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0185-1962-Barraclough-A-IEM.Pdf . _._ ' SUEZ AND HUNGARY POLAND AND WUNG-ARY 81 their sinister roles in the purges of earlier years, had b only result was to stir up demands that Farkas should trial.1 Nor was the long-postponed decision to re- party membership as effective as it might have been earlier. place the reluctant tone of the announcement with its .many r in the second place the delay between Nagy's formal and the resolution to re-admit him 03 ~3 October, 22 October by students and sities and other groups.* But by events in Poland. p1enary session of the marked the beginning Paland in the days failed to-still. - (1956)~p. 9336, n. 68 (citing the special supplement The '"OctoberDays' in Poland Though there was the same evidence of mounting tension, the events in Poland in August and September differed from that in became, of the substantial shift which had already occurred. in the the Pglish-born Soviet gmeral who had of forces within the government and the party leadership. Here, te. Syrop, cyb. cit., p. 64, places him un- noted,s two-perhaps three6gruups were struggling for. the result that the party organization, as Daniszewski subse ' &0%8sa a Ibid., 5. 389; cf. Meray, @. cit., pp. 58-59. For earlier om-, asking Nw cabinet pat on the g~ent~stwpas, cf. ibid., p. s,and Lgqky, p. 34. For Nan' 4 Qct~ber,form& requesting reinstatement, and the resolution of the Politburo on 13 cf. Zier, pp. 3-a Ibid., p. 391. + cf.Itcporsn p. 69 (Text A, 3.31, p.75 lAnnarC,§.7;A~exD,§.2;AMexE,§.4); (=f.Mmhester Gdn,15 October 1956. 82 SUEZ AND HUNGARY "3 were a number of factions, the pressure of events quickly brought b,announce the policy he favoured for Poland and offer himself for elec- their consolidation and on the eve of the meeting of the Plenum two @n as First Secretary; a new Politburo was to be elected, with only nine groupings stood face to face, each of which was angling for the su fkwnbers instead of thirteen, and Marshal Rokossovsky was to be ex- Wladyslaw Gomulka, the only communist leader who could @ded. Gomulka's election was by no means a foregone conclusion, for the confidence of the rank and file of the party and the backing bal decision rested with the central committee of ninety, many of whose Many issues divided them, not least in practical importance ers were still undecided.' But the gauntlet had been thrown down to the Soviet Union; but the basic division was between those who an open trial of strength was now unavoidable. Moreover, it was that popular demands must be firmly resisted and the new freedo ately clear where vovular svmvathies lav. The announcement*of expression curtailed, if the disintegration of the communist system to be halted, and those who, while agreeing that the situation was =----, --o---- - ing to get out of hand, believed that repressive measures would had an electrifting effect, and two days later the Warsaw committee cipitate a revolt and that the party, instead of suppressing the spontane e Polish Youth League drafted a letter, welcoming his return to movement towards democracy, must place itself at its head and guide al life and demanding that he should be restored to the party leader- eventually control it. It was significant that this demand, which showed that the rank and . By the beginning of October evidence was accumulating that, faili as pressing its views without waiting for formal action by the central active counter-measures, the situation of the right-wing, or Natolin ttee, was broadcast by Warsaw radio.3 The rgsult was further was deteriorating. In the negotiations which had been going on be the Politburo and Gomulka since mid-September, the latter had re certain secondary posts which were offered him on the theory the return of Gomulka to power.4 his demotion, he should gradually work his passage to a highe anfronted with this mowing mass movement. which evid~ntlvtnnk and had made it clear that he would be satisfied with nothing less than position of First Secretary.' He had also apparently demanded the r nation of at least four of the thirteen members of the Politburo, first foremost of Hilary Minc, the first deputy premier who had virtually c r----------- trolled the Polish economic system, and the exclusion of Marshal Ro I of raison d'htat in circumstances similar to martial law'-in other sovsky who, whatever his personal inclinations, was suspect as the sym ds, active Russian intervention-went unheeded.$ In fact, there is of Soviet domination.2 The announcement of Minc's resignation on ilence that this was not an emvtv threat and that the Natolin UOUD October was a clear indication that Gomulka had won the first ro Another was the virtual elimination of Franciszek Mazur, the only o " . -- - . -- - - - - - Bolshevik in the Politburo, who disappeared from the active politic sted on theWe;e 07 the ~lknum,leaving the country in the hands of scene during the summer and was rumoured to have gone to live in &c~sovskyand his pro-Soviet allies,' and they were also in contact with Soviet Union.3 By 15 October western correspondents in Warsaw w scow.6 There were also circumstantial reports of Soviet troop move- confidently predicting that all was ready for Gomulka's return.+ In fa . ts. Units in east Germany were said to be concentrating; two weeks the meeting of the Politburo held on 15 October to prepare for the Lare. the Plenum preparations were made for the Soviet garrisons based Plenum on the following Friday, brought the two parties face to face. gnica in the western territories to march on the capital and later they laconic communiqut issued after the meeting merely noted that 'coma bdieved to have advanced to the line Bydgoszcz-Lodz; and it was Wladyslaw Gomulka' had taken part.$ In actual fact, it was widely kno that at least one Soviet division had entered Poland from the east, that the progressives of the so-called 'Pulawy group', now a majority the total immediately available in Poland to seven.' In spite of the almost solid backing of the secretariat, had finally revealed their pl Guardiana 17 October 1956. ' Strobel, op, tit., p. 9329. At the fid meeting of the central committee on 19 October Gomulka archwzcr Guardian, 19 October 1956. SVTOD.06. d..D. 87. * Manchah Gum&, I 7 October 1956; d. Syrop, op. cit., p. 82. Ti,10 October 1956. SY~OP~OP. ~it.2 PP. 84-85. Manches&r Guardiana I 5 October I 956. Text in Zinner, op. kt., p. 195. SUEZ AND HUNGARY POLAND AND HUNGARY 85 the Soviet delegation, that only the first item of business should be pro- these precautionary measures, however, it is by no means clear that I Mos- eeeded with, and that the proceedings should then be suspended until cow was ready to throw its weight behind the Natolin group, and no 6 p.m. After a brief discussion this was agreed to, and when the committee evidence has been brought forward to show that the Soviet leaders were resumed its session at 6 p.m. it was only to hear an announcement by directly involved in the alleged preparations for aputsch. What indications Ochab that the talks with the Russians were still continuing. The session there are suggest, on the contrary, that the Soviet leaders--or at least was therefore adjourned until the following day at I I a.m. Khrushchev and his supporters in the Soviet Politburo-had already There have been many dramatic accounts of the meeting between the reconciled themselves to the idea of Gomulkaysreturn to power and were Soviet delegation and the Polish Politburo, in which Gomulka also took at this stage only interested in bringing it about without an upheaval and part. Ochab, in his announcement to the central committee on the even- on terms acceptable to themselves.' In any case the plans of the Natolin group leaked and counter-measures were taken. The security forces under s 'down to earth'. Later, he General Kornarz were alerted and proved entirely reliable; an auxiliarp d bittery. Unofficial sources militia was formed among the workers in the Zeran factory in Warsaw and arrival at Warsaw airport, the elsewhere; and it soon became clear that the army also could not be relied chev 'shouted angrily' and blustered, upon against the progressive party.3 Hence the coup planned by the atening attitude'. It was also known Natolin group came to nothing, and, making the best of the inevitable; and Ochab, who apparently did they also accepted Gomulka as a candidate for the post of first secretav, s said to have told Khrushchev at not negotiate if the Soviet forces hoping in this way to gain time for manoeuvre and still to be able to prevent approaching Lodz continued their march on Warsaw. That the his election at the forthcoming plenary session.4 This was the situation on 19 October, when the eighth Plenum con- temper on both sides was made vened in Warsaw. No one, in or outside the inner party circles, doubted plenary committee the following that it was a day of decision and the atmosphere was tense. It became ns, fed by false information from even more tense when, in the course of a brief, deliberately unemotional gerated picture of the state of opening statement, Ochab announced that a powem delegation from the mselves that the Poles, seduced nt of throwing in their lot with the capitalist Presidium of the Central Committee of the Soviet communist party, corn: prising Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan and Molotov, had arrived in terly of the 'totally unjustified and unheard Warsaw that morning.
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