The Cyprus Problem 1964-1974: the Divergent
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THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 1964-1974: THE DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES AND THE QUEST FOR SETTLEMENT THESIS Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in HISTORY Marilena Varnava INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON JANUARY 2015 DECLARATION I confirm that the work presented is my own work. Signature: Marilena Varnava 2 ABSTRACT This thesis will examine the development of the Cyprus problem from September 1964, when Galo Plaza assumed the UN Mediatory role, until July 1974, when the coup d’état and the Turkish invasion took place. Its main focus is on the internal aspects of the emerging deadlock. The efforts at peace-making will be examined in three phases: Plaza’s mediation of 1964-1965, the negotiating impasse on the island during the period 1965-1967, and finally the inter-communal talks of 1968-1974. Each of these successive phases, particularly the latter two, were inextricably interwoven with developments within the two main communities. Hence, identifying these developments will be the primary concern of the thesis. Inevitably, the role of Archbishop Makarios III, as the dominant political personality, must be taken into full account during the three phases. Starting with the most critical and hitherto under-explored period of 1964-1968, the thesis will shed light on how the de facto separation of the two communities was established and how the separate administrative and economic structures were consolidated. This divergent development of the two communities produced new realities that had to be confronted by the respective negotiators and peace-makers at all levels. Subsequently, a detailed analysis of the first round of the inter-communal talks, from 1968 until 1971, will explore how and why the two communities missed the crucial opportunity for a settlement which appeared in 1968. Although the negotiations continued until 1974, it will become evident that after 1972, the 3 implications of the internal division within the Greek-Cypriot community meant that any chance for a viable compromise settlement ‘evaporated’. Without ignoring the external aspects of the Cyprus problem, the study will argue that the burden of responsibility for the constant failures to settle the problem until 1972 lies mainly on factors produced within the island itself. Specifically, the Greek- Cypriot political leadership, as the predominant force on the island, crucially failed to grasp the nature of the changes within the island’s post-independence arena, and hence to adapt their goals accordingly. Recurrent attempts within both communities to create faits accomplis favourable to their own bargaining positions before being prepared to embark on a definitive settlement, only served to heighten the barriers to a stable and peaceful outcome. This thesis will, therefore, enlarge our understanding of an underlying failure which the events of 1974 were to throw into stark relief. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... 8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................... 9 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 10 Chapter overview .................................................................................................. 15 Literature review ................................................................................................... 18 Methodology and sources ..................................................................................... 20 Historical Background ........................................................................................... 24 PART I: 1964-1967 CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................... 45 Galo Plaza Report, 1964-1965: Origins and Consequences ............................ 45 The new Mediator in Cyprus ................................................................................. 46 Lessons from Dean Acheson’s mediation of summer 1964 .................................. 48 The parties’ agendas ............................................................................................ 52 Galo Plaza measures his options .......................................................................... 61 The UN Mediator’s report ...................................................................................... 65 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 71 CHAPTER TWO .................................................................................................... 78 1964-1967: ‘Reshuffling the Deck’: The Restructuring of the State ................ 78 1960 Constitution revised: The implementation of the ‘Thirteen Points’ ................ 80 The organization of the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves ................................................. 89 The electoral law of 1965 ...................................................................................... 95 Fragile agreement on the Judiciary ..................................................................... 107 Restructuring of the security forces of the Republic of Cyprus............................ 113 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 126 5 CHAPTER THREE .............................................................................................. 128 1964-1967: The Economic Development of the Island ................................... 128 1960-1963: First years of independence ............................................................. 130 The watershed of December 1963 ...................................................................... 138 The recovery: 1965-1967 .................................................................................... 140 The socio-economic realities for Turkish-Cypriots .............................................. 146 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 154 CHAPTER FOUR ................................................................................................ 158 1965-1967: A ‘Convenient’ Negotiating Stalemate .......................................... 158 The immediate aftermath of Plaza’s report ......................................................... 159 Dynamics of the Greco-Turkish dialogue ............................................................ 166 Political realities in Cyprus at the outset of the Greco-Turkish negotiations ........ 171 Reluctance to upset the status quo ..................................................................... 179 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 203 PART II: 1968-1974 CHAPTER FIVE .................................................................................................. 210 November 1967 Crisis: A Turning Point .......................................................... 210 Background of the crisis ...................................................................................... 211 Counting ‘gains and losses’ ................................................................................ 213 New realities: January-June 1968 ....................................................................... 219 Before Local Talks:Objectives of the parties and limitations of the interlocutors . 235 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 249 CHAPTER SIX .................................................................................................... 251 Inter-Communal Negotiations, 1968-1971 ....................................................... 251 The first phase: June –August 1968 ................................................................... 252 The second phase: August-December 1968 ....................................................... 258 6 The third phase: January 1969-September 1970 ................................................ 269 The fourth phase: September 1970-September 1971 ......................................... 298 UN involvement and a new process implemented: September-December 1971 316 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 319 CHAPTER SEVEN .............................................................................................. 328 The Final Attempt: Narrowing the Constitutional Gap - Deterioration of the Political Realities ............................................................................................... 328 February 1972:An internal crisis prevents the quick resumption of the negotiations ............................................................................................................................ 329 February 1973: Presidential elections ................................................................. 333 April 1974: Ankara’s provocative statements ...................................................... 337 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 340 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................