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Statement of Audrey Kurth Cronin Distinguished Professor Director, Center for Security, Innovation and New Technology American U

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Statement of Audrey Kurth Cronin Distinguished Professor Director, Center for Security, Innovation and New Technology American U Statement of Audrey Kurth Cronin Distinguished Professor Director, Center for Security, Innovation and New Technology American University Washington, D.C. for the Hearing on “Extremism in the Armed Forces” The Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives One Hundred Seventeenth Congress Rayburn House Office Building Wednesday 24 March 2021 1 Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Rogers, and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, thank you for your service to our country and for the honor of testifying before you today. I am Audrey Kurth Cronin, Distinguished Professor at American University in Washington, D.C. and Director of the Center for Security, Innovation, and New Technology. I come from a proud U.S. Navy family whose father and three brothers all served, and my career has combined both academic positions and government service. I have been director of the core course on War and Statecraft at the U.S. National War College and Specialist in Terrorism at the Congressional Research Service. I have served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy and in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. I am an award-winning author on terrorism and extremism. My best-known book, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (2009),1 was written in answer to a question posed to me by a senior Senator in the aftermath of 9/11. My latest book, Power to the People: How Open Technological Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists (2020),2 analyzes the risks and opportunities of emerging technologies, especially their use by terrorists and extremists. I am testifying on the basis of decades of experience researching terrorism and extremism, working with the military, and serving in both the executive and legislative branches. The violent extremism that erupted during the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol had a disproportionate number of current or former members of the U.S. Armed Forces leading the mob. Protesters exploited both traditional and digital communications at unprecedented scale and speed. The images of Americans storming the citadel of our democracy, threatening elected Members of Congress and their staffs on January 6th, were alarming enough. But as FBI investigations now generate a flood of indictments, further troubling signs of extremism in the military are coming into focus and resonating with the public. Nothing is more threatening to a democracy than the military interfering in the peaceful transfer of power. But the evolving technological context in which this event occurred is also pertinent. The United States has experienced a tectonic shift in communications that affects the Armed Forces just as it does every other element of society. We must protect our Service members and veterans from nefarious actors using digital means to manipulate their trust. Protecting patriotic Service members who serve honorably and deserve our support, even as we mitigate the problem of violent extremism in the ranks, will be a long-term test. Educating and engaging our veterans is also vital. The speed at which people are radicalized and mobilized via digital media has ramped up. That trend is heightening extremism and will not reverse itself because it is part of a new technological environment. To meet this challenge, we must first collect accurate data to assess the extent of the military's problem objectively, then devise a comprehensive plan to address it, and ultimately institute trackable policies that are tailored to the digital age. 1 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009). 2 Audrey Kurth Cronin, Power to the People: How Open Technology Innovation is Arming Tomorrow’s Terrorists (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020). 2 Background Military veterans were prominent in planning and executing the 2021 attack on the Capitol, often in a leadership role. Three militia organizations stand out in particular: Proud Boys, Oath Keepers, and the Three Percenters. These organizations mimic the structures of our military, hijack and disfigure its tenets, and prize its skills. The Oath Keepers, named for members’ professed intent to protect the Constitution, played a central organizing role in the attack. It was founded by Stewart Rhodes, a former U.S. Army paratrooper. The group has a formal structure of leaders, membership, and dues, and it makes the recruitment of military and law enforcement a priority.3 Three of four Proud Boy members charged this month with conspiring over the encrypted channel “Boots on the Ground” in advance of the attacks were veterans.4 Another paramilitary group, the Three Percenters (“III%”), named for the belief that only three percent of the American colonists fought the British, aggressively recruits veterans. Information emerging in charging documents has been shocking: A retired Air Force veteran, Larry Randall Brock, Jr., photographed on the floor of the Senate holding zip ties, posted a phrase from the Oath of Enlistment on his Facebook page: “Against all enemies, foreign and domestic.”5 A retired Army Green Beret with more than 20 years of service was charged with assaulting a D.C. police officer by throwing an American flag at him like a spear.6 And a Marine Corps veteran and retired New York police officer allegedly used a flagpole with a large Marine Corps flag on it to beat a D.C. police officer.7 At this writing, prosecutors have charged at least 312 people in the January 6th assault, of whom thirty-seven are current or former military.8 Nearly half of military-linked alleged perpetrators are veterans of the U.S. Marine Corps (18), almost a third served in the U.S. Army (11), two in the U.S. Air Force, and two in the U.S. Navy.9 Three of those accused are active- duty enlisted (two in the U.S. Army Reserve, one in the U.S. National Guard), and one additional person’s Service is unconfirmed.10 Veterans make up only about 7% of the U.S. population as a 3 Veterans Fortify the Ranks of Militias Aligned with Trump’s Views,” The New York Times, 11 September 2020; at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/us/politics/veterans-trump-protests-militias.html. 4 Spencer S. Hsu and Rachel Weiner, “Proud Boys Conspired in Multiple Encrypted Channels ahead of Jan. 6 Riot, Fearing Criminal Gang Charges, U.S. Alleges,” Washington Post, 19 March 2021; at https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/captiol-riots-indictment-proud-boys/2021/03/18/971da624- 8770-11eb-82bc-e58213caa38e_story.html. 55 U.S. Government Detention Exhibits, Larry Randall Brock, Jr., George Washington Program on Extremism; at https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Larry%20Rendall%20Brock%20Government%20Detention%2 0Exhibits.pdf. 6 Kyle Rempfer, “Retired Green Beret Assaulted Cop with Flagpole during Capitol Riot, Charges Allege,” Army Times, 19 March 2021; at https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2021/03/19/retired-green-beret-assaulted- cop-with-flagpole-during-capitol-riot-charges-allege/. 7 Insider searchable data base, at https://www.insider.com/all-the-us-capitol-pro-trump-riot-arrests-charges-names- 2021-1. 8 “Over 300 Charged from more than 40 States: What We Know about the ‘Unprecedented’ Capitol Riot Arrests,” cbsnews.com, 18 March 2021; at https://www.cbsnews.com/news/capitol-riot-arrests-2021-03-18/. 9 Gina Harkins and Hope Hodge Seck, Military.com, 26 February 2021; at https://www.military.com/daily- news/2021/02/26/marines-infantry-most-highly-represented-among-veterans-arrested-after-capitol-riot.html. 10 Ibid. 3 whole but about 10% of accused insurrectionists, especially those who organized and led the siege. Before January 6th, there was anecdotal evidence about connections between the U.S. military and extremist groups. In its 2020 report to the Committee on Armed Services about how well those who seek to enlist are screened, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness described military involvement in the Neo-Nazi groups Identity EVROPA (now called the American Identity Movement) and the Atomwaffen Division, the Boogaloo movement, and in other White nationalist assemblies. The report also exhibited a series of tattoos, symbols, flags, and posters appearing in photographs of military members. Included was a transcript of Brandon Russell, a U.S. National Guard Member and co-founder of Atomwaffen Division, bragging on the online “Iron March” forum about how easy it was to share White supremacist views in the military. Claimed Russell: “I was 100% open about everything with the friends I made at training. They know about it all.” 11 Focused on screening recruits, however, the report did not analyze how widespread the problem is, noting that “The number of current and former military personnel who ascribe to White supremacist and nationalist identity is unknown.”12 There have been other apparent signs of growing extremism in the ranks. According to a 2019 survey of 1,630 active-duty Military Times subscribers, more than a third (36%) of respondents had seen evidence of White supremacist and racist ideologies in the military, a significant increase over the 22% who reported this the year before.13 In 2020, 57% of minority troops polled said they had personally experienced some form of racist or White supremacist behavior.14 But these are surveys performed by a newspaper based on voluntary participation by readers, so the results are unscientific. We cannot consider them an accurate or comprehensive reflection of the state of the force overall. Looking at it from another direction, the percentage of veterans who are members of extremist right-wing groups or anti-government militias has long been higher than in the general population.
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