπ᾿ ὀλίγον ἐμβεβλῆσθαι τοὺς λόχους, Arrian, Anabasis 5.15.7. 923 We should not take the use of ὁπλίτας here to mean heavily-armoured phalanx-based infantry in the traditional Greco-Macedonian sense, but rather simply ‘infantry’. Cf. ἀνδράσι πεζοῑς in Polyaenus, and armatos in Quintus Curtius. 924 The Macedonians’ refusal to go further into India was due, in part, to the elephants; Arrian, Anabasis 5.25; Quintus Curtius, 9.2; Plutarch, Alexander 62; though cf. Diodorus, 17.94. 925 Diodorus, 19.27.2-4, 19.28.2-4, 19.28.6, 19.29.6. 926 See Appendix 5, Tables 5.4, 5.7.

214

However, whereas other Hellenistic armies only occasionally deviated from this standard deployment, the Seleucids experimented with much wider variation, sometimes even simultaneously deploying multiple elephant contingents in a range of different locations across the battlefield.927 Nevertheless, a frontal deployment of

Seleucid war-elephants was not uncommon, appearing clearly in the confrontation with Molon and at Raphia, and inferable from the events of both Ipsus and Panion, despite the complications of the sources. It was also possibly the case at Cyrrhestica.

These instances further divide between elephants in front of the flank(s), echoing standard cavalry positions, and those only in front of the centre, depending on the overall tactical intention.

Of these engagements, the most simple is Raphia. Here Polybius unambiguously notes that Antiochus III distributed all of his elephants across the front of both wings: 60 on his right under Philip, 42 under Myïcus on his left.

Ptolemy likewise adopted this deployment, including a similar division of strength, with 40 in front of his own left wing opposite those of Philip, and 33 on his right.928

By placing their elephants in front of the cavalry and light troops stationed on the wings, both commanders were able to reinforce the protection that these troops offered to the vulnerable flanks of the phalanx, in what Wrightson has seen as a particularly valuable function of Hellenistic war-elephants.929 The flexibility of the cavalry was also increased, since it could now more easily engage other units without completely exposing the phalanx’s unprotected sides. At the same time, the elephants were also able to assist with attacking the opposing flank, thereby aiding the cavalry’s objective in routing the enemy troops stationed there and outflanking the phalanx.

927 See Appendix 5, Table 5.4. 928 Polybius, 5.82.7-8, 5.82.13. 929 Wrightson (2019) 24, 202-3, 208, 211, (2015) 22-3.

215

Since Antiochus intended his right-wing cavalry to deliver his main attack, given their strengthened formation and the oblique deployment noted in Chapter 4.2.1, his decision to deploy his elephants in this manner was a supportive action aimed at increasing the overall offensive and defensive potential of this wing.

Conversely, Bar-Kochva has proposed that the elephant position in front of the

Seleucid left wing may not have been Antiochus’ decision at all, but was rather a response to Ptolemy’s formation. Given the numerical superiority of Ptolemy’s heavy troops in the centre (45,000 against 30,000), Bar-Kochva notes that Antiochus had no choice but to place his 10,000 Arabian light infantry next to his phalanx, opposite

Ptolemy’s Greek mercenaries.930 Therefore, he suggests that ‘one would expect

Antiochus to have protected the light troops by posting elephants in front of them, but he was prevented from doing so by the dispositions of the Ptolemaic elephants in front of… the two wings.’931 Since it was standard Hellenistic practice to neutralise enemy elephants with one’s own, or, in their absence, various anti-elephant measures such as caltrops,932 and it would have been unwise to compromise the safety of his

(weaker) wing, Bar-Kochva argues that Antiochus had no choice but to mirror

Ptolemy’s formation on this side.

This suggestion is feasible, although it relies on Ptolemy having deployed his forces first (something that we cannot confirm), and also dismisses the possibility that

Antiochus may have actively chosen this deployment prior to the battle as part of his overall tactical plan. Given that the main offensive was intended to come from the right wing, Antiochus may have deliberately chosen to reinforce his left wing with his elephants so that it could stand firm in a manner reminiscent of Alexander’s standard

930 See Polybius, 5.82.6, 5.82.12. 931 Bar-Kochva (1976) 134. 932 Cf. Diodorus, 18.70-1, 19.83-4; Sabin (2007) 420; for an overview of counterattacks, see Gerrard (2016) 35-8.

216 practice (i.e. the left wing anchored the line, whilst the right wing, followed by the centre, attacked),933 even if this is not how the battle itself played out.

We can also infer a similar frontal deployment of elephants across the Seleucid flank at Ipsus. Although Plutarch’s account provides very few details regarding the formations of each army, noting only the phalanxes in the centre and the opposing cavalry units under Demetrius and Antiochus,934 it is clear from the main events of the battle that Seleucus kept the majority of his war-elephants on his left, likely behind the main line, so that he could effectively cut off Demetrius’ return following

Antiochus’ sham retreat.935 Nevertheless, an important fragment of Diodorus reports:

‘in the battle, the elephants of Antigonus and Lysimachus fought as if nature had matched them equally in courage and strength’.936

In a brief comment prior to the engagement, Plutarch records that Antigonus had 75 elephants.937 Since there is no mention of these elephants during the crucial events on both the Antigonid right wing and in the centre, which are the focus of

Plutarch’s narrative, it seems likely that Antigonus placed these elephants in front of his left wing.938 We can therefore assume that Seleucus and Lysimachus did likewise, mirroring this arrangement according to typical Hellenistic practice. Although the actual number of the Allies’ elephants on this wing is unknown, Diodorus’ claim that they ‘fought as if nature had matched them equally’ suggests that their number was roughly comparable to their Antigonid counterparts. Scholars have therefore

933 Cf. Arrian, Anabasis 2.10-11.7, 3.13-15.4; Quintus Curtius, 3.11.1-15, 4.15.1-9; Willekes (2015) 49; Heckel (2008) 25-8; Gaebel (2002) 192. 934 Plutarch, Demetrius 29; see Chapter 4.2.1, 4.3.3. 935 Plutarch, Demetrius 29.3; see 5.2.1c below. 936 ὁτι οἱ ἐλέφαντες οἱ Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Λυσιμάχου κατὰ τὴν μάχην ἠγωνίζοντο ὡς ἂν τῆς φύσεως ἐφάμιλλον δεδωκυίας αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀλκὴν καὶ βίαν, Diodorus, 21.1.2. 937 Plutarch, Demetrius 28.3. 938 There is no reason to think that they were not in front of the army; neither Antigonus nor Demetrius are recorded as positioning their elephants anywhere else in their battles; cf. Bennett and Roberts (2009) 110 who alternatively suggest that Antigonus stationed his elephants in front of his whole line.

217 generally suggested that this force was ca. 100 pachyderms strong.939 Moreover, this statement, along with the lack of any other details for the events on this wing, implies that these forces were so evenly-matched that they created a stalemate.

Since I argue that Antiochus’ cavalry retreat was a deliberate ploy to lure

Demetrius away, given the decisiveness of Seleucus’ movement of the elephants on his left and his subsequent harassment of the exposed Antigonid phalanx, I propose that this stalemate was likewise deliberately intended. By positioning their elephants across the front of their right wing, the Allies neutralised those of Antigonus, whilst simultaneously reinforcing the defensive capacity of this wing. These troops were therefore able to hold the opposing Antigonid forces in place, allowing the cavalry and elephants on the Allied left to carry out the decisive manoeuvres in a brilliant application of the same style of combined arms tactics which Alexander so successfully utilised.940 What we could only suggest as a possible intention for the

Seleucid elephants’ deployment at Raphia, was, in light of this fragment in Diodorus, a tactical reality at Ipsus.

Antiochus III also deployed his elephants across the front of the Seleucid army in his battle against Molon. Polybius notes that Antiochus posted his ten elephants ‘at certain intervals in front of his force’ (πρὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐν διαστήμασι

κατέστησε), whilst Molon, who had no elephants of his own, positioned an unspecified number of scythed chariots in a similar manner (προεβάλετο τῆς

δυνάμεως ἐν διαστάσει).941 The close parallel of these sentences gives the impression that these two units faced each other on the battlefield. Unfortunately,

939 Bar-Kochva (1976) 108; Nossov (2008) 20-2; Gaebel (2002) 226; see 5.2.1c below for an analysis of the total number of Allied elephants at Ipsus. 940 Cf. Wrightson (2019) 186-202, 212, (2015) 67; Gaebel (2002) 296, 289; Willekes (2015) 48. 941 Polybius, 5.53.5, 5.53.10 respectively.

218

πρὸ τῆς δυνάμεως is ambiguous enough that it is not entirely certain whether these troops were placed in front of the entire line, or just one part of it, such as the wing(s) or centre. This is further complicated since Polybius gives no details about the actions of either unit. Given that Antiochus only had ten elephants, it is perhaps unlikely that they covered the whole of his battle-line.

Bar-Kochva has suggested a centre position, claiming that the scythed chariots were ‘designed to cut down the opposing phalanx’, and so were naturally opposite it, forcing Antiochus to mirror this with his elephants in order to protect the main body of his infantry.942 However, as we shall see in section 5.3 below, scythed chariots were not particularly effective against heavy infantry in formation, especially those wielding sarissae; they may have had more chance of success against unprepared cavalry. Furthermore, Polybius’ account of Molon’s failed surprise attack the previous night indicates that when Antiochus’ army deployed in the morning,

Molon’s was still in a state of confusion.943 It is thus likely that Antiochus himself dictated the position of his elephants, though this need not rule out their position across the centre of his line. Indeed, Polybius is notably silent regarding events in the centre of the field, in contrast to his detail for both wings.944

Other problems arise with Polybius’ account of Panion. As noted, since our only source for this battle consists of Polybius’ criticisms of Zeno’s allegedly contradictory account, at first glance it is inadequate for discerning much more than the Seleucid victory.945 In particular, Polybius complains that Zeno, after recording that Antiochus stationed his elephants ‘in advance of the phalanx’ along with the

942 Bar-Kochva (1976) 119; cf. also Nossov (2008) 22. 943 Polybius, 5.52.9-53.7. 944 Polybius, 5.54.1-2. 945 See Introduction, 0.2.1, Chapter 4.2.1.

219

‘Tarentines’ and various supporting light troops, states that ‘the two phalanxes met and fought stubbornly, forgetting that it was impossible for them to meet as the elephants, cavalry, and light-armed troops were stationed in front of them’.946

Polybius also objects to Zeno’s later claim that the elephants (now apparently behind the heavy infantry) ‘were of great service in receiving [the Seleucid phalanx]’ (which was strikingly in retreat despite the Ptolemaic centre crumbling), and in deterring the

Aetolian cavalry, who were terrified by their appearance.947 Taken at face value, our account of Panion is incomprehensible. However, if we adopt the suggestion that the battle happened simultaneously in two separate arenas on either side of the river, solutions to some of these problems become clearer.948 By accepting this alternative reconstruction, it is clear that whilst the elephants in the north were deployed across the front of the main force, alongside the light troops and ‘Tarentines’, those in the south were positioned behind the phalanx as a second line of defence, which they provided when this smaller force retreated from the Aetolian cavalry (in turn deterred by the wall of elephants in a development reminiscent of Ipsus). Nonetheless, even with this solution, the problem remains of how the main phalanxes in the northern arena engaged each other if the Seleucid elephants were deployed between them.

Although the deployment of elephants in front of the centre of the army is common throughout the Hellenistic period,949 the logic behind this formation has caused much confusion amongst scholars. Wrightson complains that ‘it is not clear

946 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτά φησι τὰ θηρία προτάξαι τῆς φάλαγγος ἐν διαστήματι καὶ τοὺς μετ᾿ Ἀντιπάτρου Ταραντίνους, τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ τῶν θηρίων πληρῶσαι τοῖς τοξόταις καὶ σφενδονήταις… τὰς δὲ φάλαγγας, ἐπεὶ συνέβαλλον ἀλλήλαις, μάχην ποιεῖν ἰσχυράν. ὅτι δὲ συμβαλεῖν ἀδύνατον ἦν τῶν θηρίων καὶ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τῶν εὐζώνων προτεταγμένων, τοῦτ᾿ οὐκέτι συνορᾷ, Polybius, 16.18.7-10. 947 τὰ <δὲ> θηρία τοὺς ἐγκλίνοντας ἐκδεχόμενα καὶ συμπίπτοντα τοῖς πολεμίοις μεγάλην παρέχεσθαι χρείαν... πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φησὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλῶν ἱππέας δυσχρηστεῖσθαι κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον διὰ τὴν ἀσυνήθειαν τῆς τῶν θηρίων φαντασίας, Polybius, 16.19.1-5. 948 See Chapter 4.2.1. 949 See Appendix 5, Tables 5.4, 5.7.

220 what the elephants in the centre actually did in the battle’, and that although ‘there must have been some sound tactical reason to deploy elephants... in front of the phalanx… we are just unable to determine what that was’.950 Despite this, he does suggest that the elephants may have acted as a defensive screen for the infantry,951 complementing the protective duties of the cavalry. Additionally, this deployment echoes Porus’ formation at the Hydaspes, and it is very possible that, in origin, this frontal deployment was simply a copy of Porus’ battle-line against Alexander.952

Yahalom suggests that any infantry units stationed behind the elephants were not intended to play an active role in the battle, being unable to pass through them whilst simultaneously maintaining their formation.953 Although this suggestion is not without merit, I strongly doubt that this was always the intention. Since the phalanx was a crucial part of Hellenistic armies, Yahalom’s suggestion constitutes a poor use of manpower. Wrightson speculates that the phalanxes may have fought to one side of the elephants where both sides had them.954 Alternatively, I propose that the infantry may not have engaged until the animals had moved out of the way.

Regarding Panion, it is debatable whether the Ptolemies had any elephants at this battle. If they did not, there is little reason why the Seleucid pachyderms could not directly attack the Ptolemaic phalanx themselves, and Polybius’ account appears to suggest that this is what actually happened.955 Therefore, the comment that ‘the two phalanxes met and fought stubbornly’ must describe the troops in the south.956

950 Wrightson (2019) 210. 951 Wrightson (2019) 24, 210; also Billows (1990) 102, 183. 952 See footnote 910 for the elephants at Gaugamela (331 B.C.). 953 Yahalom (2017). 954 Wrightson (2019) 210. 955 See Polybius, 16.19.11. 956 Polybius, 16.18.10; Bar-Kochva (1976) 155-6 argues that either Polybius or Zeno simplified the identification of the troops in the south in applying φάλαγγας to the Aetolians; cf. Arrian’s use of φάλαγγας to describe Porus’ infantry (footnote 913). Bar-Kochva makes a further point that the

221

A final battle potentially worth noting is Cyrrhestica. Like Panion, our sources for Cyrrhestica are poor: just one chapter of Plutarch’s biography of Demetrius, and a single entry in Polyaenus’ Strategemata.957 Sadly, as with Ipsus, Plutarch is concerned only with the actions of his hero rather than any detailed assessment of the battle itself. Consequently, we know very little about the engagement beyond the stratagem that interested Polyaenus. According to Polyaenus, Seleucus, realising that

Demetrius’ men were dispirited, took a body of picked troops through a narrow pass at some point during the battle, appearing suddenly on their flank with eight elephants at his front. Seleucus then personally appealed to Demetrius’ mercenaries, persuading them to surrender.958 Despite knowing very little details for this battle, the decision to position the elephants across the front of these troops was intended to capitalise on the psychological impact of their sudden appearance on the mercenaries’ unprotected flank. Although one could object that since this stratagem involved only a select group of Seleucus’ forces it is not comparable to the general Seleucid deployments discussed above, we should not discount the importance of a commander’s desire to exploit his elephants’ impressive appearance as another reason for their frequent frontal deployment.

5.2.1b. Integrated Within the Main Line Despite the Hellenistic preference for deploying war-elephants in front of the army, this was not the only battlefield position utilised. The Seleucids in particular showed much more flexibility in their use of war-elephant than their rivals, and in

Seleucid centre stationed behind the elephants in the north, and under the command of the king himself, did not actually engage the Ptolemaic line anyway, ‘hence the absence of any reference to Antiochus’ part in the... fighting’ (p.156). However, given the complications of Polybius’ account and the confusion surrounding this battle in general, the sole lack of any reference to Antiochus’ role in the fighting is not enough to render this any more than a possibility; see foonote 765. 957 Plutarch, Demetrius 49; Polyaenus, 4.9.3. 958 Polyaenus, 4.9.3.

222 more than half of their battles, they either did not position their elephants across their front, or alternatively split them, arranging only some in this manner, whilst others were placed elsewhere on the battlefield. Such variation was common in contemporary Indian warfare, and, given that, at least under Seleucus I, ambassadors such as Megasthenes spent time in the Mauryan court, it is possible that there was some crossover of military thinking.959 How far such contact continued through the

Hellenistic period, however, remains uncertain,960 and I suggest that Seleucid flexibility was likely more a consequence of their commanders’ experimental mindsets than a conscious reflection of Indian practice.

One notable variation in war-elephant deployment was the decision to station them, not as a separate element in front of the army, but as an integrated part of the main battle-line. This is strikingly almost exclusively a Seleucid variation, appearing just once among their Hellenistic rivals in 188 B.C. during Mutines’ Thracian campaign (the lack of infantry in Mutines’ army, however, raises questions about the comparability of this battle).961 Of the battles relevant to this thesis, this deployment appears at Thermopylae, Magnesia, and potentially Beth-Zechariah. Each of these three instances comes from the second half of our period. Whether this reflects a true tactical development over time, or is merely a consequence of our greater source material for this era is unclear. Since all three battles feature unusual arrangements of the Seleucid army in general, I suggest that the elephant deployment here were a response to the specific tactical circumstances involved.

959 Also, see footnote 915. 960 Strabo, 2.1.9; Athenaeus, 1.18d-e, 14.652f-3a; Scullard (1974) 55; Trautmann (2015) 196, 236-7; Sherwin-White and Kurht (1993) 13, 94; MacDonald (1922) 433; Kosmin (2014) 32-58; of course, the fact that Seleucid rulers were able to acquire elephants from India until the rise of Parthia indicates that some degree of diplomatic friendship existed throughout the Hellenistic period, cf. Polybius, 11.34.12. 961 Livy, 38.41.13; see Appendix 5, Tables 5.4, 5.7.

223

At Thermopylae, both Livy and Appian note that Antiochus III positioned his six elephants on his army’s flank, where the fortifications ended near the marshy ground next to the sea.962 There is some disagreement whether this was Antiochus’ right or left wing,963 but this is simply a case of one author describing the formation from a Seleucid viewpoint, the other from the Romans’. Notably, the cavalry did not occupy their usual position next to the phalanx, but were instead located behind the elephants as a second line of defence.964 The reason for this alternative arrangement here is clear. In line with the defensive nature of Antiochus’ positions, and the topographic unsuitability for cavalry, the elephants positioned on the immediate flank at the end of the fortifications were undoubtedly intended to act as an immoveable guard, effectively extending the wall around which Antiochus’ men were deployed

(the hills similarly protected his other flank). The elephants thus replaced the cavalry’s standard role as protection for the more vulnerable centre.

The situation is more complicated at Magnesia. As noted, the formation of the

Seleucid right wing, with the cataphracts and Agema stationed between the phalanx and Argyraspides is highly unusual.965 It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that this battle is also remarkable for the Seleucids’ use of unconventional units. In particular, we can see that the Seleucids’ 54 elephants were split into three groups: 16 on the extreme left flank (presumably arranged in a manner similar to Thermopylae, though this is unclear); 16 placed in reserve behind the heavy cavalry on the right; and finally

22, distributed two at a time among the phalanx, creating ten smaller infantry

962 Livy, 36.18.4; Appian, Syriaca 18. 963 ab dextro, Livy; ἐν ἀριστερᾷ, Appian. 964 See Chapter 4.2.3. 965 See Chapter 4.2.2.

224 divisions.966 The decision to deploy almost half of the elephants and their light guards in the middle of the heavy infantry in the centre is striking, and there is no other known instance of this formation in the Hellenistic period. There is a potential parallel with Porus’ line at the Hydaspes, should one prefer a literal interpretation of the claim that the infantry were drawn up in the gaps between the elephants, but, as noted, the validity of this is unlikely.967 The descriptions of Porus’ elephants and infantry mimicking a city’s towers and walls is, however, echoed in both Livy and

Appian, and the psychological impact of this arrangement (‘it caused great terror’, magnum terrorem praebebat) was undoubtedly intended.968 Antiochus’ whole line, huge and showcasing a large variety of troops from across the Empire, was clearly a demonstration of strength.

However, although we should not dismiss the significance of elephants as tools of prestige and power projection, this cannot have been the sole reason for Antiochus’ decision to deploy his army in this way. He would have been very aware of the

Romans’ victory over Hannibal’s elephants at Zama,969 and would not have taken it for granted that their presence alone would overawe them; as Livy notes,

the Roman soldiers, after the African wars, were now accustomed to sidestepping the charging animal and either showering javelins upon it from the side or, if they could get closer, hamstringing it with the sword.970

Antiochus thus conceivably decided against positioning his elephants in a straightforwardly offensive formation in front of his main line, instead integrating

966 Livy, 37.40.2, 37.40.6, 37.40.14; Appian, Syriaca 32 alternatively claims that each division was itself separated by 22 elephants, but this is clearly a mistake. Similarly, we should dismiss the vague description of the Seleucid formation given in Zonaras (9.20); Grainger (2015a) 181 claims Antiochus only had the 22 elephants deployed in the centre, contra (2002) 319, 325. 967 See 5.1.1a above. 968 Livy, 37.40.3; Appian, Syriaca 32. 969 Polybius, 15.11-5; Bar-Kochva (1976) 172; cf. Grainger (2015a) 154. 970 militem Romanum… adsuetum iam ab Africis bellis et uitare impetum beluae et ex transverso aut pilis incessere aut, si propius subire posset, gladio nervos incidere, Livy, 37.42.5.

225 them in a more defensive arrangement which kept them less exposed. Through this, each duo of elephants was, as Scullard points out, able ‘to guard the flanks of each detachment’, in a manner comparable to the usual duties of the standard cavalry, whilst, at the same time, ‘if driven back, they could withdraw in the space behind them which could then easily be filled by [other] infantrymen’.971 Therefore,

Antiochus simultaneously protected his elephants and broke his phalanx into smaller, more flexible sections, possibly in an attempt to counter the greater manoeuvrability of the Roman legions.

The third instance of the Seleucids integrating their elephants within their main line is the alleged ‘mini-formations’ at Beth-Zechariah, which, according to I

Maccabees, each comprised an elephant flanked by 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, who were ordered to follow the elephant and fight around it on the battlefield.972

Similarly, as the battle progressed, we are told that Eleazar charged the lead elephant

‘which was in the middle of the phalanx’.973 As noted in the previous chapter (4.2.1), attempts to reconstruct this battle are complex, especially in light of Tropper’s recent literary analysis. Nevertheless, if we accept that this striking Seleucid formation at least seemed plausible to the author’s audience, it is possible that it represents a development of Antiochus’ practice at Magnesia, positioning the elephants in a manner that capitalised on their towering appearance whilst also protecting them, and allowing for a more flexible arrangement to the standard battle-line.

Alternatively, I Maccabees’ comment that ‘where the [elephant] went [the cavalry and infantry] went with it’ could suggest that rather than consisting of the main fighting-force of the army, these 1,000 infantry and 500 cavalry were actually

971 Scullard (1974) 180-1. 972 I Maccabees, 6.35-6; also Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.371. 973 ἐπέδραμεν αὐτῷ θράσει εἰς μέσον τῆς φάλαγγος, I Maccabees, 6.45.

226 intended to work in a similar manner to the usual elephant guard that we see elsewhere (although this normally did not include cavalry).974 We could simply reject the large numbers involved here as part of the Maccabees’ general exaggeration.

Indeed, the number of elephants present is uncertain, with I Maccabees (6.30) and

Josephus’ Antiquitates Judaicae (12.366) stating 32, II Maccabees (13.1): 22, and

Josephus’ Bellum Judaicum (1.41): 80. Since Chapter 3.3 argued that Josephus’

Bellum Judaicum provides the most feasible figures for the Seleucid cavalry and infantry in this battle, it is logical also to prefer this source’s numbers for the elephants. However, 80 seems too many to be credible; not only was half of the

Seleucid army in the east,975 but Polybius records only 36 elephants in the Daphne parade three years earlier (165 B.C.),976 and even Antiochus III only had 54 at

Magnesia.977 Given the plausibility of Josephus’ other figures in this passage, Bar-

Kochva suggests that the elephant total stems from ‘the corruption to Π (80) of a source which read Η (8)’.978 This is reasonable.

5.2.1c. Behind the Main Line A final battlefield position in which the Seleucids occasionally deployed their war-elephants was behind the main line as a reserve or second line of defence. This was not particularly common, appearing in only a handful of battles throughout the

Hellenistic period.979 Indeed, we should not underestimate a commander’s desire to flaunt his military power by stationing the physically impressive elephants directly in

974 οὗτοι πρὸ καιροῦ οὗ ἂν ᾖ τὸ θηρίον ἦσαν καὶ οὗ ἐὰν ἐπορεύετο ἐπορεύοντο ἅμα οὐκ ἀφίσταντο ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, I Maccabees, 6.36; a possible parallel may be found in the ‘Tarentines’ at Panion which were likewise stationed alongside the elephants in the north part of the battlefield, Polybius, 16.18.7. 975 I Maccabees, 3.37. 976 Polybius, 30.25.11. 977 Livy, 37.40; Appian, Syriaca 32. 978 Bar-Kochva (1976) 81. 979 See Appendix 5, Tables 5.4, 5.7.

227 front of the enemy. Nonetheless, there are a few Seleucid instances that are of particular importance.

The most significant is Ipsus. Although a fragment of Diodorus indicates that the Allies stationed a reasonable number of elephants (ca. 75-100) in front of their right wing opposite those of Antigonus,980 the vast majority (up to 300) were held back from the main fighting on their left. The actual number of elephants present in this battle, however, is highly debated. According to Plutarch, Seleucus brought 400;

Diodorus, on the other hand, notes that Seleucus arrived in Cappadocia the previous winter with 480.981 If this is correct, it is possible that some were lost over the harsh winter.982 Regardless, the general consensus is that both figures reflect an original total of 500, which Strabo claims was the number of war-elephants that Seleucus received from the Mauryan ruler, Chandragupta, in return for several eastern satrapies during his Indian expedition a few years earlier.983

However, 500 war-elephants is such a large number that scholars have questioned its validity.984 Tarn in particular has argued for dismissing this figure purely as a ‘stereotyped’ Indian expression indicating ‘a great many’ based on a survey of ancient Indian literature.985 He argues that when asked about these elephants, the Indians, aware that a large number were involved, ‘naturally expressed it as 500’.986 Given the prevalence of this figure across ancient Indian literature, I accept the idealised nature of Seleucus’ elephants. Despite this, the logic behind

980 See 5.2.1a above. 981 Plutarch, Demetrius 28.3; Diodorus, 20.113.4. 982 Cf. Bar-Kochva (1976) 76; Billows (1990) 174. 983 Strabo, 15.2.9; also: Plutarch, Alexander 62.4. 984 There are no other instances of a Hellenistic army possessing a force comparable to this number of elephants (the next highest figure is 200 (Diodorus, 25.12)); furthermore, the logistical needs of 500 war-elephants would be considerable. 985 E.g. Milindapañha, 4.1.36, 4.4.32-3; Dîgha-Nikâya, Sâmañña-Phala Sutta 9; Jātaka, 563; Tarn (1940). 986 Tarn (1940) 89.

228

Tarn’s subsequent claim that the original number should be 150 (with only 130 present at Ipsus itself), based on the total that Polybius ascribes to Antiochus III following his meeting with Sophagesonos, because Antiochus was a great emulator of

Seleucus, is unconvincing.987 It is uncertain that Antiochus was specifically copying

Seleucus here (Polybius makes no suggestion of this), and there is no further support for this claim.988 Unfortunately, a lack of any further evidence prevents attempts to specify the actual number that Seleucus received from Chandragupta, although they made a significant impression on his contemporaries.989 Moreover, a considerable number were needed for Seleucus’ tactical plan in this battle.990

Since Seleucus moved the elephants stationed on his left during the battle to cut off Demetrius’ return following his son’s sham retreat, the general consensus of the scholarship is that they were initially stationed as a reserve behind the army. Bar-

Kochva objects to this traditional reconstruction, claiming that keeping over half of this significant elephant force in reserve may have inadvertently given away the

Allies’ intention of drawing Demetrius away from the battlefield. He therefore suggests that Seleucus’ elephants were drawn up across the front of the phalanx in order to camouflage their true intentions, before being moved to the rear following

Antiochus’ feigned retreat.991

Bar-Kochva’s concern that it would have seemed suspicious to hold so many elephants back from the initial engagement has merit. However, I question the

987 Tarn (1940) 88-9; Polybius, 11.34.12. 988 Tarn’s reasoning for reducing the total of 150 to 130 for the battle itself is also dubious; see Bar- Kochva (1976) 76-7; Scullard (1974) 269 n.46. 989 One of Demetrius’ followers notably called Seleucus ἐλεφαντάρχης (‘master of elephants’), Plutarch, Demetrius 25.4; also, cf. the use of elephants as a dynastic symbol on Seleucid coins after this battle; Houghton and Lorber (2002); Newell (1977), (1978); Kistler (2007) 69; Erickson (2018) 30, 38-40, 140, (2009) 50, 61-3, 86, 173-5, 179-80, 199; Hoover (2005) 41-3. 990 See Bar-Kochva (1976) 77, 108. 991 Bar-Kochva (1976) 108-10.

229 feasibility of his alternative reconstruction due to the complications of moving a large number of elephants from the army’s front in time to block Demetrius’ return without disrupting the heavy infantry stationed behind them. Perhaps Seleucus merely kept his elephant reserve out of sight until he was ready to move them into position, in a similar manner to that which Theodotus later suggested to Antiochus I at the so-called

‘Elephant Victory’.992 Regardless, it is clear that their use to form a defensive screen against Demetrius’ troops, combined with the sham retreat of their own cavalry forces under Antiochus, was not only spectacularly successful, but also illustrates how the

Seleucids were able to utilise their unconventional weapons to support and enhance the effectiveness of their mounted troops in a brilliant display of combined arms.993

Another significant instance of elephants forming a second line of defence behind the phalanx is Panion. Whilst those in the northern arena were stationed in front of the main line for a predominantly offensive purpose, Polybius’ comment that

‘the elephants were of great service in receiving [the phalanx] in their retreat and engaging the enemy’ indicates that the Seleucids positioned those in the hilly southern area behind the phalanx in order to reinforce the defensive element of this part of their battle plan.994 As Bar-Kochva and Grainger note, whilst a Seleucid victory in the southern arena could not decisively affect the outcome of the main engagement in the north, a Ptolemaic victory in the south would have proved disastrous for Antiochus, as it would leave his northern positions vulnerable to

Scopas’ Aetolians, who could more easily traverse the rough terrain.995 Therefore, by drawing up his elephants in reserve, Antiochus ensured that even when his smaller

992 Lucian, Zeuxis 9; Grainger (2018) 78; Bennett and Roberts (2009) 109, 111. 993 See 5.2.3 below; cf. Wrightson (2019) 1, 202, 208-12, (2015). 994 τὰ <δὲ> θηρία τοὺς ἐγκλίνοντας ἐκδεχόμενα καὶ συμπίπτοντα τοῖς πολεμίοις μεγάλην παρέχεσθαι χρείαν, Polybius, 16.19.1-2; Bar-Kochva (1976) 80, 154-6, (1989) 18; Grainger (2015a) 110, (2010) 258. 995 Bar-Kochva (1976) 153; Grainger (2015a) 110-1, (2010) 259.

230 southern phalanx retreated, the way through to the other part of the battlefield remained blocked by an impenetrable wall of elephants which terrified the Aetolian cavalry, and held the other troops to a stalemate until his forces won the engagement in the north.996

A final instance where the Seleucids deployed their elephants behind the main line comes from Livy’s note that at Magnesia Antiochus stationed sixteen elephants behind the cataphracts and Agema on his right wing as a reserve (in subsidiis).997

Unlike Ipsus and Panion, however, the tactical reason for this is unclear. It is possible that Antiochus utilised this defensive position in order to add greater security to his wing whilst he charged with the cavalry. However, other than Antiochus’ charge, our sources say very little about the actions of the other troops stationed on this wing.

Moreover, all we know about the Seleucid elephants at this battle is that their presence did not deter the Romans, and that as the fighting progressed, the phalanx gradually adopted a square formation with the elephants protected in its centre. This withstood the Romans’ attacks until the elephants grew unmanageable and broke the infantry’s ranks.998 Whether this included all of the Seleucids’ elephants or only the

22 initially placed among the phalanx in the centre is impossible to say. It is notable that the Romans also positioned their own sixteen elephants behind their main line, although this was likely to keep them out of the main fighting due to their smaller numbers and the superior quality of the Seleucids’ formidable Asian elephants in comparison to their smaller African ‘Forest’ variety.999 Thus, although positioning elephants behind the main line was not overly common, it could achieve a range of tactical effects that the Seleucids especially were willing to utilise.

996 Polybius, 19.1-4; Bar-Kochva (1976) 156; Grainger (2015a) 110, (2010) 258-9. 997 Livy, 37.40.7; contra Appian, Syriaca 32. 998 Appian, Syriaca 35. 999 Livy, 37.39.13; Appian, Syriaca 31; see 5.2.2b below.

231

5.2.1d. Summary In light of this analysis, we can see that just as the Seleucids employed a range of cavalry positions in their battle formations, so too they varied the location of their war-elephants according to tactical intent and the specific circumstances of individual battles. Whilst the overwhelming preference of other Hellenistic commanders was to station their elephants across the front of their army, possibly as a tactical hangover from Porus’ formation at the Hydaspes, though also to provide a defensive screen for their troops and capitalise on these animals’ impressive appearance, Seleucid rulers in at least half of their battles adopted other formations. In particular, at Ipsus, Panion, and Magnesia, several different arrangements were utilised simultaneously, which, although of varying degrees of success, demonstrate the adaptability of Seleucid rulers and the integration of this unconventional unit as a fundamental part of their tactical thinking. A closer inspection of Hellenistic war-elephants therefore shows that, at least under the Seleucids, their use was far more flexible than scholars have typically acknowledged. The extent to which this was a direct reflection of contemporary Indian vyūhas (‘battle-arrays’), however, is impossible to determine.

Comparing the battlefield positions of Seleucid war-elephants with those of their cavalry, we can see that frequently the two complemented each other well.

When deployed directly on the flank, such as at Thermopylae and Magnesia, they reinforced the cavalry’s traditional role in guarding the phalanx. Similarly, their position in front of the wings at Ipsus and Raphia provided a screen from behind which the cavalry could charge,1000 and strengthened the army’s defence against outflanking manoeuvres. The decision to withhold the elephants from the main line likewise had defensive motives, often dependent on the particular tactical

1000 Cf. Billows (1990) 127.

232 circumstances of the battle, such as at Panion, although they could still operate in conjunction with the cavalry, as Ipsus so brilliantly demonstrated. Where the

Seleucids drew their elephants up across the army’s centre, or as an integrated part of the main line, even here they supported the cavalry’s role as a protective force for the less manoeuvrable phalanx. Furthermore, commanders may have hoped that the psychological impact of positioning elephants in such a prominent location would cause opposing infantry lines to buckle, creating a gap through which their cavalry could charge.

5.2.2. Tactical Role The second issue which we must assess is the tactical roles that Seleucid war- elephants fulfilled on the battlefield, and how they contributed to the operational efficacy of the mounted corps. As noted, previous scholars have explicitly linked the introduction of unusual units to a perceived decline in the cavalry’s importance and ability, and have argued that that the fact that even war-elephants quickly lost their asymmetrical edge demonstrates a general stagnation of this period’s tactics.1001 Such approaches, however, do disservice to the tactical realities of the Hellenistic battlefield. I shall therefore reassess the various roles that Seleucid war-elephants performed in the battles relevant to this chapter, focusing particularly on their use to confront opposing elephants; block other units; and their capacity to engage in psychological warfare. This will demonstrate that, on the whole, the Seleucids’ use of this unconventional weapon was intended to support the traditional cavalry contingents and increase their tactical effectiveness. Moreover, despite the arguments

1001 See footnote 880.

233 of Gaebel (and even Wrightson),1002 we can see that upon closer assessment, the application of combined arms theory is relevant to at least some of the Seleucids’ battles (most notably Ipsus, Raphia, and Panion), providing a new understanding of the different elements of their mounted corps.

5.2.2a. Engaging Other Elephants Just as cavalry contingents typically attacked first due to the speed with which they operated and the importance of achieving victory on the wings, elephants, as another element of the mounted troops, were similarly among the first units to engage, especially since commanders regularly deployed them across the army’s front. This is evident for those stationed on the wing(s) at Ipsus and Raphia, and may have also been the case in the battle against Molon and in the northern arena at

Panion despite the lack of details.1003 There were of course times when the elephants were deliberately held back to attack at a more crucial moment – the most notable example being Seleucus’ brilliant manoeuvre at Ipsus, but also evident in Theodotus’ advice to Antiochus at the ‘Elephant Victory’ – but this was relatively uncommon.1004

As Hydaspes demonstrated, left unchecked, elephant contingents could have a serious impact on an opposing force.1005 It was therefore necessary for commanders to neutralise the elephants’ advantages. Although there were various ways of achieving this,1006 the most simple was to use their own pachyderms as a counter.

Indeed, with the exception of Magnesia, this was always the case where both armies

1002 Gaebel (2002) 219, 226-8, 253, 289, 301; Wrightson (2019) 1. 1003 See Appendix 5, Table 5.4. 1004 Plutarch, Demetrius 29; Lucian, Zeuxis 9; see also Ausculum (279 B.C.), and Insubria (203 B.C.), Appendix, 5, Table 5.7; Scullard (1974) 104 suggests that Pyrrhus’ actions at Ausculum may have been inspired by what he witnessed at Ipsus. 1005 Arrian, Anabasis 5.17.3, 5.18.3; Diodorus, 17.88.1, 17.89.3. 1006 See footnote 932.

234 possessed these animals, hence the common deployment of elephants directly opposite each other on the battlefield. Engaging other elephants thus became an important role for these units, paralleling the standard actions of the cavalry, who were also intended to attack their counterparts due to the need to remove the troops stationed on the enemy’s wing.

Polybius’ account of the clash at Raphia is the most famous example of elephants engaging each other in the Hellenistic period. In a passage which several scholars have praised for its accurate depiction of two elephants fighting,1007 Polybius records that as the men in the towers on the elephants’ backs fought each other with sarissae, the elephants themselves, interlocking their tusks, shoved each other in an attempt to turn their opponent and gore their sides.1008 However, significantly, most of Ptolemy’s elephants, especially those on his left, refused battle, which Polybius notes was

the habit of Libyan elephants; for unable to endure the smell and trumpeting of Indian elephants, and terrified... by their great size and strength, they immediately flee whilst still a distance from them.1009

These animals subsequently retreated, causing chaos among the units stationed behind them, allowing Antiochus to charge the disorganised Ptolemaic left wing with his cavalry and mercenary infantry in an attack that successfully combined all three of his military arms.1010 As noted, this attack could have been devastatingly successful if

Antiochus had not pursued the retreating force away from the battlefield.1011

1007 Scullard (1974) 142-3; Nossov (2008) 20; Gowers (1948) 173-4; Charles (2007) 307. 1008 Polybius, 5.84.2-5. 1009 ὅπερ ἔθος ἐστὶ ποιεῖν τοῖς Λιβυκοῖς ἐλέφασι· τὴν γὰρ ὀσμὴν καὶ φωνὴν οὐ μένουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταπεπληγμένοι τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν δύναμιν... φεύγουσιν εὐθέως ἐξ ἀποστήματος τοὺς Ἰνδικοὺς ἐλέφαντας, Polybius, 5.84.5-6. 1010 Polybius, 5.84.6-10. 1011 See Chapter 4.3.1.

235

Polybius’ comment that Ptolemy’s African elephants were afraid of the

Seleucids’ Asian elephants because of ‘their great size and strength’ (τὸ μέγεθος

καὶ τὴν δύναμιν) has long been a source of contention. Since it is common knowledge that African elephants are typically taller than their Asian cousins, scholars initially criticised Polybius for inaccuracy.1012 Gowers challenged this in

1948, pointing out that not all African elephants are the same: as well as the large

‘Savannah/Bush’ elephant (Loxodonta Africana) that dominates popular thought, and stands at 9.8-13 ft/3-4 m tall, there is also the considerably smaller ‘Forest’ species

(Loxodonta Cyclotis, 6.6-8.2 ft/2-2.5 m), which the Carthaginians and Romans used.

He thus argued that Ptolemy’s elephants at Raphia must have belonged to the ‘Forest’ variety, an idea which has become standard throughout the scholarship,1013 but which has, in turn, created several other problems.1014

A recent scientific study, however, has shed new light on this issue.

Reassessing the mitochondrial genetic patterns of the elephants within the Gash-

Barka region in Eritrea, this study proves that the elephants native to this region belong to the ‘Savannah/Bush’ species rather than the smaller ‘Forest’ type.1015 Since we know from several passages in ancient authors, along with the archaeological remains of various Ptolemaic foundations along the Red Sea, that it was here that the

1012 Tarn (1940) 99; Spinage (1994) 298; Scullard (1974) 61-8; Trautmann (2015) 243; Gowers (1948) 175-8; Delbrück (1975) 246. 1013 Gowers (1948); Scullard (1974) 19-20, 23-6, 61-2; Trautmann (2015) 24, 243; Nossov (2008) 5, 20-2; Charles (2007), (2008) 339, 346-7; Sabin (2007) 420. 1014 E.g. since some of Ptolemy’s elephants did engage their opponents, several scholars have suggested that Ptolemy must also have had some Asian elephants, inherited from his father who seized them from Apamea in 245 B.C. (OGIS 54.16; Charles (2007) 309-11; Gowers (1948) 174; Grainger (2018) 190). Whether any of these animals were still alive by Raphia is debatable (Bar-Kochva (1976) 79, 240 n.87; Kistler (2007) 65, 69; Charles (2007) 308-10). Scholars have also debated whether ‘Forest’ elephants were capable of carrying towers like those Polybius describes in this passage (Charles (2008b), (2007); Gowers (1948) 179; Scullard (1974) 180, 242-3; Nossov (2008) 28-30). 1015 Brandt (2014).

236

Ptolemies conducted their elephant hunts,1016 these findings significantly impact our reconstruction of the elephant engagement at Raphia. Contrary to the general scholarly consensus following Gowers, we now know that Ptolemy’s elephants were in fact the larger African variety (Loxodonta Africana). Once again, however, this presents us with the problem of Polybius’ explanation for their reluctance to engage the Seleucids’ Asians. Schneider suggests that Polybius is simply guilty of perpetuating the ancient idea, especially prevalent from Alexander’s time onwards, that everything was much larger in India compared to elsewhere in order to explain the Seleucid elephants’ victory.1017 Alternatively, Polybius may not have known that

Ptolemy’s animals were different from the African elephants used in Carthaginian and Roman armies and therefore simply explained their defeat according to the typical reactions of these other elephants towards their larger Indian cousins.

Regardless of the various elephant species present at Raphia, Antiochus could not have known beforehand that the majority of Ptolemy’s elephants would refuse battle. It is clear from the mirrored formation that these animals were intended, at the very least, to cancel each other out, leaving the other contingents to decide the matter elsewhere on the battlefield. Indeed, we know from the fragment of Diodorus that this was Seleucus’ intention in the earlier battle of Ipsus.1018 Moreover, rather than indicating the tactical stalemate that scholars are keen to point to in explanations of

Hellenistic warfare, this was a deliberately intended part of the Allies’ overall tactical plan. It is thus conceivable that commanders sometimes consciously sought an elephant deadlock so as to create an opportunity to utilise their other units with

1016 OGIS 54.1-2; Diodorus, 1.37.5, 3.18.4; Strabo, 16.4.4; Scullard (1974) 25, 126-33; Trautmann (2015) 239; Spinage (1994) 266. 1017 Schneider (2016) 138-40; cf. Strabo’s 15.1.22; Pliny, Naturalis Historia 8.9, 8.11; Herodotus, 3.106; Diodorus, 2.35.3-4. 1018 Diodorus, 21.1.2; see 5.2.1a above.

237 greater tactical efficacy. Alternatively, Antiochus may have hoped that his superior elephant numbers would have been enough to defeat those of the Ptolemies at Raphia.

The speed with which he capitalised on the confusion of the retreating pachyderms on the Ptolemaic left wing by combining his elephants’ attack with a well-timed cavalry and infantry charge suggests some prior planning.

In the event of an elephant victory over their counterparts, it is reasonable to assume that the standard practice was for them then to engage, or threaten, the remaining troops stationed opposite them. We know from Polybius’ account of

Panion that, as the battle progressed, the Seleucid elephants stationed in the north surrounded the Ptolemaic phalanx along with the victorious cataphract cavalry, although it is uncertain whether the Ptolemies had any elephants themselves in this battle.1019 Therefore, although initially simplistic in appearance, the standard tactic of using elephant units to engage opposing pachyderm forces theoretically offered a commander various tactical possibilities.

5.2.2b. Blocking Other Units Another important battlefield use of elephants was their ability to block the path of other units. As the analysis of their battlefield positions demonstrates, beyond a straightforwardly offensive role, elephants could also provide defensive protection for other contingents, most typically the heavily-armed phalanx in the centre. This was explicitly their purpose on the flank of the fortifications at Thermopylae, paralleling the traditional role of the cavalry.1020 In particular, Wrightson argues that their use as a defensive flank guard was one of the most significant roles of war-elephants on the

1019 Polybius, 16.19.11. 1020 See 5.2.1b above.

238 battlefield.1021 By capitalising on their imposing bulk to create an almost ‘immovable obstacle taking up a lot of space on the battlefield’, commanders were able to screen the troops stationed behind or to the side of them as well as theoretically frustrating their opponents’ plans, ‘ensuring that it took longer for enemy cavalry to outflank the battle line’.1022 That horses typically refused to approach elephants without specialised training further contributed to the effectiveness of this tactic.1023

Even when elephants were deployed in locations other than the flanks, their ability to shelter troops and block the path of an opposing force was significant, forming an essential element of the Seleucid tactical plan on at least two occasions.

The initial deployment of the Seleucid elephants behind the phalanx in the southern arena at Panion is a particularly notable example. Although this position did not in the first instance protect the flanks of the phalanx, or prevent it from falling back, it did prevent the army’s complete collapse by shielding the disorganised infantry, whilst simultaneously presenting the victorious Aetolians with a formidable living wall.1024

Given the importance of the Seleucid force stationed in the southern arena remaining undefeated, since it guarded the approach to the main army in the north, the decision to utilise the elephants here as a second line of defence was crucial. Not only were the elephants able to block the Aetolians with their sheer bulk, but significantly, since the

Aetolian horses were unaccustomed to these animals, their cavalry were scared off from the battlefield.1025 By denying the passage of the enemy’s horsemen, Antiochus was able to focus on achieving victory in the north in a tactical move reminiscent of

Ipsus.

1021 Wrightson (2019) 203-4, 208, 211; (2015) 62-3. 1022 Wrightson (2019) 204. 1023 See footnote 917; also 5.2.2c below. 1024 Polybius, 16.19.1; see 5.2.1c above. 1025 Polybius, 16.19.4.

239

Indeed, perhaps the most impressive instance of the Seleucids’ use of elephants to block an opposing cavalry unit was Seleucus I’s spectacular manoeuvre of his large elephant force to cut off Demetrius’ return in 301 B.C.1026 Whereas the elephants’ role in blocking the Ptolemaic army at Panion was defensive in nature, this earlier strategy was, as noted, part of a deliberately offensive procedure. Having successfully lured Demetrius’ cavalry away from the field through his son’s sham retreat, Seleucus moved the bulk of his elephants (which he had consciously held back behind the main line) across the pass that Demetrius had taken. When Demetrius tried to return to the battle he found that the elephants completely blocked his path. Although, unlike the

Aetolians at Panion, his cavalry must have previously had some elephant training, since the Antigonid army also possessed these animals, Demetrius was unable to force his way through. Moreover, the sheer number of pachyderms before him would have proved daunting even for men and horses with previous experience. Seleucus combined the actions of his elephants and cavalry to remove the forces stationed on

Antigonus’ right wing, subsequently exposing the phalanx to his attack with his lighter horsemen. So decisive was this integrated manoeuvre that even critics have declared it as the war-elephant’s greatest military success.1027

5.2.2c. Psychological Warfare Connected to their ability to block another unit was the potential of elephants to act as a psychological deterrent, and scholars have often claimed that this was their most important role on the battlefield.1028 Although this is debatable, since war- elephants performed a variety of functions in Hellenistic armies, and a tendency to

1026 Plutarch, Demetrius 29.3-4. 1027 Gaebel (2002) 226; Epplett (2007) 220; Kistler (2007) 67; Bar-Kochva (1976) 76; see 5.2.1c above. 1028 Sabin (2007) 421; Serrati (2013) 192; Scullard (1974) 238, 247; Nossov (2008) 40; Bosworth (2002) 166; Edwards (2001) 904.

240 overemphasise this aspect has contributed to the prevalent misunderstandings of these troops, we cannot deny that this psychological dimension formed a significant part of their military use. Large and impressive in appearance, elephants can seem formidable even when encountered in peaceful contexts by those familiar with them.

For an army meeting them for the first time, in a context of heightened aggression, it is unsurprising that the appearance of these animals could inspire fear and cause formations to waver or even break entirely. By putting pressure on the stability of an enemy’s infantry line, it was possible to hasten the creation of gaps through which the cavalry, or other units, could charge.

This was most spectacularly demonstrated in the so-called ‘Elephant Victory’.

When Antiochus I hurriedly marched against the invading Galatians, Lucian notes:

Neither the Galatians themselves nor their horses had previously seen an elephant and they were so confused by the incredible sight that, while the beasts were still a long way off and they could hear only their trumpeting, and see their tusks gleaming brightly… and their trunks raised like hooks, they turned and fled in disorder before they were within bowshot.1029

Unfortunately, a detailed account of this battle is particularly lacking. Our only extant source for the specifics of this engagement comes from the second century A.D., as part of an anecdote within a larger ‘satirical discussion’ concerned with the importance of novelty.1030 Naturally, the distance between Lucian and the events he describes, along with the rhetorical nature of his work, calls the reliability of this text into question.1031 Moreover, its explicit interest in the effects of novelty potentially

1029 οὐ γὰρ πρότερον ἰδόντες ἐλέφαντα οὔτε αὐτοὶ Γαλάται οὔτε οἱ ἵπποι αὐτῶν οὕτω πρὸς τὸ παράδοξον τῆς ὄψεως ἐταράχθησαν, ὥστε πόρρω ἔτι τῶν θηρίων ὄντων ἐπεὶ μόνον τετριγότων ἤκουσαν καὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας εἶδον ἀποστίλβοντας ἐπισημότερον… καὶ τὰς προνομαίας ὡς ἐς ἁρπαγὴν ὑπεραιωρουμένας, πρὶν ἢ τὸ τόξευμα ἐξικνεῖσθαι, ἐκκλίναντες σὺν οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ ἔφευγον, Lucian, Zeuxis 10. 1030 Coşkun (2012) 64; see Introduction, 0.2.1. 1031 Coşkun (2012) 64; Anderson (1976) 23-40.

241 casts suspicion on its emphasis that the unusual appearance of the elephants alone was responsible for the victory. Therefore, one may wish to treat this text purely as a literary construction, according to the ‘linguistic turn’ of historiographical theory.1032

However, examples of the devastation that the elephant’s psychological impact could cause persist throughout the Hellenistic period, lending credibility to Lucian’s claim that the Galatians fled in terror.1033 Furthermore, although we are dependent on

Lucian for the specific details of this battle,1034 the authenticity of an engagement involving elephants between Antiochus I and the Galatians in the 270’s B.C. is certain due to a third century B.C. terracotta statue from Myrina depicting an elephant crushing a Galatian soldier.1035 Similarly, an entry in the Suda notes that Simonides composed an epic poem describing this event,1036 whilst an entry in the Babylonian

Astronomical Diaries records the hurried dispatch of 20 elephants from Babylon to

Syria around this time.1037

Lucian’s emphasis on the impression that the elephants had on both the

Galatians and their horses (οὔτε αὐτοὶ Γαλάται οὔτε οἱ ἵπποι αὐτῶν) further illustrates that this psychological impact was not restricted solely to the men of the opposing army, but likewise affected its cavalry, which, as noted, remained unwilling

1032 See Introduction, 0.2.2. 1033 See Appendix 5, Tables 5.4, 5.7. 1034 Not all of which are necessarily accurate – for example, the claim that the Galatians also possessed scythed chariots (Zeuxis, 8) is likely incorrect; Coşkun (2012) 63-4. 1035 Pottier and Reinach (1887) pl.X; the date of this battle is heavily debated – suggestions range from 278 B.C., to the early 260’s (e.g. Tarn (1926) 157, (1930a) 451; Otto (1931) 404, 412; Bar-Kochva (1973), (1989) 501; Wörrle (1975) 59-72; Mitchell (1993) 18.). Recent scholarship favours 275 B.C. (cf. Coşkun (2012)). Since this does not change my argument, I shall not attempt to date the battle beyond locating it within the 270’s B.C. 1036 Suda, Σ.443; it is notable that this entry claims that Simonides, who ‘lived under Antiochus the so- called Great’ (γέγονεν ἐπὶ Ἀντιόχου τοῦ Μεγάλου κληθέντος, i.e. Antiochus III) supposedly wrote his epic poem about this Antiochus. However, scholars now believe that the protagonist of Simonides’ poem was in fact Antiochus I, and that the encyclopaedist mistakenly conflated the two Antiochi; Coşkun (2012) 67-8; Bar-Kochva (1989) 502-3; Mitchell (1993) 18. 1037 B.M. 92688.12-3; Smith (1924) 154-7.

242 to approach these animals without prior training.1038 An army could therefore theoretically use elephants to support its own cavalry either by scaring the enemy’s horses off the battlefield entirely (depriving the heavy infantry of mounted protection), or at least restricting their movements.1039 This was particularly valuable in securing the Seleucids’ victory at Panion.1040

Nevertheless, as armies became familiar with these animals, their psychological effect became less effective. Livy explicitly notes that the Romans, having recently fought against the Carthaginians’ elephants, were not deterred from facing those of the Seleucids at Magnesia.1041 Furthermore, it was possible to neutralise their threat either through various anti-elephant devices, or simply by goading them into attacking their own men.1042 Thus, critics have argued that once their novelty wore off, the elephant became nothing more than a liability on the battlefield.1043 This, however, does disservice to the important tactical roles that elephants fulfilled, and ignores the longevity of their military use. That these animals formed an integral part of the Seleucid army for ca. 150 years indicates that commanders continued to believe that these animals provided important military benefits.1044

Furthermore, we should note that even for an army that was familiar with elephants and knew how to defeat them, it must have taken a great deal of courage to stand firm against them. As suggested above, the sudden appearance of elephants on the flank of Demetrius’ mercenaries at Cyrrhestica (men who would have previously

1038 See footnote 917. 1039 Cf. Porus’ obstruction of Craterus’ cavalry at the Hydaspes, Arrian, Anabasis 5.9.2, 5.15.4. 1040 See 5.2.1 above; similarly, it was even possible for elephants to scare other elephants, as Polybius’ comments in his account of Raphia indicate (5.84.6). 1041 Livy, 37.42.5. 1042 See Appendix 5, Tables 5.4, 5.7. 1043 Cf. Appian, Hispanica 46; Sabin (2007) 421; Serrati (2013) 191-2; Gaebel (2002) 291, 296; Trautmann (2015) 250, 259-60. 1044 Cf. Gaebel (2002) 296-7; Trautmann (2015) 259.

243 encountered pachyderms in the Antigonid army) may have been a contributing factor to their surrender.1045 Moreover, since a simple cavalry charge alone was capable of causing fear among even experienced soldiers, it is easy to imagine the greater psychological impact of elephants.1046 Even if it was possible to overcome any initial fear, the effect which the elephants’ physical appearance had on opposing troops was a fundamental part of human psychology.

It is notable that the Romans explicitly forbade the use of war-elephants in their treaties with the Carthaginians and Antiochus III following their respective defeats.1047 Although they did not attempt to enforce this on the Seleucids until 162

B.C. (and even then the Seleucids’ use of elephants continued),1048 the fact that it was part of the conditions of the Treaty of Apamea is significant. With this psychological dimension in mind, it is unsurprising that Hellenistic kings were drawn to these animals, and we should not dismiss their significance as symbols of power and prestige.1049 Similarly, this was likely an underlying feature of the frequent decision to deploy elephants across the front of the army’s battle-line. By capitalising on the war-elephant’s natural psychological impact, Seleucid rulers were able to blunt the effectiveness of their opponents’ forces, thereby supporting the actions of their other troops, and even increasing their overall tactical efficacy.

1045 Polyaenus, 4.9.3; see 5.2.1a above. 1046 Whereas horses will try to avoid colliding with infantry (see Chapter 1.2), elephants can deliberately kill men with their trunks, feet, or tusks (see footnote 897). 1047 Polybius, 15.18.3-4, 21.42.13; Livy, 38.38.7; Appian, Syriaca 38. 1048 Appian, Syriaca 46; Polybius 321.2.9-11; see the elephants in the armies of Demetrius and Alexander Balas in 150 B.C. (B.M. 34645). 1049 Indeed, the symbolic connotations of war-elephants were an important factor in their introduction and continued military use; see Gerrard (2016) 40-52; it is perhaps in this light that we should interpret I Maccabees’ claim (6.43-6) that Eleazar gloriously killed the lead Seleucid elephant at Beth- Zechariah. Regardless of the authenticity of this event (and, as various scholars have noted, there is much to render it as fiction), it was intended to function as a glorified tale of how one man stood against such a terrifying foe, in a manner strikingly reminiscent of the Biblical story of David and Goliath. Furthermore, since elephants were a royal Seleucid emblem, Eleazar’s attack on the lead animal was loaded with symbolic significance; Tropper (2017); Hoover (2005); Bar-Kochva (1989) 139, 154, 336, 434.

244

5.2.3. Evidence of Combined Arms? From this, we can see that, just as the Seleucids employed their main cavalry units in a variety of roles on the battlefield, so too they used their war-elephants for a range of tactical purposes that were subtly interconnected with their initial position in the overall formation. This flexibility alone should refute suggestions that this period experienced a stagnation of tactical ability. Moreover, despite various scholars’ dismissals,1050 the preceding analysis has shown that on several occasions, the tactical roles of the Seleucids’ war-elephants were actively intended to support those of their cavalry in accordance with combined arms theory.

The clearest and most successful use of combined arms in the Seleucid army was at the battle of Ipsus. Here each contingent’s position in the initial battle formation was closely interconnected with the role they were intended to play, which in turn was part of an intricate plan to achieve a decisive victory. By engaging the elephants stationed in front of Antigonus’ left wing with a similar number of their own, Seleucus and Lysimachus consciously created a stalemate which pinned down the troops on this part of the line, opening up the possibility of a decisive attack on the other side of the battlefield. By following this up with Antiochus’ sham cavalry retreat, which lured Demetrius’ mounted forces away from the field, Seleucus gained the opportunity to move his remaining elephants across the pass to prevent any possibility of the enemy cavalry’s return. Consequently, the Antigonid phalanx was exposed to attack, a fact which Seleucus capitalised on, using his light cavalry to harass and break up the formation, before advancing the main body of infantry for the final blow. Not only was Seleucus’ decision to move the vast majority of his elephants to block off Demetrius’ return directly intended to support the sham retreat

1050 Gaebel (2002) 242, 260-1, 301; Wrightson (2019) 7.

245 of Antiochus’ cavalry, but the actions of each individual unit were interdependent on the others. It is unsurprising that Wrightson uses this battle as a major focus for his application of combined arms theory to the military engagements of the ancient world.1051

However, although it is true that no subsequent Hellenistic battle exhibits this level of coordination so successfully, the events of other Seleucid engagements remain significant. In particular, the actions of the various troops stationed on

Antiochus III’s right wing at Raphia were intended to complement each other. Whilst

Antiochus could not have predicted the reaction of Ptolemy’s elephants, by timing the charge of his cavalry and mercenary infantry into the Ptolemaic left flank just as the elephants stationed in front of the wing engaged, he was able to combine units from each of the military arms present in a decisive attack that led to the collapse of the

Ptolemaic wing. He could then have charged into the exposed Ptolemaic infantry had he not pursued the enemy horse away from the field. Additionally, although speculative, the decision to position his other elephants across the front of the left wing may have been intended to create a stalemate on this side of the battlefield in a manner similar to Ipsus, thus supporting the main attack from the Seleucid right, even though this was not how the battle itself developed.

Similarly, we can infer from events at Panion that the actions of the elephants and cavalry were intended to complement each other. The developments in the northern arena in particular are a notable example, where, having defeated the opposing cavalry, the Seleucid cataphracts turned to outflank the Ptolemaic phalanx at the same time as the elephants attacked from the front.1052 Moreover, by creating an

1051 Wrightson (2019) 1, 202, 208-12, (2015) 62, 65-7. 1052 Polybius, 16.19; Bar-Kochva (1976) 156.

246 immovable second line of defence with his elephants in the south, Antiochus prevented the Aetolians from attacking the Seleucids’ northern positions, enabling the decisive action to take place there, in an echo of Seleucus I’s earlier tactics. The simultaneous utilisation of two separate arenas is further testament to the sophistication of Seleucid military thought and their ability to coordinate the actions of individual units into a cohesive whole.

Therefore, although Wrightson is correct that Ipsus was the most spectacular example of combined arms in Hellenistic battles, it is clear that the Seleucids remained keen to use their elephants in a capacity that would support the actions of their other troops, especially their cavalry.1053 As far as other battles are concerned, the alleged ‘mini-formations’ of elephants, infantry, and cavalry at Beth-Zechariah are perhaps another example of intended coordination between various Seleucid troops, although, as we have seen, reconstructing the realities of this battle is complex. We would perhaps expect some sort of combined action at Magnesia, especially given the unusual Seleucid battle formation. However, although the accounts of both Livy and Appian are quite extensive, there is unfortunately very little detail regarding the elephants’ roles within the fighting itself. Additionally,

Antiochus disregarded his initial plan for his right-wing cavalry,1054 and the battle seems to have quickly dissolved into individual fights between similarly armed units.

A lack of detail for Cyrrhestica, and the battle against Molon, along with the unusual circumstances of the ‘Elephant Victory’ (where the Galatians fled before the fighting could begin), and Thermopylae (which was purely defensive in nature), likewise mean that it is impossible to tell to what extent there was any attempt on these occasions to combine the roles of the war-elephants with those of other contingents.

1053 Wrightson (2019) 1. 1054 See Chapter 4.2.2, 4.3.1.

247

Nonetheless, despite the complications of the sources, it is clear that far from indicating a ‘decline’ in the importance and efficacy of the cavalry, the Seleucids’ introduction and continued use of war-elephants was a tactically significant development aimed at supporting and enhancing the battlefield efficacy of their mounted troops. Moreover, as with their use of cavalry, the Seleucids’ creative variations of standard Hellenistic practice demonstrates a continuing development of tactical thought. We must now extend this analysis to the Seleucids’ other unconventional units in order provide a comprehensive understanding of the operation of their mounted corps.

5.3. Scythed Chariots

The second unconventional mounted contingent that we must assess is the scythed chariot. Unlike the elephant, this was something that the Seleucids directly inherited from their Achaemenid predecessors.1055 In most armies, the chariot had long since fallen out of use in favour of cavalry warfare,1056 and, given the limited prior success of the scythed version,1057 it is striking that the Seleucids continued to use it.1058 It is possible that this was from a lingering conception of this weapon’s prestige in this region, and even in armies that no longer used them, chariots continued to function as ceremonial vehicles and status symbols.1059 Nevertheless, it is notable that there are only four (reliable) occasions where scythed chariots are

1055 The exact origin of this weapon is, however, uncertain, with disagreements between Xenophon (Cyropaedia 6.1.28-30) and Ctesias (Diodorus, 2.5.4), as well as Nefiodkin (2004) and Rop (2013). The date of the scythed chariot’s invention does not affect this thesis. 1056 Even in the caturaṅgabala of contemporary Indian warfare the chariot was no longer as significant; Thapliyal (2010) 59-60; Chakravarti (1941) 2, 23. 1057 Xenophon, Cyropaedia 7.1 (though cf. 8.8), Hellenika 4.1.18-9. 1058 Mithradates of Pontus also used scythed chariots at Chaeronea (86 B.C.), Plutarch, Sulla 18.2. 1059 E.g. Athenaeus, 5.202a, 5.203b; Plutarch, Pompey 14.3-4; Polybius, 6.53.8; Herodotus, 1.60.4, 4.180.3, 6.35.1; Scullard (1974) pl.XX.c, XXIV.

248 recorded in the Seleucid army: Ipsus; an engagement just before Cyrrhestica; the battle against Molon; and, notoriously, Magnesia.1060 Even here, it is questionable whether Seleucus used the scythed chariots at Ipsus, since although both Plutarch and

Diodorus claim that he brought 120 with him,1061 neither author makes any further reference to them, and it is difficult to see how they fit within the overall progression of the battle. We should, however, resist Bar-Kochva’s argument that they were not used in this battle because they were seen as ‘superfluous’,1062 since this conflicts with their use several years later just before the battle of Cyrrhestica.

The Seleucids’ infrequent use of scythed chariots, particularly their seeming disappearance for 65 years following Cyrrhestica until Molon’s rebellion, and then for another 30 years until Magnesia is curious. Did this weapon truly drop out of use only to reappear briefly in the late-third/early-second century B.C., and if so, what was the reason for this? Of course, given the scarcity of detailed sources for the intervening period between Seleucus I and Antiochus III, it is possible that the

Seleucids used scythed chariots on other occasions for which we have no surviving evidence. Nonetheless, even the comparative evidence for the use of scythed chariots is sparse, and there is similarly a 64 year period of silence between Pharnabazus’ successful use of them (395 B.C.) and Gaugamela (331 B.C.).1063 Although, once again, we cannot be entirely certain that this silence reflects historical reality and not merely an accident of the sources, Rop significantly points out that ancient authors

1060 The claims of I Maccabees, 1.17 and II Maccabees, 13.2 for scythed chariots in Antiochus IV’s invasion of Egypt and Lysias’ army prior to Beth-Zechariah are doubtful. 1061 Plutarch, Demetrius 28.3; Diodorus, 20.113.4. 1062 Bar-Kochva (1976) 108. 1063 Xenophon, Hellenika 4.1.18-9; Arrian, Anabasis 3.11-3; Quintus Curtius, 4.12-5; Diodorus, 17.57- 8.

249 are typically unanimous in either their silence or in recording their presence; the sporadic nature of their use seems to be genuine.1064

Any attempt to classify the Seleucids’ scythed chariots within their tripartite military infrastructure is also complex. In light of its Achaemenid origin and its infrequent use in the Seleucid army, it is highly unlikely that scythed chariot units were formed from the Empire’s military settlers. The Achaemenid heritage of these weapons would perhaps suggest that we should locate them within the ‘non-regular’ troops, although the lack of any specification in the sources for the men using them is notable. Moreover, like war-elephants, the maintenance costs of chariots and the horses needed to pull them would have been significant, whilst their continued ceremonial capacity meant that they were items of status and prestige. It is thus possible that Seleucid kings may have similarly sought to maintain a monopoly on scythed chariots, effectively making them a part of their royal standing troops, even if they were present only occasionally on the battlefield. However, given that Polybius records an unspecified number of scythed chariots within Molon’s battle-line against

Antiochus III,1065 it is doubtful that these weapons were solely a royal prerogative, but rather that the local subject/allied elite also maintained them (most likely for the same reasons of prestige and tradition). We therefore cannot easily locate this weapon within the tripartite division of the Seleucid army. Since we are dealing with actual weapons here, rather than units of men who had a defined military status within the

Seleucid Empire, this is perhaps not overly surprising.

1064 Rop (2013) 170 n.17. 1065 Polybius, 5.53.9.

250

A further problem is that, significantly, there is no iconographical evidence for scythed chariots.1066 We are therefore dependent solely on the descriptions in our literary accounts for an understanding of this weapon’s physical characteristics. This is complicated by the fact that, other than Xenophon, none of the ancient authors who describe scythed chariots personally saw one in action. Consequently, the details in

Livy and Quintus Curtius in particular are occasionally confused.1067 However, by combining their accounts with Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, we can reach a general understanding of this weapon. The semi-fictional nature of the Cyropaedia, and the dubious reliability of the claim that Cyrus the Great invented scythed chariots, does not diminish the value of Xenophon’s description, due to his personal experience in facing this weapon at Cunaxa (401 B.C.).1068

Typically, scythed chariots needed four horses; these were yoked side-by-side, and required training to work effectively together.1069 It is also reasonable to assume that they were fairly robust animals – most likely ‘Nisaeans’ – adding to the overall cost and prestige.1070 The chariots themselves, Xenophon notes, were made from

‘strong timbers’ (ἰσχυρῶν ξύλων) with a box around the driver, whilst steel scythes, two cubits (ca. 3 ft/91 cm) long, were attached to the axles/wheels, projecting out towards the sides; other scythes pointed towards the ground,1071 which

Livy claims were intended ‘to catch any who fell or got beneath the chariot’.1072 Livy also adds two, ten cubits long (ca. 15 ft/4.5 m) horn-like projections attached to the

1066 Rop (2013) 174, 179; Nefiodkin (2004) 370-1; Littauer and Crouwel (1979) 153. 1067 Livy, 37.41.6-8; Quintus Curtius, 4.9.5; cf. Diodorus, 17.53.1-3; Rivet (1979) 130; Briscoe (1981) 352. 1068 Xenophon. Anabasis 1.8.20; Rop (2013) 175. 1069 Livy, 37.41.5; see Chapter 1.2. 1070 See the Apadana Frieze, Schmidt (1953) pl.52; Chapter 1.3; Littauer and Crouwel (1979) 155; Tallis (2005) 211. 1071 Xenophon, Cyropaedia 6.1.29-30. 1072 ut prolapsos subeuntesque contingeret, Livy, 37.41.7.

251 yoke.1073 The length of these is striking. Assuming that these spikes pointed forwards,

Livy’s suggestion is not too absurd, given that they would need to project beyond the horses to be useful. Nevertheless, Livy’s claim remains questionable, and some scholars emend decem to duo given the two-cubit length of the other scythes.1074 In comparison, Xenophon does not mention these spikes, although both Quintus Curtius and Diodorus note a potentially similar feature on Darius’ chariots at Gaugamela, suggesting a later development.1075 Notably, however, Diodorus’ spikes are considerably shorter: ‘three spans long (τρισπίθαμα)’ (ca. 27 inches/68.5 cm), supporting Briscoe’s suggestion of a misunderstanding on Livy’s part.1076

In order to support their various scythes, and improve their suitability for close- combat, Xenophon also notes that the wheels were strengthened to avoid breakages, and the axles lengthened in an effort to make them harder to overturn.1077 Despite this, scythed chariots still needed specific battlefield conditions to operate effectively, something which may have contributed to their limited use in Achaemenid and

Seleucid armies. In particular, they needed flat, unobstructed ground, as illustrated by

Darius’ preparations before Gaugamela, and his fear that ‘if the Macedonians reached the uneven ground his chariots would cease to be of service’.1078 Furthermore, they needed sufficient space between the two armies to gather speed, since they were

‘nearly helpless if brought to a standstill’,1079 whilst the wheels could easily become

1073 Livy, 37.41.6. 1074 Briscoe (1981) 353; Weissenborn and Müller (1907) 73; Walsh (1999) 104 n.1. 1075 Quintus Curtius, 4.9.5; Diodorus, 17.53.2. 1076 Briscoe (1981) 353. 1077 Xenophon, Cyropaedia 6.1.29. 1078 ἔνθα δὴ δείσας Δαρεῖος μὴ προχωρησάντων ἐς τὰ οὐχ ὁμαλὰ τῶν Μακεδόνων ἀχρεῖά σφισι γένηται τὰ ἅρματα, Arrian, Anabasis 3.13.2; Rop (2013) 168-9, 174;Wrightson (2019) 22; Littauer and Crouwel (1979) 154. 1079 Littauer and Crouwel (1979) 154; cf. Plutarch, Sulla 18.2.

252 stuck in the mud if conditions were particularly wet.1080 They were therefore suited only to a handful of locations, and the logistics of their transportation whilst on campaign, along with the costs of maintaining them, would have also complicated matters.1081

Above all, we must remember that these weapons could only operate in accordance with the physical abilities and limitations of the horses pulling them.1082

This will be particularly important for the assessment of the tactical use of this weapon within the Seleucid mounted corps. As with the elephant section above, we shall first determine the typical position of Seleucid scythed chariots in the overall formation, and how this compares to and/or supports the other mounted troops, before analysing their tactical functions, and the extent of their coordination under combined arms warfare.

5.3.1. Battlefield Position Just as it was common in the Hellenistic period to station elephants across the army’s front, this position was also adopted for the scythed chariots; however, whereas it was also possible to deploy elephants in a variety of battlefield locations, the realities of chariot warfare meant that scythed chariots were almost always arranged in front of the main line.1083 As Livy notes for Magnesia: ‘[Antiochus] positioned the chariots… in the front line because it would have been necessary to drive them through his own men had they been placed at the extremities of the line or

1080 Cf. Porus’ chariots (although not scythed chariots), Arrian, Anabasis 5.15.2; Quintus Curtius, 8.14.4; Wrightson (2019) 22. 1081 Rop (2013) 171-2. 1082 See Chapter 1. 1083 See Appendix 5, Tables 5.5, 5.8.

253 in the centre’.1084 This is not to dismiss a commander’s desire, as with the elephants, to capitalise on the potential psychological impact of the scythed chariots’ formidable appearance (something that Diodorus notes at Gaugamela)1085 by deliberately placing them at the head of the army, but this can only have been secondary to the practicalities of their use. Therefore, although we do not have any details for their use against Demetrius in the engagement prior to Cyrrhestica beyond their failed charge,1086 it is likely that even here they were initially deployed in a frontal arrangement.

Similarly, all we know about their use in Molon’s army against Antiochus III is that an unknown number were deployed ‘at intervals in front of his line’.1087 As noted, the close parallel in Polybius’ wording between the position of Molon’s chariots and Antiochus’ ten elephants suggests that they shared similar positions on the battlefield.1088 Whether they were drawn up across the army’s centre or one of the wings is debatable, and though a position in the centre of the field is likely, there is nothing in Polybius to allow us to determine this with certainty. Bar-Kochva’s claim that scythed chariots were ‘designed to cut down the opposing phalanx’, and therefore must have been opposite it in the centre of the battlefield,1089 is problematic. First, on at least three occasions (most notoriously at Magnesia), scythed chariots were drawn up in front of the wings, opposite the enemy’s cavalry.1090 As Livy’s comment above illustrates, these weapons were, out of necessity, intended only to attack those units

1084 quia si in extremo aut in medio locatae forent, per suos agendae erant, in prima acie, ut ante dictum est, locaverat rex, Livy, 37.41.8; since Livy himself notes the chariots were on Antiochus’ left wing, I interpret this comment as drawing a distinction between a position in front of the main force and as an integrated part of the battle-line, either on the edges or in the centre. 1085 Diodorus, 17.58.2. 1086 Plutarch, Demetrius, 48.2. 1087 προεβάλετο τῆς δυνάμεως ἐν διαστάσει, Polybius, 5.53.11. 1088 Section 5.2.1a. 1089 Bar-Kochva (1976) 121. 1090 Magnesia: Livy, 27.40.12; also Sardis (547/6 B.C.) and Gaugamela (331 B.C.), see Appendix 5, Tables 5.5, 5.8.

254 directly opposite them. It is thus likely that in these instances the scythed chariots functioned as a specialised form of heavy-cavalry, intended to neutralise the enemy’s forces on the wings, thereby theoretically allowing the standard mounted troops stationed behind them to outflank the exposed phalanx. Second, although the evidence available shows that scythed chariots often engaged infantry units,1091 I shall show that they were not specifically ‘designed to cut down’ heavily armoured infantry in formation.

5.3.2. Tactical Role The flawed argument that the scythed chariot was ‘invented just to break a close and numerous battle-array of heavy-armed infantrymen’ is one that Nefiodkin particularly proposes in his attempt to locate this weapon’s origin. Claiming that they would have been ineffective against light troops armed with large numbers of missiles, which would have ‘frightened both drivers and horses’, he argues that, by process of elimination, they must have functioned as shock-weapons aimed at breaking up the dense formation of the hoplite phalanx.1092 However, as Rop points out, in almost every instance where scythed chariots engaged an unbroken phalanx they were ‘completely – even humorously – ineffective’.1093 This was particularly so at Cunaxa (401 B.C.).1094 Moreover, Cyrus the Younger’s army here also included these weapons, whilst his enemy crucially did not possess hoplites; that Cyrus still transported his scythed chariots from Sardis to Cunaxa demonstrates that they were not specifically intended to attack a hoplite phalanx.1095 The success of Pharnabazus’

1091 See Appendix 5, Tables 5.5, 5.8. 1092 Nefiodkin (2004) 372, passim. 1093 Rop (2013) 172. 1094 Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8.20. 1095 Xenophon, Anabasis 1.7.10; Rop (2013) 172.

255 attack in 395 B.C. was notably against lighter armed troops who were caught out of formation.1096

Moreover, whilst the scythes indicate that these vehicles were intended for close-combat in contrast to earlier chariots, it is vital to remember that they were still pulled by horses, and so the same considerations apply to them as to standard cavalry contingents. It is therefore curious that although Nefiodkin acknowledges that cavalry charges were typically unsuccessful against close formations of heavily-armed infantry,1097 he does not apply this reasoning to scythed chariots. Just as Chapter 4.3 noted that horses, as a natural part of their behaviour, will not willingly charge a wall of spears, meaning that it was only with great difficulty that cavalry could attack a hoplite phalanx head-on, and they certainly could not frontally charge a sarissa- bearing phalanx,1098 there is no reason to think that the horses pulling scythed chariots were any different.1099

Nevertheless, the events on Antiochus’ left wing at Magnesia lend some justification to Nefiodkin’s concern that scythed chariots would suffer against light missile-bearing troops. Although the scythed chariots were meant to initiate the attack on the left before withdrawing from the main fighting,1100 Eumenes, stationed directly opposite and familiar with their weaknesses, ordered his cavalry and light infantry to spread out and harass them with missiles, causing the horses to panic, and throwing the troops stationed behind them into confusion.1101 Thus, Livy observes:

1096 Xenophon, Hellenika 4.17-9; Rop (2013) 173. 1097 Nefiodkin (2004) 372. 1098 Chapter 4, footnote 796. 1099 Although Diodorus (17.58.4-5) and Quintus Curtius (4.15.4) record that Darius’ chariots had some success against Alexander’s phalangites on the left of his formation at Gaugamela, these chariots must have merely exploited a gap which had appeared in the line, especially given the support of Mezaeus’ cavalry. Moreover, overall, they still had little effect on the battle; Heckel (2010) 109. 1100 Appian, Syriaca 32. 1101 Livy, 37.41.9-10; Appian, Syriaca 33.

256

In this way, the chariots were driven away from the ground between the two lines and, once this ridiculous sideshow was removed, the signal was given on both sides and they finally proceeded to a regular battle.1102

Although this dismissive attitude towards the scythed chariots is perhaps justified in light of their overwhelming failure, Briscoe notes that ‘[Livy’s] division between these preliminaries and the battle proper is misleadingly schematic’.1103

As even Livy’s own description of the battle illustrates, Eumenes capitalised on the panic caused among the troops stationed behind the scythed chariots, charging into the now exposed flank of the cataphracts with his own cavalry.1104 Since this resulted in the collapse of the entire Seleucid left wing, it is clear that Eumenes’ initial attack was not solely a preliminary move before the main part of the battle, but was intended as a decisive blow against the enemy. Furthermore, by characterising the scythed chariots as nothing more than a ‘ridiculous sideshow’ (inani ludibrio),

Livy creates the misleading impression that they played no significant role in

Antiochus’ own battle plan. Whilst their ultimate failure means that we are reduced to speculation, it is unrealistic to assume that they were not intended to be an important component in the Seleucid attack, and it is evident that Eumenes took their threat seriously.

As Appian notes, Eumenes ‘disregarded the others, but feared the onset of the chariots drawn up mostly against him’.1105 The scythed chariots’ position in front of the left wing, opposite the light infantry and cavalry under Eumenes’ command, suggests that it was these troops that Antiochus intended them to charge, presumably

1102 ita medio inter duas acies campo exiguntur quadrigae, amotoque inani ludibrio, tum demum ad iustum proelium signo utrimque dato concursum est, Livy, 37.41.12. 1103 Briscoe (1981) 354; cf. Kromayer (1907) 190. 1104 Livy, 37.41.9-42; Appian, Syriaca 33. 1105 Εὐμένης, τῶν μὲν ἄλλων κατεφρόνησε, τὴν δὲ ῥύμην τῶν ἁρμάτων τεταγμένων ἐφ᾿ ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα δείσας, Appian, Syriaca 33.

257 in order to break the formation of the Romans’ right wing and expose the main infantry’s flank to the heavy cavalry’s attack. Despite his devastating counterattack, it is possible, given his initial fear, that had Eumenes not acted as quickly as he did, and had he not known how to combat this weapon, the scythed chariots could have been successful. Therefore, although Nefiodkin’s caution of this weapon’s potential disadvantage against missile-bearing troops has merit, we should not dismiss its ability to engage light troops successfully, especially in circumstances where they were unprepared, as Pharnabazus demonstrated in 395 B.C.1106

The only instance where the sources record that the Seleucids were actually able to attack with their scythed chariots, however, is their engagement with

Demetrius prior to Cyrrhestica. Even here they were unsuccessful; Demetrius easily avoided their onset (it is not stated what troops the chariots charged) and routed his opponent.1107 With this uninspiring record in mind, it is unsurprising that the fiasco at

Magnesia was the last serious attempt to use this unconventional weapon in the

Seleucid army.

5.3.3. Evidence of Combined Arms? As a consequence of the Seleucids’ limited use of scythed chariots, attempts to assess the extent to which they operated according to combined arms theory are difficult, especially since Plutarch does not elaborate on the only instance of their deliberate attack. Nevertheless, this does not rule out their ability, under the right conditions, to complement the standard cavalry. In particular, given the detailed accounts in both Livy and Appian for Magnesia, we can identify the potential for

1106 Xenophon, Hellenika 4.1.19. 1107 Plutarch, Demetrius 48.2.

258 combined arms warfare in this battle, despite the collapse of the Seleucid left wing at the beginning of the fighting.

In light of the scythed chariots’ position in Antiochus’ battle-line and Eumenes’ reaction, it appears that the chariots were intended to open the battle on this side of the army by charging into the lighter troops stationed on the Romans’ right wing.

Presumably, as noted, this was intended to disrupt these units, creating a gap in the

Romans’ line which would allow the Companions and cataphracts stationed behind the chariots to charge into the Latin ala’s exposed flank, with the support of the other

Seleucid light troops deployed on this wing, whilst the phalanx attacked the legions in the centre.1108 At the same time, Antiochus would charge with his own right-wing cavalry, theoretically creating a pincer movement. Naturally, since the battle did not develop in this manner, and we cannot know what Antiochus himself actually intended, this remains speculative, and we should remember that commanders do not always act, or plan, in accordance with military theory.

Considering the size of Antiochus’ army at Magnesia, especially the length of his front line, and the variety of troops present, it is likely that the scythed chariots’ inclusion was part of a demonstration of strength and prestige aimed at emphasising the wealth and power of the Seleucid Empire and overawing the Romans.

Additionally, Antiochus may have hoped to catch the Romans, who were becoming familiar with traditional Hellenistic tactics, off-guard. This is not to suggest a decline in the operational efficacy of the standard Seleucid cavalry; not only did the main attack on the right come from these units, but it is possible that had Antiochus also employed a traditional cavalry attack on his left, this wing may have been more

1108 Cf. Bar-Kochva (1976) 172.

259 successful (or at least may not have collapsed so quickly).1109 Nor should we completely dismiss these unconventional weapons as novelties. Despite their failure at Magnesia, it is clear that, just as with their elephants, scythed chariots were (at least conceptually) intended to work in conjunction with the Seleucids’ other mounted units.

5.4. Camels

The final unconventional mounted contingent that we must consider is the camel-archers. Most commonly, camels were used in armies as baggage animals, serving in this capacity throughout history.1110 Although incapable of operating in every type of terrain, and ‘particularly susceptible to changes of climate’, these animals are notable for their endurance, especially their ability to go without water for lengthy periods, and are also ‘less liable to panic under fire than other animals’, such as elephants.1111 In light of these logistical benefits, it is reasonable to suggest that

Seleucid rulers likewise maintained some camels themselves as part of their general military infrastructure.1112 The use of camels as an active unit within the Seleucids’ battlefield deployment, however, is limited to just one occasion at Magnesia, although Xenophon and Herodotus record that Cyrus used camels against Croesus at

Sardis (547/6 B.C.), where they allegedly frightened the horses due to their smell and

1109 Grainger (2015a) 182; Bar-Kochva (1976) 172. 1110 E.g. Xenophon, Cyropaedia, 7.1.49; Diodorus, 17.2, 17.71.2, 17.105.7, 19.55.1, 20.73.3; Plutarch, Crassus 21.6, 25.1; Pausanias, 6.5.4; Herodotus, 1.80.2; Quintus Curtius, 3.3.24; Glover (1950) 4; Tallis (2005) 211. 1111 Glover (1950) 3; also: Pliny, Naturalis Historia 8.26; British Army Veterinary Department (1914) 276-94; Mukasa-Mugerwa (1981) 43-8, 77-9. 1112 The logistics of how and where these were kept are unfortunately unclear.

260 appearance.1113 Similarly, Kauṭilya mentions the possibility of the ancient Indians using camels in arid climates.1114

Regarding Magnesia, both Appian and Livy note that this unit originated from

Arabia, something that Strabo also supports, as does the overall geographic distribution of this animal in general.1115 In a similar manner to the various cavalry units assessed in Chapter 3.2.2, it is likely, given this ethnic designation, and their single known battlefield use, that this contingent formed part of the Seleucids’ ‘non- regular’ mounted troops.1116 These camel-archers were thus distinct from any camels potentially kept for logistical purposes. It is conceivable that the main reasons these animals were used at Magnesia was simply because they were the natural mount of the Arabian contingent that Antiochus had called up. Nevertheless, we must assess their integration within the Seleucids’ tactical conception of their army, and how they potentially complemented the other mounted troops on the battlefield. As with the previous sections, we shall first consider their position in the battle-line, before speculating on their possible tactical role, and their potential use within combined arms warfare.

5.4.1. Battlefield Position At Magnesia, Livy records that an unspecified number of Arabian camel- archers were next to the scythed chariots at the front of the Seleucid left wing.1117

Alternatively, Appian initially groups them together with the Dahae, Mysians, and

1113 Xenophon, Cyropaedia 7.1.27, 7.1.48; Herodotus, 1.80.4-5. 1114 Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra 9.1.49; Thapliyal (2010) 351; there is also evidence that the Romans maintained several cohorts of dromedarii in the third century A.D. (P.Dura 100, 101; Gilliam (1956) 76; Dixon and Southern (1992) 2), though it is uncertain that they ever went into battle mounted on camels. 1115 Appian, Syriaca 32; Livy, 37.40.12; Strabo, 16.4.18; also: Pliny, Naturalis Historia 8.26; Mukasa- Mugerwa (1981) 3. 1116 Other Arabian troops served as ‘non-regular’ infantry at Raphia, Polybius, 5.82.12. 1117 Livy, 37.40.12-3.

261

Elymaians in a throwaway reference to Antiochus’ various missile troops.1118 As noted, the Dahae, Mysians, and Elymaians were each on the Seleucid right wing, rather than the left.1119 Since Livy states that the resulting confusion from Eumenes’ attack on the scythed chariots also spread to the camels, it is preferable to locate the

Arabian camel-archers here rather than with the Dahae, and Appian himself makes this location clear a little further into his account: ‘the camels were disordered first, having been stationed next to the chariots’.1120

Again, this location in front of the wing is one that Seleucid unconventional troops regularly occupied, and their position next to the scythed chariots is particularly striking, especially in light of the subsequent chaos that this caused.

However, although this may suggest that the two units were intended to operate in a very similar manner, the camel-archers’ deployment also parallels the cavalry’s typical positions, especially those of the lighter skirmishing units.1121 Livy observes that the ‘Tarentines’ and Galatian horsemen were stationed alongside the

Arabians.1122 As noted, the ‘Tarentines’ specialised in flexible support, capable of engaging the enemy either from a distance or at close-quarters, and it is possible that the Galatians were very similar.1123 It is thus worth considering whether the Arabian camel-archers’ proximity to these cavalry units had any bearing on their intended tactical role in this battle. It is possible, given that this is their only known appearance in the Seleucid army, that Antiochus, considering them rather unusual, simply put them on his wing out of the way. However, I would counter that the very fact that he prominently positioned these troops at the head of his left wing makes this less likely.

1118 Appian, Syriaca 32. 1119 Livy, 37.40.8-9; Chapter 3.2.2. 1120 αἵ τε κάμηλοι πρῶται τῆς ἀταξίας ᾐσθάνοντο, πλησίον τοῖς ἅρμασι παρατεταγμέναι, Appian, Syriaca 33. 1121 See Chapter 4.2.1-2, 4.3.3. 1122 Livy, 37.40.13. 1123 See Chapter 3.2.2.

262

Indeed, if Antiochus truly did not intend this dromedary unit to play a major role in the battle, there were far more suitable positions in his arrangement (either on the extreme flank, or behind the main line) that he could have utilised.1124

5.4.2. Tactical Role Due to the collapse of the Seleucid left wing at the beginning of the battle, the

Arabian camel-archers did not play an active role in the fighting, merely contributing to the confusion that the scythed chariots created. Consequently, neither Appian nor

Livy preserve any details regarding how Antiochus intended to use them, and both authors quickly dismiss them in their accounts. This is most unfortunate. Nonetheless, by considering their descriptions of the Arabians’ armament in conjunction with the position of these troops on the Seleucid flank alongside the ‘Tarentines’ and

Galatians, we can offer some tentative suggestions.

Both Appian and Livy note that, mounted on their ‘very swift’ (ὀξυτάτας) dromedaries, the Arabian camel-archers were equipped not only with bows, but also wielded long, narrow swords suitable for close-combat.1125 In particular, Livy claims that these swords were 4 cubits long (6 ft/1.83 m).1126 Although this length initially seems exaggerated, it is not impossible, especially since dromedaries are typically ca.

5.9-6.6 ft/1.8-2 m tall, meaning that any weapon intended for close-combat would need to be relatively long to be effective.1127 The Arabians’ mix of long- and close- range weapons suggests a degree of flexibility to their battlefield functions. Appian’s

1124 Cf. the position of the Roman elephants at Magnesia, Livy, 37.39.13; Appian, Syriaca 31; see section 5.2.1c above. 1125 Appian, Syriaca 32; Livy, 37.40.12-3; cf. Herodotus, 7.69, 7.86, 7.184; Xenophon, Cyropaedia 6.28 alternatively notes two archers mounted on each camel. 1126 Livy, 37.40.12; cf. Diodorus, 2.17.2. 1127 Livy, 37.40.13; it is possible that this weapon comprised a smaller blade attached to a long shaft, similar to a glaive; a blade this long is not completely objectionable (cf. the huge zweihänder (7.5 ft/2.13 m)), though less feasible for mounted troops.

263 inclusion of the superlative adjective ὀξύτατος in his description further indicates their manoeuvrability, and several other ancient authors also note this quality when discussing these animals.1128 Therefore, with this potential for swift multi-combat use in mind, their battlefield position alongside the versatile ‘Tarentines’ gains significance. I thus suggest that the intention at Magnesia was to use them in a similar tactical role, as adaptable close- and long-range light support, even if in reality this did not transpire as hoped.

5.4.3. Evidence of Combined Arms? Once again, the rapid collapse of the left wing drastically limits our ability to analyse the application of combined arms theory to these unconventional mounted troops. Nevertheless, as I argued above for the scythed chariots (5.3.3), the theoretical potential for combined arms was present in this battle, at least to some degree. Given the camel-archers’ close proximity to the light cavalry on the cataphract’s flank, along with their flexible tactical roles as a consequence of possessing multiple weapons, it is plausible that if the original intention was for the cataphracts to charge whatever gap the scythed chariots created, the Arabians, ‘Tarentines’, and Galatians were meant to provide this heavily-armed unit with highly manoeuvrable back-up. At the same time, this flexibility allowed them to work in conjunction with the various light infantry contingents stationed on the wing in order to protect the less mobile phalanx, which was occupied with the Roman legions in the centre.

As noted, whether Antiochus’ original battle-plan mirrored this and was developed according to combined arms theory, rather than merely leaving each unit to attack independently (as became the reality), is impossible to tell. Indeed, given this

1128 Aristotle, Historia Animalium 8(9).632a30; Strabo, 15.2.10; Diodorus, 19.37; Tarn (1930b) 160-1.

264 apparently solitary use of Arabian camel-archers in the Seleucid army, it is likely that rather than demonstrating any innovative tactical desire to employ this unit as a decisive element in his battlefield strategy, Antiochus simply used them to supplement to his light cavalry because the Arabian contingent arrived with them.

Nonetheless, this does not indicate a deterioration of Seleucid tactical thought. As the assessment of their armament (which illustrates their multi-role abilities) and their position in the Seleucid battle-line close to the ‘Tarentines’ (who shared this flexibility) demonstrates, they fit comfortably into the Seleucids’ theoretical conception of their army’s tactical operation, even if Antiochus did not deliberately seek them out. Therefore, whilst the collapse of the Seleucid left wing reduces us to speculation, I propose that the Arabian camel-archers at Magnesia were intended to complement the other Seleucid light cavalry stationed on this flank.

5.5. Conclusion

Despite comprising only a small percentage of the Empire’s forces, it is clear that the sustained use of unconventional mounted troops played an important role within the operation of the Seleucid army. As we have seen, these units often occupied prominent positions in front of the main battle-line, illustrating their importance for initiating the attack, and allowing Seleucid rulers to exploit their capacity for psychological warfare, although the war-elephants in particular were frequently deployed in a variety of locations on the battlefield (i.e. in front of the flanks/centre; as an integrated part of the main line; or even behind the formation) depending on the role they were intended to fulfil. Not only does this demonstrate a flexibility similar to the standard cavalry, but it also shows the Seleucids’ willingness for tactical experimentation. Having reassessed the relevant battle accounts for the

265 war-elephants, scythed chariots, and camel-archers, we can see that, just like their traditional horse contingents, the Seleucids’ unconventional mounted troops could (at least theoretically) perform a range of important duties, such as: engaging various enemy units (either to neutralise their advantage, or in a deliberately offensive capacity); protecting their own troops (most often the phalanx); and actively blocking opposing contingents on the battlefield. Combining the above analysis with that presented in Chapter 4 for the tactical use of the standard cavalry, I therefore argue that each element was intended to work in conjunction with the others to increase the operational efficacy of the mounted corps in particular, and the army as a whole.

Although the nature of our evidence limits investigation, we can see that, despite arguments to the contrary, the application of combined arms theory (or, in some cases, at least its potential) is relevant to a number of Seleucid battles. As

Wrightson points out, the coordination between each unit of the Allied army at Ipsus is the most obvious example.1129 However, as I have shown, we can usefully build upon Wrightson’s work, extending the application of combined arms theory to include Raphia, where the attacks of the elephants, cavalry, and infantry of the right wing were all coordinated in a decisive blow against the Ptolemaic left. Similarly, at

Panion, the elephant defence in the southern arena allowed the decisive action to happen in the north, with the attack from the elephants in this area synchronised with that of the cataphracts to surround and destroy the Ptolemaic phalanx.1130 Even at

Magnesia, where the use of unconventional mounted weapons was of little help (the scythed chariots, and even the elephants later in the battle, actually contributed to the

Seleucids’ defeat), and the battle disintegrated into individual fights between units

1129 Wrightson (2019) 1, 202, 208-12, (2015) 62, 65-7. 1130 The ‘mini-formations’ at Beth-Zechariah offer another possibility, but the complications of the sources here prevent certainty.

266 with seemingly little coordination, we can detect their potential (especially with the

Arabian camel-archers) to supplement and support the standard Seleucid cavalry.

Therefore, whilst the realities of certain battles did not always develop according to theory (it is worth remembering that, on the whole, they rarely do), and although some (e.g. the ‘Elephant Victory’) do not seem to have involved/needed this level of combined arms, it is possible in several instances to identify the intention for some sort of coordination in the Seleucids’ initial tactical plan. Not only does this challenge the standard attitude of the scholarship regarding this period’s tactical sophistication, but it also offers a new understanding of these unconventional troops that allows us to assess their battlefield contributions and incorporation into the

Seleucid army more effectively. With this in mind, we should thus resist the prevailing view that these unconventional mounted troops were simply ‘novelties’, the product solely of Hellenistic decadence.1131 Although the period’s propensity for extravagance and displays of power and prestige remains important, and it is possible that some units were included purely on a ruler’s whim, I have shown that each of the

Seleucids’ unconventional mounted contingents was integrated into the tactical conception of their army. Moreover, the extended use of these units (especially war- elephants) throughout the Hellenistic period,1132 along with the fact that Ipsus,

Cyrrhestica, the ‘Elephant Victory’, and possibly Panion, were won as a direct consequence of their use, further illustrates their significance. Whilst on some occasions (e.g. Magnesia) the inclusion of such troops was ineffectual, or even disastrous, it is clear that, on the whole, they were a valuable part of the Seleucid

1131 Cf. Serrati (2013) 191; Ducrey (1986) 103, 106 = (1985) 105, 108; Bar-Kochva (1976) 75, 83; Sabin (2007) 417; the use of scythed chariots and Arabian camel-archers in particular may also have been a reflection, at least initially, of the Seleucids’ Achaemenid inheritance and the multicultural composition of their Empire. 1132 See Appendix 5.

267 mounted corps, and their ability to fulfil various tactical functions allowed them to supplement, support, and even enhance the roles of the standard Seleucid cavalry.

This is crucially not to imply that the cavalry were no longer a capable force on the Hellenistic battlefield. Indeed, by combining the analysis of the previous chapter with that presented above, we can see that the argument of Ducrey and Serrati (i.e. that the introduction and continued use of unconventional troops was a symptom, or even cause, of a declining importance of the cavalry) is fundamentally incorrect. Not only does this approach misunderstand the tactical integration of these troops within the organisation and operation of the mounted corps, but as Chapter 4 demonstrated, there is no indication that the Seleucids ever considered their cavalry to be tactically insignificant, and it is highly unlikely, given the assessments of Chapters 1 and 3, that its quality deteriorated. Moreover, as I have argued, such arguments do a disservice to the complex nature of Hellenistic warfare. The cavalry did not lose their importance; rather the nature of battle had changed.

268

CONCLUSION

The above analysis has demonstrated the importance of the Seleucids’ mounted arm. Despite the difficulties of our source material, this thesis makes several contributions to the study of the Seleucid Empire and Hellenistic warfare and substantially advances our knowledge of the Seleucid cavalry. I have proposed a new tripartite framework through which to assess the organisation of the Seleucids’ military infrastructure. I have demonstrated that there was no decline in the quality or operation of Seleucid mounted forces, and argued that their use of unconventional units was intended to supplement the traditional cavalry contingents through combined arms warfare. Far from experiencing tactical stagnation, we can see that

Seleucid commanders remained open to variation and experimentation. Thus, contrary to received opinion, the Seleucids’ use of cavalry was one of continual evolution and innovation.

By reconsidering the underlying infrastructure of the Seleucid army, it is clear that the previous two-way division between ‘regulars’ and subjects/allies, implicitly creating a dichotomy between ‘Greco-Macedonians’ and ‘others’, is inadequate and misleading.1133 In fact a tripartite analysis is much more appropriate. I have therefore proposed a new approach, based on standing troops (comprising the Royal Guard, permanent garrisons, and possibly some other troops on rotational duty), reserve troops (made up of the Empire’s military settlers), and ‘non-regulars’ (consisting of subjects, allies, and mercenaries). This tripartite division has formed a significant theoretical framework for this thesis, calling for a reassessment of the organisation and operation of the Seleucid army.

1133 Chapter 2.2.

269

Not only have I reinstated the traditional view of the existence of a military settlement system similar to that maintained by the Ptolemies,1134 but, unlike much work in the field which has neglected the core constituent of the cavalry – the horse,1135 the analysis presented here has shown that several ‘types’ of horses were available to the Seleucids. As we saw in Chapter 1.3, through a combination of the different physical abilities of their native ‘Nisaeans’ and ‘Turanians’, along with their potential use of some ‘Central Asian’ and (occasionally) ‘Mediterranean’ horses, the

Seleucids had access to the best range of equines in the Hellenistic world. This enabled them to develop a flexible, multi-faceted cavalry arm that effectively blended the cavalry traditions of their Macedonian and Achaemenid predecessors. The quality and capabilities of their horses did not decline, but rather improved. The subsequent chapters of this thesis have built upon this, assessing how, through the application of this tripartite framework, this varied cavalry force was organised as an integral part of the Seleucids’ military infrastructure, featuring the elite Companions and Agema of the Royal Guard, the cataphracts of the reserve, and the diverse, flexible contingents of the ‘non-regulars’, such as the Dahae, and the ‘Tarentines’.1136

As part of this reassessment of the Seleucid cavalry, I have also illuminated the logistical underpinnings of the Empire’s stud and supply system (an issue that has not received much attention in previous scholarship).1137 Additionally, I have demonstrated the need to re-evaluate the army’s infantry:cavalry ratios. There has been no detailed previous consideration of this evidence.1138 This has led to the misleading claim that in the Hellenistic period infantry:cavalry ratios declined from

1134 Chapter 2.3. 1135 Cf. Willekes (2013) 10, 18-23. 1136 Chapter 3.2. 1137 Chapter 3.4. 1138 As noted, Mielczarek (1993) 23 devotes only four sentences to this issue.

270 the 6:1 achieved by Alexander to 10:1 in line with earlier Classical armies, supporting claims that the cavalry’s importance deteriorated in this period.1139 As we have seen, this misrepresents the evidence. Although, on occasion, the Seleucid army operated in a 10:1 split, their cavalry use could also reach a ratio as high as 5:1, demonstrating an even greater emphasis on mounted troops than that witnessed under Alexander. This reassessment of the numerical evidence therefore counters previous misconceptions of the Seleucid cavalry’s declining significance. Contrary to suggestions of decline, the variable nature of this infantry:cavalry ratio (similar to previous Achaemenid ratios, albeit less erratic) illustrates the continued importance and flexibility of the mounted corps within the Seleucid army, and its commanders’ sensitivity to the individual needs of specific battles.1140

This thesis has also reconsidered the tactical operation of the Seleucids’ cavalry contingents, as well as that of their more unconventional mounted units of war- elephants, scythed chariots, and camel-archers. By building on the preceding assessment of the different contingents present within the Seleucid mounted corps, the analysis presented here has enabled us to obtain a greater understanding of their physical abilities. Here I have established that beyond their standard wing deployment and traditional role protecting the phalanx, the Seleucid cavalry was used in a range of ways, including the unusual centre position of the heavily-armed right- hand units at Magnesia, the offensive reserve in the battle against Molon, and the cunning sham-retreats of Ipsus and Elasa.1141 Moreover, the intricate coordination between the heavy cavalry (consisting of the Guard and reserve) and the lighter units

(typically formed from the ‘non-regulars’) that was intrinsic to the success at Ipsus,

1139 Aperghis (2004) 194. 1140 Chapter 3.3; Appendix 2, Table 1.2. 1141 Chapter 4.2.2-3, 4.3.2.

271 though also evident elsewhere, demonstrates how the tripartite military infrastructure affected, and was in turn influenced by, Seleucid tactical developments.1142 Although it is true that opposing Hellenistic cavalry units often neutralised each other on the battlefield, this is not evidence of any decline in their ability, but rather a symptom of the highly symmetrical nature of this period’s warfare. It is therefore both unreasonable and erroneous to criticise Hellenistic generals for not replicating

Alexander’s success. Additionally, the Seleucid cavalry’s variety of functions and battlefield placements demonstrates the willingness of its commanders to experiment, challenging claims of Hellenistic tactical stagnation.

The analysis of the war-elephants, scythed chariots, and camel-archers has likewise illustrated the Seleucids’ flexibility in these units’ deployments on the battlefield. Although Hellenistic custom typically placed unconventional units across the front of the army, often to capitalise on the psychological impact of their appearance, the Seleucids (especially where their war-elephants were concerned) remained open to other possibilities, occasionally integrating them within the main line, or placing them behind the army as a second line of defence.1143 Moreover, we have seen that, on at least three occasions,1144 the Seleucids’ ability to field multiple units of unconventional troops allowed them to combine these different battle arrangements to achieve various tactical objectives.

By approaching the ancient battle accounts through the modern military theory of combined arms, the above analysis has shown that the Seleucids’ use of unconventional mounted weapons was intended to work in conjunction with the standard cavalry in order to improve their operational efficacy and gain a potential

1142 Chapter 4.3.4. 1143 Chapter 5.2-4, especially 5.2.1. 1144 Ipsus, Panion, and Magnesia.

272 advantage over their opponents. Furthermore, I have contributed to the study of combined arms theory by demonstrating that, contrary to the claims of previous scholarship,1145 the Seleucids attempted to coordinate the different elements of their army beyond the battle of Ipsus.1146 Not only does this rebut current conceptions of the use of unconventional troops, showing that they are not evidence that the Seleucid cavalry was in decline, but it also bestows a deeper level of tactical sophistication on

Seleucid rulers than has previously been acknowledged. 1147

This thesis therefore calls for a reassessment of all Hellenistic battles (not only those of the Seleucids) and demonstrates the need for further investigation of the use of combined arms tactics in each of the armies of this period, and the continuing quality and tactical importance of their mounted troops. Greater exploration into the operation of the various Hellenistic infantry contingents, as a complement to the above analysis, would also be particularly illuminating. The research presented here additionally offers a platform from which to consider other aspects of the use of unconventional weapons, such as their promotion of power and prestige, in further detail. This, especially for war-elephants, was a significant part of their military use,1148 and future work on this topic would continue to develop our understanding of these unusual contingents.

Overall, the conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate that, by adopting a tripartite framework to assess the Seleucid army, it is clear that each of their mounted arms, whether standard cavalry contingents or unconventional units, was tactically integrated within their military infrastructure. Moreover, they functioned as an integral and coordinated part of Seleucid battlefield strategy, which remained

1145 Wrightson (2019) 1, 202; Gaebel (2002) 242, 260-1, 301. 1146 In particular, see Raphia and Panion, Chapter 5.2.3. 1147 Cf. Ducrey (1986) 103 = (1985) 105; Serrati (2013) 191; Chapter 5.2-4. 1148 Cf. Gerrard (2016) 40-52.

273 adaptable to the specifics of individual battles. At no point in the period studied in this thesis did the Seleucids ever consider their mounted troops to be tactically unimportant, nor did they decline in either quality or operational efficacy in comparison to their fourth century B.C. Macedonian predecessors. The fact that

Seleucid mounted contingents decisively contributed to the outcome of at least seven battles,1149 six of which resulted in victory, is testimony of their overall impact on the

Hellenistic battlefield.

1149 Ipsus, Cyrrhestica, the ‘Elephant Victory’, Raphia, Panion, Magnesia, and Elasa.

274

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ancient Sources

Unless otherwise stated, all Greek and Latin texts are from the Loeb Classical

Library; translations are adapted from the most recent editions. All websites were last accessed in March 2020.

Aelianus Tacticus – Greek and translation: Matthew, C. (2012) The Tactics of Aelian or On the Military Arrangements of the Greeks: A New Translation of the Manual that Influenced Warfare for Fifteen Centuries, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley.

Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia, Volumes I-II – see: Lukenbill, D.D. (1968 [1926-7]).

Apsyrtus, Hippiatrica Berolinensia – Greek: Hoppe, C. (1971) Corpus Hippatricorum Graecorum, Volumen I: Hippatrica Berolinensia, Teubner, Stuttgart. Translation: author’s own.

Arrian, Cynegeticus – Greek: Wirth, G. (1968) Flavii Arrianii, Quae Exstant Omnia: Scripta Minora et Fragmenta, Teubner, Leipzig. Translation: Dansey, W. (1831) Arrian on Coursing: The Cynegeticus of the Younger Xenophon, Translated from the Greek with Classical and Practical Annotations, and a Brief Sketch of the Life and Writings of the Author, J. Bohn, London.

Arrian, Tactika – Greek and translation: DeVeto, J.G. (1993) Flavius Arrianus, ΤΕΧΝΗ ΤΑΚΤΙΚΑ (Tactical Handbook) and ἜΚΤΑΞΙΣ ΚΑΤΑ ἈΛΑΝΩΝ (The Expedition against the Alans), Ares Publishers, Chicago.

B.M. 34645 – Cuneiform and translation of Sachs, A.J. and Hunger, H. (1996) Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Babylonia, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien.

275

B.M. 92688 – Cuneiform and translation: Smith, S. (1924) Babylonian Historical Texts: Relating to the Capture and Downfall of Babylon, Methuen & Co Ltd., London.

BCHP 9 – translation: https://www.livius.org/sources/content/mesopotamian- chronicles-content/bchp-9-end-of-seleucus-i-chronicle/.

BGU 6.1261 = 8.1734 – Greek: http://papyri.info/ddbdp/bgu;8;1734. Translation: author’s own.

Codex Vaticanus Arabicus – translation: Stinespring, W.F. (1932), accessed via: https://sites.google.com/site/demontortoise2000/description_of_antioch.

CT 22.74 – Cuneiform and translation: Stolper, M.W. (1985) Entrepreneurs and Empire: The Murašû Archive, the Murašû Firm, and Persian Rule in Babylonia, Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut Te Istanbul, Leiden.

Ctesias, Persika – translation: Nichols, A. (2008) The Complete Fragments of Ctesias of Cnidus: Translation and Commentary with an Introduction, PhD Thesis, University of Florida.

De Munitionibus Castrorum – Latin: http://www.intratext.com/IXT/LAT0347/_P8.HTM. Translation: author’s own.

Dîgha-Nikâya – translation: Walsche, M. (1987) The Long Discourses of the Buddha, Translation of the Dîgha-Nikâya, Translated from the Pâli, Wisdom Publications, Boston.

Dpd 6-8 – Cuneiform and translation: https://www.livius.org/sources/content/achaemenid-royal-inscriptions/dpd/.

IG – Greek: https://epigraphy.packhum.org. Translations: author’s own.

Jātaka – translation: Chalmers, R. (1895), accessed via: http://sacred-texts.com/bud/j1/index.htm.

Kauṭilya, Arthaśāstra – translation: Shamasastry, R. (1915), accessed via: https://archive.org/details/Arthasastra_English_Translation.

276

Maccabees – Greek: https://en.katabiblon.com/us/index.php?text=LXX. Translation: adapted from the Good News Translation (1992) and the New Revised Standard Version (1989), accessed via: https://www.biblegateway.com/.

Milindapañha – translation: Rhys Davies, T.W. (1890) The Questions of King Milinda, Translated from the Pâli, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

OGIS – Greek: Dittenberger, W. (1903) Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae, Supplementum Sylloges Inscriptiones Graecarum, Volumen Prius, Apud S. Hirzel, Leipzig. Translations of OGIS 229 and 338 are adapted from Austin, M.M. (2006) The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; all other translations are the author’s own.

P.Dura – Greek: http://papyri.info/search?&COLLECTION=ddbdp&SERIES=p.dura. Translations: author’s own.

P.Hib. – Greek: http://papyri.info/browse/ddbdp/p.hib. Translations: author’s own.

P.Köln – Greek: http://papyri.info/browse/ddbdp/p.koeln. Translations: author’s own.

P.Tebt. – Greek and translation: Grenfell, B.P. et al. (1902) The Tebtunis Papyri, Part I, Henry Frowde, London.

PBS 2/1 189 – Cuneiform and translation: Stolper, M.W. (1985) Entrepreneurs and Empire: The Murašû Archive, the Murašû Firm, and Persian Rule in Babylonia, Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut Te Istanbul, Leiden.

PF 1635-1704 – Cuneiform and translation: Hallock, R.T. (1969) Persepolis Fortification Tablets, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Philochorus – Greek and translation: https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-jacoby/philochoros-of- athens-328-a328?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.brill-s-new- jacoby&s.q=philochoros.

277

Photius, Bibliotheca – Greek: Henry, R. (1960) Photius Bibliothèque, Tome II: Codices 84-185, Les Belles Lettres, Paris. Translation: Freese, J.H. (1920) The Library of Photius, Volume 1, Richard Clay & Sons Ltd., Suffolk.

Polyaenus – Greek: https://elinepa.org/en/polyaenus-stratagems/. Translation: http://www.attalus.org/info/polyaenus.html.

Porphyry, FGrH 260 F32.8 – translation: https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-jacoby/porphyry-260- a260#BNJTEXT260_F_32.

Rāmāyana – translation: Griffith, R.T.H. (1870), accessed via: http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/rama/.

Ṛgveda – translation: Griffith, R.T.H. (1896), accessed via: http://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/rigveda/.

Royal Correspondence of the Assyrian Empire, Part II – see: Waterman, L. (1930).

SB 8.9790 – Greek: http://papyri.info/ddbdp/sb;8;9790. Translation: author’s own.

SEG – Greek: https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/supplementum- epigraphicum-graecum. Translations: author’s own.

Suda, Ν.425 – Greek: Adler, A. (1933) Suidae Lexicon, Pars III: Κ-Ο; ω, Teubner, Leipzig. Translation: author’s own.

Suda, Σ.443 – Greek: Adler, A. (1935) Suidae Lexicon, Pars IV: Π-Ψ, Teubner, Leipzig. Translation: author’s own.

The Inscriptions of the Sultan Daği – see: Jonnes, L. (2002).

Theophylact Simocatta – Greek: de Boor, C. and Wirth, P. (1972) Theophylacti Simotticae Historiae, Teubner, Stuttgart. Translation: author’s own.

TL 44 – Lycian: Kalinka, E. (1901) Tituli Asiae Minoris: Conlecti et Editi Auspiciis, Caesareae Academiae Litterarum Vindobonensis, Volumen 1: Tituli Lyciae lingua Lycia conscripti, Hölder, Vienna.

278

Trogus, Prologues – Greek: Seel, O. (1972) M. Iuniani Iustini, Epitomata Historiarum Philippicarum, Pompei Trogi, Accedunt Prologi in Pompeium Trogum, Teubner, Stuttgart. Translation: http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/justinus_08_prologi.htm.

UCP 9/3 – Cuneiform: http://www.achemenet.com/fr/item/?/sources- textuelles/textes-par-regions/babylonie/nippur/3404856. Translation: Kurht, A. (2007) The Persian Empire: A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period, Volume II, Routledge, London.

UPZ I.110 – Greek: http://papyri.info/ddbdp/upz;1;110?rows=3&start=108&fl=id,title&fq= collection:ddbdp&fq=(ddbdp_series:upz+OR+hgv_series:upz+OR+dclp_series:up z)&fq=(ddbdp_volume:1+OR+hgv_volume:1+OR+dclp_volume:1)&sort=series+ asc,volume+asc,item+asc&p=109&t=150. Translation: author’s own.

Vegetius, Epitoma Rei Militaris – Greek: Önnerfors, A. (1995) P. Flavii Vegeti Renati, Epitoma Rei Militaris, Teubner, Stuttgart. Translation: Clark, J. (1767), accessed via: http://www.digitalattic.org/home/war/vegetius/.

Welles, RC – see: Welles, C.B. (1934).

279

Modern Scholarship

Abel, F.-M. (1949) Les Livres des Maccabées, Librairie Lecoffre, Paris.

Adcock, F.E. (1957) The Greek and Macedonian Art of War, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Afshar, A. and Lerner, J. (1979) ‘The Horses of the Ancient Persian Empire at Persepolis’, Antiquity, 53: 44-7.

Anderson, E.B. (2016) Cataphracts: Knights of the Ancient Eastern Empires, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley.

Anderson, G. (1976) Lucian: Theme and Variation in the Second Sophistic, Brill, Leiden.

Anderson, J.K. (1961) Ancient Greek Horsemanship, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Aperghis, G.G. (2004) The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Ash, R. (2002) ‘Epic Encounters? Ancient Historical Battle Narratives and the Epic Tradition’, in Levene, D.S. and Nelis, D.P. (eds.) Clio and the Poets: Augustan Poetry and the Traditions of Ancient Historiography, Brill, Leiden, 253-73.

Austin, M.M. (1986) ‘Hellenistic Kings, War, and the Economy’, Classical Quarterly, 36: 450-66.

Austin, M.M. (2006) The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Azzaroli, A. (1985) An Early History of Horsemanship, Brill, Leiden.

Balme, D.M. (1991) Aristotle, History of Animals, Volume III: Books 7-10, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

280

Bar-Kochva, B. (1973) ‘On the Sources and Chronology of Antiochus I’s Battle against the Galatians’, Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 199: 1- 8.

Bar-Kochva, B. (1976) The Seleucid Army: Organisation and Tactics in the Great Campaigns, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Bar-Kochva, B. (1989) Judas Maccabaeus: The Jewish Struggle against the Seleucids, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Bar-Kochva, B. (1993) ‘Review: Bar-Kochva, Taylor, and Judas Maccabaeus: Reading and Reviewing’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 113: 237-8.

Barthold, W. (1984) An Historical Geography of Iran, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Bell, A. (2004) Spectacular Power in the Greek and Roman City, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Bennett, B. and Roberts, M. (2009) The Wars of Alexander’s Successors 323-281 BC, Volume 2: Armies, Tactics and Battles, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley.

Bickerman, E. (1938) Institutions des Séleucides, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris.

Biffi, N. (2002) Il Medio Oriente di Strabone: Libro XVI della Geografia, Edipuglia, Bari.

Billows, R.A. (1990) Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Billows, R.A. (1995) Kings and Colonists: Aspects of Macedonian Imperialism, Brill, Leiden.

Bivar, A.D.H. (2003 [1983]) ‘The Political History of Iran under the Arsacids’, in Yarshater, E. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Iran, Volume 3(1): The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanian Periods, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 21-99.

281

Boardman, J. (1970) Greek Gems and Finger Rings: Early Bronze Age to Late Classical, Thames and Hudson, London.

Boiy, T. (2010) ‘Review – The Seleukid Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire by G.G. Aperghis’, Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 69: 118.

Borton, A. (1990a [1977]) ‘Introduction’ in Evans, J. et al. (eds.) The Horse, W.H. Freeman and Company, New York, 3-15.

Borton, A. (1990b [1977]) ‘Selection’ in Evans, J. et al. (eds.) The Horse, W.H. Freeman and Company, New York, 132-86.

Bosworth, A.B. (2002) The Legacy of Alexander: Politics, Warfare and Propaganda Under the Successors, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Brandt, A.L. et al. (2014) ‘The Elephants of Gash-Barka, Eritrea: Nuclear Patterns and Mitochondrial Genetic Patterns’, Journal of Heredity, 105: 82-90.

Braun, K. (1970) ‘Der Dipylon-Brunnen B1. Die Funde’, Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung, 85: 129-269.

Briant, P. (1986) ‘Guerre, tribut et forces productives dans l’Empire achéménide’, Dialogues d’histoire ancienne, 12: 33-48.

Briscoe, J. (1978) ‘Review: The Seleucid Army: Organisation and Tactics in the Great Campaigns by B. Bar-Kochva’ in The Classical Review, 28: 306-8.

Briscoe, J. (1981) A Commentary on Livy: Books XXXIV-XXXVII, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Briscoe, J. (1991) Titi Livi: Ab Urbe Condita: Libri XXXI-XL, Teubner, Stuttgart.

Briscoe, J. (2012) ‘Livy’, in Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (eds.) The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 877-9.

British Army Veterinary Department (1914 [1908]) Animal Management, H.M. Stationary Office, Harrison and Sons, London.

282

British Horse Society (2019) Advice on Pasture Management, available at: https://www.bhs.org.uk/advice-and-information/horse-care/pasture-management.

Brodersen, K. (2007) ‘Review – The Seleukid Royal Economy, The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire by G.G. Aperghis’, The Classical Review, 57: 454-6.

Brodersen, K. (2012) ‘Appian’ in Hornblower, S. and Spawforth, A. (eds.) The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 3rd Revised Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 130.

Brown, T.S. (1961) ‘Apollophanes and Polybius, Book 5’, Phoenix, 15:187-95.

Brownson, C.L. (1988) Xenophon, Anabasis, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Bucher, G.S. (2007) ‘Toward a Literary Evaluation of Appian’s Civil Wars, Book 1’ in Marincola, J. (ed.) A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, Volume II, Blackwell, Oxford, 454-60.

Budge, E.A.W. and King, L.W. (1902) Annals of the Kings of Assyria: The Cuneiform Texts with Translations, Transliterations, etc. from the Original Documents in The British Museum, The British Museum, London.

Budiansky, S. (1997) The Nature of Horses: Their Evolution, Intelligence and Behaviour, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London.

Bugh, G.R. (1988) The Horsemen of Athens, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Bugh, G.R. (2006) ‘Introduction’ in Bugh, G.R. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1-8.

Cameron, A. (1989) ‘Introduction: The Writing of History’, in Cameron, A. (ed.) History as Text: The Writing of Ancient History, Duckworth, London, 1-10.

Cargill, J. (1995) Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century B.C., Brill, Leiden.

Chakravarti, P.C. (1941) The Art of War in Ancient India, Low Price Publications, Delhi.

283

Chaniotis, A. (2005) War in the Hellenistic World: A Social and Cultural History, Blackwell, Malden.

Chapdetrey, L. (2007) Le pouvoir séleucide: Territoire, administration, finances d’un royaume hellénistique (312-129 avant J.-C.), Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes.

Charles, M.B. (2007) ‘Elephants at Raphia: Reinterpreting Polybius 5.84-5’, Classical Quarterly, 57: 306-11.

Charles, M.B. (2008a) ‘Alexander, Elephants and Gaugamela’, Mouseion: Journal of the Classical Association of Canada 8: 9-23.

Charles, M.B. (2008b) ‘African Forest Elephants and Turrets in the Ancient World’, Phoenix, 62: 338-62.

Charles, M.B. (2015) ‘Achaemenid Elite Cavalry: From Xerxes to Darius III’, The Classical Association, 65: 14-34.

Charles, M.B. (2016) ‘The Achaemenid Chiliarch par excellence’, Historia 65: 392- 412.

Clark, E.A. (2004) History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Clark, J. (2004) ‘Introduction: Horses and Horsemen in Medieval London’ in Clark, J. (ed.) The Medieval Horse and its Equipment, c. 1150-c. 1450, The Boydell Press, Woodbridge, 1-32.

Clutton-Brock, J. (1974) ‘The Buhen Horse’, Journal of Archaeological Science, 1: 89-100.

Clutton-Brock, J. (1992) Horse Power: A History of the Horse and the Donkey in Human Societies, Natural History Museum Publications, London.

Clutton-Brock, J. (1996) ‘Horses in History’ in Olson, S.L. (ed.) Horses through Time, Roberts Rhinehart Publishers, Boulder, 83-102.

284

Cohen, G.M. (1972) ‘The Hellenistic Military Colony: A Herodian Example’, Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, 103: 83- 95.

Cohen, G.M. (1978) The Seleucid Colonies: Studies in Founding, Administration and Organisation, Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, Wiesbaden.

Cohen, G.M. (1991) ‘Katoikiai, Katoikoi and Macedonians in Asia Minor’, Ancient Society, 22: 41-50.

Cohen, G.M. (2013) The Hellenistic Settlements in the East from Armenia and Mesopotamia to Bactria and India, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Comber, M. (1997) ‘Re-Reading the Roman Historians’, in Bentley, M. (ed.) Companion to Historiography, Routledge, London, 43-56.

Cooley, C.H. (1910) Social Organisation: A Study of the Larger Mind, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York.

Coşkun, A. (2011) ‘Galatians and Seleucids: A Century of Conflict and Cooperation’ in Erickson, K. and Ramsey, G. (eds.) Seleucid Dissolution: The Sinking Anchor, Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 85-106.

Coşkun, A. (2012) ‘Deconstructing a Myth of Seleucid History: The So-Called “Elephant Victory” Revisited’, Phoenix, 66: 57-73.

Coşkun, A. (2013) ‘Belonging and Isolation in Central Anatolia: The Galatians in the Graeco-Roman World’ in Ager, S.L. and Faber, R.A. (eds.) Belonging and Isolation in the Hellenistic World, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 73-95.

Coşkun, A. (2018) ‘The War of Brothers, the Third Syrian War, and the Battle of Ankyra (246-241 BC): A Re-Appraisal’, in Erickson, K. (ed.) The Seleukid Empire, 281-222 B.C. War Within the Family, The Classical Press of Wales, Swansea, 197-252.

Cowley, A. (1923) Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century: Edited, with Translation and Notes, Claredon Press, Oxford.

285

Crawford, D.J. (1971) Kerkeosiris: An Egyptian Village in the Ptolemaic Period, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Crowley, J. (2012) The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite: The Culture of Combat in Classical Athens, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Cumont, F. (1926) Fouilles de Doura-Europos (1922-1923), Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, Paris.

Cuyler Young, T. (1988) ‘The Consolidation of the Empire and its Limits of Growth under Darius and Xerxes’ in Boardman, J. et al. (eds.) The Cambridge Ancient History, Volume IV: Persia, Greece and the Western Mediterranean, c. 525 to 479 B.C., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 53-111.

Dąbrowa, E. (2011) Studia Graeco-Parthica: Political and Cultural Relations between Greeks and Parthians, Harrassowitz Verlag, Wiebaden.

Dandamayev, M. and Medvedskaya, I. (2006) ‘Media’ in Yarshater, E. (ed.) Encyclopædia Iranica, Online Edition, available at: http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/media.

Davidson, J. (1991) ‘The Gaze in Polybius’ Histories’, The Journal of Roman Studies, 81: 10-24.

Davidson, J. (2009) ‘Polybius’, in Feldherr, A. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Roman Historians, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 123-36.

Davies, R.W. (1969) ‘The Supply of Animals to the Roman Army and the Remount Sytem’, Latomus, 28: 429-59.

Davies Morel, M.C.G. (2005) Breeding Horses, Blackwell, Oxford.

Davis, R.H.C. (1989) The Medieval Warhorse: Origin, Development and Redevelopment, Thames and Hudson Ltd., London.

Debevoise, N.C. (1938) A Political History of Parthia; University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

286

Delbrück, H. (1975) History of the Art of War: Within the Framework of Political History, Volume I: Antiquity, translated from the German by Walter J. Renfroe Jr., Greenwood Press, Westport = (1900) Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, Verlag von Georg Stilke, Berlin.

Dewald, C. (2007) ‘The Construction of Meaning in the First Three Historians’ in Marincola, J. (ed.) A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, Volume I, Blackwell, Oxford, 89-101.

Dittenberger, W. (1903) Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae, Supplementum Sylloges Inscriptionum Graecorum, Volumen Prius, Apud S. Hirziel, Leipzig.

Dixon, K.R. and Southern, P. (1992) The Roman Cavalry: From the First to the Third Century AD, B.T. Batsford Ltd., London.

Donaghy, T. (2014) Horse Breeds and Breeding in the Greco-Persian World: 1st and 2nd Millennium BC, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle.

Ducrey, P. (1986) Warfare in Ancient Greece, translated by Janet Lloyd, Schoken Books, New York = Ducrey, P. (1985) Guerre et guerriers dans la Grèce antique, Payot, Paris.

Eckstein, A. (2006) Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Edwards, E.H. (2016 [1991]) The Horse Encyclopedia, DK, London.

Edwards, J. (2001) ‘The Irony of Hannibal’s Elephants’, Latomus 60: 900-5.

Engels, D.W. (1978) Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Engels, D.W. (2013) ‘Logistics: Sinews of War’ in Campbell, B. and Tritle, L.A. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 351-68.

287

Epplett, C. (2007) ‘War Elephants in the Hellenistic World’ in Heckel, W. et al. (eds.) Alexander’s Empire: Formulation to Decay, Regina Books, Claremont, 209- 32.

Erickson, K.G. (2009) The Early Seleucids, their Gods and their Coins, PhD Thesis, University of Exeter.

Erickson, K.G. (2018) The Early Seleucids, their Gods and their Coins, Routledge, London.

Errington, R.M. (1977) ‘Review, The Seleucid Army: Organisation and Tactics in the Great Campaigns by B. Bar-Kochva’, in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 97: 209- 10.

Erskine, A. (2005 [2003]) ‘Approaching the Hellenistic World’, in Erskine, A. (ed.) A Companion to the Hellenistic World, Blackwell, Malden, 1-15.

Erskine, A. (2013) ‘Hellenistic Parades and Roman Triumphs’ in Spalinger, A. and Armstrong, J. (eds.) Rituals of Triumph in the Mediterranean World, Brill, Leiden, 37-56.

Esposito, G. (2019) Armies of the Hellenistic States 323 BC to AD 30: History and Organisation, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley.

Evans, J. and Borton, A. (1990 [1977]) ‘Anatomy and Physiology’ in Evans, J. et al. (eds.) The Horse, W.H. Freeman and Company, New York, 89-131.

Farrington, S. (2015) ‘A Likely Story: Rhetoric and the Determination of Truth in Polybius’ Histories’, Histos 9: 29-66.

Feldman, L.H. (1984) Josephus and Modern Scholarship (1937-1980), de Gruyter, Berlin.

Feldman, L.H. (1994) ‘Josephus’ Portrayal of the Hasmoneans Compared with 1 Maccabees’, in Parente, F. and Sievers, J. (eds.) Josephus and the History of the Greco-Roman Period: Essays in Memory of Morton Smith, Brill, Leiden, 41-68.

288

Fingerson, K.R. (2007) ‘Persian Katoikoi in Hellenistic Smyrna’, Ancient Society, 37: 107-20.

Fischer-Bovet, C.C. (2012) ‘Katoikoi’ in Bagnall, S. et al. (eds.) The Encylopedia of Ancient History, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, 3712-3.

Fischer-Bovet, C.C. (2014) Army and Society in Ptolemaic Egypt, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Fraser, P.M. (1996) Cities of Alexander the Great, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Gabrielli, M. (2006) Le cheval dans l’empire achéménide, Horse in the Achaemenid Empire, Ege yayınları, Istanbul.

Gaebel, R. (2002) Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman.

Gafni, I.M. (1989) ‘Josephus and 1 Maccabees’, in Feldman, L.H. and Hata, G. (eds.) Josephus, the Bible and History, Brill, Leiden, 116-31.

Gerrard, S.R. (2016) The Use of the Hellenistic War-Elephant: Dynamics of Prestige and Power Projection, MA Thesis, The University of Manchester.

Gichon, M. (1982) ‘Review: The Seleucid Army by Bezalel Bar-Kochva’, Israel Exploration Journal, 32: 168-9.

Gilbey, W. (1900) Small Horses in Warfare, Vinton & Co. Ltd., London.

Gilliam, J.F. (1965) ‘Dura Rosters and the Constitutio Antoniniana’, Historia, 14: 74- 92.

Glover, R.F. (1950) ‘Some Curiosities of Ancient Warfare’, Greece and Rome, 19: 1- 9.

Goldstein, J.A. (1976) The Anchor Bible: I Maccabees: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, Doubleday & Company, Inc., New York.

Goodwin, D. (1999) ‘The Importance of Ethology in Understanding the Behaviour of the Horse’, Equine Veterinary Journal, 28: 15-9.

289

Gorman, R.J. and Gorman, V.B. (2007) ‘The Tryphê of the Sybarites: A Historiographical Problem in Athenaeus’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 127: 38-60.

Gowers, W. (1948) ‘African Elephants and Ancient Authors’, African Affairs, 47: 173-80.

Gowing, A.M. (2010) ‘From Polybius to Dionysius: The Decline and Fall of Hellenistic Historiography’, in Clauss, J.J. and Cuypers, M. (eds.) A Companion to Hellenistic Literature, Blackwell, Malden, 384-94.

Grainger, J.D. (1990) The Cities of Seleukid Syria, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Grainger, J.D. (1997) A Seleukid Prosopography and Gazetteer, Brill, Leiden.

Grainger, J.D. (2002) The Roman War of Antiochos the Great, Brill, Leiden.

Grainger, J.D. (2010) The Syrian Wars, Brill, Leiden.

Grainger, J.D. (2015a) The Seleukid Empire of Antiochus III (223-187) Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley.

Grainger, J.D. (2015b) The Fall of the Seleukid Empire, 187-75 BC, Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley.

Grainger, J.D. (2018 [2014]) The Rise of the Seleukid Empire (323-223 BC), Pen & Sword Military, Barnsley.

Grenet, F. et al. (1980) ‘L’Arsenal’, in Bernard, P. et al. ‘Campagne de fouille 1978 à Aï Khanoum (Afghanistan)’, Bulletin de l’Ecole française d’Extrême-Orient, 68: 1-104.

Grenfell, B.P. et al. (1902) The Tebtunis Papyri, Part I, Henry Frowde, London.

Griffith, G.T. (1947) ‘Alexander’s Generalship at Gaugamela’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 67: 77-89.

Griffith, G.T. (1963) ‘A Note on the Hipparchies of Alexander’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 83: 68-74.

290

Griffith, G.T. (1968 [1935]) The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World, Bouma’s Boekhuis N.V. Publishers, Groningen.

Grimm, C.L.W. (1853) Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zu den Apokryphen des Alten Testamentes: Dritte Lieferung. Das erste Buch der Maccabäer, Verlag von S. Hirzel, Leipzig.

Gruen, E.S. (1984) The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Gruen, E.S. (1993) ‘Part One: The Social and Religious Aspects of Hellenistic Kingship, Introduction’ in Bullock, A. et al. (eds.) Images and Ideologies: Self- Idefinition in the Hellenistic World, University of California Press, Berkeley, 3-6.

Gruen, E.S. (1996) ‘Hellenistic Kingship: Puzzles, Problems, and Possibilities’ in Bilde, P. et al. (eds.) Aspects of Hellenistic Kingship, Aarhus University Press, Aarhus, 116-25.

Hadley, R.A. (1974) ‘Royal Propaganda of Seleucus I and Lysimachus’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 94: 50-65.

Hallock, R.T. (1969) Persepolis Fortification Tablets, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Hammond, C. (1993) Narrative Explanation and the Roman Military Character, D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford.

Hannestad, L. (1994) ‘The Chronology of the Hellenistic Fortress (F5) on Failaka’, Topoi, 4: 587-95.

Hanslik, R. (1936) ‘Νισαῖον πεδίον’ in Pauly, A. and Wissowa, G. (eds.) Real- Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, XVII, J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Stuttgart, 712-3.

Hau, L.I. (2011) ‘Tychê in Polybios: Narrative Answers to a Philosophical Question’, Histos 5: 183-207.

Head, D. (1992) The Achaemenid Persian Army, Montvert Publications, Stockport.

291

Heckel, W. (2008) The Conquests of Alexander the Great, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Heckel, W. et al. (2010) Scythed Chariots at Gaugamela: A Case Study’ in Carney, E. and Ogden, D. (eds.) Philip II and Alexander the Great: Father and Son, Lives and Afterlives, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 103-9.

Herzfeld, E. (1968) The Persian Empire: Studies in Geography and Ethnography of the Ancient Near East, Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, Wiesbaden.

Hewsen, R.H. (2007) ‘Terre, peuple et langue: Géographie physique’ in Dédéyen, G. (ed.) Histoire du peuple arménien, Privat, Toulouse, 31-43.

Holt, F.L. (2006/2007) ‘Review – The Seleukid Royal Economy: The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire by G.G. Aperghis’, The Classical Journal, 102: 180-1.

Hoover, O.D. (2005) ‘Eleazar Auaran and the Elephant: Killing Symbols in Hellenistic Judaea’, Scripta Classica Israelica, 24: 35-44.

Horbury, W. (1990) ‘Review: Judas Maccabaeus: The Jewish Struggle against the Seleucids by B. Bar-Kochva’, Vetus Testamentum, 40: 382-3.

Houghton, A. and Lorber, C. (2002) Seleucid Coins: A Comprehensive Catalogue, Part I: Seleucus I through Antiochus III, Volume 1, Introduction, Maps, and Catalogue, The American Numismatic Society, New York.

Houle, D.J. (2015) Ethnic Constructs in the Seleucid Military, MA Thesis, University of Waterloo.

House, J.M. (1984) Towards Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.

House, J.M. (2001) Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, Kansas University Press, Lawrence.

How, W.W. and Wells, J. (1957a [1912]) A Commentary on Herodotus, Volume I (Books I-IV), Oxford University Press, Oxford.

292

How, W.W. and Wells, J. (1957b [1912]) A Commentary on Herodotus, Volume II (Books V-IX), Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Huyse, P. (2008) ‘Compte-rendu réalisé – Le cheval dans l’empire achéménide / Horse in the Achaemenid Empire. Instanbul, Ege Yanınları, 2006, XIV + 135 p. (Studia ad Orientem Antiquum Pertinentia, 1)’, Abstracta Iranica, 29: 45-6.

Hyland, A. (1990) Equus: The Horse in the Roman World, B.T. Batsford Ltd., London.

Hyland, A. (1998) The Warhorse, 1250-1600, Sutton Publishing, Gloucestershire.

Hyland, A. (2003) The Horse in the Ancient World, Praeger Publishers, New York.

Hyland, A. (2013) ‘War and the Horse’ in Campbell, B. and Tritle, L.A. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 493-526.

Iossif, P.P. and Lorber, C. (2010) ‘The Elephantarches Bronze of Seleucos I Nikator’, Syria, 87: 147-64.

Jones, A.H.M. (1964) The Later Roman Empire 284-602: A Social, Economic, and Administrative Survey, Volume II, Blackwell, Oxford.

Jonnes, L. (2002) The Inscriptions of the Sultan Daǧi I, Dr. Rudolf Habelt GmbH, Bonn.

Jonnes, L. and Ricl, M. (1997) ‘A New Royal Inscription from Phrygia Paroreios: Eumenes II Grants Tyraion the Status of a Polis’, Epigraphica Anatolica 29: 1-30.

Keegan, J. (2004 [1976]) The Face of Battle, Pimlico, London.

Kissel, T.K. (1995) Untersuchungen zur Logistik des römischen Heeres in den Provinzen des griechischen Ostens (27 v. Chr.-235 n. Chr), Scripta Mercaturae Verlag, St. Katharinen.

Kistler, J.M. (2007) War Elephants, University of Nabraska Press, Lincoln.

293

Kosmin, P.J. (2014) The Land of the Elephant Kings: Space, Territory, and Ideology in the Seleucid Empire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Kroll, J.H. (1977) ‘An Archive of the Athenian Cavalry’, Hesperia, 46: 83-140.

Kromayer, J. (1907) Antike Schlachtfelder: Bausteine zu einer antiken Kriegsgeschichte, Band 2: Antike Schlachtfelder in Griechnland 2: Die hellenistische-römische Period: von Kynoskephalae bis Pharsalos, Weidmann, Berlin.

Kurht, A. (1995) ‘The Assyrian Heartland in the Achaemenid Period’, Pallas, 43: 239-54.

Lampini, A. (2013) Istae contra omnium religiones: Characterising Northern Barbarian Religiosity in the Greco-Roman Literary Tradition from Hellenism to the Late Empire, Academic Dissertation, University of Turku.

Launey, M. (1949) Recherches sur les Armées Hellénistiques, Tome I, De Boccard, Paris.

Lawrence, A. (1979) Greek Aims in Fortification, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Lendon, J.E. (1999) ‘The Rhetoric of Combat: Greek Military Theory and Roman Culture in Julius Caesar’s Battle Descriptions’, Classical Antiquity, 18: 273-329.

Lendon, J.E. (2005) Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity, Yale University Press, New Haven.

Lenfant, D. (2005) ‘Polybe et les “fragments” des historiens de Rhodes Zénon et Antishtène (XVI 14-20)’ in Schepens, G. and Bollansée, J. (eds.) The Shadow of Polybius: Intertextuality as a Research Tool in Greek Historiography, Peeters, Paris.

Levene, D.S. (2007) ‘Roman Historiography in the Late Republic’ in Marincola, J. (ed.) A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, Volume I, Blackwell, Oxford, 275-89.

294

Liepe, H-U. (1958) Die Pferde des Latène-Oppidum Manching, Studien in vor-und frühgeschichtlichen Tierresten Bayerns 4, Munich.

Lightfoot, J.L. (2017) ‘In Search of Strabo’s Homer’ in Dueck, D. (ed.) The Routledge Companion to Strabo, Routledge, London, 251-62.

Littauer, M.A. and Crouwel, J.H. (1979) Wheeled Vehicles and Ridden Animals in the Ancient Near East, Brill, Leiden.

Lorber, C. (2012) ‘An Egyptian Interpretation of Alexander’s Elephant Headdress’, American Journal of Numismatics, 24: 21-31.

Lowe, B.J. (2017) ‘Strabo and Iberia’ in Dueck, D. (ed.) The Routledge Companion to Strabo, Routledge, London, 69-78.

Luckenbill, D.D. (1968 [1926]) Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia, Volumes I-II: Historical Records of Assyria, From the Earliest Times to Sargon, Greenwood Press, New York.

Ma, J. (1999) Antiochus III and the Cities of Western Asia Minor, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Ma, J. (2007) ‘Review – The Seleukid Royal Economy. The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire by G.G. Aperghis’, Hermathena, 182-8.

MacDonald, G. (1922) ‘The Hellenistic Kingdoms of Syria, Bactria, and Parthia’ in Rapson, E.J. (ed.) The Cambridge History of India, Volume 1: Ancient India, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 427-66.

Maffre, F. (2006) ‘Compte rendu de lecture du livre de Marcel Gabrielli, Le cheval dans l’empire achéménide – Horse in the Achaemenid Empire’, Revu des etudes anciennes, 109: 378-80.

Maier, F.K. (2012) ‘Learning From History παρὰ δόξαν: A New Approach to Polybius’ Manifold View of the Past’, Histos, 6: 144-68.

Marcus, R. (1943) Josephus, Jewish Antiquities, Volume V: Books 12-13, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

295

Marincola, J. (2001) Greek Historians, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Marincola, J. (2007) ‘Introduction’ in Marincola, J. (ed.) A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, Volume I, Blackwell, Oxford, 1-9.

Markle, M.M. (1977) ‘The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor’, American Journal of Archaeology, 81: 323-39.

Markle, M.M. (1978a) ‘The Seleucid Army. Organisation and Tactics in the Great Campaigns by Bezalel Bar-Kochva, Review’, The Classical World, 71: 407-10.

Markle, M.M. (1978b) ‘Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon’, American Journal of Archaeology, 82: 483-97.

Markman, S.D. (1943) The Horse in Greek Art, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.

Marquart, J. (1905) Untersuchungen zur Geschicte von Eran, Dieterische Verlagsbuchhandlung, Leipzig.

Martin, M.A. (1887) Les Cavaliers Athéniens, Ernest Thorin, Paris.

McGreevy, P.D. and McLean, A.N. (2007) ‘Roles of Learning Theory and Ethology in Equitation’, Journal of Veterinary Behaviour, 2: 108-18.

McKenzie, L. (1994) ‘Patterns in Seleucid Administration: Macedonian or Near Eastern?’, Mediterranean Archaeology, 7: 61-8.

McLeod, W. (1977) ‘Review: The Seleucid Army: Organisation and Tactics in the Great Campaigns by Bezalel Bar-Kochva’, The American Historical Review, 82: 69-70.

Meeus, A. (2018) ‘Introduction: Narrative and Interpretation in the Hellenistic Historians’, in Meeus, A. (ed.) Narrative in Hellenistic Historiography, Histos Supplement 8, Histos, Newcastle, 1-22.

Meister, K. (1975) Historische Kritik Bei Polybios, Franz Steiner Verlag GMBH, Wiesbaden.

296

Mielczarek, M. (1993) Cataphracti and Clibanarii: Studies on the Heavy Armoured Cavalry of the Ancient World, translated by Maria Abromowicz, Oficyna Naukowa, Łódź.

Mielczarek, M. (1998) ‘Cataphracts – A Parthian Element in the Seleucid Art of War’, in Dąbrowa, E. (ed.) Ancient Iran and the Mediterranean World: Proceedings of an International Conference in Honour of Professor Jósef Wolski held at the Jagiellonian University, Cracow, in September 1996, Jagiellonian University Press, Kraków.

Miller, R.D. (1996) ‘Behaviour of the Horse: Allelomimetic Behaviour’, Journal of Equine Veterinary Science, 16: 282-4.

Miller, R.P. and Walters, K.R. (2004). ‘Seleucid Coinage and the Legend of the Horned Bucephalas’, Schweizerische Numismatische Rundschau, 83: 45-56.

Minns, E.H. (1915) ‘Parchments of the Parthian Period from Avroman in Kurdistan’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 35: 22-65.

Mitchell, S. (1993) Anatolia: Land, Men, and Gods in Asia Minor, Volume 1, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Momigliano, A. (1929) ‘Il decreto trilingue in onore di Tolomeo Filopatore e la quarta guerra di Celesiria’, Aegyptus 10: 180-9.

Moore-Colyer, R.J. (1992) ‘Horse Supply and the British Cavalry: A Review, 1066- 1900’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, 70: 245-60.

Moore-Colyer, R.J. (1995) ‘Aspects of Horse Breeding and the Supply of Horses in Victorian Britain’, The Agricultural History Review, 43: 47-60.

Moreno, A. (2009) “The Attic Neighbour’: The Cleruchy in the Athenian Empire’ in Ma, J. et al. (eds.) Interpreting the Athenian Empire, Duckworth, London, 211-22.

Mukasa-Meugerwa, E. (1981) The Camel (Camelus Dromedarius): A Bibliographical Review, International Livestock Centre for Africa, Addis Ababa.

297

Nefedkin, A.K. (2006) ‘The Tactical Development of Achaemenid Cavalry’, Gladius 26: 5-18.

Nefiodkin, A.K. (2004) ‘On the Origin of the Scythed Chariot’, Historia, 53: 369-78.

Newell, E.T. (1977) The Coinage of the Western Seleucid Mints From Seleucus I to Antiochus III, The American Numismatic Society, New York.

Newell, E.T. (1978) The Coinage of the Eastern Seleucid Mints From Seleucus I to Antiochus III, The American Numismatic Society, New York.

Nicolai, R. (2007) ‘The Place of History in the Ancient World’ in Marincola, J. (ed.) A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, Volume I, Blackwell, Oxford, 13-26.

Nodet, E. (2015) ‘Josèphe et 1 Maccabées’, Revue Biblique, 122: 507-39.

Nossov, K. (2008) War Elephants, Osprey Publishing, Oxford.

Oates, J. (1979) Babylon, Thames and Hudson, London.

Olson, S.D. (2007) Athenaeus, The Learned Banqueters, Volume II: Books 3.106e-5, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Ornan, T. (2001) ‘The Bull and its Two Masters: Moon and Storm Deities in Relation to the Bull in Ancient Near Eastern Art’, Israel Exploration Journal, 51: 1-26.

Otto, W. (1931) ‘Zu den syrischen Kriegen der Ptolemäer’, Philogus, 86: 407-25

Paton, W.R. (2012) Polybius, The Histories, Volume VI: Books 28-39, Fragments, Loeb Classical Library, Revised by Walbank, F.W. and Habicht, C., Unattributed Fragments edited and translated by Olson, S.D., Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Pédech, P. (1958) ‘Deux campagne d’Atniochus III chez Polybe’, Revue de Études Ancienes, 60: 67-81.

Pédech, P. (1964) La method historique de Polybe, Société d édition “Les Belles Lettres”, Paris.

298

Pelling, C. (2000) ‘Fun with Fragments: Athenaeus and the Historians’ in Braund, D. and Wilkins, J. (eds.) Athenaeus and His World: Reading Greek Culture in the Roman Empire, University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 171-90.

Porten, B. (1968) Archives from Elephantine: The Life of an Ancient Jewish Military Colony, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Portier-Young, A.E. (2011) Apocalypse against Empire: Theologies of Resistance in Early Judaism, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids.

Potter, D.S. (1999) Literary Texts and the Roman Historian, Routledge, London.

Potter, G.D. and Yeats, B.F. (1990 [1977]) ‘Behavioural Principles of Training and Management’ in Evans, J. et al. (eds.) The Horse, W.H. Freeman and Company, New York, 655-82.

Pottier, E. and Reinach, S. (1887) La nécropole de Myrina: recherches archéologiques exécutées au nom et aux frais de l’École française d’Athènes, Tome Deuxième, Ernest Thorin, Paris.

Potts, D.T. (2007) ‘Cataphractus and kamāndār: Some Thoughts on the Dynamic Evolution of Heavy Cavalry and Mounted Archers in Iran and Central Asia’, Bulletin of the Asia Institute, 21: 149-58.

Pritchett, W.K. (1985) The Greek State at War, Part IV, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Pritchett, W.K. (1991) The Greek State at War, Part V, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Rahe, P.A. (1981) ‘The Annihilation of the Sacred Band at Chaeronea’, American Journal of Archaeology, 85: 84-7.

Rahmati, M. (2018) ‘The Frontiers and Place-Names of Kurdistan in the Ilkhanid Period Based on Nuzhat al- Qulūb’, Review of European Studies, 10: 68-81.

Rawlings, L. (2007) The Ancient Greeks at War, University of Manchester Press, Manchester.

299

Rawlingson, G. (1881) The History of Herodotus, D. Appleton and Company, New York.

Rich, J. (2015) ‘Appian, Polybius and the Roman’s War with Antiochus the Great: A Study in Appian’s Sources and Methods’ in Welch, K. (ed.) Appian’s Roman History: Empire and Civil War, The Classical Press of Wales, Swansea, 65-124.

Rivet, A. (1979) ‘A Note on Scythed Chariots’, Antiquity, 53: 130-2.

Rop, J. (2013) ‘Reconsidering the Origin of the Scythed Chariot’, Historia 63: 167- 81.

Roth, J.P. (1999) The Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 B.C.-A.D. 235), Brill, Leiden.

Roueché, C.M. and Sherwin-White, S. (1985) ‘Some Aspects of the Seleucid Empire: The Greek Inscriptions from Failaka, in the Arabian Gulf’, Chiron, 15: 1-39.

Rutherford, R. (2007) ‘Tragedy and History’ in Marincola, J. (ed.) A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, Volume II, Blackwell, Oxford, 504-14’.

Sabin, (2000) ‘The Face of Roman Battle’, The Journal of Roman Studies, 90: 1-17.

Sabin, P. (2007) ‘Battle’ in Sabin, P. et al. (eds.) The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Volume 1: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 399-460.

Sachs, A.J. and Hunger, H. (1996) Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Babylonia, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien.

Schalit, A. (1960) ‘The Letter of Antiochos III to Zeuxis Regarding the Establishment of Jewish Military Colonies in Phrygia and Lydia’, The Jewish Quarterly Review, 50: 289-318.

Schepens, G. (2007) ‘History and Historia: Inquiry in the Greek Historians’, in Marincola, J. (ed.) A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, Volume I, Blackwell, Oxford, 38-55.

300

Schmidt, E.F. (1953) Persepolis I, Structures, Reliefs, Inscriptions, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Schmitt, (1964) Untersuchngen dur Geschitchte Antiochus’ des Grossen und seiner Zeit, F. Steinger Verlag, Wiesbaden.

Schmitt, R. (2002) ‘Nisāya’ in Yarshater, E. (ed.) Encyclopædia Iranica, Online Edition, available at: http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/media.

Schneider, P. (2016) ‘Again on the Elephants of Raphia: Re-Examining Polybius’ Factual Accuracy and Historical Method in the Light of a DNA Survey’, Histos 10: 132-48.

Schuler, C. (1999) ‘Kolonisten un Einheimische in einer attalidischen Polisgründung’, Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik 128: 124-32.

Scullard, H.H. (1974) The Elephant in the Greek and Roman World, Thames and Hudson, Cambridge.

Sears, M.A. and Willekes, C. (2016) ‘Alexander’s Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea, 338 BCE’ in The Journal of Military History, 80: 1017-35.

Sekunda, N. (1992) The Persian Army 560-330 BC, Osprey Publishing, London.

Sekunda, N. (1994) Seleucid and Ptolemaic Reformed Armies 168-145 BC, Volume 1: The Seleucid Army, Montvert, Stockport.

Sekunda, N. (2007) ‘Military Forces’ in Sabin, P. et al. (eds.) The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Volume 1: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 325-67.

Sekunda, N. (2010) ‘The Macedonian Army’ in Roisman, J. and Worthington, I. (eds.) A Companion to Ancient Macedonia, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden, 446-71.

Serrati, J. (2013) ‘The Hellenistic World at War, Stagnation or Development?’ in Campbell, J.B. and Tritle, L.A. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 179-98.

301

Shahbazi, A.Sh. (1987) ‘ASB “horse” (equus caballus, Av. aspa-, Old Pers. asa- and aspa-, Mid. And N.Pers. asp/b), i. In Pre-Islamic Iran’ in Yarshater, E. (ed.) Encyclopædia Iranica, Volume II ANĀMAKA – ĀṮĀR AL-W ARĀ , Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 724-30.

Shahbazi, A.Sh. (2012) ‘Persepolis’ in Yarshater, E. (ed.) Encyclopædia Iranica, Online Edition, available at: www.iranicaonline.org/articles/persepolis.

Sherwin-White, S. (1991) ‘Aspects of Seleucid Royal Ideology: The Cylinder of Antiochus I from Borsippa’ in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 111: 71-86.

Sherwin-White, S. and Kurt, A. (1993) From Samarkhand to Sardis, A New Approach to the Seleucid Empire, Duckworth, London.

Sidnell, P. (2006) Warhorse, Cavalry in Ancient Warfare, Hambledon Continuum, London.

Sievers, J. (1991) ‘Review: Judas Maccabaeus: The Jewish Struggle Against the Seleucids by Bezalel Bar-Kochva’, Shofar, 9: 140-3.

Simpson, G.G. (1972 [1951]) Horses: The Story of the Horse Family in the Modern World and through Sixty Million Years of History, Oxford University Press, New York.

Smith, F. (1896) ‘Maximum Muscular Effort of the Horse’, Journal of Physiology, 19: 224-6.

Smith, F. (1898) ‘Relation between the Weight of a Horse and its Weight-Carrying Power’, The Journal of Comparative Pathology and Therapeutics, 11: 287-90.

Smith, S. (1924) Babylonian Historical Texts: Relating to the Capture and Downfall of Babylon, Methuen & Co Ltd., London.

Spence, I.G. (1993) The Cavalry of Classical Greece: A Social and Military History with Particular Reference to Athens, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Spinage, C.A. (1994) Elephants, T. & A.D. Poyster Ltd., London.

302

Sponenberg, D.P. and Bellone, R. (2017 [1996]) Equine Color Genetics, John Wilely & Sons Inc., Hoboken.

Stadter, P. (2007) ‘Biography and History’ in Marincola, J. (ed.) A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, Volume II, Blackwell, Oxford, 528-40.

Sterling, G. (2007) ‘The Jewish Appropriation of Hellenistic Historiography’ in Marincola, J. (ed.) A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, Volume I, Blackwell, Oxford, 231-43.

Stolper, M.W. (1985) Entrepreneurs and Empire: The Murašû Archive, the Murašû Firm, and Persian Rule in Babylonia, Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut Te Istanbul, Leiden.

Strootman, R. (2018) ‘The Coming of the Parthians: Crisis and Resilience in the Reign of Seleukos II’, in Erickson, K. (ed.) The Seleukid Empire, 281-222 B.C. War Within the Family, The Classical Press of Wales, Swansea, 129-150.

Tallis, N. (2005) ‘Transport and Warfare’ in Curtis, J. and Tallis, N. (eds.) Forgotten Empire: The World of Ancient Persia, The British Museum Press, London, 210-35.

Tarn, W.W. (1926) ‘The First Syrian War’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 46: 155- 62.

Tarn, W.W. (1930a) Hellenistic Military & Naval Developments, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Tarn, W.W. (1930b) ‘The Date of Milet I, iii, No. 139’, Hermes, 65: 446-54.

Tarn, W.W. (1940) ‘Two Notes on Seleucid History: 1. Seleucus’ 500 Elephants, 2. Tarmita’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 60: 84-94.

Tarn, W.W. (1948) Alexander the Great: Volume 2, Sources and Studies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Tarn, W.W. (1966) The Greeks in Bactria and India, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

303

Tarn, W.W. and Griffith, G.T. (1952 [1927]) Hellenistic Civilisation, Edward Arnold Ltd., London.

Taylor, R. (1992) ‘Review: Judas Maccabaeus: The Jewish Struggle against the Seleucids by B. Bar-Kochva’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 113: 208-9.

Thapliyal, U. (2010) Warfare in Ancient India: Organisation and Operational Dimensions, Manohar, New Delhi.

Tomkinson, W. (1895) The Diary of a Cavalry Officer in the Peninsula War and Waterloo Campaign, 1809-1815, Swan Sonnenschein & Co., London.

Toynbee, J.M.C. (1973) Animals in Roman Life and Art, Thames and Hudson, London.

Trautmann, T.R. (2015) Elephants and Kings: An Environmental History, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Tropper, A. (2017) ‘The Battle of Beth Zechariah in Light of a Literary Study of 1 Maccabees 6:32-47’, Hebrew Union College Annual, 88: 1-28.

Tuplin, C. (1987) ‘Xenophon and the Garrisons of the Achaemenid Empire’, Archäologische Mitteilungen aus Iran, 20: 167-245.

Tuplin, C. (2007) ‘Review – The Seleukid Royal Economy. The Finances and Financial Administration of the Seleukid Empire by G.G. Aperghis’, Latomus 66: 759-61.

Tuplin, C. (2008) ‘The Seleucids and Their Achaemenid Predecessors: A Persian Inheritance?’ in Darbandi, S.M.R. and Zournatzi, A. (eds.) Ancient Greece and Ancient Iran: Cross-Cultural Encounters, 1st International Conference (Athens, 11-13 November 2006), National Hellenic Research Foundation, Hellenic National Commission for UNESCO, Cultural Center of the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Athens, Athens, 109-36.

Tuplin, C. (2010) ‘All the King’s Horses: In Search of Achaemenid Persian Cavalry’ in Fagan, G.G. and Trundle, M. (eds.) New Perspectives on Ancient Warfare, Brill, Leiden, 101-82.

304 van Dijk-Coombes, R.M. (2018) ‘Mesopotamian Gods and the Bull’, Sociedades Precapitalistas, 8: e030. van Gils, L. et al. (2018) ‘Introduction’ in van Gils, L. (eds.) Textual Strategies in Ancient War Narrative: Thermopylae, Cannae and Beyond, Brill, Leiden, 1-16. van Henten, J.W. (1983) ‘Der Berg Asdod. Überlegungen zu 1. Makk. 9,15’, Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic, and Roman Period, 14: 43-51.

Van’t Dack, E. (1997) ‘Sur l’évolution des instutions militaires lagides’ in Armées et fiscalité dans le monde antique. Actes du colloque national, Paris, 14-16 octobre 1976, Colloques nationaux du Centre national de la recherché scientifique 936, Paris, 77-105.

Viereck, P. and Roos, A.G. (1962) Appiani, Historia Romana, Volumen I, Teubner, Leipzig.

Vlassopoulos, K. (2007) Unthinking the Greek Polis: Ancient Greek History beyond Eurocentrism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Vogelsang, W. (1995) ‘Review: Satrapes et satrapies dans l’empire achéménide de Cyrus le Grand à Xerxés ler by Thierry Petit, Indo-Iranian Journal, 38: 62-8. von Prott, H. and Kolbe, W. (1902) ‘Die Inschriften: Die Arbeiten zu Pergamon 1900-1901’, Mitteilungen, Des Kaiserlich Deutschen, Archaeologischen Instituts, Athenische Abtelung, 27: 44-151.

Walbank, F.W. (1957) A Historical Commentary on Polybius, Volume I: Commentary on Books I-VI, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Walbank, F.W. (1967) A Historical Commentary on Polybius, Volume II: Commentary on Books VII-XVII Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Walbank, F.W. (1979) A Historical Commentary on Polybius, Volume III: Commentary on Books XIX-XL, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Walbank, F.W. (1992 [1981]) The Hellenistic World, Fontana Press, London.

305

Walbank, F.W. (2000) ‘Athenaeus and Polybius’ in Braund, D. and Wilkins, J. (eds.) Athenaeus and His World: Reading Greek Culture in the Roman Empire, University of Exeter Press, Exeter, 161-70.

Walbank, F.W. (2002) Polybius, Rome and the Hellenistic World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Walsh, P.G. (1999) Titi Livi: Ab Urbe Condita: Tomus VI: Libri XXXVI-XL, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Walton, F.R. (1967) Diodorus Siculus, Library of History, Volume XII: Fragments of Books 33-40, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.

Waterman, L. (1930) Royal Correspondence of the Assyrian Empire, Part II: Translation and Transliteration, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbour.

Weissenborns, W. and Müller, H.J. (1907) T. Livi: Ab Urbe Condita: Buch XXXVII- XXXVIII, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin.

Welles, C.B. (1934) Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period: A Study in Greek Epigraphy, Yale University Press, London.

Wenghofer, R. (2018) ‘Rethinking the Relationship Between Hellenistic Baktria and the Seleukid Empire’, in Erickson, K. (ed.) The Seleukid Empire, 281-222 B.C. War Within the Family, The Classical Press of Wales, Swansea, 151-71.

Whatley, N. (1964) ‘On the Possibility of Reconstructing Marathon and Other Ancient Battles’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, 84: 119-39.

Whitby, M. (2007) ‘Reconstructing Ancient Warfare’, in Sabin, P. et al. (eds.) The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Volume 1: Greece, the Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 54-81.

White, K.D. (1970) Roman Farming, Thames and Hudson, London.

Wibbing, S. (1962) ‘Zur Topographie einzelner Schlachten des Judas Makkabäus’, Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins, 78: 159-70.

306

Wiemer, H-U. (2013) ‘Zeno of Rhodes and the Rhodian View of the Past’ in Gibson, B. and Harrison, T. (eds.) Polybius and his World. Essays in Memory of F.W. Walbank, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 279-306.

Wilber, D.N. (1937) ‘Summary Descriptions of the Extant Structures’, Bulletin of the American Institute for Iranian Art and Archaeology, 5: 92-105.

Willekes, C. (2013) From the Steppe to the Stable: Horses and Horsemanship in the Ancient World, PhD Thesis, University of Calgary.

Willekes, C. (2015) ‘Equine Aspects of Alexander the Great’s Macedonian Cavalry’ in Howe, T. et al. (eds.) Greece, Macedon and Persia, Oxbow Books Ltd., Oxford, 47-58.

Willekes, C. (2016) The Horse in the Ancient World: From Bucephelus to the Hippodrome, I.B. Tauris, London.

Williams, M.H. (1990) ‘Review: Judas Maccabeus and the Jewish Army’, The Classical Review, 40: 371-3.

Worley, L.J. (1994) Hippeis, Westview Press, Oxford.

Wörrle, M. (1975) ‘Antiochos I., Achaios der Älte und die Galater’, Chiron, 5: 59-88.

Wrightson, G. (2015) ‘Macedonian Armies, Elephants, and the Perfection of Combined Arms’, in Howe, T. et al. (eds.) Greece, Macedon and Persia, Oxbow Books, Oxford, 59-68.

Wrightson, G. (2019) Combined Arms Warfare in Ancient Greece: From Homer to Alexander the Great and his Successors, Routledge, Oxon.

Yahalom, I. (2017) ‘Reinterpreting Diodorus – A New Approach for Elephant Tactics in the Hellenistic World: The Battles of Paraitacene, Gabiene, Gaza and Panion’, Unpublished paper from the International Ancient Warfare Conference 2017, Aberystwyth, 30th June 2017.

Ziegler, K. (1971) Plutarchi, Vitae Parallelae, Volumen III. Fasc. 1, Teubner, Leipzig.

307

APPENDIX 1 Potential ‘Non-Regular’ Cavalry Contingents

Table 1.1. Achaemenid Cavalry Contingents

Contingent Notes Example(s)

Achaemenid Royal Guard; Quintus Curtius, Arrian, Anabasis 3.9.4 claims that they were 3,000 strong (cf. Συγγενεῖς 3.11.5; Diodorus, 4.12.1, 4.12.18); their horses were most 17.20.2, 17.59.2; (‘Kinsman’) likely ‘Nisaeans’ (cf. Herodotus, 9.20; Quintus Curtius, 3.9.4 Sekunda (1992) 56) Arrian, Anabasis Albanians ? 3.11.4 Arrian, Anabasis Arachosians ? 3.11.3, 7.6.3; Quintus Curtius, 4.12.6 Areians (see ‘Medians’, Herodotus, 7.62) Arrian, Anabasis 7.6.3 (Split into ‘Greater’ and ‘Lesser’ Armenia, Xenophon, see Quintus Curtius, 4.12.10, 4.12.12); Cyropaedia 2.1.6, Strabo, 11.13,7, 11.14.9 praises the region Anabasis 4.3.3; for its horse-raising abilities, and notes that Armenians Arrian, Anabasis it was later able to supply cataphracts, 3.11.7; Quintus implying the presence of ‘Nisaean horses’, Curtius, 3.2.6, and the ability to field heavy cavalry (see 4.12.10, 4.12.12 Chapters 1.3, 3.4.1)

According to UCP 9/3 the holder of ‘horse- land’ was required to provide: an iron Babylonians corselet with a hood, other armour (hood, UCP 9/3 coat, neck-cover), a bow with 120 arrows, a sword, and two iron lances

Herodotus, 7.86.1, Mounted archers and javelin-men; some 8.113.2; Arrian, heavily-armoured cavalry (cf. ‘Scythians’, Anabasis 3.11.3, Arrian, Anabasis 3.13.4); according to Bactrians 3.13.4, 4.17.3, 7.6.3; Herodotus, 7.86.1 they were armed like their Diodorus, 17.19.4; infantry, with similar head-gear to the Quintus Curtius, ‘Medians’ (cf. 7.61, 7.64.1) 4.12.6

Armed with double-edged axes and light Barcani Quintus Curtius, 3.2.5 (leather) shields Xenophon, Anabasis Bithynians ? 6.4.24 (cf. Brownson,

308

(1998) 435, n.35), 6.4.30 Xenophon, Cyropaedia 5.3.24; Arrian, Anabasis Cadusians ? 3.11.3; Diodorus, 17.59.5; Quintus Curtius, 4.12.12 ? Nemsianus, Cynegetica 204ff. and Oppian, Arrian, Anabasis Cappadocians Cynegetica 170ff. praise this region for the 3.11.7 quality of its horses (see Chapter 3.4.1) Mounted archers; according to Herodotus, 7.86.1 they were armed like their infantry, Herodotus, 7.86.1; Caspians wearing cloaks, with reed bows and short Quintus Curtius, 3.2.8 swords (cf. 7.67.1) Mercenaries with long wicker shields and Xenophon, Anabasis Chaldaeans lances 4.3.3 ? Cilicians (cf. Herodotus, 3,90.3 for the existence of an Diodorus, 17.19.4 Achaemenid mounted guard in this region) According to Herodotus, 7.86.1 they were armed like their infantry, and similar to the ‘Medians’, but with turbans instead of loose caps (cf. 7.61, 7.62.2); (cf. How and Wells Cissians Herodotus, 7.86.1 (1957a) 283, (1957b) 154 who note that the Cissian satrapy was officially Susiana (see ‘Susians’) and that it corresponded to Elam (see ‘Elymaians’)) Arrian, Anabasis Coele-Syrians ? 3.11.4 Light cavalry; mounted archers. According to Quintus Curtius, 7.7.32, each horse Arrian, Anabasis carried two riders, one of whom would 3.11.3; Quintus Dahae dismount in battle; (often classed under the Curtius, 4.12.6, ‘Scythians’, near the Caspian Sea and 7.7.32; (Herodotus, Hyrcania, see Strabo, 11.7.1, 11.8.2; Head 1.125.4) (1992) 49 classes them under the ‘Sacae’) Derbices (see ‘Bactrians’) Quintus Curtius, 3.2.7 Elymaians (see ‘Cissians’) Herodotus, 7.62 According to Xenophon, Cyropaedia 4.2.1, Xenophon, ‘they had a reputation for being good Cyropaedia 4.2.1, 5.3.24, 7.8.15; Arrian, Hyrcanians horsemen and they still have that reputation Anabasis 3.11.4 now’ (εὔιπποι δὲ καὶ τότε ἐδόκουν εἶναι Diodorus, 17.19.4; καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκοῦσιν) Quintus Curtius, 3.2.6 Mounted archers; according to Herodotus Herodotus, 7.86.1, Indians 7.86.1 they were armed like their infantry, 8.113.2; Arrian, wearing tree-wool garments, and had bows Anabasis 3.15.1

309

with iron-tipped arrows (cf. 7.65; though see Chakravarti (1941) 42); according to Arrian, Indika 16 they typically had two lances and a small shield TL 44; Quintus Curtius, 7.10.12; Lycians ? Tuplin (2010) 120); Head (1992) 56, fig. 43 Xenophon, Anabasis 3.13.4; Diodorus, Lydians ? 14.36.3; Polyaenus, 7.14.3 Xenophon, Anabasis Mardians ? 4.3.3 Armoured cavalry; according to Herodotus, 1.215, they are ‘like the Scythians in their dress and manner of life’ (Μασσαγέται δὲ ἐσθῆτά τε ὁμοίην τῇ Σκυθικῇ φορέουσι καὶ δίαιταν ἔχουσι), and have Arrian, Anabasis Massagetae spearmen, archers, and battle-axes (although 4.16.7-17.2; Quintus it is unclear whether the cavalry also have Curtius, 4.12.7 all of these weapons), and their horses are armoured with bronze breastplates; (often classed under ‘Scythian’, see Arrian, Anabasis 4.16.7-17.2; Head (1992) 49 classes them as ‘Sacae’) According to Herodotus, 7.86.1 they were armed like their infantry (cf. 7.61), who Herodotus, 7.86.1, were similar to the ‘Persians’; this region 8.113.2; Xenophon, was home to the ‘Nisaean’ horses (see Medians Cyropaedia 2.1.6; Chapter 1.3, 3.4.1), so it is highly likely that Diodorus, 17.19.4; most (if not all) of their cavalry was heavy; Quintus Curtius, 3.2.4 (Diodorus, 19.29.2 records some Median lancers at Paraitakene (317 B.C.)) Arrian, Anabasis Mesopotamians ? 3.11.4 According to Xenophon, Anabasis 5.6.8, they were ‘a cavalry which the barbarians Xenophon, themselves regard as superior to the whole Anabasis1.8.5, 5.6.8, Paphlagonians of the King’s cavalry’ (καὶ ἱππείαν ἣν Hellenika 4.1.3; αὐτοὶ οἱ βάρβαροι νομίζουσι κρείττω Diodorus, 17.19.4 εἶναι ἁπάσης τῆς βασιλέως ἱππείας) Mounted archers; according to Herodotus, 7.86.2 they were armed like their infantry, Paricanians Herodotus, 7.86.2 wearing cloaks, and armed with bows and daggers (cf. 7.67.3-68)

310

Mounted archers (cf. the ‘Parthian shot’); the development of heavy, mail-clad cavalry Arrian, Anabasis is notable here, indicative of the possession 3.11.4, 3.15.1, 7.6.3; Parthians of ‘Nisaean’ horses (see Chapters 1.3, Quintus Curtius, 3.4.1); (Diodorus, 19.29.2 records some 4.12.11 Parthian lancers at Paraitakene (317 B.C.)) According to Herodotus, 7.84, they were armed like their infantry, wearing loose Herodotus, 7.84; caps, embroidered tunics with iron scales, Arrian, Anabasis trousers, and armed with wicker shields, 3.11.3, 7.6.3; Quintus bows, spears, and daggers (although it is Persians Curtius, 3.2.4; unclear if the cavalry also had all of these (cf. Xenophon, weapons), however, some of the cavalry Cyropaedia 4.3.8, wore headgear of hammered bronze or iron 5.2.1, 8.5.23, 8.8.22) (cf. 7.61); units were sometimes mixed with their infantry (Arrian, Anabasis 3.11.3) Xenophon, Anabasis Phrygians ? 6.4.24 Mounted archers; (according to Herodotus, 7.64.2 their infantry, at least, wore tall caps, and trousers, and were armed with bows, daggers, and axes – it is possible that their cavalry were similar, cf. 8.113.2); mostly Herodotus, 8.113.2; lightly-armed but there were also some more Xenophon, Sacae heavily-armed cavalry (see Head (1992) 49); Cyropaedia 5.3.24; (often classed as ‘Scythians’, see Arrian, Anabasis Herodotus, 7.64.2: ‘the Sacae who are 3.11.4 Scythians... for the Persians call all Scythians Sacae’, Σάκαι δὲ οἱ Σκύθαι... οἱ γὰρ Πέρσαι πάντας τοὺς Σκύθας καλέουσι Σάκας) Arrian, Anabasis Sacesinians ? 3.11.4 No armour of bronze or iron, except daggers. Armed with lassos, which they allegedly used at close-quarters to drag Herodotus, (1.125.4), Sagartains horses and men close to them; however, they 7.85 are not mentioned in any actual battles, (see Tuplin (2010) 165; Head (1992) 33) Typically light cavalry, armed with bows and shields, and able to ride in circles around their opponents (Arrian, Anabasis Arrian, Anabasis 4.4). They generally rode ‘Central Asian’ 3.11.6, 4.4; Diodorus, Scythians horses (see Chapter 1.3.); Arrian, Anabasis 17.59.5; Quintus 3.13.4 claims that the Scythian cavalry (and Curtius, 4.12.11; their horses) which were brigaded with the (cf. Herodotus, 4) Bactrians ‘were better protected by defensive armour’ (ἀκριβέστερον εἰς

311

φυλακὴν πεφραγμένοι ἦσαν), implying some heavier cavalry – possibly riding ‘Turanian’, or even ‘Nisaean’ horses? (Ancient sources frequently use ‘Scythian’ as a catch-all term for (nomadic) people from the northern regions of the Achaemenid Empire and Central Eurasia; cf. Herodotus, 7.64.2 regarding the ‘Sacae’) Light cavalry archers and javelin-men, able to wheel around their opponents (Arrian, Anabasis 4.5.4), implying ‘Central Asian’ Arrian, Anabasis Sogdians (or possibly ‘Turanian’?) horses (see 4.5.4-6.2, 4.17.3, 7.6.3 Chapter 1.3); (Arrian, Anabasis 4.5.4 calls them ‘Scythians’; see ‘Bactrians’) Arrian, Anabasis Susians (see ‘Cissians’) 3.11.3; Quintus Curtius, 4.12.6 Arrian, Anabasis Tapurians (see ‘Bactrians’) 3.11.4; Quintus Curtius 3.2.6 Zarangians ? Arrian, Anabasis 7.6.3

Notes:  This table is not an exhaustive list; rather, it contains the most notable/referenced Achaemenid cavalry contingents, and/or those most securely known.  The sources listed do not include every instance of a particular contingent, but rather notable occasions, or those referenced elsewhere in this thesis.  Where ‘?’ is given under the ‘Notes’ column, this indicates a lack of any description for this contingent in the sources.  Unknown contingents: Quintus Curtius, 3.2.8 notes that with the Caspians were the cavalry of ‘other less known nations’ (cum iis erant ignobiles aliae gentes).  Arabian camel-archers feature in Herodotus, 7.86.2, 7.184.4.  Libyan chariots (although not scythed), feature in Herodotus 7.86.2, 7.184.4.  According to Xenophon, Cyropaedia 8.8.22, Cyrus I armed both the men and horses of his cavalry with breastplates, and gave each man a javelin.  Cyrus the Younger’s horsemen were armed with breastplates, thigh-pieces, and helmets, and their horses were also armed with frontlets and breast-pieces (Xenophon, Anabasis 1.8.6-7).

312

APPENDIX 2 Infantry:Cavalry Ratios

Table 2.1. Seleucid Ratios (Between 301-160 B.C.)

Battle/Force Infantry Cavalry Ratio Notes Source Plutarch, 64,000 10,500 6.1:1 Demetrius 28.3 Bar-Kochva Ipsus Allied army (301 B.C.) (1976) 107, 64,000 15,000? 4.3:1 247 n.11; cf. Diodorus, 20.113.4 Achaeus Only the troops Polybius, 6,000 500 12:1 against Selge in Asia Minor 5.72.3 (218 B.C.) Polybius, Raphia 62,000 6,000 10.3:1 (217 B.C.) 5.79.13 Antiochus’ Eastern Expedition 100,000 20,000 5:1 Justin, 41.5.7 (Ca. 212-206 B.C.) Livy, 36.15.3 (cf. 35.43.6, Unusual 36.19.11); Thermopylae 10,000 500 20:1 (191 B.C.) circumstances Appian, Syriaca 17 (cf. 20) Livy, 60,000 12,000 5:1 Magnesia 37.37.9, (190 B.C.) (60,900?) (12,200?) (4.9:1?) 37.40 Night attack I Maccabees, just prior to 5,000 1,000 5:1 Not the full army Ammaus 4.1 (165 B.C.) I Maccabees, 40,000 7,000 5.7:1 3.39 ‘not less than Ammaus II (165 B.C.) 20,000’ (οὐκ ? ? ? Maccabees, ἐλάττους τῶν 8.9 δισμυρίων) I Maccabees, Beth-Zur 60,000 5,000 12.1 (164 B.C.) 4.28

313

? (‘thousands’ χιλιάσιν II Infantry figure is 80,000 ? Maccabees, τῶν exaggerated ἱππέων, II 11.2, 11.4 Maccabees, 11.4) Josephus, Ca. Bellum Ca. 5,000 Ca. 10:1 50,000 Judaicum 1.41 I Maccabees, 6.30; These figures are Beth- Josephus, 100,000 20,000 5:1 greatly Zechariah Antiquitates (162 B.C.) exaggerated Judaicae 12.366 Infantry figure II exaggerated; 110,000 5,300 20.8:1 Maccabees, cavalry figure 13.2 possible I Maccabees, Elasa 20,000 2,000 10:1 (160 B.C.) 9.3

Notes:

 The Daphne parade (165 B.C.) is not included as it is not a battle/campaign. Furthermore, the propagandistic nature of this event means that the authenticity of various contingents is debatable (see Chapter 3.2.3), complicating the numbers recorded in Polybius, 30.25.  For Seleucus I’s infantry:cavalry ratios prior to Ipsus (301 B.C.), see Table 2.2 below.

314

Table 2.2. Other Hellenistic Ratios (Set-battles and notable forces only)

Battle/ Infantry Cavalry Ratio Notes Source Force THE DIADOCHI

Lysimachus Lysimachus: Lysimachus: Lysimachus: 4,000 2,000 2:1 Diodorus, vs. Seuthes of Thrace Seuthes: Seuthes: Seuthes: 18.14.2 (323/2 B.C.) 20,000 8,000 2.5:1 Perdiccas vs. Ariarathes: Ariarathes: Diodorus, Ariarathes 2:1 of 30,000 15,000 18.16.2 Cappadocia (323/2 B.C.) Craterus: Craterus: Ca. 10:1 20,000 2,000+ Diodorus, Hellespont (321 B.C.) Eumenes: Eumenes: 18.30.4-5 4:1 20,000 5,000 Antigonus: Antigonus: Antigonus: Diodorus, 10,000 2,000 5:1 18.40.7; Orcynii Plutarch, (320/19 B.C.) Eumenes: Eumenes: Eumenes: Eumenes 20,000 5,000 4:1 9.2 Antigonus: Antigonus: Antigonus: Antigonus 40,000+ 7,000+ Ca. 5:1 Diodorus, vs. Alcetas Alcetas: Alcetas: Alcetas: 18.45.1 (319 B.C.) 16,000 900 17.8:1 Antigonus’ army Diodorus, following 60,000 10,000 6:1 Antipater’s 18.50.3 death (319 B.C.) Eumenes vs. Eumenes: Eumenes: Eumenes: Diodorus, Seleucus in Babylonia 15,000 3,300 4.5:1 18.73.4 (318 B.C.) Antigonus: Antigonus: Diodorus, Antigonus: 8,500 Ca. 3:1 19.27.1 28,000+ Paraitakene (10,000+) (Ca. 3:1) (19.29) (317 B.C.) Eumenes: Eumenes: Eumenes: Diodorus, 35,000 6,100 5.7:1 19.28.4 Antigonus: Antigonus: Antigonus: Diodorus, 22,000 9,000 2.4:1 19.40.1 Gabiene (316 B.C.) Eumenes: Eumenes: Eumenes: Diodorus, 36,700 6,000 6.1:1 19.40.4

315

Ptolemy: Ptolemy: Ptolemy: Diodorus,

18,000 4,000 4.5:1 19.80.4 Gaza Not the full (312 B.C.) Demetrius: Demetrius: Demetrius: Diodorus, Antigonid 12,500 4,600 2.7:1 19.82 army Only the Nicanor vs. Nicanor: Nicanor: Nicanor: troops from Seleucus in 10,000 Ca. 7,000 Ca. 1.4:1 Media and Diodorus, Babylonia Persia 19.92.1-2 (312 B.C.) Seleucus: Seleucus: Seleucus: Not a full 3,000+ 400 Ca. 7:1 force Antigonus Diodorus, marches on 80,000+ 8,000 Ca. 10:1 Egypt 20.7:1 (306 B.C.) Demetrius Demetrius: Demetrius: Demetrius: The battle vs. 56,000 15,000 3.7:1 does not Diodorus, Cassander Cassander: Cassander: Cassander: actually 20.110.4 (302 B.C.) 29,000 2,000 14.5:1 happen Plutarch, Antigonus: Antigonus: Antigonus: Ipsus Demetrius (301 B.C.) 70,000+ 10,000 Ca. 7:1 28.3 Demetrius’ Plutarch, army 98,000 12,000 8.2:1 Demetrius (289 B.C.) 43.2 Pyrrhus Plutarch, sails to Italy 22,500 3,000 7.5:1 Pyrrhus (280 B.C.) 15.1 Plutarch, Pyrrhus in 2,500 12:1 Pyrrhus Sicily 30,000 22.4 (278 B.C.) Diodorus, 1,500 20:1 22.10.2 Pyrrhus Plutarch, arrives in 20,000 3,000 6.6:1 Pyrrhus Tarentum 24.4 (276 B.C.) Pyrrhus’ force Plutarch, against 25,000 2,000 12.5:1 Pyrrhus Sparta 26.9 (272 B.C.) PTOLEMIES (Post 301 B.C.) Polybius, Raphia 70,000 5,000 14:1 (217 B.C.) 5.79.2

316

GREECE AND MACEDON Macedon is short of troops following Antipater Alexander’s marches campaigns; Diodorus, 13,000 600 21.7:1 against initially allied 18.12.2 Leosthenes with Thessaly (323/2 B.C.) who would provide cavalry (Macedonian figures are not given, but Leonnatus arrived in Macedon just Lamia Greeks: Greeks: Greeks: before this Diodorus, (323/2 B.C.) 22,000 3,500+ Ca. 6:1 battle with 18.15.2 20,000+ infantry and 1,500 cavalry (ca. 13.3:1), Diodorus, 18.14.5) Mace- Mace- Mace- Diodorus, donians: donians: donians: 18.6.5 Crannon 43,000 5,000 8.6:1 (323/2 B.C.) Greeks: Greeks: Greeks: Diodorus, 25,000 3,500 7.1:1 18.17.2 Antipater Antipater Antipater Antipater and Crassus and Diodorus, and Crassus: and Crassus: vs. the Crassus: 18.24.1 30,000 2,500 Aetolians 12:1 (322/1 B.C.) Diodorus, 12,000 400 30:1 18.38.1 Aetolians in After Thessaly persuading Diodorus, (320 B.C.) 25,000 15,000 1.7:1 the 18.38.3 Thessalians to join them Agathocles Not the full Diodorus, pursues the 8,000 800 10:1 Carthaginians army 20.38.1 (308 B.C.) Ophellas’ Diodorus, 10,000+ 600 Ca. 16:1 army 20.41.1 (308 B.C.)

317

Xenodocus Xenodocus: Xenodocus: Xenodocus: 10,000 1,000 10:1 vs. Leptines Diodorus,

and Leptines and Leptines and Lepitnes and 20.56.1-2 Demophilus Demophilus: Demophilus: Demophilus: (307 B.C.) 8,200 1,200 6.8:1 Deinocrates’ Diodorus, 20,000 1,500 13.3:1 force 20.57.2 (307 B.C.) Agathocles’ Diodorus, force in 16,000 1,500 10.7:1 Libya 20.61.2 (307 B.C.) Deinocrates’ Diodorus, 20,000 3,000 6.7:1 force 20.79.2 (306 B.C.) Agathocles: Agathocles: Agathocles: 5,000 800 6.3:1 Diodorus, Torgium (305 B.C.) Deinocrates: Deinocrates: Deinocrates: 20.89.1-2 25,000+ 3,000 Ca. 8:1 Cleonymus sails to Diodorus, 22,000 2,000 11:1 Tarentum 20.104.2 (303 B.C.)

Agathocles Diodorus, crosses to 30,000 3,000 10:1 Italy 21.8 (Ca. 294 B.C.) Antigonus Antigonus Antigonus Polybius, III: III: III: 2.65.5 Sellasia 28,000 1,200 23.3:1 (222 B.C.) Cleomenes: Cleomenes: Cleomenes: A force of Polybius, ? ? ? 20,000 men 2.65.7 Aratus + an unknown number of Polybius, advances to 3,000 300 10:1 Patrae Taurion’s 4.10.1 (220 B.C.) troops Achaeans: Achaeans: Achaeans: Achaean 5,000 500 10:1 Polybius, League Messenians Messenians Messenians forces and Lace- and Lace- and Lace- 4.15 (220 B.C.) daemonians: daemonians: daemonians: 2,500 250 10:1 Philip V’s Polybius, 15,000 800 18.8:1 army 4.37.5 (219 B.C.) Achaean Polybius, League 12,000 900 13.3:1 forces 5.91.6-7 (217 B.C.)

318

Philip V Livy, marches to 5,000 300 16.6:1 Chlacis 31.24.1 (200 B.C.) Philip V: Philip V: Philip V: Livy, Athacus (199 B.C.) 20,000 2,000 10:1 31.34.7 Cyno- Philip V: Philip V: Philip V: Livy, 33.4.4 scephalae 23,500 2,000 11.8:1 (197 B.C.) Nicostratus’ Livy, 5,000 300 16.6:1 force 33.14.12 (197 B.C.) Deinocrates: Deinocrates: Deinocrates: 3,000 100 30:1 Livy, Tendeba (197 B.C.) Pausistratus: Pausistratus: Pausistratus: 33.18.14 3,000 100 30:1 Philip V: Philip V: Philip V: Livy, Stobi (197 B.C.) 6,000 500 12:1 33.19.3 Diophanes’ Polybius, 1,000 100 10:1 force 21.3b (192 B.C.) Livy, Thoas’ force 2,000 200 10:1 (192 B.C.) 35.37.7 Meippus Livy, marches to 3,000 200 15:1 Perrhaebia 36.10.5 (191 B.C.) Perseus’ Livy, force 39,000 4,000 9.8:1 42.51.11 (171 B.C.) Plutarch, Perseus: Perseus: Perseus: Pydna Aemilius (168 B.C.) 40,000 4,000 10:1 13.4 Cyrenean Polybius, 8,000 500 16:1 force 31.18.13 (163 B.C.) CARTHAGE Hamilcar’s force Diodorus, 45,000 5,000 9:1 against 19.106.5 Agathocles (310 B.C.) (Agathocles’ troops are uncertain Diodorus, Tunis 40,000 1,000 40:1 (310 B.C.) (26,000 20.10.5 infantry + 10,000

319

others), Diodorus, 20.11.1) Xanthippus’ Polybius, 12,000 4,000 3:1 force 1.32.9 (255 B.C.) Hasdrubal’s Diodorus, 50,000 6,000 8.3:1 army 25.12 (229/8 B.C.) Hasdrubal’s After founding Diodorus, 60,000 8,000 7.5:1 army New Carthage 25.12 (228 B.C.) At the Ebro: At the Ebro: At the Ebro: Polybius,

90,000 12,000 7.5:1 3.35.1 At the At the At the Hannibal’s Polybius, Pyrenees: Pyrenees: Pyrenees: forces 3.35.7 (218 B.C.) 50,000 9,000 5.5:1 At the At the At the Polybius Rhone: Rhone: Rhone: 3.60.5 38,000 8,000+ Ca. 4:1 Hanno’s Not the full Polybius, 10,000 1,000 10:1 force army 3.35.5 (218 B.C.)

Polybius, Trebia 28,000 10,000+ Ca. 2:1 (218 B.C.) 3.72.7-8 Polybius, Cannae Ca. 40,000 Ca. 10,000 Ca. 4:1 3.114; (218 B.C.) Livy, 22.46

Polybius, Metarus 70,000 4,000 17.5:1 (207 B.C.) 11.20.2 Hasdrubal: Hasdrubal: Hasdrubal: 30,000 3,000 10:1 Polybius, Syphax (203 B.C.) Numidians: Numidians: Numidians: 14.1.14 50,000 10,000 5:1 OTHERS Satyrus: Satyrus: Satyrus: Thates 24,000+ 10,000 Ca. 2:1 Bosporan Diodorus, (310/309 B.C.) Eumelus: Eumelus: Eumelus: kingdom 20.22.4 22,000 20,000 1.1:1

Notes:  Roman figures are not included due to the different nature of their army’s organisation and development, meaning that it is debatable how comparable these are to other Hellenistic figures.

320

 Jewish figures are not included due to the generally unreliable nature of the extant sources for these armies, as well as the different nature of their military developments.

Table 2.3. Alexander’s Ratios (Set-battles and notable forces only)

Battle/Force Infantry Cavalry Ratio Notes Source Alexander’s Prior to attacking Diodorus, 30,000 3,000 10:1 army Thebes 17.9.3 (335 B.C.) Arrian, 30,000+ 5,000+ Ca. 6:1 Anabasis 1.11.3 Diodorus, Diodorus’ individual 4,500 7.1:1 17.17.3; Alexander 32,000 units add up to 5,100 (5,100) (6.3:1) Justin, crosses the not his stated 4,500 Hellespont 11.6.2 (334 B.C.) Highest figures Lowest: Lowest: Lowest: probably represent the Plutarch, 30,000 4,000 7.5:1 total Macedonian army Alexander Highest: Highest: Highest: (including Antipater’s 15.1 43,000 5,000 8.6:1 force) in 334 B.C. Antipater’s Diodorus, force in 12,000 1,500 8:1 Macedon 17.17.3 (334 B.C.) Force left in Arrian, Phrygia 3,000 200 15:1 Not the full army Anabasis (334 B.C.) 1.23.6 Arrian, Gaugamela 40,000 7,000 5.7:1 Anabasis (331 B.C.) 3.12.5 Alexander in Plutarch, Hyrcania 20,000 3,000 6.6:1 Not the full army Alexander (330 B.C.) 47.1 Memnon’s Quintus force in 4,000 600 6.6:1 Not the full army Curtius, Arachosia 7.3.5 (329 B.C.) Menedemus Quintus sent to 3,000 800 3.8:1 Not the full army Curtius, Maracanda (329 B.C.) 7.6.24

321

Amyntas’ Arrian, force in 10,000 3,500 2.9:1 Not the full army Anabasis Bactria 4.22.3 (327 B.C.) Arrian, Not the full army; Hydaspes 6,000 5,000 1.2:1 Anabasis (327/6 B.C.) unusual circumstances 5.14.1 Leonnatus’ Arrian, force at the 8,000 1,000 8:1 Not the full army Anabasis Indus 6.18.3 (326/5 B.C.) Alexander’s intended Quintus force to hold 13,000 2,000 6.5:1 Hypothetical Curtius, Asia 10.2.8 (324 B.C.)

Notes:  The total Macedonian army in 334 B.C. was: 42,000-44,000 infantry, 6,000- 6,600 cavalry = 6.4:1-7.3:1 (Arrian, Anabasis, 1.11.3; Diodorus, 17.17.3; Justin, 11.6.2).  Plutarch, Alexander 66.5 claims that Alexander’s army comprised: 120,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry = 8:1.  Alexander received various reinforcements throughout his campaigns (see: Arrian, Anabasis 1.29.4; Diodorus, 17.65.1, 17.95.4; Quintus Curtius, 5.1.40- 2, 7.3.4, 7.10.11-12, 9.3.21, 10.1.1) – these figures are not included.

Table 2.4. Classical Greek Ratios (Set-battles and notable forces only) Battle/ Infantry Cavalry Ratio Notes Source Force An unknown Athens number of marches on 3,000 Thucydides, 600 Ca. 5:1 allies; the Potidaea 1.61.4 + allies cavalry are (432 B.C.) Macedonian Athenian force sent to Thucydides, 4,000 300 13.3:1 Potidaea 6.31.2 (430 B.C.)

322

Pericles sails Thucydides, for the 4,000 300 13.3:1 Peloponnese 2.56.2 (430 B.C.) Athens: Athens: Athens: Thucydides, Spartolus (429 B.C.) 2,000 200 10:1 2.79.2 Athens: Athens: Athens: Thucydides, Solygia (425 B.C.) 2,000 200 10:1 4.42.3 Athens: Athens: Athens: Thucydides, 4,000 600 6.6:1 4.68.5 Pelo- Pelo- Pelo- Megara (424 B.C.) ponnesian ponnesian ponnesian Thucydides, relief force: relief force: relief force: 4.70, 4.72.1 6,000 600 10:1 Boeotians: Boeotians: Thucydides, 17,500 Boeotians: 17.5:1 4.93.3 Delium (424 B.C.) Boeotians: 1,000 Boeotians: Diodorus, 20,000 20:1 12.69.3 + ‘an immense crowd of Brasidas Brasidas Brasidas barbarians’ Lyncestis and and and (καὶ ἄλλος Thucydides, (423 B.C.) Perdiccas: Perdiccas: Perdiccas: ὅμιλος τῶν 4.124.1 3,000 1,000 3:1 βαρβάρων πολύς); the cavalry is Macedonian Athenian Thucydides, expedition to 1,200 300 4:1 Thrace 5.2.1 (422 B.C.) Brasidas at Thucydides, 2,000 300 6.6:1 Cerdylium 5.6.5 (422 B.C.) Boeotians at Thucydides, 10,500 500 21:1 Phlius 5.57.2 (418 B.C.) Athenian Thucydides, 300 3.3:1 force under 5.61.1 Laches and 1,000 Diodorus, Nicostratus 200 5:1 (418 B.C.) 12.79.1 Athenian Thucydides, expedition to 3,000 20 150:1 Melos 5.84.2 (416 B.C.) Athenian Thucydides, 5,100 650 7.8:1 force in Sicily 6.98.1 (414 B.C.)

323

Gylippus’ Diodorus, 3,000 300 10:1 force 13.7.7 (414 B.C.) Athenian Diodorus, force 13.52.1; following 1,000 100 10:1 Xenophon, Cyzicus Hellenika (410 B.C.) 1.1.34 Athenian Diodorus, force sent to 1,000 400 2.5:1 Nisaea 13.65.1 (409 B.C.) Alcibiades’ Xenophon force 1,500 150 10:1 Hellenika, (407 B.C.) 1.4.21 Agis II’s force Diodorus, 28,000 1,200 23.3:1 at Decelea 13.72.4 (406 B.C.) Syracusan Diodorus, 30,000+ 5,000 Ca. 6:1 force 13.68.5 (406 B.C.) Dionysius I Diodorus, marches to 2,000 400 5:1 Gela 13.93.1 (405 B.C.) Dionysius I Diodorus, marches to 600 100 6:1 Achradine 13.113.1 (405 B.C.) Rhegium’s Diodorus, 6,000 600 10:1 force 14.40.3 (397 B.C.) Messene’s Diodorus, 4,000 400 10:1 force 14.40.4 (397 B.C.) Dionysius I Diodorus, marches to 80,000 3,000+ Ca. 26:1 Eryx 14.47.7 (397 B.C.) Dionysius Diodorus, 30,000 3,000 10:1 near Taurus 14.58.2 (397 B.C.) Agesilaus II Diodorus, 10,000 400 25:1 at Ephesus 14.79.2 (396 B.C.) Council of Diodorus, 15,000+ 500 Ca. 30:1 Corinth 14.82.10 (394 B.C.)

324

Lace- Lace- Lace- Xenophon, daemonians daemonians daemonians Hellenika and allies: and allies: and allies: 4.2.16 14,200 700 20.3:1

Lace- Lace- Lace- daemonians daemonians daemonians Diodorus, and allies: and allies: and allies: 14.83.1 23,000 500 46:1 An unknown number of light troops; the infantry figure is only for the hoplites; Nemea (Athens: (394 B.C.) 6,000 infantry, 600 cavalry = Xenophon, Allies: Allies: Ca. 12:1 10:1; Hellenika 19,000+ 1,550 Boeotians: 4.2.17 5,000 infantry, 800 cavalry = 6.3:1; Euboeans and Chalcidians: 1,000 infantry, 100 cavalry = 10:1) Dionysius I’s Diodorus, 20,000 1,000 20:1 force 14.100.2 (390 B.C.) Thurian Diodorus, 14,000 1,000 14:1 force 14.101.2 (390 B.C.) Leucanian Diodorus, 30,000 4,000 7.5:1 force 14.101.4 (390 B.C.) Dionysius Diodorus, 20,000 3,000 6.6:1 sails to Italy 14.103.2 (389 B.C.) Croton’s Diodorus, force 25,000 2,000 12.5:1 14.103.6 (389 B.C.) Demophon’s Diodorus, force 5,000 500 10:1 15.26.2 (378 B.C.)

325

Boeotian Diodorus, force 12,000 2,000 6:1 15.26.4 (378 B.C.) Athenian Diodorus, force 20,000 500 40:1 15.29.7 (377/6 B.C.) Agesilaus II Diodorus, 18,000+ 1,500 Ca. 12:1 in Boeotia 15.32.1 (377/6 B.C.) Athenian Diodorus, force in 5,000 200 25:1 Boeotia 15.32.2 (377/6 B.C.) Jason of ? Pherae’s 20,000 Xenophon, force as hoplites + 8,000 ? Hellenika ταγός of numerous 6.1.19 Thessaly peltasts (374 B.C.) Jason of Jason of Jason of Diodorus, Leuktra Pherae: Pherae: Pherae: (371 B.C.) 15.54.5 1,500 500 3:1 Epamein- Diodorus, 7,000 600 11.6:1 ondas’ force 15.68.1 (369/8 B.C.) Diodorus, Theban force 8,000 600 13.3:1 (368 B.C.) 15.71.3 Dionysius I Diodorus, invades 30,000 3,000 10:1 Carthage 15.73.2 (368/7 B.C.) Mantineans Mantineans Mantineans and allies: and allies: and allies: 20,000 2,000 10:1 Diodorus, Mantinea (362 B.C.) Tegeans Tegeans Tegeans and 15.84.4 and allies: and allies: allies: 30,000 3,000 10:1 Theban force sent to Diodorus, 3,000 300 10:1 Megalopolis 15.94.2 (362/1 B.C.) Hastily Philip II vs. Philip II: Philip II: Philip II: formed Diodorus, Bardylis 10,000 500 20:1 Macedonian 16.4.4 (359/8 B.C.) army Dionysius I’s Diodorus, force 100,000 10,000 10:1 16.9.2 (357/6 B.C.)

326

Ono- Ono- Ono- marchus: marchus: marchus: 20,000 500 40:1 Diodorus, Crocus Field Philip II (353 B.C.) Philip II and Philip II and 16.35.4 and Thessalians: Thessalians: Thessalians: 20,000 3,000 6.6:1 Athenian Diodorus, force sent to 5,000 400 12.5 the Phocians 16.37.3 (352 B.C.) Theban force Diodorus, sent to 4,000 500 8:1 Megalopolis 16.39.2 (352/1 B.C.) Olynthus’ Demosthenes, 10,000+ 1,000 Ca. 10:1 army 19.266 (348 B.C.) First Athenian Philochorus, force to 4,000 150 26.6:1 FGrH 328 Olynthus F50 (348 B.C.) Third Athenian Philochorus, alliance with 2,000 300 6.6:1 FGrH 328 Olynthus F51 (348 B.C.) Philip II: Philip II: Philip II Diodorus, Chaeronea (338 B.C.) 30,000+ 2,000 Ca. 15:1 16.85.5 Agis III’s Diodorus, 20,000 2,000 10:1 uprising 17.62.7 (331 B.C.)

Notes:  There are many battles/forces where no cavalry are mentioned – these are not included.  In some instances light troops are not always included in the infantry numbers provided.  Athens’ original force for the Sicilian Expedition (415 B.C.) was: 5,100 infantry, 30 cavalry = 170:1 (Thucydides, 6.43). After the first set of reinforcements the cavalry figure increased to 310 = 16.5:1 (Thucydides, 6.94.4).  Alleged strength of Thessaly under a ταγός (‘commander’) according to Xenophon, Hellenika 6.18: 10,000+ hoplites, 6,000 cavalry = ca. 2:1.

327

 Philip II vs. Bardylis (359/8 B.C.): Bardylis of Illyria’s force: 10,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry = 16.6:1 (Diodorus, 16.4.3).  Diodorus, 2.5.6 claims that Dionysius I’s army comprised: 120,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry = 10:1 (these figures are exaggerated).

Table 2.5. Achaemenid Ratios (Set-battles and notable forces only)

Battle/ Infantry Cavalry Ratio Notes Source Force Cyrus I’s Medes: 60,000 infantry, 10,000 force from Xenophon, 80,000 14,000 5.7:1 cavalry = 6:1; the Medes Cyropaedia Armenians: 20,000 and 2.1.6 Armenians infantry, 4,000 (Ca. 559 B.C.) cavalry = 5:1 Hyrcanians: an unknown number of infantry (‘as many Hyrcanians, foot-soldiers as they could; πεζούς τε Sacae, and Xenophon, Cadusians ? 8,000 ? ὁπόσους ἐδύναντο); Cyropaedia join Cyrus I Cadusians: 20,000 5.3.24 (Ca. 549/8 infantry, 4,000 B.C.) cavalry = 5:1; Sacae: 10,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry = 5:1 Cyrus I’s (+ 2,000 scythed Xenophon, army 600,000 120,000 5:1 chariots); numbers Cyropaedia (539 B.C.) are exaggerated 8.6.19 Xerxes Herodotus, leaves 21,000 3,000 7:1 Sardis 7.40-1 (480 B.C.) Herodotus records the total army as 2,700,000. Assuming that the chariots and Xerxes’ Herodotus, 2,600,000 camels were 20,000 army at 80,000 32.5:1 7.60.1, (inferred) strong (cf. Doriscus 7.85.1 (480 B.C.) Herodotus, 7.184.4), the mounted troops totalled 100,000 men; Diodorus,

328

11.3.7 alternatively states that Xerxes’ army was only 800,000 strong. Regardless, these numbers are clearly exaggerated Numbers are clearly Herodotus, Thermopylae 700,100 80,000 8.8:1 (480 B.C.) exaggerated 7.184.4 Nepos, Plataea 200,000 20,000 10:1 (479 B.C.) Pausanias 1 Cyrus the Younger’s Only the troops from Diodorus, 67,000 3,000 22.3:1 force at Asia 14.19.7 Sardis (401 B.C.) Xenophon, Artaxerxes Infantry figure is 1,200,000 6,000 200:1 Anabasis II’s army clearly exaggerated (401 B.C.) 1.7.11 Pharnabazus and Only the troops in the Tissaphernes Diodorus, 20,000 10,000 2:1 satrapies of the march on 14.39.4 Hellespont and Lydia Ephesus (397 B.C.) Only the troops Plain of Diodorus, 50,000 10,000 5:1 under Pharnabazus Caÿster 14.80.1 (396 B.C.) and Tissaphernes Otys gives Xenophon, Only the troops of troops to 2,000 200 10:1 Hellenika Paphlagonia Agesilaus II 4.1.3 (395/4 B.C.) Artaxerxes Plutarch, II against Infantry figure seems 300,000 10,000 30:1 Artaxerxes the exaggerated Cadusians 24.1 (385 B.C.) Ratio does not 151,000 + include the unknown ‘a very great number of light number of Autophra- troops (cf. Head Nepos, light troops’ Ca. dates in 20,000 (1992) 66 on the Datames (levis 7.6:1 Cappadocia validity of these extra 8.2 (367 B.C.) armaturae light troops); the maximum infantry figure is numerum) clearly exaggerated Artaxerxes Infantry figure seems Diodorus, 300,000 30,000 10:1 III’s army exaggerated 16.40.6 (351/0 B.C.)

329

> 20,000 (‘a little short of the same number [i.e. Arrian, the cavalry ? Not the full 20,000 Anabasis figure] (Ca. 1:1) Achaemenid army μισθοφόροι 1.14.4 Granicus ὀλίγον (334 B.C.) ἀποδέοντες δισμυρίων) Infantry figure is Diodorus, 100,000 10,000+ Ca. 10:1 clearly exaggerated 17.19.4-5 600,000 ? ? ? (this figure is clearly Justin, 11.6 exaggerated) Persians: 70,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry = 2.3:1; Medes: 50,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry = 5:1; Barcani: 10,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry = 5:1; Armenians: 40,000 infantry, 7,000 Prior to cavalry = 5.7:1; Quintus Issus 223,000 62,200 3.6:1 Hyrcanians: 6,000 Curtius, (333 B.C.) cavalry, (no 3.2.4-10 infantry); Tapurians: 1,000 cavalry, (no infantry); Derbices: 40,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry = 20:1; Caspian Sea: 8,000 infantry, 200 cavalry = 40:1; Others: 5,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry = 1.3:1 However, Arrian claims that historians Arrian, typically ascribe 130,000 30,000 4.3:1 Anabasis 600,000 troops to 2.8.5-8 Issus Darius – this number (333 B.C.) is exaggerated Diodorus, These figures are 400,000+ 100,000 Ca. 4:1 17.31.2; exaggerated Justin,

330

11.9.1

Polybius objects that ? there was not enough Callisthenes (30,000 30,000 ? room on the (Polybius, mercenaries) battlefield for even 12.18.2) this 60,000 Arrian, Infantry figure is 1,000,000 40,000 25:1 Anabasis clearly exaggerated 3.8.6 Quintus 200,000 45,000 4.4:1 Curtius, 4.12.13 Gaugamela These figures are Diodorus, (331 B.C.) 800,000 200,000 4:1 exaggerated, but the 17.53.3 (cf. ratio is possible 17.39.4) These figures are clearly exaggerated, Justin, 400,000 100,000 4:1 but again, the 11.12.5 repetition of the 4:1 ratio is possible Ariobarzanes’ force at the Arrian, Only the troops in 40,000 700 57.1:1 Anabasis Persian Persis Gates 3.18 (331 B.C.) Darius III’s Arrian, Only the troops in force at 6,000 3,000 2:1 Anabasis Media Media 3.19 (331 B.C.) Darius III at Quintus Ecbatana 34,000 3,300 10.3:1 Curtius, (331 B.C.) 5.8.4

331

APPENDIX 3 An Overview of the Operation of Seleucid Mounted Troops in their Battles

Table 3.1. Battlefield Positions and Tactics of Seleucid Mounted Troops Key: C = Cavalry; E = Elephants; SC = Scythed Chariots; CA = Camel-Archers

Battle Number Opponent Position/ Formation Tactics Notes Outcome Source

- Sham retreat of the left-wing cavalry under Antiochus to lure C: 10,500 Inferred Demetrius away from the (15,000?) - Cavalry on the wings battlefield - Light-cavalry harass the Plutarch, unprotected Antigonid phalanx Demetrius 29; Ipsus Antigonus Debated: - Elephants on the right fight Allied army Victory (301 B.C.) - Ca. 100 at the front of the evenly with those of Antigonus Diodorus, E: 400? right wing (Diodorus, 21.1.2) 20.113.4, (Debated) - Ca. 300 held in reserve - Elephants on the left moved to 21.1.2 behind the left wing block off Demetrius’ return SC: 120 ? ? ― ― ― Very few Plutarch, Cyrrhestica C: ? Demetrius ? ? Victory (285 B.C.) details Demetrius 332

Polyaenus: 49; E: 8 - At the front with a body of ? Polyaenus, picked men from the Guard 4.9.3 (Prior to Cyrrhestica) Plutarch, Demetrius 48.2 records that Seleucus attacked Demetrius ? with chariots, but he was able to SC: ? avoid their charge (Plutarch does not state what troops these chariots charged) ― ― ― ― ― C: ? ? ? Theodotus’ advice: ? - Four elephants to be sent - Theodotus tells Antiochus to against the Galatian cavalry on keep the elephants hidden the right wing; four elephants against the left wing The ‘Elephant’ until the Galatian cavalry Galatians Lucian, Galatians - Eight elephants to be sent Victory Victory E: 16 charge; however, the flee before Zeuxis 8-11 (Ca. 270’s B.C.) against the chariots in the Galatians could still see the centre the battle elephants before they were Reality: within bowshot - The Galatians flee, and the elephants trample the enemy ― ― ―

333

― ― ― - Cavalry on the wings - Cavalry reserve ordered to C: ? - Reserve cavalry behind both encircle the enemy wings - Both wings attack - In front of the main line Molon (πρὸ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐν E: 10 ? Against Against διαστήμασι κατέστησε, another Polybius, Victory Molon Polybius, 5.53.5) Seleucid 5.53-4 (220 B.C.) ― ― ― army SC: Molon Molon: in front of the main line has an (προεβάλετο τῆς δυνάμεως ? unknown ἐν διαστάσει, Polybius, number 5.53.10) ― ― ― Cavalry on the wings: - On the right: 2,000 under - Antiochus charges the Antipater, then 2,000 ‘at an Ptolemaic left wing and pursues it off the field, exposing the Polybius, Raphia C: 6,000 Ptolemy angle’ (ἐν ἐπικαμπίῳ, Defeat (217 B.C.) phalanx 5.79-85 Polybius 5.82.9) - Left wing cavalry is pushed - On the left: 2,000 under back, exposing the phalanx Themison

334

Elephants attack first - Elephants charge the Ptolemaic In front of the wings: elephants and engage some of - 60 elephants under Philip in them, predominantly on the E: 102 front of the right wing Seleucid right - 42 elephants in front of the - Antiochus’ Indian elephants left wing under Myïcus push Ptolemy’s Africans back, especially on the Ptolemaic left wing ― ― ― ― ― ― ? - Antiochus calls on ‘2,000 of his cavalry who were ? accustomed to fight round - The cavalry withstand the first him’ (παρακαλέσας τοὺς Bactrian attack, but start to have difficulties with the περὶ αὐτὸν εἰθισμένους second and third attacks until Not the full Polybius, Tapuria C: ? Euthydemus κινδυνεύειν τῶν ἱππέων Victory (Ca. 208 B.C.) the infantry arrives army 10.49 , Polybius, δισχιλίους - The ‘royal cavalry’ (βασιλέως 10.49.7) ἱππεῖς) kill many of the - The rest form up in the enemy, and make many others ‘usual order’ ( τὰς prisoners before withdrawing εἰθισμένας τάξεις, Polybius, 10.49.8)

335

― ― ― ― ― ― ― ― ― Two arenas inferred North: There are difficulties in - Cataphracts under reconstructing the battle due to the Antiochus’ youngest son on complications of Polybius’ account the right wing, occupying North: the high ground - The cataphracts charge and rout - ‘Tarentines’ in front of the the Aetolian cavalry on the Two arenas Ptolemaic phalanx, next to the Ptolemaic left separated Army by the river Polybius, Panion C: ? elephants - The cataphracts then attack the Victory (200 B.C.) (under are inferred 16.18-9 - Companions in the centre Ptolemaic phalanx in its Scopas) for this flank/rear at the same time the with the king, behind the battle elephants elephants attack its front - Unspecified cavalry on the South: ? left wing - (Presumably defensive South: protection for the phalanx’s - Inferred – some on either flanks) side of the phalanx?

336

North: North: - In front of the phalanx in the - The elephants charge/surround centre along with the the Ptolemaic phalanx ‘Tarentines’. The spaces South: E: ? between the elephants are - The Seleucid phalanx retreats filled with the usual bowmen behind the elephants and slingers - The elephants act as a wall South: stopping the Aetolians and - Behind the phalanx scaring their cavalry ― ― ― ― ― ― - Behind the elephants on the The cavalry play no role in this C: 500 wing battle - On the flank of the phalanx ? Unusual and fortifications near the (Presumably defensive protection conditions; Livy, 36.15- for the flank) Thermopylae sea, with their guards (Livy, topography 19; Appian, E: 6 Rome Defeat (191 B.C.) 36.18.4 says this is the right unsuitable Syriaca 17- (In the retreat, the elephants impede wing; Appian Syriaca 18 has for cavalry 20 the infantry and scare the cavalry’s warfare them on the left) horses – Livy, 36.19.4-5) ― ― ― ― ― ― Right: - Antiochus charges with the Livy, 37.39- cavalry on the right wing and 42; Appian, C: 12,000 - 3,000 cataphracts and the Magnesia Rome routs the opposing Latin ala, Defeat Syriaca 32- (190 B.C.) (12,200) 1,000 Agema under pursuing it to the Roman’s 5; Antiochus between the camp (Justin, 337

centre and the Argyraspides - The cataphracts on the left are 31.8; - 1,200 Dahae on the wing thrown into confusion by the Florus, Left: scythed chariots. Eumenes then Epitomata - 3,000 cataphracts and the charges into their exposed 1.24.16-8; flank, causing the Seleucid left Zonaras, 1,000 Companions on the wing to collapse 9.20 A-C) flank, next to the centre - ‘Tarentines’ and 2,500 Galatian cavalry on the wing - 22 elephants part of the main - The elephants do not scare or line in the centre: two deter the Romans (Livy, elephants separating each of 37.42.5) the ten phalanx divisions; - As the battle progresses, the (Appian’s arrangement in infantry forms a square Syriaca 32 differs, but is formation with the elephants in incorrect) the centre. Eventually the - 16 elephants in reserve elephants become behind the right wing unmanageable, putting their E: 54 - 16 elephants on the extreme own phalanx to flight (Appian, left wing Syriaca 35) - ( onaras’ dispositions are - (Zonaras has them thrown into vague and other than the confusion by the retreat of the agreement over the position chariots, this is not impossible of the chariots, we should on the Seleucid left, but we not prefer his account over should not prefer his account Livy and Appian) over those of Livy and Appian)

338

- Appian, Syriaca 32: ‘to begin the battle, with orders to retire after the first onset’ (προπολεμεῖν τοῦ μετώπου... καὶ εἴρητο αὐτοῖς μετὰ τὴν πρώτην SC: ? πεῖραν ὑποχωρεῖν) We cannot - In front on the cavalry on the - Eumenes orders his light troops accept left wing to attack the scythed chariots Florus’ with missiles, throwing them figures into confusion as the horses bolt in various directions. This confusion spreads to the camels, other auxiliary troops, and cataphracts on the left wing, ultimately leading to its collapse CA: ? - In front of the cavalry on the We cannot - Thrown into confusion by accept left wing, next to the scythed Eumenes’ attack on the chariots Florus’ chariots figures - 500 cavalry around each Debated I Maccabees, Beth- Judas elephant validity of 6.28-47; (II C: 5,000 ? Victory Zechariah Maccabaeus - Cavalry on the wings of the the battle Maccabees, (162 B.C.) main force intended to accounts 13.1); 339

protect the phalanx Josephus, Bellum - Distributed among the ? - Given wine before the battle (I Judaicum phalanx, in the centre, each E: 8? Maccabees, 6.34) 1.41-6, (Debated) surrounded by 1,000 infantry - Eleazar allegedly kills the lead Antiquitates and 500 cavalry elephant Judaicae 12.369-75 ― II Maccabees, 13.2 claims that there were 300 scythed ― ― chariots in the army prior to the battle, but this is unlikely ― ― ― - Cavalry unusually do not attack I first Maccabees, - Cavalry on the wings Judas - Bacchides uses a sham retreat Not the full 9.4-22; Elasa C: 2,000 - Skirmishing cavalry in front Victory (160 B.C.) Maccabaeus with his right wing cavalry to army Josephus, of main lines draw Judas Maccabaeus away Antiquitates from the battle Judaicae 340

- The left wing cavalry leave the 12.420-31 main battle to help trap Judas Maccabaeus between the two cavalry forces ― ― ― ― ― ― ― ― ―

341

APPENDIX 4 Seleucid Cavalry Tactics

Table 4.1. Cavalry Tactics Summary

Tactics Battles Sources Inferred – Plutarch, Demetrius Ipsus (301 B.C.) 29.3 Against Molon (220 B.C.) Polybius, 5.53.2, 5.53.4 Raphia (217 B.C.) Polybius, 5.82.9, 5.82.11 Panion (200 B.C.) Polybius, 16.18.6 Cavalry on the Magnesia (190 B.C.) Livy, 37.40; Appian, Syriaca flanks (Light cavalry only) 32 I Maccabees, 6.38; Josephus, Beth-Zechariah (162 B.C.) Antiquitates Judaicae 12.371 I Maccabees, 9.11-12; Elasa (160 B.C.) Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.426 Cavalry next to the Livy, 37.40.5-6, 37.40.11; Magnesia (190 B.C.) centre Appian, Syriaca 32 Panion (200 B.C.) Cavalry in the centre Polybius, 16.18.7 (Companions and ‘Tarentines’) Against Molon (220 B.C.) Polybius, 5.53.5 Cavalry held in Livy, 36.18.4; Appian, Syriaca reserve Thermopylae (191 B.C.) 18 Ipsus (301 B.C.) Plutarch, Demetrius 29.3 Against Molon (220 B.C.) Polybius, 5.54.1-2 Raphia (217 B.C.) Polybius, 5.84.4, 5.85.1-4 Cavalry attack first Tapuria (ca. 208 B.C.) Polybius, 10.49.7 Panion (200 B.C.) Polybius, 16.18.8 Livy, 37.42.7ff.; Appian, Magnesia (190 B.C.) Syriaca 34; Zonaras, 9.20 Cavalry attack after I Maccabees, 9.12; Josephus, Elasa (160 B.C.) the phalanx Antiquitates Judaicae 12.427-8 Raphia (217 B.C.) Polybius, 5.84.8, 5.85.7-12 Charge and pursuit Livy, 37.42.7-45.6; Appian, as an offensive Magnesia (190 B.C.) strategy Syriaca 34, 36; Zonaras, 9.20 Demetrius at Ipsus (301 B.C.) Plutarch, Demetrius 29.3 Ipsus (301 B.C.) Plutarch, Demetrius 29.3 Sham Retreat I Maccabees, 9.14-18; Elasa (160 B.C.) Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae 12.429-30

342

Table 4.2. Visible Evidence of the Tripartite Division

Tripartite Tripartite Battles Division of Division of Notes Cavalry Present Infantry Present Very few details regarding the troops present – cavalry Ipsus ? ? (presumably heavy) and (301 B.C.) light/skirmishing cavalry; phalanx; light infantry? Companions, ξυστοφόροι Probably cavalry, and unspecified Against (though no clear reserve cavalry; the Agema Possibly Molon mention of the are not mentioned, but note (220 B.C.) Argyraspides) that the Companions are conspicuously not stationed with the king in this battle The cavalry are not distinguished beyond the Raphia ? X Guard, but the presence of (217 B.C.) both reserve and ‘non- regular’ cavalry is possible Very few details in Polybius; Tapuria ― ― (Ca. 208 B.C.) not the full Seleucid army No explicit mention of the Agema, but their absence is unlikely; no specification of ? Panion X the infantry beyond the (200 B.C.) Probably phalanx, but it is it likely that the Argyraspides and some ‘non-regulars’ were present Unusual circumstances; very Thermopylae ? ? few specifics regarding the (191 B.C.) troops present Magnesia X X (190 B.C.) Very few specifics regarding Beth- the troops present (both light Zechariah ? ? and heavy cavalry present; (162 B.C.) both the phalanx and other ‘infantry’ present) Most of the army with Elasa ― ― Demetrius, so it is likely the (160 B.C.) Guard were absent

Notes:  In accordance with the analysis of Chapter 4, this table does not include the Seleucids’ unconventional units present in these battles.

343

APPENDIX 5 Unconventional weapons

Table 5.1. Battle Checklist

Battle Elephants Camels Chariots Notes Sources Plutarch, Allied Army; Demetrius 29; Ipsus X ― X no details for (301 B.C.) Diodorus, the chariots 20.113.4, 21.1.2 X (Prior to Plutarch, Cyrrhestica) Cyrrhestica X ― Demetrius 49; (285 B.C.) ― Polyaenus, 4.9.3

The ‘Elephant Galatians Lucian, Zeuxis X ― ― Victory’ flee before 8-11 (Ca. 270’s B.C.) the battle X Against (Molon’s another Against Molon X ― army) Polybius, 5.53-4 (220 B.C.) ― Seleucid army Polybius, 5.79- Raphia X ― ― (217 B.C.) 85 Not the full Tapuria ― ― ― Polybius, 10.49 (Ca. 208 B.C.) army Polybius, 16.18- Panion X ― ― (200 B.C.) 9 Livy, 36.15-9; Unusual Thermopylae X ― ― Appian, Syriaca (191 B.C.) conditions 17-20 Livy, 37.39-42; Appian, Syriaca 32-5; Magnesia X X X (Justin, 31.8; (190 B.C.) Florus, Epitomata 1.24.16-8; Zonaras, 9.20 A- C) I Maccabees, 6.28-47; (II Debated Maccabees, validity of Beth-Zechariah X ― ― 13.1); Josephus, (162 B.C.) the battle Bellum accounts Judaicum 1.41- 6, Antiquitates

344

Judaicae 12.369-75 I Maccabees, 9.4-22; Not the full Josephus, Elasa ― ― ― (160 B.C.) army Antiquitates Judaicae 12.420-31

Table 5.2. Evidence of Combined Arms?

Evidence of Battle Notes Combined Arms? The Seleucids’ clearest and most successful Ipsus X (301 B.C.) combined use of elephants, cavalry and infantry Cyrrhestica ? Very few details (285 B.C.) The Galatians flee before the battle; if Lucian’s presentation of Theodotus’ advice is reliable, the ‘Elephant elephants were intended to neutralise the Galatian ? Victory’ cavalry, suggesting some possible supportive (270’s? B.C.) action intended to improve the standard cavalry’s effectiveness Against Very few details, other than the surrender of ? Molon Molon’s forces (220 B.C.) The Seleucid elephants on the right wing attacked the opposing Ptolemaic elephants, driving them back. This was combined with Antiochus’ cavalry Raphia X (217 B.C.) charge, along with the mercenary infantry stationed alongside him on this wing, whilst the left wing and centre held the Seleucid line Tapuria ― ― (Ca. 208 B.C.) The cataphracts stationed on the Seleucid right wing in the northern arena defeated the opposing Ptolemaic cavalry. The elephants in the north attacked the Ptolemaic centre, whilst the victorious Panion X Seleucid cataphracts turned back to surround the (200 B.C.) Ptolemaic phalanx. Meanwhile, in the southern arena, the elephants there acted as an impenetrable wall, creating a stalemate, allowing the decisive action to happen in the north Thermopylae ? Unusual circumstances; few details (191 B.C.)

345

Intended? No details given for the elephants in the battle beyond their place in the infantry square as the battle progressed, and the subsequent confusion they caused when they became unmanageable. The Magnesia ? (190 B.C.) swift collapse of the Seleucid left wing hinders analysis of the scythed chariots and camel-archers, although it is possible that there was some potential intended use of combined arms here (see Chapter 5.3.3, 5.4.3) Intended? Very few specifics for this battle, along with the Beth- debated validity of the various battle accounts in Zechariah ? our ancient sources; however, if we accept the (162 B.C.) alleged ‘mini-formations’, these potentially indicate the intention for some sort of coordination between the various Seleucid troops Elasa ― ― (160 B.C.)

Notes:  In accordance with the focus of Chapter 5, this table concerns only the operation of the Seleucids’ unconventional mounted units in conjunction with their cavalry. The operation solely of infantry units in conjunction with the standard cavalry is not addressed here.

Table 5.3. Ratios Key: I = Infantry C = Cavalry; E = Elephants; SC = Scythed Chariots; CA = Camel- Archers

Ratio to Ratio % of the Cavalry Battle I C E SC CA to Mounted and Cavalry Troops Infantry E: E: E: 3.6% 26.3:1 186.3:1 (2.6%?) (37.5:1?) (197.5:1?) Ipsus 10,500 SC: SC: SC: 64,000 400? 120 ― (301 B.C.) (15,000?) 87.5:1 620.8:1 1.1% Allied army (125:1?) (658.3:1?) (0.8%?) TOTAL: TOTAL: TOTAL: 20.2:1 143.3:1 4.7% (28.9:1?) (151.9:1?) (3.4%?)

346

Cyrrhestica ? ? 8 ― ― ? ? ? (285 B.C.) ‘Elephant Victory’ ? ? 16 ― ― ? ? ? (Ca. 270’s B.C.) Against Molon ? ? 10 ― ― ? ? ? (220 B.C.) Raphia 62,000 6,000 102 ― ― 58.8:1 666.6:1 1.7% (217 B.C.) Tapuria (Ca. 208 B.C.) ? ? ― ― ― ― ― ― Not the full army Panion ? ? ? ― ― ? ? ? (200 B.C.) Thermopylae (191 B.C.) 10,000 500 6 ― ― 83.3:1 1,750:1 1.2% Unusual circumstances E: E: 222.2:1 1,333.3:1 E: 0.4% (225.9:1 (1,353.7: (0.4%?) 60,000 12,000 ?) 1?) Magnesia 54 ? ? (190 B.C.) (60,900?) (12,200?) SC: ? SC: ? SC: ? CA: ? CA: ? CA: ? TOTAL: TOTAL: TOTAL: ? ? ? Beth- Zechariah 50,000 5,000 8 ― ― 625:1 6,875:1 0.2% (162 B.C.) Elasa (160 B.C.) 20,000 2,000 ― ― ― ― ― ― Not the full army

Notes:  The average percentage of the Seleucids’ unconventional units in relation to the mounted troops is 1.6% (1.4%?). The average percentage of the Seleucids’ unconventional units in relation to the army as a whole is 0.2%.

347

Tables 5.4-6. Seleucid Battle Tactics

Table 5.4. Elephants

Cross-over Tactics Battles Sources with Cavalry Roles Elephants in Inferred – Diodorus, Ipsus (301 B.C.) Similar, plus front of the 21.1.2 extra flexibility main line Polybius, 5.82.8, Raphia (217 B.C.) for the cavalry Flanks 5.82.13 Polyaenus, 4.9.3 Cyrrhestica (285 B.C.) (Seleucus’ stratagem) Elephants in Polybius, 5.53.4 Some cross-over front of the Against Molon? (220 (Front certainly, but with protecting main line B.C.) centre?) the phalanx Centre Polybius, 16.18.7, Panion (200 B.C.) 16.18.10 Livy, 36.18.4; Elephants as Thermopylae (191 B.C.) Appian, Syriaca 18 part of the line Same On the left flank – Flanks Magnesia (190 B.C.) Livy, 37.40.14 Similar to the Livy, 37.40.1-2; Magnesia (190 B.C.) heavy cavalry on Appian, Syriaca 32 the right Elephants as Some potential part of the line I Maccabees, 6.35; coordination Centre Beth-Zechariah (162 (Josephus, (though cavalry B.C.) Antiquitates supporting the Judaicae, 12.371) elephants) Inferred – Plutarch, Complement – Ipsus (301 B.C.) Demetrius 29.3 combined arms Inferred (southern Panion (200 B.C.) arena) – Polybius, Elephants 16.19.1-4 behind the Behind the right wing main line – Livy, 37.40.6-7 Magnesia (190 B.C.) Kept in the centre of the infantry’s square formation – Appian, Syriaca 35 Elephants ‘Elephant Victory’? (ca. Intention? – Lucian,

kept hidden 270’s B.C.) Zeuxis 9 Inferred – Diodorus, Ipsus (301 B.C.) Elephants 21.1.2 Similar attack first Against Molon? (220 Inferred – Polybius, B.C.) 5.53.4

348

Raphia (217 B.C.) Polybius, 5.84.1 Inferred – Polybius, Panion? (200 B.C.) 16.18.7, 16.18.10 Plutarch, Demetrius Complement – Ipsus (301 B.C.) Elephants held 29.3 combined arms back to attack Inferred (southern later Panion? (200 B.C.) arena) – Polybius, 16.19.1 Elephants Similar Ipsus (301 B.C.) Diodorus, 21.1.2 charge/engage (standard other Hellenistic Raphia (217 B.C.) Polybius, 5.84.1-8 elephants practice) ‘Elephant Victory’ (ca. Intended – Lucian, Elephants 270’s B.C.) Zeuxis 9 charge/engage Polybius, 16.19.1, other units Panion (200 B.C.) 16.19.10 Plutarch, Demetrius Complement – Elephants Ipsus (301 B.C.) 29.3 combined arms actively used Inferred (southern to block an Panion (200 B.C.) arena) – Polybius, enemy unit 16.19.1 Plutarch, Demetrius, Ipsus (301 B.C.) Complement 29.3 – Horses ‘Elephant Victory’ (ca. Lucian, Zeuxis 9-10 – Complement 270’s B.C.) Horses; men Polybius, 5.84.2, Psychological Raphia (217 B.C.) 5.84.5, 5.85.1 – Warfare Elephants Polybius, 16.19.4 – Panion (200 B.C.) Complement Horses Not successful – Magnesia (190 B.C.) Livy, 37.42.5 Defensive Panion (200 B.C.) Polybius, 16.19.1 protection for Livy, 36.18.4; Same Thermopylae (191 B.C.) the phalanx Appian, Syriaca 18 Raphia (217 B.C.) Polybius, 5.84.7 Elephants Livy, 36.19.4-5 disrupt their Thermopylae (191 B.C.) (In the general own men confusion) Magnesia (190 B.C.) Appian, Syriaca 35

Notes:  Livy records elephants in the front of Antiochus III’s army, with an intended psychological impact on the march to Larissa (191 B.C.).

349

 Elephants are recorded in the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries (-149A) as being present in the armies of both Demetrius and Alexander Balas (150 B.C.), however, no details are preserved for the battle, except that Demetrius had 25 elephants, and the two elephant corps defeated each other.

Table 5.5. Scythed Chariots

Cross-over with Tactics Battles Sources Cavalry Roles Chariots in Livy, 37.41.8; (Appian, front of the Magnesia (190 B.C.) Syriaca 32; Zonaras, main line 9.20) Flanks Chariots in Molon’s chariots Polybius, 5.53.10 front of the against Antiochus (Likely opposite the main line (220 B.C.) elephants – centre?) Centre Intended – Appian, Syriaca 32 Chariots (Intended to attack the Magnesia (190 B.C.) Similar attack first light infantry and cavalry stationed on the Roman’s right wing) Chariots Livy, 37.41.9-42.1; disrupt their Magnesia (190 B.C.) Appian, Syriaca 33; own men Zonaras, 9.20

Notes:  Scythed chariots are recorded as being among the Allied army at Ipsus, but no details are given regarding their role in the battle (Plutarch, Demetrius 28.3; Diodorus, 20.113.4).  According to I Maccabees, 1.17, scythed chariots were allegedly present in Antiochus IV’s army during his invasion of Egypt (170 B.C.), but the validity of this is doubtful.  Scythed chariots were allegedly present in Lysias’ army prior to Beth- Zechariah (II Maccabees, 13.2), again, the validity of this is doubtful.

350

 It is unclear which of Demetrius’ troops Seleucus’ scythed chariots charged prior to Cyrrhestica (285 B.C.). Nevertheless, this charge was unsuccessful (Plutarch, Demetrius 48.2).

Table 5.6. Camels

Cross-over Tactics Battles Sources with Cavalry Roles Camels in front of the Livy, 37.40.12-13; Similar to the Magnesia (190 B.C.) main line Appian, Syriaca 32 light cavalry? Flank Camels Livy, 37.41.11; Appian, disrupt their Magnesia (190 B.C.) Syriaca 33 own men

Tables 5.7-9. Comparative Battle Tactics

Table 5.7. Elephants

Cross-over Tactics Battles Sources with Cavalry Roles Diodorus, 19.27.2, Paraitakene (317 B.C.) 19.27.4, 19.28.4, 19.29.6 Gabiene (316 B.C.) Diodorus, 19.40.3-4 Gaza (312 B.C.) Diodorus, 19.82.3 Elephants in Ipsus (301 B.C.) Diodorus, 21.1.2 front of the Same (‘dividing main line his [Hannibal’s] Flanks elephants in Polybius, 3.72.10; (Livy, front of the Trebia (218 B.C.) 21.55.2) wings, so that his flanks were doubly protected’, τὰ δὲ

351

θηρία μερίσας πρὸ τῶν κεράτων, δι᾿ ἀμφοτέρων προεβάλετο) Raphia (217 B.C.) Polybius, 5.82.7 Metaurus (207 B.C.) Polybius, 11.1.3, 11.1.7 Illipa (206 B.C.) Polybius, 11.22.1

Inferred – Livy, 28.14.4, Bagrades (203 B.C.) 28.15.5 Cynoscephalae (197 Polybius, 18.23.7; (Livy, B.C.) 33.8.3?) Gaugamela? (331 B.C.) Arrian, Anabasis 3.11.6 Arrian, Anabasis 5.15.5; Quintus Curtius, 8.14.10, Hydaspes (327/6 B.C.) (8.14.13, 8.14.22); (Diodorus, 17.84.4; Polyaenus, 4.3.22) Diodorus, 19.28.2, Paraitakene (317 B.C.) 19.28.6 Diodorus, 19.40.1, Gabiene (316 B.C.) 19.40.4 Elephants in Gaza (312 B.C.) Diodorus, 19.82.4 Some cross-over front of the Tunis (255 B.C.) Polybius, 1.33.6 with protecting main line Tagus (220 B.C.) Livy, 21.5.10 the phalanx Centre Inferred – Livy, Baecula (208 B.C.) 27.18.18 Grumentum (207 B.C.) Livy, 27.48.5, 27.48.7 Polybius, 15.11.1; Livy, Zama (202 B.C.) 30.33.4 Adrumentum Livy, 30.35.5 (aftermath of Zama) Rome vs. Macedon (200 Livy, 31.36.4 B.C.) Cynoscephalae (197 Polybius, 18.25.5; Livy, B.C.) 33.8.3 Elephants as Livy, 38.41.13 part of the Mutines against Thrace (No Numidian infantry, line (188 B.C.) however) Centre Dionysius, Antiquitates Ausculum (279 B.C.) Romanae 20.1.4 Elephants (Behind the flanks) behind the Livy, 27.14.5 main line Canusium (209 B.C.) (Elephants subsequently moved to the front)

352

Livy, 37.39.12; Appian, Magnesia (190 B.C.) Syriaca 31 Intended – Quintus Hydaspes (327/6 B.C.) Curtius, 8.14.18 Elephants Gabiene (316 B.C.) Diodorus, 19.42.1 Similar attack first Raphia (217 B.C.) Polybius, 5.84.1 Zama (202 B.C.) Polybius, 15.12.1 Elephants Ausculum (279 B.C.) Plutarch, Pyrrhus 21.6 held back to Insubria (203 B.C.) Livy, 30.18.6 attack later Pydna (168 B.C.) Livy, 44.41.3 Inferred – Diodorus, Paraitakene? (317 B.C.) 19.28.2, 19.28.4, Elephants Similar 19.29.6, 19.30 charge/ (standard engage other Gabiene (316 B.C.) Diodorus, 19.42.1,6 Hellenistic elephants Ipsus (301 B.C.) Diodorus, 21.1.2 practice) Raphia (217 B.C.) Polybius, 5.84.1-8 Arrian, Anabasis 5.17.3; Quintus Curtius, 8.14.24; Diodorus, Hydaspes (327/6 B.C.) 17.88.1 – Infantry Quintus Curtius, 8.14.18 – Intended to attack the cavalry Plutarch, Pyrrhus 17.3; Heraclea (280 B.C.) Zonaras, 8.3; Florus, Epitomata 1.13.8 Plutarch, Pyrrhus 21.5 – Ausculum (279 B.C.) Phalanx (intended but not possible) Elephants Tunis (255 B.C.) Polybius, 1.34.1 charge/ Panormus (251/0 B.C.) Polybius, 1.40.12 engage other In conjunction units Utica (240 B.C.) Polybius, 1.76.8 with the cavalry Tagis (220 B.C.) Livy, 21.5.15 Trebia (218 B.C.) Livy, 21.55.9 Canusium (209 B.C.) Livy, 27.14.5-6 Grumentum (207 B.C.) Livy, 27.48.11 Metaurus (207 B.C.) Polybius, 11.1.7-9 Livy, 30.18.6-7, Insubria (203 B.C.) 30.18.10 – Cavalry and infantry Polybius, 15.12.3-4; Zama (202) Livy, 30.33.14-15 Cynoscephalae (197 Livy, 33.9.7; Polybius,

353

B.C.) 18.25.7 Inferred for other battles where it is not explicitly stated and only one side has elephants: Beneventum (275 B.C.) Plutarch, Pyrrhus 25.4-5 Baecula (208 B.C.) Livy, 27.18.18-20 Illipa (206 B.C.) Polybius, 11.23-4.1 Bagradas (203 B.C.) Livy, 28.14-5 Mutines against Thrace Livy, 38.41.13-4 (188 B.C.) Arrian, Anabasis 5.15.4 Elephants – Elephant guard actively used Hydaspes (327/6 B.C.) intended to block to block an Craterus from crossing enemy unit the river Arrian, Anabasis 5.15.4 – Horses (intended to

block Craterus from Hydaspes (327/6 B.C.) cross the river) Arrian, Anabasis 5.15.5- 6; Quintus Curtius, Complement 8.14.23 – Horses; men Intended – Diodorus, Gaza (312 B.C.) 19.84.1 Plutarch, Pyrrhus 17.3; Florus, Epitomata 1.13.8 – Horses; Zonaras, 8.3 – Heraclea (280 B.C.) Horses; men Complement Cassius Dio 9.39.24 – Psychological Men (aftermath of Warfare Heraclea (280 B.C.)) Polybius, 1.33.9 – Men Polybius, 1.39.11-2 – Tunis (255 B.C.) Men (following Tunis (255 B.C.)) Utica (240 B.C.) Polybius, 1.74.3 – Men The Saw (238 B.C.) Polybius, 1.84.4 – Men Livy, 21.55.7; Appian, Trebia (218 B.C.) Hannibal 7; Polybius, 3.74.2 – Horses; men Canusium (209 B.C.) Intended – Livy, 27.14.5 Insubria (203 B.C.) Livy, 30.18.8 – Horses Complement Zama (202 B.C.) Intended – Livy, 30.33.4 Defensive protection Polybius, 3.72.8; Livy, Trebia (218 B.C.) Same for the 21.55.2 phalanx

354

Defensive protection Arrian, Anabasis 5.17.2 Hydaspes (326/7 B.C.) Complement for other – Cavalry units Arrian, Anabasis 5.17.5- 7; Quintus Curtius, Hydaspes (327/6) B.C. 8.14.30; Diodorus, 17.88.3 Heraclea (280 B.C.) Zonaras, 8.3 Dionysius, Antiquitates Romanae 20.12 (Night march prior to Elephants Beneventum (275 B.C.) the battle) disrupt their Plutarch, Pyrrhus 25.5; own men Zonaras, 8.6; Florus, Epitomata 1.13.12 Panormus (251/0 B.C.) Polybius, 1.40.13 Metaurus (207 B.C.) Polybius, 11.1.8-9 Canusium (209 B.C.) Livy, 27.14.10,12 Illipa (206 B.C.) Polybius, 11.24.1 Polybius, 15.12.2; Livy, Zama (202 B.C.) 30.33.12,15

Notes:  This table does not contain contemporary ancient Indian examples beyond the Hydaspes (327/6 B.C.).  Elephants in front of the force during marches, see Polybius, 1.75.3; Livy, 21.34.5.  Psychological impact: - Hannibal crossing the Alps (218 B.C.), (Polybius, 3.53.8). - Plutarch, Pyrrhus 20.2-3 notes the failed psychological impact of Pyrrhus’ elephants against Fabricius (279 B.C.).  Elephants disrupt their own men: - Not a battle: Livy, 44.5.2. - Elephants almost disrupt their own troops at Trebia (218 B.C.), but Hannibal adapts to this (Livy, 21.55.11-56). - Potential to disrupt/cause fear among own troops, see Livy, 27.18.20.

355

Table 5.8. Scythed Chariots

Cross-over Tactics Battles Sources with Cavalry Roles Xenophon, Sardis (547/6 B.C.) Chariots in Cyropaedia 7.1.28 Positioned with front of the Arrian, Anabasis some cavalry main line 3.11.6-7; Quintus Gaugamela (331 B.C.) units Flanks Curtius, 4.12.6, 4.12.9, 4.12.13 Xenophon, Sardis (547/6 B.C.) Cyropaedia 7.1.16 Xenophon, Anabasis Chariots in Cunaxa (401 B.C.) front of the 1.8.10

main line Dascyleium (395 Xenophon, Hellenika Centre B.C.) 4.1.18 Arrian, Anabasis Gaugamela (331 B.C.) 3.11.6 Chariots Quintus Curtius, behind the Gaugamela (331 B.C.) 4.12.10 main line Intended – Xenophon, Sardis (547/6 B.C.) Cyropaedia 7.1.9 Chariots Diodorus, 17.58.2; Similar attack first (Quintus Curtius, Gaugamela (331 B.C.) 4.15.3; Arrian, Anabasis 3.11.13) Xenophon, Anabasis Cunaxa (401 B.C.) 1.8.10 Xenophon, Hellenika Dascyleium (395 4.1.19 (Light infantry, Chariots B.C.) attack not in formation) infantry Arrian, Anabasis 3.13.5; Diodorus, Gaugamela (331 B.C.) 17.58.4-5; Quintus Curtius, 4.15.3-4, 4.15.14-7 Diodorus, 17.58.2 – Psychological Gaugamela (331 B.C.) Men; (contra Arrian, warfare Anabasis 3.11.5-6) Xenophon, Anabasis Chariots Cunaxa (401 B.C.) disrupt their 1.8.20 own men Gaugamela (331 B.C.) Diodorus, 17.58.4

356

Notes:  Mithradates had scythed chariots at Chaeronea (89 B.C.), but there are very few details about their use in this battle (Plutarch, Sulla 18.2).  The Galatians allegedly had scythed chariots at the ‘Elephant Victory’ (ca. 270’s B.C.), which, according to Lucian (Zeuxis 8-10) they integrated within their main line. The chariots, however, disrupted their own men in the general confusion when they fled from Antiochus I’s elephants. The validity of these Galatian chariots having scythes, however, is unlikely (see Chapter 5.3).

Table 5.9. Camels

Cross-over with Tactics Battles Sources Cavalry Roles Camels in Complement (see front of the Sardis (547/6 B.C.) Herodotus, 1.80.2 psychological main warfare below) line/force Camels at the Xenophon, Cyropaedia Positioned with back of the Sardis (547/6 B.C.) 6.33; (Herodotus, 1.80.2) some cavalry baggage train Xenophon, Cyropaedia Psychological 6.2.18, 7.1.22, 7.1.27, Sardis (547/6 B.C.) Complement warfare 7.1.48; Herodotus, 1.80.4- 5 – Horses

Notes:  Herodotus, 7.184.4 records the presence of Arabian camel-archers in the Achaemenid army at Thermopylae (480 B.C.).

357