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Letters from the Chairs Greetings Delegates, My name is Donald Le. I am currently a junior at BC High and will be your chair. Throughout my past three years doing Model UN, I have become a more skillful speaker, cooperative collaborator, and creative thinker. While these virtual circumstances are unorthodox, the skills you will attain, the people you will meet, and the discussions you will have will make this conference a truly unforgettable experience. I trust that this committee will foster insightful and challenging conversation, which I look forward to observing. If you have any questions please feel free to contact me via email: [email protected] ​ Cordially, Donald Le Table Of Contents History…………………………………………….4 Current Situation…………………………….5 Positions………………………………………… Goals/Guiding Questions………………. Bibliography………………………………….. *This committee will be a joint-crisis. By the nature of this style of delegation, the committee will be fast-paced and will operate with directives rather than resolutions. Directives are shorter in length and more targeted and specific with regards to actions than resolutions. They will require a 50% simple majority to pass. Furthermore, 2 sponsors and 3 signatories will be required to present the directive. Therefore, committee pace will be very quick and a lot of directives will be passed on both sides.* History In the 19th century, countries began to interact with Korea, and attempted to influence its culture. In 1876, Japan first began to pressure Korea to form a diplomatic relationship. This trade with Japan began to weaken Korea’s bonds with China. As a result, China and Russia tried to take more control of the peninsula, but Japan retained control in their victories in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. The outcome of these wars is that Korea becomes a protectorate of Japan. In 1910, Japan officially annexed Korea after they tried to resist Japanese control of their foreign relations, military, banking, and communication infrastructure. This annexation involved military occupation and forcing citizens to practice Shintoism. Japan also tried to assimilate Korea by prohibiting the Korean language and Korean family names. After World War I, Koreans, inspired by nationalism and self-determination, began the March First Movement, which was put down by Japan. Korea experienced prevalent poverty due to the economic restrictions and exploitation of natural resources by Japan. Japan was eventually defeated in World War II, and Korea was divided by the 38th parallel. North Korea was controlled by the USSR, while the South was controlled by the US. The United Nations had passed a resolution to hold free elections in both states, but the Soviets ignored this resolution. The North Korea government was created by the Soviets, while in the South, free elections were held, which led to a National Assembly and the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Current Situation Following the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from North Korea, Kim II-sung established the communist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea “DPRK” on September 9th, 1948. However, Kim had greater aspirations and wanted to unify the entire Korean peninsula under the DPRK’s communist rule. Kim believed he lacked the legitimacy and power that other communist leaders had. Joseph Stalin was instrumental in the Russian Revolution and Mao Tse Tung in the Chinese Civil War. Kim believed that uniting Korea under his rule would solidify his legitimacy. In South Korea, the United States had instilled its Democratic philosophy, which persisted even after they left. Syngman Rhee, who had been elected as South Korea’s President, took full control of the Republic of Korea “ROK”. The ROK, under Rhee, remained democratic and refused to submit to Kim’s communist agenda. Kim was left with no other choice but to pursue military action. However, the newly formed DPRK lacked a strong military foundation. To make matters worse, the United States still had military advisory groups in South Korea, even after they seceded power to Rhee and the ROK. Therefore Kim had to seek help from other commuist powers. Kim’s first potential alliance was with Joseph Stalin. Stalin supported Kim’s desires, but he was hesitant to help due to the implications his involvement would have on the Soviet Union. Stalin believed that helping Kim would infuriate the United States, especially with America’s rising neo-conservative ambitions. Compared to America, Stalin lacked the military prowess and technology that America had. Therefore, Stalin delayed his support, as he still wanted to help but feared the U.S’s retaliation. A year later, Kim sought aid from Mao Tse Tung. Kim had assisted Mao and the People’s Liberation Army during the Chinese Civil War, providing 2,000 railway cards worth of material and 70 thousand North Korean Soldiers. Unsurprisingly, Mao offered his support, but was limited in what he could provide as China was recovering from its Civil War. Later, Stalin’s hesitation turned into confidence. Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State for the United States, gave a speech defining the “Acheson Line”. This arbitrary strategic line was formed across Japan and the Philippines and outlined where America was going to defend its interests against communism. In addition, America did not intervene against Mao and his communist party during the Chinese Civil War. Therefore, such events made Stalin more confident in aiding Kim, since the threat of American retaliation seemed unlikely and even if America attacked, Stalin could defend the Soviet Union, since he developed successful nuclear weapons. Kim needed Stalin and Mao’s help in order to execute his invasion. While these events may have appeared as though America was uninterested, Stalin still risked a potential nuclear war with America, since he would be violating the trusteeship’s agreement. On one hand Stalin sought to empower the commuinst regimes in the east and believed an alliance with Kim would be beneficial. On the other hand, he could not risk getting into another war with America, for the costs and consequences would be unrepairable. As for Mao, he felt obligated to reciprocate the aid Kim provided to him during the Chinese Civil War. However, the devastation of the Civil War left China in a state of social and financial instability, which would only get worse if China involved themselves with Kim and his desire for occupation. Nonetheless, Kim followed through with his plans and executed his first invasion across the 38th Parallel. President Rhee fled and Kim captured Seoul in 24 hours. However, the war was far from over. Preceding the attacks, South Korea retaliated. America deployed a 40,000-man force called the X-Corps composed of the 1st Marine Division, 7th infantry division, and 8,600 ROK troops. Conflict had just begun. Positions 1) Joseph Stalin (Soviet Union Dictator) 2) Kim II Sung (Premier of North Korea) 3) Mao Tse Tung (Chairman of the People’s Republic of China) 4) Peng Dehuai (Lead Chinese People) ​ 5) Choi Yong-kun. (North Korean Commander) ​ 6) Terenty shtykov (Soviet) 7) Kim Tu-bong (North Korean general) 8)Viacheslav Molotov (Soviet Soldier) 9)Lazar Kaganovich (Soviet Soldier) 10)Kliment Voroshilov (Soviet Soldier) 11) Andrei Zhdanov (Soviet Soldier) 12)Lin Bao (Chinese soldier) 13)Xi Zhongxun (Chinese soldier) 14)Ho Bong-hak (North Korean soldier) ​ 15)Kim Pong-ryul (North Korean soldier) 16)Kang Kon (North Korean soldier) 17)Kang Thae-mu (North Korean soldier) ​ 18)Lee Kwon-mu (North Korean Soldier) 19)Kim Yun-sim (North Korean Soldier) 20)Kim Myong-guk (North Korean Soldier) Goals and Guiding Questions 1) Members of the committee from the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China must discern whether or not involvement in the war would benefit or impose negative repercussions for their respective nations. Northern Koreans must persuade these potential allies as to why an alliance is both necessary and beneficial for both parties. 2) Discuss military techniques and strategies the North can execute to maintain their foothold in Seoul and eventually throughout the whole Korean Peninsula 3) Outline the North’s vision for a united Korea. Will it be a totalitarian country? What about the economy, will it be a socialist one? 4) Long term questions: How should this struggle over the Peninsula be approached? With aggressive diplomacy or military aggression? Or is there another way. 5) Can the two sides negotiate and avoid military conflict? Can Kim fulfill his need for power in another manner? .
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