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U.S. FORCES in AFRICA by Randle Steinbeck

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U.S. FORCES in AFRICA by Randle Steinbeck U.S. FORCES IN AFRICA By Randle Steinbeck INTRODUCTION Unified Combatant “US Africa Command, with partners, counters transnational Command – a joint threats and malign actors, strengthens security forces and command of the US responds to crises in order to advance US national interests and Department of promote regional security and stability.” Defense intended to Thus reads the mission of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), one provide command of the eleven unified combatant commands, responsible for US and control for US military operations and relations in 53 African nations (excluding forces, regardless of Egypt). Home to the some of the fastest growing economies and branch of service populations in the world, Africa sits at the intersection of international commerce and adjacent to critical sea lines of communication. The US plays a unique role in ensuring access to these strategic routes remains open to all. Simultaneously, the US seeks to support safe, prosperous lives across the continent and looks to strengthen its close relationships with many African nations. Ultimately, the US has multiple strategic interests across, and Unified Combatant adjacent to, the continent and seeks to develop military, economic, Command areas of and sociopolitical ties in Africa. As General Stephen Townsend, responsibilities Commander, United States Africa Command, said before this very Wikimedia.com committee, “Simply put, a secure and stable Africa is essential for America’s security,” (Townsend 2020). Sea Lines of Beyond the inherent importance of the African continent, Africa Communication has become an arena of geostrategic competition as the world again (SLOC) – the turns towards Great Power Competition. The People’s Republic primary maritime of China (PRC) has significantly increased its presence on the routes between ports, continent, both economically and militarily. As one example, the used for trade, Chinese People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti is the logistics and naval first Chinese military base overseas, which substantially expands the forces HARVARD MODEL CONGRESS PRC’s ability to project power in the Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean. Great Power Competition - competition between EXPLANATION OF THE ISSUE entities powerful enough to integrate Historical Development multiple elements of Recent History of US Military in Africa national power in a coordinated effort to Prior to the creation of AFRICOM in 2007, responsibility for US challenge the military operations was spread across three separate UCCs: capabilities of the European Command for West and South Africa, Central Command United States for East Africa, and Indo-Pacific Command for the Indian Ocean and Islands off the East African coast. Following the September 11 Attacks, the US established Camp Lemonnier (the only permanent US military base in Africa) in Djibouti to house the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa and in the early 2000’s, the US military Operation began establishing Cooperative Security Locations and Forward Juniper Shield - the Operating Sites across the continent. In 2007, in conjunction with military operation the creation of AFRICOM, the US began Operation Juniper conducted by the Shield in the Sahel region of Africa, consisting of counterterrorism United States and operations and the interdiction of arms and drug trafficking across partner nations in the central Africa. Sahara/Sahel region As articulated by former AFRICOM Commander GEN Thomas of Africa, consisting Waldhauser, the historical mission of AFRICOM has existed along of counterterrorism five lines of effort: efforts and policing of arms and drug 1. Neutralize al-Shabaab and transition the security trafficking across responsibilities of the African Union Mission in Somalia to the central Africa. It is Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). part of the Global 2. Degrade violent extremist organizations (VEO) in the Sahel War on Terrorism Maghreb and contain instability in Libya. (GWOT). 3. Contain and degrade Boko Haram. 4. Interdict illicit activity in the Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa with willing and capable African partners. 5. Build peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster response capacity of African partners. (Waldhauser 2017) al-Shabaab - a terrorist, jihadist These efforts continue to form the backbone of US military efforts fundamentalist group in Africa. However, they have also evolved to reflect strategic based in East Africa priorities and on-the-ground realities. Today, the continent’s (particularly strategic environment is defined by three principle efforts: Somalia) which 1. Facilitating the security of international lines of commerce pledged allegiance to and communication. Al-Qaeda in 2012. 2. Global Power Competition. 3. Countering the Persistent Reality of VEOs. © HARVARD MODEL CONGRESS 2021 – REDISTRIBUTION OR REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 2 HARVARD MODEL CONGRESS Historically, AFRICOM has been plagued by inadequate resources since its creation in 2007. In 2015 then-AFRICOM Boko Haram - Commander General David Rodriguez testified before Congress that also known as Islamic his command operated at 13% of its requested intelligence, State in West Africa surveillance, and reconnaissance capacity and confronted difficult or the Islamic State's operational trade-offs between supporting French operations in Mali West Africa Province, and the search for the kidnapped Chibok girls in Nigeria. Currently, is a jihadist terrorist approximately $2 billion (just 0.3%, of the $700 billion Defense organization based in budget) is spend on African operations to support the roughly 6,000 northeastern Nigeria, US troops on the continent (Wilkins 2020). also active in Chad, Niger and northern Scope of the Problem Cameroon The United States needs a comprehensive continental strategy due to the very real interests the US has in Africa—and increasingly limited means through which to advance them. These interests reach far beyond the visible counterterrorism mission and zero-sum conceptions of geopolitical competition with the PRC. By 2050, one out of every four people on the planet will be African, and by 2030, continental consumer and business spending will top $6.7 trillion (Brooking 2018). Observers have dubbed the current era “Africa’s 85% of Africans democratic moment,” as political reforms across the continent have live on less than swept away autocrats and brought an end to decades-long conflict $5.50 a day. (Nobel 2019). Despite these gains, the African continent stands at a crossroads: conflicts across the region—such as those in Libya, the World Bank 2019 Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central African Republic—threaten the rule of law; environmental degradation and climate change endanger vital resources; regional terror continues to plague areas of the continent; and a host of other issues could potentially disrupt the positive trajectory of Africa. America’s broad interests in Africa—from counterterrorism, global health, democratic governance and the liberal international order, US economic strength, and supporting US allies—demand a coherent strategy which weaves these disparate threads into self-reinforcing whole. Without such a strategy, policy will remain beholden to distractions and political mood, while also being brittle and vulnerable to The landmass of setbacks. Africa is larger Africa and National Security than the United The African continent is located adjacent to multiple strategic States, China, choke points and sea lines of communication, including the India, Japan, and Mediterranean Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar on NATO’s southern all of Europe flank, the Red Sea, the Bab al Mandeb strait, and the Mozambique Channel. These routes facilitate more than one third of global combined. shipping and are vital to international commerce and US national security. Over half of the world’s agricultural land is in Africa and population and economic growth on the continent leave Africa poised to be a major driver of progress and a powerful player on the © HARVARD MODEL CONGRESS 2021 – REDISTRIBUTION OR REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED 3 HARVARD MODEL CONGRESS world stage. Furthermore, 26 African nations hold reserves of minerals determined to be critical to the US economic and national security (EO 13817). Global Power Competition (China) China and Russia have both long recognized the geostrategic and economic importance of the African continent and continue to seize opportunities to expand their influence across the region. Per the National Defense Strategy, great power competition with China and Russia should be prioritized due to the unique “magnitude of the threats they pose to US security and prosperity today and the potential for those threats to increase in the future,” (2018). The US has traditionally sought constructive partnerships with African nations to help develop the economic, infrastructure, humanitarian, and security sectors of our partners. China currently outpaces all of its competitors on the continent, and with the construction of a People’s Liberation military port and helicopter facilities on its first overseas military Army (PLA) – the base in Djibouti, is developing the capacity to project power into the military of the People’s African continent as well as the Indian Ocean. Estimates suggest that Republic of China and they seek additional military bases and unprofitable Chinese seaport the Chinese Communist investments in East and Southern Africa track with the involvement Party (CCP) of the PLA. The Chinese continue to leverage
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