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HumanHuman UniquenessUniqueness asas a a GuideGuide toto ResolvingResolving� ConflictsConflicts BetweenBetween AnimalAnimal andand HumanHuman In­In­� tereststerests11� WhileWhile itit isis byby nono meansmeans clearclear whetherwhether wewe shouldshould speakspeak ofof animalsanimals asas rights-bearers,rights-bearers, inin anyany literalliteral sense,sense, oror simplysimply asas creaturescreatures toto whomwhom wewe havehave certaincertain responsibilities,responsibilities, itit isis reasonablyreasonably clearclear thatthat animalsanimals areare properproper ob­ob­ 2 jectsjects ofof moralmoral concern.concern. 2 GrantingGranting animalsanimals moralmoral standing,standing, however,however, needneed notnot resultresult inin attemptsattempts toto promotepromote animalanimal welfare.welfare. ImagineImagine yourselfyourself inin thethe followingfollowing situation.situation. YouYou areare aa biochemist,biochemist, isolatedisolated onon aa desertdesert islandisland withwith youryour daughterdaughter Jill,Jill, youryour petpet dogdog PhiloPhilo andand aa smallsmall butbut well-equippedwell-equipped laboratory.laboratory. OneOne dayday youryour daughtdaught fallsfalls ill;ill; herher healthhealth failsfails rap­rap­ idlyidly andand itit seemsseems evidentevident sheshe willwill diedie unlessunless somethingsomething isis done.done. YouYou synthesizesynthesize whatwhat maymay bebe aa curecure butbut youyou areare notnot sure;sure; itit maymay alsoalso bebe aa poison.poison. WhatWhat shouldshould youyou do?do? TheThe ob­ob­ viousvious answeranswer isis thatthat youyou testtest thethe potionpotion onon Philo.Philo. ToTo dodo otherwiseotherwise wouldwould bebe morallymorally un­un­ justifiable.justifiable. 33 TheThe factfact thatthat youyou testtest thethe possible cure on Philo does not showshow thatthat you do not care about him or take him to be a proper object of moral concern. It is just that in this case Philo's interests are out­ weighed by Jill's. Conflicts like the above demonstrate that moral concern is not a sufficient guide for our treatment of animals. Donald VanDeVeer has ~osedppsed the problem well: The troublesometroublesome .and.and difficult question�question whichwhich arises,arises, onceonce oneone isis convincedconvinced that�that bothboth humanhuman beingsbeings (or(or many)many) andand animals�animals (or(or many)many) havehave atat leastleast somesome morally�morally relevantrelevant interests,interests, concernsconcerns howhow to�to wei~h~ theirtheir respectiverespective interestsinterests inin gen­�gen­ ~anderal and howhow toto adjudicateadjudicate conflictsconflicts of�of interestinterest whichwhich arisearise betweenbetween humanshumans and�and animals.animals.4�4 . WhatWhat needsneeds toto bebe shownshown isis howhow moralmoral concernconcern oughtought toto bebe manifestmanifest withwith respectrespect toto animals.animals. ~ot~ot eveneven thethe establishmentestablishment ofof animalanimal rights,rights, aa veryvery strongstrong conclusion,conclusion, wouldwould resolveresolve thisthis problem.problem. IfIf animalanimal interestsinterests areare protectedprotected byby rights,rights, wewe stillstill mustmust askask toto whatwhat extent,extent, ifif any,any, theythey areare protectedprotected againstagainst humanhuman interests.interests.5S AA justjust resolutionresolution ofof thethe aboveabove problemproblem willw~ll havehave toto taketake accountaccount ofof bothboth similaritiessimilarities andand differencesdifferences betW'eenbetween humanshumans andand animals.animals. RecentRecent studiesstudies ofof animalanimal behaviorbehaviorhavehave shownshown thatthat be­be­ haviorhavior toto bebe significantlysignificantly moremore complexcomplexand,and, consequently,consequently, moremore similarsimilar totohumanhumanbehaviorbehavior thanthanpreviouslypreviouslyassumed.assumed.66 AmongAmong otherotherthings,things, animalsanimalshavehavebeenbeenfoundfound toto useusecomplicatedcomplicated EaA 11/1�11/1 8 communication systems and to modify objects human nature. It is here that human unique­ ~or use as tools, two activities once deemed ness lends a hand to animal welfare. the exclusive property of human beings. Such I sophisticated behavior has led a number of sciencists to conclude that at least some ani­ What needs to be shown with respect to ani­ mals have a fairly substantial mental life.' mals is not only that their welfare i$ ~ Needless to say, this conclusion has marked matter of moral concern but equally important implications for the weighing of animal in­ how much weight animal interests ought to terests. An animal with a high level of carry whenever they conflict with human in­ awareness is vulnerable in more ways than one terests. One plausible approach to this wich a low level and, consequently, places a problem has been labeled by VanDeVeer "two­ greater demand on our moral consideration. factor egalitarianism."a As its name sug­ gests, two-factor egalitarianism focuses on Excitement over these discoveries, however, two factors: these are. extent of interest should not lead us to forget the remaining, and psychological complexity. Once these are significant differences between animal and determined, various principles inform the human behavior. Recently discovered similar­ moral agent how much weight each deserves, i:ies, significant though they be, are not allowing in general that significance varies great enough to bridge that divide. Nor is directly with extent of interest and degree it likely that future research will do so. of psychological compleXity. Such a system Barring the discovery of presently unknown has intuitive appeal. 9 By focusing on the life-forms, human uniqueness appears a fact extent of interest involved two-factor egali­ to be lived with. To those concerned about tarianism allows us to take into account rela­ animal welfare such a conclusion may seem un­ tive cost and benefit. Underlying each de­ :ortunate and even distressing. Tradition­ cision will be a cost-benefit analysis. At ally, human uniqueness has been taken to the same time, two-factor egalitarianism as­ justify a rather cavalier attitude toward cribes greater weight to the interests of our animal welfare. Whether one spoke of souls, own kind, a position many persons find morally minds, intrinsic value, or divine commands, appealing. Moreover, it does so on the non­ the well-being of animals was felt to be in­ discriminatory, or, egalitarian grounds of significant compared to that of human beings. psychological complexity. All this is not to The result is well-known: the most trivial sav there are no problems regarding the of human interests allows the most thorough ac~eptability of two-factor egalitarianism as disregard for animal interests. It is no a guide to moral deliberation. 1Q For purposes wonder, then, that advocates of animal wel­ of this paper, however, I will ignore what­ fare have preferred to emphasize similari­ ever difficulties there may be and work with­ :1es while downplaying differences between in the framework provided by two-factor egal­ animal and human behavior. itarianism. My intention is to sketch a some­ In what follows, I want to re-examine the what plausible system in terms of which the role of human uniqueness in adjudicating con­ role of human uniqueness can be evaluated, flicts between animal and human interests. not to argue that two-factor egalitarianism ~~ conclusion will be that for the most part provides an adequate context for resolving t~is role has been misunderstood. Properly conflicts between animal and human interests. understood, human uniqueness is a vital com­ Let me begin with extent of interest. ponent in the case for animal welfare. My A continuum of interests is not difficult argument ~ill proceed in two stages. To be­ to envision. With respect to myself, I know oin I will sketch a system of moral princi­ o , . that some things count more for my well-being ples for adjudicating conflicts between an~- than others.. The extent of this counting is, mal and human interests. Iftlile grancing some of course, not a matter of my apprehension Doral consideration to animal interests, alone; it is a reflection of the world and my these principles both recognize human unique­ place therein. In many cases, I am aware of ness and grant high priority to human inter­ and correctly apprehend the relative impor­ ests. Having outlined this system, I will tance of my interests. In other cases, I do use it to address questions regarding the not. Unlike normal, adult humans, the knowl­ morality of animal experimentation. After edge animals have of their own L~terests will distinguishing two distinct ways in which be extremely vague or entirely intuitive. 11 [he systen can be applied to such questions, On our part, the determination and weighing I will argue that resolution of the debate of animal interests requires careful, pro­ over animal experimentation depends to a longed observation, with special care taken large extent on fundamental assumptions about to avoid anthropomorphic distortions. Recent E8A 11/1 9 9 studies of wolves, chimpanzees and gorillas reflective awareness. The value of such aware­ indicate that such distortions can be avoided ness, limited as it is~· is that it allows for and animal interests assessed from an objec­ greater adaptability: a painful course will be tive, scientific standpoint. 12 avoided, a pleasurable one pursued. In this Interests, both human and animal, can be di­ way bare awareness of pain and pleasure allows vided up in several ways. For purposes of an organism to unthinkingly anticipate the this paper, I want to distinguish between future and react accordingly. One characteris­ three levels of importance, which I call tic of non-reflective awareness is that pat­ 'basic,' 'serious' and 'peripheral. '13 Per­ terns of response must be built into the organ­ ipheral interests are goods the absence of ism, a product of evolutionary selection. which results in some loss but whose presence At Some point on the continuum, bare aware­ is not essential to well-being. In this ness of pain and pleasure is filled out with a sense, satisfactions of peripheral interests capacity to learn from experience, resulting are luxuries, pleasures that could be done in more flexible patterns of behavior. Closed without. Basic interests lie at the other instincts, a matter of rigid, genetic program­ extreme of the continuum. A basic interest ming, become supplemented and, in some cases, is a good, the absence of which results supplanted by open instincts. Unlike closed either in death or a life not worth living. instincts, open instincts specify general For purposes of convenience, let me refer to patterns of response, leaving details to be a basic interest whose frustration results filled in by individual and communal exper­ in death as a Bl-interest. A basic interest ience. Internally, animals which can learn whose frustration results in a life not worth from experience will have more highly develop­ living I will refer to as a B2-interest. An ed nervous systems. Externally, animals which example of a B2-interest is the absence of can learn from experience will tend to be intense, prolonged suffering. An example of social anirnals. 14 There are good reasons for a Bi-interest is food, the consumption of this. Whether limited or prolonged, the which is necessary for life. effect of communal life is to shield individ­ Serious interests lie near the middle of ual animals from deficiencies in their own the continuum. IJhile counting heavily to­ experience and/or capacities: the community ward the quality of existence, they are not as a whole provides an ongoing reservoir of so basic that their frustration results in adaptive response. Utilization of this res­ ervoir requires highly developed means of death or an intolerable life. w~at their frustration results in is, quite simply, a communication. Accordingly, animals with a bad life. What makes a life good or bad capacity to learn will have significant will vary from kind to kind, as well as from capacities for expression, whether in the individual to individual. For our purposes, form of gesture, sound, posture, or facial we can regard a life as bad if a significant expression. number of natural tendencies are frustrated. Associated with plasticity of behavior is A bad life is a life without fulfillment. the haVing of a unified life. For animals An example of a serious interest for wolves near the bottom of the continuum, life is no is membership in a pack. A solitary wolf more than a series of discrete experiences, lacks opportunity to satisfy its strong some good, other bad. With increasing psy­ social instincts. An example of a serious chological complexity it beComes necessary interest for human beings (as well as many that life be unified over time not only in a animals) is being loved or appreciated by biological but also in. a "biographical" others of their kind. While life may not sense. Past, present and future are thereby cease to be worth living without such ful­ b()und together in a way previously unknown. fillment, it is hard to imagine a truly The past remains present in memory and ca­ happy person whose life is empty of affec­ pacity while the future anticipates itself tion. in long and short term goals. One measure Just as interests lie on a continuum with of the extent to which life becomes an respect to importance, so animals and humans animal's own in more than a numer~cal sense lie on a continuum with respect to psycho­ is the development of indiVidual personal­ logical complexity. At one end of this con­ ities. For our purposes,· we can think of tinuum are beings barely sentient, having no personality as "unified complexity." Not more than a primitive capacity to feel pain only is the behavior of animals having a or pleasure. Here, the organism's drive for life in the biographical sense complex, it homeostasis has become externalized in a non­ is also unified in a distinctive manner. is E8A 11/1 1:0

It is not hard to run the continuum on from One way to proceed at this point would be here. In human beings we see a much greater to raise a general question regarding guide­ capacity to learn, brought about by neurologi­ lines for moral judgment. Granted that we cal and social changes. Closed instincts need "ranking principles," how are we to have receded further while open instincts decide what is and what is not an acceptable have become even more open. Along with human principle? While this is an important issue culture and language has come increased indi­ which must eventually be ~aced, I am going to viduality. Most important, humans have ac­ sidestep it for purposes of this paper. Rather quired the capacity to conceptualize their than raising a general question about the lives as wholes and, subsequently, direct them nature of morality, I will present six prin­ according to rational and moral norms. Here, ciples for adjudicating conflicts between awareness becomes fully reflective. Although animal and human interests. Which, if any, recent studies indicate that some primates of these principles are morally justifiable other than man are self-conscious--at least I will leave, in this paper, to the reader's to the extent that they can identify them­ judgment. My purpose in presenting these selves in mirrors and pictures--there is good six principles is to outline a mininal, non­ reason to believe their conceptual abilities speciesistic system with respect to animal quite limited and virtually no reason to re­ welfare. In order to distinguish this sys­ gard them as moral agents. So far, human be­ tem from other systems falling under the ings stand alone at their end of the continuum. rubric of two-factor egalitarianism I will I will call animals which are barely sentient call it "the c-system." The c-system is a "level-I beings." Such beings have no more minimal system with respect to animal wel­ than a primitive capacity to feel pain and fare because in every kind of conflict save pleasure. Animals which have a life in the one priority is granted to the interests of biogrpphical sense, I will refer to as "level­ higher beings. The c-system is non-species­ II beings." The increasing complexity of istic in that it does not grant special sta­ these animals allows their lives to be unified tus to humans simply on the grounds that over time in ways not previously possible. they are human. The source of human pri­ Humans and whatever other beings have the ca­ ority lies in human capacity. An animal pacity to direct the lives they have in accord belonging to level-III would deserve greater with rational and moral norms, 1 will refer to consideration than a human belonging to as "level-III beings." Here, personality level-II. It is in this sense that the c­ reaches its fulfillment in agency, made poss­ system is an egalitarian system. ible by the apprehension of external standards The first three principles are common to for behavior. Combining these three levels of all systems falling under the rubric of two­ psychological complexity with our four kinds factor egalitarianism. These are the left­ of interests, we can now demarcate twelve, dis­ right, the top-bottom and the cross-over tinct categories of interests. These are principle. The left-right principle concerns listed in the follOWing table:

cacegories of interest P-interests Bl-interests S-interests

III S III P level-III beings II S II P level-II beings I S I P level-I beings

interests in a particular row. that is, in­ Each interest involved in a conflict can be terests of the same level of beings. It placed, more-or-less determinately, in one of reads. these categories. What are needed now are leaving aside the difference between principles ranking these categories with re­ Bl and BZ interests and staying with­ with­ spect to moral significance. in a given row, interests trump, i.e., i.e., take moral precedence, from left to to right. right. E8A 11/1 11 11

(In a moment, we will consider 'the relative t:he B., interests of level-I and level­ weight of BI and Bz interests.) The top­ II befngs trump the P interests of bottom principle concerns interests in a level-III beings. given column, that is, similar interests According to the BZ principle, it is wrong to held by beings of different levels. It make the life of any animal unbearably hor­ reads, rible, that is, so bad that the animal is within each column interests trump better off dead, for the sake of peripheral from top to bottom. l 6 interests. To reject this principle would in effect be to disregard animal interests all The cross-over principle is needed for com­ together. pleteness. It reads, reads, II trumps are transitive. Together the left-right, top-bottom, cross­ Together the left-right, top-bottom and over, BI, SB and B2 principles define the c­ cross-over principles resolve numerous con­ svstem. As noted, the c-system is a minimal flicts. Apart from the difference between system with respect to animal welfare. Given BI and B2 interests, they handle e~ery con­ the nature of this system it might well be flict going down and/or to the rignt on our expected to justify in a rather straightfor­ table of interests. The remaining three prin­ wat'd manner present practices involving ani­ ciples deal with cases "cutting against the mal suffering. What I hope to show in the 0'"rain " that is , , where the lesser interests of following is that this is an illusion. Even higher beings trump the greater interests of of a system granting minimal standing to ani­ lower beings, or conversely, the greater in­ in­ mals may impose forceful restrictions on terests of lower beings trump the lesser in­ the way in which and the extent to which terests of higher beings. These three prin­ prin­ animals can justifiably be made to suffer ciples are the BI ' SB and B2 principles. The The or die. In order to show this I want to BI principle reads, reads, concentrate not on highly questionable a P interest of a level-III being trumps practices, such as the use of rabbits for a BI interest of a level-lor level-II cosmetic testing or the raising of veal being. calves in small, wooden crates, but rather This controversial principle tells uS that on a practice which most people feel is justified even if unfortunate, namely, the (normal) humans are justified in killing (nor­ use of animals in scientific experimenta­ mal) animals for the sake of any interest tion. What I want to argue is that even whatever. 17 on the c-system there are serious questions The last two principles concern the extent about the justifiability of this practice. to which animals ought to suffer for the sake 1.et me begin by narrowing down my focus of human interests. In stating them as well of interest. A striking characteristic of as the BI principle, I am proceeding on the assumntion that animals have a stronger in­ the use of animals in science is its great terest in avoiding extreme suffering than in diversity. One problem with the old debate staying alive. IS According to the SB prin­ between "vivisectors and antivivisection­ ists" is that it radically oversimplifies ciple, the issues involved. Animals are used in the S interests of level-III beings trump many different ways in science; they are the B2 interests of level-I and level-II not just "cut up." Accordingly, the extent beings while the P interests of level-III to which animal interests are sacrificed beings trump the 5 interests of level-I varies widely. On the one hand, field and level-II beings. studies such as those of Goodall and Schaller need not involve any serious dis­ The SB principle allows you to inflict any ruption of animal interests. On the other amount of suffering on an animal for the sake hand, studies such as the well-known depri­ of human fulfillment. It also allows you to vation experiments of Harry Harlow and sacrifice the wellbeing of an animal for the colleagues involve an extreme sacrifice of sake of any interest whatever. animal interest. Most situations involving The only principle contained in the c-sys­ the use of animals in science lie somewhere tem which rules in favor of animal interest between these two extremes. In this paper is the B2 principle. The B2 principle reads, my concern is with those cases where sign1­ E6A 11/1 12 ficant suffering is inflicted on an animal. isfied with the general idea that their That there are numerous cases ~here what we dreadful doings are performed in pursuit have called B2 and S interests are sacri­ of a worthy aim. It is their duty to ficed is clear. The person who doubts this ponder in every separate case whether need only refer to the relevant literature. it is really and truly necessary thus to 19 Simply calling attention to these in­ sacrifice an animal for humanity.21 stances of significant suffering, of course, Put in our terms, Schweitzer is suggesting is not to pass judgment on them either pro that the scientist treat each sacrifice of or con. The question of justification is animal interest as analogous to the sacri­ one to which we now turn. fice of Philo's interests. To do so, the According to the c-system we are justi­ scientist must in each case compute animal fied in inflicting significant suffering loss and human gain and:-then, weigh the on an animal so long as that suffering is respective interests on some system such necessary for the satisfaction of signi­ as the c-system. The justified operations ficant human interests. Such a view has at will be those in which the gain outweighs present a wide constituency. Animal advo­ the loss. Let us refer to this ideal as cates work to eliminate instances of unnec­ "the Schweitzerian ideaL" The Schweitzer­ essary suffering. Scientists themselves ian ideal requires a strict comparison of are trying increasingly hard to eradicate interests frustrated and satisfied at an instances of superfluous suffering, whether individual level. This accords well with these stem from poor experimental design, our feeling that no animal should have to sloppy technique or inadequate housing and suffer without good reason. care. 20 Granted though that so many agree The Schweitzerian ideal embodies a strong that no more suffering should be inflicted concern for animal welfare and it is not un­ un­ than necessary, why is it that scientists usual to hear scientists citing this ideal ideal and animal advocates often disagree about with approval. However, scientists rarely rarely what is and what is not necessary suffering? if ever shape and direct their own work work This is especially puzzling in light of the according to the dictates of the Schweitzer­ Schweitzer­ apparent fact that in cases such as that in­ ian ideal. By this I do not mean that that volving Jill and Philo almost everyone will scientists cease to be concerned with animal animal agree that the animal's interests ought to welfare when they actually engage in scien­ scien­ be sacrificed. Of course, part of the reason tific inquiry, as though their apparent apparent may be that some animal advocates are unin­ acceptance of the Schweitzerian ideal were a a formed sentimentalists or even that some matter of hypocrisy. My point is simply that that scientists allow egoistic desires for publi­ in practice they operate, sometimes without cation and public esteem to interfere with recognizing it, according to the dictates of of their moral judgment. Be this as it may, a another ideal, an ideal I will refer to as as deeper source of disagreement lies in the use "the worthy practice ideal." By way of say­ by scientists and their critics of two radi­ ing what this ideal is let me offer an ex­ ex­ cally different ideals concerning how super­ planation for the general neglect of the the fluous suffering is to be detected. Unfor­ Schweitzerian ideal. ideal. tunately, the resulting difference in the way cost-benefit analyses are derived is almost Application of the Schweitzerian ideal re­ invariably overlooked. What I want to do now quires a "cost/benefit" analysis for each ~ords, is to discuss this difference in approach. In particular case. It demands, in other the process of so doing, I will suggest that that we perceive a direct relation between another source of disagreement is a differ­ interests frustrated and interests satisfied. ence about what constitutes the most signifi­ The problem is that in science as actually cant human interests. practiced particular instances of animal suf­ fering rarely coordinate directly with contri­ The great humanitarian Albert Schweitzer butions to human welfare. In a recent study once posed the following as an ideal for for of alternatives to animal experimentation, science: science: the British scientist D. H. Smyth argues, Those who test operations or drugs on Attempts to base legislation on such animals, or who inoculate them with di­ issues as whether the experiments are seases so that they may be able to help directly useful in the alleviation of human beings by means of the results suffering are not likely to be success­ thus obtained, ought never to rest sat­ ful. It is impossible to make any dis­ E&A 11/1 13�13

tinction between fundamental, medical, medical, pursue it. Whatever suffering occurs in the veterinary and commercial research research pursuit of that goal is justified so long as which could be useful in deciding which which the reasonably anticipated benefits are particular piece of biomedical research research sufficiently great. Consequently, it is not will contribute to the alleviation of of necessary to show in each individual case suffering. 22 22 that animal loss is balanced by human gain; only that such loss as does occur occurs in Smyth's point is a telling ooe. The absence absence the practice of a responsible science. The of direct correlations between suffering and and Schweitzerian ideal takes a very different payoff is not happenstance. Rather, it stems approach. To begin, it shifts the burden of from the very nature of science. Scientific Scientific proof to the scientist with respect to each inquiry is not a linear process, laid out in in individualindiVidual case. It is not enough, in other advance and checked by a few crucial experi­ experi­ words, to show that animal suffering occurs ments. While science is also not a matter of of in the "pursuit of a worthy aim." "Every trial and error, there. is a. marked element of of separate case" must be weighed and whatever serendipity. Setting this factor of chance suffering occurs shown to be compensated for in a social endeavor exceeding the grasp of of by a signif:cantly greater good. Assuming anyone person virtually entails that the im­ im­ that Smyth ~s correct in his claim that at pact of many experiments cannot be foreseen. present such direct correlations cannot be This, unfortunately, is as true for animal animal demonstrated for most instances of animal experimentation as it is for atom-smashing. atom-smashing. research, it follows that the present use The fact that in the former case we are deal­ deal­ of animals in science cannot be justified ing with sentient creatures is, as far as as on the Schweitzerian ideal. Acceptance of scientific method is concerned, simply irrel­ irrel­ that ideal would result in quite significant evant. None of this is to deny that good or restrictions being placed on the range and ex­ promising experimental design ca,n. be di.stin­ tent of animal experimentation. guished from bad. These kinds of decisions allow morally sensitive scientists tp week The worthy practice ideal has a strong out some animal work on the basis of low appeal, the basis of which lies in two con­ promise. More often, individual cases elude victions: first, that science is in general assessment on any moral system. The projected a worthy activity and, second, that scientific payoff is too complexly related to the suffer­ progress can be maximized by minimizingminimiZing non­ ing inflicted to be divided up or anticipated methodological restrictions on scientific in the manner required. work. The worthy practice ideal is attractive because it gives scientists a great deal of The worthy practice ideal affirms that sci­ freedom to pursue as they see best what we entists should inflict no more suffering than all see as worthy goals. Anyone who wants to is necessary for the pursuit of scientific reject this ideal in favor of the Schweitzer­ knowledge. Unlike the Schweitzerian ideal, ian ideal will need to show either that ani­ which focuses on individual cases, this ideal mals deserve more consideration than the focuses on the general practice of animal ex­ worthy practice ideal allows and/or that the perimentation. According to it, particular benefits derived from a science operating instances of animal suffering are justified under the worthy practice ideal are not that if they occur as a consequence of responsible, much greater and perhaps even less than those methodologically sound scientific practice. derived from a science operating under the If it is then asked why this connection jus­ more restrictive Schweitzerian ideal. Let me tifies animal suffering the answer is that say a few words about how each line of argu­ the general practice of science contributes ment may be pursued. significantly to the alleviation of human suffering. Instances of animal suffering Advocates of the Schweitzerian ideal will which result from improper methodology or want to argue that in the case of animal ex­ ex­ insignificant projects will not be justified perimentation we ought to sacrifice m~thod­ on the worthy practice idaa1. ology for morality, that is, that we ought ought t~ place non-methodological, moral restric­ restric­ Most scientists, I suggest, operate accord­ t~ons on what scientists do to animals even even ing to the worthy practice and not the when we accept as worthy, practices which which Schweitzerian ideal. One way to see this is might be pursued more effectively without without to consider the practical consequences of such restrictions. Success in this regard regard each ideal. The worthy practice ideal allows depends upon shOWing that our moral obliga­ obliga­ for an open-ended justification of animal ex­ tions to animals are stronger than normally normally goa~ perimentation. It says: here is a worthy perceived. If these obligations are strong strong E8A 11/1 14 14 enough, questions about animal experimenta­ of Philo and Jill, wouldn't you feel morally tion will parallel those about human experi­ obligated to sacrifice Philo's interests? My mentation. There is no doubt that we could answer is, "Yes, I would." The act sacrificing pursue some worthy goals more effectively Philo's interests for the sake of Jill's is than we do if we gave free rein to the prac­ morally justified. It does not follow from tice of human experimentation. For instance, this, however, that the general practice of our understanding of brain disorders could sacrificing animal interests is justified. As be advanced greatly by studying the devel­ I will now point out, there are important opment of children on which we have inflicted differences between the individual act and various kinds of cerebral lesions. Yet, the general practice. despite the worthiness of this end, we do not engage in such a practice because we Consider for a moment, a difference with quite properly regard it as morally repugnant. respect to necessity. In the case of Jill The animal advocate who pursues this line and Philo the father is forced to make a will argue, as many have, that the same con­ difficult decision by extraordinary circum­ siderations which prevent uS from giving stances; unless he acts his daughter will free rein to the practice of human experi­ very likely die. In addition to a clearly mentation ought to prevent us from giving perceived and quite specific connection be­ free rein to the practice of animal experi­ tween Philo's (possible) loss and Jill's mentation. 23 (possible) gain, there is an element of real necessity. The situation is quite different Arguments such as the above are extremely with respect to the general practice of important. We cannot get a grip on the moral animal experimentation. Here, there is no issues without them. One problem with such parallel to the necessity confronting the arguments, though, is that taken by themselves father. While there is no question that some they may give the impression that the debate persons will suffer more and die sooner if over animal welfare is entirely a matter of the general practice is terminated, society weighing animal interests against human inter­ itself would not be placed in any danger. ests. This is a mistake. A large component of There is at present no overwhelming threat the debate concerns determining what is in our to the existence or well-being of society own best interests. If the extensive sacrifice the staving off of which depends upon the of animal interests is not in our own interes~ general practice of animal experimentation. it will not be justified even on the c-system. Instead of being forced upon us by an un­ Acceptance of the worthy practice ideal as a pleasant necessity, animal experimentation is justified norm depends upon the presupposition pursued as an apparent means to a better life. that the general practice of animal experimen­ tation is a worthy practice. Although this pre­ There are other, equally important differ­ supposition is often accepted without pause, ences between the individual case and the gen­ it strikes me as highly questionable. In a eral practice. One concerns the link between moment, I will suggest several reasons for be­ suffering and payoff. There is a good chance lieving that the general practice of animal that much suffering incurred in the general experimentation is not a worthy practice what­ course of research will never result in the ever weight we assign animal interests. Prior alleviation of either human or animal suffer­ to doing this, however, let me set the stage ing. Unlike those individual cases where by pointing out three crucial differences be­ there is a direct connection between suffer­ tween the individual act and the general prac­ ing and payoff, benefits derived from scien­ tice of sacrificing animal interests. tific research follow a circuitous route. In some cases, knowledge gained may never "pay Unlike the Schweitzerian ideal, which assesses off" due to a lack of technology or will. On individual sacrifices of animal interests one the darker side, there is every reason to be­ by one, the worthy practice ideal assesses in­ lieve knowledge gained has and will be used dividual sacrifices as components of a general by some humans to violate the basic and ser­ practice. Ultimately, it is the general prac­ ious interests of other humans; governments tice which must be justified on the worthy are not loving fathers. practice ideal. In attempting to so justify a general practice it is crucial that we avoid Another difference has to do with the ex­ a common confusion. Attempts to justify the tent of animal suffering. Unlike the Jill/ general practice of animal experimentation Philo case, there is no limit to the extent often incorporate an emotional appeal to our of animal suffering which may be brought intuitions about particular cases: if you about by the general practice of animal ex­ were forced to choose between the interests perimentation. In the latter case, as opposed EBA 11/1�11/1 IS to the former, we have an ,open-ended or "blank­ eral practice of animal experimentation, it is check" justification. Given that we are un­ also the case that that practice for various likely to resolve all medical problems con­ reasons decreases the value of life in any fronting us, there will always be more method­ society wherein it occurs. ologically sound experiments which may result By way of assessing Soave's claim we must in beneficial knowledge. By linking the prac­ once again avoid confusing the particular and tice of animal experimentation to such vaguely the general. It does not follow from the apprehended promises rather than directly per­ fact that particular individuals have profited ceived necessities, an open-ended justifica­ from animal research that society as a whole tion is provided for the sacrifice not of one, has profited from such work. While it is clear tWO, or even hundreds but quite literally for that some individuals have profited greatly that of many billions. from the practice of animal experimentation, The general practice of animal experimenta­ there is good reason to believe that present tion involves much more than and cannot be standards of living and health are not a con­ justified in the same terms as the sacrifice seqUiance of nor dependent upon that practice. of Philo's interests for Jill's. Crucial The major contributions~f animal experimenta­ differences with respect to necessity, payoff, tion to health lie in the area of recovery and extent of suffering drive a wedge between from illness. The major determinates of our intuitions regarding particular cases and health, however, lie in the area of prevention. our judgment about general practices. In the A thorough study of documentary evidence re­ latter case we must ask not only whether ani­ garding causes of death in England and Wales mal interests should ever be sacrificed for during the past three centuries led Thomas human interests--that is clear--but also whe­ McKeown to the fol~owing conclusion, ther benefits derived from the general The appraisal of influences on health health practice outweigh losses resulting therefrom. in the past three centuries suggested In raising this question I want to put aside that we owe the improvement, not to to consideration of the extensive losses animals what happens when we are ill, but to to suffer. Let us assume that animal interests the fact that we do not so often be­ be­ count for very little and ask, given this come ill; and we remain well, not be­ be­ assumption, whether the general practice of cause of specific measures such as as methodologically-unrestricted animal experi­ vaccination and immunization, but be­ be­ mentation is in the best interests of human cause we enjoy a higher standard of of society. nutrition and live in a healthier healthier ellvironment . 255 In a paper describing some of the benefits derived from animal experimentation, Orland McKeown reaches the follOWing conclusion re­ re­ Soave concludes, garding the contribution of medical research Animal research constitutes one of to improved health, health, the primary reasons for the high stand­ The direction of medical research has ard of living and health enjoyed today been determined by the belief thac im­ by citizens of the United States. 24 provement in health depends essentially If correct, Soave's claim provides strong on knowledge of the body and its diseases, support for the belief that animal experimen­ applied mainly through personal medical tation is a worthy practice. It is, of course, intervention in the form of immunization and therapy ... (T)his interpretation is undeniable that the practice of animal experi­ mentation has resulted in a number of contri­ not in accord with past experience: the butions to human (and animal) welfare. Insulin, modern improvement in health wa's initiated and carried quite a long way with little open-heart surgery, the control of infection, assistance from science and technology.... the development of powerful anesthetics and 26 other wonder-drugs are only some of the bene­ fits derived from or in conjunction with ani­ Is MeKeown right? This is a difficult and im­ mal experimentation. These and other contri­ portant question into which we can go no fur­ butions, striking as they are, have led many ther here. 27 McKeown's research is of such a persons and especially scientists to conclude quality as to indicate that claims about the with Soave that human society has a great indispensability of animal research to public stake in animal experimentation. Despite its health are highly suspect. 28 While McKeown surface appeal, such a claim is mistaken. Not himself favors increased medical research, he only is it not the case that present standards observes that "in advanced countries health of living and health are dependent on the gen- is still determined mainly by personal be­ havior and the environment.,,29 E&A 11/1 16 If animal research does not make an impor­ Desensitization to animal sufferipg is in it­ tant and indispensable contribution to public self a terrible thing. R.D.Laing has rightly health, questions must also be raised about observed, "We become less human to the extent its economic feasibility. Animal research that we treat any living beings as things."34 is expensive and as such places strain on an Another related concern has to do with the long­ already overstrained national budget. 30 Per­ term effects of desensitization. the English haps money used in support of animal research philosopher John Locke once argued that we could be better used elsewhere. Rather than should discourage cruelty in children on the pursue this line of criticism, however, I want grounds that lithe custom of tormenting and kill­ to turn the discussion in another direction. ing beasts, will, by degrees, harden their minds I have suggested that the general practice of even towards men." 35 If Locke is correct there animal experimentation does not make a signi­ is clearly a danger that desensitization con­ ficant contribution to public health. I want cenring animal suffering will result in desensi­ now to argue that in various ways that prac­ tization concerning human suffering. While I tice undermines the value of life in modern suspect there is something to this correlation society. The charges I will make are contro­ 1 am not prepared to affirm it. One reason is versial not least because they have to do with that Locke overlooks the extent to which human ·.rh.at might be called "intangible factors." beings are capable of arbitrarily restricting How one views them will depend in large measure their sphere of concern: the fact, if it were on how one views human life. At bottom they a fact, that I am not disturbed by black men have to do with questions about what consti­ consti­ dying in the streets of South Africa does not tutes a truly "good life"31 and as such are are show that I am not seriously concerned with liable to lively debate. Nevertheless, they they the sufferings of friends and neighbors; a are important and we overlook them at our own own society which routinely inflicts pain on ani­ peril. peril. mals (or barbarians, for that matter) may strenuously resist harming any person who is Richard Ryder has argued in his book, Victims a member of that society. However, while of Science, that the most horrible feature of this capacity to draw arbitrary distinctions animal experimentation as presently practiced protects the general practice of animal ex­ is its "terrible ordinariness."32 What in the perimentation from what we might call "Locke's case of Jill and Philo is a tragedy, forced on objection," it opens it up to another, more the father by extraordinary circumstances, be­ serious objection. C. S. Lewis put the prob­ comes in science a way of life. In the process lem this way: animals utilized cease to be seen as creatures .... ith lives and purposes of their own and become Once the old Christian idea of a total instead "animal tools," instruments for the difference in kind between man and beast purpose of man. That such de-sensitization has been abandoned, then no argument for occurs is quite plausible on general psycho­ experiments on animals can be found which logical grounds. The routine infliction of is not also an argument for experiments misery exerts a strong pressure toward desen­ on inferior men. 36 sitization. Evidence that such desensitization Given the discovery that some animals not only occurs can be found in the terminology used construct tools but also have highly developed when speaking of animals, the range of uses systems of communication, Lewis' point is not to which animals are put, the minimal condi­ a trivial one. If Washoe and her relatives tions under which animals are kept and the have greater psychological capacities than growth of an "animal industry" promoting the severely retarded humans, why should we in­ use of animals. 33 All of this, of course, is flict terrible suffering on chimpanzees but not to deny that individual scientists may be not on less capable humans? According to the very sensitive to the horrors of animal suf­ c-system one is morally obligated to give fering. Some scientists, of whom I have been preference to more highly developed creatures. fortunate to meet mo~e than a few, care enough that they refuse to participate in practices My point is not to advocate using retarded common to others. The problem I want to note persons in research. It is simply that a so­ here is not one of individual cruelty but ciety which inflicts extreme suffering on rather that posed by an institutionalized higher animals ought to have good reasons thoughtlessness, a widespread and socially con­ for not inflicting it on "lower humans." If doned failure to realize just what it is that they don't, that society ceases to be a ra­ is being done. The mere fact that so many de­ tional society and I, for one, regard that fenders of animal experimentation regard cri­ as most undesirable. If Lewis' point is to tics thereof as overly-emotional sentimentalists be set aside, we need some good, morally relevant reasons for treating all animals is itself an indication that desensitization has occurred. differently than !ll humans. To my knowl­ • • E8A 11/1 17�17 edge, the defenders of animal experimenta­ doubts this need only ask whether increased tion have yet to come up with any such such health and life-span, whatever their source, reasons. reasons. have resulted in increased happiness. So Another concern has to do with the desir­ far as I can see, they have not. 39 ability of life in a society which routinely This completes my discussion of reasons for sacrifices animal interests. By way of mak­ believing that the general practice of animal ing this point, let me step back a moment experimentation is not a worthy practice. To­ from questions of right and wrong and call gether they suggest that not only is that attention to just how sad it is that so many practice not necessary for human health or animals live such horrible lives. In order survival but further, that it has a baneful to do so let me make reference to an intrig­ 37 I effect on the overall well-being of society. uing little story by Desmond Stewart. n If successful, these reasons indicate that this story the earth is invaded and conquer­ present scientific practices involving animal ed bv an alien race, the Troogs. The Troogs suffering cannot be justified even on the c­ proc~ed to treat humans no better .nor worse system. This conclusion, I note, is not a con­ than we have treated the animals. In this sequence of assigning greater weight to ani­ they feel completely justified since they mal interests but of asking seriously whether are without doubt vastly superior to human the institution in question is in the best beings. Yet for all their unquestioned unquestioned interests of human society. One nice effect superiority we cannot help but feel that that of this approach is that the issue of animal the Troogs are lacking something, some some welfare becomes part and parcel of a larger basic trait which would raise them above above issue concerning the nature and goals of the brutal level at which they act. We We social organization: what constitutes a truly might even be tempted to call the trait trait good life for humans and how should society they lack 'humanity,' that is, humane­ humane­ be structured so as to allow maximal realiza­ ness, the having of compassion, sympathy, sympathy, tion of that life. 40 Reflection on the moral and consideration for other creatures. creatures. status of animals will not resolve that issue. Whether or not the Troogs are morally jus­ Until it is dealt with, however, we cannot say tified in what they do, we fee! it is be­ be­ whether the general practice of animal experi­ neath their dignity as superior creatures creatures mentation is in the best interests of (normal) to so callously and routinely use inferior human beings. 41 creatures for their own purposes. 38 38 III Finally, we must reckon with the possi­ Historically, human uniqueness has been bility that in pursuing benefits to be 42 gained from animal experimentation we are, taken to justify exploitation of animals. almost paradoxically, cutting ourselves We have just seen reason to question any such off from a deeper source of happiness. In attempt. Even if animal life and suffering the final analysis, human happiness does is inconsequential compared to ours, it does not stem from a longer life or even good not follow that animals exist only for us, health but from the sense of a life well not for themselves. It may be that what makes lived. Even if the practice of animal ex­ us unique--what raises us so far above the perimentation makes a significant contri­ level of brutes--is a capacity to appreciate bution to longer life or better health-­ the value each sentient creature's life has something which I doubt--we still must ask for it itself. Our examination of the c­ whether in so doing it contributes to human system, a minimal morality according high happiness. My own conviction is that on the priority to human interests, suggests that whole it does not. An integral part of a granting any value to animal well-being places truly good life is a sense of having contri­ serious limitations on the human use of ani­ buted to the well-being of others. In this Our own unique life as moral and rational respect, the wise person Willingly sacrifices agents picks up this value, incorporates it elements of his/her well-being for the well­ into our own quest for fulfillment and, there­ being of others. A life built around the by, multiplies its significance. suffering of others can only be happy in the Advocates of animal welfare have no intrin­ most restricted of senses. Correspondingly, sic reason for fearing human uniqueness. As a society which promotes the welfare of a long as uniqueness is l'inked to responsibility few at the cost of inflicting on all respon­ as well as privilege it provides a buffer for sibility for the massive suffering of animals animal interests. We have seen this to be the is not a desirable society from the stand­ case with the c-system. Granting humans the point of human happiness. The person who privilege of violating animal interests for E&A II/I 18 the sake of their own interests provides no 4Donald VanDeVeer, "Interspecific Justice," license for excess once it is realized that Inouiry, vol.22 (1979), p. 58. human interests are tied to animal welfare. That human interests are so tied follows from SLawrence Haworth argues not only that ani­ the vary uniqueness of humans. Given this, mals have rights but that these tights are though, we need not give up the quest for a extremely weak and easily overridden by human stronger system than the c-system. One weak­ interests. Cf. "Rights, Wrongs and Animals," ness in the above line of argument is that it Ethics, vol. 88 (1978). trades too heavily on human interests: it 6For discussion of much of this research, sounds as though treating animals well is not see Edmund Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Syn­ something that should be done for its own thesis (Harvard, 1975). Wilson's book con­ sake·. This is a just criticism. Although the tains an extensive bibliography. c-system does accord moral standing to animals, that standing is so low as to require multi~ 7For example, Donald Griffin, The Question plication by human interest to protact animal of Animal Awareness (Rockefeller University ~elfare~ Whatever the status of the c-system, Press, 1976). however, the accessibility of such reenforce­ 8VanDeVeer. ment is itself heartening. 9Robert Nozick makes a similar suggestion Richard L. Fern in Anarchy, State and Uto~ia (Basic, 1974), University of Illinois p. 40. at Urbana-Champaign lOCf. VanDeVeer, pp. 74ff, for a discussion of several objections to two-factor egalitar­ II use the term 'animal' as short for 'non­ ianism. human animal.' Earlier versions of this pa­ per ~ere given at the Conference on Medicine 11H. J. McCloskey has argued that only beings . ' An~mals and Man held at the University of who ought to be concerned about their interests Illinois Medical Center (Chicago Circle), have interests. If this were so, it follows Lake Forest College, the University of Ill­ that animals, of whom it cannot be said that inois (Urbana) and Yale University. The paper they ought to do anything, do not have inter­ ~hich now appears is both clearer and stronger ests. Tom Regan has replied, correctly I be­ as a result of ensuing discussion. Special lieve, that while interests are the sorts of thanks are due Charlotte Brown, David Keppler, things moral agents ought to be concerned about, Paul Langner, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Sally Moran, it is not true that only moral agents have Mary Morgan, Mike Nelson, Don Scheid and Jim interests. Here, as elsewhere, Regan draws Wallace.�Wallace. parallels between the status of animals and "marginal humans" such as infants and sever1y 211 On .. h�h e restr~ct~on on t e absolutism of man's retarded persons. Cf. McCloskey, "Rights," rule over Nature is now generally accepted; Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15 (1965) and moral philosophers and public opinion agree Regan, Philosophical Quarterlv, vol 26 (1979), that it is morally impermissible to be cruel pp. 251-7. to animals. And by this they mean...that it is wrong to cause them to suffer unnecessar­ 12Cf. Wilson. Also, George Schaller, ~ ily." John Passmore, "The Treatment of Ani­ Mountain Gorilla (University of Chicago, 1963); mals," Journal of the Historv of Ideas, XXXVI L. David Mech, The Wolf (Natural History Press, (1975), p.195. Moral philosophers, of course, 1970), and Jane van Lawick-Goodall, In the differ as to whether our moral responsibility Shadow of Man (Houghton Mifflin, 1971). to animals is direct or indirect. For more on 13VanDeVeer also distinguishes between basic, this issue, see Tom Regan's introduction to serious and peripheral interests; his distinc­ Animal Rights and Human Obligations, ed. by tions are somewhat different from mine. Rom Regan and Peter Singer (Prentice-Hall, 1976) . l4It does not follow, of course, that all�all social animals have a marked capacity to learn�learn 3"The humanity which would prevent human from experience.�experience. suffering is a deeper and truer humanity than the humanity which would save pain or death lSJames Rachels develops the notion of "hav­ in the animal." Charles Eliot. Quoted in ing a life in a biographical sense" in a talk, Robert J. White, "Antivivisection: The Reluc­ "Do Animals Have a Right to Life?" given at tant Hydra," The American Scholar, vol. 40 the 1979 Blacksburg conference on Ethics and (1971); reprinted in Regan and Singer pp. Animals, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 163-169. ' State University. E8AII/1 E8AII/1 19 has labeled "speciesism," is argued by him to 16Cf. Nozick, p. 42; also, VanDeVeer, p.70. be a bare prejudice, a flat violation of the The justification of this principle lies at basic moral principle that equal amounts of the heart of tyo-factor egalitarianism. suffering are equally bad regardless of who or 17Given that various humans, present and fu­ what is the subject of such suffering. ture, have interests in keeping (some) animals 24American Journal of Public Health, vol.57, alive, the Bl-principle will not justify whole­ no. 9, September, 1967; p. 1626. Published as sale slaughter of animals. one of 4 articles jointly titled "Vivisection-­ leA similar claim is made by Peter Singer, Vivistudv: The Facts and the Benefits to Animal Animal Liberation (Avon, 1975), p.6 and p.22; and Huma~ Health." Reprints of these articles also, VanDeVeer, pp. 70f. are available from The National Society for Medical Research. 19For examples of such suffering, see Singer; also Richard Ryder, Victims of Science (London, 25Thomas McKeown, The Role of Medicine: Dream, 1975) and Jeff Diner, Phvsical and Mental Suf­ Mirage or Nemesis? Princeton University Press, fering of Experimental Animals (Animal Welfare 1979, p.79. McKeown is Emeritus Professor of Institute, 1979). Social Medicine at the University of Birming­ ham. 20Excellent work has been done in this regard by the Scientists' Center for Animal Welfare. 2EoMcKeown, p .10. For some suggestions as to how suffering may be 270ne area in which animal research has bear­ reduced see Russell and Burch's discussion of ing on the prevention of disease is that of nu­ the three "r's"--reduction, refinement and re­ trition. I Since it might be felt that such re­ placement--in W.M.S.Russell and R.L.Burch, The search vitiates the ne~ative implications of Principles of Humane Experimental Technique McKeown's work, I include the following comment: (Methuen, 1959). The first and most important reason for 2lAlbert Schweitzer, "The Ethic of Reverence the decline of infectious diseases was was for Life," reprinted in Regan and Singer, p.137. an improvement in nutrition. It resulted resulted 22D. H. Smyth, Alternatives to Animal Experi­ from advances in agriculture which spread mentation (Scholars Press in association with throughout the western world from about about the Research Defense Society, 1978), p. 167. the end of the seventeenth century. Al­ Al­ though incidental to our theme, it is of of 23Recent1y, Tom Regan, James Rachels, Joel great interest that the advance was due due Feinberg and others have followed Henry Salt initially to the introduction of new new (Animal Rights, MacMillan, 1894) in arguing that crops such as the potato and maize, and and if humans have rights, so do animals. Each ar­ to more effective application of tradi­ tradi­ gues that if all humans have moral rights then, tional methods--increased land use, "iven the existence of so-called "marginal hu­ manuring, winter feeding, rotation of of :ans" there are no good reasons for claiming crops, etc.--rather than to mechanical mechanical that only humans have moral rights. Presenta­ or chemical methods associated with in­ in­ tions~these arguments can be found in the dustrialization." (McKeown, p.7S) p.7S) Regan/Singer anthology. A recent attempt at rebuttal can be found in R.G.Frey's book, In­ It is also worth noting in light of recent con­ terests and Ri~hts: the Case A~ainst Animals troversies that extensive research has not led (Oxford, 1980). Other writers, for whom the to agreement regarding acceptable levels of notion of moral rights has little appeal, have cholesteroL argued in a similar manner from different bases. 28In pressing this question, it should not In his book, The Moral Status of Animals (Ox­ be forgotten that numerous persons have, as a ford, 1977), Stephen Clark argues in a Humean consequence of medical innovations, suffered vein that the moral sentiment applies to both more than they would have otherwise. This in­ humans and animals. A much better known argu­ cludes persons undergoing unnecessary and/or ment is th~t of Peter Singer. Singer has argu­ unsuccessful operations as well as term1nally ed along classical utilitarian lines that the ill patients who are forced often against only reason we feel justified in giving free their will to continue a life full of pain. rein to the practice of animal experimentation A useful discussion of some of these problems is that we arbitrarily choose to regard animal relative to coronary bypass surgery can be suffering as less important than human suffer­ found in The New York Times, November 18, 1980, ing. This view, which Singer (following Ryder) p. l5f. Not only does this article suggest ESA 11/1 20 that bypass surgery is a "mixed blessing," it 36C.S.Lewis, God in the Dock: Essays on Theol­ also indicates that reduction of risk factors ogy and Ethics, ed. by Walter Hooper. W. B. such as cigarette smoking, hypertension, hyper­ Eerdmans, 1970, p. 227. cholesteremia, obesity and sedentary living makes a far greater contribution to the elimin­ 37Desmond Stewart. "The Limits of Trooghaft." ation of atherosclerosis. Encounter (London, February, 1972). Reprinted in Regan and Singer, pp. 238-45. 29McKeown. p. 9. 38T.L.S.Sprigge has raised a question as to 30According to the National Institute of whether truly enlightened people would even want Health Publication No. 80-2091, approximately to survive "at the cost of massive suffering to $800 million was spent on research using lab­ other sentient creatures." Sprigge. p. 130. oratory animals by nonprofit organizations in After reflecting on this question, proceed to 1978 alone. Of this amount, a larger percentage reflect on how little our own well-being, let ~as paid for through grants and contracts from alone survival, depends on the massive suffer­ NIH. The amount spent is not going down. A re­ ing we inflict on animals. cent article in The New York Times of December 7, 1980, estimates that it will cost as much 39"'What is man 'Without the beasts? If all as 3 billion dollars just to test presently ex­ the beasts were gone, man would die from great isting chemicals as required by the Toxic Sub­ loneliness of spirit, for whatever happens to the beasts also happens to man. All things are stances Control Act of 1976. While such. work connected." Remark attributed to the Suquamish may be methodologically sound, one wonders Indian Chief Seatlh 1855. Cited in National whether the economy would be better off if less Geoiraohic, vol. 159. no. 2, p. 159. expensive alternatives were pursued. In a recent . . ~O letter to The Beast, Andrew Rowan of the Insti­ Numerous persons, including Lawrence Haworth tute for the Study of Animal Problems and a (Haworth. p.109), Philip Devine ("The Moral noted authority on the topic of "alternatives," Basis of Vegetarianism," Philosophy, vol. 53 claims, "perhaps 50% of all animals used in (1978), p.493), and Maurice Visscher (Journal of sa fety evaluation and toxicity testing could be the American Medican Association, vol. 199 , no. stopped immediately without jeopardizing human 9 (1967), p.129) have suggested that concern health or safety." (The Beast, no. 8, Winter for animal welfare takes the place of concern 1980-81; p. 56.) for human welfare. While this may be true for • some, there is no necessary trade-off. Indeed, J1r use 'gOOd' here in a non-moral sense. the two concerns have often comeCOme together. 32Ryder, Victims of Science, p. 18. According to Passmore, "The attack on slavery, 33 .. . at the hands of evangelicals and of Bentham, art~cle ~n A recent . The" New York Times (De­ ran hand- in- h and Wl'th t h e attack on crue1ty to cember 7 , :980~, ent~tlhedf Allco~panYf.that ThfriVeSanimals," (Passmore, p.2l7). Animal welfare on Regu1at~on, gave teo oWlng ~gures or advocates h t d d 1 k h d h sales and profits of two companies supplying abuse of an~vel en e tio over oOi ow deep t e , . ~ma s runs n our soc ety an , con­ an~mals Breed~ng for research: Charles River sequentl h f '1 d h 1 d'~ca1 T ., '. $ y, ave al e to see ow tru y ra LaDorator~es sold 18 mill~on animals for 30 their ro os 1 . l' , 1 d . 1 . . . .. p pas are l.n a po ~tlca an soc~a mlll~on and a proflt of $3 m~llion; Hazelton sense For s l' ht' . k . h' T •• $43 2 " h· f . ome en ~g en~ng remar s ~n t ~s ,--abara tarlestorles d~d . m~lll.on wort 0 busi­ regard s C 1 t D 11 "Th' k' d B . 2" . , ee ar e on a ery, ~n ~ng an e­ ness for a prof It of $ m~ll~on. F~gures are ing with Beasts" 0 th ~'f h D d b f h d' J 30 1980 ' n e r 1 t ax, e. y _or t e year en ~ng une,. Richard Morris and Michael W. Fox (Acropolis 3~R. D. Laing. Quoated in Stanley Godlovitch, Books, 1978), esp. p.87. My own belief is that

"Ur:ilities, \1 Godlovitch and Harris, p. 173. An significant improvements in animal welfare will insightful albeit controversial analysis of only come about through the development of more ?roblems associated with desensitization can be equitable social systems. Animals occupy a spe­ found in T.L.S.Sprigge, "Metaphysics, Physical­ cial place in such change simply because they ism and Animal Rights," Inquirv, vol. 22, nos. are politically helpless. When animals are 1-2, pp. 101-43. treated fairly, it will be a matter of princi­ ~. ple, not of expediency. ~:>Quoted in Robert S. Brumbaugh, "Of Man, Animals, and Morals: A Brief History," On the ~lIt appears then, that in the final analysis Fifth Dav: Animal Rights and Human Ethics, ed. some conflicts between interests can' only be by Richard Knowles Martin and Michael W. Fox resolved by appeal to non-moral values. For a (Acropolis Books. 1978)_ p. 17. careful and enlightening discussion of such appeals relative to moral consistency, see Ruth Barcan Marcus, "Moral Dilemmas and Consistency," Journal of PhilosophY, vol.77 (1980). E8A 11/1�11/1 2121

4Z"Brutes are as things in our regard: so far as they are useful to us, they exist for us, not for themselves; and we do right in using them unsparingly for our need and convenience, thought not for our wantonness." Father Joseph Rickaby, Moral PhilosoohyPhi10soohy (1901); extract re­ printed in Regan and Singer, p. 180.