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Un Ebola Response Mptf UN EBOLA RESPONSE MULTI-PARTNER TRUST FUND The Office of the Director of the Sustainable Development Unit, Executive Office of the Secretary-General at the United Nations, UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, http://mptf.undp.org/ebola STEPP Strategy Strategic Objective 1: STOP the outbreak Mission Critical Action 1: Identify and Trace People with Ebola Mission Critical Action 2: Safe and Dignified Burials Strategic Objective 2: TREAT the infected Mission Critical Action 3: Care for Persons with Ebola and Infection Control Mission Critical Action 4: Medical Care for Responders Provision Strategic Objective 3: ENSURE essential services Mission Critical Action 5: Provision of Food Security and Nutrition Mission Critical Action 6: Access to Basic (including non-Ebola Health) Services Mission Critical Action 7: Cash Incentives for Workers Mission Critical Action 8: Recovery and Economy Strategic Objective 4: PRESERVE stability Mission Critical Action 9: Reliable Supplies of Materials and Equipment Mission Critical Action 10: Transport and Fuel Mission Critical Action 11: Social Mobilization and Community Engagement Mission Critical Action 12: Messaging Strategic Objective 5: PREVENT outbreaks Mission Critical Action 13: Preventing Outbreaks Other: Enabling Support to all Objectives RECOVERY Strategy RECOVERY Objective 1: RS01 Health, Nutrition, and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) RECOVERY Objective 2: RS02 Socio-Economic Revitalization RECOVERY Objective 3: RS03 Basic Services and Infrastructure RECOVERY Objective 4: RS04 Governance, Peace Building and Social Cohesion PART ONE 03 Foreword 05 Executive Summary Mechanisms and Milestones Achievements on the Ground 19 Operations and Governance 24 Contributions 27 Lessons Learned 29 Country and Regional Projects Guinea Liberia Sierra Leone Regional DRC 93 Financial Information Photo: © UNMEER UNICEF A-Life Community Mobilization against Ebola UN EBOLA RESPONSE MULTI-PARTNER TRUST FUND FINAL REPORT Recipient ORGANISATIONS CONTRIBUTORS AUSTRALIA, Government of LATVIA, Government of FAO BAHRAIN Royal CHARITY ORG LUXEMBOURG, Government of ICAO BELGIUM, Government of Malaysia, Government of BOLIVIA, Government of MALTA, Government of ILO BRAZIL, Government of MAURITIUS, Government of IOM CANADA, Government of MONTENEGRO, Government of CHILE, Government of NEW ZEALAND, Government of UNAIDS CHINA, Government of NORWAY, Government of UNDP COLOMBIA, Government of PERU, Government of CYPRUS, Government of PHILIPPINES, Government of UNESCO CZECH Republic, Government of PORTUGAL, Government of UNFPA REPUBLIC of KOREA, DENMARK, Government of Government of ESTONIA, Government of ROMANIA, Government of UN HABITAT FINLAND, Government of SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION UNHCR GEORGIA, Government of SWITZERLAND THE RUSSIAN FederatioN GERMANY, Government of UNICEF Guyana, Government of TOGO, Government of UNMEER HOLY SEE TURKEY, Government of UNITED KINGDOM, INDIA, Government of Government of UNOPS IRELAND VENEZUELA, Government of UN WOMEN ISRAEL, Government of Volvo Group PRIVATE SECTOR JAPAN, Government of WFP KAZAKHstan, Government of WHO 2 FINAL REPORT UN EBOLA RESPONSE MULTI-PARTNER TRUST FUND FOREWORD This report elaborates the contributions of the Ebola Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund to the United Nations’ response to the 2014 West African Ebola outbreak. The Fund met its mandate to offer all phases of the response a fast, collaborative and flexible financial mechanism to meet unfunded needs on the ground in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. It also extended support in 2017 and 2018 to stop separate Ebola outbreaks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Fund showed how a pooled funding mechanism could successfully bring the UN system together with donors and stakeholders to help end a fast moving and unprecedented health crisis. As scheduled, the Fund was operationally closed at the end of November 2018. The Fund’s closure is an opportunity for reflection on its results and lessons learned. Ebola took the lives of over 11,000 people and left thousands of others medically, socially and economically vulnerable. It set back development gains and was a global health security concern. We will use what we learned from this crisis to do better. This means improving emergency planning and readiness for public health threats – infectious disease or otherwise – so that a tragedy of this nature never happens again, in West Africa or elsewhere. The 2014 Ebola epidemic was a wake-up call to strengthen the accessibility, resiliency and quality of healthcare for everyone, everywhere. It took advantage of weak healthcare systems – under-staffed and under-resourced – and it tore through communities. Ebola showed what would happen when communities were not prepared, and it shed light on the gaps that must be fixed now to cope with the health emergencies of the future. Mobilizing funding from a wide-variety of stakeholders with one of the highest levels of donor engagement ever seen in a UN trust fund, the Fund worked to close these gaps, bolstering readiness to stop and prevent Ebola and strengthening healthcare systems in the epicenter countries. Its projects built out healthcare capacity and infrastructure against a variety of backdrops – in slums, prisons, schools, along borders, and in the hardest hit communities. They brought quality healthcare services to the most vulnerable populations, like survivors, orphans, and women and children. Projects showed that community-led responses were effective, and many initiatives supported localities to take charge of the monitoring, treatment and behavior changes needed to halt the Ebola epidemic. Social mobilization was key to ending the outbreak, and through the bravery and resolve of those on the ground, transmission was brought to zero. One of the Fund’s main achievements was the simultaneous finance of response and recovery objectives under the same instrument. The Fund showed how urgent needs, like stopping Ebola transmission, could pair with longer-term objectives, like strengthening health systems to support preparedness and longer-term development. As a result, at the national level down through to communities, projects put in place plans, protocols, human capacity, infrastructure and equipment that would help countries be ready to handle Ebola or any other public health threat. We need to stay this course. With the end of Ebola Response MPTF operations, the international community must carry forward and build on the framework that communities, governments, civil society and the UN have put in place through the Fund. Active now in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ebola still poses a serious threat, and we must continue to press for greater health security and readiness globally. Ms. Michelle Gyles-McDonnough Director, Sustainable Development Unit, Executive Office of the Secretary-General at the United Nations 3 WUNHO EBOLA Contact tracersRESPONSE visiting aMULTI-PARTNER community in Conakry, TRUST providing FUND buckets and chlorine, and teaching them how to wash hands properly at home FINAL REPORT © UNMEER/Martine Perret 4 FINAL REPORT UN EBOLA RESPONSE MULTI-PARTNER TRUST FUND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Mechanisms and Milestones The Ebola Response MPTF was a critical part of the The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General established financing compact for the Ebola response. The Trust Fund the Ebola Response MPTF to support the organization’s provided: response to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. It • a mechanism for a coordinated, flexible and rapid UN was initiated following the Security Council’s adoption response through a common financing mechanism; of Resolution 2177 (2014), which requested the UN to • a coherent UN System contribution to the overall accelerate its response to the outbreak. The Fund took Ebola response through the strategic use of three days to become operative in September 2014, a time resources; when the numbers of people newly diagnosed with Ebola in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone were doubling every three • an accountable, transparent and cost-effective weeks. financial instrument for the mobilization of funding from all stakeholders; The Fund was designed to provide all phases of the UN • a results-based management system; and response a fast, collaborative, and strategic financial • support for the UN’s establishment of a mechanism to meet unfunded and under-funded needs. It multidisciplinary global platform focused on ending the was guided by the five Strategic Objectives and 13 Mission outbreak. Critical Actions (MCAs) of the UN STEPP Strategy: Stop the Outbreak; The ‘Ebola Response Outlook 2015,’ described the outbreak as “a shifting group of multiple local crises.” The Fund was Treat the Infected; successfully nimble, allocating US$163 million to 86 projects Ensure Essential Services; that closed gaps and helped track every last Ebola contact and treat every last case – until there were none. Preserve Stability; Prevent Outbreaks. Funded projects put human capacity on the ground – thousands of contact tracers, social mobilizers, medical It helped finance the concerted action of 14 UN agencies, personnel and logisticians – that reinforced national and local including the UN Mission on Emergency Ebola Response capacity. Projects assured that responders were trained, safe, (UNMEER). compensated and equipped. They mobilized communities to take the lead in surveillance, education and behavior The Ebola Response MPTF had one of the highest levels of change. They fostered and provided for safe burial
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