Otto Neurath and the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Otto Neurath and the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science Mikel Breitenstein University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA Global Unity: Otto Neurath and the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science Abstract: Otto Neurath (1888-1945) was a pioneer in modern global information organization, an educator, sociologist, scientist of the early 20th century, and cofounder of the Vienna Circle. The international cooperative goals of shared information among scientists that he envisioned led to the Unity of Science Institute and the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. The progress towards modern scientific inquiry and theory that he encouraged, with recognition of the historical context, laid the groundwork for others who followed him as critics and refiners of empirical methods. Neurath was in every way a man of his times, but not an ordinary one. He was a social scientist and an intellectual activist, and his radical and original visions of a unified scientific world made him a prescient voice in modern philosophy of science, information, and society. 1. Introduction The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science was a grand project to bring together scientific philosophies from a variety of disciplines, embodied in essays, in a series of printed volumes. It was not intended to contain all knowledge, of course, but would embody the premises and perspectives of leading thinkers from many realms of modern science in the middle of the 20th century. The goal of creating such an encyclopedia had at least three aspects: 1) to define, by classification and explication, the fields of modern science, 2) to establish a documented body of unified topics, and 3) to affirm an interdisciplinary network that would allow scientists from many specialties to come together to solve problems. It was the product of the convergence of several interlocking forces: encyclopedism, logical positivism in general, the Vienna Circle in particular, and the genius of Otto Neurath. During the18th century, encyclopedists created visions of unified knowledge, and by the end of the 19th century, encyclopedism had great momentum and was promoted in intellectual circles. The sciences, with their international languages of symbolic notations, were honored as a new organizing force for the world. The world-view philosophical perspective, incorporating metaphysics, was well established in Germany and in other European countries. Unified systems thinking followed logically. Systems theory helped thinkers in many disciplines to give form to the rapid changes being wrought by technological advance. Utopian social reform became a motivating force. The causes and effects of World War I promoted internationalism in cultural and economic matters. Logical positivism, also called scientism, was a reaction to earlier philosophies that admitted metaphysical considerations. A way of thinking born originally with the Industrial Revolution, it had evolved to a program of thinking that merged scientific inquiry and observations with the philosophical search for meaning and knowledge. The process of “scientization” (Verwissenschaftlichung) took a number of forms (Bambach, 1995, 24). In general, scientism was a term that covered the movements in philosophy, and the sciences, that identified reliable and provable knowledge with the idea of science itself (Bambach, 1995, 27). In economics, medicine, and architecture, an emphasis on the material, the concrete, the functional, was what counted. For positivists, matter was what existed, and only matter was capable of affecting the mind. All philosophical studies, e.g. ontology (what exists?), epistemology (what do we know?) and ethics (what should we do?) should, from the 94 positivist perspective, be predicated on clear knowledge of a mostly scientific nature (Everdell, 1997, 15). Philosophy, under the name “epistemology,” could function as the methodological foundation of all scientific fact (Bambach, 1995, 29). Pre-World War I Vienna was an environment of opposing forces. There were rising trends of social conservatism, nationalism, and biological ideals. The opposing forces included advocates of "Jewish" neo-positivism, of the liberal theory of marginal utility (Grenznutz), of opportunity cost, of psychoanalysis, and of Marxism (Stadler, 1991, 56). Often, their grounding in the materialism of science was joined to their grounding in political concerns for the fair distribution of opportunity and benefits to all of society. As early as 1907, Otto Neurath, a sociologist, Hans Hahn, a mathematician, and Philipp Frank, a physicist, began to meet for intellectual discussions that led eventually to a first “Vienna circle” of thinkers and activists. This circle and the later more famous one were comprised of a dynamic group of well-educated philosophers with strong mathematical and scientific training. Most members embraced positivism to some degree. The final Vienna Circle (Wiener Kreis) was a gathering not of quiet, reclusive thinkers, but of vocal scientists, philosophers, and social activists. Not all members who attended the regular Thursday meetings were equal in recognized status, nor did all agree. They were a loosely organized political and intellectual group. Their new ideas prevailed, and laid a foundation for scientific thinking in the early-mid 20th century. Between 1928 and 1937, the Vienna Circle published ten books in a series named “Papers on Scientific World-View” (Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen), edited by Moritz Schlick and Philipp Frank. In 1930, Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach became editors of the Journal of Unified Science (Erkenntnis), that was published between 1930 and 1940, and edited toward the end by Neurath, Carnap, and Charles Morris (Murzi, 1998, 2). By the late 1920s, many Circle members experienced increasing difficulty in employment because of their liberal and socialist politics and, often, because of their Jewish identity. Emigration and exile dissipated the ranks steadily through the 1930s, as dangers grew. Circle leader Moritz Schlick, who stayed in Vienna, was murdered in July 1936 by a pro-Nazi student. This event ended the public existence of the Vienna Circle, and in 1938 it was abolished altogether by the National Socialist government. Otto Neurath was an archetypal social activist and idealist. Neurath was born in Vienna on December 10, 1882, into a middle-class scholarly Jewish family. He studied at the University of Vienna and the University of Berlin, and received a Ph.D. from the latter school in 1905. A teaching career at the New Vienna Trade Academy (Neue Wiener Handelsakademie) (1907-1914) was interspersed with travels in Eastern Europe and the Balkans under contract with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1911-1913). Both ended with his service in World War I (1914-18). After the war, Neurath participated actively in several community planning and service organizations. He worked as a civil servant for the Central Planning Office of the Bavarian Social Republic (later known as the Social Democratic Republic of Bavaria) in Munich during 1919; when it fell he was briefly jailed, although he was not officially a member of the Communist party. Upon release, he went to Vienna and was active in the housing reform movement during the period known as Red Vienna. Infusing all of Neurath’s activities during these years was a commitment to utopian social reform, inspired by his strong belief in Marxist socialism. He was among the first in Vienna to call for a centrally-planned economy based on Marxist concepts, with policy determined by social welfare considerations and by empirical statistical analyses of goods, services, and standards of living (Wilson, 1987, 569). He also was the founder of the Museum for Housing and Town Planning, over which he presided from 1919-24. He was founder and director of the Social and Economic Museum, from 1924 to 1933, when he left Austria. 95 2. Neurath and Scientific Unity Neurath brought to his view of science a historical and dynamic perspective, a recognition of the uncertainty of physical description and the probabilistic nature of scientific prediction (Wilson, 1987, 569). He felt that an essential precondition of all reflection and all theory building was to begin with a vocabulary and set of concepts that were pre-given (Haller, 1991, 124). From that point, new knowledge could be created by the shifting of our concepts as we shift our thoughts. Then a continuous transformation process from old knowledge to new would take off. Neurath had been conspicuous for his demand for a unified language. According to Rudolf Carnap, it was Neurath who suggested the designations ‘Physicalism’ and ‘Unity of Science’ (Haller, 1991, 118). Neurath was fully convinced of and inspired by his commitment to insure that his evolving scientific world-conception should infuse all forms of personal and public life, of teaching, of architecture. Social life was to be purely rational. All his problems and concerns led him toward the goal of the unity of scientific effort (Haller, 1991, 119), for the good of society. 3. Neurath and Internationalism Neurath left Vienna in 1933, due to fear of arrest, and went to The Hague, Netherlands. There he founded and led the International Foundation for Visual Education, from 1933-40 (Wilson, 1987, 568). During that time, he promoted visual education and used a system he had designed, The Vienna Method of Picture Statistics, to develop further an international language, the International System of Typographic Picture Education (ISOTYPE) of over 2000
Recommended publications
  • PDF Download Starting with Science Strategies for Introducing Young Children to Inquiry 1St Edition Ebook
    STARTING WITH SCIENCE STRATEGIES FOR INTRODUCING YOUNG CHILDREN TO INQUIRY 1ST EDITION PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Marcia Talhelm Edson | 9781571108074 | | | | | Starting with Science Strategies for Introducing Young Children to Inquiry 1st edition PDF Book The presentation of the material is as good as the material utilizing star trek analogies, ancient wisdom and literature and so much more. Using Multivariate Statistics. Michael Gramling examines the impact of policy on practice in early childhood education. Part of a series on. Schauble and colleagues , for example, found that fifth grade students designed better experiments after instruction about the purpose of experimentation. For example, some suggest that learning about NoS enables children to understand the tentative and developmental NoS and science as a human activity, which makes science more interesting for children to learn Abd-El-Khalick a ; Driver et al. Research on teaching and learning of nature of science. The authors begin with theory in a cultural context as a foundation. What makes professional development effective? Frequently, the term NoS is utilised when considering matters about science. This book is a documentary account of a young intern who worked in the Reggio system in Italy and how she brought this pedagogy home to her school in St. Taking Science to School answers such questions as:. The content of the inquiries in science in the professional development programme was based on the different strands of the primary science curriculum, namely Living Things, Energy and Forces, Materials and Environmental Awareness and Care DES Exit interview. Begin to address the necessity of understanding other usually peer positions before they can discuss or comment on those positions.
    [Show full text]
  • Some Major Issues and Developments in the Philosophy Ofscience Oflogical Empiricism
    -----HERBERT FEIGL----- Some Major Issues and Developments in the Philosophy ofScience ofLogical Empiricism AsouT twenty-five years ago a small group of philosophically minded scientists and scientifically trained philosophers in Vienna formulated their declaration of independence from traditional philosophy. The pamphlet Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis (1929) contained the first succinct statement of the outlook which soon after became known as "logical positivism." In the first flush of enthusiasm we Viennese felt we had attained a philosophy to end all philosophies. Schlick spoke of a "Wende der Philosophie" (a decisive turning point of philosophy). Neurath and Frank declared "school philosophy" as obsolete and even suggested that our outlook drop the word "philoso­ phy" altogether, and replace it by "Einheitswissenschaft" or by "scien· tific empiricism." The notable impact of Alfred Ayer's first book in England, and my own efforts ~oward a propagation of Logical Positiv­ ism in the United States during the early thirties, and then the immi· gration of Carnap, Frank, von Mises, Reichenbach, Hempel and Berg­ mann created a powerful movement, but it elicited also sharp opposition nncl criticism. Through the discussions within the movement and its own production and progressive work, as well as in response to the NO'l'F.: This essay is a revised and considerably expanded .version of a lecture given in plenary session at the International Congress for Philosophy of Science, Zurich, /\ngust 25, 1954. It was first- published in Proceedi11gs of the Secono International Congress of the International Union for tl1e Philosophy ot Science (Neuchatel, Switzerland, 19 55). In the cordial letter of invitation I received from Professor Ferdinand Gonseth, president of the Congress, he asked me to discuss "I'empirisme logi<\ue,-ce qu'il fut, et ce qu'il est clevenu." Much as I appreciated the honor of t 1is ambitious assignment, I realized of course that the limitations of time would permit me to deal onJy with some selected topics within this larger frame.
    [Show full text]
  • Situational Analysis
    Situational Analysis by Kevin D. Hoover CHOPE Working Paper No. 2016-17 February 2016 Situational Analysis Kevin D. Hoover Department of Economics Department of Philosophy Duke University 18 February 2016 Mail: Department of Economics Duke University Box 90097 Durham, NC 27708-0097 Tel. (919) 660-1876 Email [email protected] Abstract Situational analysis (also known as situational logic) was popularized by Karl Popper as an appropriate method for the interpretation of history and as a basis for a scientific social science. It seeks an objective positive explanation of behavior through imputing a dominant goal or motive to individuals and then identifying the action that would be objectively appropriate to the situation as the action actually taken. Popper regarded situational analysis as a generalization to all of social science of the prototypical reasoning of economics. Applied to history, situational analysis is largely an interpretive strategy used to understand individual behavior. In social sciences, however, it is applied many to types of behavior or to group behavior (e.g., to markets) as is used to generate testable hypothesis. Popper’s account of situational analysis and some criticisms that have been levied against it are reviewed. The charge that situational analysis contradicts Popper’s view that falsification is the hallmark of sciences is examined and rejected: situational analysis is precisely how Popper believes social sciences are able to generate falsifiable, and, therefore, scientific hypotheses. Still, situational analysis is in tension with another of Popper’s central ideas: situational analysis as a method for generating testable conjectures amounts to a logic of scientific discovery, something that Popper argued elsewhere was not possible.
    [Show full text]
  • Unity of Knowledge in Transdisciplinary Research for Sustainability - G
    UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE (IN TRANSDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH FOR SUSTAINABILITY) – Vol. I - Unity of Knowledge in Transdisciplinary Research for Sustainability - G. Hirsch Hadorn UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE IN TRANSDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH FOR SUSTAINABILITY G. Hirsch Hadorn Department of Environmental Sciences, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, Switzerland Keywords: Holism, issue-oriented research, sustainable development, transdisciplinarity, integration, humanities, sciences, justice, reductionism, materialism, risk, scientific discipline, scientific knowledge, uncertainty of knowledge, systems knowledge, target knowledge, transformation knowledge, moral knowledge, technology assessment Contents 1. Introduction 2. Unity of Knowledge in the History of Ideas: Ontological and Subjective Concepts 3. Unity and Diversity of the Sciences and Humanities 4. Unity of Knowledge in Societal Problem Solving 5. Unity of Knowledge in Education 6. Sustainability 7. Science and Society in Sustainable Development 8. Transdisciplinary Research for Sustainability 9. Outlook Acknowledgements Glossary Bibliography Biographical Sketch Summary Today, there is a social need for a comprehensive unity of knowledge that would provide orientation and ensure action in the context of the complex problems of modern civilization. Based on an intellectual need for unity of knowledge, different concepts of unity of knowledgeUNESCO have emerged in the course – ofEOLSS the history of ideas. The intellectual need for unity can be directed at the world, science, action or the individual. It can involve the quest for the unity of the world based on a principle that is immanent in it, the unity of science as a theoretical, methodical or epistemological unity, the unity of action as a correlationSAMPLE of scientific, pragmatic CHAPTERSand moral knowledge or, finally, unity as the educational task of the individual.
    [Show full text]
  • Reexamining the Problem of Demarcating Science and Pseudoscience by Evan Westre B.A., Vancouver Island University, 2010 a Thesis
    Reexamining the Problem of Demarcating Science and Pseudoscience By Evan Westre B.A., Vancouver Island University, 2010 A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS ©Evan Westre, 2014 All Rights Reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without the permission of the author. Supervisory Committee Reexamining the Problem of Demarcating Science and Pseudoscience By Evan Westre B.A., Vancouver Island University, 2010 Dr. Audrey Yap: Supervisor (Department of Philosophy) Dr. Jeffrey Foss: Departmental Member (Department of Philosophy) ii Abstract Supervisory Committee Dr. Audrey Yap: Supervisor (Department of Philosophy) Dr. Jeffrey Foss: Departmental Member (Department of Philosophy) The demarcation problem aims to articulate the boundary between science and pseudoscience. Solutions to the problem have been notably raised by the logical positivists (verificationism), Karl Popper (falsificationism), and Imre Lakatos (methodology of research programmes). Due, largely, to the conclusions drawn by Larry Laudan, in a pivotal 1981 paper which dismissed the problem of demarcation as a “pseudo-problem”, the issue was brushed aside for years. Recently, however, there has been a revival of attempts to reexamine the demarcation problem and synthesize new solutions. My aim is to survey two of the contemporary attempts and to assess these approaches over and against the broader historical trajectory of the demarcation problem. These are the efforts of Nicholas Maxwell (aim-oriented empiricism), and Paul Hoyningen-Huene (systematicity). I suggest that the main virtue of the new attempts is that they promote a self-reflexive character within the sciences.
    [Show full text]
  • The Unity of Science in Early-Modern Philosophy: Subalternation, Metaphysics and the Geometrical Manner in Scholasticism, Galileo and Descartes
    The Unity of Science in Early-Modern Philosophy: Subalternation, Metaphysics and the Geometrical Manner in Scholasticism, Galileo and Descartes by Zvi Biener M.A. in Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 2004 B.A. in Physics, Rutgers University, 1995 B.A. in Philosophy, Rutgers University, 1995 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2008 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Zvi Biener It was defended on April 3, 2008 and approved by Peter Machamer J.E. McGuire Daniel Garber James G. Lennox Paolo Palmieri Dissertation Advisors: Peter Machamer, J.E. McGuire ii Copyright c by Zvi Biener 2008 iii The Unity of Science in Early-Modern Philosophy: Subalternation, Metaphysics and the Geometrical Manner in Scholasticism, Galileo and Descartes Zvi Biener, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2008 The project of constructing a complete system of knowledge—a system capable of integrating all that is and could possibly be known—was common to many early-modern philosophers and was championed with particular alacrity by Ren´eDescartes. The inspiration for this project often came from mathematics in general and from geometry in particular: Just as propositions were ordered in a geometrical demonstration, the argument went, so should propositions be ordered in an overall system of knowledge. Science, it was thought, had to proceed more geometrico. I offer a new interpretation of ‘science more geometrico’ based on an analysis of the explanatory forms used in certain branches of geometry. These branches were optics, as- tronomy, and mechanics; the so-called subalternate, subordinate, or mixed-mathematical sciences.
    [Show full text]
  • Science Wars 1St Edition Kindle
    SCIENCE WARS 1ST EDITION PDF, EPUB, EBOOK Anthony Walsh | 9781351491860 | | | | | Science Wars 1st edition PDF Book Accessed 15 may Sort: Best Match. Fabulous First Editions from the s. Facebook Twitter. TomS HA. The losers are left in the dust. Why does this all mean? Judges Guild. If the initial print run - known as the 'first printing' or 'first impression'- sells out and the publisher decides to produce a subsequent printing with the same typeset, books from that second print run can be described as a first edition, second printing. They took place principally in the United States in the s in the academic and mainstream press. Social conditions and attitudes affect how strongly one attempts to resist falsification for the core of a program, but the program has an objective status based on its relative explanatory power. The authors insist that the "science critics" misunderstood the theoretical approaches they criticized, given their "caricature, misreading, and condescension, [rather] than argument". Action Films. The antidemocratic right often accuses the new science studies of relativism, but it is wrong about just what it is to which the new science studies "relativizes" sciences. History of football. For "educated classes" whose own status depends on the same appeals to objectivity, rationality, expertise, and progressiveness on which science's legitimacy depends, science discourses can be mobilized to encourage people to think in politically seductive ways about any and all social issues. This publisher chose not to include the year that it was printed. Any number can play. Good Times. Star Wars. Wild Card. Booksellers will often describe these later first editions as a 'first edition thus' or just 'first thus'.
    [Show full text]
  • History Syndrome OR Popperian Credentials of Geology PS MOHARIR
    Proc. Indian Acad. Sci. (Earth Planet. Sci.), Vol. 102, No. 2, June 1993,. pp. 283-305. Printed in India. History syndrome OR Popperian credentials of Geology P S MOHARIR National Geophysical Research Institute, Uppal Road, Hyderabad 500 007 India. MS received 12 June 1991; revised 28 December 1992 Abstract. Earth-science is greatly concerned with history. It is argued by some that a historical discipline is not a science. This is contrary to the conclusion from the demarcation criteria of Popper, set to separate science from formal disciplines such as metaphysics, mathematics and logic. Others have spoken of the unity of all sciences. Classification of intellectual activities is based on oenus proximum and differentia specifica. Hence the two viewpoints can be readily reconciled. Earth-science has been criticized variously for being descriptive, inductive, explanatory, etc. Other historical and concrete sciences have also attracted similar adverse comments. These issues are discussed at length to argue that Popper's work should be extended further to define a demarcation of science into immanent and historical. It is also argued that the rignur of cognitive and logical determinants of science is not an adequate reason to embrace sociological models of science. Further, sociological/logical models of science present a misleading dichotomy. Keywords. Demarcation criteria; historical sciences; Kuhnian model; mathematicalization; earth-science revolution. 1. Introduction The purpose of this paper is to discuss whether geology can be a science. Science is a modern catchword. Therefore, everyone is bound to argue that his discipline is science and then proceed to define it. Most such definitions are territorial.
    [Show full text]
  • Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science Rudolf Carnap I
    Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science Rudolf Carnap I. What Is Logical Analysis of Science? The task of analyzing science may be approached from various angles. The analysis of the subject matter of the sciences is carried out by science itself. Biology, for example, analyzes organisms and processes in organisms, and in a similar way every branch of science analyzes its subject matter. Mostly, however, by ‘analysis of science’ or ‘theory of science’ is meant an investigation which differs from the branch of science to which it is applied. We may, for instance, think of an investigation of scientific activity. We may study the historical development of this activity. Or we may try to find out in which way scientific work depends upon the individual conditions of the men working in science, and upon the status of the society surrounding them. Or we may describe procedures and appliances used in scientific work. These investigations of scientific activity may be called history, psychology, sociology, and methodology of science. The subject matter of such studies is science as a body of actions carried out by certain persons under certain circumstances. Theory of science in this sense will be dealt with at various other places in this Encyclopedia; it is certainly an essential part of the foundation of science. We come to a theory of science in another sense if we study not the actions of scientists but their results, namely, science as a body of ordered knowledge. Here, by ‘results’ we do not mean beliefs, images, etc., and the behavior influenced by them.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 21 Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science Rudolf Carnap
    Chapter 21 Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science Rudolf Carnap 1. What Is Logical Analysis of Science? The task of analyzing science may be approached from various angles. The analysis of the subject matter of the sciences is carried out by science itself. Biology, for example, analyzes organisms and processes in organisms, and in a similar way every branch of science analyzes its subject matter. Mostly, however, by 'analysis of science' or 'theory of science' is meant an investigation which differs from the branch of science to which it is applied. We may, for instance, think of an investigation of scientific activity. We may study the historical development of this activity. Or we may try to find out in which way scientific work depends upon the individual conditions of the men working in science, and upon the status of the society surrounding them. Or we may describe procedures and appliances used in scientific work. These investigations of scientific activity may be called history, psychology, sociology, and methodology of science. The subject matter of such studies is science as a body of actions carried out by certain persons under certain circumstances. Theory of science in this sense will be dealt with at various other places in this Encyclopedia; it is certainly an essential part of the foundation of science. We come to a theory of science in another, sense if we study not the actions of scientists but their results, namely, science as a body of ordered knowledge. Here, by 'results' we do not mean beliefs, images, etc., and the behavior influenced by them.
    [Show full text]
  • Unity, Disunity and Pluralism in Science
    Unity, Disunity and Pluralism in Science David A. Edwards and Stephen Wilcox (1980) ABSTRACT We discuss the problems of consensus and unity in science. The natural sciences seem to contrast with many other areas of endeavor in that a high level of consensus seems to exist in them. However, a careful analysis of the structure of particular physical theories, such as those concerned with electrons, shows that there is great heterogeneity of both theory and methodology. We argue that the natural science community tends to be tolerant of diversity. We contrast this tolerance among natural scientists with the more overt disagreement occurring in the social sciences and humanities. Our central theme is that many intellectual problems arise from straining too hard to make a successful perspective into a total worldview. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to a flaw therein: for nature is always the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action; that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature’s universal laws and rules – SPINOZA 1. Introduction The revised modern scientific version of Genesis resembles in many ways the older version. The following figure compactly summarizes modern cosmology. All that exists is assumed to fit together into a compact hierarchy, all of which is ultimately reducible to the lower levels, which are both ontologically more fundamental and older in time than the upper levels.
    [Show full text]
  • Reflections on the History and Philosophy of Experimental Psychology*
    Psychology, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science: Reflections on the History and Philosophy of Experimental Psychology* GARY HATFIELD Abstract: This article critically examines the views that psychology first came into existence as a discipline ca. 1879, that philosophy and psychology were estranged in the ensuing decades, that psychology finally became scientific through the influence of logical empiricism, and that it should now disappear in favor of cognitive science and neuroscience. It argues that psychology had a natural philosophical phase (from antiquity) that waxed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that this psychology transformed into experimental psychology ca. 1900, that philosophers and psychologists collaboratively discussed the subject matter and methods of psychology in the first two decades of the twentieth century, that the neobehaviorists were not substantively influenced by the Vienna Circle, that the study of perception and cognition in psy- chology did not disappear in the behaviorist period and so did not reemerge as a result of artificial intelligence, linguistics, and the computer analogy, that although some psychologists adopted the language-of-thought approach of traditional cognitive science, many did not, and that psychology will not go away because it contributes independently of cognitive science and neuroscience. 1. A Science of Psychology? Psychology has been self-consciously trying to be a science for two hundred years, give or take fifty. In the meantime it has developed a variety of labora- tory techniques, collected much experimental data, shown some theoretical development, and undergone changes of opinion about whether its primary object of study is mind or behavior. Has it made its way to sciencehood? Some have thought psychology became scientific by freeing itself from philosophy near the end of the nineteenth century, while others make it wait for behavior- ism and positivism.
    [Show full text]