The Cyprus Problem 1964-1974: the Divergent

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Cyprus Problem 1964-1974: the Divergent THE CYPRUS PROBLEM 1964-1974: THE DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES AND THE QUEST FOR SETTLEMENT THESIS Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in HISTORY Marilena Varnava INSTITUTE OF COMMONWEALTH STUDIES SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON JANUARY 2015 DECLARATION I confirm that the work presented is my own work. Signature: Marilena Varnava 2 ABSTRACT This thesis will examine the development of the Cyprus problem from September 1964, when Galo Plaza assumed the UN Mediatory role, until July 1974, when the coup d’état and the Turkish invasion took place. Its main focus is on the internal aspects of the emerging deadlock. The efforts at peace-making will be examined in three phases: Plaza’s mediation of 1964-1965, the negotiating impasse on the island during the period 1965-1967, and finally the inter-communal talks of 1968-1974. Each of these successive phases, particularly the latter two, were inextricably interwoven with developments within the two main communities. Hence, identifying these developments will be the primary concern of the thesis. Inevitably, the role of Archbishop Makarios III, as the dominant political personality, must be taken into full account during the three phases. Starting with the most critical and hitherto under-explored period of 1964-1968, the thesis will shed light on how the de facto separation of the two communities was established and how the separate administrative and economic structures were consolidated. This divergent development of the two communities produced new realities that had to be confronted by the respective negotiators and peace-makers at all levels. Subsequently, a detailed analysis of the first round of the inter-communal talks, from 1968 until 1971, will explore how and why the two communities missed the crucial opportunity for a settlement which appeared in 1968. Although the negotiations continued until 1974, it will become evident that after 1972, the 3 implications of the internal division within the Greek-Cypriot community meant that any chance for a viable compromise settlement ‘evaporated’. Without ignoring the external aspects of the Cyprus problem, the study will argue that the burden of responsibility for the constant failures to settle the problem until 1972 lies mainly on factors produced within the island itself. Specifically, the Greek- Cypriot political leadership, as the predominant force on the island, crucially failed to grasp the nature of the changes within the island’s post-independence arena, and hence to adapt their goals accordingly. Recurrent attempts within both communities to create faits accomplis favourable to their own bargaining positions before being prepared to embark on a definitive settlement, only served to heighten the barriers to a stable and peaceful outcome. This thesis will, therefore, enlarge our understanding of an underlying failure which the events of 1974 were to throw into stark relief. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................... 8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................................................................... 9 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 10 Chapter overview .................................................................................................. 15 Literature review ................................................................................................... 18 Methodology and sources ..................................................................................... 20 Historical Background ........................................................................................... 24 PART I: 1964-1967 CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................... 45 Galo Plaza Report, 1964-1965: Origins and Consequences ............................ 45 The new Mediator in Cyprus ................................................................................. 46 Lessons from Dean Acheson’s mediation of summer 1964 .................................. 48 The parties’ agendas ............................................................................................ 52 Galo Plaza measures his options .......................................................................... 61 The UN Mediator’s report ...................................................................................... 65 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 71 CHAPTER TWO .................................................................................................... 78 1964-1967: ‘Reshuffling the Deck’: The Restructuring of the State ................ 78 1960 Constitution revised: The implementation of the ‘Thirteen Points’ ................ 80 The organization of the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves ................................................. 89 The electoral law of 1965 ...................................................................................... 95 Fragile agreement on the Judiciary ..................................................................... 107 Restructuring of the security forces of the Republic of Cyprus............................ 113 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 126 5 CHAPTER THREE .............................................................................................. 128 1964-1967: The Economic Development of the Island ................................... 128 1960-1963: First years of independence ............................................................. 130 The watershed of December 1963 ...................................................................... 138 The recovery: 1965-1967 .................................................................................... 140 The socio-economic realities for Turkish-Cypriots .............................................. 146 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 154 CHAPTER FOUR ................................................................................................ 158 1965-1967: A ‘Convenient’ Negotiating Stalemate .......................................... 158 The immediate aftermath of Plaza’s report ......................................................... 159 Dynamics of the Greco-Turkish dialogue ............................................................ 166 Political realities in Cyprus at the outset of the Greco-Turkish negotiations ........ 171 Reluctance to upset the status quo ..................................................................... 179 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 203 PART II: 1968-1974 CHAPTER FIVE .................................................................................................. 210 November 1967 Crisis: A Turning Point .......................................................... 210 Background of the crisis ...................................................................................... 211 Counting ‘gains and losses’ ................................................................................ 213 New realities: January-June 1968 ....................................................................... 219 Before Local Talks:Objectives of the parties and limitations of the interlocutors . 235 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 249 CHAPTER SIX .................................................................................................... 251 Inter-Communal Negotiations, 1968-1971 ....................................................... 251 The first phase: June –August 1968 ................................................................... 252 The second phase: August-December 1968 ....................................................... 258 6 The third phase: January 1969-September 1970 ................................................ 269 The fourth phase: September 1970-September 1971 ......................................... 298 UN involvement and a new process implemented: September-December 1971 316 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 319 CHAPTER SEVEN .............................................................................................. 328 The Final Attempt: Narrowing the Constitutional Gap - Deterioration of the Political Realities ............................................................................................... 328 February 1972:An internal crisis prevents the quick resumption of the negotiations ............................................................................................................................ 329 February 1973: Presidential elections ................................................................. 333 April 1974: Ankara’s provocative statements ...................................................... 337 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 340 CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................
Recommended publications
  • Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues
    Order Code RL33497 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues June 27, 2006 Carol Migdalovitz Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues Summary Cyprus has been divided since 1974. Greek Cypriots, 76% of the population, live in the southern two-thirds of the island. Turkish Cypriots, 19% of the populace, live in the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC), recognized only by Turkey, with about 36,000 Turkish troops providing security. United Nations peacekeeping forces (UNFICYP) maintain a buffer zone between the two. Since the late 1970s, the U.N., with U.S. support, has promoted negotiations aimed at reuniting the island as a federal, bicommunal, bizonal republic. In recent times, the U.N. Secretary General’s April 5, 1992, “Set of Ideas” was a major, but unsuccessful, framework for negotiations for an overall settlement. Next, both sides accepted U.N. confidence-building measures only in principle and they were never recorded nor implemented. The prospect of Cyprus’s European Union (EU) accession and its eventual membership intensified and complicated settlement efforts. After five rounds of U.N.-mediated proximity (indirect) talks beginning in December 1999, Secretary General Kofi Annan presented his “observations” on substance and procedure on November 8, 2000, leading Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash to withdraw from the talks for a year. Denktash and (Greek) Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides finally met on December 4, 2001 and agreed to begin direct talks on January 16, 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • Arab Spring and Israeli Security: the New Threats
    Alternative Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3, 509-546, November 2011 509 ARAB SPRING AND ISRAELI SECURITY: THE NEW THREATS Dünya BAŞOL* ABSTRACT The aim of the article is to evaluate Israel’s security perceptions about the Arab Spring. The study argues that The Arab Spring is the reshuffling of the Middle East by re- aligned U.S.-Turkish common policies. For Israel the devil you know is more acceptable than the unknown future. Bearing in mind all the results of the surveys showing that Arabs can easily fall into radical Islam, Israel prefers not to enter such a dangerous and risky game for toppling down the old dictators and establishing new regimes. Israel could resist such a change and force U.S. to postpone or cancel their new policies if it were a decade ago, but today she is extremely isolated in international arena thanks to Bibi’s government. On the other hand, Israel struggles to counter the Turkish offenses in diplomacy, has to avoid the ―Iranian Trap‖ that is being set by Iran slowly and carefully for the past few years, and also domestically facing serious crises. All those dynamics are forcing Israel to remain silent unless it breaks the isolation that it fell, and watch carefully the games played by U.S., Turkey and Iran in the Middle East. Key words: Israeli Politics, Arab Spring, Radical Islam, Israel’s Security Perception, Iran’s Foreign Policy. ARAP BAHARI VE İSRAİL GÜVENLİĞİ: YENİ TEHDİTLER ÖZET Bu çalışmanın amacı İsrail güvenlik algısının Arap Baharına nasıl baktığını analiz etmektir. Bu çerçevede çalışma, İsrail’in güvenlik perspektifi bağlamında, Ortadoğu’da çıkan karışıklıkları bölgeye belirsizlik ve istikrarsızlık getireceği için temkinli baktığını iddia etmekte ve İsrail’in bölgedeki otoriter rejimlerin yıkılmasını, siyasal İslam tehlikesinden kendisine tehdit oluşturduğunu düşünmektedir.
    [Show full text]
  • The Gordian Knot: American and British Policy Concerning the Cyprus Issue: 1952-1974
    THE GORDIAN KNOT: AMERICAN AND BRITISH POLICY CONCERNING THE CYPRUS ISSUE: 1952-1974 Michael M. Carver A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of The requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS May 2006 Committee: Dr. Douglas J. Forsyth, Advisor Dr. Gary R. Hess ii ABSTRACT Douglas J. Forsyth, Advisor This study examines the role of both the United States and Great Britain during a series of crises that plagued Cyprus from the mid 1950s until the 1974 invasion by Turkey that led to the takeover of approximately one-third of the island and its partition. Initially an ancient Greek colony, Cyprus was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in the late 16th century, which allowed the native peoples to take part in the island’s governance. But the idea of Cyprus’ reunification with the Greek mainland, known as enosis, remained a significant tenet to most Greek-Cypriots. The movement to make enosis a reality gained strength following the island’s occupation in 1878 by Great Britain. Cyprus was integrated into the British imperialist agenda until the end of the Second World War when American and Soviet hegemony supplanted European colonialism. Beginning in 1955, Cyprus became a battleground between British officials and terrorists of the pro-enosis EOKA group until 1959 when the independence of Cyprus was negotiated between Britain and the governments of Greece and Turkey. The United States remained largely absent during this period, but during the 1960s and 1970s came to play an increasingly assertive role whenever intercommunal fighting between the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot populations threatened to spill over into Greece and Turkey, and endanger the southeastern flank of NATO.
    [Show full text]
  • The Liberation Struggle of Eoka 1955-1959 and the Chloraka Coast
    THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF EOKA 1955-1959 AND THE CHLORAKA COAST Today the Chloraka coast in Paphos is a busy tourist area. At the time of the 1955-1959 struggle for liberation, however, it was a remote deserted shoreline, and this is why it was cho- sen as the site for the secret arrival from Greece of EOKA leader George Grivas Dhigenis and for receipt of the first shipments of arms. Because of the very important events that took place here during preparations for the EOKA struggle in 1954 and the early part of 1955, the Chloraka coast and particularly the areas "Alyki", "Rodafinia" and "Vrexi" are among the most important monumental sites of the 1955-1959 struggle for freedom. It was here that the flame of freedom was lit for the first time. It was from here that the message was spread to the whole of Cyprus that the yoke of English Colonial Rule was about to be thrown off. THE CHAPEL OF SAINT GEORGE About two hundred metres from the sea, at the place known as "Alyki", where the leader Dhigenis disem- barked on 10 November 1954, Zena Gunther built the chapel of Saint George, at her own expense, in honour of the military leader. The chapel, which was later decorated with icons by George and Alexander Constantinides under the supervision of Paphos Diocese and with donations from Christians, is now an integral part of the monu- mental site on the Chloraka coast. Together with the other monumental works, it serves to perpetuate his- toric memory and to underline the Christian faith that inspired the freedom fighters of the struggle and was indissolubly linked to their love for freedom for the fatherland.
    [Show full text]
  • Propaganda War During the Peak of the Enosis Campaign: the Case of the English Edition of Halkin Sesi
    Propaganda War During the Peak of the Enosis Campaign: The Case of the English Edition of Halkin Sesi Nikolaos Stelgias,1 Magdalene Antreou2 Abstract During the second half of the 1950s, the Greek Cypriot leadership, the British colonial administration and the Turkish Cypriot community contested for the right to decide the future of the island. The local press had a unique role in this political battle as a medium for the unleashing of a fierce ‘propaganda war’. The British administration propagated its messages to the public through the local English-language press, while the Turkish Cypriot community took part in this ‘propaganda war’ through the short- lived ‘English Edition of the Halkın Sesi’, which is the object of this study. The study, which relies on archival material, finds that the second largest community of the island was not a reactionary element in Cyprus’ political field. With innovations, such as the English-language version of a propagandist newspaper, the Turkish Cypriot community emerged as a vital player in the field of the Cyprus Problem. Keywords: Cyprus Problem, propaganda, Turkish Cypriots, Halkın Sesi, English language press Introduction: Propaganda war in Cyprus’ English-language press during the peak of the Enosis campaign We have decided to publish an English edition of Halkın Sesi after serious con- sideration. The object of this English edition is to state and restate the Turkish point of view on Cyprus and counter fight the prolific Greek propaganda, which is based on falsehoods or sentiment. We feel that it is high time the English-speak- ing world has a serious look at the other side of the Cyprus coin, a side, which in modesty and due to lack of means has not been sufficiently stated so far3.
    [Show full text]
  • The Crux of the Cyprus Problem
    PERCEPTIONS JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS September - November 1999 Volume IV - Number 3 THE CRUX OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM RAUF R. DENKTAŞ His Excellency Rauf R. Denktaş is President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Anthony Nutting, who was the British Minister of State at the Foreign Office during the period 1954-56, wrote in his book I Saw for Myself his impression following talks with the leaders of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots: “There is nothing Cypriot about Cyprus except its name. In this beautiful beleaguered island you are either a Greek or a Turk. From the leaders of the two communities downwards the chasm of suspicion and hatred which separates them is frighteningly wide.”1 EOKA terrorism, which aimed to unite the island with Greece (enosis), was at its height and the Turkish Cypriots, who looked upon enosis as changing colonial masters for the worst, resisted it with every means at their disposal. Hence, the message passed on to all young Greek Cypriots was, “the struggle against the real enemy of our nation and religion, the remnants of the occupying power in Cyprus, will commence as soon as the fight for enosis comes to a successful conclusion”! Any Greek Cypriot who saw the futility and the danger of the drive for enosis, and thus supported independence as a more suitable solution, was regarded as a traitor to the national cause and murdered by EOKA (the Greek Cypriot terrorist organisation). In fact, everyone who opposed enosis was declared an enemy and lived under a constant threat. All Turkish Cypriots were against enosis! By 1957, inter-communal clashes assumed the character of a civil war.
    [Show full text]
  • Law of Thesea
    Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs Law of the Sea Bulletin No. 83 asdf United Nations New York, 2014 NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Furthermore, publication in the Bulletin of information concerning developments relating to the law of the sea emanating from actions and decisions taken by States does not imply recognition by the United Nations of the validity of the actions and decisions in question. IF ANY MATERIAL CONTAINED IN THE BULLETIN IS REPRODUCED IN PART OR IN WHOLE, DUE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN. Copyright © United Nations, 2013 Page I. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA ......................................................... 1 Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks ................................................................................................................ 1 1. Table recapitulating the status of the Convention and of the related Agreements, as at 30 November 2013 ................................................................................................................. 1 2. Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements, as at 30 November 2013 ................................................................................ 9 a. The Convention ....................................................................................................................... 9 b.
    [Show full text]
  • British Intelligence Against Eoka in Cyprus 1945-1960
    BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AGAINST EOKA IN CYPRUS 1945-1960 A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY NİHAL ERKAN IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS JULY 2019 Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences ___________________________ Prof. Dr. Tülin Gençöz Director I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. ___________________________ Prof.Dr.Oktay Tanrısever Head of Department This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. _____________________ Prof.Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı Supervisor Examining Committee Members Assoc. Prof. Dr. M. Fatih Tayfur (METU, IR) _____________________ Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı (METU,IR) _____________________ Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever (METU,IR) _____________________ Prof. Dr. Gökhan Koçer (Karadeniz Teknik Uni., ULS) _____________________ Assist. Prof.Dr. Merve Seren (Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Uni., INRE) _____________________ I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last name : Nihal Erkan Signature : iii ABSTRACT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE AGAINST EOKA IN CYPRUS, 1945-1960 Erkan, Nihal Ph.D; Department of International Relations Supervisor: Prof.Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı July 2019, 367 pages This thesis analyses the role of British intelligence activities in the fight against EOKA in Cyprus between 1945 and 1960.
    [Show full text]
  • Raymond Saner
    Book chapter in “Unfinished Business”, editor.Guy Olivier Faure, The University of Georgia Press, Atlanta, Georgia and London, 2012. Copyright with Publisher CYPRUS CONFLICT: WILL IT EVER END IN AGREEMENT? Raymond Saner ABSTRACT The goal of this chapter is to describe factors, which have contributed to the persistent failures of peace negotiations on Cyprus. In particular, the author attempts to delineate the impact which multiple and competing external stakeholders (influential foreign powers, supranational institutions, intergovernmental organizations and NGOs from various countries) have had on the peace process and how these third parties (first level GR and TR, secondary level USA, UK, EU and UNO) have used the Cyprus conflict for their own strategic aims and secondary gains by offering their influence to the two conflict parties (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots). As a result of these ongoing external stakeholders interferences, the Cyprus conflict has persisted and negotiation behavior of the primary conflict parties became characterized by opportunistic tactical maneuvers prolonging and deepening non-agreement ever since the peace enforcing presence of UN forces on the island starting in 1974 and lasting up to the writing of this article. BRIEF SUMMARY OF CYPRUS CONFLICT 2002-JANUARY 2006 1,2 In January 2002, direct talks under the auspices of Secretary-General Annan began between Republic of Cyprus President Glafcos Clerides (Greek community) and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash (Turkish Community). In November 2002, UN Secretary-General Annan released a comprehensive plan for the resolution of the Cyprus issue. It was revised in early December. In the lead up to the European Union's December 2002 Copenhagen Summit, intensive efforts were made to gain both sides' signatures to the document prior to a decision on the island's EU membership.
    [Show full text]
  • The Blue Beret
    The Blue Beret Summit in Geneva The UNFICYP Magazine June/July 2011 Contents Editorial . .2 Power outages follow lethal explosion . .4 Geneva summit ushers in intensive negotiation phase/ SG’s meeting with the leaders . .5 Completion of EU, UNDP-PFF urban upgrading project/ Cyprus UNDP team wins Photo Competition . 6 Pilgrimage to Dherynia’s Ayia Marina Church/ A family visit to honour a dead son . .7 Summer Medal Parade - Sunset Ceremony . .8 UNPOL Medal Parade - Recipient’s View . .9 An Australian Anniversary to be proud of . .10/11 Antonaki Peppis - “UN Tony” retires after 71 years/ It was 20 years ago today ... well, almost! . .12 MFR Company receive well deserved UN Medals/ UN Medal Parade at San Martin Camp/ UN Medals awarded at Ledra Palace Hotel . .13 Sgt Hruska remembered/ Volleyball tournament/ Sector 4 tennis tournament/ FC’s first visit to FMPU . .14 UNFICYP do well at the 2011 Cyprus services Orienteering Championships/ Nine MFR soldiers raise 400 euros for charity/ Sector 4 visit Buffavento Castle . .15 New Faces . .16 New Faces / New York to Nicosia charity event . .17 Visits . .18 UNFICYP joins “Stigma Fuels HIV” campaign/ Nine graduates from HIV/AIDS peer education training . .19 Serving UNFICYP’s civilian, military and police personnel The Blue Beret is UNFICYP’s in-house journal. Views expressed are of the authors concerned, and do not necessarily conform with official policy. Articles of general interest (plus photos with captions) are invited from all members of the Force Copyright of all material is vested in UN publications, but may be repro-duced with the Editor’s permission.
    [Show full text]
  • Oliver Miles 6 March 1936–10 November 2019
    Libyan Studies 51 (2020), pp 6–7 © The Society for Libyan Studies doi:10.1017/lis.2020.14 Oliver Miles 6 March 1936–10 November 2019 By Hugh Miles Oliver Miles, a distinguished British diplomat and noted Arabist, died on 10 November 2019 of pancre- atic cancer. He was 83. Richard Oliver Miles was born on 6 March 1936 and educated at Ampleforth and at Merton College, Oxford, where he read classical mods followed by oriental lan- guages and got a first class degree in both. At the ageof24heenteredtheDiplomaticServiceand heservedinAbuDhabi,Amman,Mukalla,Aden and Jedda. He played a key role in ending Britain’s colonial role in what is now Yemen, and had a lifelong love of the people of the Arabian Gulf, becoming one of the Diplomatic Service’s leading experts on Arab and Middle East affairs. He also had mid-career postings to Cyprus, during General Grivas’ struggle to annex Cyprus to Greece, and to Athens, where he would return as ambassador at the end of his career. In 1980 he became head of NENAD, the Near East and North Africa Department and in 1984 he was appointed ambassador to Libya, a posting which lasted only four months before diplomatic relations were broken off following the murder of WPC Yvonne Fletcher. Miles had been to Libya during his tenure at NENAD so had some prior understanding about the country, but as ambassador he found Libya an Figure 1. Oliver Miles (Photo: Mr. Nasir Hamid). unpredictable, exciting place which seemed to offer both lots of snakes and lots of ladders.
    [Show full text]
  • Politics in Plural Societies : a Theory of Democratic Instability
    POLITICS IN PLURAL SOCIETIES A Theory of Democratic Instability ALVIN RABUSHKA University of Rochester and KENNETH A. SHEPSLE Washington University, St. Louis Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company A Bell & Howell Company Columbus, Ohio CHAPTER 5 Majority Domination We turn in this chapter to an analysis of ethnic politics in dominant major- ity configurations. A major theme that emerges from this analysis is the denial by majorities of political freedoms to minorities as well as access to a proportional share of the public sector. First we explore ethnic politics in Ceylon to illustrate how a dominant Sinhalese majority deals with an important Tamil minority; second, we extend the empirical coverage with a comparative treatment of majority domination in Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Mauritius, Rwanda, and Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania). Ceylon The most important source of division and disruption in Ceylonese politics and the greatest impediment to integrative trends has been the persistence of sentiments of identification and solidarity with broader primordial groups generally referred to as communities.1 The Sinhalese, constituting about seventy percent of the population, is the majority community in Ceylon. The remaining minorities consist of Ceylon Tamils who arrived from India between the fourth and twelfth centuries, eleven percent; Indian Tamils who arrived in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to work on the tea estates, twelve percent; Moors 1. Robert N. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1967), p. 4. We rely heavily upon the evidence Kearney provides of Sinhalese politics. See also W. Howard Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Calvin A.
    [Show full text]