Proc. Indian Acad. Sci. (Earth Planet. Sci.), Vol. 102, No. 2, June 1993,. pp. 283-305. Printed in India.

History syndrome OR Popperian credentials of Geology

P S MOHARIR National Geophysical Research Institute, Uppal Road, Hyderabad 500 007 India.

MS received 12 June 1991; revised 28 December 1992

Abstract. Earth-science is greatly concerned with history. It is argued by some that a historical discipline is not a science. This is contrary to the conclusion from the demarcation criteria of Popper, set to separate science from formal disciplines such as metaphysics, mathematics and logic. Others have spoken of the unity of all sciences. Classification of intellectual activities is based on oenus proximum and differentia specifica. Hence the two viewpoints can be readily reconciled. Earth-science has been criticized variously for being descriptive, inductive, explanatory, etc. Other historical and concrete sciences have also attracted similar adverse comments. These issues are discussed at length to argue that Popper's work should be extended further to define a demarcation of science into immanent and historical. It is also argued that the rignur of cognitive and logical determinants of science is not an adequate reason to embrace sociological models of science. Further, sociological/logical models of science present a misleading dichotomy.

Keywords. Demarcation criteria; historical sciences; Kuhnian model; mathematicalization; earth-science revolution.

1. Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether geology can be a science. Science is a modern catchword. Therefore, everyone is bound to argue that his discipline is science and then proceed to define it. Most such definitions are territorial. The word 'science' is used above in a more specific sense. The question to be discussed is whether geology can be regarded as a science in the strict Popperian sense (Popper 1968, 1979, 1984). Popper has proposed a criterion for demarcating 'science' from other intellectual pursuits such as logic, mathematics, metaphysics, etc. Thus, it is easy to see that the domains excluded from being regarded as scientific are by no means dishonourable or trivial. In the conventional, territorial sense, for example, mathematics would be called a science, but on Popperian criterion, it is not. Popper's criterion is quite exacting. As a result, there is a discernible trend among earth-scientists to move away from Popperian concepts. The strategy is to emphasize the differences from sciences such as physics and to argue that Popper's criterion is not relevant for sciences such as biology and geology (Halstead 1980). This then leads to notions that sciences are inductive or that science is what scientists do. The purpose of this paper is to argue that these responses are unnecessary and unfortunate, as geology can be a science in the Popperian sense. The problem is with the self-image of geologists as well as with the outsider's perception of geology. It is argued that at the level of demarcating 'science' from non-scientific domains, geology has a unity with successful disciplines such as physics.

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Among sciences thus demarcated, it may differ from others. For example, it may then be relevant to recognise physics as an immanent science and geology as a historical one. It is suggested that Popper's work should be extended by developing a methodo- logical demarcation criterion between immanent and historical sciences. It is argued that there is no contradiction in perceiving the unity of all sciences at one level and in dwelling upon their differences at another. In fact, the classificatory principles of 9enus proximum and differentia specifica suggest such an equilibrium. The actual work of scientists is moderated by many pragmatic considerations. However, the definition of what is scientific should not be coloured by these considerations. Thus, the debate between Popperians and Kuhnians (Kuhn 1970, 1976) is quite central to the theme of this paper. It is argued that the two viewpoints are not alternatives to each other but address different problems. A sociological study of scientists should not be used to define science but may suggest how the practice of science could be improved.

2. Sources of doubt and the nature of reaction

"One cannot help noting that of late geology is being mentioned less and less frequently among the most important natural sciences", wrote Boganik (1968). "I categorically object to claims that geology has outlived itself, is in a blind alley...", reacted Belousov (1968). The despair and the reaction need an analysis, as geology is, indeed, a troubled science. "General laws are indeed rare in geology. Why is this so? Is geology not amenable to such generalizations or are geologists too little concerned with the universal aspects of geology? Is geology perhaps still too immature to produce generalizations of wide applicability or have geologists found that, for their purposes, general laws are intellectual traps? Or do geologists,because of their subject matter, have to reason somewhat differently from chemists and physicists? Perhaps we, and the biologists who must also perforce travel a comparable, or even more complex, network of paths, have something different in the way of disciplined reasoning to offer the philosophers of science. Just possibly, the philosophers of science err in judging the goals and calibre of a science by the traditionally rigorous sciences of physics and chemistry. May there be goals other than the general laws of physics with their undeniably beautiful simplicity and vast inclusiveness?", asked Bradley (1963, p. 12). Many questions, indeed. Geology has been called an inductive science because geological laws are rare and it uses generalizations instead. Physics and chemistry are put on a pedestal as rigorous sciences. Schrodinger (1956) distinguishes between "physical" and historical sciences, geology belonging to the latter category. Callinga range of sciences 'physical' is synecdochical (Synecdoche is referring the whole by part, figuratively). Popper (1957) avoids a synecdochic usage and calls the two sets of sciences theoretical and historical. Simpson (1963) prefers to call them immanent and historical sciences. Schwinner (1943) calls geology an "explanatory natural science", whereas Spencer (1884) includes geology among concrete sciences. The proper sets of contrasting terms would possibly be abstract/concrete, immanent/historical, deductive/inductive, quantitative/descriptive, predictive/explanatory and nomological/generalizing. One may be tempted to identify physics as an abstract, immanent, nomological, deductive, quantitative and predictive science. But is there any science which is concrete, historical, generalizing, inductive, descriptive and explanatory? Is earth-science such a science? History syndrome 285

There are many problems here, because the contrasting terms listed in pairs above are not antonyms strictly, but may be merely extremes of a spectrum, may arise by bipolar quantization or exaggeration of the spectrum, may be two terms among a finite set, the two may not be immiscible or an antonymity is meant but is actually not met for a variety of reasons, and there may .be a contingent association among some terms and hence some of the terms may be used metonymically. All this has caused a good deal of confusion. This paper is an attempt to understand it, if not to remove it. Physics is, indeed, largely, though not entirely, an abstract, immanent, deductive, quantitative, nomological and predictive science. Some of these adjectives, such as deductive, quantitative, predictive, etc. are taken to be laudatory, but need not necessarily be so. Other adjectives such as abstract, nomological, immanent, etc. impart significant contingent advantages to physics, but may also restrict its scope. Broadly speaking, because physics can attract these adjectives, it has been regarded as a successful and prestigious science. The contrasting terms to these, then, either have derogatory connotations or bring disadvantages or difficulties in their wake. Each one of these disadvantageous or derogatory adjectives has been used for geology (earth-science), not always with justification. Frequently, they have been accepted by the geologists together with the associated value judgement. This paper intends to analyse the issues from many angles. The title is justified on two grounds. The major factor is that geology is a historical discipline but collecting other attributes also, it is a HISTORICAL (historical, inductive, statistical, teacher-dominated (i.e. doxastic), observational, retrodictive, interpolatory, concrete, artefactual and/ingual (descriptive) discipline.

3. History and Science

Consider two disciplines, one dealing with immanent aspects of the external world and the other whose basic concern is with the history of it. Obviously, the study of history will bring out the immanent aspects; the first discipline is content with merely those, the second discipline recognizes that knowledge, but is essentially concerned with the historical aspects. CoUingwood (1956) observed that "... whereas science lives in a world of abstract universals, which are in one sense everywhere and in another nowhere, in one sense at all times and in another at no time, the things about which the historian reasons are not abstract but concrete, not universal but individual, not indifferent to space and time but having a where and when of their own, though the where need not be here and the when cannot be now" (emphasis added). Thus, the immanent discipline is science and the other discipline is contrasted against it as history, which is not science. Moreover, immanent science deals with abstract universals whereas the historical discipline deals with concrete individuals. Does it mean that the immanent/ historical divide is identical to the abstract/concrete divide? Not really. Chemistry is an immanent science but would still have to deal with 2-mercaptopropylamine disulphide or 5-methoxytryptamine. In fact, the route to understand or define abstract universals may be through concrete individuals. So immanent science, which has no temporal or historical aspects, can deal with particulars and at times can be so engrossed with them that it may not proceed to the abstraction of a universal from them. Similarly, geology is a historical discipline. It may study history of the FaraUon or the Phoenix plate but it can also deal with 'a plate'. When Carey (1976, p. 99) 286 P S Moharir says that an "earth with a thinner mantle" would have produced more plates, one is not even talking of plates or the earth that actually exists, but of plates as universals. One can talk of the San Andreas fault in particular, but so can one of transform faults in general. Thus, it is neither true that an immanent science has no concern with particulars or concretes, nor that a historical discipline deals only with particulars. Is the belief, that science must be immanent, tantamount to assuming that, history not being a science, a historical discipline, or history as a whole, is inferior? Collingwood (1960) adds: "I conclude that natural science as a form of thought exists and always has existed in a context of history, and depends on historical thought for its existence. From this I venture to infer that no one can understand natural science unless he understands history: and that no one can answer the question what nature is unless he knows what history is" (emphasis added). Obviously, Collingwood distinguishes between science and history, but regards history as important. Natural science cannot even exist without history, though the latter is not science. That one can distinguish between the two, does not imply inferiority of one of them, even if it is not called science. Becker (1932) emphasizes that "Much of what is called science is properly history, the history of biological or physical phenomena. The geologist gives us the history of the earth; the botanist relates the life history of plants .... We cannot properly know things as they are unless we know "how they came to be what they are".... Historical- mindedness is so much a preconception of modern thought that we can identify a particular thing only by pointing to the various things it successively was before it became that thing which it will presently cease to be" (emphasis added). If history is not science, it is always the essential context of science and science is properly history, then science is a subset of history. History has a bigger canvas than science on which the latter occupies Some area. In addition, the study of abstract universals is a smaller area than the study of concrete particulars, because the universals deal with communalities, differences among individuals being neglected. Thus, a discipline like geology which is historical and deals with particulars without surrendering the opportunity or possibility of extracting universals has a far wider range of interests than an immanent, abstract science like physics. Is it any wonder then, that it is also a more difficult discipline to pursue? Carnap (1955) has no difficulty in admitting predominantly historical disciplines also as sciences. In fact, he says: "Let us take 'physics' as a common name for non- biological field of science, comprehending both systematic and historical investig.ations within this field, thus including chemistry, mineralogy, astronomy, geology (which is historical), meteorology, etc." (emphasis added). Chamberlin (1904), a geologist, may not be expected to deny the status of science to his own discipline; but his view is of importance because he was a methodologist of science also. "In some sense the earth sciences must come to comprehend the essentials of all the sciences. At least as much as any other scientists we are interested in the fundamental assumptions of all the sciences and in their consistent application", he said (emphasis added). That too, is h statement of unity of sciences. Mark the phrase "earth sciences", rather than geology. As I tend to agree with Carnap, Chamberlin and Becker, who do not deny the status of science to historical disciplines, instead of the cautious and neutral phrases 'historical discipline' and 'geology', now onwards the phrases 'historical science' and 'earth-science' are used, though the idea is not to prejudge the issue and the discussion will continue. History syndrome 287

4. Role of Mathematics

Another distinction that is normally drawn is that physics is quantitative and mathe- matical (even though these two terms are not synonymous, they are usually taken to go together. Graph theory, for example, is certainly mathematical, but not necessarily quantitative), whereas earth-science is much less so. Mathematicalization of a science is normally taken to be an index of the progress in that science and a more mathematical science is taken to be more advanced. Properly speaking, mathematicalization is only a measure of formalization. Even non-scientific disciplines can be formalized. Mathematics and logic are not classified as sciences by Popper (1968). So, mathematics must be the most mathematicalized discipline and yet is not science. The stress on mathematicalization is not necessarily wrong, but it is wrong to confuse it with the progress or health of a science. Huxley (1869) put the point very succinctly: "Mathematics may be compared with a mill of exquisite workman- ship, which grinds you stuff of any degree of fineness; but nevertheless, what you get out depends upon what you put in; and as the grandest mill in the world will not extract wheat-flour from peascod, so pages of formulae will not get a definite result out of loose data." Thus, what is important is that the data and the assumptions be valid. If they are wrong, any amount of mathematics cannot rectify the situation. Fisher (1882) brought out another point, which is ignored by Huxley's powerful metaphor, when he said: "... we cannot but lament, that mathematical physicists seem to ignore the phenomena upon which our science founds its conclusions, and, instead of seeking for admissible hypotheses the outcome of which, when submitted to calculation, might agree with the facts of geology, they assume one which is suited to the exigencies of some powerful methods of analysis, and having obtained their result, on the strength of it bid bewildered geologists to disbelieve the evidence of their senses," Mathematics too has its difficulties, not all mathematics is easy to handle. Therefore, there is a tendency or a temptation to deal with those postulates that can lead to manageable mathematics, without worrying about the veracity of those postulates. The concern of science is not with manageability of mathematics but with the veracity of the axioms which mathematics merely combines and transforms. "The fascinating impressiveness of rigorous mathematical analysis, with its atmosphere of precision and elegance, should not blind us to the defects of the premises that condition the whole process. There is, perhaps, no beguilement more insidious and dangerous than an elaborate and elegant mathematical process built upon unfortified premises", wrote Chamberlin (1899). The certitude and precision of mathematics are not transferable to science. In the debate about the age of the earth, Lord Kelvin proved to be wrong and the view held about the long age of the earth by the geologists prevailed. It was a clash between quantitative physics backed by sophisticated mathematics and geology which was derided as 'descriptive'. Highly mathematicalized science misled because the assumptions made were faulty. Another such situation arose when Jeffreys (1924), who should be credited for furthering mathematicalization of geophysics, was adjudged to be wrong, because his physical assumptions were too simplistic. Plate tectonics, arising out of Wegener's (1915) continental drift theory has come to be widely accepted in the face of all the mathematics of Jeffreys, because the data suggested mobilist interpretation, even though the physical mechanism of drift or plate motion is not understood adequately. In the context we are dealing with, 'descriptive' is not merely a descriptive term, 288 P S Moharir but is used in a derogatory sense. It implies that the argument is entirely verbal and is subject to all the drawbacks of verbosity, anacoluthia, unintended transformation of meaning by paraphrasing, etc. Just to give one example, Read (1957) wrote: "I suggest that, with certain reservations that need not be considered at this moment, the best geologist is he who has seen most rocks." When Mclntyre (1963, p. 3) was recalling this, he said: "I believe it was H. H. Read who affirmed that "the best geologist is he who has seen the most geology". What was suggested with reservations, became at another moment, affirmation, and 'rocks' became 'geology'. But words are a medium. They can be imparted precision and rigour with conscious effort. Developing mathematics and logic are attempts in that direction. It must be appreciated that, in the ultimate analysis, they too have all the drawbacks of language. For example, most of the mathematical theorems are existential in nature. For every polynomial of degree n, there exist exactly n roots. For n greater than 4 there are no formulae that would give those roots. They have to be found out algorithmically and computationaUy. If the polynomial is (x + 1)(x + 2)...(x + 20) = x 2~ + 210x 19 q-... -t- 20[, wherein the roots are - 1, -2 ..... -20, a computational procedure may not give these values. If one adds just 10 -23 to the coefficient of x 19, ten roots appear as complex conjugate pairs with significant imaginary components! (Wilkinson 1959). Is this, in principle, very different from the pitfalls in the use of languages? Hubbert (1987) has documented a case of how American petroleum-reservoir engineers have used an erroneous flow equation for almost 25 years. He has traced the error to Slichter (1899). Wang (1987), writing in honour of Slichter, has indicated that the error was in Slichter's words, rather than in his equations. This is an interesting point. Mathematics may be the language of science, but as we use it, it cannot be used alone. It is embedded in another natural language. There is a continual transla- tion from mathematics to the latter, to facilitate comprehension, to offer elaboration, etc. The latter also provides connection from one mathematical step to the next. So mathematics should share and the mathematician should shoulder the responsibility of any equivocation, ambiguity, confusion or error, arising out of such a conjunctive use of mathematics and a natural language. Mathematics too is a script, has to be scribed down and suffers from the drawbacks of description. To be able to describe is no mean ambition itself, as Camus (1984) pointed out. However, geologists always aimed to achieve much more. The full title of Lyell's book (I 830)is "Principles of geology, being an attempt to explain the former changes of the earth's surface by reference to causes now in operation" (emphasis provided). The aim is to reconstruct the past causally and a severe restriction is imposed that no cause not now in operation would be entertained, so that flights of fancy are curtailed. Explanation and causes are not subsumed under description. To be sure, description was an important ingredient in the work-plan of many an early earth-scientist. Playfair (1811) believed: "If the face of the earth were divided up into districts, and accurately described we have no doubt that, from the comparison of these descriptions, the true theory of the earth would spontaneously emerge without any effort of genius or invention. It would appear as an incontrovertible principle" (emphasis provided). Wood (1985, pp. 5-6) has ridiculed this attitude: "The house of Geology was to be built stone by stone; its foundations were to be wide and imbedded in the solid rock. Without any architect, the house - the theory of the earth - would be finished when all the stones had been laid on top of one another. This was the plan." The ridicule is unfair. Playfair's had been a valid attitude based on the methodological History syndrome 289

work of Bacon. In science, the importance of method is supreme. "Once the method is learned.., men's wits are leveled; any one can do science", said Hesse (I964). It is in this Baconian sense that Playfair did not need any genius, once the descriptions were available. The architect was merely to follow the Baconian inductive procedure, in which comparison is the main tool. Baconian confidence in the powers of induction has been deflated by the subsequent methodologists of science, but that is another and later story. The fact remains that many early scientists, not only geologists, believed in induction, of which accurate description was the beginning, but only the beginning. 'Descriptive' is thus a derogatory term applied to the practice of induction. Induction was put forth by Bacon as a scientific method based on experimentation and comparison against the degenerate practice of doxastic logic, even in empirical matters. His suggestions were then progressive. Empirical world was a better beginning than authoritative word. In the practice of hypothetico-deductive method also, eventually the outcome of the experimentum crucis must be described. The aims of earth-science have not remained frozen. Earth-scientists are no more diffident about the use of mathematics. In fact, there has already been a criticism against excessive but blind use of mathematics in earth-science (White 1987). This may mean that the kind of mathematics that is appropriate in some other sciences does not yield dividends in earth-science. That may not merely mean that earth-science is not an exact science but only that it is an exacting science; that it poses problems for mathematicians which have not yet been tackled.

5. Is Geology a Science?

That geology is only an explanatory discipline which tries to explain past and is not a predictive science is also an argument which tries to establish its non-scientificity. At times the argument is too sweeping and carelessly claims more than what can be logically sustained. There is a notion of a crucial experiment. Whenever there are two competitive hypotheses, their predictions in some situations could be divergent, If thai situation could be experimentally established, one could observe what actually happens. That would then settle the issue. The inherent assumption here is that the experimenter is in a position to create the situation which will discriminate between the hypotheses. We may be dealing with objects which are not within the realm of human manoeuvrability. Then we would have to wait till such a discriminating situation arose on its own, and be content observing it then. That such a situation could arise very rarely or very late is not reason enough to say that such predictions are not acceptable. What the experimentum crucis deals with is a potential testability, not an actual testability in someone's lifetime or employment tenure. The issue at stake is logical and not chronological. Observational discipline need not be disqualified from being scientific because the issue is not whether man can control things at will, but whether the hypotheses are self-insulatory, so that no facts could disprove them. There is also a case of selective application of an argument to prove that geology (or any historical discipline which is basically concerned, with explaining the past) is not a science, without bothering about whether under such an argument, any discipline is scientific at all. Such an argument has been offered by Weber (1927): "... suppose that we reconstruct the world's past, by applying our present laws to the data of the 290 P S Moharir world's present state. It is evident that we could never meet with a contradiction in making this reconstruction, provided that no disharmony existed between our present data and laws. Then, suppose we find deep in the earth a geological condition which shows a past different from the one we have reconstructed? Will we conclude that the laws of mechanics have evolved, and that they were different in the past? No, for the scientist can always say that our present laws of mechanics are faulty, and must be modified to cover new facts. This amounts to saying scientific laws do not enable us to recover historical facts." In this argument, the reference to time and history is contrived and inessential. 'Present laws' and 'the world's present state' could be replaced by 'the laws derived from our empirical experience in a finite domain' and the 'description of that finite domain in some parameter-space.' The extrapolation would then take us outside this domain. If what is actually observed contradicts the extrapolation, will we conclude that the laws are different outside the described domain? No, we may merely say that the laws have been wrongly abstracted from the empirical experience in a limited domain and must be modified to cover new facts. So, this amounts to saying that scientific laws do not enable us to extrapolate beyond the domain of the empirical experience from which the laws have been abstracted. This is a truism. Only a particular case of it has been selected for presenta- tion to argue that historical reconstruction is not fool-proof. In a predictive discipline, when the prediction goes wrong, what stops us from saying that the laws on which the prediction is based are wrong? In fact, that should be the conclusion drawn. Does it then follow that 'scientific prediction is not possible? The question as to whether geology was a science has been frequently raised. "Geology... was the first science to be concerned with the history of nature rather than its order .... That its historical character made geology a different sort of science was appreciated from the beginning of its development. Doubts were sometimes expressed as to whether it could properly be called a science at all. Since the geologist, like the historian, had to rely largely on ancient relics and monuments of change, his conclusions were thought to be debatable in a way that those of the physicist, for example, were not," wrote Gillispie (I 951). History is the essence of geology. "I cannot agree with Bailey (1967) that Hutton was the founder of modern geology, because of the ahistorical nature of his work, and geology is nothin9 if not an historical science", wrote Hallam (1989, p. 60). There seems to have been a widespread impression among geologists that their discipline was not accepted as a science. Being a historical discipline seems to have caused all the doubts. The reactions have been many. Goudge (1958), for example, says: "... the model of a hierarchical deductive system, so often presented as the ideal to which the theoretical part of every science should approxi- mate, is not relevant to the sciences concerned with natural history, however much it is relevant to non-historical sciences". So, if deductive ability is advanced as the indicator for a discipline to be scientific, Goudge begins by questioning such a definition. Halstead (1980) thought that "Popper's definition of science is such that all disciplines with an historical or time component are automatically excluded." Hallam (1989) also shares this impression. "By his (Popper's) rigid demarcation criterion.., theories in the historical sciences, including the theory of evolution by natural selection, would be excluded from true science because falsification in the strictest sense is not possible" (p. 224),he wrote (emphasis provided). Halstead (1980), therefore, wrote to defend historical sciences against Popper. He shows that Popper was disenchanted with Marx, Marx was the champion of history, therefore, Popper History syndrome 291 disliked history and worked to deny historical disciplines a status of science. Bondi, a renowned physicist, responded to Halstead's accusations and wrote (Bondi 1980): "My interpretation of Popper's teaching is radically different from Halstead's, because I see it in no way excluding historical sciences (like palaeontology) from the realm of science. The essence of Popper's criterion of demarcation is that a scientific hypothesis must be disprovable empirically, not that the disproof need be direct." Popper (1980) himself wrote to clarify his stand: "... it does appear.., that some people think that I have denied scientific character to the historical sciences, such as palaeontology, or the history of the evolution of life on Earth,... This is a mistake, and I here wish to affirm that these and other sciences in my opinion haoe scientific character: their hypotheses in many cases can be tested. It appears as if some people would think that the historical sciences are untestable because they describe unique events. However, the description of unique events can very often be tested by deriving from them testable predictions or retrodictions" (emphasis provided). Hallam (1989, p. 224) comments that Popper has "backtracked" his earlier view. This is a misinterpretation. Popper has affirmed his ,r that historical disciplines, merely by dealing with unique events, do not become nonscientific. The criteria of scientificity remain testability and falsifiability and historical disciplines can meet them. He has talked of predictions and retrodictions in the same breath. What is testable or falsifiable need not necessarily be a prediction, it can as well be retrodiction. They are both deductions from the hypotheses, which is what is needed. The mistake is what "some people think." It has been made by those who attributed a wrong view to Popper. Popper has corrected that mistake and has not backtracked. But the impression that Popper regarded historical disciplines as nonscientific has persisted. That Popper regarded Darwin's theory of evolution as non-scientific, was used as a rhetorical and eristic argument by the theologists in America, to claim that biblical creationism should have equal time with evolution in the curriculum. A good analysis of this creationist attempt has been made by Gould (1984). Without going into details, the mischief in the creationists quoting Popper can be exposed by just two quotations from Gould: "they misuse a popular philosophy of science (the reference is to Popper) to argue that they are behaving scientifically in attacking evolution. Yet the same philosophy demonstrates that their own belief is not science, and that "scientific creationism" is a meaningless and self-contradictory phrase, an example of what Orwell called "newspeak"." "The entire creationist program includes a little more than a rhetorical attempt to falsify evolution by presenting supposed contradictions among its supporters. Their brand of creationism, they claim, is "scientific" because it follows the Popperian model in trying to demolish evolution. Yet Popper's argument must apply in both directions. One does not become a scientist by the simple act of trying to falsify a rival and truly scientific system; one has to present an alternative system that also meets Popper's criterion--it too must be falsifiable in principle." Misrepresenting a view for rhetorical and motivated reasons is a standard practice and one should see through it. Misrepresentability of a view is a defect which can hardly be corrected and, therefore, it is illogical to abandon a viewpoint merely because there has been a concerted effort to misrepresent it. The true issues, indeed, are very different and deep. The adjective 'scientific' is not to be attached to disciplines. Disciplines are defined for administrative convenience in universities and for trade-unionist purposes in professions (division of concern, 292 P S Moharir responsibility, employability and credit). This pigeonholing is based on the content and the functions. Essentially, it is a territorial question. On the other hand, what is scientific, is a methodological question. Therefore, that adjective can only be applied to individual theories, research programmes (Lakatos 1976) or traditions (Laudan 1977). Therefore, in every discipline there has been a continuous problem of sifting what is scientific. Neither would all of physics be scientific, nor all geology un- (or non-) scientific.

6. Migration to Kuhn: A critique The problem of separating what is scientific from nonscientific has been called the problem of demarcation (Popper 1968, p. 34). Many solutions have been offered and debated. These are all proposals (Popper 1968, p. 37). William of Occam is said to have achieved such a separation by his nominalist stand. He argued that empirically there are only particulars, universals are merely words. The latter may facilitate a discourse but have no real existence. Therefore, by pointing out the empirical importance of particulars he had "set the stage for an empirical and scientific way of thinking about the facts of experience. His Nominalism had the effect of separating science from metaphysics" (Stumpf 1989, p. 198). Another historically important contribution to the problem of demarcation was made by Bacon who believed in careful observation and controlled experimentation and the method of science was induction from the particulars to the general. He did not propose induction merely from enumeration but his method depended on drawing tables of essence and presence, deviation, comparison and exclusion (Stumpf 1989, pp. 223-224). Bacon was very confident of what he was proposing, He believed that whatever was done prior to him was worth forgetting to make a fresh and careful start. Hence he called his work 'Great Instauration'. He opined that the "inquiries into nature have the best results when they begin with physics and end with mathe- matics" (Bacon 1939). Physics here means 'empirical observations' made by the mind as 'tabula rasa'. The mind must be blank before observations are made, no theoretical bias should be there. Bacon's views came to have enormous influence on the minds of scientists. Many regard him as a father of modern science. Many geologists believed in a Baconian model of science. Collection of particular facts 'uncoloured' by the theoretical expectations itself then becomes a great and meaningful endeavour. The phase of generalizing could always be postponed arguing that the data are still inadequate. The flaw in an inductive model of science was pointed out by Hume (1955). It is that the inductive conclusion does not logically follow because the pattern observed thus far (not necessarily in time) may not.continue beyond, irrespective of how long it has held. Therefore, inductive generalization asserts more than what logically follows. Popper's (1968) criteria of scientificity are testability and falsifiability of a hypothesis under consideration. How the hypothesis is conceived is not of concern to Popper. That is a topic falling under a different discipline! The deductions from the hypothesis regarding the empirical world should be tested and if they are not borne out by empirical facts, the hypothesis should be viewed as incorrect. Popper suggests that the aim of a scientist is not to improve the longevity of his hypothesis by making ad hoc alterations in his hypothesis so that the discordant fact is now explained by it. History syndrome 293

He should, on the other hand, specify empirical conditions under which he will (logically) abandon his hypothesis. Thus, a scientist is not attached to his hypothesis. He is not perturbed when his hypothesis is empirically falsified. That, indeed, is a mechanism through which progress takes place. There is no loss of face for a scientist in that situation. Popper is dealing with the logical and not the psychological or pragmatic aspects of science. This is an important point. Scientists, as professionals embedded in a social structure and its sustenance and reward system, trying to establish priority, get credit and establish traditions, as individuals, undergoing competitive pressures, enjoying ecstacy of involvement, discovery and achievement, and subject to vagaries of opportunities, do indeed exist. For such scientists, which problem to work on, which theory to adhere to and when to switch allegiance to another theory, are all pragmatic questions. Scientists can thus be studied as individuals or as groups, leading to psychological and sociological analyses of scientists. Such a task has been performed by Kuhn (1970) and it has been highly applauded by earth-scientists. "Kuhn has highlighted major features of science with a most illuminating conceptual model and has been perceptive in challenging the conventional view of cumulative progress. The earth sciences do indeed appear to have undergone a revolution in the Kuhnian sense", wrote Hallam (1973, p. 108), while narrating the story of ascendance of plate tectonics. There is no doubt at all that scientists have psychological and sociological compulsions and that these interact with their work qua scientists. One report of a geological debate tells us that Buckland got up "amidst the cheers of the delighted assembly, who were, by this time, elevated by the hopes of soon getting some tea (it was quarter to twelve p.m.)" (Woodward 1908). Who would deny that science has sociology, punctuated by tea-time, etc. which under the synchronization of culture (Toffier 1981) would indicate that 11.45 is indeed late for tea? On the other extreme, scientific activities could be truncated or reoriented by wars, so that Wiener, Wigner, Oppenheimer, Fermi, Feynman, Von Neumann, etc. all work on making a bomb. But after the tea is sipped, the lunch is had and the war is over, the scientists should resume the thread of their work and discussions in a rational manner. Before proceeding further, it is useful to summarize the Kuhn (1970) model. The scientists are trained in a particular paradigm which comprises a "strong network of commitments, conceptual, theoretical, instrumental and methodological" (p. 42). Paradigm is "the source of the methods, problem-field, and standards of solution accepted by any mature scientific community at any given time" (p. 102). The role of a scientist is to adhere to a paradigm in which he has been schooled and sort out the difficulties the paradigm faces by his skill, analytical, observational, instrumen- tational, experimental. If some difficulties persist, it is a failure not of the paradigm but of the scientists. This is the "normal" mode. However, there are situations when the difficulties faced by the paradigm are many, vital and urgent. A new paradigm may seem to fare better, in which case, scientists switch their loyalty to it and work in the normal mode again. This transition is a revolution. It is not actuated by logical imperatives. "Competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs" (p. 147), it is, in fact, more akin to a religious conversion experience (p. 150). The crisis faced by the paradigm is not logical but psychological and is resolved by conversion. The competitive paradigms otherwise are "incommensurable". There is no communication between their adherents. Kuhn's model is, thus, not merely a sociological model, but the role of rationality and logic is deliberately 294 P S Moharir

underemphasized or even denied. "In Kuhn's view there can be no logic but only psychology of discovery", complained Lakatos (1976, p. 90). That is its defect. One cannot deny that scientists have psychology and sociology. These are verifiable facts. But one need not exaggerate their importance to say that there are no other considerations (Barrow 1988, p. 336). That attitude would then be psychologism or sociologism, converting valid disciplinary studies into exclusive ideological polemics. To say that Kuhn's sociological model of science describes accurately what happened in earth science (even this is questionable) is not to suggest that it should be accepted as a model, in the sense of an ideal. While analyzing why Wegener's ideas were not well-received, Hallam (1973, p. 111) wrote: "Another reason for lack of acceptance was the partiality of Wegener's critics, who were normally only concerned with their own specialized field. It is quite clear reading the inter-war literature that there was virtually no intellectual communication for example, between the geophysicists on the one hand and the biologists (including palaeontologists) on the other. It required an outsider such as Wegener to point out that the latter group's land bridges were untenable, but that the intercontinental faunal and floral similarities had to be explained somehow" (emphasis provided). Lack of communication may be a Kuhnian litmus, but it suggests a pathological condition to be removed, if possible. The role of the unschooled outsider in reversing fragmentation of scientists in uncommunicating discipline - confined local paradigm - adherents is not recognized by Kuhn, but must be encouraged. Completeness of empirical evidence and integration of different perspectives are logically and cognitively desirable, even though scientists may inertially resent them. Hallam (1973, p. 113) says this more explicitly a little later: "The trouble must partly have been that Wegener was not an accredited member of the professional geologists club; at least one senses the undertones in the literature. We of course now see it as a positive advantage that Wegener had not been brainwashed by the conventional geolooical wisdom as a student. The key role that an outsider can play in transforming the world view in a particular subject is now well recognized" (emphasis provided). Paradigm-loyalists are enrolled and accredited. These are administrative or pragmatic arrangements, frequently not formal but implicit and yet effective. Science progresses because some have not been initiated effectively within the prevalent paradigm. How scientific debates can be moderated and modulated by sociological, organizational and other nonscientific considerations is illustrated by a story about the debate between Sedgwick and Murchison told by Hallam (1989, p. 81). Fora closing, when one side in a debate has differential advantage, on the pragmatic consideration of paucity of 'space', the felt need to present science as a unified front against the antirational, nonscientific or antiscientific, even if it necessi- tates abandoning free scientific debate, scientists feeling ostracized by the responses of professional associations of scientists, are all genuine pragmatic realities of the social conduct of science. And yet in the pursuit of scientific validity of theories and in the cognitive assessment of rival hypotheses, these are hindrances, which one hopes, do not become strangleholds. "If we were to believe Wegener's hyothesis we must forget everything which has been learned in the last 70 years and start all over again", starkly remarked a scientist attending 1928 AAPG Symposium (Chamberlin 1928, p. 87). This is in conformity with Kuhn's view that paradigm-shift does not constitute progress, it is merely an inconvenience. "There is always a strong inclination for a body of professionals to History syndrome 295

oppose an unorthodox view. Such a group has a considerable investment in orthodoxy: they have learned to interpret a large body of data in terms of the old view, and they have prepared lectures and perhaps written books with the old background. To think the whole subject through again when one is no longer young is not easy and involves admitting a partially misspent youth .... Clearly it is more prudent to keep quiet, to be a moderate defender of orthodoxy, or to maintain that all is doubtful, sit on the fence, and wait in statesmanlike ambiguity for more data (my own line till 1959)", wrote Bullard (1975) (emphasis provided). He is not talking of scientists but of professionals (this is an important distinction, see Price (1965), who distinguishes four estates: science, professions, administration and politics, with very different aims, priorities and values). Considerations are starkly practical, viz. investment (in time, effort and money, which are all interconvertible), the sale of books, and psychological, but when the scientist in the professional wakes up, his procrastination in taking sides is to be terminated by "more data". "Finally, one must not underestimate the role of sheer conservative prejudice and intellectual fashion, and the great emotional security obtained by adhering to the established ideas" (emphasis provided), advised Hallam (1973, p. 113). Not to underestimate something is different from accepting it as desirable. If scientific issues of veridicity of data, consistency of the hypothesis with data, logical validity of the application, etc. are at stake one better stay clear of the prejudices, fashion and considerations of emotional security, as consciously as possible. The stronger their hold, the more forceful should the corrective measures be. Kuhn has precisely been criticised for not distinguishing science from other logically less demanding human indulgences. While talking of the good fit the behaviour of scientists has with the Kuhn model, Barrow (1988) wrote: "The reason why it is possible to squeeze the practice of science into its confines is probably because the same can be done with just about any activity: organized crime in Chicago, styles in high-jumping, terrorism, football tactics, car design, Paris fashions: you name it and Kuhn's theory applies." Bacon began by prescribing psychotherapy to scientists against the three distempers of fantastical, contentious and delicate learning and four idols of the cave, the market-place, the tribe and the theatre (Stumpf 1989, pp. 222-223). He had understood correctly that the scientists' job was to exorcize them, though the method he suggested was inadequate and flawed. Let Kuhn not put the clock bacl: by mistaking the descriptive reality of such factors, with their inevitability or normative desirability. They may persist but should not finally (changing the emphasis of Hallam in the above quotation, which must be inadvertent) prevail in science. To be fair, it must be pointed out that Kuhn (1976) has subsequently revised many of his views. The paradigm-shift is no more entirely irrational, there is progress in science, the competing paradigms are not totally incommensurate, etc. But the changes he has made are Kuhnian in spirit; it is an attempt to adhere to the sociological and historical paradigm he had presented by making ad hoc changes where essential. This has made his later views more incoherent (see Shapere 1971). Peirce (1957, pp. 12-13) has argued that the purpose of holding a belief is to nullify mental tension created by doubt. Yet he discredits methods of tenacity and authority as worthless for scientists, because they are by conscious choice more interested in pursuing truth than in mere settlement of opinion. Kuhn has not appreciated this distinguishing trait in scientists. 296 P S Moharir

7. Return to Popper and beyond

Under the mistaken notion that according to Popper's 'rigorous' criteria for scienti- ficity, historical disciplines do not qualify, the latter have shied away from the former and many earth scientists have turned to the sociological or historical model of Kuhn. (It must be added here, that many earth scientists have never migrated to Kuhn). There are many mistakes in this. Firstly, the demarcation criteria do not operate on disciplines as entities. So there is no question of any criterion of scientifieity disqualify- ing a whole discipline. It is only the theories, research programmes or traditions that are classified by the demarcation criteria. It is not true that concern with history will disqualify them, per se, from being scientific. Secondly, the classification worked out is not fixed. Prediction of a testable or falsifiable result presumes what can be observed, measured or estimated. As measurement techniques evolve, newer entities become observable, measurable and estimable. So, a disqualified theory can later qualify as scientific. Disqualification by Popper's criteria may then suggest directions where the effort should be concentrated, or at least, motivate such an effort. Thirdly, Kuhn's model is not a 'model' for action, not a model that one should attempt to adhere to. It is a historical description of how an average scientist works, it may suggest how a good scientist should not work, or what a good scientist should avoid. While discussing why Wegener might have failed to sway the consensus of earth-scientists towards his views, Hallam (1973, p. 109) says: "A number of reasons can be put forward, not all of them redounding greatly to the credit of the Earth science community." Is that in spite of the story of earth-science conforming to the Kuhnian mould or because of it? In any case, it is a welcome admission that there are normative expectations from scientists. Fourthly, if Popper is adjudged as harsh, unjust or irrelevant for earth science as a historical discipline, one should not swing to Kuhn. They are not alternatives. An alternative to Popper must be another logical and cognitive criterion, another normative definition. If Kuhn is found wanting or in- accurate as a describer of how scientists behave, one must turn to better sociologists of science. Le Grand (1988), Rudwick (1985), Secord (1986) and Oldroyd (1990) have shown that such alternatives are already available, one of them being Laudan (1977, 1984). They show that social factors are important, modulate the controversial debates, condition the disputes but do not entirely determine their resolution, cognitive factors do assert themselves. Normative and descriptive studies of science supplement each other rather than supplant. They provide the ideal to strive for and the social pathology respectively, so that one can decide what to encourage and what to correct for in the sociological dynamics of scientists.

8. Extending Popper

It is certainly true that Popper;s work is inadequate or incomplete. It is a great piece of work because it is bold, honest and unafraid of proposing rigorous and difficult objectives. But it is incomplete because it has taken a rigid reductionist and disciplinary stand. In fact, the term demarcation used by him is a trade unionist term (Geddie 1966). He has left important and relevant issues out, as belonging to different disciplines. The issue of how scientists conceive (or should conceive) hypotheses is untouched by him. In historical and concrete sciences, conception of hypotheses is History syndrome 297 more difficult Peirce (1957) talks of deduction, induction and abduction as three modes of scientific thinking and brings out interrelations among them. The relations are analogous to those among the system-theoretic trinity of forward problem, inverse problem and system identification. According to him, deduction is merely explicative or analytic; only the other two modes of thinking play the amplificative or synthetic role. The first of these statements is frequently used to condemn deduction as it cannot lead to growth of knowledge. If knowledge is what one can assert, use (even in nonutilitarian ways) and depend on, it must be explicit and not only potentially and logically existent implicitly in the codified axioms. Many deductions could be totally unforeseen and in that sense add to explicit knowledge. Further, very rarely can the axioms of empirical science be testable and falsifiable directly. In this sense deduction is useful to test the relevance of the axioms to the external world. Similarly, the second statement is convertible into a criticism of induction and abduction--as cases of paralogism, as they assert more than what is logical. But why should they not be admitted as suggestions to be further operated upon by the logical apparatus of testability and falsifiability, if the latter can never get their own operand logically? In the normal Criticisms, thus, there is a fallacious assumption that whatever can be separated by definition must be used in isolation and exclusion. Differentiable processes can also be used conjunciively with different or even overlapping roles. In historical and concrete sciences, the mortality of hypotheses is also larger. That makes generation of hypotheses a more important problem in them. It is interesting to look at the debate between Lord Kelvin and Chamberlin from this angle, because it involved a confrontation between a physicist - a votary of a deductive, immanent science, - and a proponent of earth-science which is historical and concrete. Chamberlin was a methodologist of science. He proposed a method of multiple working hypotheses (Chamberlin 1890) as against the two other methods he disposes off--methods of ruling theory and provisional hypothesis. A simple combinatorial consideration would indicate that there is yet another method--that of multiple ruling theories. The method of ruling theory is what Kuhn's (1970) normal science is. The method of provisional hypothesis is more honest, all facts are to be consciously sought and examined. But, "the mind rapidly degenerates into the partiality of paternalism", even if tile hypothesis is provisional, as an "intellectual child" it tends to get protected. Then it is hard to differentiate between the methods of ruling theory and provisional hypothesis. Chamberlin's preferred method is proposed to get over "the dangers of parental affection." The advantage is that "the re-action of one hypothesis upon another tends to amplify the recognized scope of each, and their mutual conflicts whet the discriminative edge of each. The analytic process, the development and demonstration of criteria, and the sharpening of discrimination, receive powerful impulse from the co-ordinate working of several hypotheses." During the centenary of Chamberlin's methodological paper, there was an irreverent comment (Johnson 1990), possibly to justify the method of ruling theory. In the end, it says: "The goal of MWH is perhaps accompanied these days by the totality of minds and motivations in a diverse scientific community, acting through time, but not in the mind of any single individual". Reacting to Johnson and defending Chamberlin, Locke (1990) pointed out: "However, the method is used continuously by disciplines" (emphasis in the original). Johnson (1990) in his reply rightly said that it is more than what Chamberlin meant. When two or more theories are being cultivated within the discipline in an adversarial mode, we have what Chamberlin forgot--the method of multiple ruling theories. Johnson 298 P S Moharir argued that this method, perhaps has the advantage of Chamberlin's method and hence an individual is freed from the tyranny of the latter. Locke thought that the advantage was due to the multiplicity of explanations and hence the two 'multiple' methods were equally advantageous. The Kelvin-Chamberlin debate indicates that both Johnson and Locke are wrong; the method of multiple working hypotheses l~as advantage over the method of multiple ruling theories. Kelvin (Thomson 1862) was confident of his theory and his conclu- sions. They could not be wrong "unless sources now unknown to us are prepared in the great storehouse of creation." Kelvin's clause is in the spirit of stating a counter- factual. He did not think it could be so. It was a rhetorical device for extra effect. As Kelvin and the geologists were locked in a fierce debate, he had the advantage of multiple ruling theories, just as Chamberlin had. This advantage is a social therapy. Contestants may be adamant and yet they have to draw deductions from the opponent's theory at least to prove that he is wrong and a good contestant can be trusted to bring out weaknesses in your arguments. To Lord Kelvin's (1899) sense of certitude, Chamberlin (1899) reacted by asking: "Can these definite statements, bearing so much the air of irrefutable truth, be allowed to pass without challenge? What is their real nature and their true degree of certitude when tested respecting their fundamental postulates and their basic assumptions?" He added: "What the internal constitution of the atoms may be is yet an open question. It is not improbable that they are complex organizations and the seats of enormous energies. Certainly, no careful chemist would affirm either that the atoms are really elementary or that there may not be locked up in them energies of the first order of magnitude." This is one of the most prophetic statements in the history of science. Was Chamberlin encouraged to make such novel proposals due to his faith in the method of multiple working hypotheses, which is a personal prescription or challenged to come up with them due to debate with Kelvin who was aggressive? The latter advantage was shared equally by both the contestants, but Kelvin, individually under the spe.ll of a ruling theory, did not have the former benefit. Because of it, it was simpler for Chamberlin to be open to future. Thus, when the physicists were suffering from maladie fin de siecle (end-of-century illness) that they were devotees of a completed science (see, for example, the story of Prof. John Trowbridge of Harvard University dissuading students joining his department as no important research remained to be done in physics (Weaver 1987)), the methodologist of multiple working hypotheses triumphed by being prophetic, confident that science does not offer certitude. Chamberlin was an inductivist. While explaining the method of working hypothesis he wrote: "the facts are sought for the purpose of ultimate induction and demonstration, the hypothesis being but a means for the more ready development of facts and of their relations, and the arrangement and preservation of material for the final induction". But the method can be, in the modern context, rearranged as a hypothetieo-deductive method. Then the method of multiple working hypotheses will enrich the Popperian methodology. In fact, the method of multiple working hypotheses was proposed by Gilbert (1985), even before Chamberlin, and he was not an inductivist. Popper's work is incomplete in yet another way. The problem he tackled is that of demarcation of science from formal disciplines such as metaphysics, mathematics and logic. That is he viewed science as a unity. But this is merely a primary classifica- tion. Science can further be subdivided in a number of ways, e.g. historical/immanent sciences. Concern with time and history would identify a historical science. But in History syndrome 299 the light of the kind of a demarcation problem Popper has solved, such an identification would not do. That would merely be like defining science by its concern with the experiential world. That is defining science or historical science as disciplines by their subject matter. But by Popper's criteria much that deals with the experiential world may still be nonscientific. The point being made is clarified by noting that linguistic use apart, the demarcation criteria of Popper do not separate science, but scientificity. So, within the domain of what is scientific, how does one separate immanent-scientificity from historico-scientificity? This question has not been adequately discussed and resolved, but deserves to be.

9. Nominal and qualified scientists

We are already into some linguistic problems. 'Science' is a noun and 'scientific' is an adjective. As used above, the noun 'science' refers to a subject area or a territory identified by interest in matters empirical. The adjective 'scientific' is defined methodo- logically. We may talk of a theory in science, a theory pertaining to the admissible subject matter. Not every such theory may be scientific, in the methodological sense. The role of adjective is to qualify. When the adjective 'scientific' is applied to theories in science, it would qualify science. That is, not everything in the territory of science would be scientific. Now, consider a noun 'scientist'. Is it to be understood as made from the noun 'science' or from the adjective 'scientific'? The two 'scientists' are obviously different. They may be called 'nominal or territorial scientist' and 'adjectival or qualified scientist' respectively. Popper's concern is with qualified scientists and Kuhn's with nominal scientists. For a nominal scientist, the concept of "scientificity' (abstract noun from the adjective 'scientific') is not defined or required. Kuhn has been thought of as an alternative to Popper because the linguistic usage did not distinguish between the two scientists--nominal and qualified. The two sciences they practise may also be called nominal and qualified science, respectively. Popper separates out formal disciplines such as mathematics, logic and metaphysics as nonseiences. (some authors refer to mathematics and logic as formal sciences as against empirical sciences, which are just called sciences by Popper. These are merely terminological matters, which do not change the central issues). It may be desirable to further separate metaphysics from mathematics and logic, not again in terms of their subject matter, but in methodological terms, in the Popperian spirit. Then, it would be clear that just as not all that interests the discipline of science is scientific or has scientificity, not all that is done in the name of mathematics and logic is mathematical or logical or has mathematieity or logicity. May be, there are some lessons here. Firstly, what might be useful in qualified science may be qualified mathematics rather than nominal mathematics. Secondly, when mathematics is to be successful in science, there must be certain conditions to be satisfied; one of them is that the postulates of a mathematical model should not contradict those of the science to which it is to apply. So, mathematics that is successful in physics may not be the one that would also succeed in earth-science and a similar statement should'hold for logic. If an earth-scientist is guided by physics-mimicry, he may choose mathematics that is matched to physics but not to his science. So, if mathematics is more successful in physics then in earth-science, one should find out whether it is because physicists have chosen qualified mathematics but the earth- 300 P S Moharir

scientists have relied on nominal mathematics or whether physicists have taken care to choose matched mathematics, which the earth-scientists have not. In the case of logic it has already been argued (Bateson 1977) that the logic matched to historical sciences will have to be a dynamic logic integrating time with it.

10. Kuhnian revolution? Not entirely

It is frequently said that (Jones 1974; Carey 1976, pp. 15-16; Hallam 1973, pp. 108-113) that mobilism of Wegener which matured into plate tectonics has brought a Kuhnian revolution in earth-science. This is not a correct description of what happened. Firstly, there was no lack of communication between the contending parties. There was an angry communication, there were accusations and counteraccusations, the language used was harsh (see Meyerhoff 1970; Hallam 1973 and Le Grand 1988, for examples), but as controversy is the heart of science, these symptoms do not mean lack of communication, but vigorous communication. Secondly, the contending parties agreed on many issues. About the need of multi-disciplinary data in earth-science, Wegener (1929, trans. 1966, p. vii) said: "Scientists still dq not appear to understand sufficiently that all earth sciences must contribute evidence towards unveiling the state of our planet in earlier times, and that the truth of the matter can only be reached by combining all this evidence." On the same theme, Meyerhoff (1970) said that "both overspecialization and lack of multidiscipline training lead to misconcep- tions and misunderstandings", and then listed 13 disciplines, the data from which is relevant to settle earth-scientific debates. These statements bring out their agreement. Criticizing Wegener, Lake (1922) said, "Whatever Wegener's own attitude may have been originally, in his book he is not seeking truth, he is advocating a cause, and is blind to every fact and argument that tells against it." The insistence, that a scientist should not advocate, is a Popperian one. Commenting on Du Toit's style, Hallam (1973, pp. 33-36) pejoratively says: "Splendid stuff undoubtedly, but this is the colourful language of a pamphleteer." This again is the same concern that only cognitive considerations must prevail. "Wegener showed a ready capacity to test his ideas", testified Hallam (1973, p. 109). This too is a Popperian attitude. Expectations begin with the adversary and may be applied to the self only to avoid counter- accusations. Yet among a group of people, reminding each other of Popperian virtues, looking for violations by the adversary and trying to generate visible proofs of one's adherence to them, there cannot be a Kuhnian revolution. In addition, if there are some Chamberlinians around, the chances of a Kuhnian revolution are even dimmer. There is just enough scope and hope for a steady progress towards qualified science. There surely was a transition from inductive methodology to a deductive one. Neither Baconian/Millian induction nor Popperian hypothetico-deduction are blind. Reid (1922), reviewing the theory of continental drift wrote: "There have been many attempts to deduce the characteristics of the earth from the hypothesis; but they have all failed .... This is another of the same type. Science has developed by the painstaking comparison of observations and, through close induction, by taking one short step backward to their cause; not by first guessing at the cause and then deducing the phenomena". Much later, Bullard (1964, p. 24) commended mobilist theory because "it suggests relations and other hypotheses that can be tested". The gradual ascendancy of the hypothetico-deductive method over the inductive method, which was deeply History syndrome 301 entrenched, indicates that the earth-science was getting more scientific in a more rigorous way, notwithstanding its historical nature.

11. Taxonomical lessons

Earth-science has a great concern for time and history. (These two concepts also need not necessarily go together. For example, Hutton (1788, 1795) who discovered deep time had tried to reconstruct earth-science as an ahistorical science. This has been called the Hutton paradox by Gould (1988, p. 80)). This somehow has created doubts whethei" it is a science at all. On the other hand, views have also been expressed to voice the unity of sciences. The two sets of views look contradictory, but need not necessarily be so. Classification is based on genus proximum and differentia specifica. The classes at the same level are then called cohyponyms (von Engelhardt and Zimmermann, 1988). Cohyponyms differ from each other, but at the higher level, they belong to the same class and therefore they all resemble each other. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the concepts of the unity of all sciences and the differences between immanent and historical sciences. Sciences form a class apart from non- scientific disciplines such as metaphysics, mathematics and logic and to that extent all sciences share common features. At a lower level, immanent and historical sciences are cohyponyms, different subclasses of science. The dichotomy of immanent and historical sciences, thus, is not absolute. In fact, as Gould (1988, p. 9) wrote: "Dichoto- mies are useful or misleading, not true or false." Classification based on the dual criteria of genus proximum and differentia specifica can induce different authors to emphasize either differences or similarities among the cohyponyms, depending on their purpose. When the differences are emphasized, among the cohyponyms a wrong ordinal hierarchy is frequently claimed. Science is imagined to be superior to formal disciplines and physics is presumed to be a model for other sciences. This is contrary to the purpose of classification. One can distinguish without ordinating. What can be separated in an analytic mood must also be integrated in the anabolic spirit. The classification based on genus proximum and differentia specifica can and should be used for both these purposes. Pragmatic, professional, reductionist and trade-unionist considerations normally block the two-way significance and utility of classifications. All these comments apply to the dichotomy of sociological and logical analyses of science. None of these approaches is exclusive and individually satisfying. Sociology "can potentiate as well as constrain" (Gould 1988, p. 7) and so can logic. Therefore, one cannot run away from Popper and embrace Kuhn or vice versa. (I am using these eponyms synecdochically and metonymically (metonymy is addressing one referent by another related to it) to denote cognitive and historical approaches respectively, to science, and both of them can be improved upon). History of science can be criticized from a logical viewpoint, so that the past is not presented as a model for future. The logical progress of science should be studied from a proper historical perspective, so that the past debates are not paraphrased in the present day perspective and the temptation of a Whiggish interpretation (Butterfield 1931) is defeated, so that the present direction and pace are not confused with the future potential. No discipline is entirely immanent or historical. Physics is also getting to be increasingly historical. Every discipline has its own balance of the immanent and historical aspects. "Geology exhibits as even a balance of historical and nonhistorical 302 P S Moharir elements of any of the sciences, and here the relationship of the two may be particularly clear. It is in a strategic position to illuminate scientific philosophy--an opportunity not yet sufficiently exploited", wrote Simpson (1963). That is true even now.

12. Conclusion

The discussion above can be summarized as follows: (1) Geology has largely been understood as a concrete, historical, inductive, descriptive, explanatory and generalizing science. (2) It has evolved and can shed its inductive, descriptive and generalizing nature. (3) There is no logical difference between explanatory and predictive or nomological and generalizing disciplines. Every discipline seeks a different equilibrium among these attributes as it matures. (4) Being a historical and concrete science is more of essence for geology. (5) On Popper's criterion, geology can certainly be admitted as a science. (6) Among sciences some are immanent and others historical. Within the domain of sciences there could be a methodological demarcation to distinguish them. This needs more work. (7) Psycho-sociological models of science are not concerned with the problem of demarcating science and therefore they are not Valid alternatives to the cognitive model of Popper. (8) Psycho-sociological models (in the sense of well-fitting descriptions) can indicate what need be done by way of education so that a cognitive model (in the sense of goal or objective) is better approached. (9) Recent geological controversies do indicate that cognitive expecta- tions are being aired more persistently, thus signifying a shift away from both Bacon and Kuhn. (10) Classification does not mean ordination. Thus historical sciences are different from and not inferior to immanent sciences. (11) In fact, some of the foremost immanent sciences are now getting more historical. (12) At present, the equilibrium between immanent and historical considerations in geology is such that methodo- logical demarcation between them would offer rich challenge and meaningful insights. There are some useful corollaries too. (1) It may be useful to learn from the progress of other historical sciences, rather than merely looking up to the successful immanent sciences. For example, other historical sciences have taken to system-theoretic causal analysis (Blalock Jr. 1961; Heise 1975) more seriously than has geology. In an observa- tional science such techniques would be more dependable. (2) In a generalizing science as opposed to a nomological one, the problems are different. There is a critical problem of "the hold on the individual case" (Scriven 1959). Therefore, Scriven has developed the notion of "normic statements", as more appropriate. The question of falsifiability of normic statements needs to be studied. (3) As geology is a science dealing with processes on time scales much slower than the human life-span, a fresh look at interpreting experimental data is needed. Mackin (1963) provides a particularly enlightening example. (4) There is a need for a transition from Kuhnian paradigm to the Popperian one. Naess (1972) has argued at length about such a possibility. Education plays an important role in such a transition and should be reviewed from this perspective. (5) Methodological analyses of geological controversies should be welcome. Sengor (1991) and Trumpy (1991) are two recent examples. Such analyses would have enormous educative value for Popperisation of geology. History syndrome 303

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to the anonymous referees of another paper, as their comments triggered the theme of this paper. Encouragement provided by Shri B. "K. Rag of the NFTDC played a catalytic role. The time needed to think about the history became available only because of the visiting appointment offered by the NGRI, Hyderabad. The Society of Theoretical Geophysicists once provided a captive audience to arti- culate some of these ideas, before they crystallized. Doxography of Albritton Jr. (1963) was of immense help. The implicit support from Prof. D. Guptasarma and the invitation from Prof. V. K. Gaur to write this article were the necessary conditions for its materialization. The former also cleared this paper for publication. Conversion of nonuniform scribble to a uniform typescript was effected by Mrs Rukmini Venkateswaran. To comment on another's thought is a co-mental activity. It has been my privilege that my thoughts passed through the minds of three referees (though not in a style and format they may have preferred), resided therein for a while and generated a reaction. Here is an end result.

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