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Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science Founding Editor John Symons Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science Founding Editor John Symons Volume 52 Series Editor Shahid Rahman, Domaine Universitaire du Pont du Bois, University of Lille III, Villeneuve d’Ascq, France Managing Editor Nicolas Clerbout, Universidad de Valparaíso, Valparaíso, Chile Editorial Board Jean Paul van Bendegem, Gent, Belgium Hourya Benis Sinaceur, Techniques, CNRS, Institut d’Histoire et Philosophie des Sci, Paris, France Johan van Benthem, Institute for Logic Language & Computation, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, The Netherlands Karine Chemla, CNRS, Université Paris Diderot, Paris, France Jacques Dubucs, Dourdan, France Anne Fagot-Largeault, Philosophy of Life Science, College de France, Paris, France Bas C Van Fraassen, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA Dov M. Gabbay, King’s College, Interest Group, London, UK Paul McNamara, Philosophy Department, University of New Hampshire, Durham, NH, USA Graham Priest, Department of Philosophy, Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, NY, USA Gabriel Sandu, Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland Sonja Smets, Institute of Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, The Netherlands Tony Street, Divinity College, Cambridge, UK Göran Sundholm, Philosophy, Leiden University, Leiden, Zuid-Holland, The Netherlands Heinrich Wansing, Department of Philosophy II, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany Timothy Williamson, Department of Philosophy, University of Oxford New College, Oxford, UK Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science aims to reconsider the question of the unity of science in light of recent developments in logic. At present, no single logical, semantical or methodological framework dominates the philosophy of science. However, the editors of this series believe that formal frameworks, for example, constructive type theory, deontic logics, dialogical logics, epistemic logics, modal logics, and proof-theoretical semantics, have the potential to cast new light on basic issues in the discussion of the unity of science. This series provides a venue where philosophers and logicians can apply specific systematic and historic insights to fundamental philosophical problems. While the series is open to a wide variety of perspectives, including the study and analysis of argumentation and the critical discussion of the relationship between logic and philosophy of science, the aim is to provide an integrated picture of the scientific enterprise in all its diversity. This book series is indexed in SCOPUS. For inquiries and submissions of proposals, authors can contact Christi Lue at [email protected] More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/6936 Claudia Fernández-Fernández Awareness in Logic and Epistemology A Conceptual Schema and Logical Study of The Underlying Main Epistemic Concepts Claudia Fernández-Fernández Departamento de Filosofía Universidad de Málaga Málaga, Spain ISSN 2214-9775 ISSN 2214-9783 (electronic) Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ISBN 978-3-030-69605-4 ISBN 978-3-030-69606-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69606-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Contrariwise, continued Tweedledee, if it was so, it might be; and if it were so, itwouldbe;butasitisn’t,itain’t. That’s logic. Carroll, Lewis (1920). Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. New York: Macmillan. Preface I take the liberty of introducing the main goals of this book with a metaphoric tale that will guide you through the different paths that will be covered. Once upon a time, about thirteen years ago, in a highland, a woman named Sofia gave birth to two beautiful twin girls. Sofia was very fond of Aristotle and Greek Philosophy in general, so she named her girls Episteme and Logos. Some weeks later, there was a terrible fire that burned down the house and took many lives from the small town in the highland. The only survivors were the twin girls, whose destiny was altered tragically. The State tried to find a new family for the girls, but they were forced to be separated, since the only adoptive families they found could only take one of the girls, respectively. Thus, Episteme stayed near the highland with a humble family, while Logos was adopted by a family who lived in the big city. Episteme grew up in harmony with nature. Her family were artists and writers, who inspired her an interest for reading, writing and learning foreign languages. By the age of sixteen she was already fluent in Spanish and French and had learned some German and Greek. When she turned eighteen and finished high school she decided to move to the big city and start a Philosophy degree at the university. Logos, on the other hand, grew up in a technological environment. Her adoptive family were engineers and technicians, who taught her, at a very young age, some programming skills. Thereupon, Logos was attracted to logical puzzles, electrical circuits and computer programming. During her teenage years she enjoyed developing software for making her daily life easier. After finishing high school she decided to study Computer Science at the university. The degrees of Philosophy and Computer Science share a common subject at this university in the first semester of the first year, namely, Philosophical Logic. The first day of class two girls were rushing through the corridor to get to room 314, the Philosophical Logic class. Right at the entrance, before even entering the room, they looked up at each other and their faces went pale. It was as if they were looking at a mirror, but they were not. Their faces looked exactly the same, though their hairs and make-up were different. ‘Who are you?’, said Episteme after starring at Logos for a long time. ‘And who are you?’, replied Logos. ‘Well, I am Episteme from the highland’, Episteme said. ‘And I am Logos from the city. But how is this possible?’, answered Logos looking puzzled. From that moment on, the twin girls began getting to know each other. They obviously did not know that they had a twin sister and, as it turned out, neither did their adoptive families. Episteme and Logos spent most of the following days together, learning about each other’s life. They soon noticed that though they had different interests, their characters had many vii viii Preface similarities and they were both intellectually curious. But, when Logos started telling Epis- teme what her hobbies were, the communication began to fail since they did not share a common background knowledge. Episteme was unable to understand, at first, all those strange programming languages and concepts that Logos tried to explain to her. And also the other way round, when Episteme told Logos about her interest in Philosophy and mentioned some authors and theories, Logos was astonished. She had no clue what her sister was talking about, though she was speaking in English. This initial state of general confusion changed very quickly, once both caught up with each other’s hobbies and its specific vocabularies. At this point, they were able not only to understand everything the other sister said, but also to find some common ground, thanks also to the subject of Philosophical Logic, which they enjoyed very much. As they both grew older, finished their degrees and started their respective academic careers, they decided to collaborate and deepen into the connections between Epistemology and Epistemic Logic, which not only was a hot topic at the time, but also served them for giving a sense to their own life experiences. This tale entails as its moral that though very different in its form, language and methods, the fields of Epistemology and Epistemic Logic share the same root in its foundations and can be reconnected at some point. This is precisely the main motivation for this book. When I realised that these fields of study, which I was aware that shared a common ground, had been growing and developing in almost complete isolation from one another, I felt the need to explore its roots and develop a ‘tool’ for reconnecting them. With the creation of the conceptual schema, that this book provides, the two subjects will find that common ground, though only between two very specific areas (Awareness Justification Internalism and a dynamic interpretation of Awareness Logic). The core concept through which this bridge will be built and that connects the specific epistemological view with a concrete proposal of Epistemic Logic is that of Awareness (in its epistemic interpretations), as will be properly defined and justified.
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