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Behind the Assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and the Latest on the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program

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Behind the Assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and the Latest on the Iranian Nuclear Weapons Program WTH nuclear scientist? Behind the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh and the latest on the Iranian nuclear weapons program Episode #81 | December 3, 2020 | Danielle Pletka, Marc Thiessen, and David Albright Danielle Pletka: Hi, I'm Danielle Pletka. Marc Thiessen: And I'm Marc Thiessen. Danielle Pletka: going on? Marc Thiessen: That was very dramatic. Danielle Pletka: I know. I was really feeling it. Marc Thiessen: Marc Thiessen: Give it a little more spirit, Dany. Danielle Pletka: I want our listeners to wonder what they're getting each time. Oh, and by the way, we are supposed to remind -- hey guys who are listening, please subscribe, review, send this to your friends, and do all of those good things that help our podcast get to more and more people so that Marc and I can be famous. Marc Thiessen: Excellent. I support that sentiment. What the hell is going on is somebody assassinated the head of the Iranian nuclear program. Before we get into the implications of that and why this happened now, and all the rest of it, let's just take a moment to reflect on the James Bond-like details of this assassination. Of course, we don't know for sure how this happened or who did it, though we have our suspicions. But, the story is coming out that it was apparently allegedly the Israelis, that they used a remote controlled machine gun in a Nissan truck that was parked in a roundabout when the head of this Iranian nuclear program was coming out. It was packed with explosives and so they allegedly used a satellite to guide the remote machine gun and then blew up the truck after the guy was assassinated. Marc Thiessen: There are some people who speculate that doing it entirely remotely would've been unlikely, that they wouldn't have had anybody on the ground participating, and certainly there were people on the ground setting this up, getting the 2 weapons and all the technology into Iran over a period of time. But, this is literally like a scene out of a Bond movie. When you see things happening that you say, "That couldn't really happen in real life." It apparently just did and Fakhrizadeh is no more. Danielle Pletka: Yeah. I've got to say, I don't mourn any of these guys and I want to talk about the politics around who is actually mourning them. But, you are totally right. I mean, the fact that the Israelis have these capabilities. I mean, whoever did it, but maybe the Israelis, have these capabilities- Marc Thiessen: We'll just assume for our sake of the podcast that the Israelis did it and leave it to them to deny. Danielle Pletka: It's absolutely stunning. It really is. We've basically seen two major story lines. One, that there were at least a dozen operatives on the ground who were involved in pulling Fakhrizadeh out of the car and then shooting him or getting in a gun battle with his security guards. But then, another version of the story where there's absolutely nobody there except this satellite controlled machine gun. Can I just say, I need a satellite controlled machine gun? Marc Thiessen: Doesn't everyone? The Biden administration is going to ban those too, Dany. Danielle Pletka: Oh God. Marc Thiessen: So, your second amendment rights are being taken away. Danielle Pletka: Get yours while you can. But, the technology behind this, the knowledge, the planning. The fact that they knew where he was and when he was visiting his summer house, the Iranian version of his dacha outside Tehran. And that they could get him at a time and a place of their choosing is absolutely incredible. I mean, I would watch that movie- Marc Thiessen: On the 10 year anniversary of the assassination of another Iranian nuclear scientist. Danielle Pletka: Right. Marc Thiessen: So, I mean, literally not just the time of their choosing, but like literally the time of their choosing. Not just, "We can get you any time we want," but they literally planned this to send a message to all Iranian nuclear scientists that, "We basically can pick you off at will." Danielle Pletka: Yeah, and the reality is, I guess, that the Israelis, if it was indeed the Israelis, can. I was about to say, I would totally watch that movie if Daniel Craig was in it. But, let's talk a little bit about the fallout. We're going to talk with our guest about some of the technical issues and who Fakhrizadeh was, and what he did, and about the Iranian nuclear program. So, let's you and I talk politics for a second. Marc Thiessen: Sure. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE | 1789 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20036 | 202.862.5800 | aei.org 3 Danielle Pletka: There has been a spate of what I can only label disgraceful stories, including my personal favorite from John Brennan. And here, you can assume that my epithet has been edited out, bleeped out. Marc Thiessen: Oh, say it. We've got an explicit rating. Danielle Pletka: No. No, because it's that bad. This is a former senior Obama administration official who was soft on- Marc Thiessen: And the head of the CIA. Danielle Pletka: And who was soft on Iran, who was soft on Hezbollah, who was soft on all of these guys, and he goes out and calls this an act of terrorism. I mean, W-T-F? Marc Thiessen: Absolutely. And here's the thing also, first of all, he lead an agency that engages in all sorts of covert operations that are violations of international law. That's by definition what a covert operation is. Danielle Pletka: Oh, but not to speak of extrajudicial killings with drones. I'm sorry. Marc Thiessen: Yes. Now, what he says... What he says is that, he anticipated your line of attack and said that there's a difference because we were taking out people who were members of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, which are non-state actors and are terrorist organizations and unlawful combatants. However, Fakhrizadeh, the Iranian nuclear scientist was a general in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp, which is a designated terrorist organization because the Trump administration so designated it. Marc Thiessen: So, basically there is no legal difference between taking out the head of the Iranian nuclear program, or for that matter, Qassem Soleimani, the head of the IRGC Quds Force, who was killed by the Trump administration, and taking out the second in command of Al Qaeda who also happened to be in Tehran. Why was that? That's something that you and I are going to be exploring a lot in the next year, the Iran/Al Qaeda connection. Or taking out Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Marc Thiessen: So, the idea that the former head of the CIA would label this an act of terrorism when it's a lawful act carried out by covert action, similar to what the United States does all the time, carried out by the United States' closest ally in the region against our sworn enemy, the Islamic Terrorist Republic of Iran, just shows the depths of hatred for this administration. That it literally drives you to such distraction that you side with Iran against Israel and the United States. Danielle Pletka: Well, I mean, come on. That's the hallmark of pretty much all the Obama administration officials. They became Iran's lawyer, Iran's advocate, and everything else. And shame on them. But- Marc Thiessen: And oh, by the way, can I just jump in? Danielle Pletka: Yeah. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE | 1789 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, DC 20036 | 202.862.5800 | aei.org 4 Marc Thiessen: There were a number of Iranian nuclear scientists who met their mysterious end during the Obama years, right? There were several of them who were killed when President Obama was in office, presumably by the same actors who were involved in this and presumably with the same, at least if not coordination or cooperation, at least implicit approval of the United States. So- Danielle Pletka: Well, that's where you're wrong. Marc Thiessen: There's a level of hypocrisy here too. Marc Thiessen: Oh, am I? Danielle Pletka: That's where you're wrong. Yes. Because, in fact, it was the Obama administration that went to the Israeli government and leaned on them to stop getting rid of Iran's nuclear scientists because it was complicating Obama's efforts to help them continue their- Marc Thiessen: Well, there you go. Danielle Pletka: I mean, I'm sorry. To help them "end their nuclear weapons program." I mean, so there's that travesty. Then there's travesty number two. People who are supposedly journalists writing for outlets like the New York Times, who suggest that this was all political. Basically in their unbelievable America-centrism, they believe that everything happens with a view to either helping or hurting Donald Trump. Because he is, after all, the reason why we all get up in the morning and why the sun rises. Danielle Pletka: And they, theorizing that Israel or whoever did it conducted this unbelievably complex, unbelievably sophisticated operation in order to stymie the Biden administration as it goes forward to try to recapitulate to the Iranians in the Middle East. I mean, it is beyond ludicrous to suggest that the Israelis don't have an independent agenda and that they planned this when they knew already that Biden was going to win the election.
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