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The Causes and Representative Consequences of Invalid Voting in Latin America

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The Causes and Representative Consequences of Invalid Voting in Latin America The Causes and Representative Consequences of Invalid Voting in Latin America By Mollie J. Cohen Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Vanderbilt University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in Political Science December, 2016 Nashville, Tennessee Approved: Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, Ph.D. Jonathan Hiskey, Ph.D. Mitchell A. Seligson, Ph.D. Zeynep Somer-Topçu, Ph.D. Timothy J. Power, Ph.D. Copyright © [2016] by [Mollie Jane Cohen] All Rights Reserved For Mom and Dad, with love. Y para mi querido Kenyi, que me hace reír cuando lloro y llorar por reír. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This dissertation would not have been possible without generous financial support from Vanderbilt University’s College of Arts and Sciences, the Political Science Department’s Research on Individuals, Politics, and Society lab, and the Latin American Public Opinion Project. Much of the fieldwork involved in the dissertation was also funded by the National Science Foundation’s Dissertation Enhancement Grant. I am grateful to all of these institutions, and to the individuals within them who read my proposals and generously funded this work. This project involved eleven months of fieldwork in Peru, none of which would have been possible without the patience and support of local Peruvian academics, public scholars, and institutions. I am especially indebted to David Sulmont and the Instituto de Opinión Pública at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú, Patricia Zárate and Jorge Aragón and the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, and José Incio and the team at INFOGob at the Jurado Nacional de Elecciones in Lima; the Asociación Servicios Educativos Rurales (SER) in Cajamarca; and Jorge Zegarra and Gobierno y Desarrollo Humano in Arequipa. Their assistance in navigating Peruvian institutions, their support of the project, and their generosity in providing data were invaluable. A special thanks goes to Mariana Ramirez Bustamante, my research assistant during the early days of fieldwork in Lima, and to the whole Ramirez Bustamante clan for their constant kindness, friendship, and generosity. Above all, I am grateful to the dozens of Peruvians – normal citizens, activists, former and sitting politicians, and candidates – who took time to share their opinions with me. Their willingness engage in extended, detailed conversations about their political opinions was humbling, and their opinions and knowledge are the foundation of this project. Gracias a todos. iv This project also benefitted from the support and feedback of my friends and colleagues at the Political Science Department. I am especially indebted to Laura Sellers, Fred Batista Pereira, Eelco van der Maat, Beth Estes, Matt Layton, Mason Moseley, Mariana Rodriguez, Daniel Zizumbo Colunga, Oscar Castorena, Carrie Roush, and all the members of the LAPOP group. Their critical feedback and smart questions improved this project immensely, and their friendship made graduate school fun. In addition to support from my friends, my work has benefitted from the guidance of my advisors and academic mentors. My Dissertation Committee has supported my growth as a scholar and as a person, for which I am grateful. Their willingness to read numerous drafts and provide critical feedback improved my writing, clarified my thinking, and shaped the way I approach research questions. In addition to making me smarter, they are generous people – I am thankful to each of them for their small kindnesses, from a congratulatory drink to a dinner invitation or a bag of coffee beans from home. I am especially grateful to Liz Zechmeister. Her support of my work and professional development has been constant and generous. I am honored to call her my advisor, fellow distance runner, nerdy pursuit enthusiast, and friend. I never would have been in the position to write a dissertation about politics without my family. My grandparents Bernard, Ann, Alex, and Sally talked politics around the dinner table when I was small. I am immensely grateful for this abnormal socialization and the lessons it taught me about debating policy civilly, preferably over or immediately following a good meal. My siblings Carolyn, David, and Megan taught me a lot about negotiation and strategic decision making (“politics”); they are the best siblings anyone could ask for. My parents are my biggest fans. Their endless support and encouragement, and their pride in even my smallest accomplishments, has been a comfort in the hardest moments of this process. Finally, Kenyi has v the dubious honor of being the only family member I got to choose. I’m so grateful to have his terrible jokes and wonderful laugh in my life. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................... iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iv LIST OF TABLES ......................................................................................................................... ix LIST OF FIGURES .........................................................................................................................x Chapter I. Introduction .................................................................................................................................1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................1 Defining Invalid Votes .............................................................................................................3 Invalid Voting in Latin America ..............................................................................................5 Explaining Invalid Voting ...........................................................................................................9 The Dissertation: A Roadmap ...................................................................................................13 II. Protest via the Null Ballot: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of the Decision to Cast an Invalid Vote in Latin America ..............................................................................................17 Introduction ...............................................................................................................................17 Motivations for Protest via the Invalid Vote .............................................................................20 Analysis: What Are Invalid Voters Protesting? .......................................................................26 Political Context and Invalid Voting .........................................................................................36 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................45 III. A Dynamic Model of the Invalid Vote: How Shifting Features of Political Competition Shape Null Voting Behavior ....................................................................................................48 Introduction ..............................................................................................................................48 Polarization, the Number of Candidates, and Invalid Voting .................................................51 Polarization ............................................................................................................................55 Number of Candidate Options ...............................................................................................60 The Stability of Candidate Options .......................................................................................63 Cross National Aggregate Data Analysis .................................................................................65 Discussion ................................................................................................................................80 IV. Campaigning for No-One: Elite Mobilization of the Invalid Vote in Latin American Presidential Elections ...............................................................................................................83 Introduction ..............................................................................................................................83 Invalid Vote Campaigns in Latin America ...............................................................................84 Features of Invalid Vote Movements in Latin American Presidential Elections .....................86 Future Lines of Inquiry ............................................................................................................95 vii V. Strategic Entry under Uncertainty: The Peruvian Case ............................................................98 Introduction ...............................................................................................................................98 The Differential Effects of Political Uncertainty ....................................................................103 Wasted Votes ........................................................................................................................104 Invalid Ballots ......................................................................................................................108 Saturation of the Political Space ...........................................................................................111
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