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Atomic Archive” Beyond the “Atomic Archive” Making Sense of Iran’s Nuclear Intentions Bruno Tertrais Paper No. 57 January 15, 2020 Friends of Israel Initiative Beyond the “Atomic Archive” Making Sense of Iran’s Nuclear Intentions In January 2018, through a clandestine operation that took place in Shorabad (a distant Tehran suburb), Israel obtained a large number of documents, which shed new light on the Iranian nuclear program. Along with more recent developments, the Archive suggests that Tehran’s weaponization efforts could be – assuming that it remains dormant – reactivated at any time.1 Irrespective of the exact fate of the provisions included in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Tehran’s enduring nuclear weapons expertise, and probable violations of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) legally-binding commitments leave little doubt about its persistent intentions. What was found The warehouse from where the documents were taken comprised 32 large safes loaded in mobile containers. Israeli agents were able to extract information from about a third of them. Documents taken to Israel (hereafter “the Archive”) include: - 114 folders containing more than 55,000 pages, including 8,500 handwritten documents. Some of them contain handwritten notes, including from the Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the head of the program, and Fereydoon Abbasi-Davani, a well-known key expert (for instance on how to deceive the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA). Folders were divided in three color-coded categories: black (technical), green (infrastructures), and red (relations with the IAEA). - 183 CDs and DVDs containing another 50,000 files of about a hundred pages each. Israel believes it amounted to a fifth of the whole archive. Most of the documents in its possession are from before 2006. 1 This report was written after a series of extensive briefings by and discussions with officials received during a trip to Israel in October 2019. The author was able to see some of the original materials. Information included in this text stems also from the reports produced in 2018 and 2019 by the Institute for Science and International Security, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, as well as from Ronan Bergman, « Iran’s great nuclear deception », Ynet Magazine, 23 November 2018. Beyond the “Atomic Archive”: Making Sense of Iran’s Nuclear Intentions 1 Friends of Israel Initiative The Archive was curated in 2016, after the signing of the JCPOA, and the documents hidden in Shorabad in 2017, in a non-descript location, probably, inter alia, to ensure the IAEA would not ask to inspect it. Only four or five persons knew about the whole process. Copies of the documents in possession of the Israeli government have been given to the IAEA.2 Intelligence was also shared with P5 countries. None of the recipient countries or organizations had publicly expressed any doubt about the authenticity of the documents. The Archive: What’s New The Archive confirms and details the scope of the Iranian parallel nuclear program, which involved the full range of activities – from mining and enriching uranium to producing operational nuclear weapons and adapting them on ballistic missiles re- entry vehicles (the Shahab-3 missile). The most stunning finding from the Archive is the Iranian plan – dating from the turn of the century, at the time “Project 110”3 was launched – to manufacture five ten- kilotonimplosion-type, UHE-based nuclear devices (one for hot testing4 and four warheads) by early 2003. The plan was approved in 1999 by the “Supreme Council for Advanced Technologies”, a body formed in 1998 which included President Khatami, National Security Council Secretary Rouhani, Defense Minister Adm. Shamkhani, and AEOI Head Aghazadeh. At first glance, this may suggest a limited nuclear program, similar to that of, say, South Africa. However, the Archive makes it clear that this was only an initial step, and the planned infrastructure was for a much more ambitious program. Several hundred personnel were involved in nuclear weapons research and development. Iran wanted to move fast: it thus sought assistance from foreign experts. More than a dozen such experts, none of which coming from Western Europe, assisted its nuclear weapons program. Iran also got access to the so-called “AQ Khan” blueprints in 2003. However, by the end of 2002 Iran had already settled on a indigenous, workable implosion design, before getting those blueprints – which were nevertheless helpful for benchmarking. In addition, Iran had identified a budgetary line for possible highly enriched uranium (HEU) purchase abroad. The seized documents do not include any sign of State-level assistance: it is not known, in particular, whether there ever was nuclear weapons cooperation between Tehran and North Korea. 2 This has probably allowed the Agency to confirm the authenticity of many of them, in particular through the correspondence with IAEA officials. 3 Project 110 was part of the AMAD program. Project 111 focused on the re-entry vehicule. 4 The Archive makes it clear that Iran was in the process of selecting a test site (Project Midan), with five possible locations identified. Beyond the “Atomic Archive”: Making Sense of Iran’s Nuclear Intentions 2 Friends of Israel Initiative Archive documents confirm that Iran “halted”, to use the US 2007 National Intelligence Estimate expression, its weapon-related activities in 2003, mostly for fear of international reactions. However, by the end of the year the secret AMAD Project was morphed into a double-faced organization entitled SADAT (2003-2008), then PARDIS (2008-2011), then from 2011 onwards SPND for “Organization for Defensive Innovation and Research”. SNPD included 70% of the AMAD personnel and was headed by Mohsen Fakrizadeh. This allowed Iran to maintain its nuclear expertise under the guise of dual-use activities (civilian and military) such as nuclear physics, 3D simulations, etc. Furthermore, and crucially, the Archive includes evidence that the SNPD was also to address knowledge gaps. The SPND’s covert activities include in particular three programs, Sareb-1 (testing), Sareb-2 (warhead integration), and Sareb- 3 (warhead production). A Unique Case Several countries have abandoned their nuclear weapons ambitions in the past. However, the Iranian case is unique. - Sweden abandoned its nuclear project in 1968 without having built fissile material production facilities or elaborated actual weapons designs. There was a deliberate strategy of transferring personnel and equipment resources from nuclear weapons work to the area of materials research for protection (EMP effects, etc.) and non-proliferation. Nuclear weapons research staff declined rapidly from about 300 personnel to 100 in 1972, and a few tens by the late 1980s.5 Some archives were maintained by individuals due to stringent Swedish laws forbidding any destruction of official work. - Switzerland had a small undeclared uranium stockpile but never went beyond theoretical studies.6 Decades later, when it accessed a large cache of proliferation-sensitive documents connected to the international network known as the “AQ Khan network”, it decided its destruction under IAEA supervision. - Brazil may have developed designs for nuclear weapon.7 It maintained uranium enrichment facilities. There is no evidence it maintained any structured program to develop a nuclear weapons option. - South Africa abandoned its nuclear arsenal in 1990. Its HEU production plant was closed and the HEU stockpile downgraded to a lower percentage of enrichment. Weapons blueprints were destroyed, some under IAEA 5 Thomas Jonter, Sweden and the Bomb. The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1972, SKI Report 01:33, September 2001. 6 Jurg Stüssi-Lauterberg, Historical Outline on the Question of Swiss Nuclear Armament, 31 December 1995 (US Department of State translation). 7 Brazil Nuclear Weapons Program, www.globalsecurity.org. Beyond the “Atomic Archive”: Making Sense of Iran’s Nuclear Intentions 3 Friends of Israel Initiative supervision. Nuclear facilities were converted to non-nuclear weapon research. A full and complete inventory of materials and facilities was compiled by the IAEA.8 - Iraq had maintained after 1991 some documents and small equipments hidden in scientists’ homes, that could have been useful in resuming uranium enrichment activities. The Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission expanded its activities at the turn of the century. Testimonies indicated that Iraq had the intention to resume its nuclear program after the lifting of sanctions.9 - Libya gave the IAEA and the United States its nuclear-weapons related documentation. None of these precedents included maintaining a curated archive, a structured organization with paid staff working on sensitive activities, undeclared nuclear sites and materials, fissile material production facilities, and actual warhead designs. And no other currently non-nuclear country is close to having the same capabilities. Iran is almost certainly the only true state with “latent nuclear weapon capability” – i.e. the only known country that would have the ability to built nuclear weapons in a short period of time should it decide to do so and was left alone. Implications And Further Developments The Archive reveals or confirms that those analysts who thought as early as 2002-2003 that Iran had operational nuclear weapons intentions and
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