Project Number: ##-###-####

HUMAN INTERACTIONS AND DECISION-MAKING IN RECREATIONAL AVALANCHE ENVIRONMENTS

An Interactive Qualifying Project Report

submitted to the Faculty

of the

WORCESTER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of Bachelor of Science

by

______Madeline N. Sola

______Thomas C. Reese

______Katarzyna J. Kulbacka

Date: December 12, 2002

Approved:

______Professor Gregory Theyel, Major Advisor 1. decision-making 2. avalanche terrain ______3. recreation Dean Paul W. Davis, Co-Advisor Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION...... 3

RESEARCH CONTEXT ...... 3

METHODS ...... 8

Avalanche Database Analysis ...... 8

Expert Interviews ...... 8

Participant Interviews ...... 9

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS ...... 9

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS ...... 23

REFERENCES ...... 25

APPENDICES ...... 28

2 Abstract – The primary cause of human-triggered avalanches has been found to be error in human judgment. Very little research has been done to investigate the influence of group interactions on the decision-making processes of alpine recreationists. In addition to analysis of an avalanche database, we interviewed Swiss ski tourists to understand group dynamics among recreationists in avalanche settings. After analysis of the interview data, we identified four themes that shape human interactions in recreational avalanche environments; the experience level of participants, the relationships between the participants, the leadership styles groups adopt, and the role gender plays in decision-making.

Acknowledgements – We would like to thank the Swiss Federal Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research (SLF) for use of their avalanche database. We would also like to thank the interviewees of this study for sharing their knowledge and time.

Introduction

In the past 16 years, more than 2,000 people have been killed by avalanches worldwide (Colorado Avalanche Information Center, 2002). An area of research that may help reduce the number of avalanche deaths that has not been thoroughly studied is the decision-making processes of individuals recreating in alpine environments. This article presents research that sheds light on the characteristics of avalanche victims in Switzerland and the nature of decision- making of people who participate in alpine recreation in Switzerland. We began this study by analyzing records of avalanche deaths in Switzerland over a 30- year period. Based in this analysis and a review of relevant literature, we developed interview questions that we asked Swiss alpine recreationists. After analyzing their responses, we identified four significant aspects that shape human interactions during recreation in avalanche environments. These aspects are the experience level of the participants, the relationships between the participants, the leadership models groups adopt, and the role gender plays in decision-making. The following are general findings for each of these aspects:  Experience Level – Experience and ability in one‟s sports does not equate to avalanche knowledge and safety.  Relationships between Participants – Relationships between participants affect communication and trust which influence risk-taking.  Leadership – The leader of a group is determined by its characteristics.  Gender – Women may be less likely to die in avalanches when participating in recreational alpine activities because they tend to take less risk.

The paper begins with a review of existing research on causes of avalanches, including human causes, risk-taking in recreation, group decision-making among people participating in recreational activities, and how gender affects participation in recreational activities. Second, we describe our methods that include analysis of an avalanche database maintained by the Swiss Federal Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research (SLF) and extensive interviews with Swiss participants in alpine recreation. Next, we present our findings from our analysis of the avalanche database and interviews, and we close with a discussion of the implications of our findings on avalanche safety.

Research Context

3

There are approximately 25 people killed yearly by avalanches in the Swiss Alps (SAFEL/SFSO, 1997). An avalanche occurs when the stress (from gravity) trying to pull the snow downhill exceeds the strength (from bonds between snow grains) of the snow cover. There are four ingredients of an avalanche: a steep slope, a snow cover, a weak layer in the snow cover, and a trigger. Many studies have shown that the trigger is very often a human. Prior research has shown that nine out of ten avalanche victims (or someone in their group) initiate their own avalanche (Atkins, 2000; McCammon, 2000; Logan & Atkins, 1996). Between October 1984 and September 1996, 83% of Canada‟s fatal avalanches were triggered by a recreationist (Canadian Avalanche Association, 1996). The majority of avalanche victims are skiers, backcountry snowboarders, and snowmobilers who find themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time, and then make the wrong decision (Behan, 1998). The following sections describe risk recreation, risk-taking, and decision-making in risk recreation.

Risk Recreation

Over the years, avalanches have been dramatically reduced within controlled ski areas. However, backcountry regions have seen no change in the frequency of slides. This is partly because backcountry areas are not managed at all. For this study, it is important to understand why some recreationists choose to expose themselves to greater avalanche danger by skiing in the backcountry, and how this risk affects their decisions. Education and training create both positive and negative effects when applied to avalanche prevention. Hazard evaluation and route finding are very important skills; however, Burtscher and Nachbauer (1999) have found that members of alpine associations are twice as likely to die in avalanches as non-members. They attribute this to two factors: a higher frequency of participation and the fact that members are more educated in avalanche safety. It is believed that alpinists, who are aware of avalanche risk, do not avoid high-risk areas, using their knowledge as an invisible security blanket. Researchers have tried to understand the appeal of risk recreation (Robinson, 1992; McIntyre, 1992; McFarlane & Boxall, 1998). Robinson (1992) has defined risk recreation as “…an endeavor, in which achievement usually occurs in a private rather than a public setting and involves physical danger with no discernible extrinsic rewards.” McIntyre (1992) found that as involvement increases, a participant goes through stages of development. A beginner is stimulated by a perceived risk, whereas the expert, through an increase in participation and skill, prefers recreational surroundings characterized by real risk. This greatly affects the chosen setting. Experience leads to specialization and a change in attitude and social affiliations within the sport (McFarlane & Boxall, 1998). More experienced users associate themselves with other specialists, and prefer more natural settings and conditions with less managerial intervention. As a skier, climber, etc., becomes an expert, some develop a strong desire to participate in a natural environment as opposed to a commercialized area. Little (2002) studied women who participate in adventure recreation. Through her research and interviews with participants, she saw a recurrence of limiting factors for female participation. The most common constraints for the women studied were a lower self-esteem, a lack of confidence in personal skill, and an overall disbelief that women are suitable for higher- risk activities. Little believes that these constraints are a result of expected gender roles. She found that nearly all of her subjects had, at one point in time, “reconstructed their definition of

4 adventure to incorporate less physically or environmentally reliant leisure” (Little, 2002). These constraints can be used to explain Goulet‟s (2000) findings in his study of risk in alpine skiing. Through observation and a questionnaire, he categorized three different groups of skiers; uninjured, injured, and risk-taking. He divided each of these groups by gender and found that women were under-represented in the risk-taking group (29.4%), and over-represented in the injured group (56.3%).

Psychology of Risk-Taking

Research has shown that there are many motivations for risk-taking. The desire for achievement and challenge is one reason (Rudestam & Slanger, 1997). The excitement of having accomplished a complicated task is a thrill to high-risk sport participants. Participants are often preoccupied with the development of their skills. When a certain level of performance is established, the individual frequently needs to set still higher attainment levels to achieve the desired self-reward. Aesthetic consideration is another motive for risky behavior (Rudestam & Slanger, 1997). This can take many forms including a rhythmical pleasure of the experience, beauty of a controlled movement, appreciation for the natural environment, and an overall magnificence of a maneuver done well. Additionally, differences in biology are an explanation for risk-taking (Kuhlman & Zuckerman, 2000). This theory concerns itself with hereditary personality traits associated with risk-taking. Lauriola and Levin (2001) describe the most researched driving force for risky behavior as “a need for arousal that can be provided by varied, novel, complex, and intense experiences.” This personality trait is termed sensation seeking. High sensation seekers are more likely to engage in sports that offer new and potentially arousal increasing experiences (Jack & Ronan, 1998). In addition, they tend to seek out dangerous environments (Brown & Cogan, 1999). High sensation seekers‟ greater willingness to accept risk may be the factor that puts them more at risk due to their behavior (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993). Freixanet and Goma (1991) list the characteristics of people who participate in high-risk physical activities as extraversion, emotional stability, conformity to social norms, and seeking thrill and experience by socialized means. One‟s ability and learning in coping with the risk involved in a particular sport are aspects that mediate sensation-seeking tendencies (Jack & Ronan, 1998). The more knowledge and expertise in the sport, the more high sensation seekers lean towards aims and objectives than towards enjoying the sport for its own sake (Chivirella & Martinez, 1994). The factor most responsible for the disinhibition associated with risk-taking is self-efficacy (Rudestam & Slanger, 1997). When people determine themselves capable of handling an activity, they perform with self-confidence, approach threatening tasks fearlessly, experience little in the way of stress reactions, and are able to direct all effort to the task rather than concerning themselves with thoughts about their own abilities. People have a variation of risk perceptions with respect to the behaviors they may or may not engage in (Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993). The more risky the activity is estimated to be, the less likely the person is to do it. If someone engages in most kinds of risky behavior, the positive and negative outcomes can be easily identified. The risk appraisal is probably reduced if there are no apparent negative consequences of the activity. Low sensation seekers are more influenced by risk appraisals than high sensation seekers. They tend to pay more attention to the negative costs of the behavior, while high sensation seekers selectively attend to the pleasure or

5 rewards of the activity. Risk evaluation is a consequence rather than a cause of risky behavior. After one has had any experience with the activity, one‟s level of sensation seeking may determine how the experience is interpreted. The behavior of high sensation seekers is generally more risky, but they themselves do not perceive this as such (Cohen & Vredenburgh, 1995; Heino et. al., 1996). High sensation seekers may see themselves less at risk (Heino et. al., 1996). Some individuals plan and carefully prepare for their risk-taking (Kerr et. al., 1999; Chivirella & Martinez, 1994). The belief of personal control in risk-taking allows participants to build up protective frames. When these frames are effective, individuals can enjoy the danger in risk activities. If the frames are not effective, risk-taking activities are likely to provoke fear and anxiety (Apter, 1992). Risk sport participants are more or less taking calculated risks rather than taking them recklessly (Brown & Cogan, 1999; Rudestam & Slanger, 1997). Degree of confidence is the biggest factor in the determination of whether or not certain chances are taken in some areas and not others. The experience of constant successful performances is a factor that permits the taking of a physical risk. Engagement occurs when someone‟s knowledge of technical information and practice leads to an expectation of acceptable risk (Robinson, 1992). What some see as dangerous situations, others see opportunities to test ability (Goulet et al., 2000). Women have a lower tendency towards sensation seeking through adventurous behavior than sensation seeking in general (Chirivella & Martinez, 1994). Differences between the sexes refer above all to the way they obtain sensations rather than the search for them in itself. Women do not usually choose risky sports activities as a means of sensation seeking. Women and men differ in both their risk perceptions and reported risk behaviors (Betz et. al., 2002; Kerr & Vlaminkx, 1997). Men perceive most behaviors as less risky and are more likely to engage in more risky behaviors than women are (Betz et. al., 2002). Males are generally more risk-taking than females (Lauriola & Levin, 2001).

Decision-Making in Risk Recreation

In order to understand motivations and recreational choices in alpinism, we found it necessary to explore various decision-making models. The first, used by Atkins, is the Naturalistic Decision-Making (NDM) Model (2000). There exist two steps within this model; the first being recognition. The participant identifies a problem and “evaluates the situation to define the nature of the problem.” Next, s/he looks for, and decides upon a solution. According to Atkins, participants will base their judgments upon their conceptual grasp of the situation. With such a facilitated model, there are only two sources of error – the knowledge that the person is basing his/her decisions upon, or the process of coming to a decision. The second model, similar to the NDM model, was described by McCammon. Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) has been found to take place in experts during real-world situations. It is also comprised of two steps and is almost identical in nature. The expert “recognizes a situation as being typical of a class of situations, mentally test a response, then act (2000).” All of this happens on a subconscious level, and is usually referred to as intuition. McCammon says that the skill to recognize a situation as typical cannot be taught; it can only be learned. (McCammon, 2000)” Robinson‟s proposed Risk Recreation model is comprised of five phases. The first, attraction, is a description of all the motivating factors for involvement. This includes the need

6 for stimulation, setting preference and a feeling of personal control over the consequences of one‟s actions. The second phase, cognitive appraisal, is best described by Robinson: “An individual‟s perception of personal ability in a specific environment leads him/her to anticipate certain outcomes as a result of their perceived competence… [In] situations where perceived risk exceeds perceived competence, the individual anticipates a failure outcome, and the consequences associated with it.” These personal appraisals are essential to determining the amount of risk someone is willing to take (1992).”

When someone‟s abilities do not adequately meet the requirements for a successful experience, then the participant must ask him/herself whether to approach or withdraw. This process of decision-making is the third phase. If the expected outcome is failure, he/she will adjust the activity to a more suitable level of risk. The next phase, performance experience, describes how the actual risk of a setting is relative to the competency of the individual. An individual will usually seek a balance between the two. If there is an irregularity, then either a loss of control, or a lack of stimulation, can occur. The fifth and final phase, intuitive-reflexive appraisal, is the individual‟s assessment of his/her capabilities during and after the activity (i.e. satisfaction with the task at hand, a loss of control, etc.) (Robinson, 1992). Ian McCammon, of the National Outdoor Leadership School in Lander, Wyoming, has studied how heuristics have been applied to avalanche education. He has described four common heuristics:  Familiarity – The tendency to believe that a behavior is correct because it has been done before. “I come here all the time…”  Social Proof – The tendency to believe that a behavior is correct because others are doing it. “It has to be safe; otherwise those people wouldn‟t be there…”  Commitment – The tendency to believe that a behavior is correct because it is consistent with previous decisions. “It worked last time...”  Scarcity – The tendency to believe that a behavior is correct because one feels entitled to it (most prevalent with “powder fever”). “We‟ve got to hit that slope before anyone else breaks trail…” Heuristics have been shown to work well for people who do not have enough available information to make a logical decision. These “rules of thumb” are often shunned by experts due to a limited number of potential outcomes (McCammon, 2002). Werner Munter, a Swiss avalanche researcher, developed an avalanche assessment process termed “3x3” (www.geocities.com/Yosemite/Trails/1996/3x3.html). He takes into account three factors at three different points during a ski tour; tour planning, route selection, and the exact location of the slope. These factors are:  Snow pack/Weather – avalanche report, general snow conditions, possibility of slab avalanches  Terrain – map, slope angle, existing ski tracks, steepest part of slope  Human Factor – people in group, equipment, distance between group members

Munter‟s reduction method takes all of these factors into account in addition to the avalanche hazard rating. Using his equation, alpine enthusiasts can determine whether the potential risk of avalanche is acceptable or not.

7 The majority of the research done on the causes of human triggered avalanches has been focused on the individual participant and certain factors that can have a negative affect on their better judgment during recreation. Very little research has been done in the exploration of intangible factors that may, in addition, influence decision-making processes of participants of alpine recreation, particularly the influence of other people in a group setting. Our study addresses this issue in hopes that our findings will help increase avalanche safety.

Methods

In order to address the outstanding questions we identify above, we completed three tasks; avalanche database analysis, expert interviews, and participant interviews.

Avalanche Database Analysis

The Swiss Federal Institute for Snow and Avalanche Research (SLF) has maintained a database of avalanche incidents for over 50 years. Whenever a person is killed in an avalanche, Swiss authorities require SLF to conduct an investigation. Therefore, SLF records contain all avalanche incidents resulting in fatalities. We focused on avalanche events leading to recreationist fatalities during the period of 1970 through 1999. We identified key questions that we answered while analyzing the database. The purpose of these questions was to guide our analysis:  What is the proportion of male and female avalanche victims in Switzerland?  What is the age distribution of avalanche victims?  Do most avalanche fatalities occur on guided or non-guided tours?  What alpine activities lead to the most avalanche fatalities?  Does the size of the group have a positive or negative effect on the number of avalanche deaths? The first step in analyzing the database was to create a data set for use with the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software. We organized our data in columns in the following way:

Avalanche Month Gender Year of Year Age Group Activity Up / Tour / Guide / Number Birth Size Down Off-Piste No Guide

SLF has collected many different fields of data concerning avalanche fatalities. In order to narrow our study, we focused our attention on the following fields of the avalanche database: time of year, gender, age, group size, activity, up or down, tour or off-piste, and guided or not. We computed descriptive statistics for the variables chosen. We identified characteristics of avalanche fatalities through our analysis of the database. Our findings also guided the development of our interview questions.

Expert Interviews

The purpose of the expert interviews was to gain a better understanding of ski touring and off-piste practices. In order to accomplish this, we interviewed three professional mountain

8 guides. Our team chose these experts by convenience from the avalanche researchers at SLF. These informational interviews also served as a basis for testing our participant interview questions.

Participant Interviews

To understand group dynamics and social roles in alpine recreation, we conducted a series of interviews with Swiss ski tourists. We implemented a broad approach for choosing our interview subjects. We contacted members of the Academic Alpine Club of Zürich, the Swiss Alpine Club – Davos, and employees of SLF for interviews. We chose these particular participants in order to interview a variety of alpine recreationists. Maxwell (1996) states, “Qualitative researchers typically study a relatively small number of individuals or situations and preserve the individuality of each of these in their analyses, rather than collecting data from large samples and aggregating the data across individuals or situations. Thus, they are able to understand how events, actions, and meanings are shaped by the unique circumstances in which these occur.” Because of this, we interviewed 14 people of varying age, gender, and experience. Our interview questions were based on our analysis of the avalanche database, as well as the information we gained from our expert interviews. Our participant interview protocol can be found in Appendix A. Some sample questions included:  How is ski touring with more experienced people different from ski touring with less experienced people?  Does the gender make-up of the group influence your behavior?  When you go ski touring, how is leadership determined? The interviews were semi-structured in nature, where we asked purposeful questions and probed for added detail and personal experiences. We recorded each interview (via tape recorder) with permission from the participant. After the interview was completed, the third member of our team listened to the interview and made his/her own notes. Then, all three team members compiled their notes and observations to form a common understanding of the interviews.

Results and Analysis

The results of this study were both quantitative and qualitative in nature. Some of the findings from the database analysis are given in order to provide descriptive information on avalanche deaths in Switzerland. The remainder of the quantitative results is woven within the discussion of our interview results.

Quantitative Results and Analysis

Activity

In order to focus our interviews, we needed to know what group of people was being affected most by avalanche danger. Table 1a shows the breakdown of avalanche deaths by activity. The percentages are found in Table 1b. The majority of people killed in avalanches are skiing (85.5%). Climbers are the second most common group with 11.5%.

9

Table 1a – Activity of Avalanche Deaths Total Male Female % % Activity Deaths Deaths Deaths Male Deaths Female Deaths Ski 567 461 97 82.6 17.4 Climbing 76 61 11 84.7 15.3 Snowboard 15 13 2 86.7 13.3 Hike 11 8 3 72.7 27.3 Paraglide 3 3 0 100 0 Snowshoe 2 1 1 50 50 Heliski 1 1 0 100 0 XC Skiing 1 1 0 100 0

Overall 663 549 114 82.8 17.2 *There were 13 entries missing gender data. Percentages are taken excluding these numbers.

Table 1b – Avalanche Deaths by % Activity Ski Climb Snowboard Hike Paraglide Snowshoe Heliski XC Ski Number of Deaths 567 76 15 11 3 2 1 1 % of Database* 85.5 11.5 2.3 1.7 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 *Data fields from 1970-1999

Location

The map in Figure 1 shows the two most common locations of avalanche fatalities. The cantons of Valais (VS) and Gräubunden (GR) have been the hosts to 72% of all Swiss avalanche fatalities from 1970 to 1999 (35% and 37%, respectively).1 This is not surprising, considering the majority of the Swiss Alps are contained in these two cantons.

Figure 1 – Avalanche Deaths per Canton

1 A canton is a Swiss state. There are 26 cantons in Switzerland.

10

Age

In order to understand the characteristics of avalanche victims, we assessed the age of victims. Figure 2 is a display of the frequencies of ages within the database. The majority of the avalanche victims are between the ages of 18 and 32. Tremper (2002) states that most avalanche victims in the United States are between the ages of 18 and 35. Our analysis shows the majority of victims in Switzerland to be in the 18 to 35 age range.

Figure 2 – Age of Avalanche Victims

11 35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80

Time of Year

Figure 3 shows the frequencies of male, female, and total avalanche deaths (y) in Switzerland from 1970 to 1999 (x). The fluctuations are likely to be due to differences in snow conditions from year-to-year. However, there is a general downward trend over the 30-year time period.

Figure 3 – Avalanche Fatalities by Year

12 50

45

40

35

30

Male Fatalities 25 Female Fatalities Total Fatalities

20

15

10

5

0 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005

Figure 4 is a display of avalanche fatalities by month. In the spring, the snow pack is much more stable than in December, January, and February. This creates better skiing and safer avalanche conditions. However, these conditions also attract more people. Therefore, even with a more stable snow pack, the existence of more “triggers” (i.e. people) produces avalanches even in June.

Figure 4 – Avalanche Fatalities by Month

13 November December 1% 12% October 1%

September 1% August January 2% February January March July 14% 2% April May June February June 2% 20% July May August April 8% 16% September March October 21% November December

The following figure shows the percentage of male deaths [(total # of male fatalities)/ (total # of fatalities)] and the percentage of female deaths [(total # of female fatalities)/ (total # of fatalities)] from 1970 to 1999. Many of our experienced interviewees told us that the number of women participating in backcountry recreation has increased significantly over the years. Figure 5 shows a higher percentage of female deaths during the earlier years in the database, and a recent decrease in the percentage of female avalanche deaths. The overall trend has remained constant other the past 20 years, decreasing slightly. This shows that although the number of women participants in the backcountry is increasing, the average number of women avalanche fatalities per year has remained the same.

Figure 5 – Yearly Avalanche Fatalities by % Gender

14 125.00

100.00

75.00

Male % by Year Female % by Year

Percentage 50.00

25.00

0.00

1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 Year

Qualitative Results and Analysis

From our database analysis and interview data, we have identified four main themes; the experience level of the participants, the relationships between the participants, the leadership styles groups adopt, and the role gender plays in decision-making. These themes help explain participants‟ decision-making while partaking in recreational activities in avalanche environments. We classified the interview data into categories based on similar subject matter (i.e. experience level, age, gender, etc.). The themes are based on our analysis of the interview data, our literature review, and quantitative analysis of the avalanche database.

Experience Level

The experience level of alpine sport enthusiasts both positively and negatively affects their decision-making. As one of our interviewees said, “being experienced in ski touring is not the same as being experienced in avalanche danger: An experienced ski tourist can know where the best [skiing] places are, but [he/she] doesn‟t necessarily know how to identify the avalanche hazards.” In addition, one mountain guide best illustrated this with a personal experience. The guide was leading a group of ski tourists on a steep slope. He went down first, setting a safe track for the rest to follow. One by one, the group descended, following the established route. All went well until one of the skiers, referred to as a “specialist” by the interviewee (someone who thinks that he/she is an expert), came down the slope, 30 meters away from the area deemed safe by the guide. An avalanche was triggered, seriously injuring another group member who needed to be air lifted from the site. There are two different effects of experience shown in this scenario. The first, is that the guide, obviously a professional in his field, was very skilled in recognizing avalanche risk;

15 making him more than capable of choosing a safe path for his tour. The second is the “specialist,” who was a very skilled skier, but his knowledge of avalanche danger was less than adequate for this situation. The skill he possessed in his sport affected how he perceived his own abilities. He felt confident that he did not have to follow the track established by the guide, because he was an expert skier. His distorted perception not only put himself at risk, but also endangered the well-being of his companions. Another ski tourist put it best: “People don‟t realize [the] danger they are in, and ski on slopes they shouldn‟t be skiing...” The fact that many people tend to mistake skiing experience for avalanche experience was a recurring theme in our interviews with mountain guides and tour leaders. One skier confessed that the reason why he had been avalanched on a tour was because, although he was an established skier, his mountaineering knowledge was fairly minimal. When we asked our participants to define levels of expertise within ski touring, many said that it was very difficult because avalanche and skiing abilities are two very different things. Some of the ski tourists we interviewed gave their opinions of the levels of avalanche knowledge:  Novice - Has no knowledge of how an avalanche can be triggered. The man/woman cannot recognize signs of avalanche danger, or as one interviewee put it, “doesn‟t even know what an avalanche is.”  Intermediate: A person fitting this classification has a basic understanding of avalanche development, but in no great detail.  Expert (Professional): This person knows the history of the snow pack and has followed its development. He/She has the ability to identify areas of high avalanche risk and knows when to turn back, or how to proceed responsibly. The mismatch between a person‟s avalanche knowledge and experience in a sport helps identify recreationists who are likely to be at great risk in avalanche settings. Our analysis of the avalanche database revealed a significant proportion (57%) of avalanche deaths among people who are 16 to 35 years old. In order to better understand this finding, we asked our interviewees whether age plays a role in avalanche risk. A few people told us that the age of the ski tourist makes no difference in how one behaves in the backcountry. These people were not the majority however. Many claimed that although age did not matter in terms of ability, “younger people are more risky than older, experienced people.” This is one possible explanation for the noticeable difference in the ages of avalanche fatalities. Some common lines from our interviews are found below, as well as a breakdown of age in Table 2.  “Before 25, you take much more risk; always want to do crazy stuff while you‟re young.”  “The younger you are... [you] take more risk.”  “People have different perceptions of risk based on experience, personality, age; and this causes trouble.”  “Younger people take more risks than older, experienced people.”

Table 2 - Breakdown of Avalanche Fatalities by Age Age Group Number of Deaths Percentage 0-10 1 0.2 11-15 23 3.5 16-20 85 12.8 21-25 115 17.4 26-30 97 14.7 31-35 81 12.2

16 36-40 63 9.5 41-45 56 8.5 46-50 60 9.1 51-55 43 6.5 56-60 23 3.5 61-65 11 1.7 65+ 4 0.6

Overall 662* 100 *14 entries did not contain age information, and were excluded from this table.

Yet another explanation, other than simply taking more risks than older participants, was provided by a young ski tourist. He described a “learning curve,” and then drew a plot similar to the one shown below. The first line represents a ski tourist‟s development in skiing ability. The lower line signifies the development of “avalanche skills.” Avalanche skills take much longer to acquire than skills within a particular alpine sport. This ski tourist went on to explain that younger participants have not had enough time to considerably educate themselves in avalanche safety. They are excellent athletes; however, their practical knowledge in avalanche danger lags considerably.

Figure 6 – “Learning Curve”

17 COMPETANCE

TIME

Skiing Ability Avalanche Skills

Yet another common topic during our interviews was ambition. This usually went hand in hand with the comments about young people and their higher acceptance (or ignorance) of risk. At the same time, ambition is not limited to young sport participants. A professional mountain guide we interviewed said that the worst people to guide “are ambitious, want to ski nothing but steep slopes, and think that they know something about avalanches.” One ski tourist said that she refused to go skiing with very ambitious people, whom she dubbed „go-getters.‟ People who treat ski touring as a race between companions, without taking the necessary precautions, are dangerous. Two of our interviewees said that they have had to pull aside and reprimand companions who they felt were being reckless. The experience of an individual not only affects one‟s own perceptions of ability, but also those of his/her companions. McFarlane et al. (1998) have said that “Those with the most experience may… [set] the standards of behavior for the group and have more influence over site choice than other group members.” Many of the ski tourists we interviewed said that they would take higher risks if touring with a person more experienced than him/herself. Surprisingly, even people who lead tours (but are not professional mountain guides) said that they too would slip into the background, leaving all decision-making up to the most experienced person(s). It is understandable why a group would place their trust in the most experienced person. However, even the most knowledgeable ski tourist can become avalanched. Authors, such as Burtscher et al. (1997) and Burtscher and Nachbauer (1999) have shown that increased experience and education in avalanche safety has not decreased the number of avalanche incidents, but surprisingly, increases one‟s chance of being caught in an avalanche. It is believed that many experienced alpine enthusiasts ignore signs of avalanche danger. This can be attributed to a higher level of confidence in his/her own abilities to deal with avalanche threat. According to Robinson (1992), “An individual‟s perception of personal ability in a specific environment leads him/her to anticipate certain outcomes as a result of their perceived competence. Thus, in situations where perceived risk exceeds perceived competence, the individual anticipates a failure outcome… Alternatively, in

18 situations where perceived competence at least equals or exceeds perceived risk, the individual anticipates success and the avoidance of risk consequences.”

McIntyre (1992) has said that as one gains experience, one tends to replace a perception of risk with real danger. Goulet et al. (2000) believe that risk seeking provides opportunity to test one‟s abilities. Our interviewees have told us that the more experienced one is, the more willing he/she is to take risks. One ski tourist simply said, “Experts like risk.” The purpose of this section is not to undermine the importance of experience in backcountry recreation. Many of our participants recalled near misses, avoided only because of their past experience. Years ago, one woman was avalanched while on a tour in Austria. When she returned to similar conditions the following year, she avoided that area, where a group ahead of her was caught in an avalanche. Yet another example is of a man who was skiing with a friend and developed a “bad feeling.” He told his friend to wait, walked 50 meters, and with that same bad feeling looming over him, turned around. The next day, five people were killed by an avalanche on that slope. Experience is invaluable during ski touring and other forms of alpine recreation. However, experienced ski tourists, according to one interviewee, “…have their own set patterns.” It is important for the participant to ask whether his/her decision-making is based upon knowledge, or as one skier put it, “[a] higher confidence from many successful tours.”

Relationships between Participants

Relationships between participants affect decision-making during recreational alpine activities. The influence of the relationship between recreational participants and avalanche safety was exhibited by a mishap, as recounted by one interviewee. When she was 19, she was ski touring with a close friend and several other people when she was caught in a big avalanche in Austria. There were bad weather conditions and it had just started to snow. The group she was in was reaching the summit of a mountain, when they had to make a ski depot and go the rest of the way by foot. The woman was following her friend and another person who were sharing leadership, and she did not question their decisions. In the process of the two leaders changing position for trail breaking, they triggered a slab avalanche. The people behind her slid down the entire slope and were seriously injured by rocks. When asked why she had blindly followed the leader, she answered,

“I think it was this friendship. I never had the uncertainty that something could be wrong.”

People who ski tour with friends often take more risks. This is likely to be the case because a certain level of trust is present among friends who know each other well. This trust obscures the participant‟s judgment and causes one to leave the responsibility of decision- making to another individual or the rest of the group. The member of the group believes that his/her friend(s) will not lead them into a dangerous situation. One participant expressed this well by saying, “When I go with friends, I tend to know how much experience they have, and it makes a difference. I also know their perception of risk, how they judge risk, and how far they are willing to push it. Knowing their experiences and ability makes you more relaxed and not so conservative.” Additional comments on relationships and acceptance of risk are:

19  One participant stated that he “has a friend who is a good ski tourist and will go with this guy into places he wouldn‟t usually go.”  Another claimed that, “if you know people well, you know their experiences and levels. With friends you can try something risky, as long as they know what they are doing.”  Yet another said, “With good friends I might do crazy stuff because they are all on the same level and we make decisions as a team.”

When the relationship is more than just a friendship, a more established trust exists where men tend to exhibit a more protective behavior. Two male interviewees said that they behave differently when with their girlfriend/wife. One of these participants stated that he “skis more conservative” when in the backcountry with his girlfriend. Similarly, another participant said that he takes less risk with his wife than with his friends because “they know each other well and she can immediately see if something is wrong or if it gets dangerous.” He is unable to guard his wife from the knowledge of any imminent danger. Trust also relates to one‟s ability to communicate with others, a key element in decision- making. With strangers or unfamiliar people, no, or very little, trust exists among the members in the group. The lack of trust between people can affect the level of risk people face. One does not know the experiences and abilities of the participants; therefore it is difficult to have confidence in their judgment. Discussion is more difficult because there is a concern that one‟s opinion will not be considered. One participant said, “When I go skiing without my boyfriend, it‟s not as easy to speak up. With other people it‟s harder to convey my feelings because they don‟t think like I do. They always listen to what the simple majority says. If I have a bad feeling, I can‟t explain to them why I feel that way.” Additional comments on communication are:  One participant stated that, “It‟s important for me to be able to make decisions on my own and with someone you don‟t know it‟s more risky and tricky.”  Two interviewees said that, “with closer friends, it is easier to discuss.”

Different types of relationships influence risk-taking. The relationship between recreational participants, if familiar, can lead to blind trust which can increase risk. Likewise, the lack of communication and trust between unfamiliar participants can also lead to increased risk.

Leadership

Through our participant interviews, we have found that there are three primary leadership styles that can exist during a ski tour. We were able to identify these applying models used by Lall and Lall (1979). Of the five they established, we have chosen the autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire leadership styles. The analysis of our interview data through the use of a model helped us to better understand how decision-making, through leadership, is affected by the composition of a group.

Which Leadership Style?

During one interview, a ski tourist recalled an avalanche accident:

20 “There were maybe six of us discussing the one slope. It looked dangerous, so we were trying to figure out how to get to the top. We decided to go up on the direct edge of it and traverse one by one. We got to the top in ten minutes when we saw a youth group from Basel, who we had met at our hut, following in our tracks. They were being led by two guides, and did not cross on the top one by one, but as a group. Then, the whole slope came off.”

The characteristics of the group itself make a significant difference in how leadership is designated. Members of large groups, such as the youth group from Basel, usually possess a wide range of experience levels, and do not know each other well. Because of this, large groups tend to adopt an autocratic style of leadership. Smaller groups, often composed of friends who are on a similar experience level, are more likely to make decisions collectively; on a democratic basis. The laissez-faire style depends more on the individuals within the group than the overall size of the group.

Autocratic Leadership Style

Autocratic leadership occurs when one person takes charge of a group, and assumes responsibility for the decision-making. From our interviews, we found that, more often than not, the person with the most experience selects this role. Statements such as, “[the] leader is usually chosen by being the most experienced” or, “leadership is deferred to the most experienced people in the group” were not uncommon. The behavior of individuals within the group is greatly affected by the leader. In the presence of someone who is obviously more experienced, one interviewee said, “…leadership is deferred to the most experienced people in the group.” Others stated that everyone listens to the most experienced person, or that group members “just follow the leader.” A handful of ski tourists confessed that they were not as attentive to potential hazards when with an expert. Often, they blindly trust the autocratic leader when it came to any kind of decision-making. Interviewees have also described the typical leader as being more energetic than the rest of the group. Physically fit people are usually the ones who break the trail when walking up, therefore leadership is dependent on one‟s strength. It was not surprising to hear our interviewees say, “Men are more energetic and go first.” One of them stated, “Women can be very experienced, however a man who is stronger, but less experienced will lead.” Therefore, leadership is not a matter of gender but physical ability. The autocratic leadership style often takes place among larger groups of people with diverse experience levels. Most of our interviewees said that they would automatically assume the role of leader if they were touring with an unfamiliar group of lesser-experienced skiers. Each of these ski tourists claimed to be of an upper-intermediate or expert level of experience. They explained that a feeling of responsibility exists, making it necessary to adjust the tour to the least experienced group member.

Laissez-faire Leadership Style

Laissez-faire style takes place when there is no designated leader, and the group simply does the activity. This form incorporates/yields minimum direction and control from a leading body, with maximum freedom for the individuals of the group. This style is not necessarily

21 chosen, but is determined by the members of the group. One of our interviewees said that he likes “homogenous groups where everyone is independent and can make their own decisions.” One interviewee in particular voiced his concern for this style of leadership, saying, “Leaderless groups are the most dangerous.” He justified this by saying that no one is fully aware of what is happening, making accidents more prone to happen.

Democratic Leadership Style

The democratic style of leadership was the most common practice among intermediate and experienced ski tourists. One woman said, “A private tour for me means that everyone is about the same. I prefer small numbers of people. It‟s like a team of people discussing what to do – to continue or not…” The reference to a smaller group size is very significant, because it forms “a dependence on each other to make decisions.” This model of leadership is usually found among groups of friends, or close acquaintances. Interviewees have said that when you recreate with close friends, you share experiences, and become similar in skill level. Because of this, communication comes easily, and decision-making is not as “one-sided” as found in the autocratic form. Some said that in order for a democratic style of leadership to take place, there needs to be at least three people in the group. One ski tourist said that when traveling with one other person, the stronger of the two tends to lead, taking the responsibility of decision-making upon him/herself. “Discussion is better with three or more people because there is more time to [talk].” The reasoning behind this is that when there are three people, the leader has to wait for two people to catch up, rather than just one. While waiting for the third person, there is more time to collectively decide where to go, and to identify areas of risk. Within a large group, the majority of tourists feel that people tend to follow the “average opinion.” It is nearly impossible to consider everyone‟s perceptions, making a democratic style of leadership very difficult to maintain. Many of our participants said that this is why they avoid skiing in groups of more than six people.

Gender

Historically, women seldom participated in alpine recreational activities. Today, based upon various backcountry studies, women make up about one-third of the ski touring population. From 1979 to 1995, a total of 656,000 people ski toured in the Austrian mountains of which 65% were men and 35% were women (Burtscher & Kornexl, 1996). Similarly, since 1980, females have comprised over one-third of the backcountry recreationists in Utah (Fredston, et. al., 1994). However, women are less likely to die in avalanches while participating in alpine recreation. From the analysis of the Swiss avalanche database for the years 1970 through 1999, 17.2% of 676 avalanche victims were women. This percentage is significantly lower than the estimated participation percentage of 35%. There are several possible explanations for the lower rate of avalanche deaths for women. From our study, interviewees felt that this phenomenon is due to the difference in the amount of risk taken by men and women. The majority of the people interviewed for this study claim that

22 men take more risks than women. This was also found in studies completed by Lauriola and Levin (2001) and Betz, Blais, and Weber (2002). In the study conducted by Lauriola and Levin, respondents were asked to rate the likelihood they would participate in specific risky activities. Men were significantly more likely participate in risky behaviors than woman. In the study conducted by Betz, et. al., participants were given risky decision-making trials in which they had to make a decision between two options. Males were found to be more risk-taking than women. The risk-taking nature of men does not appear to be due to varying experience levels between the genders. Two interviewees said that they “know women who are very experienced, but are still very conservative.” Another interviewee claimed that the “typical woman is very experienced, but also very hesitant, possibly exaggerating avalanche risk.” It is possible that this is due to the notion that women are less inclined than men to choose high-risk sport activities as a means of sensation seeking (Chirivella & Martinez, 1994). Women appear to enjoy ski touring for the sake of the sport itself and not merely just the final run down the mountain. In support of this, one female participant stated, “I prefer going with less experienced people because I feel that taking risk is unnecessary. I enjoy skiing in less steep terrain anyway.” In terms of the way the group interacts, participants agreed that gender does not play a role. The gender make-up of the group may or may not influence how individual behaves. One interviewee said, “There is a bit of machismo when women are around, but this can also happen with a group of only men.”

Conclusions and Implications

As we have shown, assessing avalanche risk is more complex than just evaluating physical conditions. In fact, when we asked our interviewees how they assess avalanche situations, all of them failed to mention taking into consideration, for example, the effect other people have on their decisions. The major implication of our study is to sensitize participants of alpine recreation to the fact that human interactions affects avalanche risk, with hopes that our findings will help aid in increasing avalanche safety. Many experienced alpinists tend to overestimate their capabilities to deal with avalanche risk. This can be attributed to a high competency in skiing ability, or to a large number of high- risk, accident-free tours. The tourist must determine whether they have enough avalanche knowledge for a particular setting. Also, each participant needs to determine how his/her experience level will affect the tour. The amount of risk each person is willing to take is determined by the confidence one has in his/her companions. If one is very experienced, it should be taken into consideration that the group will accept his/her input more than that of others; regardless of whether he/she is certain or not. As valuable as this experience may be, each person in the group needs to ask, “Why are we doing this?” Participants need to be aware that the relationships they have with other members in the group have an effect on their decision-making. If a participant is ski touring with friends or a significant other, they should be sure they are evaluating avalanche risk themselves, and not leaving it to another individual or even the rest of the group. A warning should sound when a participant is with people they do not know very well. Communication, and thus decision- making, will be more difficult than with friends. The leadership style a group exhibits depends on its size and make-up. One should be aware that presence of inexperienced members in a group indicates a need for the most experienced person to take over leadership. They are then fully responsible for all other group

23 members. Relatively small groups of friends who know one another well should adopt a democratic leadership style. Friendship among participants makes communication much easier, which leads to collective decision-making. Finally, one should be aware of the risk involved with leaderless groups, where individuals make decisions on their own. Interviewees consider that type of group the most dangerous due to the chaos existing in the group. Interviewees claim that the gender of the participants does not play a role in the way the group interacts. However, the quantitative data shows that the gender of the particular participant does matter. Women are less likely to die in an avalanche while participating in alpine recreation. This is believed to be due to the conservative risk-taking nature of women. Both genders should consider this finding when recreating in avalanche terrain.

Recommendations for Further Study

A continuation of this study would require additional normalization data. We developed several hypotheses that we could not further because of this issue. For example, we speculated that smaller groups (2 to 3 people) are safer than large groups. Our assumption was made using our interview data and a study conducted by Atkins (2000). The analysis of the avalanche database tells another story; where the frequency of avalanche death within small groups (2 to 3 people) is almost twice that of large groups (seven or more people). Atkins (2000) justified a similar finding in his study by saying that, “groups of 2 or 3 are probably the most common size for groups heading into the backcountry.” Although we had the data from the avalanche database to determine whether a significant correlation existed, we did not have the actual numbers of small and large groups that go into the mountains each year. Therefore, we could not make any conclusions on the relationship between group size and safety. One third of the recreational avalanche fatalities in the database are guided. In order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether a guide adds safety to a tour, we would need to normalize the number of guided versus unguided tours. SLF maintains a data field containing the type of guide (i.e. Jungend und Sport, Professional Mountain Guide, Swiss Alpine Club, etc). To determine whether one is safer than the other is, it would be imperative to explore the participation numbers of each.

24 References

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McIntyre, N. (1992). Involvement in Risk Recreation: A Comparison of Objective and Subjective Measures of Engagement. Journal of Leisure Research, 24(1), 64-71.

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27 Appendices

Appendix A – Participant Interview Protocol

Appendix B – Questionnaire Development

Appendix C – Questionnaire

Appendix D – Protocol for Administration

28 Appendix A – Participant Interview Protocol

 Self-Defined Experience Level o How do you judge your personal expertise level? (novice, intermediate, expert)

 Group Dynamics o How does each of the following factors influence your behavior when in a group setting? . Experience Level . Relationships between Participants . Gender . Age . Group Size . Leadership (who does what, how does it change, how many)

 Avalanche Experience Education and Training Personal Experiences (who, what, when, where, why, and how)

 Decision-Making in Backcountry Settings o How do you identify avalanche situations? o What factors influence your behavior? o How does group make-up affect your decision-making?

29 Appendix B – Questionnaire Development

We developed a questionnaire suitable for determining the behavior of both genders in backcountry recreation. Our primary focuses were hazard perception, risk acceptance, group dynamics, and social roles. In order to do this, we developed questions that focused on each aspect of this study. In addition to descriptive fields (gender, age, activity, etc.), we wanted to understand the participants‟ knowledge of avalanche risk. This was done through questioning their knowledge of established warnings and signs. This included geographic signs, an understanding of the European avalanche warning system, what the day‟s avalanche warning is, etc. The participant was also asked how much education, in the form of formal classes, they have had on avalanche awareness and safety. We also wanted to understand how each person views the activity he/she partakes in. Questions asked included, but were not limited to; frequency of participation, how long the participant has been involved, and how he/she perceives the risk of the activity. We also wanted to explore which locations they tend to recreate in (i.e. controlled ski areas, backcountry, etc.). Group dynamics and social roles were also taken into account. First, we wanted the participant to tell us whether he/she is a member of an alpine organization. In addition, we wanted to determine a typical group size and the gender composition of the typical group. The subject was questioned as to how leadership is determined as well.

30 Appendix D – Protocol for Administration (Not to be sent to participants)

This questionnaire is meant to be given to ski tourists at various trailheads, common routes, etc. It is a written survey, which will be given to the ski tourists in a packet, and will not be conducted on the spot. The participant will complete the questionnaire upon his/her return home, and then mail it back to the researchers. The packet will include the questionnaire, the researchers‟ contact information, and a stamped, self-addressed envelope for the return of the questionnaire. The recommended method of distribution is to wait at a trailhead and personally hand a packet to each ski tourist. This can be made most effective by choosing one site early in the day, and handing a packet to each skier entering the trailhead. After a couple hours, the researchers should move to another trailhead, and distribute the questionnaire to a second group of tourists; only this group will be returning from a ski tour. The questionnaire itself has been made so that the majority of it can be coded in a statistical program such as SPSS. Requests for written responses are found throughout the questionnaire. These will have to be coded by grouping similar responses. The intent of the written response questions was not to make it difficult on the researcher. Rather, we did not want to lead the participant into a particular answer, and could not have listed every possibility.

31