Windows Poster 20-12-2013 V3
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NTFS • Windows Reinstallation – Bypass ACL • Administrators Privilege – Bypass Ownership
Windows Encrypting File System Motivation • Laptops are very integrated in enterprises… • Stolen/lost computers loaded with confidential/business data • Data Privacy Issues • Offline Access – Bypass NTFS • Windows reinstallation – Bypass ACL • Administrators privilege – Bypass Ownership www.winitor.com 01 March 2010 Windows Encrypting File System Mechanism • Principle • A random - unique - symmetric key encrypts the data • An asymmetric key encrypts the symmetric key used to encrypt the data • Combination of two algorithms • Use their strengths • Minimize their weaknesses • Results • Increased performance • Increased security Asymetric Symetric Data www.winitor.com 01 March 2010 Windows Encrypting File System Characteristics • Confortable • Applying encryption is just a matter of assigning a file attribute www.winitor.com 01 March 2010 Windows Encrypting File System Characteristics • Transparent • Integrated into the operating system • Transparent to (valid) users/applications Application Win32 Crypto Engine NTFS EFS &.[ßl}d.,*.c§4 $5%2=h#<.. www.winitor.com 01 March 2010 Windows Encrypting File System Characteristics • Flexible • Supported at different scopes • File, Directory, Drive (Vista?) • Files can be shared between any number of users • Files can be stored anywhere • local, remote, WebDav • Files can be offline • Secure • Encryption and Decryption occur in kernel mode • Keys are never paged • Usage of standardized cryptography services www.winitor.com 01 March 2010 Windows Encrypting File System Availibility • At the GUI, the availibility -
Using Remote Desktop Services with Ifix 1
Proficy iFIX 6.5 Using Remote Desktop Services GE Digital Proficy Historian and Operations Hub: Data Analysis in Context 1 Proprietary Notice The information contained in this publication is believed to be accurate and reliable. However, General Electric Company assumes no responsibilities for any errors, omissions or inaccuracies. Information contained in the publication is subject to change without notice. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form, or stored in a database or retrieval system, or transmitted or distributed in any form by any means, electronic, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of General Electric Company. Information contained herein is subject to change without notice. © 2021, General Electric Company. All rights reserved. Trademark Notices GE, the GE Monogram, and Predix are either registered trademarks or trademarks of General Electric Company. Microsoft® is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation, in the United States and/or other countries. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. We want to hear from you. If you have any comments, questions, or suggestions about our documentation, send them to the following email address: [email protected] Table of Contents Using Remote Desktop Services with iFIX 1 Reference Documents 1 Introduction to Remote Desktop Services 2 Using iClientTS 2 Understanding the iFIX and Remote Desktop Services 3 File System Support 5 Where to Find More Information on Remote Desktop Services 5 Getting -
Active @ UNDELETE Users Guide | TOC | 2
Active @ UNDELETE Users Guide | TOC | 2 Contents Legal Statement..................................................................................................4 Active@ UNDELETE Overview............................................................................. 5 Getting Started with Active@ UNDELETE........................................................... 6 Active@ UNDELETE Views And Windows......................................................................................6 Recovery Explorer View.................................................................................................... 7 Logical Drive Scan Result View.......................................................................................... 7 Physical Device Scan View................................................................................................ 8 Search Results View........................................................................................................10 Application Log...............................................................................................................11 Welcome View................................................................................................................11 Using Active@ UNDELETE Overview................................................................. 13 Recover deleted Files and Folders.............................................................................................. 14 Scan a Volume (Logical Drive) for deleted files..................................................................15 -
Feature Description
NTLM Feature Description UPDATED: 19 March 2021 NTLM Copyright Notices Copyright © 2002-2021 Kemp Technologies, Inc. All rights reserved. Kemp Technologies and the Kemp Technologies logo are registered trademarks of Kemp Technologies, Inc. Kemp Technologies, Inc. reserves all ownership rights for the LoadMaster and Kemp 360 product line including software and documentation. Used, under license, U.S. Patent Nos. 6,473,802, 6,374,300, 8,392,563, 8,103,770, 7,831,712, 7,606,912, 7,346,695, 7,287,084 and 6,970,933 kemp.ax 2 Copyright 2002-2021, Kemp Technologies, All Rights Reserved NTLM Table of Contents 1 Introduction 4 1.1 Document Purpose 6 1.2 Intended Audience 6 1.3 Related Firmware Version 6 2 Configure NTLM Authentication 7 2.1 Configure Internet Options on the Client Machine 7 2.2 Configure the LoadMaster 11 2.2.1 Enable NTLM Proxy Mode 13 2.2.2 Configure the Server Side SSO Domain 13 2.2.3 Configure the Client Side SSO Domain 15 2.2.4 Configure the Virtual Service 15 2.3 Configure Firefox to Allow NTLM (if needed) 17 2.4 Troubleshooting 18 References 19 Last Updated Date 20 kemp.ax 3 Copyright 2002-2021, Kemp Technologies, All Rights Reserved NTLM 1 Introduction 1 Introduction NT LAN Manager (NTLM) is a Windows Challenge/Response authentication protocol that is often used on networks that include systems running the Windows operating system and Active Directory. Kerberos authentication adds greater security than NTLM systems on a network and provides Windows-based systems with an integrated single sign-on (SSO) mechanism. -
Microsoft Patches Were Evaluated up to and Including CVE-2020-1587
Honeywell Commercial Security 2700 Blankenbaker Pkwy, Suite 150 Louisville, KY 40299 Phone: 1-502-297-5700 Phone: 1-800-323-4576 Fax: 1-502-666-7021 https://www.security.honeywell.com The purpose of this document is to identify the patches that have been delivered by Microsoft® which have been tested against Pro-Watch. All the below listed patches have been tested against the current shipping version of Pro-Watch with no adverse effects being observed. Microsoft Patches were evaluated up to and including CVE-2020-1587. Patches not listed below are not applicable to a Pro-Watch system. 2020 – Microsoft® Patches Tested with Pro-Watch CVE-2020-1587 Windows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability CVE-2020-1584 Windows dnsrslvr.dll Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability CVE-2020-1579 Windows Function Discovery SSDP Provider Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability CVE-2020-1578 Windows Kernel Information Disclosure Vulnerability CVE-2020-1577 DirectWrite Information Disclosure Vulnerability CVE-2020-1570 Scripting Engine Memory Corruption Vulnerability CVE-2020-1569 Microsoft Edge Memory Corruption Vulnerability CVE-2020-1568 Microsoft Edge PDF Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2020-1567 MSHTML Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2020-1566 Windows Kernel Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability CVE-2020-1565 Windows Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability CVE-2020-1564 Jet Database Engine Remote Code Execution Vulnerability CVE-2020-1562 Microsoft Graphics Components Remote Code Execution Vulnerability -
Using a Remote Desktop Connection with Filemaker Pro 12 © 2007–2012 Filemaker, Inc
FileMaker® Pro 12 Using a Remote Desktop Connection with FileMaker Pro 12 © 2007–2012 FileMaker, Inc. All Rights Reserved. FileMaker, Inc. 5201 Patrick Henry Drive Santa Clara, California 95054 FileMaker and Bento are trademarks of FileMaker, Inc. registered in the U.S. and other countries. The file folder logo and the Bento logo are trademarks of FileMaker, Inc. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners. FileMaker documentation is copyrighted. You are not authorized to make additional copies or distribute this documentation without written permission from FileMaker. You may use this documentation solely with a valid licensed copy of FileMaker software. All persons, companies, email addresses, and URLs listed in the examples are purely fictitious and any resemblance to existing persons, companies, email addresses, or URLs is purely coincidental. Credits are listed in the Acknowledgements documents provided with this software. Mention of third-party products and URLs is for informational purposes only and constitutes neither an endorsement nor a recommendation. FileMaker, Inc. assumes no responsibility with regard to the performance of these products. For more information, visit our website at http://www.filemaker.com. Edition: 01 Contents Chapter 1 Introduction to Remote Desktop Services and Citrix XenApp 4 About Remote Desktop Services 4 Remote Desktop Services server 4 Remote Desktop Services client (Remote Desktop Connection) 4 Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) 4 Benefits of using Remote Desktop Services 4 System -
Faq Av Bridge Va 999 821
Contents 1 Vaddio IP Streaming Features and Functionality................................................................................. 2 1.1 Frequently Asked Questions ........................................................................................................ 2 1.2 Streaming Configuration.............................................................................................................. 4 1.3 Application Examples................................................................................................................... 5 1.3.1 Distribution Application (Single Stream-to-Multiple Clients)............................................... 5 1.3.2 Recording/Archive Application ............................................................................................ 6 2 Compatibility Summary ....................................................................................................................... 7 2.1 Vaddio Lab Tested Interoperability.............................................................................................. 7 2.2 Field Test Media Players or Server............................................................................................... 7 3 Media Player/Server Interoperability .................................................................................................. 8 3.1 Quicktime Media Player............................................................................................................... 8 3.2 VLC Player ................................................................................................................................. -
I Feasibility of Streaming Media for Transportation Research And
Feasibility of Streaming Media For Transportation Research and Implementation Final Report Prepared by: Drew M. Coleman July 2007 Research Project SPR-2231 Report No. 2231-F-05-11 Connecticut Department of Transportation Bureau of Engineering and Highway operations Division of Research Keith R. Lane, P.E. Director of Research and Materials James M. Sime, P.E. Manager of Research i TECHNICAL REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 1. Report No. 2. Government Accession 3. Recipients Catalog No. 2231-F-05-11 No. 4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date Feasibility of Streaming Media for July 2007 Transportation Research and 6. Performing Organization Code Implementation SPR-2231 7. Author(s) Drew M. Coleman 8. Performing Organization Report No. 2231-F-05-11 9. Performing Organization Name and 10. Work Unit No. (TRIS) Address 11. Contract or Grant No. Connecticut Department of Transportation CT Study No. SPR-2231 Division of Research 13. Type of Report and Period Covered 280 West Street Final Report Rocky Hill, CT 06067-3502 February 2001-June 2007 12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address Connecticut Department of Transportation 2800 Berlin Turnpike 14. Sponsoring Agency Code Newington, CT 06131-7546 SPR-2231 15. Supplementary Notes Conducted in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration 16. Abstract This report is intended to serve as a guide for transportation personnel in the development and dissemination of streaming video-based presentations. These were created using streaming media production tools, then delivered via network and Web-based media servers, and finally, viewed from the end-users’ PC- desktops. The study focuses on three popular streaming media technology platforms: RealNetworks®, Microsoft® and Apple®. -
Copyrighted Material
Index Note to the Reader: Throughout this index boldfaced page numbers indicate primary discussions of a topic. Italicized page numbers indicate illustrations. IUSR_computername account, 274–275 Numbers disabling, 61 mapping certificates to, 283–286 3DES, 125–126, 416, 494 user accounts, configuring for 802.1x standard (IEEE), 181–184, 494 delegation, 46 authentication for, 182 ACEs (Access Control Entries) combining VPNs with, 190 authentication for clients, 494 802.11a standard (IEEE), 494 in Discretionary Access Control List, 7 vs. 802.11b, 170 Active Directory (AD), 3, 494 802.11b standard (IEEE), 494 assigning GPO to container in, 28 for certificate store, 404 Configuration container for certificate templates, 360 A mapping certificates to accounts, 283–286 Access Control Entries (ACEs), 494 in mixed mode, 324 in Discretionary Access Control List, 7 publishing certificates through, 404–409 Access Control List (ACL), 494 in child domain, 406–409 Access Control Settings dialog box, 16 from standalone online CA, 404–406 Auditing tab, 16, 440 to view published certificates and CRLs, “Access Is Denied” error message, 420 358–359 access point, 494. See also wireless access Active Directory domain controller point (WAP) client security to traffic, 226–229 access token, 260, 494 testing, 227–229 account lockout policy, in security Active Directory domains templates, 9 Properties dialog box, General tab, 228 account logon events, tracking, 15, 445 trust relationships, 271–273, 272 account management events, tracking, 15, Active Directory object, auditing, 18 445–446 Active Directory Properties dialog box, 228 Account Policies Active Directory Sites and Services (ADSS), security template configuration, 12, 5, 494 12–14, 13 configuration, 407–408 in security templates, 9 Active Directory Users and Computers (ADUC), accountability trail, 14 COPYRIGHTED5, MATERIAL494 accounts Active Server Pages (ASP), SUS and, 111 Administrator account, renaming, 55, 56 AD. -
Jim Allchin on Longhorn, Winfs, 64-Bit and Beyond Page 34 Jim
0805red_cover.v5 7/19/05 2:57 PM Page 1 4 Scripting Solutions to Simplify Your Life Page 28 AUGUST 2005 WWW.REDMONDMAG.COM MrMr WindowsWindows Jim Allchin on Longhorn, WinFS, 64-Bit and Beyond Page 34 > $5.95 05 • AUGUST Make Room for Linux Apps Page 43 25274 867 27 Active Directory Design Disasters Page 49 71 Project1 6/16/05 12:36 PM Page 1 Exchange Server stores & PSTs driving you crazy? Only $399 for 50 mailboxes; $1499 for unlimited mailboxes! Archive all mail to SQL and save 80% storage space! Email archiving solution for internal and external email Download your FREE trial from www.gfi.com/rma Project1 6/16/05 12:37 PM Page 2 Get your FREE trial version of GFI MailArchiver for Exchange today! GFI MailArchiver for Exchange is an easy-to-use email archiving solution that enables you to archive all internal and external mail into a single SQL database. Now you can provide users with easy, centralized access to past email via a web-based search interface and easily fulfill regulatory requirements (such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). GFI MailArchiver leverages the journaling feature of Exchange Server 2000/2003, providing unparalleled scalability and reliability at a competitive cost. GFI MailArchiver for Exchange features Provide end-users with a single web-based location in which to search all their past email Increase Exchange performance and ease backup and restoration End PST hell by storing email in SQL format Significantly reduce storage requirements for email by up to 80% Comply with Sarbanes-Oxley, SEC and other regulations. -
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[MS-MSSOD]: Media Streaming Server Protocols Overview
[MS-MSSOD]: Media Streaming Server Protocols Overview This document provides an overview of the Media Streaming Server Protocols Overview Protocol Family. It is intended for use in conjunction with the Microsoft Protocol Technical Documents, publicly available standard specifications, network programming art, and Microsoft Windows distributed systems concepts. It assumes that the reader is either familiar with the aforementioned material or has immediate access to it. A Protocol System Document does not require the use of Microsoft programming tools or programming environments in order to implement the Protocols in the System. Developers who have access to Microsoft programming tools and environments are free to take advantage of them. Intellectual Property Rights Notice for Open Specifications Documentation . Technical Documentation. Microsoft publishes Open Specifications documentation for protocols, file formats, languages, standards as well as overviews of the interaction among each of these technologies. Copyrights. This documentation is covered by Microsoft copyrights. Regardless of any other terms that are contained in the terms of use for the Microsoft website that hosts this documentation, you may make copies of it in order to develop implementations of the technologies described in the Open Specifications and may distribute portions of it in your implementations using these technologies or your documentation as necessary to properly document the implementation. You may also distribute in your implementation, with or without modification, any schema, IDL's, or code samples that are included in the documentation. This permission also applies to any documents that are referenced in the Open Specifications. No Trade Secrets. Microsoft does not claim any trade secret rights in this documentation. -
Understanding the Windows SMB NTLM Authentication Weak Nonce Vulnerability
Understanding the Windows SMB NTLM Authentication Weak Nonce Vulnerability Hernan Ochoa Agustin Azubel [email protected] [email protected] Understanding the Windows SMB NTLM Authentication Weak Nonce Vulnerability Presentation goals: ‣ Describe the vulnerability in detail ‣ Explain & demonstrate exploitation • Three different exploitation methods ‣ Clear up misconceptions ‣ Determine vulnerability scope, severity and impact ‣ Share Conclusions BlackHat USA 2010 Understanding the Windows SMB NTLM Authentication Weak Nonce Vulnerability Vulnerability Information ‣ Flaws in Windows’ implementation of NTLM - attackers can access SMB service as authorized user - leads to read/write access to files, SMB shared resources in general and remote code execution ‣ Published February 2010 ‣ CVE-2010-0231, BID 38085 ‣ Advisory with Exploit Code: • http://www.hexale.org/advisories/OCHOA-2010-0209.txt ‣ Addressed by MS10-012 BlackHat USA 2010 Understanding the Windows SMB NTLM Authentication Weak Nonce Vulnerability Why talk about this vulnerability? ‣ Major 14-year old vulnerability affecting Windows Authentication Mechanism! - Basically, all Windows versions were affected (NT4, 2000, XP, 2003, Vista, 2008, 7) - Windows NT 4 released in ∼1996 - Windows NT 3.1 released in ∼1993 (∼17 years ago) - All this time, we assumed it was working correctly.. but it wasn’t... - Flew under the radar... BlackHat USA 2010 Understanding the Windows SMB NTLM Authentication Weak Nonce Vulnerability Why talk about this vulnerability? ‣ Interesting vulnerability, not your common buffer overflow - Issues in the Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) - Challenge-response protocol implementation issues - Replay attacks - Attack to predict challenges is interesting BlackHat USA 2010 Understanding the Windows SMB NTLM Authentication Weak Nonce Vulnerability Why talk about this vulnerability? ‣ There’s a lesson to be learned..