The Canadian Brewing Industry’s Response to , 1874-1920

Matthew J Bellamy

The prohibitionist are putting us out of terms of the nation-forming British North business, so that we have lost heavily.1 America Act of 1867, the provinces had the constitutional power to prohibit the A.E. Cross, Calgary Brewing and retail sale of intoxicating drink. This vast Malting Co., 1916 power was first exercised by Canada's smallest province, ; At the dawn of the twentieth century, its prohibition period lasted the longest - prohibition became part of a broader from 1901 to 1948. was impulse in North American and Nordic the next Canadian province to jump countries to regulate the production and aboard the wagon (1916 to 1930), then consumption of alcoholic beverages. In came (1916 to 1927), some nations the ‘noble experiment’ last- (1916 to 1924), (1916 to 1923), ed longer than in others. For instance, in , (1917-1925), New the Russian Empire and Soviet Union Brunswick (1917 to 1927), British prohibition existed from 1914 to 1925; in Columbia (1917 to 1921), and the Iceland it lasted from 1915 to 1922; in Territory (1918-1921). Newfoundland, Norway it remained a sobering fact of life which was not part of Canada at that for eleven years (1916-1927); in Finland time, imposed prohibition in 1917 and prohibition was enforced from 1919 to repealed it in 1924. 's experiment 1932 - thirteen long years, the same with banning the sale of all alcoholic amount of time that it existed in the drinks, in 1919, lasted only a few months. United States (1920 - 1933). Quebec has always been an exceptional case in Canadian history. The Protestant In Canada, due to division of powers moral urge towards prohibition that between the central and provincial gov- existed in English Canada was simply ernments, prohibition lasted longer in not evident in the predominantly French- some regions than in others. Under the speaking and Roman Catholic province of Quebec.

While the temperance acts in each of * This article has undergone peer review. the Canadian provinces varied, they

2 Journal of the Brewery History Society generally closed legal drinking establish- thousands of well-paying jobs disap- ments and forbade the sale of for peared; and the civil liberties of thirsty beverage purposes and its possession Canadians were restricted. Yet all this and consumption except in a private might all have been avoided had the dwelling. Under the terms of the provin- brewers waged a better war against the cial legislation brewers could legally sell prohibitionists. their product outside the province, as inter-provincial trade was a federal It has long been the position of social authority. This created a loophole that and political historians alike that prohibi- was exploited by a handful of more tion was destined to become a factor in industrious brewers. But in March of Canadian life during the early twentieth 1918, the loophole was pulled tightly century. Business historians generally shut when the newly elected federal gov- agree, concentrating their studies - to ernment of Robert Borden stopped, for the limited extent that they exist in the duration of the first world war and Canada - on the efforts of brewers to one year thereafter, the manufacture and overcome the obstacles presented dur- importation of ‘intoxicating drinks’ into ing the prohibition era.3 The existing provinces where purchases were historiography is without exception com- illegal.2 As of 1918, therefore, Canada plimentary of the endeavours of had gone dry. Canadian brewers and their ability to survive during this ‘difficult’ period. The Prohibition had a devastating effect on consensus, therefore, is that brewers the Canadian brewing industry. Whereas ‘made the most of their opportunities.’ once there were scores of small local brewers, by the end of the prohibition era The following paper challenges the exist- only a few large companies re- ing historiography. Contrary to the mained. Bottom feeders like Edward established position, the paper argues Plunkett Taylor - later dubbed Excess that the unwillingness and inability of Profits Taylor by his critics - used the the brewing industry to organize itself opportunity of prohibition to capture and lobby effectively as well as its failure assets at rock-bottom prices and to to reach out to other anti-prohibitionists construct large breweries that could cap- in society (e.g. labour) was as much a italize on modern production techniques factor in the onset and continuation of and advertising. By 1935, Taylor's com- prohibition of beer as the actions of pro- pany, , was twenty hibitionists. Had the brewers been better times the size of most turn-of-the-century organized, less defensive, and more breweries and represented a new post- strategically minded perhaps they could prohibition reality. As a result of prohibi- have had their product - ‘a temperance tion, the fortunes of many Canadian drink’ - exempted from prohibitionist brewers evaporated. Legacies were lost; legislation.

Brewery History Number 132 3 The Canadian brewing Industry at the Scotia, 1 in Prince Edward Island, 36 in turn of the century , 4 in the Yukon Territory, and 61 in Ontario. The Canadian brewing By the end of the nineteenth century, the industry had large investments in hotels, brewing industry was an established and saloons, factories, equipment, casks and vibrant concern in Canada, although from other real assets. It also paid out more an international perspective it was still than $2 million a year for various supplies relatively small. In 1892 the number of and services, including $817,350 in breweries was 125.4 Ten years later the wages. Canadian brewers employed number had increased slightly to 133. 1,977 individuals directly and paid There were breweries in every province about $1 million in excise and custom across the land: 18 in the province of duties.5 In comparison, the manufactur- Quebec, 2 in , 4 in Nova ers of iron and steel products employed

Country Production Output per Breweries capita

Germany 1,464,839,000 26.01 3,544

United States 1,224,555,000 16.07 1,886

England and Wales 1,157,283,684 35.88 155

Ireland 109,873,000 24.60 36

Scotland 82,405,728 18.57 125

Netherlands 49,532,518 9.70 494

Italy 31,873,508 1.00 99

Canada 25,108,254 4.73 131

New Zealand 7,376,004 8.92 74

Table 1. National production (imperial gallons), Beer production per capita, and number of Breweries in 1900

Sources. Wilson, R.G. and Gourvish, T.R. (1988) The Dynamics of the International Brewing Industry since 1800. Routledge: London and New York, pp. 31, 40, 77, 116 and 191, 249; Donnachie, I. (1998) A History of the Brewing Industry in Scotland. John Donald: Edinburgh, table 56, p. 150; Anon. (1903) One Hundred Years of Brewing: A Complete History of the Progress made in the Art, Science and Industry of Brewing in the World, particularly during the Nineteenth Century. H.S.Rich: New York, p. 616.

4 Journal of the Brewery History Society 4,110 workers and paid out $1,693,542 (Guelph, Ontario). Two of these firms in wages, while lumber product man- would not survive prohibition. Canadian ufacturers paid out $2,689,864 to their breweries were getting bigger, although 2,075 employees.6 While by no means they were not yet the massive firms that Canada’s most significant industry, they would become after the Second brewing played an important part in World War. Nor were they anywhere near Canadian economic life. as big as their international counterparts. In 1900, for example, Labatt and Carling The output of the brewing industry had combined to produce 1,000,000 gallons increased steadily since Confederation. of beer.11 In comparison, that same In 1867, 137 breweries produced year Ireland's single largest brewer, 6,843,000 gallons of malt liquor. By Guinness, manufactured over 74,000,000 1900, an almost identical number of brew- gallons of malt liquor. In the United eries (131) manufactured over twenty- States, Anheuser-Busch produced over five million gallons of beer.7 30,000,000 gallons of beer.

Admittedly these numbers paled in The increase in beer production over the comparison to those of the great beer- last quarter of the nineteenth century - in producing nations at the turn of the cen- Canada and elsewhere - was due in large tury (see Table 1). In 1900, England and measure to technological developments. Wales produced over a billion gallons of For example, new refrigeration process- beer.8 That same year, 1,816 brewers in es, such as ice-making equipment and the United States manufactured 1.2 bil- ammonia-based refrigerators, permitted lion gallons of the beverage, while year round beer production. In addition, German brewers produced 1.4 billion machinery for filtering the beer under gallons of malt liquor. And although pressure speeded up the entire produc- Canada had a larger population in 1900 tion process. Finally, in larger plants, (5.3 million Canadians compared to 5.1 bottles were no longer filled by hand, but million Dutch), the Netherlands produced moved quickly through sterilizing equip- twice the amount of beer.9 ment and along conveyor belts to be filled and then sealed automatically with The number of Canadian breweries a crown cap. declined from 135 to 117 between 1900 and 1911. Despite this, output remained Brewers were producing more, and beer relatively constant at roughly 24,000,000 drinkers were correspondingly consum- gallons per annum.10 The largest ing larger amounts of their favourite Canadian brewers at the turn of the brand of beer - be it a Labatt's Pale Ale, century were Dow and Dawes (, Carling's Canada Club Lager or Grant Quebec), Carling (London, Ontario), Springs Brewery Ale which the owners Labatt (London, Ontario) and Sleeman proclaimed: ‘gratifies the taste, refresh-

Brewery History Number 132 5 Country 1875-79 1880-84 1885-89 1890-94 1895-99 1900-04

England & Wales 40.50 33.60 32.50 33.40 34.50 34.30

Germany n.a. 17.66 21.33 23.51 26.57 26.35

United States 6.60 13.30 19.20 15.00 16.00 18.30

Canada 2.45 2.61 3.01 3.57 3.65 4.88

Italy n.a. n.a. 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.15

Table 2. Per Capita Beer Consumption in Select Countries, 1875-1904 (Gallons).

Sources. Wilson, R.G. and Gourvish, T.R. (1988) The Dynamics of the International Brewing Industry since 1800. Routledge: London and New York, pp. 40, 77 and 94; Anon. (1903) One Hundred Years of Brewing: A Complete History of the Progress made in the Art, Science and Industry of Brewing in the World, particularly during the Nineteenth Century. H.S.Rich: New York, p. 616. ens the body.’12 Immigrants who came to Wales at the time, it was relatively high Canada after 1860 were from strong beer compared to that in nations with strong drinking countries such as England, wine-drinking cultures - such as Italy (see Ireland, Scotland and Germany and this Table 2). Added to which, Canadian con- contributed to an emerging beer culture sumption was on the rise. In 1914 each in Canada. In addition, Canada was Canadian was consuming, on average, becoming increasingly industrialized and over seven gallons of beer a year (a 65% urbanized. Many of the workers in the increase since 1900).14 And this was not manufacturing and mining sectors drank the relatively watered-down beer of the beer during and after work. Furthermore, post-prohibition years; rather it ranged in as workers began to receive higher strength from 8 to 12%. But prohibition wages and salaries, they purchased changed all that. more beer. As a result beer consumption on a per capita basis increased from 2.45 gallons per year during the period 1875- The effect of prohibition on the brew- 1879 to 4.88 gallons per year by 1900- ing industry 1904.13 While this level of consumption was relatively low compared to that tak- Prohibition had a destructive effect on the ing place in Germany, England and Canadian brewing industry. Nationally,

6 Journal of the Brewery History Society the number of breweries in operation was breweries that once dominated the cut in half, from 112 in 1915 to just 66 in Canadian beer industry, only a few large 1935. In Alberta firms like the Mountain breweries remained. The large breweries Springs Brewing Company put their took advantage of the demise of local assets up for sale under the strain of breweries to exploit a void in the market. prohibition.15 ‘I am no longer able to con- This, along with improved transportation tinue,’ the owner of Mountain Springs, provided by the railroad and the rise of Konrad Knapp, wrote to his sister in the the trucking industry, made it possible for summer of 1918. ‘All of our toil has been large centralized companies to dominate for naught.’ In Ontario there were 49 the beer industry. Prohibition had cost a breweries in 1915. Two years later there good deal: those who once made their were only 23 left. Business was so bad at living from the brewing industry were Labatt, one of Canada's largest brewers, forced to find other work; personal for- that in June of 1921 the directors of the tunes vanished; the government lost tens company held an emergency meeting of thousands of dollars in tax revenue; and agreed to wind up the affairs of the and some of Canada's finest beer was no firm. The board was subsequently talked longer available for consumption. And it out of its decision by Edmund M. Burke, might all have been avoided if the brew- who would go on to lead the company ers had got their act together and through the dark days of prohibition.16 embraced a conventional commercial Labatt managed to survive prohibition tactic: i.e. the art of inside and outside largely by shipping beer and spirits to the lobbying. United States. The London brewer organ- ized export operations at Port Stanley on Lake Erie, Ford City in Windsor, and Lobbying Sarnia on Lake Huron and hired special staff to handle business with reliable By the turn of the century, lobbying was bootleggers.17 Other Canadian brewers a well established business practice in were not so fortunate. For example, Canada. Indeed, lobbying had been a Sleeman Brewing and Malting Company, part of the Canadian landscape since the which had been in business since 1847, earliest colonial times. The grants, was forced to close its doors in 1916 due monopolies and concessions that made to the effects of province-wide prohibition.18 possible the early voyages of Jacques Likewise, was unable to Cartier, Martin Frobisher, Henry Hudson operate under the constraints of prohibi- and others were obtained through lobby- tion and was sold in 1924 to the rum-run- ing at court; the decisions that favoured ning syndicate of Low, Leon and Burns. the Family Compact and the Chateau Clique (i.e. a small group of Canadian By the end of the (i.e. around colonial elite) were the result of lobbying 1930) instead of the scores of small the British Cabinet and Parliament.

Brewery History Number 132 7 These pressure tactics on the part of bied the federal government for the the business community continued fol- ‘national policy’ tariff of 1879.19 They suc- lowing Confederation. After Hugh Allan's ceeded in equating their narrow sectoral lobbying for the contract to build a interests with the broader political inter- transcontinental railway led to the Pacific ests of politicians and other classes in Scandal and the subsequent fall of the Canada. It was a different story when it Conservative government, John A. came to the Canadian brewers and their Macdonald (Canada's first Prime response to prohibition. Minister) regrouped and made a tri- umphant return to power based on the support of the Canadian Manufacturers' Inside Lobbying Association. By 1870, the manufacturers of the nation were well-organized, strate- To be fair, the Canadian brewers appreci- gically-minded and focused in terms of ated the benefits to be derived from the public policy they sought from the ‘inside lobbying’, and they worked hard at federal government. cultivating ties with those in political power. As early as 1852, the brewers Unlike the brewers of the nation, employed a paid lobbyist to pressure cer- Canadian manufacturers understood that tain elected officials to block the passage effective lobbying required a coordination of the Cameron Act - an act calling for of two very different kinds of lobbying prohibition in Canada East and Canada activity, what political scientists now term West.20 While they were successful on ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ lobbying. ‘Inside lob- that occasion, they were not in 1864 bying’ occurs in the nation's capitals and when the government passed the Dunkin includes a mix of activities, from providing Act. Named after its parliamentary analysis and information to committees to sponsor, Christopher Dunkin, the Act negotiating with policy makers. ‘Outside empowered any city, county, parish, lobbying’, on the other hand, is an activi- town, or village in Canada to enact legis- ty that takes place outside the capital and lation prohibiting the sale of intoxicating is aimed at shifting the politics and pres- beverages. The brewing lobby was no sure around an issue. Some of these more successful in 1878 when it attempt- activities include ad campaigns, building ed to prevent the ratification of the Scott broad and diverse coalitions, and grass- Act - an act which gave local govern- roots rallies. If history is any guide, lobby- ments the right to prohibit, by popular ing works best when ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ vote, the retail sale of alcohol. activities are co-ordinated to ensure that they set up a strategic synergy in terms of The Scott Act was tenaciously opposed timing, targeting, and messaging. The by the brewers and distillers of the nation Canadian Manufacturers Association as well as traditional Tory supporters, understood this when it successfully lob- especially in Quebec. The most organ-

8 Journal of the Brewery History Society ized opposition came from brewers of Macdonald informing him that he and var- Ontario, who traditionally supported the ious other brewers would be petitioning Conservative Party. In Guelph, the brew- parliament to repeal the Scott Act. er George Sleeman helped to organize O'Keefe was seeking the Prime Minister's local opposition to the bill and later was support. He was not hesitant to point an important part in the campaign against out that the brewers were spending the enactment of the ‘’ in his ‘large amounts of money for effective township.21 representation’ in the nation's capital.23 Macdonald, however, was not to be pres- Shortly after the introduction of the Scott sured. He neither responded to O'Keefe's Act, the brewers of the nation formed (in letter, nor pushed for the Scott Act's 1878) the Canadian Brewers and repeal as had been requested. Instead, Maltsters' Association (C.B.M.A.).22 he opted for the status quo. By allowing While the long-term mandate of the any county or municipality - or province - C.B.M.A. was ‘to promote Canadian to prohibit the retail sale of liquor by brewing and further the interest of majority vote, the Scott Act relieved the Canadian brewers’, its immediate objec- federal government of the responsibility tive was to lobby for the Scott Act's for the law. Having passed the Scott Act, repeal. It proved to be too little, too late. the federal government had no real rea- son to pay any attention to Eugene On Parliament Hill there was no craving O’Keefe. This left O'Keefe and the brew- to revisit the liquor question. Even the ing lobby in a very difficult position. Now prime minister, John A. Macdonald - a they would have to fight against ‘local man who enjoyed his drink almost as option’ referenda that, governments much as he did his political power - was could justly argue, represented ‘the will of unwilling to come to the defence of the the people’. Not until after the turn of the liquor traffic. Despite the presence of the century did the brewing lobby come to brewer in cabinet, ‘Old realize that if it was to influence the ‘will Tomorrow’ recognized the political advan- of the people’ then it would have to tages of inaction. Macdonald understood launch an effective publicity campaign that the late 19th century issue of prohibi- and/or a grass roots movement (i.e. out- tion split Canadians more-or-less down side lobbying effort) rather than an inside the middle. For a man whose paramount lobbying campaign. But most brewers did concern was always national unity, not realize this until it was too late. Only Macdonald was not about to take any in June of 1915, after suffering recent action that might divide the population. ‘local option’ losses in Shawinigan and Grand Mère, did Quebec brewers start to Nevertheless, the brewers felt they had talk about a new plan of action. ‘I am at a friend in Macdonald. On 1st December the present time’, G. Norman wrote to his 1880, Eugene O'Keefe wrote to boss Norman Dawes, the president of

Brewery History Number 132 9 Quebec's largest brewery, ‘seriously that year, the decision was made to ‘call studying the plan of incorporating a soci- on every brewer in Ontario’ to donate ety, whose aim should be to fight any $50.00. ‘The money’, Ontario brewers measure or step taken having in view the were told, ‘is wanted immediately for an prohibition of beer’.24 Until that time, the important purpose from which you will brewers continued to focus their efforts derive great benefit.’ Shortly thereafter on lobbying the federal government from the secretary treasurer of the Ontario the inside. Brewers’ Association, Eugene O'Keefe, wrote the leader of the Liberal Party, In 1885, the brewers of the nation lobbied , stating that a ‘large sum of the Senate to pass an exemption to the money’ would soon be coming his way.26 Scott Act allowing for the sale of less- The action had not been sanctioned by potent beer, wine and cider, but lost out the C.B.M.A. Indeed, the C.B.M.A. knew when the House of Commons balked at nothing about it until much later, indicat- the measure. In part this was due to the ing the lack of co-ordination between the fact that those on the Hill were receiving federal and provincial brewing bodies. mixed and contradictory messages from The brewing lobby was thus functioning those engaged in brewing. Most brewers in an ad hoc manner with no overriding supported the position of the CBMA. The strategic vision and no division of duties London brewer John Labatt was repre- between the provincial and national sentative of this group. ‘The [Scott] act is brewing lobby. As it turned out, Laurier a big humbug’, he stated. ‘It does more was no more willing than Macdonald to harm than good and needs to be become a captive of special interests. On repealed’.25 But other brewers - usually the matter of prohibition he would let the those who were relatively small in scale people decide and therefore he called for and located outside of the large urban a plebiscite on the issue during his first centres of Central Canada - defended the term as Prime Minister. status quo because of the enormous profits that could be made by violating the In the weeks leading up to the 1898 intent of the law. Without a businesslike, national plebiscite on prohibition, Prime bureaucratic and non-democratic struc- Minister Laurier (1896-1911) was inun- ture, the C.B.M.A. was unable to maintain dated with mail. Indeed he received 97 solidarity of brewers and rein in dissi- letters relating to the matter. All the major dents within the industry. prohibitionist groups let their voices be heard, drawing on a long heritage of tem- This became further evident in 1894 perance agitation in Anglo-Canada. In a when the Ontario Brewers and Maltsters’ two-week period in late February, Laurier Association began cultivating political ties received impassioned correspondence with the federal Liberal Party. At an exec- from the Christian Temperance Union, utive committee meeting in November of the Centennial Methodist Church, the

10 Journal of the Brewery History Society Congressional Union of Nova Scotia and whelmingly against it. Laurier was thus New Brunswick, the Prohibition Council, able to ignore the ‘will of the people’. the Sons of Temperance and the County, municipal and, later, provincial Woman's Christian Temperance Union.27 governments, however, would ignore The letter-writing campaign represented such plebiscites at their own peril. a co-ordinated lobbying assault without equal in the annals of the Canadian tem- In the aftermath of the national plebiscite, perance movement. prohibitionists turned their attention to effecting ‘dry’ legislation in the provinces. In comparison, the lobbying efforts of the They faced little opposition from the brewers were dismal. Only three of the brewing lobby. ‘The campaign against us letters Laurier received on the issue of was a still one,’ a Saint John clergyman the prohibition plebiscite came from the wrote in 1909. ‘They held no public meet- brewing lobby and one man had written ings, nor did they appear at our meet- them all. Eugene O'Keefe had entered ings’.30 In most of the provincial referen- the brewing business in 1861 when he da of 1915-1916, the Canadian brewers purchased the Victoria Brewery at the and distillers had no army of volunteers corner of Victoria and Gould streets in to support their cause and had to rely, . An enterprising and ambitious instead, on newspaper advertising to man, O'Keefe grew his business into one make their case.31 of Ontario's largest breweries. In 1898, he became the first brewer in Canada to When the issue of national prohibition install a mechanically refrigerated store- resurfaced in 1914 the brewers of the house.28 The machinery had not come nation were little more prepared than they cheaply, however, and thus he had more had been forty years earlier when con- than most to lose by prohibition. In fronted with the possibility of local-option September 1898 - fully six months after prohibition under the Scott Act. The brew- the high water mark of the prohibitionists' ers' associations still lacked the full-time latest campaign - he wrote Laurier with ‘a staff necessary to develop provincial few reasons we advance in opposition to and/or national strategies. Furthermore, the stance of our prohibitionist friends.’29 the brewing lobby lacked the ability to co- Again, it was too little too late. The ordinate internal and external activities national plebiscite went ahead and the and foster organizational growth. To anti-prohibitionists lost. Fortunately for make matters worse still, the man who the brewers of the nation, the govern- had almost single-handedly battled the ment of Sir Wilfrid Laurier felt the prohibitionists over the last 30 years was majority of 13,687 (or 51.3% of the pop- now gone. Following the death of his only ular vote) in favour of prohibition was not son in 1911, Eugene O'Keefe lost interest large enough to warrant passing a law, in brewing matters. He sold his shares in especially since Québec had voted over- his brewery and resigned as the presi-

Brewery History Number 132 11 dent of the Ontario Brewers' and program of ‘outside lobbying’. As in the Maltsters' Association. Without O'Keefe, United States, Canadian prohibitionists the brewing lobby lost what little potency sought to mobilize a national constituen- it possessed. Thus when wartime prime cy of thousands of people, which would minister Borden proposed instituting be united in purpose and singular in national legislation which would forbid objective.35 Admittedly it took some time the manufacture of intoxicating beverages, for the prohibitionists to act in a cohesive the brewing industry did not directly manner. For most of the nineteenth cen- appeal to him to do otherwise. While the tury, dry voices were rarely in absolute prime minister heard from the Licensed harmony.36 Nevertheless, when the Victuallers32 and various distilleries,33 he movement did coalesce around the turn did not from the brewers of the nation. of the century it became a force to be With the most to lose from prohibition the reckoned with. Indeed, so innovative was victuallers were ‘left to carry the ball in one particular prohibitionist organization - challenging prohibition legislation in the i.e. the Anti-Saloon League of America - courts and in lobbying efforts with gov- that it ‘changed the nature of popular ernments’.34 political action’.37

The brewers of the nation, therefore, In an attempt to convert Canadian culture were moderately successful when it the prohibitionists continued to stress came to the act of inside lobbying. While the dangerous effects of consuming the brewers understood the benefits to be intoxicating beverages. The message of derived from cultivating influence within prohibitionists was often clear, concise the federal and provincial political parties and direct, as the poster below demon- they were often insufficiently organized strates. to achieve their goals. It was an even sorrier tale when it came to the act of In defence against posters such as this, ‘outside lobbying’. Canadian brewers maintained that they contributed a good deal to the nation in terms of tax revenue and jobs.38 The pro- Outside Lobbying hibitionists responded that any economic gain was grossly outweighed by the Prohibitionists realized something that social cost. Alcohol was not only the the brewers did not: this was a cultural/ cause of poverty, misery, and crime, but moral battle as much as a political one; it also insanity and health defects. The was a fight for the hearts and minds of beer manufacturers had often attempted Canadians, as much as for having influ- to entice Canadians to drink their particu- ence in the corridors of political power. lar brand with promises of better health. Thus relatively early in their campaign the ‘Good health will be yours if you drink prohibitionists embarked upon a zealous O'Keefe's Bold Label Ale’, one advertise-

12 Journal of the Brewery History Society and empowered by the moral imperat- ives of late nineteenth-century Anglo- Protestant Canada.

In the 1890s, prohibitionists effectively worked to have their message heard by the youngest and most impressionable individuals in society. ‘Health Readers’ began to appear in Canadian schools. These readers were filled with prohibi- tionist propaganda on the dangerous effect of drinking beer. On reading a description of the alleged effect of beer consumption on the heart, the young reader was left with the dire warning that ‘the heart bears this abuse as long as it can and when it stops - the beer drinker is dead’.39 There was no attempt by brewers to have such propaganda removed from the schools. Figure 1. Prohibitionist poster. The prohibitionists were also better than Source. Glenbow Archives NA-2629-5 the brewers at crafting their message so as to resonate with the dominant values of the day. During the First World War, for ment read. Similarly, instance, the prohibitionists were able to Breweries pledged that its Cascade beer associate their cause with the war effort. was as ‘truly a food as the bread you eat’ Prohibitionists successfully employed and ‘not only a drink that refreshes, but the rhetoric of ‘efficiency,’ ‘duty,’ and one that tones up the system, builds body ‘self-sacrifice.’ With this patriotic war-cry strength and brain efficiency.’ But where- added to all their other slogans, the pro- as the campaigns of the brewers were hibition forces rapidly moved on to new primarily intended to increase brand victories. market share and thereby profits, those of the prohibitionists were designed to Again, the brewers of the nation found change social behaviour. In effect, it was themselves on the defensive. Indeed, an unequal battle of moral imperatives one wonders if the brewers themselves against narrow material gain. When it were not being affected by the prohibi- came to outside lobbying the prohibition- tionist rhetoric. After all, despite being ists were far more strategically minded brewers, they were attached to their

Brewery History Number 132 13 churches and their wives and would have tion if it became a fact of Canadian life: had to bend their sensibilities. At Labatt labourers, farmers, hotel and saloon brewery in London some members of the owners, barrel makers, bottlers, shippers, board even quietly questioned if the pro- as well as the vintners and liquor manu- hibitionists might not be right about the facturers. Yet the brewers of the nation need for wartime sacrifices.40 Such self- did not reach out to these groups. doubts certainly did not strengthen the anti-prohibitionist cause. In the twilight of The case was different elsewhere. In his career, John Carling spent much of reaction to vehement attacks by temper- his time lobbying both the provincial and ance reformers in late Victorian times, federal governments for funds to build a English brewers and publicans - a potent regional insane asylum in London. A combination in terms of lobbying - formed Methodist himself, Carling was motivated ‘the trade’. In a relatively short period, to do so out of a sense of guilt and an ‘the trade’ gained a formidable reputation, unconscious acceptance of the prohibi- which other pressure groups could only tionist rhetoric linking alcohol consump- envy.41 Having reached out to working- tion to insanity. The ambiguous attitude of class drinkers and moderate reformers brewers to their own profession was also as well as overcoming internal divisions, reflected during the Royal Commission ‘the trade’ was able to resist government on the Liquor Traffic (1892-1895). When support of anti-drink legislation.42 ‘The asked if they would give up their business brewers had the money, while the publi- if financially compensated, about half of cans swayed votes of working-class the brewers stated they would. Some of drinkers’.43 As a result prohibition failed the same brewers talked openly about to become a reality in England. In the mental and moral strain of operating Denmark, brewers made much of the fact a brewery in ‘temperate times’. One that beer was a ‘temperance drink.’ Its might speculate that the brewers were relatively low level of alcohol distin- affected by the perceptions of a large and guished it from harmful spirits like vodka. overtly judgemental segment of society. Unlike the brewers in Canada, Danish Perhaps, to use the terminology of post- brewers distanced themselves from the modernist philosophers, they had come manufacturers of hard liquors. They sup- to ‘internalize the gaze.’ Whatever the ported the in the reason, after 1900, the brewers of the expectation that restrictions on spirits nation were constantly on the defensive. would improve their prospects.

But perhaps the greatest failing of the The success of ‘the trade’ in England brewing industry was its failure to build a might well have served as a model for broad-based coalition capable of drown- brewers in Canada. But they took no ing out the ‘dry’ voices in society. Many notice. This was unfortunate because would be negatively affected by prohibi- Canadian brewers would have also found

14 Journal of the Brewery History Society an ally in labour. Of the various groups in proactive and far more strategic in society, the working class was over- thought and action, they might well have whelmingly against the idea of full- had beer exempted from prohibitionist fledged prohibition. legislation. Historically, lobbying has worked best when ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ The prim, tee totalling working-class mas- activities have been co-ordinated to culinity of the prewar years had apparently assure that they make strategic sense in been largely eclipsed by a version that had terms of timing, targeting, and messag- quietly taken root in working-class saloons in ing. But this is something the brewing the same period, and was finally ready to lobby did not do. While they dedicated defend publicly their right to drink responsibly significant resources to lobbying govern- and moderately.44 ment from the inside, they did little to influence the culture around the issue of During the depression of 1913-1915 beer drinking and prohibition. Thus, in labour leaders told provincial and federal the end, theirs was an extremely weak governments that the prohibitionist legis- response to the threat and onset of pro- lation had forced ‘thousands engaged in hibition. the brewing and allied industries out of work’.45 Workers argued that it was their From a nineteenth-century perspective, constitutional right to be able to consume this was a very un-Canadian tale. beer.46 These efforts by organized labour Usually, Canadian business successfully to prevent a bone-dry regime seemed to lobbied government for the public policies resonate with a larger number of it wanted. But in the case of prohibition, Canadian working-men and women. But the brewing industry ultimately failed the brewing industry was unwilling to to persuade the government to do its unite and co-ordinate with labour in an bidding. From another perspective, how- attempt to prevent prohibition. ever, the story was very Canadian. In the years following Confederation, the fragile Canadian nation was divided Conclusion along regional, religious and socio-eco- nomic lines. These divisions were The unwillingness and inability of the omnipresent during the last quarter of the brewing industry to organize itself and nineteenth century, dividing those within lobby effectively, as well as its failure the brewing industry. Canadian brewers to reach out to other anti-prohibitionists were trapped between their wallets and in society (e.g. labour), were as much their social register. Steelmakers had no factors in the onset and continuation of moral qualms about making steel prohibition in Canada as the actions of because steel made nations. But did beer prohibitionists. Had the brewers been make nations? Or did it cause national better organized, less parochial, more decay? Canadian brewers were increas-

Brewery History Number 132 15 ingly uncertain. As a result, they served 7. Anon (1903) One Hundred Years of up a watered-down response to prohibi- Brewing: A Complete History of the Progress tion. made in the Art, Science and Industry of Brewing in the World, particularly during the Nineteenth Century. H.S.Rich: New York, p. 616. References 8. Wilson, R.G. and Gourvish, T.R. (1988) The Dynamics of the International Brewing 1. A.E. Cross to G.A. Ings. (3 February Industry Since 1800. Routledge: London and 1916) CBMP, box 71, file 560. New York, p. 116. 2. Brewers’ Association of Canada (1965) 9. ibid, p. 31. Brewing in Canada. Ronald's-Federated Ltd: 10. Fifth Census of Canada, 1911, vol. 3, p. 29. , pp. 100-10. 11. Phillips, G.C. (2000) op.cit. p. 158. 3. Denison, M. (1955) The Barley and the 12. Bowering, I. (1988) The Art and Mystery Steam: The Molson Story. McClelland and of Brewing in Ontario. GSPH: Burnstown, p. 53. Stewart: Toronto; Molson, K. (2001) The 13. Report of Louis P. Kribs (1894) op. cit. p. 11. Molsons: Their Lives and Times, 1780-2000. 14. Heron, C. (2003) Booze: A Distilled Firefly Books: Willowdale, Ontario, Woods, History. Between the Lines Press: Toronto, p. S.E. (1983) The Molson Saga, 1763-1983. 177. Doubleday Canada: Toronto; Hunter, D. 15. Globe and Mail, July 10th, 1918. (2001) Molson: The Birth of a Business 16. Tucker, A. Labatt: A History (unpub- Empire. Viking: Toronto; McCreath, P.L. lished), pp. 159-167. (2001) The Life and Times of Alexander 17. ibid, pp. 181-200. Keith: Nova Scotia's Brewmaster. Four East 18. Rudy, J. (1994) ‘Sleeman's: Small Publications: Tantallon, N.S.; Brenton Business in the Ontario Brewing Industry, Haliburton, G. (1994) What's Brewing: Oland, 1847-1916.’ M.A. Thesis, University of Guelph. 1867-1971. Four East Publications: Tantallon, 19. Forster, B. (1996) A Conjunction of N.S.; Phillips, G.C. (2000) On Tap: The Interest, Business, Politics and Tariffs, 1825- Odyssey of Beer and Brewing in Victorian 1879. University of Toronto Press: Toronto, London-Middlesex. Cheshire Cat Press: especially pp. 110-126. Sarnia, Ontario; Winn Sneath, A. (2001) 20. Phillips, G.C. (2000) op.cit. p. 124. Brewed in Canada: The Untold Story of 21. Heron, C. (2003) op. cit. p. 160. Canada's 350-Year-Old Brewing Industry. 22. Denison, M. (1955) op. cit. p. 263. Dundurn Group: Toronto. 23. E. O'Keefe to John A. Macdonald,(1 4. Report of Louis P. Kribs in connection December 1880), Library and Archives with the Royal Commission on the Liquor Canada, John A. Macdonald Fonds, MG 26 Traffic. (1894) The Murray Printing Company: A, "Personal Letters" series, volume 371, Toronto, p. 11. page 172698, letter from, reproduction copy 5. ibid. number C-1750. 6. Statistics Canada, Canada Year Book. 24. G. Normand to Norman Dawes (26 June (1907) Ottawa. 1915), Library and Archives of Canada,

16 Journal of the Brewery History Society Molson Fonds, MG III 28 vol. 404, file p. 107981. ‘National Breweries Ltd., Campaigns, 1915- 34. Heron, C. (2003) op. cit. p. 189. 1925’. 35. The best work on the American effort to 25. Canada. Royal Commission on the organize for reform is Austin Kerr, A. (1985) Liquor Traffic, Minutes of Evidence, Ontario Organized for Prohibition: A New History of vol. 4 (1895) p. 366. the Anti-Saloon League. 26. Eugene O'Keefe to Wilfrid Laurier (24 Press: New Haven. November 1894), Library and Archives 36. Noel, J. (1995) Canada Dry: Canada Wilfrid Laurier Fonds, Reel C739, p. Temperance Crusades before Confederation 3372. University of Toronto Press: Toronto. 27. Centennial Methodist Church to Wilfrid 37. Austin Kerr, K. (1980) ‘Organizing for Laurier (28 February 1898), Library and Reform: The Anti-Saloon League and innova- Archives Canada Wilfrid Laurier Fonds, Reel tion in Politics’, American Quarterly, vol. 32, C754, pp. 21077-8; Christian Temperance no. 1, Spring, p. 37. Union to Wilfrid Laurier (28 February 1898), 38. See, for instance, the testimony of the ibid, pp.20807-9; Congressional Union of Toronto brewer, Robert Davies. Canada. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to Laurier Royal Commission on the Liquor Traffic, (23 February 1898), ibid, pp. 20935-37; Sons Minutes of Evidence, Ontario vol. 4 (Ottawa, of Temperance to Wilfrid Laurier (16 February 1895) pp. 713-716. 1898), ibid, Reel C754, pp. 20688-89; 39. Brenton Haliburton, G. (1994) op. cit. p. 24. Woman's Christian Temperance Union to 40. Minutes of the Board of Directors, 13 Wilfrid Laurier (22 February 1898), ibid, Reel May 1915, 8 February 1916. C754, pp.20834-6. 41. See Crapster, B. (1949) ‘"Our Trade, 28. Power, M. ‘Eugene O'Keefe’, in Our Politics’': a Study of the Political Activity Dictionary of Canadian Biography. University of the British Liquor Industry, 1868-1910’. of Toronto Press: Toronto, Vol. XIV, pp. 796-7. Ph.D. thesis, . 29. Eugene O'Keefe to Wilfrid Laurier (2 42. Mathias, P. (1958) ‘The Brewing September 1898), Library and Archives Industry, Temperance and Politics’, Historical Canada Wilfrid Laurier Fonds, Reel C759, pp. Journal, vol. 1, pp. 97-114; Valverde, M. and 26154-55. O'Malley, P. (2004) ‘Pleasure, Freedom and 30. Heron, C. (2003) op. cit. p. 190. Drugs: The Uses of "Pleasure" in Liberal 31. ibid, p. 191. Governance of Drug and Alcohol Consump- 32. Licensed Victuallers to Robert Borden tion’, Sociology, vol. 38 (1), pp. 28-31. (27 June 1916), Library and Archives 43. Fahey, D. (1980) ‘Brewers, Publicans Canada, Robert Borden Fonds, Reel C4398, and Working Class Drinker: Pressure Group pp. 118272 to 118313; Ibid (27 July 1916), Politics in Late Victorian and Edwardian Reel C4398, p. 118252. England,’ HS/SH vol. XIII, no. 25, May, p. 85. 33. Hamilton Distillery to Robert Borden (7 44. Heron, C. (2003) op. cit. p. 231 September 1916), Library and Archives 45. ibid, p. 228. Canada, Robert Borden Fonds, Reel C4390 46. ibid, pp. 230-31.

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