U.S. FORCES in AFRICA by Randle Steinbeck

U.S. FORCES IN AFRICA By Randle Steinbeck

INTRODUCTION

Unified Combatant “US Africa Command, with partners, counters transnational Command – a joint threats and malign actors, strengthens security forces and command of the US responds to crises in order to advance US national interests and Department of promote regional security and stability.” Defense intended to Thus reads the mission of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), one provide command of the eleven unified combatant commands, responsible for US and control for US military operations and relations in 53 African nations (excluding forces, regardless of Egypt). Home to the some of the fastest growing economies and branch of service populations in the world, Africa sits at the intersection of international commerce and adjacent to critical sea lines of communication. The US plays a unique role in ensuring access to these strategic routes remains open to all. Simultaneously, the US seeks to support safe, prosperous lives across the continent and looks to strengthen its close relationships with many African nations. Ultimately, the US has multiple strategic interests across, and Unified Combatant adjacent to, the continent and seeks to develop military, economic, Command areas of and sociopolitical ties in Africa. As General Stephen Townsend, responsibilities Commander, United States Africa Command, said before this very Wikimedia.com committee, “Simply put, a secure and stable Africa is essential for America’s security,” (Townsend 2020). Sea Lines of Beyond the inherent importance of the African continent, Africa Communication has become an arena of geostrategic competition as the world again (SLOC) – the turns towards Great Power Competition. The People’s Republic primary maritime of China (PRC) has significantly increased its presence on the routes between ports, continent, both economically and militarily. As one example, the used for trade, Chinese People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti is the logistics and naval first Chinese military base overseas, which substantially expands the forces

HARVARD MODEL CONGRESS

PRC’s ability to project power in the Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean. Great Power Competition - competition between EXPLANATION OF THE ISSUE entities powerful enough to integrate Historical Development multiple elements of Recent History of US Military in Africa national power in a coordinated effort to Prior to the creation of AFRICOM in 2007, responsibility for US challenge the military operations was spread across three separate UCCs: capabilities of the European Command for West and South Africa, Central Command United States for East Africa, and Indo-Pacific Command for the Indian Ocean and Islands off the East African coast. Following the September 11 Attacks, the US established Camp Lemonnier (the only permanent US military base in Africa) in Djibouti to house the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and in the early 2000’s, the US military Operation began establishing Cooperative Security Locations and Forward Juniper Shield - the Operating Sites across the continent. In 2007, in conjunction with military operation the creation of AFRICOM, the US began Operation Juniper conducted by the Shield in the Sahel region of Africa, consisting of counterterrorism United States and operations and the interdiction of arms and drug trafficking across partner nations in the central Africa. Sahara/Sahel region As articulated by former AFRICOM Commander GEN Thomas of Africa, consisting Waldhauser, the historical mission of AFRICOM has existed along of counterterrorism five lines of effort: efforts and policing of arms and drug 1. Neutralize al-Shabaab and transition the security trafficking across responsibilities of the African Union Mission in Somalia to the central Africa. It is Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). part of the Global 2. Degrade violent extremist organizations (VEO) in the Sahel War on Terrorism Maghreb and contain instability in Libya. (GWOT). 3. Contain and degrade Boko Haram. 4. Interdict illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa with willing and capable African partners. 5. Build peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster response capacity of African partners. (Waldhauser 2017) al-Shabaab - a terrorist, jihadist These efforts continue to form the backbone of US military efforts fundamentalist group in Africa. However, they have also evolved to reflect strategic based in East Africa priorities and on-the-ground realities. Today, the continent’s (particularly strategic environment is defined by three principle efforts: Somalia) which 1. Facilitating the security of international lines of commerce pledged allegiance to and communication. Al-Qaeda in 2012. 2. Global Power Competition. 3. Countering the Persistent Reality of VEOs.

Historically, AFRICOM has been plagued by inadequate resources since its creation in 2007. In 2015 then-AFRICOM Boko Haram - Commander General David Rodriguez testified before Congress that also known as Islamic his command operated at 13% of its requested intelligence, State in West Africa surveillance, and reconnaissance capacity and confronted difficult or the Islamic State's operational trade-offs between supporting French operations in Mali West Africa Province, and the search for the kidnapped Chibok girls in Nigeria. Currently, is a jihadist terrorist approximately $2 billion (just 0.3%, of the $700 billion Defense organization based in budget) is spend on African operations to support the roughly 6,000 northeastern Nigeria, US troops on the continent (Wilkins 2020). also active in Chad, Niger and northern Scope of the Problem Cameroon The United States needs a comprehensive continental strategy due to the very real interests the US has in Africa—and increasingly limited means through which to advance them. These interests reach far beyond the visible counterterrorism mission and zero-sum conceptions of geopolitical competition with the PRC. By 2050, one out of every four people on the planet will be African, and by 2030, continental consumer and business spending will top $6.7 trillion (Brooking 2018). Observers have dubbed the current era “Africa’s 85% of Africans democratic moment,” as political reforms across the continent have live on less than swept away autocrats and brought an end to decades-long conflict $5.50 a day. (Nobel 2019). Despite these gains, the African continent stands at a crossroads: conflicts across the region—such as those in Libya, the World Bank 2019 Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic—threaten the rule of law; environmental degradation and climate change endanger vital resources; regional terror continues to plague areas of the continent; and a host of other issues could potentially disrupt the positive trajectory of Africa. America’s broad interests in Africa—from counterterrorism, global health, democratic governance and the liberal international order, US economic strength, and supporting US allies—demand a coherent strategy which weaves these disparate threads into self-reinforcing whole. Without such a strategy, policy will remain beholden to distractions and political mood, while also being brittle and vulnerable to The landmass of setbacks. Africa is larger Africa and National Security than the United The African continent is located adjacent to multiple strategic States, China, choke points and sea lines of communication, including the India, Japan, and Mediterranean Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar on NATO’s southern all of Europe flank, the Red Sea, the Bab al Mandeb strait, and the Mozambique Channel. These routes facilitate more than one third of global combined. shipping and are vital to international commerce and US national security. Over half of the world’s agricultural land is in Africa and population and economic growth on the continent leave Africa poised to be a major driver of progress and a powerful player on the

world stage. Furthermore, 26 African nations hold reserves of minerals determined to be critical to the US economic and national security (EO 13817). Global Power Competition (China) China and Russia have both long recognized the geostrategic and economic importance of the African continent and continue to seize opportunities to expand their influence across the region. Per the National Defense Strategy, great power competition with China and Russia should be prioritized due to the unique “magnitude of the threats they pose to US security and prosperity today and the potential for those threats to increase in the future,” (2018). The US has traditionally sought constructive partnerships with African nations to help develop the economic, infrastructure, humanitarian, and security sectors of our partners. China currently outpaces all of its competitors on the continent, and with the construction of a People’s Liberation military port and helicopter facilities on its first overseas military Army (PLA) – the base in Djibouti, is developing the capacity to project power into the military of the People’s African continent as well as the Indian Ocean. Estimates suggest that Republic of China and they seek additional military bases and unprofitable Chinese seaport the Chinese Communist investments in East and Southern Africa track with the involvement Party (CCP) of the PLA. The Chinese continue to leverage economic and infrastructure projects under the Belt and Road Initiative as tools of geopolitical power. China leads its G20 partners in head of state and senior leadership visits to Africa over the last decade and during the 7th Forum On China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing in September 2018, China pledged over 60 billion USD in investments. Additionally, over the past seven years, China has sold over two billion USD in arms to African partners (Townsend 2020). As mentioned above, one avenue of influence heavily utilized by the PRC is the development of infrastructure projects across the Belt and Road African continent. Since 1966, Chinese companies have built or Initiative – a global renovated at least 186 African government buildings, including 24 development strategy offices or residences of heads of state. Of the 70 buildings for which adopted by the financing information was available, the Chinese government or a Chinese government Chinese company financed all but three, and Beijing partially or fully involving subsidized the construction costs for at least 45 of the 70 buildings infrastructure (Meservey 2020). These projects to strengthen ties appear to be development and working: African states comprised nearly half of the 37 signatories of investments in nearly a 2019 open letter defending China’s human rights abuses of its 70 countries and minority Uighur population (Putz 2019); As of 2016, 39 African international governments had publicly supported Beijing’s preferred method for organizations resolving maritime disputes sparked by China’s expansionist South

China Sea claims, in opposition to a 2016 international tribunal ruling that the United States endorsed — (Wen & Xiaochen 2016).

Global Power Competition (Russia) Russia has also sought to expand its influence across the African continent, increasing access agreements by over 200% over the past Wagner Group – a seven years and remaining the top arms dealer for the entire Russian paramilitary continent, selling over nine billion USD in arms during the same organization that period. Private military companies have served as a highly many accuse of being destabilizing influence in the region and operate as a covert tool of a unit of the Russian the Kremlin to establish a Russian military footprint in Africa and Ministry of Defense exert its influence by maintaining illiberal regimes. For instance, the that offers the Wagner Group has deployed several thousand fighters to Libya Russian government and GRU agents and special forces members have reportedly plausible deniability operated under the cover of the company. Furthermore, the group downed a U.S. unarmed, unmanned aircraft in November using a sophisticated Russian air defense system and the Kremlin has deployed fighter jets to the Al Jufra Airbase to support Wagner (Correll 2020). Beyond covert military support, Russia’s efforts to exert influence in Africa can be seen with the October 2019 Russia- GRU – the foreign Africa Summit in Sochi where all 54 African countries attended with military-intelligence over 43 Heads of State. agency of the Persistent VEOs Russian Federation and Russia’s largest Violent extremist organizations are rapidly expanding across foreign-intelligence Africa, exploiting weak governance and disenfranchisement. agency. Commands Generally, African governments see VEOs as a pressing near-term the military threat that limit their ability to effectively govern and hinder their intelligence service ability to develop. These organizations also pose a threat to U.S. and the GRU special interests, both on the African continent, abroad, and in the U.S. forces Homeland. In East Africa the primary U.S. focus has been on al- Qa’ida’s al-Shabaab, which is “the largest and most kinetically active al-Qa’ida network in the world,” (Townsend 2020). Following a series of attacks against Somali and US bases in 2019, al-Shabaab declared Americans and US interests worldwide as priority targets. Also in the east, insurgents have escalated their activities in Mozambique, with insurgents pledging bayat, or allegiance, to the local faction of the Islamic State in June 2019. Since then, attacks Nusrat al-Islam have escalated 300 percent relative to the same period in the (JNIM) – a militant previous year (ACLED 2020). As such, the Islamic State is quickly jihadist organization franchising VEOs across Africa and may become the preeminent in the Maghreb and threat to African security and US interests, as we saw in Iraq and West Africa and an Syria. Al-Qaeda affiliate In West Africa, the primary VEO threats are al-Qa’ida’s Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and ISIS networks in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin—the widely known Boko Haram is one of these networks and is formally known as the Islamic State in West Africa or the Islamic State's West Africa Province.

Congressional Action On October 3, 2018 the Senate passed the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act, better known as the BUILD Act. This piece of “legislation will transform the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) into the US International US International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC) with a budget Development of $60 billion, twice the size of OPIC’s current budget. Most Finance importantly, the USIDFC will take equity positions in investments, Corporation something that OPIC never had authority to do,” (Schneidman (USIDFC) – an 2018). This new agency will act as an essential instrument of independent agency of commercial diplomacy and will hopefully generate greater U.S. the United States business investment in Africa while making U.S. businesses more federal government competitive. On January 9, 2019, Congress passed the Women’s that provides financing Entrepreneurship and Economic Empowerment Act, which for private expanded the US Agency for International Development’s development projects (USAID) microenterprise development program to encompass small and medium sized businesses owned, operated, and controlled by women and contained provisions that attempted to reduce gender-based violence and discrimination and support the development of economic opportunities and strengthened property US Agency for rights for women. International Furthermore, when the Trump Administration expressed the Development (USAID) desire to drawdown US forces in Africa, it received strong, bipartisan – an independent agency blowback from Congress. In a letter to Secretary of Defense Esper, of the United States House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Adam Smith, federal government that and ranking member Mac Thornberry, urged the Department of is primarily responsible Defense to “carefully consider the adverse implications of reducing for administering our force posture in Africa,” cautioning that “the threat of violent civilian foreign aid and extremism and terrorism persists” in the AFRICOM area of development assistance operations. The same letter stated, “a decrease in our investment now may result in the need for the United States to reinvest at many more times the cost down the road,” and was co-signed by House Intelligence and Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee Chairman Jim Langevin and ranking member Elise Stefanik. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Jim Inhofe and Senators Lindsey Graham and Chris Coons were also quick to criticize the desire to draw down forces in Africa, making statements such as, “rather than talking about drawing down troops in Africa, we should finally assign forces to AFRICOM on an enduring basis, in order to provide the command with predictable resourcing so it can be most effective in defending US national security” (Mehta & Gould 2020).

Other Policy Action Department of Defense AFRICOM advocates for a partner-centric interagency approach with a whole-of-government model across three themes: partner for success, compete to win, and maintain pressure on malign networks (Townsend 2020). AFRICOM states that challenges on the African continent cannot be resolved solely through the application of U.S. military might. Rather, solutions emerge from a diverse network which includes African nations, strategic allies, multinational Security is a coalitions, and the full spectrum of U.S. government departments prerequisite for the and agencies. It is important to note the lessons learned in Vietnam development and and relearned in Iraq, that security is a prerequisite for the advancement of a development and advancement of a functioning society. The African continent is a contested environment, as previously functioning society. described. As such, the U.S. must compete to secure U.S. interests, while seeking areas of aligned interest with American partners and allies with which to work towards shared objectives. The Department of Defense looks to counter the actions of malign actors, as the efforts of Russia, China, and VEOs destabilize African nations and promote a disregard for human rights and inclusive economic growth that will have a negative impact on the progress Africa has recently seen. Finally, and most importantly, AFRICOM will continue to maintain pressure on malign networks with the, “principal means for applying pressure is working with African and international partners, increasing African security capabilities, information Information operations, and, only when necessary, using military force.” Operations – the Presidency integrated employment of electronic warfare, On December 13, 2018, President Trump released his Africa computer network Strategy, which is organized around three central principles: operations, psychological prosperity, through “advancing US trade and commercial ties with operations, military nations across the region to benefit both the United States and deception, and Africa;” security, through “countering the threat from radical Islamic operations security, in terrorism and violent conflict;” and stability, through foreign aid, concert with specified while ensuring that US taxpayer dollars for aid are used efficiently supporting and related (Trump 2018). capabilities, to influence, On June 5, 2020, President Trump ordered the redeployment of disrupt, corrupt or usurp approximately 9,500 U.S. troops from the 34,500 currently stationed adversarial human and in Germany. Additionally, his order would place a cap on US troops automated decision stationed in Germany at 25,000. This effects the US strategy vis-à- making vis Africa as Germany hosts US Africa Command, and any reduced presence there could undercut AFRICOM’s posture and planning (Rapp-Hooper 2020).

Conservative View Conservative views towards Africa vary, but a few common themes do emerge. Generally, the conservative viewpoint is that American tax dollars should not be widely spent overseas, except to facilitate access to economic markets for American businesses. Many believe that development work is not the business of the government and is more effective when done through private charities and businesses. Most conservatives heavily favor the use of military force on the continent against VEOs, and strongly support defeating Chinese influence on the continent. Conservatives also generally strongly support the right of religious freedom and wish to spread it, as seen by Secretary Pompeo’s initiatives.

China’s political Liberal View influence in Africa spans political There is little consensus on Africa amongst liberals. Foreign aid party training, and military actions are generally not partisan issues but break down media and digital along the lines of “Hawks” and “Doves.” Most liberals support space, and the counteracting Chinese influence and developing the capabilities of framing of allies and partners, but simultaneously attempt to seek a balance on governance norms the money spent on overseas aid and developing more robust social stimson.org safety nets domestically.

AREAS OF DEBATE

Africa is a vast continent with situations that differ from region to region and country to country. It is a theater for great power conflict and is vital to US national interests. As such, this section will China’s multibillion provide you with several broad strategies and particular points to consider and discuss. However, this fails to even scratch the surface dollar “One Belt, with regards to all the possible strategies and items of interest and One Road” leaves ample room for further exploration of ideas. initiative is central to expanding its Grand Strategy financial reach in A continent-wide approach to US interests in Africa will reflect Africa and is a the significance and diversity of the region in US eyes. But what is significant part of grand strategy? In the words of one practitioner, grand strategy their grand “refers to the collection of plans and policies that comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and strategy. economic tools together to advance that state’s national interest. Africacenter.org Grand strategy is the art of reconciling ends and means. It involves

purposive action — what leaders think and want. Such action is constrained by factors leaders explicitly recognize (for instance, budget constraints and the limitations inherent in the tools of statecraft) and by those they might only implicitly feel (cultural or cognitive screens that shape worldviews),” (Feaver 2009). As

discussed, the United States has limited means—especially in light of recent events—through which it may achieve its ends, by coordinating disparate actions these actions can reinforce one another and provide the most efficient employment of means to reach an end. Additionally, such actions typically draw from all aspects of national power, not just the military, allowing a nation to be flexible in dealing with different situations and utilizing the tools most appropriate for the job. Such a strategy would require buy in from both the broader government and the American people and is not a small commitment, we have seen leaders and average Americans do not always think in timespans suitable to large-scale engagement and multi-year efforts, and without this support any initiatives will prove fragile to headwinds and may contribute to greater disengagement from the African continent. Political Perspectives on this Solution This issue is not necessarily divided along partisan lines. Both conservatives and liberals may be wary of what might appear to be the provision of additional resources to foreign nations (even if it is not) for their own reasons. By the same logic, individuals from both sides of the political spectrum may support the development and implementation of a grand strategy, again for their own reasons. Country-by-Country Approach Some (such as The Economist) have asserted that the U.S.’s Africa China’s trade with policy may be best served by a flexible, country-by-country approach Africa has increased guided by experienced policymakers and experts (2020). Indeed, immensely over the this mirrors the Carter Administration’s policy towards Latin years. America, where Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher cfr.org stated, “the best overall policy may be a non-policy,” (2014). This flexible response would allow for a hyper-tailored response to individual situations. However, a piecemeal response risks creating an imbalance between “America’s globally strained means and ambitious regional ends,” (Wilkins 2020). The absence of a clear, coherent strategy can leave US objectives vulnerable to distraction. Additionally, without a comprehensive plan, an ad-hoc country approach would likely lack the broad congressional and public support required for the sustainability of any multi-year strategy. Finally, the United States now faces a near-peer competitor that has proven itself to be a formidable adversary. While China is not the only challenge in Africa, a strategy is likely needed to factor in Chinese activity and measure it against US interests and objectives.

Political Perspectives on this Solution Again, perspectives on this solution are not necessarily divided along partisan lines. Both conservatives and liberals may be wary of what might appear to be the provision of additional resources to foreign nations (even if it is not) for their own reasons. By the same logic, individuals from both sides of the political spectrum may support the development and implementation of an ad-hoc strategy. American global Anchoring Success Abroad to Problem Solving at Home power is rooted in American global power is rooted in the assertion of principles and the assertion of values alongside military capabilities and economic ingenuity. In principles and short, power stems not necessarily from the barrel of a gun, but from values alongside the vision of a successful nation that others wish to emulate. This is military perhaps best put by a key figure in the last great power competition capabilities and the U.S. participated in, George Kennan. In his landmark 1946 Long economic Telegram and the subsequent 1947 “X” article, Kennan stated, “This is [the] point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every ingenuity. courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués,” (1946). In a contest for influence, the United States will have a significant structural advantage in soft power—the intrinsic characteristics of liberalism have a seemingly universal appeal, seen in the rapid spread of capitalism and democracy across geographic and cultural lines. However, the challenges of this century are a crucial test for American values and are a focal point for international attention. From the 2008 financial crisis to structural racism, Americans coming together to redress injustice and creating a prosperous, inclusive economic and sociopolitical nation can reinforce American leadership across the world. However, by failing to live up to our own ideals, and failing to provide a model for which other nations strive to reach, we undermine our foreign policy objectives (e.g. Nyabola 2020; Denmark & Rojansky 2020). Many foregin Large scale structural reform is difficult and time consuming, nations see America and many may say that issues such as environmental protection, and its values as a inclusive access to opportunity, and social safety nets are not model to strive germane to the foreign affairs. Furthermore, dollars spent on towards and domestic affairs generally take away dollars from military matters. achieve. American Cultural Political Perspectives on this Solution Values Generally, foreign nations, especially our allies, have more left- leaning political spectrums than in the United States, thus conservative policies may not resonate with them, as can be seen with the current US response to the Black Lives Matter movement.

Additionally, socially liberal domestic policies may not necessarily resonate with more traditional societies, such as LGBTQ rights and some African nations. Commercial Diplomacy As we have seen, the Chinese actively utilize infrastructure projects and economic power as tools of influence on the African continent. The US too could utilize economic tools, such as a bolstered USIDFC to foster commercial development and two-way trade relations with African nations, while strengthening the transparency and free market norms that many see as critical to liberal society. The US can also reemphasize and allocate further resources to impactful American programs that benefit Africa, including the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the African Growth and Opportunity Act, Power Africa, and Feed the Future. This strategy would help establish a vested interest in maintaining positive relations with the US and demonstrate the benefits of liberal society (as opposed to the illiberal model proposed by China and Russia) while simultaneously developing economic As a centralized opportunities for American businesses in Africa. However, it is important to note that as a centralized economy, economy, China China can mobilize economic and social resources in a way that is can mobilize difficult for the US to match, and therefore might be able to economic and outperform the US in sheer number of dollars spent. social resources in Political Perspectives on this Solution a way that is difficult for the US Conservatives are often leery of foreign aid packages, as can some liberals. However, conservatives very often are in support of the to match. development of economic opportunities for U.S. businesses.

BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS

Following the COVID-19 pandemic, the American public is far less likely to support the vast Department of Defense. However, even if Americans continue to support current levels of defense spending, the monumental economic crisis already unfolding may simply prevent the US Government from affording it. Defense considerations will need to be measured against the needs of restarting the domestic economy, and increased calls for greater social safety netting must also be on the minds of many congressional members. The new social, economic, and political realities that emerge after the crisis will almost certainly require the US government to shrink the defense budget and will thus force defense leaders to make extremely tough choices regarding national security priorities and funding.

CONCLUSION

Africa is a dynamic, rapidly growing continent that is host to myriad U.S. strategic interests, but that has often been left out of the limelight. U.S. policy must counter encroaching global power competitors while also providing benefit to our partners and allies across the continent. Whether this be through a country-by-country approach or a grand strategy, disparate levers of government power—beyond the application of military force—likely need to be integrated into the operation. U.S. policy must counter encroaching global GUIDE TO FURTHER RESEARCH power competitors while also The best place to start your research is just below, in the providing benefit bibliography. You can use the sources I used in writing this briefing as starting points for your own research. There are also a lot of great to our partners and online resources that break down complex international relations allies across the topics into really digestible pieces – I would recommend the Council continent. on Foreign Relations. You also may want to create a Google News Alert for US-Africa Policy. This will alert you if Congress or the President takes any sort of substantial action relating to Africa and will help you keep up to date as the conference approaches. Finally, reading old articles from credible news sources (like the New York Times or Wall Street Journal) can help you get a sense of how US policy on and attitudes towards Africa have shifted over the past several years.

GLOSSARY

al-Shabaab – a terrorist, jihadist fundamentalist group based in East Africa (particularly Somalia) which it pledged allegiance to Al- Qaeda in 2012.

Belt and Road Initiative – a global development strategy adopted by the Chinese government involving infrastructure development and investments in nearly 70 countries and international organizations.

Boko Haram – also known as Islamic State in West Africa or the Islamic State's West Africa Province, is a jihadist terrorist organization based in northeastern Nigeria, also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon.

Great Power Competition – competition between entities powerful enough to integrate multiple elements of national power in a coordinated effort including the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power including diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military at a level that challenges the capabilities of the United States.

GRU – the foreign military-intelligence agency of the Russian Federation and Russia’s largest foreign-intelligence agency. Commands the military intelligence service and the GRU special forces.

Information Operations (IO) – the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own (JP 3-13).

Nusrat al-Islam (JNIM) – a militant jihadist organization in the Maghreb and West Africa and an Al-Qaeda affiliate.

Operation Juniper Shield – the military operation conducted by the United States and partner nations in the Sahara/Sahel region of Africa, consisting of counterterrorism efforts and policing of arms and drug trafficking across central Africa. It is part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – the military of the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Sea Lines of Communication – the primary maritime routes between ports, used for trade, logistics and naval forces.

Unified Combatant Command – a joint command of the U.S. Department of Defense intended to provide command and control for U.S. forces, regardless of branch of service. There are currently 11 UCCs, 7 geographic commands and 4 functional commands.

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – an independent agency of the United States federal government that is primarily responsible for administering civilian foreign aid and development assistance.

U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (USIDFC) – an independent agency of the United States federal

government that provides financing for private development projects.

Sahel Maghreb – the Sahel is a semi-arid zone of transition in Africa between the Sahara to the north and the Sudanian savanna to the south. The Magheb is a subregion of North Africa includes Algeria, Libya, Mauritania (part of West Africa), Morocco, and Tunisia that is effectively a western part of the Arab world and is predominantly Muslim.

Wagner Group – a Russian paramilitary organization that many accuse of being a unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense that offers the Russian government plausible deniability.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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