Germany and WMD Proliferation

Germany and WMD Proliferation HARALD MÜLLER laring U.S.-German differences over Iraqi policy, to the use of force also underwent subtle change from an highlighted by personal animosity between Presi- absolute restriction to homeland (and allied) defense to a Gdent George W. Bush and Chancellor Gerhard willingness to participate on out-of-area operations in a Schroder, have been seen by many observers as signaling multilateral and legalized context. the emergence of a rift between the United States and This article begins with an empirical account of this many of its European allies. However, the differences evolution and describes in detail present German attitudes between the United States and Germany in the area of and strategic preferences regarding proliferation and non- WMD proliferation that have become so obvious during proliferation. The German position—and its evolution the 2002-03 Iraqi crisis are not just a recent development, over time—is then interpreted in the light of different nor are they restricted to this single area of security policy.1 theories of international relations and foreign policy. Rather, they reflect deep-seated differences between the (Readers who are more interested in the policy side of the two countries and their leaders on the precise meaning of issue and less in the theoretical discussion of it may choose proliferation as a security problem; on threat assessment, to jump to that section). The article concludes that the notably the connection between proliferation and terror- pattern of evolution, as well as present policies, can best ism; on the instruments best suited to deal with the prob- be accounted for by a constructivist approach that inter- lem; and on the broader issues of how a world order should prets policy change as an outgrowth of evolution in the be shaped in which the policies to counter proliferation country’s identity and understanding of appropriate can be optimized. behavior in the light of this evolution. Germany, while The present German position is the result of almost sticking to basic tenets of its postwar identity, adapted its half a century of policy evaluation in which Germany concrete meaning several times in reaction to conflicts emerged from being the main—and restive—target of between that identity and the role expectations that nonproliferation policy into a proactive player and advo- important allies placed on Germany. No other approach cate of nonproliferation. In parallel, the German attitude is capable of accounting for the evolution in Germany’s The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 1 HARALD MÜLLER nonproliferation policy in as coherent a way. This finding armed, resurgent Germany could once more emerge as a has important policy implications: It means that as Ger- major threat to peace in Europe loomed large on either man policy is rooted in a deep ideational structure, it is side of the Iron Curtain. Germany renounced nuclear likely to continue, and, therefore, so are current U.S.- weapons in the London Protocol to the German Treaty German disagreements. Repairing the U.S.-German rup- (which restored limited sovereignty) and signed the Pro- ture revealed by the Iraqi crisis will not be a simple tocol to the Brussels Treaty (1955) and the NPT (1969) reconciliation after a quarrel in the family, but will require grudgingly and as a consequence of strong political per- much more serious efforts on both sides to understand the suasion by its allies, notably the United States.3 perspective of the other. The arguments made herein In the fifties, the predominant expectation in the Ger- will be illustrated mainly with evidence from the nuclear man leadership was that this renunciation would be tem- proliferation/nonproliferation sector, using additional porary; as soon as Germany was recognized as an equal material from other WMD areas as appropriate. and trustworthy member of the family of civilized (that is, Western) states, it would be accorded the right to A QUICK LOOK AT THE EVOLUTION OF obtain what its peers Britain and France already possessed 4 GERMAN POLICY or were in the course of acquiring as a symbol of power. Indeed, as is now known, Germany agreed with France— If we count the 1946 MacMahon Act—the U.S. law that which was still in shock over what it perceived as Ameri- prohibited the United States from offering nuclear assis- can betrayal over the Suez war—and Italy in 1957 to tance to other countries—as the start of nonproliferation develop nuclear weapons together (on French territory, policy, then it is fair to say that Germany found itself at thereby circumventing the German commitment not to the receiving end of it for the first quarter-century after make them in Germany); however, Charles de Gaulle, World War II. This position was the natural outcome of a with his vivid World War II memories, called off the deal war that many viewed as caused by German military immediately upon taking power in 1958.5 potential. The Manhattan Project had been initiated prin- It was not by chance that the German government cipally in order to neutralize a supposed German nuclear had kept the 1957 deal secret. Nuclear armament was a weapons program, and the relief of the Allied leaders highly contested issue in Germany, which as a legacy of after they learned that Hitler was nowhere near achiev- the traumatic experience of WW II had a strong pacifist ing a nuclear capability was considerable. Consequently, undercurrent. This undercurrent came into the open dur- the Allies wanted to make sure that postwar Germany— ing the 1950s with public demonstrations against German a member of uncertain character and reliability in the rearmament. Even stronger protests opposed equipping emerging new world order after 1945—would not disturb German military forces (Bundeswehr) with dual-use European and global balances by becoming a nuclear launchers (aircraft, artillery) that would be provided with weapon state. U.S. nuclear warheads in case of war. Unions, churches, the majority of the Social Democratic (SPD) opposition, Regaining Status: From Dismantlement to the and many German citizens joined these protests in the NPT late fifties. This first German peace movement died out, Immediately after WW II, Germany was forced to dis- however, after the planned dual-use equipment was intro- mantle its nuclear research establishment.2 All uses of duced into the Bundeswehr. weapons-usable nuclear material, even in basic research, The postwar West German state was a fairly uneasy were prohibited for the vanquished state. Later—from polity. The unspeakable crimes of the Hitler regime were 1955 on—Germany was constrained by the milder form not really understood, recognized, or fully uncovered in of legally binding commitments. Thus, the victors of the fifties. There was a lot of anxiety about whether Ger- World War II provided for a non-nuclear Germany as a many would be admitted into the circle of Western nations pillar of stability for the postwar security order. This was and doubts that the United States was really willing to the one subject on which all four victors in the European defend the country against the menace of Soviet commu- theater—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, nism. The German political elite wanted to develop, as and the Soviet Union, were in agreement despite all the soon as possible, a viable nuclear technology base, and to troubles of the Cold War. The concern that a nuclear participate, as fully as the allies permitted, in the nuclear deterrent. The U.S. offer to deploy dual-key systems—the 2 The Nonproliferation Review/Summer 2003 GERMANY AND WMD PROLIFERATION warheads under U.S. custody, the launcher/carriers deployed full support and a significant German contribution to with allied (in this case, German) armed forces—was NATO. However, the center-left was more willing to rec- emphatically welcomed.6 When the U.S. State Depart- ognize the restrictions on the country desired by its neigh- ment explored the idea of a NATO multilateral nuclear bors and allies, viewed civilian—particularly economic force (MLF) in the early sixties, the Germans were enthusi- and social achievements—as equally or more important astic, much more so than other European allies. Eventu- than being on a level playing field with France and Brit- ally it turned out that Germany had more enthusiasm for ain in military terms. The Brandt government was also this idea than its American authors. The proposal fell willing to take steps to ameliorate the fear and distrust of through, mainly because nonproliferation became a Germany’s Eastern neighbors, including the Soviet Union. major US objective, and the MLF was seen as a hindrance In that sense, military self-restraint was part of the to achieving consensus on that issue with the Soviet Ostpolitik developed by the center-left government after Union. Unresolved questions about the viability of a reli- 1968. As a result, German concerns focused finally on the able command and control system for a fleet manned by a economic aspects of nonproliferation, though the accom- great number of different nations also played a role in the panying statement made by the German government proposal’s failure. The U.S. decision to drop the MLF when it signed the NPT also contained security condi- project left then German Chancellor Erhard in limbo.7 tions that needed to be met in order to maintain In other words, throughout this period, civilian and mili- Germany’s membership in the Treaty. The most impor- tary nuclear rehabilitation ranked high on Bonn’s politi- tant of these was the continuation of NATO and the U.S. cal agenda, and this ambition was constrained primarily nuclear umbrella. Status issues, however, did not appear by the unwillingness of West Germany’s allies, especially in the statement.10 the United States, to agree to Germany’s entrance into the nuclear club.

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