E8A 11/1 E8A 11/1 77� HumanHuman UniquenessUniqueness asas a a GuideGuide toto ResolvingResolving� ConflictsConflicts BetweenBetween AnimalAnimal andand HumanHuman In­In­� tereststerests11� WhileWhile itit isis byby nono meansmeans clearclear whetherwhether wewe shouldshould speakspeak ofof animalsanimals asas rights-bearers,rights-bearers, inin anyany literalliteral sense,sense, oror simplysimply asas creaturescreatures toto whomwhom wewe havehave certaincertain responsibilities,responsibilities, itit isis reasonablyreasonably clearclear thatthat animalsanimals areare properproper ob­ob­ 2 jectsjects ofof moralmoral concern.concern. 2 GrantingGranting animalsanimals moralmoral standing,standing, however,however, needneed notnot resultresult inin attemptsattempts toto promotepromote animalanimal welfare.welfare. ImagineImagine yourselfyourself inin thethe followingfollowing situation.situation. YouYou areare aa biochemist,biochemist, isolatedisolated onon aa desertdesert islandisland withwith youryour daughterdaughter Jill,Jill, youryour petpet dogdog PhiloPhilo andand aa smallsmall butbut well-equippedwell-equipped laboratory.laboratory. OneOne dayday youryour daughtdaught fallsfalls ill;ill; herher healthhealth failsfails rap­rap­ idlyidly andand itit seemsseems evidentevident sheshe willwill diedie unlessunless somethingsomething isis done.done. YouYou synthesizesynthesize whatwhat maymay bebe aa curecure butbut youyou areare notnot sure;sure; itit maymay alsoalso bebe aa poison.poison. WhatWhat shouldshould youyou do?do? TheThe ob­ob­ viousvious answeranswer isis thatthat youyou testtest thethe potionpotion onon Philo.Philo. ToTo dodo otherwiseotherwise wouldwould bebe morallymorally un­un­ justifiable.justifiable. 33 TheThe factfact thatthat youyou testtest thethe possible cure on Philo does not showshow thatthat you do not care about him or take him to be a proper object of moral concern. It is just that in this case Philo's interests are out­ weighed by Jill's. Conflicts like the above demonstrate that moral concern is not a sufficient guide for our treatment of animals. Donald VanDeVeer has ~osedppsed the problem well: The troublesometroublesome .and.and difficult question�question whichwhich arises,arises, onceonce oneone isis convincedconvinced that�that bothboth humanhuman beingsbeings (or(or many)many) andand animals�animals (or(or many)many) havehave atat leastleast somesome morally�morally relevantrelevant interests,interests, concernsconcerns howhow to�to wei~h~ theirtheir respectiverespective interestsinterests inin gen­�gen­ ~anderal and howhow toto adjudicateadjudicate conflictsconflicts of�of interestinterest whichwhich arisearise betweenbetween humanshumans and�and animals.animals.4�4 . WhatWhat needsneeds toto bebe shownshown isis howhow moralmoral concernconcern oughtought toto bebe manifestmanifest withwith respectrespect toto animals.animals. ~ot~ot eveneven thethe establishmentestablishment ofof animalanimal rights,rights, aa veryvery strongstrong conclusion,conclusion, wouldwould resolveresolve thisthis problem.problem. IfIf animalanimal interestsinterests areare protectedprotected byby rights,rights, wewe stillstill mustmust askask toto whatwhat extent,extent, ifif any,any, theythey areare protectedprotected againstagainst humanhuman interests.interests.5S AA justjust resolutionresolution ofof thethe aboveabove problemproblem willw~ll havehave toto taketake accountaccount ofof bothboth similaritiessimilarities andand differencesdifferences betW'eenbetween humanshumans andand animals.animals. RecentRecent studiesstudies ofof animalanimal behaviorbehaviorhavehave shownshown thatthat be­be­ haviorhavior toto bebe significantlysignificantly moremore complexcomplexand,and, consequently,consequently, moremore similarsimilar totohumanhumanbehaviorbehavior thanthanpreviouslypreviouslyassumed.assumed.66 AmongAmong otherotherthings,things, animalsanimalshavehavebeenbeenfoundfound toto useusecomplicatedcomplicated EaA 11/1�11/1 8 communication systems and to modify objects human nature. It is here that human unique­ ~or use as tools, two activities once deemed ness lends a hand to animal welfare. the exclusive property of human beings. Such I sophisticated behavior has led a number of sciencists to conclude that at least some ani­ What needs to be shown with respect to ani­ mals have a fairly substantial mental life.' mals is not only that their welfare i$ ~ Needless to say, this conclusion has marked matter of moral concern but equally important implications for the weighing of animal in­ how much weight animal interests ought to terests. An animal with a high level of carry whenever they conflict with human in­ awareness is vulnerable in more ways than one terests. One plausible approach to this wich a low level and, consequently, places a problem has been labeled by VanDeVeer "two­ greater demand on our moral consideration. factor egalitarianism."a As its name sug­ gests, two-factor egalitarianism focuses on Excitement over these discoveries, however, two factors: these are. extent of interest should not lead us to forget the remaining, and psychological complexity. Once these are significant differences between animal and determined, various principles inform the human behavior. Recently discovered similar­ moral agent how much weight each deserves, i:ies, significant though they be, are not allowing in general that significance varies great enough to bridge that divide. Nor is directly with extent of interest and degree it likely that future research will do so. of psychological compleXity. Such a system Barring the discovery of presently unknown has intuitive appeal. 9 By focusing on the life-forms, human uniqueness appears a fact extent of interest involved two-factor egali­ to be lived with. To those concerned about tarianism allows us to take into account rela­ animal welfare such a conclusion may seem un­ tive cost and benefit. Underlying each de­ :ortunate and even distressing. Tradition­ cision will be a cost-benefit analysis. At ally, human uniqueness has been taken to the same time, two-factor egalitarianism as­ justify a rather cavalier attitude toward cribes greater weight to the interests of our animal welfare. Whether one spoke of souls, own kind, a position many persons find morally minds, intrinsic value, or divine commands, appealing. Moreover, it does so on the non­ the well-being of animals was felt to be in­ discriminatory, or, egalitarian grounds of significant compared to that of human beings. psychological complexity. All this is not to The result is well-known: the most trivial sav there are no problems regarding the of human interests allows the most thorough ac~eptability of two-factor egalitarianism as disregard for animal interests. It is no a guide to moral deliberation. 1Q For purposes wonder, then, that advocates of animal wel­ of this paper, however, I will ignore what­ fare have preferred to emphasize similari­ ever difficulties there may be and work with­ :1es while downplaying differences between in the framework provided by two-factor egal­ animal and human behavior. itarianism. My intention is to sketch a some­ In what follows, I want to re-examine the what plausible system in terms of which the role of human uniqueness in adjudicating con­ role of human uniqueness can be evaluated, flicts between animal and human interests. not to argue that two-factor egalitarianism ~~ conclusion will be that for the most part provides an adequate context for resolving t~is role has been misunderstood. Properly conflicts between animal and human interests. understood, human uniqueness is a vital com­ Let me begin with extent of interest. ponent in the case for animal welfare. My A continuum of interests is not difficult argument ~ill proceed in two stages. To be­ to envision. With respect to myself, I know oin I will sketch a system of moral princi­ o , . that some things count more for my well-being ples for adjudicating conflicts between an~- than others.. The extent of this counting is, mal and human interests. Iftlile grancing some of course, not a matter of my apprehension Doral consideration to animal interests, alone; it is a reflection of the world and my these principles both recognize human unique­ place therein. In many cases, I am aware of ness and grant high priority to human inter­ and correctly apprehend the relative impor­ ests. Having outlined this system, I will tance of my interests. In other cases, I do use it to address questions regarding the not. Unlike normal, adult humans, the knowl­ morality of animal experimentation. After edge animals have of their own L~terests will distinguishing two distinct ways in which be extremely vague or entirely intuitive. 11 [he systen can be applied to such questions, On our part, the determination and weighing I will argue that resolution of the debate of animal interests requires careful, pro­ over animal experimentation depends to a longed observation, with special care taken large extent on fundamental assumptions about to avoid anthropomorphic distortions. Recent E8A 11/1 9 9 studies of wolves, chimpanzees and gorillas reflective awareness. The value of such aware­ indicate that such distortions can be avoided ness, limited as it is~· is that it allows for and animal interests assessed from an objec­ greater adaptability: a painful course will be tive, scientific standpoint. 12 avoided, a pleasurable one pursued. In this Interests, both human and animal, can be di­ way bare awareness of pain and pleasure allows vided