Volume 9 | Issue 10 | Number 2 | Article ID 3497 | Mar 07, 2011 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Focus

', Go Home!' Internet Nationalism in Contemporary Japan as a Digitally Mediated Subculture 「 コリアンズ ゴーホー ム」現代日本におけるデジタル方式下位文化としてのインターネット・ ナショナリズム

Rumi Sakamoto

‘Koreans, Go Home!’ Internetgroup harassing Korean tourists on Tsushima, a Nationalism in Contemporary Japan Japanese island 138 km from and 2 as a Digitally Mediated Subculture 50km from . This island has been attracting attention from Japanese nationalists Rumi Sakamoto because of the increasing presence of Korean tourists and Korean investment since the 2002 Introduction opening of high-speed ferry service between Busan and Tsushima. Nationalist campaigns over the island intensified when ’s Masan City adopted the ‘Tsushima Day’ bill in 2005, claiming that Tsushima should be a Korean territory, thereby countering Shimane prefecture’s ‘Takeshima Day’, establishing Japanese claim to Korea’s Dokdo island.3 The YouTube video in question captured several flag-holding Japanese men and women yelling: ‘Go home, Koreans!’ and ‘We won’t allow a Korean invasion!’ at tourists fresh off the ferry from Busan. Though not physically violent, the atmosphere was tense and disturbing.

This episode is just one expression of Japan’s new grassroots nationalism, which has gained force over the last decade against the backdrop of increasingly vociferous historical revisionism and neonationalism.4 As seen in the recent conflict over the Senkaku Islands5 as well as Japan’s hard-line response to the North Korean Tsushima Island attack on , nationalistic sentiments seem to be increasingly dictating Japan’s foreign policy and public opinion. Contrary to On 18 September 2009, a person using the what is sometimes assumed, contemporary online name of ‘xegnojw’ posted a four-minute is not a monolithic entity, video on YouTube entitled ‘Japanese Racists for it is produced by multiple participants and Hoot Down Korean Tourists in Tsushima’.1 It groups with different ideas and modes of depicted members of a Japanese nationalist communication. The kind of blatant jingoism

1 9 | 10 | 2 APJ | JF and narrow-minded xenophobia seen above, has rarely been discussed in English language though still largely marginalised in the official scholarship.11 It is often pointed out that discourses of the state and public media, has today’s Japanese youths are increasingly found a niche in Japan, especially innationalistic and that the Internet is playing a cyberspace. New groups such asZaitokukai part in this trend.12 In considering how the (Citizens’ Group against Special Rights for technology and culture of the Internet Korean residents in Japan)6 and Shuken kaifuku influenced the formation of nationalism in o mezasu kai (Citizens’ Group that seeks cyberspace, this article engages with the idea Recovery of Sovereignty),7 however outlandish of a ‘cyber public sphere’. What internet- their stances, have successfully extended specific elements have contributed to the influence through effective use of the Internet, particular netto-uyo shape of nationalism? How incorporating YouTube and its Japanesemight we understand the paradox of the equivalents such as Niko-niko dōga (‘smiley borderless technology of the Internet videos’) and PeeVee TV to spread theirproducing an insular community and messages and publicise their activities.xenophobic nationalism? Channeru Sakura (2004-), which distributes conservative and nationalistic content via To answer these questions, after a brief look at satellite TV and Internet, also provides a 2-channeru and the netto-uyo phenomenon, this significant virtual space for neonationalist article offers a content analysis of nationalism perspectives. Without the Internet, it isin the Tsushima threads, focusing on the doubtful that an extreme nationalist group’s construction of ‘Korea’ as Japan’s other. It then foray into direct action on the peripheral island considers this case’s implication for the notion of Tsushima would have reached an audience of a ‘cyber public sphere,’ and discusses some beyond the group itself. As it happened, Internet-dependent factors relevant to the however, the video clip was immediately taken netto-uyo formation of the nation as an up by Japan’s largest online forum, 2-channeru, imagined community before finally considering prompting a barrage of nationalistic responses some unique characteristics of Internet there. A site ‘not for the faint of heart’,8 this nationalism in contemporary Japan. But first, unmoderated forum is known to be the main let us briefly look at some existing approaches outlet for revisionism and xenophobic neo- to nationalisms in cyberspace to put this study nationalism of the internet generation.9 into a context.

Nationalisms in Cyberspace

In the early days of the Internet, some Zaitokukai on YouTube: ‘Kick out Koreans predicted that, as a global and borderless from Tsushima!’ technology, the Internet would become a homogenising force that challenged and This article offers an analysis of the online eliminated chauvinism and narrow-mindedness. discourse of anti-Korean nationalism sparked Today’s optimistic observers also emphasise by the aforementioned YouTube video on2- the potential of cyberspace to provide channeru. It aims to examine thesomething akin to Habermas’ ‘ideal speech characteristics of the nationalistic postings and situation’ and ‘autonomous public sphere,’13 in the online construction of Korea as Japan’s which citizens/individuals communicate other.10 The case offers insight intorationally and democratically, without the contemporary Japan’s so-called netto-uyo (net constraints of ethnic, gender, class or other right-wingers . . . uyoku) phenomenon, which real-life inequalities. If we follow these insights

2 9 | 10 | 2 APJ | JF that the Internet provides an ‘autonomous are all considered potential enemies of the public sphere’ and ‘eradicates differences,’ nation. then we may conclude that the Internet challenges, and might even eventually end, Another relatively well-publicised and studied sectarian nationalisms. Nicholas Negroponte in case of Internet nationalism is Chinese online Being Digital, for one, famously stated that nationalism that emerged around the 2005 anti- 17 with the Internet ‘there will be no more room Japanese movement. Japanese Internet for nationalism than there is for smallpox’.14 nationalism is quite different from the Chinese counterpart. First, while Chinese online Such a prediction, however, seems, at best, nationalism has been widely viewed as decidedly premature. While the Internet has supporting or enabling on-street nationalism, certainly created an extensive global network the netto-uyo variety of Japanese Internet and promoted the exchange of ideas, it has nationalism this article addresses has largely hardly created a global democraticstayed within Cyberspace, rarely spilling out consciousness. Even a cursory survey reveals onto the street. Secondly, scholars of Chinese that nationalistic and xenophobic commentaries online nationalism have (in somewhat thrive on the Internet. And yet, in contrast to Habermasean spirit) typically located it within the abundant scholarship on nation andthe framework of civil society and citizens’ nationalism, Internet nationalism remains an activism, reading online activities as a sign of understudied phenomenon. In particular, the Chinese civil society as an independent sphere important question of how the Internet as a from the communist state. As one scholar put new medium affects the nature of nationalism it, ‘civil society and the Internet energise each and national imaginary deserves furtherother in their co-evolutionary development in investigation. ’.18

One strand of current scholarship on Internet As we will see, however, one can hardly nationalism focuses on the diasporicsuggest that Japanese internet nationalism communities’ online ‘long distance’embodies a democratic civil society. Not only nationalism.15 Such studies look at how, for does it fall short of producing on-street politics, example, the Palestinians, Kurds, or overseas but it is also confined within niche online Chinese maintain and reinforce their national communities, hardly representative of civil identities through the Internet. As Thomas society. Perhaps for these reasons, Japanese Eriksen points out, the aims of ‘virtual nations’ Internet nationalism has received much less are ‘of a classic nation-building kind’.16 In other attention than Chinese ‘civil’ nationalism has words, they aim to create and sustain the done in English-language scholarship. Though nation as a unified entity in the context of less visible than the Chinese examples and geographical dispersion of the population definitely not mainstream, Japanese Internet beyond national borders. Japanesenetto-uyo nationalism is a significant recent phenomenon internet nationalism, on the other hand, has no that indicates the formation of a shared space agenda for creating a transnational national where people engage with xenophobic identity among the overseas Japanese. It is nationalism and offers an opportunity for much more inward-looking and far lessexploring the interface between the Internet inclusive. Netto-uyo’s ‘we the Japanese’ does and nationalism. Besides, even though much not even include all ethnic Japanese, as those scholarship on Chinese online nationalism who do not share their values (liberals, left- focuses on its role in offline activism, it is quite wingers, feminists, supporters of non-Japanese conceivable that there also exist a large residents’ rights, Korean TV drama fans etc.) number of Chinese Internet users who

3 9 | 10 | 2 APJ | JF participates in, for example, online anti- exhibit xenophobia towards immigrants, depict Japanese discussions without ever taking to the Korea and China negatively, and uphold street. If so, this study could offer a framework revisionist history, justifying and glorifying for comparison with such phenomenon. Japan’s wartime actions. They also support political leaders’ official visits to Yasukuni 2-channeru and Netto-uyo Shrine, revision of Article 9 of the constitution, and patriotic education. Although netto-uyo is 2-channeru, or 2-chan for short, is Japan’s most not exclusive to 2-chan, 2-chan is the main popular online community, with around ten playground fornetto-uyo , where this 19 million users accessing it each day. In this phenomenon developed.22 They became visible community the majority of posters post as through a number of Internet-generated 20 ‘anonymous’. 2-chan does not require user controversies that erupted around 2002-2004 registration or email verification – a standard such as those over the World Cup Soccer practice for many English-language online hosted by Korea and Japan, ‘Hate-Korea’ comic forums. There is hardly any moderation, either. books, the so-called ‘ comic The forum consists of about 700 ‘boards’ such book’23 and Dokdo/Takeshima, to name just a as ‘cooking,’ ‘business news,’ or ‘hacking’. few. Each ‘board’ contains several hundred ‘threads,’ with a maximum of 1,000 posts per Though it is hard to establish who they really thread. Once the number of posts reaches are, netto-uyo are generally thought to be 1,000, a new thread is created, and the old individual ‘heavy’ net users who are thread is archived. Some discussions are sympathetic to right-wing/nationalist views, but serious; many aren’t. Depending on the board, few are real-life activists or members of right- posts can be utterly banal, discriminatory or wing/nationalist organisations.24 While they are extreme, hence 2-chan’s nickname as ‘public extremely vocal online and clearly identifiable toilet graffiti’. At the same time, with more as a discursive group, when it comes to real-life users than any other single media site in political actions, netto-uyo’s involvement is 21 Japan, 2-chan is an important medium, with limited to occasional net-driven phenomena considerable social influence. It has had impact such as dentotsu (‘phone attack’ – organised on mass media, too, as mainstream journalists phone complaints on specific issues to sometimes use 2-chan as a news source. government offices, left-leaning media etc.), matsuri (sudden and extreme concentration of Since its establishment 10 years ago,2-chan postings in a specific thread for a limited time) has developed an idiosyncratic online culture, and enjō (rush of critical or accusatory vocabularies and styles of interaction. Racism comments and trackbacks to a specific blog or and nationalism have been part of this 2-chan SNS site) targeting left/liberal opinions and culture; participants of certain boards have sites. Netto-uyo essentially remaingenron- developed an explicitly nationalistic discourse uyoku [‘right-wing by speech’]25 in cyberspace; (in particular, ‘World History,’ ‘East Asia in fact, some action-oriented right-wingers News,’ ‘News Far East’ and ‘Hangul’), earning have criticised netto-uyo for their lack of action themselves the collective name of netto-uyo, or and hiding behind anonymity.26 ‘net right-wingers’. While this does not mean that the majority of the users share such Netto-uyo as an Expression of Social sentiments, there is a clearly noticeableAnxiety of Post-recession Japan subculture within this site shared by those who gather on specific boards. Mirroring the Since the emergence ofnetto-uyo coincided post-1990s historical revisionism,netto-uyo with the marked lowering of the average age of

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2-chan users in 2003-200427 as well as the direct or necessary consequence of the forum deepening of social problems related toparticipants’ economic circumstances or their Japanese youth (e.g. NEET, freeter, hikikomori pre-constituted identity as the ‘new [withdrawal from society]),netto-uyo underclass’. Rather, I believe that their netto- nationalism has often been associated with uyo identity is constructed discursively, by unemployed, low-income or reclusive youths.28 engaging in the types of practice I will describe Linking netto-uyo and young unemployed in the following. people is common among Japanese commentators. For example, a JapaneseThe Tsushima Threads sociologist, Takahara Motoaki, has suggested that recent youth nationalism – including Consider the nationalistic postings on the Internet nationalism – is an expression of the threads that started with the YouTube video social anxiety of marginalised and discontent mentioned earlier. These threads appeared in youths who are struggling in the recession and September 2009 on the ‘East Asia News+’ the resultant board, onesocial of several netto-uyo boards. At the marginalisation.29 According to him,time of the research, most of the threads on nationalistic youths displace their anxiety onto these boards were on Korea-related topics. The imaginary external enemies, while identifying Tsushima thread in question started with a with the fantasy of strong Japan temporarily posting on a Korean-language site Kukinews relieves their anxiety.30 report on a Youtube clip of the aforementioned incident as the increasing number of Korean During the 1970s and 1980s, when thetourists agitated right-wingers. Normally Japanese economy was strong and life-time insignificant in Japanese minds, this small employment and seniority systems wereisland came to attract the attention of some widespread, ‘company’ identity served as a popular media and the netto-uyo especially reservoir for Japanese men’s national identity, following a report on the Korean territorial as loyalty to the company was conflated with claim on the island in reaction to Shimane loyalty to the state as the protector of the prefecture’s ‘Takeshima Day’ and continuing prosperity of the companies they worked conflict over Dokdo/Takeshima issues.33 for.31 The majority of today’s youths, however, are denied secure ‘company’ membership The thread I examined attracted 7,000 postings because of the new norms brought by the extended over seven threads in 4 days. The recession. Downsizing, restructuring,usual limit for postings per thread is 1,000 and outsourcing, flexible employment systems – the majority of topics stays well within this these strategies that companies havelimit; so 7,000 reflects a significant level of introduced in response to the recession that interest. In many ways, these postings were followed the bursting of the bubble have meant typical netto-uyo chatters. First, the thread that many young people fail to obtain stable started with a report ofminor news that jobs on completion of their education. They involved Korea, rather than any major have come to constitute a large ‘new lower international news widely reported on national class’ sector notable for casual service labour, mass media such as TV and newspaper. 2-chan which is unstable and badly paid.32 Under such ‘news’ boards often have a different pattern of circumstances, constructing and attacking the framing and agenda setting from those of TV external enemy figure in cyberspace seems to and newspaper news, partly because of its self- offer one way of dealing with social frustration awareness as an ‘alternative media’ that and anxiety. I would, however, add that the challenges mainstream media and their ‘nationalistic’ identity of netto-uyo is not a ‘hypocrisy’. Typically, a small ‘news item’ like

5 9 | 10 | 2 APJ | JF this one is found in a Korean, Chinese or related issues which had nothing to do with sometimes an English language source,34 and is Korean tourists on Tsushima: the ‘special tax translated into Japanese and posted. The and welfare privileges’ that zainichi Koreans preferred source is popular global media, in allegedly enjoy, the ‘illegal occupation’ of this case the YouTube video clip. ThisTakeshima Island’, kimchi with parasite eggs, particular clip was uploaded with anor crimes by and overseas. introduction in three languages: Japanese, Links were made to a TV news item about a English, and Korean. Secondly, the discussion Japanese boy who was attacked in Korea, quickly turned into a repetition of well-snapshots of anti-Japanese artwork by Korean rehearsed netto-uyo stances, issues and school children, a Youtube clip on a rape by a concerns, not necessarily related to the original zainichi Korean, 2-chan threads on zainichi posting. This is exactly what happened with the pension entitlement and welfare benefits, Tsushima thread, as we will see. Certain shocking images of anti-Japanese vocabularies, enunciation patterns anddemonstrators slaughtering pheasants (Japan’s discursive structures define netto-uyo chatters, national bird) in front of the Japanese Embassy, and we can find them regardless of the thread. and many more. These and other unrelated The presence of visual content that points to events and images are linked together under emotionally potent issues (in this casethe unifying but empty sign of the ‘Koreans’. theYoutube clip of a xenophobic protest), is also very common. The result is to depict Koreans as violent, unethical, overly emotional and irrational ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ people, who are a ‘threat’ to Japan. In comparison, ‘we Japanese’ are portrayed as a Netto-uyo postings on this thread were intense, moral, rational, polite and too tolerant people many exhibiting unrestrained hostility towards who are being taken advantage of—and Korea and Koreans. Given2-chan ’s lack of victimised by—the Other’s aggression, slyness regulation and total anonymity, the tone is and lack of morality. There is a certain irony often extreme. Taboo derogatory terms are here, of course, that while accusing the Other routinely used. Koreans are associated with of lacking morality, such posts are rife with excrement, rubbish, public urination, stealing, crude xenophobic verbal abuse of the Korean prostitution, violence, illegal activity and Other that is hardly moral. ‘Koreans’ in this obscenity. Vulgar and callous statements that forum are a symbol of negativity and a would not be found in the mass media and repository for its participants’ hostility, rather other public spaces abound. Typical postings than real ‘Koreans’ in the sense of the citizens read: ‘Koreans are cancer of Japan and should of South Korea. Its function is to construct leave Japan’; ‘Koreans are the world’s shame; antagonisms between ‘us’ and ‘them’. The ‘parasite rubbish race Koreans should die’, and ‘Korea’ or ‘Koreans’ simply operate as a sign even ‘let’s massacre the stupid Koreans now’. that carries negative values such as ‘inferior’, Such virulent statements were abundant ‘dirty’, ‘shameless’, ‘primitive’, ‘violent’, and throughout the 4 days I observed this‘irrational’. The posts served as triggers for particular thread, and are commonplace in invoking and repeating a clear and antagonistic netto-uyo chatter in general. us/them relationship.

Collectively, the 7,000 postings produced and In reality, this ‘us’ and ‘them’ boundary is a reinforced the negative image of Korea and product of rewriting history, for Japan and Koreans far beyond the Tsushima issue. Forum Korea have a deeply intertwined history dating participants brought up a multitude of Korea- back to ancient times; Tsushima Island itself is

6 9 | 10 | 2 APJ | JF a repository of numerous traces of extensive sophisticated knowledge, art and culture, Korea-Japan relations.35 and talks of deep respect towards the Koreans. (Author’s photographs)

As Oguma Eiji has emphasized, Korea was part of the Japanese Empire until 1945.36 But the netto-uyo posts conveniently forget the colonial history, favouring ahistorical and essentialised representations of homogeneous ‘Koreans’ as Japan’s inferior Other. This is consistent with the postwar myth of homogeneity and general hostility towards Koreans and zainichi Koreans. It is also consistent with recent revisionist-neo- nationalist promotion of anti-Korean xenophobia.

The participants typically blurred distinctions between South Koreans, North Koreans and zainichi Koreans (Korean residents in Japan, mostly second, third, and even fourth generation). Just eight minutes after the original posting about the YouTube video, someone wrote: ‘Zainichi Koreans should get out of Tsushima Island’. This is an odd thing to say because the Korean tourists captured in the Youtube video stepping off the ferry are most likely South Koreans, not zainichi Koreans. The right-wing activists on the video themselves certainly seem to think so, judging from what they are screaming. But no one points this out. Far from it, people join in accusing zainichi of heinous crimes. As the days pass and comments accumulate, more and more postings assert zainichi should leave Japan and go back to their ‘homeland’.

Over the course of the four days, the forum’s participants extended the target of xenophobic commentaries from Koreans to foreigners in general. Some postings criticised North Koreans. Even ‘Chinese’ were attacked a few times. They repeated crude messages like ‘Japan belongs to the Japanese. Korea belongs A stone monument for Korean embassies to the Koreans. Koreans, go home’ and to Japan during the period in ‘foreigners should stay out of Japan’. Some Tsushima. The bilingual explanation board pointed out how European nations that had says that the Korean visits brought Japan accepted immigrants are now suffering the

7 9 | 10 | 2 APJ | JF consequences. Others argued against granting shades of skin colour or the shape of eyes and suffrage to non-Japanese residents.37 essentialise them into racial differences. Indeed one might argue, as with Freud’s “narcissism of Of course, the threads were not entirely small differences”, that the desire and homogeneous. Some marginal minorities did obsession for locating subtle differences could attempt to insert different views. For example, even be stronger when two groups are one participant says of the rightist activity: apparently alike. 2-chan posters, however, do ‘Japan’s shame; I cannot accept such a stupid not seem interested in discussing ‘racial’ action that will lower Japan’s international features, possibly because their ‘Koreans’ are standing’. But this kind of statement is curtly largely symbolic, and not real-life flesh and dismissed, ignored, or identified as intrusion by blood ‘Koreans’. a ‘Korean spy’. The conversation then goes on as if they did not exist. There is noBeing an online community,2-chan lacks engagement, no argument, and no discussion. corporeality and any physical marker of racial This partly has to do with 2-chan’s culture of differences. This means that there is no way of cynicism, where taking other posters’ opposing knowing for certain whether participants are in views seriously and engaging them isfact racially ‘Japanese’. What’s on the screen, considered uncool. Engaging or taking things ultimately, is digitised data and text, not flesh seriously is a common ‘mistake’ noviceand blood. It is impossible to identify the participants are often caught making. In this participants’ ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ identities. The forum participants are expected to ‘read the posters to the Tsushima threads showed air’ and carry on by adding to the existing considerable suspicion and paranoia over cyber conversation with slight variation of themes. To ‘racial passing’. They seemed particularly use a 2-chan net slang, the quality of vigilant toward trolling—anonymous non- mattari—or being laid back, slow, and not Japanese participants planting provocative causing trouble—is valued. postings to stir up and disrupt online discussion—and other identity deceptions along ‘Race’ racial lines. For example, fear over the Other’s Interestingly, although racism and xenophobia seeping into the online community was characterise 2-chan’s netto-uyo discourse, its expressed in their speculations that some construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ contains very posters were pretending to be Japanese, to be few comments on racial traits of Korans or Koreans or even to be Japanese pretending to Japanese. Race is assumed but not argued for. be Koreans pretending to be Japanese. This is noteworthy in light of the fact that historically, Japanese nationalism and national In their attempt to identify the infiltrating unity have been conceptualised around the Other, participants sometimes said to the notion of ‘racial’ homogeneity and purity, in suspected posters: ‘What’s your passport particular, stressing the notion of blood. number? [a non-Japanese, passport number would look different]’ ‘Your grammar is a bit Even though Japanese and Koreans are both funny [therefore you must be non-Japanese]’. ‘Asians’ and therefore racial markers are less ‘No Japanese would specially claim that to be clear than those for ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’, for Japanese [since you say you are Japanese you example, historically speaking, attempts to must be non-Japanese]’ and so on. There was decipher and articulate subtle ‘racial’even a posting suggesting that the original differences between Japanese and Koreans YouTube clip was planted by zainichi Koreans, have not been uncommon. It is always possible thus rendering the whole thing a kind of joke to read differences into real or imagined slight played on the Japanese.

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Such suspicions on one level reflect the fact Japanese boy’. However, it is unclear which that the Internet is a deterritorialised space war, which invasion, or which massacre these that is open to the whole (IT-literate) world; postings refer to. In many cases they have no information, images, and participantsreferent to reality and no one seems to mind. themselves can come from anywhere, their The comments are discursively productive, origin and identity blurred, hidden or unknown. consolidating the ‘us’/‘them’ antagonism and Unlike the physical world, ‘Japanese’ identity maintaining the moral superiority of the online is easy to perform and assume, as long Japanese who are constructed as a victim. as linguistic competency exists. In addition, the anxiety over the ‘true’ identities of theIt seems that dehistoricised and participants is further promoted by thedecontextualised images and symbols are aforementioned 2-chan culture of anonymity gathered together not to represent reality but and cynicism, which makes pretending and to produce new humiliation, new trauma, and other identity plays an accepted practice in this new victimhood for Japan. In this sense they particular online community. The use of are similar to Baudrillard’s ‘simulations’ or ‘self-referential signs’, which are ‘objects and ‘Korean’ voice and stance by Japanese users to discourses that have no firm origin, no referent, achieve an ironical and mocking effect (say, by 38 no ground or foundation’ other than their inserting Korean words likeuri nara or own.40 They operate outside the logic of nida39 here and there) for example, is fairly representation, and hence are immune to common in netto-uyo postings. Uncertainty of rationalist critique.41 Baudrillard’s point was ‘Japanese’ identity thus plagues the seemingly that simulation proliferated as a result of the confident nationalist voice. new media like TV, but the Internet as a Does History Matter? participatory medium carried this trend even further. 2-chan users are not just passive While the posters regularly refer to historical consumers of such signs provided by the mass and political issues between Japan and Korea, media but are producing, performing, and many do not seem to have much interest in exchanging referentless, decontexualised signs actual history or politics. For example: ‘Korea to generate a sense of belonging to a cyber is an enemy country that is invadingcommunity and a fantasy ‘Japan’. Takeshima; Japan is at war with Korea’; ‘In With the Internet, gathering and producing Tsushima Koreans are doing every evil thing information and images is easy, fast and cheap. imaginable, including raping Tsushima women’, We can access far more information far more ‘Koreans have a history of massacring quickly than we could before, and we do not Tsushima people … Historically you Koreans have to rely on mass media. If one wants to find owe Tsushima Islanders more than you can out how “terrible” Koreans (or any other group) ever repay’. Clearly, accuracy is not a major are, such information is only clicks away, concern for these participants; it seems that within seconds. Information is available for these statements are not even meant to be a ‘superdistribution’ to anyone interested, where representation of reality. Strong words like the content spreads quickly and effortlessly via ‘evil’, ‘war’, ‘massacre’, ‘rape’, and ‘invasion’ digital technology without being limited by are exchanged as empty signs without any national borders, defamation laws or historical or evidential basis. Disturbing visual distribution costs. images are also circulated, for example, bleeding pheasants laid on a rising-sun flag, Not Quite a Public Sphere Korean children’s ‘fuck Japan’ art exhibition, or a YouTube clip of ‘a Korean attacking a As briefly mentioned earlier, advocates of the

9 9 | 10 | 2 APJ | JF so-called ‘virtual public sphere’ havediscussion among people who share similar emphasised the Internet’s potential to promote views tend to radicalise each individual’s liberatory practices.42 Building on Habermas’s original position, leading the group as a whole notion of public sphere, defined as a network to thinking the same thoughts in a more for communicating information and points of extreme fashion. According to one study, group view, they have argued that electronicpolarisation is especially strong with communication media have ‘unique capacities anonymous online communication.45 This may to create democratic, participatory realms in at least partially explain what we have cyberspace devoted to information andobserved: that netto-uyo are individuals with debates’.43 Many studies of cyberactivism xenophobic and racist sentiments who gather around human rights, peace movements, racial on specific online forums, where their views equality and so on, seem to suggest the are reinforced via interacting with others of the democratic potential of the Internetsame persuasion. technology. At the same time, we need to caution against Our example from 2-chan, however, makes seeing 2-chan nationalism merely as a more clear that the technology and culture of the intense version of pre-existing, real- Internet, far from promoting public value or life46 nationalism. Human behaviour is mutual understanding, sometimes contributes influenced by the environment in which it to the formation of a unique expression of occurs, and the Internet offers a unique nationalism. As we have seen,2-chan online environment, where people often behave exchanges appeared highly regulated and differently from the way they do in the real patterned, allowing little room for democratic world. Correspondingly, discourses that discussion. On the one hand, the potential for develop on the Internet may exhibit different democratic communication certainly seems to characteristics from those that form outside the be there, as the 2-chan forum clearly provides Internet. In the following I look at how internet- an infrastructure for an information network related elements have contributed to the and open communication, and it has a large specific articulation of 2-chan nationalism and number of participants who speakpoint out that online nationalism challenges us anonymously, free of class, gender and other to rethink our standard understanding of constraints. The participants seemingly have nationalism. political interest and intent, too. And yet 2-chan is a far cry from a ‘virtual public sphere’. It The Internet’s Role in the Formation of 2- does not function as a communication network chan Nationalism for exchanging information and viewpoints to promote democratic values. If anything, what Nationalism is usually associated with 47 goes on there resembles private in-group modernity and nation-states. The collective gossiping, insulated from competing views and identity of national ‘we’ emerged with reinforces insiders’ identity industrialisationby to support the newly unified excluding/ostracising outsiders. It seems nation-states in Europe, and this model spread similar to what Rheingold has called ‘single- to the rest of the world from the late 19th niche colonies of people who sharecentury onwards. In this process, modern intolerances’.44 national media has played a significant role. Benedict Anderson’s classic study of modern 2-chan’s xenophobic nationalism could be a nationalism, Imagined Communities, for product of a phenomenon known as ‘group example, analyses nationalism in terms of the polarisation’, which refers to a pattern where national and territorial imagination supported

10 9 | 10 | 2 APJ | JF by nation-wide print capitalism. Reading a other portable devices let people constantly newspaper each morning, Anderson suggests, access information of their choice and is an (imagined) shared experience, which encourages non-territorial and/or contributes to the formation of nationaldeterritorialised imagination. Further to this, consciousness.48 the new digital environment means that we are no longer passive consumers of media; unlike In contrast, the nation imagined via the mass national print media, which offers one- subculture of online netto-uyo community is way communication, the Internet allows each of deterritorialised and does not exactly coincide us to create our own set of information and with the national boundary. And the media even feed it back to the public space of the content 2-chan users consume can be quite Internet for others to consume, process, and different from that of national media. As pass on, all in bite-size. And unlike the national mentioned earlier, 2-chan users are highly newspaper, in which we inevitably encounter critical of mass media, and tend to gravitate news that we did not intend to read, or ideas towards alternative and extreme perspectives we do not agree with, each of our ‘own set of that have little place in national newspapers or information’ we collect online can be highly TV. personalized, narrow and fragmented.

Today’s digitised media environment means 2-chan nationalism can be seen as one such that we are no longer reading the same technologically mediated small-scale site of newspaper in the same way. As Cass Sunstein imagination. It is not a nation-wide imaginary suggested with concepts such as the ‘Daily Me’ that is supported by national media and 49 and ‘customisation’, with the Internet and stretches as wide as the national territory. portable digital devices such as mobile phones, Rather it is a fragmented and customised ‘Daily laptops and iPhones, each of us is constantly We’ nationalism, representing a small sector clicking away to ‘filter in’ what we want to see and an extreme view. With the Tsushima and ‘filter out’ what we do not want to see. threads, by constantly monitoring, gathering Every time we access the Internet we are and consuming Korean news of an anti- customising and personalising our exposure to Japanese nature, its participants were topics and viewpoints that fit our interests and customising their information so as to reinforce proclivities. This is a different activity from the the view that ‘they’ hate ‘us’, in turn justifying ritual of reading the same ‘national’ newspaper that ‘we’ hate ‘them’. The Internet’s role here with everyone else, every morning. With the is crucial, because without digitised electronic personalised media of ‘Daily Me’, we are communication, it is difficult to efficiently unlikely to be creating a single imagined access and distribute the small, in many ways community for a single nation-state. Chances insignificant, news articles and images that are, by accessing a customised andhave become central to netto-uyo chats. personalised set of news and information each day, we are producing many, partially2-chan Nationalism as Postmodern and overlapping—but never identical—imagined Subcultural Nationalism communities both within and without the physical border of a single nation-state. Implicit to many theories of nationalism is the existence of the modern subject who voluntarily As Yoshimi and Kan have argued,50 digital identifies with and commits to the nation. For media have eroded the national imaginary example, one of Japan’s most influential maintained by national media such as TV and political thinkers, Maruyama Masao, asserted newspaper. Mobile phone, laptop, iPod and that ‘modern nationalism is characterised by its

11 9 | 10 | 2 APJ | JF members’ autonomy and subjectivity’.51 When promotes the modern nation-state.54 There was Anderson talked about the ‘will to kill and die a strong undercurrent that everyone and for the nation,’52 he was alluding to the same everything be relativised rather than point that nationalism arises out of a modern committed to or taken seriously, which renders subject with a commitment to national2-chan nationalism postmodern. The historical solidarity. lack of a modern subject in Japan has often been pointed out. Masao Miyoshi, for example, In contrast, what we find on2-chan is a has observed that ‘the dispersal and demise of postmodern subject characterised bymodern subjectivity … have long been evident fragmentation and cynicism. Even though the in Japan, where intellectuals have chronically netto-uyo discourse has a strong affinity with complained about the absence of selfhood’.55 It revisionist politics, there is little sense of netto- is possible that 2-chan nationalism is simply uyo commitment collectively to any fixed reproducing this ‘Japanese’ tendency online. It position (that is, beyond the basic xenophobia is also likely that this is combined with the discussed earlier), including nationalist and Internet’s tendency to promote a postmodern right-wing positions. In fact, the posters in the subject. Mark Poster’s work, which examines Tsushima threads tended to distancethe link between postmodern subject and themselves from the existing right-wingers and electronic media, for example, suggests that nationalist organisations. The occasional‘electronic communications constitute the attempts of such organisations to recruit netto- subject in ways other than that of the major uyo via 2-chan were largely ignored. modern institutions,’56 rendering them Announcements of right-wing demonstrations ‘unstable, multiple, and diffuse’ (Poster 1995). did occasionally appear in Tsushima threads; In Cyberspace, markers of social belonging but they never produced enthusiasticsuch as ethnicity and gender are invisible and responses. Netto-uyo are far too cynical. In irrelevant (as they say, ‘On the Internet nobody response to invitations to join right-wing knows you are a dog’). Subjects are virtual and activities outside cyberspace, they suggested disembodied. One can assume and experiment things like ‘right-wingers are in factzainichi with multiple subjectivities, and Cyberspace Koreans’ and ‘right-wingers and Koreans has become a ‘significant social laboratory for should both leave Japan’, maintaining aexperimenting with the constructions and distance from real-life nationalists.53 Netto- reconstructions of self that characterise uyo’s anti-Korean sentiments do not necessarily postmodern life’, where one could try on mean they identify with nationalist political different identities and personalities.57 Such an activists, as is seen, for example, in the environment encourages speaking from a following comment on the original YouTube position without full commitment and without video of the right-wing demonstration on letting that position subsume one’s sense of Tsushima: ‘There go the bloody right-wingers identity and belonging. With 2-chan, too, the again. They are no different from the crazy possibility that some of the posters are Korean guy who set a rising-sun flag alight’. ‘experimenting’ with nationalist subjectivities there, while trying out other types of Overall, the Tsushima threads were dominated subjectivities on other sites, cannot be entirely by fragmented, decontextualised and bite-sized rejected. images and statements. Despite the abundant nationalistic vocabulary and sentiments that The lack of modernist commitment and weak positioned ‘Japan’ over ‘Korea’, thesesense of subjectivity means that perhaps we fragmented postings did not develop into a can see 2-chan nationalism as a ‘subcultural’ coherent narrative that legitimates andand ‘apolitical’ nationalism that is akin to a

12 9 | 10 | 2 APJ | JF leisure pursuit, hobby or style that functions to unifying ideology of the nation-state that is create an in-group feeling of belonging to this reproduced through a different channel and online community. The obsession andchallenges us to rethink our understanding of attachment to the fantasy Japan in thisnationalism in the age of global electronic discourse, I suspect, is not the real, existing media. As electronic media and the global nation-state, Japan, but ‘nation as ainformation network is turning the imagination fetish,’58 which is highly media-led, and image- into a global affair, Japan as an ‘imagined’ oriented. It is not the classic kind ofcommunity is also being deeply affected. nationalism based on national pride and belonging to the imaginary community of fellow Of course, the bigger questions of if, and how, Japanese. Rather, the driving force behind it is such a subcultural, postmodern and online the failure to enter the mainstream resulting in neonationalism is linked with more directly frustration and anxiety, which is then projected political nationalist ideas and movements on the ‘enemy’ figure and imaginaryoutside cyberspace, needs to be examined fictionalised and idealised Japan. further to assess its political efficacy. Although netto-uyo nationalism currently remains largely Conclusion within cyberspace, and although cynicism seems to prevail over modernist commitment to To conclude,netto-uyo nationalism is a fixed meaning, the potential for its aggressive and shrill, but fragmentary. Its politicisation and mobilisation exists. As Slavoj coherence mainly comes from the symbol of the Zizek argued in his work on ideology and ‘Koreans’ as Japan’s detested Other. While the postmodern cynicism, the lack of conscious hostility towards Korea, as well as towards commitment does not stop one from acting as if China and North Korea is a shared trend there is such a commitment: ‘even if we do not among all variants of neo-nationalism and take things seriously, even if we keep an revisionism in post-1990s Japan, there are ironical distance, we are still doing them.’ As some elements that are unique tonetto-uyo one of the many strands of nationalisms that nationalism: it is a postmodern and subcultural constitute contemporary Japan’s neonationalist nationalism aided by digital media and global landscape, 2-chan online nationalism should accessibility to information. A product of not be dismissed as mere chatter. borderless Internet technology,2-chan nationalism also exhibits parochial principles of nationalism. Rather than a virtual public sphere, the global and transnational electronic Acknowledgements network has in this case produced an inward- looking and xenophobic nationalism with little I would like to thank Matt Allen, Stephen awareness of the outside world. The oft-pointed Epstein, Manying Ip, Matthew Penney and out democratic potential of the Internet has, in Mark Selden for their valuable feedback on the this instance, been aborted. earlier versions of this paper.

While I am hardly suggesting that the Internet Appendix: typical netto-uyo chats – from a ‘caused’ nationalism, I hope to have shown that thread about the rejection of Korean rescue certain Internet-specific elements (such as team to enter New Zealand following an anonymity, speedy information exchange, easy earthquake in February 2011. monitoring of global news) have contributed to the particular style of online neonationalism. 1 ： [―{}@{}@{}-]Korean Monkeys φ Netto-uyo nationalism is not the archetypal ★：2011/02/25(Fri)

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ID: ??? 663 （´・ω・｀）：（｀ハ´ ）：2011/02/27(Sun) 13:20:48.40 ID:iYOJxnTz Earthquake-hit New Zealand rejects Korean rescue team due to a concern with foot and No country wants Koreans to come. mouth disease. 664 （´・ω・｀）：（｀ハ´ 660 ）：2011/02/27(sun) 14:02:23.53 ID:TXghT97S： Rokudaimhamadadenzaemon◆AKUMA/.c.o Concern with looting, rape, rescue dog eaten, ：2011/02/27(Sun) 10:22:22.44 ID:Cg4n2goz using pet medication.

This shows that today’s Korea is a real source 665 （´・ω・｀）：（｀ハ´ of trouble. ）：2011/02/27(Sun) 14:04:39.41 ID:xKeHh4np

661 （´・ω・｀）：（｀ハ´ Japan should ban Koreans. ）：2011/02/27(Sun) 10:24:56.64 666 （´・ω・｀）：（｀ハ´ ID:H4GeBAxG ）：2011/02/27(Sun) 14:17:39.64 ID:H4GeBAxG The Japanese are ostracising us Koreans. (partially written in mock Korean) >>664

662 （´・ω・｀）：（｀ハ´ You exposed us. (in mock Korean) ）：2011/02/27(Sun) 13:12:29.58 (￣∀￣) ID:FqpSFRYw 667 （´・ω・｀）：（｀ハ´ ）：2011/02/27(Sun) 17:51:41.19 ID:6t+ujcZr Koreans will behave disgustingly to Let’s ban Koreans from Japan. get praise, which will only lead to their bad reputation. If accepted 668 （´・ω・｀）：（｀ハ´ help from Korean, NZ will forever ）：2011/02/27(Sun) 18:22:48.49 demanded to thank Korea. New Zealand knew this and that’s why >>660 they rejected Korean team. No, now just now but also the past. Korean monkeys have vanity, but

not sincerity, modesty, respect 669 ：Asahiruyasuzakijouha＠FREE TIBET towards others. ◆giKoK4gH6I ：2011/02/27(Sun) 19:23:12.80 ID:IHRyVVDZ Even though half of Korean >>662 population are Christians, their Christianity has produced evil There was a Korean who died in trying to save Christians who are totally different a Japanese person at a train station. I have not from Christianity. intention to speak badly of him.

There are no other shameful 670 （´・ω・｀）：（｀ハ´ people like this. ）：2011/02/27(Sun) 19:43:02.18

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We don’t need looters. Gries, P. H. (2005) ‘Chinese Nationalism: Challenging the State?’, Current History 104 (683): 251-256.

Rumi Sakamoto is a senior lecturer in the Habermas, J. (1984)The Theory of School of Asian Studies, the University of Communicative Action. Boston: Beacon Press Auckland, New Zealand, and a Japan Focus associate. She is the coeditor with Matthew Honda, Y. (2007) ‘Focusing on Contemporary Allen of Popular Culture, Globalization and Japan’s “Youth” Nationalism’, Social Sciences Japan. Japan Journal 10 (2): 281-286.

Recommended citation: RumiIida Y. (2003) ‘Shikaku ideorogī to fetisshu to Sakamoto, ‘Koreans, Go Home!’ Internet shite no nashonarizumu [nationalism as a visual Nationalism in Contemporary Japan as a ideology and fetish]’, Gengobunka kenkyū kiyō Digitally Mediated Subculture, The Asia-Pacific 15 (1): 91-104. Journal Vol 9, Issue 10 No 2, March 7, 2011. Iwasaki M. et al. (2008) ‘The Topology of References Post-1990s Historical Revisionism’, positions 16 (3): 507-538. Anderson, B. (1991) Imagined Communities. London: Verso. J-Cast News (2009) ‘2 channerā: igaina jituzō [unexpected reality of 2-chan users]’, [online] Bakker, P. (2001) ‘New Nationalism: The Available here [Accessed: 4 Feb 2011]. Internet Crusade’, Paper presented for the 2001 International Studies Association Annual Kimura, M. (Interview) ‘Uyoku netto-uyoku Convention, Chicago, IL, 20-24 February 2001. o dō miteirunoka [right-wingers’ perspectives on netto-uyo]’, in D. Kobayashi (ed.)Netto- Bureuilly, J. (1994) Nationalism and the State. uyoku tte donna yatsu? [Netto-uyoku - who are Chicago: University of Chicago Press. they?] Tokyo: Takarajimasha: 128-131.

Candan, M. and U. Hunger (2008) ‘Nation Kondo, R. and A.Tanizaki (2007) Netto-uyoku to Building Online: A Case Study of Kurdish sabukaru minshu-shugi [netto-uyoku and Migrants in Germany’, German Policy Studies 4 subcultural democracy]. Tokyo: San’ichi shobō. (4): 125-153. Kosugi, R. (2006) ‘Youth Employment in Japan’s Card, J. (2006) ‘A Chronicle of Korea-Japan Economic Recovery: “Freeters” and “NEETs”, Friendship’, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Focus. Langman, L. (2005) ‘From Virtual Public Spheres to Global Justice: a Critical Theory of Chan, B. (2006) ‘Virtual Communities and Internetworked Social Movements’, Chinese National Identity’, Journal of Chinese Sociological Theory 23 (1): 42-74. Overseas 2 (1): 1-32. Liu, S-D. (2006) ‘China’s Popular Nationalism Eriksen, T. H. (2007) ‘Nationalism and the on the Internet: Report on the 2005 Anti-Japan Internet’, Nations and Nationalism 13 (1): 1-17. Network Struggles’, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 7 (1): 144-155. Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Gavan McCormack, G. (2011) ‘Small Islands –

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Big Problem: Senkaku/Diaoyu and the Weight Poster, M. (2001) (ed.)Jean Baudrillard: of History and Geography in China-Japan Selected Writings, Stanford: Stanford Relations’, The Asia-Pacific Journal 19 (1. 1) University Press. January. Poster, M. (1995) ‘Postmodern Virtualities’, Maruyama, M. (1964) Gendai-seiji no shisō to [online] Available here [Accessed: 10 Feb kōdō [thoughts and actions in contemporary 2010]. politics]. Tokyo: Miraisha. Rheingold, H. (1993) The Virtual Community. McLelland, M. (2008) ‘“Race” on the Japanese Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. Internet: Discussing Korea and Koreans on “2- channeru”’, New Media & Society 10(6): Rheingold, H. (2003) Smart Mobs: The Next 811–829. Social Revolution: Ttransforming Cultures and Communities in an Age of Instant Access. New Miyamoto, M. (2009)Tsushima ga abunai York: Basic Books. [Tsushima under threat]. Tokyo: Sankei- shimbun. Sanstein, C. (2001) Republic.com. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press. Miyoshi, M. (1989) ‘Against Native Grain’, Miyoshi, M. and H.D. Harootunian (eds.) Sasada, H. (2006) ‘Youth and Nationalism in Postmodernism and Japan. Durham: Duke Japan’, SAIS Review 26 (2): 109-122. University Press: 143-168. Seto, H. (2008) ‘Watashi wa naze netto-uyoku o Morris-Suzuki, T. (2011) ‘Guarding the Borders shuchō surunoka [why do I insist on being a of Japan: Occupation, Korean War and Frontier netto-uyo?]’, in D. Kobayashi (ed.) Netto-uyoku Controls’, The Asia-Pacific Journal 9 (8. 3). tte donna yatsu? [Netto-uyoku – who are they?]. Tokyo: Takarajimasha: 73-78. Negroponte, N. (1996) Being Digital. London: Hodder & Stoughton. Sia, C-L., B. C. Y. Tan and K-K. Wei (2002) ‘Group Polarization and Computer-Mediated Nimiya, K. (2003) Koeni dashite yomenai netto Communication: Effects of Communication keijiban [Internet BBS that cannot be read Cues, Social Presence, and Anonymity’, aloud].Tokyo: Chukō shinsho rakure. Information systems Research 13 (1): 70-90.

Oguma E. (1995) Tan’itsu minzoku shinwa no Slater, D. (2010) ‘The Making of Japan’s New kigen [The origin of the homogeneity myth]. Working Class: “Freeters” and the Progression Tokyo: Shinyōsha. From Middle School to the Labor Market’, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Oguma, E. and Y. Ueno (2003)Iyashi no nashonarizumu (Nationalism as Healing). Takahara, M. (2006) Fuan-gata nashonarizumu Tokyo: Keiōgijuku-daigaku shuppankai. no jidai [The era of anxiety-type nationalism]. Tokyo: Yōsensha. Ogura, T. (2005) ‘Sengo nashonarizumu no shūen to arata na nashonarizumu no taitō [the Tanimichi, K. (2005) ‘The Youthful Face of end of the postwar nationalism and theJapanese Nationalism’, Far Eastern Economic emergence of new nationalism]’, in Ishizaka, K. Review 168 (10): 33-36. et al. Higashi-ajia: kōsakusuru nashonarizumu [East Asia: intermingling nationalism]. Tokyo: Tsuji, D. (2008) ‘Intānetto ni okeru “ukei-ka” Shakaihyōronsha: 168-211. genshō ni kansuru jisshō kenkyū: chōsa kekka

16 9 | 10 | 2 APJ | JF gaiyō hōkokusho [An empirical study of right- • Rumi Sakamoto, “Will you go to war? Or will leaning phenomenon on the Internet: ayou stop being Japanese?” Nationalism and summary report]’ [online] AvailableHistory in Kobayashi Yoshinori’s Sensoron here [Accessed: 4 Feb 2011]. • Rumi Sakamoto and Matthew Allen, "Hating Turkel, S. (1997) Life on the Screen: Identity in ‘The Korean Wave'’’ Comic Books: A sign of the Age of the Internet. New York: Simon & New Nationalism in Japan? Schuster. • Ian Condry, Youth, Intimacy, and Blood: Yamamoto, K. (2010) Kokkyō no shima ga Media and Nationalism in Contemporary Japan abunai [Islands at national borders are under threat]. Tokyo: Asuka-shinsha. Notes

Yang, G. (2003) ‘The Co-evolution of the 1 Link (Accessed on 19th Feb 2010; this video Internet and Civil Society in China’,Asian has since been removed due to a copyright Survey 43 (3): 405-422. claim by the nationalist group that organised the Tsushima campaign.) Yoshimi, S. and S-J Kang (2001)Gurōbaru-ka no enkin-hō: atarashii kōkyō-kūkan o motomete 2 Tsushima is about 700 square kilometres in [Perspectives on globalization: in search of a area, and has a population of about 30,000 (as new public space]. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten. of 2010). It is the closest Japanese territory to Slater, D. (2010) ‘The Making of Japan's New any foreign country; on a fine day, one can Working Class: “Freeters” and the Progression actually see Busan from Tsushima (it is, in fact, From Middle School to the Labor Market’, The the only place in Japan one can see a foreign Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. territory with the naked eye.). For an example of recent conservative/nationalist take on Wada, H. (2005) ‘Takeshima/Tokdo - A Plea to Tsushima as a ‘national defense issue’, see Resolve a Worsening Japan-Korea Dispute’, The Miyamoto (2009); Yamamoto (2010) Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. 3 The city council in Masan passed the Zhou, Y., Y-C. Chuang et al. ‘Living on the ‘Tsushima Day’ bill, commemorating June 19 as Cyber Border: Minjian Political Writers in the day when a 15th century general led forces Chinese Cyberspace (1)’, Current Anthropology to take over Tsushima. 46 (5) 779-804. 4 See Oguma and Ueno (2003) for Japan’s Zizek, S. (1989)The Sublime Object of grass-roots nationalism; for Japan’s historical Ideology. London; New York: Verso. revisionism, see Iwasaki et al. (2008). Articles on related subjects 5 McCormack 2011.

• Yoshiko NOZAKI and Mark Selden, Japanese 6 Textbook Controversies, Nationalism, and Zaitokukai was established in 2007 and now Historical Memory: Intra- and Inter-national boasts several thousand members (according to Conflicts its website) and many branches throughout Japan. Its original focus was the so-called • Matthew Penney, Nationalism and Anti- ‘special privileges’ of Korean residents in Americanism in Japan – Wars, Aso, Japan; but their target has now expanded to Tamogami, and Progressive Alternatives foreigners in Japan.

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7 Shuken kaifuku o mezasu kai was established 13 Habermas (1984). in 2006, with a stated goal of ‘fighting against the attempts of China and communism to 14 Negroponte (1996: 236). invade and colonise Japan’ (from the group’s 15 website). For example, Bakker (2001); Chan (2006); Eriksen (2007); Candan and Hunger (2008). 8 Tanimichi 2005. 16 Erikson (2006: 6). 9 In Appendix I have provided a short 17 translation from a typical anti-Korean thread on Gries (2005); Zhou et al. (2005); Liu (2006). another topic, to show 2-channeru’s style, 18 visual quality and subcultural mode of Yang (2003: 405-406). Another view is that expression. the Chinese government manipulates cyber nationalism to put pressure on Japan without 10 While China and North Korea, too, are letting anti-Japanese demonstrations get out of routinely othered and demonized, Korea is2- hand. channeru’s favourite other. Responses to 19 Korea-related topics are almost guaranteed on For example, Mixi, Japan’s most popular 2-channeru. This focus on South Korea in social networking service has about 5 million contrast with offline neo-nationalists’ focus on users, which is about half the number of 2-chan China and North Korea (and the US) as Japan’s users. It is also the case that while 2-chan has threat, is likely to be a product of the earlier been described as the world’s largest BBS, the context for the emergence and crystallization of number of YouTube or Twitter users exceeds 2- netto-uyo. Examples include 2-channeru users’ chan users. See Net Rating/Nielsen Online heated online indignations at South Korea’s (Nov 2008) [online] Available here [Accessed 7 rough play and the referee’s bias towards Oct 2009]. South Korea in the 2002 World Cup Soccer, Korean netizens’ 2004 cyber ‘attack’ on2- 20 From 2003 IP addresses of the users have channeru over Dokdo/Takeshima in 2004, the been recorded, so strictly speaking 2-chan is no phenomenon of the ‘Hate-Korea’ web comic in longer entirely anonymous. A vast majority still 2005 which was largely about2-channeru post as ‘anonymous’, while some choose to use users’ backlash against the extreme popularity pseudonyms. of Korean TV drama and other cultural imports 21 in early 2000s (Sakamoto and Allen 2007). McLelland (2008: 821).

11 An important exception is Mark McLelland 22 Tsuji (2008: 11). (2008), who challenges the ‘Anglophone’ 23 understanding of the online discourse of ‘race’ Motomiya Hiroshi’s historical comic, Kuni ga by closely examining the2-channeru moeru (The Country is Burning), which discussions on Korea and Koreans. Heincluded depiction of the Nanjing Massacre, concludes that 2-chan racial thinking is more became a target of criticisms fromnetto-uyo preoccupied with the link between ‘blood’ and and some conservative politicians, ending with ‘cultural competence’ than that in multicultural an apology, termination of the series and societies like the US or Australia, where ‘Asian deletion of references to the Nanjing Massacre race’ is conceptualised as a single category. when the comic was published in book form.

12 Sasada (2006); Honda (2007). 24 Seto (2008); Tsuji (2008).

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25 Kondo and Tanizaki (2007: 156). the Korean presence in Tsushima is regarded as external pollution and invasion, despite the 26 Seto (2008: 76); Kimura (2008: 129-30). historical Korean presence in Tsushima. Contemporary nationalist discourse seems to 27 2-channeru (2006: 177). A majority of 2-chan be attempting to purge the historical presence users are said to be youth and young adults of Korea and the islands’ memory of it by newly (Sasada 2006: 119; Nimiya 2003: 5); but this reconstructing Korea as an external figure. view has been challenged by one recent survey that found that the largest age group of the 36 Oguma (1995). War-time multiculturalism users has gone up to 33-44. See J-cast News was quickly forgotten after the war. See (2009). Morris-Suzuki (2011), for example, for Japan’s postwar border control against illegal Korean 28 Nimiya (2003: 11-13). entry in the immediate postwar period. Even though many such Koreans were former 29 Takahara (2006). residents returning to Japan after

30 decolonisation, they were treated as Kondo and Tanizaki hold a similar view problematic outsiders and foreigners. (2007: 156-165). For a general discussion of youth employment problem, freeters and 37 If indeed netto-uyo are economically and NEETs in Japan, see Kosugi (2006) and Slater socially disadvantaged young people, as has (2010). been suggested, this type of anti-Korean

31 sentiment may share something with the well- Ogura (2005: 188). documented pattern of the underprivileged 32 These are examples of jobs often taken by national self blaming the immigrant Other – immigrant workers in countries like Europe, ‘they’ are stealing ‘our’ jobs. USA, UK, New Zealand and Australia. 38 A Korean word for ‘my country’. 33 A city council in Masan passed the ‘Tsushima 39 Day’ bill in 2005, commemorating June 19 as A Korean word to mark a polite ending of a th sentence. the day when a 15 century general led forces to take over Tsushima (Card 2006). For an 40 Poster (2001: 1). overview of the Takeshima-Dokdo issue, see

Wada (2005). Following the nationalists-right 41 Poster (2001: 7). wing campaigns and publicity via right-leaning media, there have been mainstream reports 42 Rheingold (2003); Langman (2005). about the Korean presence on the island, too. 43 Langman (2005: 44). 34 Often minor news starts thenetto-uyo conversation. Examples include an anti-44 Rheingold (1993: 207). Japanese statement made by a Korean blogger; a Korean media’s critique of a YouTube video of 45 Sia et al., 2002. Korean ‘foul play’ in the 2002 World Cup; or someone crossing out ‘Japan Sea’ and writing 46 In this article by ‘real-life’ I simply refer to ‘East Sea’ on a world map exhibited in a non-electronic environments outside museum in Berlin. cyberspace.

35 In this respect it is interesting to note that 47 Gellner (1983); Anderson (1991); Breuilly

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(1994). this, but they failed to define the overall discourse. 48 Anderson (1991). 55 Miyoshi (1989). 49 Sunstein (2001). 56 Poster (1995). 50 Yoshimi and Kan (2001). 57 Turkle (1995: 180). 51 Maruyama (1964).

58 52 Iida (2003: 93). Anderson (1991).

59 53 This attitude is reciprocated by the While Korea is constructed as Japan’s Other traditional neonationalists, who tend to be in the Tsushima threads discussed here, ‘China’ dismissive of netto-uyo for their lack of and ‘tokutei-ajia (‘certain Asia’; a 2-chan slang rigorous ideology as well as their hiding behind that refers to China, South Korea and North anonymity, which they consider to be a sign of Korea) appear similarly othered innetto-uyo netto-uyo’s lack of commitment. discourse in general.

54 A number of core posters attempted to do 60 Zizek (1989: 33).

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