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Development Assistance and Counterterrorism Development Assistance and Counterterrorism Jessica Trisko Darden SEPTEMBER 2019 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Development Assistance and Counterterrorism Jessica Trisko Darden SEPTEMBER 2019 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Cover image: A boy stands as an aid convoy of Syrian Arab Red Crescent drives through the besieged town of Douma, Eastern Ghouta, Damascus, Syria, March 5, 2018. REUTERS/Bassam Khabieh. © 2019 by the American Enterprise Institute. All rights reserved. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s). Contents Executive Summary .................................................................................. 1 Introduction ............................................................................................2 I. A Civilian Counterterrorism Strategy ........................................................3 II. Refining the Development Approach to Counterterrorism ..........................8 III. Conclusion and Recommendations ...................................................... 17 Notes ................................................................................................... 19 iii Executive Summary errorism remains a persistent challenge driven Many US-funded programs have taken standard Tby ideology and unstable political and economic development projects, in areas such as girls’ educa- environments. US counterterrorism policy must draw tion or civic engagement, and argued that they are on all available tools—including foreign assistance— now directed at structural conditions driving vio- to succeed. lent extremism. This approach is misguided and has Part I of this report argues that US foreign assis- proved ineffective. Instead, the emphasis should be tance can support counterterrorism efforts if centered on directing programming funds in a targeted and on four pillars: (1) prioritizing local physical security, evidence-based manner. If done correctly, terrorism (2) responding to humanitarian need, (3) improving prevention programs can help shift popular support governance, and (4) targeting and tailoring program- for political violence among local communities. ming to local contexts. Ensuring physical security is The report offers recommendations on how to paramount, but humanitarian assistance plays a crucial better measure the success of terrorism preven- role in limiting the appeal of armed groups that use the tion programs, effectively targetat-risk populations, chaos of a conflict or disaster to recruit.Medium-term respond to local governance concerns, and shape improvements in governance, combined with develop- economic conditions in ways that support America’s ment programming that actually addresses the factors counterterrorism goals. Short-term interventions to driving individuals toward terrorism, are essential in respond to immediate needs must be supported by achieving sustainable progress. longer-term strategies. This allows partner countries Part II reviews how US development assistance to build on US investments by changing the underly- has been used to counter violent extremism in Africa, ing conditions that contribute to terrorism and polit- South Asia, and low-conflict areas of the Middle East. ical violence. 1 Introduction he United States government has engaged in an practiced in deploying the military against terror tar- Textended, multidimensional fight against terror- gets abroad, the same cannot be said for civilian coun- ism for almost two decades. Despite recent battlefield terterrorism efforts. successes, the 2018 National Defense Strategy notes Part I of this report examines the role of foreign devel- that “terrorism remains a persistent condition driven opment assistance in the US counterterrorism tool kit. by ideology and unstable political and economic struc- It assesses the degree to which current efforts, led by tures.”1 The 2017 National Security Strategy highlights the State Department and the US Agency for Interna- the pervasiveness of this security threat throughout tional Development (USAID), contribute to the overall much of the developing world. In recent years, vio- goal of “preventing terrorists from directing or support- lent extremist organizations—which use ideologically ing external operations against the United States home- justified violence to further their social, economic, or land and our citizens, allies, and partners overseas.”7 political objectives—have fomented conflict in devel- It argues that current efforts are spread too thin and oping countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, need to be concentrated on four pillars: (1) physical Nigeria, and the Philippines.2 security, (2) humanitarian need, (3) responsive gover- The damage terrorism and violent extremism have nance, and (4) targeted and tailored interventions. done also extends well beyond the military realm. Part II draws lessons primarily from past US gov- Extremist violence often creates or exacerbates an ernment–funded programs in Afghanistan, Burkina unstable economic environment—discouraging for- Faso, Chad, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, eign investment, degrading infrastructure, and dis- and Tunisia. It recommends improved impact mea- rupting governments’ ability to provide services. sures for terrorism prevention programs and suggests According to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s how the US can refine its current approach to bet- Global Terrorism Index, terrorism cost the world ter support its objectives. While these countries rep- roughly $52 billion and more than 18,800 lives in 2017 resent only a portion of ongoing efforts worldwide, alone.3 Fragile states bear the brunt of this burden, as their successes and limitations should inform future they are both more likely to face terrorist attacks and programs. more vulnerable to the economic consequences.4 Overall, the report argues that a development-based The US military plays an essential role in degrad- approach to counterterrorism holds promise in shift- ing and disrupting terror networks abroad, but force ing popular support among local communities away alone will not succeed in suppressing highly adapt- from terrorism if funds are programmed in a targeted able terrorist movements.5 Foreign assistance for and evidence-based manner. This means that pro- terrorism prevention programs can complement gram goals should be clearly defined, program activ- military tools by funding civilian efforts to (1) dis- ities should be limited in scope, and effectiveness rupt the recruitment and radicalization of individu- should drive program design, participant selection, als and (2) reduce local support for violent extremist and monitoring and evaluation. Recognizing the con- groups and political violence more generally. Yet civil- nection between security conditions and program ian programming in this area is estimated to make up effectiveness is also vital; terrorism prevention pro- less than 0.1 percent of the total US counterterror- grams cannot operate effectively in areas with signifi- ism budget.6 And while the US government is well cant ongoing conflict. 2 I. A Civilian Counterterrorism Strategy he US military has played the lead role in counter- capabilities of terrorist groups but also the social Tterrorism efforts abroad, with mixed results. The foundations of their support—have not led to an notable success of the United States and its partners integrated US counterterrorism strategy. Instead, in defeating the Islamic State’s physical caliphate in the US government has released a series of separate Iraq and Syria has not eliminated the Islamic State as strategies. For example, in 2015, the Department of a threat. Nor has the war in Afghanistan and the con- Defense’s (DOD) Defense Science Board identified tinued presence of US troops prevented the Taliban uncertainty within the DOD and US government from regaining control over significant portions of the writ large about the DOD’s appropriate role, noting country, even as the Islamic State has expanded there. that “the DoD lacks a strategic framework for how it This suggests that a civilian-led counterterrorism should fit into a broader, USG CVE approach.”10 It effort—focused on undermining local support for ter- also recognized the need for greater cooperation and rorism—should play a greater role in US strategy. A integration with the State Department and USAID, stronger civilian component will also facilitate tran- including coherent policy goals. In turn, the State sitions in responsibility as the United States seeks to Department and USAID released a Joint Strategy shift more of the global counterterrorism mission to on CVE in 2016.11 This strategy largely ignored the its partners. crucial role of security forces in paving the way for Civilian-led counterterrorism is often referred to development efforts. as countering violent extremism (CVE) or terror- The absence of a unified approach has resulted in a ism prevention—terms that are used interchange- lack of cohesion and stove-piping across government ably here. While the term “violent extremism” has no efforts, with agencies at best making some progress internationally agreed-upon definition, it generally toward their own identified ends and at worst work- refers to the use of ideologically justified violence as a ing at cross-purposes. Recognizing the need for a means to a desired political or social end.8 more comprehensive
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