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Gerald M. Steinberg

MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND THE NPT EXTENSION DECISION

by Gerald M. Steinberg

Gerald M. Steinberg is a professor in the Political Studies Department and Director of Arms Control Projects at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, . His activities include participation in the track-two meetings of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) sponsored by the University of California, and in the Mediterranean Seminars of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).1

n May 11, 1995, the signa- South Africa, and other states. NPT Review Conference. These tories of the Treaty on the The favorable outcome of the issues were also raised in the four ONon-Proliferation of Nu- NPTREC was by no means a fore- preparatory conferences that pre- clear Weapons (NPT) agreed by ac- gone conclusion. Numerous con- ceded the NPTREC and, in the case clamation to extend this agreement flicts and disputes could, potentially, of Main Committee I (dealing with beyond the initial 25 years specified have led to far different results, rang- the elimination of nuclear weapons), 2 4 in the original text. This decision, ing from short-term extensions, sus- led to sharp disputes and divisions. and the adoption of four accompa- pension of the conference, splits These conflicting interests and per- nying documents, marked the culmi- among the signatories, or even the spectives also blocked adoption of a nation and conclusion of the 1995 collapse of the NPT regime.3 These formal final declaration in New York. NPT Review and Extension Confer- contentious issues included: demands In addition, an extensive Egyptian ence (NPTREC) held in New York by some non-nuclear weapon states campaign centered on Israel’s and attended by 175 signatories. that the five nuclear powers agree nuclear policy, and NPT status was The indefinite extension of the to specific measures and timetables seen as a significant threat to the NPT was a major achievement for towards nuclear disarmament; ques- desired outcome. Israel was and re- the supporters of the NPT regime. tions over security assurances; po- mains one of three nuclear threshold The U.S. government and the litical/economic disputes between states which are also NPT “hold- Clinton administration had made this the non-aligned nations and the de- outs” (along with India and Pakistan) a central foreign policy objective and veloped states; and doubts about the (Brazil is the other major non-NPT had dedicated extensive resources effectiveness of the International state). In the year preceding the con- towards the accomplishment of this Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ference, as well as during the con- outcome. Many other individuals and safeguards system (as illustrated by ference itself, the Egyptian governments also contributed signifi- the problems experienced in the government, joined by a number of cantly, including the president of the cases of Iraq and North Korea). other Arab states and , sought NPTREC, Ambassador Jayantha Many of these had come up in past to pressure Israel into changing its Dhanapala of Sri Lanka, as well as discussions of the NPT, and were policy on the NPT. Egyptian govern- the representatives from Canada, responsible for deadlock in the 1990 ment representatives defined their

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 17 Gerald M. Steinberg

objectives in different language at regional nonproliferation in the Middle lishment of United Nations Special various times, but the ostensible goal East. Finally, it considers the long- Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to was to force Israel to accept the term impacts of this outcome on the search for, monitor, and destroy NPT, place all its nuclear facilities on-going Arab-Israeli peace process, Saddam Hussein’s efforts to main- under safeguards within a fixed pe- making the argument that Egypt’s tain weapons of mass destruction riod of time, and end the long-stand- leverage among Arab and non- (WMD) and missiles to deliver ing Israeli policy of nuclear aligned states on this issue has now them, and President George Bush’s ambiguity.5 Israel consistently re- declined and that the most intense 1991 Arms Control Ini- jected these pressures and resisted future conflicts over these issues are tiative had already increased the fo- basic policy changes, viewing the likely to take place in the context of cus on these issues. In 1990, Egypt maintenance of a virtual nuclear de- bilateral and regional negotiations. presented a framework to create a terrent capability as necessary to Middle East Zone Free of Weapons offset the asymmetries in the size of THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE of Mass Destruction (MEWMDFZ), conventional forces, territorial extent, PROCESS AND THE BUILD- known as the “Mubarak Initiative.” and demography that it believes UP TO THE NPTREC Although the regional conception for threaten the existence of the Jewish ACRS was similar to the Bush Ini- state.6 The Middle East peace process tiative, ACRS emphasized the direct that began in October 1991 with the negotiation of Confidence-Building This conflict had a significant im- Madrid conference marked a funda- pact on the NPTREC and on the Measures (CBMs) and the step-by- mental change in the region and in step expansion of regional measures, broader Middle East peace process. the relationships between Washing- The factors involved included Egyp- rather than focusing on long-term ton, , and Cairo. After the 7 tian domestic politics, inter-Arab objectives, as in the Bush proposal. Madrid Conference, a series of bi- However, a number of key states, relations, Israeli policy and interests, lateral negotiations led to unprec- security perceptions of the major including Syria, Iraq, and Iran were edented agreements between Israel not involved in the multilateral pro- states in the region, and the bilateral and the (1993) and a and trilateral relations between and cess, and this constituted a major peace treaty between Israel and Jor- limitation on the negotiation of re- among the United States, Israel, and dan (1994). Egypt. gional security arrangements. The Madrid Conference also es- This article describes and assesses At an early stage in the ACRS tablished a number of multilateral meetings, Egypt began to press Is- the Egyptian campaign against working groups, including a group Israeli’s nuclear stance, the factors rael to agree to include its nuclear on Arms Control and Regional Se- policy on the agenda. The Egyptian that determined the outcome at the curity (ACRS). The multilateral NPTREC (in which both Israel and representatives stated that progress framework was designed to tackle in the regional peace process was Egypt can claim diplomatic success), regional issues that extended beyond and the likely implications of this linked to the end of Israel’s nuclear the bilateral negotiations, and to es- monopoly.8 Israel rejected the Egyp- outcome on future nuclear negotia- tablish a basis for discussion and tions in the Middle East. It begins tian demands to discuss the nuclear mutual recognition between Israel issue in detail, arguing that the de- by tracing the background of the and the wider Arab world, extend- Egyptian campaign, from the after- velopment of regional security must ing from North Africa to Saudi be based first on progress in imple- math of the 1991 Madrid Conference Arabia and the Gulf States. to its development in the final run- menting regional peace agreements, up to the opening of the NPTREC The ACRS working group was the as well as putting a broad network 9 in April 1995. It then examines the most ambitious, and manifested the of CBMs into place. Until these events at the meeting itself and the growing emphasis on arms control conditions were reached, the Israeli factors that led to the eventual re- and nonproliferation initiatives in policy based on the maintenance of jection of Egypt’s most extreme de- the region. Prior to the beginning of the ambiguous nuclear deterrent mands and the adoption of what was the ACRS process, the belated dis- would remain. Thus, the detailed ne- seen as a compromise statement on covery of the scope of the Iraqi gotiations demanded by Egypt that nuclear weapons program, the estab- would lead to a change in this policy

18 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 Gerald M. Steinberg were unacceptable. As a result, by dominated the press conference held options are open.”16 early 1995, the ACRS process had by Peres and Mousa, in which the In December 1994, Israeli Presi- become blocked over this issue. Egyptian foreign minister sought to dent Weizman paid an official visit The meetings and other activities gain support from the Israeli public. to Egypt. Although the office of the in the ACRS working group, as well When Mousa argued that the Israeli Israeli president is largely symbolic, as similar exchanges between Egypt capability posed a danger to Egypt, and he plays no policymaking role, and Israel in the annual meetings of Peres noted that although the United Weizman’s visit had important po- the IAEA and the U.N. General As- States “has a very large arsenal, ...it litical significance in the context of sembly were closely intertwined has a policy of peace.... I know that Israeli-Egyptian relations, and, in with the preparations for the upcom- our Arab neighbors generally, and particular, the growing conflict over ing NPTREC. This sparring pro- clearly Egypt, know that Israel the nuclear issue. Egyptian govern- vided a prelude to the intense debate doesn’t have any belligerent inten- ment officials and the press (both 12 that took place during the conference tions....” government and opposition) used in New York. Mousa’s meetings in Jerusalem Weizman’s visit to emphasize the marked the beginning of a new and demands for Israel to join the NPT. The NPTREC in the Context of more intense phase of the conflict. The intensification of the Egyptian Egyptian-Israeli Relations This period included frequent bilat- campaign led to internal debates eral or multilateral meetings, as well By the end of 1994, the Arab-Is- within the Israeli government regard- as a series of summits (two-way, ing possible responses. Rabin con- raeli peace process had made sub- four-way, and various other combi- stantial progress, with a number of sistently rejected proposals to nations) in Cairo, Washington, New change the Israeli position,17 and Is- new agreements and treaties. How- York, Europe, and Jerusalem, focus- ever, Egypt was not a party to any of raeli foreign ministry and military ing primarily on the Egyptian-Israeli intelligence officials prepared docu- these agreements, having made its conflict with respect to the NPT. peace with Israel in 1979. Thus, ments analyzing the long-term im- from mid-1994 until May 1995, Shortly after Mousa’s visit, Egyp- plications of the Egyptian policy, as when the NPTREC ended, Egyptian- tian officials declared that they well as on options for exerting Israeli relations were dominated by would seek the support of the Arab counter-pressure. Summaries, in- the nuclear issue. League and the non-aligned move- cluding the prospects for “punishing ment (NAM) in linking NPT exten- Egypt” and the possibility of war in In late August 1994, Egyptian sion to changes in Israeli policy.13 the next decade, were leaked and Foreign Minister Amre Mousa paid Going further, Egyptian leaders, in- published in the Israeli press.18 10 his first official visit to Israel. This cluding Mubarak, indicated that However, the Israeli response was was a highly charged and conflictive “Egypt would withdraw from the limited and indirect since, despite visit, beginning with Mousa’s initial NPT unless the issue of Israeli the conflict over the NPT, the refusal to visit the Yad Vashem Ho- non-membership is addressed spe- Mubarak government was honoring locaust Memorial, which is an impor- cifically in the NPT Extension Con- the security aspects of the 1979 tant part of official visits for all ference.”14 There was a great deal treaty, which was viewed as prefer- diplomats and official guests. From of confusion in the Egyptian policy, able to likely alternatives in Egypt the beginning, Mousa clearly stated particularly in statements made by (such as a fundamentalist Islamic that this visit was focused solely on Mubarak. At one point, Mubarak regime). Some Israeli officials saw Egypt’s demand that Israel sign the stated “the day Israel signs, I will the Egyptian campaign on the NPT NPT. A number of Israeli analysts sign” and “Egypt will not renew its as domestically driven. Mubarak commented on Mousa’s insensitivity signature” on the NPT if Israel re- was perceived as under internal in efforts to avoid Yad Vashem and fuses to sign.15 Other sources dis- threat, and the hostility to Israel confrontation with the Holocaust, and cussed the possibility that “Egypt is (known as the “Cold Peace”) and the links between this and the Egyp- contemplating withdrawing from the pressures on the NPT issue were tian pressures to “strip Israel of its Treaty or ‘suspending’ its member- partly interpreted in this context.19 11 weapon of last resort.” The issue ship,” while Mousa stated that “All

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 19 Gerald M. Steinberg

Nevertheless, the rhetoric of the Egypt over the nuclear issue would terial production cut-off, as being conflict escalated, and following the weaken support in Israel for conces- supportive of the Egyptian position, leak of the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s sions and so-called “security and American officials spoke of an assessments regarding the possibil- risks.”23 If Egypt, which was the first Israeli “gesture” to satisfy Egypt.31 ity of war, the Egyptians responded state to sign a peace treaty with Is- However, as the conflict over the in kind. In January 1995, rael, exhibited such hostility, aligned NPT began to affect the peace pro- Ruz-El-Yusuf, one of Egypt’s lead- itself with Syria, and placed primary cess adversely, the United States ing weeklies, carried a lead article emphasis on “stripping Israel of its started to pressure Egypt to alter its on the prospects of war with Israel.20 deterrent,” Peres noted that many position on NPT extension, and the Retired General Farik Sa’ad Eldin Israelis would question the wisdom focus shifted from conflict between Shazli, who led the Egyptian mili- of continuing the process.24 As a Israel and Egypt to an Egyptian- tary in the 1973 War and is a major result of this assessment, Peres ac- American confrontation. member of the opposition, was tively sought an accommodation with quoted extensively. He declared: Egypt that would remove the issue THE THREAT TO NPT “The combined weaponry possessed from the agenda.25 He noted that the EXTENSION by the Arab states today exceeds that solution “does not include Israel sign- of Israel, if all of these weapons were ing the treaty,” but rather was based In early 1995, some officials in the directed against Israel the Arab on less far-reaching (and undis- U.S. government estimated that states would defeat Israel.” Amin closed) policy changes that would there were 80 to 100 nations favor- 32 Elhawidi, former Egyptian Minister satisfy the Egyptians and defuse the ing indefinite extension. Although of War and Head of General Intelli- conflict. In his annual address before the extensive American effort had gence and another opposition figure, the U.N. General Assembly, Peres insured that some of the traditional stated: “I expect war with a certainty explicitly presented Israel’s vision of major NPT critics would be support- because the agreements which have “A Middle East which will be ive (Mexico had just received mas- been signed and are being signed nuclear-free, missile-free, hunger- sive emergency financial aid, and the today lead to war.”21 This exchange free,discrimination-free, tyranny- NAM was divided), the outcome 33 did not contribute to the Middle East free.”26 His remarks at the Nobel was still in doubt. Proposals in- peace process or the normalization Prize award ceremony a few months cluded the establishment of a dead- of relations. later contained similar language.27 In line for nuclear disarmament, universality, demands (particularly During this period, meetings be- the next month, a series of meetings between Israeli and Egyptian officials from Iran) for greater and “non-dis- tween Egyptian and other Arab lead- criminatory” access to nuclear tech- ers also focused on the issue of Israel focused on various compromise pro- posals to defuse the conflict.28 How- nologies, specific and binding security and the NPT. On December 28 and assurances, the unresolved problem 29, 1994, Mubarak met with Saudi ever, Egypt continued to insist on a specific Israeli commitment to sign of North Korea, and safeguards fail- Arabia’s King Fahd and Syrian 34 29 ures in the case of Iraq. President Hafez el-Assad in Alexan- the NPT, and Israel refused. The dria. In their communique, the lead- growing conflict between Israel and Forty non-aligned states were still ers called for Israeli withdrawal from Egypt began to impede the broader uncommitted, including many Arab the Golan Heights and a return to the Middle East peace process, particu- and Islamic states. While the United pre-1967 borders, while they en- larly with respect to public support States sought indefinite and uncon- dorsed the Mubarak Initiative and for “security risks” and territorial ditional extension, a group of 14 30 the “immediate” negotiation of a withdrawal in Israel. non-aligned nations, led by Indone- Middle East Nuclear-Weapons-Free The stage and the leaders shifted sia, called for “rolling extensions” Zone (MENWFZ).22 to Washington, where the conflict of 25 years, linked to completion of continued, along with efforts by the a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Israeli Foreign Minister Peres was (CTBT) and progress towards closely identified with the peace pro- U.S. government to mediate. The Mubarak government interpreted nuclear disarmament among the five cess, and he expressed concern that nuclear powers.35 Other options in- the growing political conflict with U.S. policies, such as the Bush Ini- tiative and interest in the fissile ma- cluded shorter rolling extensions with

20 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 Gerald M. Steinberg different conditions. Some analysts process would reduce political sup- manded that “Israel sign this treaty and policymakers were concerned port in Israel for concessions and and put its nuclear installations un- about the possibility of a “hung con- “security risks.” der the system of guarantees of the ference” in which the outcome would As a result, the United States be- International Atomic Energy 36 46 remain unresolved. gan to pressure Egypt to accept the Agency.” In the period preceding the open- proposed Israeli gestures and en- On February 12, 1995, the lead- ing of the NPTREC, a number of dorse NPT extension. Under- Sec- ers of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the analysts called for pressure on Israel retary of State Lynn Davis stated, Palestinians met in Washington for to “shut down its Dimona reactor,”37 “we are impressing upon Egypt our talks on a number of issues linked based, in part, on the expectation that desire to have them support an in- to the peace process, particularly on Egypt and some other Arab states definite extension,” while noting that the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian track. would attempt to link extension of the United States did not realistically However, the Blair House summit the NPT to Israeli acceptance of expect Israel to sign the NPT or to was dominated by the Egyptian cam- curbs on its program.38 Some “take steps inconsistent with how paign. In the opening session, For- policymakers and analysts were con- they see their security today.”44 As- eign Minister Mousa delivered a cerned that the appearance of a sistant Secretary of State for Near vitriolic attack on Israeli policy, de- “double standard” in U.S. policy on Eastern Affairs Robert Pelletreau manding to know when Israel would the NPT and Israel would compli- went to Egypt in late January and sign the NPT, and tabled a document cate NPT extension.39 John reportedly warned Egypt that some that included allegations of environ- Simpson noted concerns that “lack members of Congress had raised the mental dangers to Egypt resulting of any movement towards a possibility of reviewing American aid from the Israeli reactor complex. ZFWMD [zone free of WMD] to Egypt ($2.2 billion per year) in light Peres again responded, declaring: would result in a refusal by Arab of the Egyptian threats to obstruct “Since Camp David, there has been governments to accept a long exten- NPT extension.45 However, Osamah no change in our position and the sion of the NPT.”40 Mitchell Reiss El Baz, special advisor to President distance between Dimona and Egypt warned that the Israeli nuclear pro- Mubarak, dismissed the prospects of has also not changed.”47 In an inter- gram would be a central issue, and a cut in U.S. aid. The Egyptians were view with the London-based paper that, in the absence of U.S. pressure aware that both Israel and the United El Hayat, Mubarak was quoted as on Israel to close Dimona, “the con- States were loathe to do anything that saying that “Egypt will sign the NPT cerns of Arab parties may dominate might weaken the Mubarak regime when Israel does,” and claimed sup- the Review Conference.”41 In addi- and lead to increased support for radi- port from Syria and a number of tion, some argued that the confer- cal Islamic groups seeking to over- Persian Gulf states.48 The summit ence provided an opportunity to “cap throw the Egyptian government. concluded just as the other such ef- the nuclear capabilities” of the three Egypt intensified its efforts to gain forts had, without an agreement, and 42 threshold states. support from the Arab states and the issue remained unresolved. The However, by early 1995, it had called a special meeting of the 22 crisis in the relations between Israel become clear that Israel was going members of the Arab League to be and Egypt intensified, and became to accept neither the Egyptian de- held on March 23 with the goal of personalized, with Rabin referring to mand that it sign the NPT nor pro- gaining support for linking NPT ex- “a bad wind blowing from the Egyp- 49 posals to close Dimona. Israel tension to Israeli accession. On Feb- tian foreign ministry.” rejected the assertion that Dimona ruary 6, 1995, a preliminary meeting Egypt’s efforts to gain support in was “nearing the end of its operat- of the foreign ministers of the eight the Arab League for major Israeli ing life,”43 noting that the small re- “ Declaration” states— policy concessions led the U.S. gov- actor is not technically comparable Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Kuwait, ernment to undertake what was de- to much larger, power reactors, de- Oman, , and the United scribed as “a concerted diplomatic signed earlier than Dimona. It was Arab Emirates—officially endorsed counter-offensive” focusing on the also apparent that pressures in this the Egyptian hard line. In their final Gulf Cooperation Council and other direction in the context of the peace statement, they repeated the de- moderate Arab states threatened by

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 21 Gerald M. Steinberg

Iraq and Iran. According to reports, continued his efforts to work out a further elaboration of the Israeli po- American representatives stressed formula with Egypt before the sition on the MENWFZ, emphasiz- the link between the policies of these NPTREC’s opening. According to ing the development of a system of states and the continued alliance with press reports, in late February, in yet mutual inspection and comparing this the United States, as well as the re- another meeting (this time in Paris), with the discredited NPT/IAEA veri- lation between NPT extension, the Peres had presented a more specific fication system.55 However, while security of these states, and the sta- version of the Israeli policy, pledg- the Israelis might have felt that the bility of the region. This was similar ing to “begin negotiation of a gap was closing, no such evaluation to the successful American strategy MENWFZ two years after bilateral came from Cairo. on the Chemical Weapons Conven- peace agreements are signed with all On March 23, 1995, Egypt hosted tion (CWC) in 1993, when the Egyp- states, including Iran.” But Foreign a special full meeting of the Arab tian government sought to forge an Ministry proposals to agree to dis- League ministers, which was de- Arab block that would remain out- cussions of the proposed signed to create a unified position side the treaty, and to link the posi- MEWMDFZ in the ACRS talks for the NPTREC. This would have 53 tions of Arab states on the CWC to were reportedly rejected by Rabin. served as a nucleus to gain wider the Israeli position on the NPT. De- Although Peres presented this as support of the members of the NAM. spite the Egyptian effort, many other another gesture to end the impasse, Vice President Al Gore arrived in Arab states have signed the CWC. it was apparently not understood as Cairo at the same time and strongly The leaders of the Persian Gulf and such, and the conflict, as well as ef- reiterated the U.S. policies in direct North African states reportedly forts to resolve it, continued. On and blunt talks with President agreed that the primary sources of March 21, Yosi Beilin, a member of Mubarak and the representatives of regional instability and insecurity the Israeli cabinet and Peres protege, the other Arab states attending the came from the nuclear, chemical, and went to Cairo again, and spoke about Arab League meeting. As a result biological weapons programs of Iran the goal of a nuclear-weapon free of the American pressure and the and Iraq, and that the indefinite ex- Middle East—after the achievement interests of some of these states to tension and strengthening of the NPT of a lasting peace, and that both ob- distance themselves from the Egyp- regime were in their own national in- jectives could be negotiated “in par- tian attempt to dominate the forum, 50 terest. allel.” (This was a major departure, the meeting did not endorse the The full-scale American campaign since Israeli official policy has and Egyptian effort, and the Secretary of to obtain consensus in the NPTREC continues to be that detailed nego- the Arab League declared that “some continued, and in early March, Sec- tiations can only begin after peace in Arab countries are leaning toward retary of State the region has been fully achieved.) signing without an Israeli commit- visited the region. Following the Beilin also noted that the concrete ment to do so.”56 meeting with Christopher, Mubarak language and commitment to join a The extensive discussions be- softened his position, declaring that MEWMDFZ, included in the Israeli tween the United States and Egypt he did not expect Israel to “demolish ACRS paper on the goals of the pro- continued until the opening of the or remove everything now,” but that cess, marked a major change in NPTREC. From April 5 to 9, it was reasonable to expect an an- policy. Beilin clamed, Mubarak was in Washington, and, It was the first comprehen- nouncement of “a timetable or some- once again, the Egyptian policy on 51 sive Israeli paper about this thing on any concrete steps.” A issue and I believe that the the NPT and Israel was a major fo- few days later, Mubarak announced common denominator be- cus of official discussions and me- that Egypt would not withdraw from tween Egypt’s view about it and the Israeli one is not a dia appearances. The U.S. the NPT, even if Israel refused to very small one. I think the government, including President Bill change its policy. Mubarak indicated idea of an agreement on a Clinton, continued to seek an Egyp- that while protesting the Israeli posi- nuclear-free zone, which is an idea of President tian agreement to end the efforts to tion, Egypt would support exten- block indefinite extension or link its 52 Mubarak, is something mu- sion. tual.54 policies to explicit condemnation of

Throughout this period, Peres had A few days later, Peres presented a Israel. In his meetings with Clinton,

22 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 Gerald M. Steinberg

Mubarak again pledged that Egypt block indefinite extension, but, as and other supporters of extension would not disrupt the conference and Paul Power has noted, “it could hope sought to avoid a divisive vote and “would not be lobbying other govern- to gain something on the universal- split decision that might have weak- ments against extension of the ity issue, because the United States ened the role of the NPT.) Although NPT.”57 In contrast, Mousa, who was dedicated to avoiding a visible this proposal would have gained a accompanied Mubarak, declared that split on permanent unqualified exten- majority (it was cosponsored by over Egypt had not modified—and would sion.”59 In his opening statement, 100 states), the Canadian text may not modify—its demands, which, he Mousa declared that, not have gained consensus approval. stated, were: 1) Israeli agreement, the treaty as it stands today In contrast, a group of NAM states and in view of the absence prior to the NPTREC, to discuss a of accession to it by a neigh- proposed rolling extensions for 25 nuclear-free Middle East in “the next bor with well known nuclear years.61 South Africa then introduced meeting” of the ACRS negotiations; capabilities, is incapable of a draft of principles linked to indefi- safeguarding the national 62 and 2) Israel’s commitment to joini security of Egypt. Conse- nite extension. The language was the NPT within two years of signing quently, Egypt finds itself largely based on U.S. draft propos- peace treaties with Syria and Leba- today in a position where she als, and, because of the South Afri- 58 cannot support the indefinite non. The apparent contradiction extension of the Treaty. can government’s prestige, also between Mubarak and Mousa raised He even raised the option of “sus- gained the support of the non-aligned questions regarding Mubarak’s au- pending the Conference for a rea- movement. This had the effect of se- thority and divisions in the Egyptian sonable period of time.” Other Arab verely weakening Egyptian leverage leadership, or perhaps a division of states, particularly Syria, supported and its potential for gaining the sup- labor between the leaders. the Egyptian position. In his opening port of the NAM in linking some ac- Apparently, the Egyptian effort to statement, the Syrian foreign minis- tion specific mention to Israel. forge a unified Arab position prior ter attacked the Israeli policy, and Although officials of the U.S. gov- to the NPTREC was faltering, as was declared that “Syria cannot agree to ernment reported that Mubarak Cairo’s attempt to speak for and rep- the extension of the NPT unless Is- promised Clinton that Egypt would resent the Arab world. Egypt still had rael accedes to the Treaty and sub- not disrupt the extension process by the support of Syria, and would work jects its nuclear installation to seeking to isolate Israel, the Ameri- closely with the Syrian delegation in international inspection.”60 He re- can and other delegations expected the meetings in New York. But with- peated the Egyptian call for suspen- that to obtain complete consensus, out firm backing from the Gulf States sion of the conference “to correct some form of compromise with the and North Africa, the Egyptian posi- the loopholes in the Treaty.” As a Egyptian demands would be neces- tion was much weaker than had been non-signatory, Israel itself did not sary. The U.S. delegation had been sought. This also weakened Egypt’s participate formally in the conference working with delegates from some capability to forge alliances or gain but did maintain low-level represen- moderate Arab states on such a com- the support of other states in the tation based on its permanent U.N. promise resolution. There was also NAM in the attempt to link NPT delegation. some hope that the Egyptians would extension to a change in the Israeli The conference began with eight view the language in the other reso- policy. days of general debate, in which 116 lutions and reports, cited above, as speeches were made. After the gen- an acceptable achievement. How- THE MEETINGS IN NEW eral debate, the three Main Commit- ever, the efforts to devise a compro- YORK (APRIL-MAY 1995) tees (Disarmament, Safeguards, and mise failed and the Egyptian Peaceful Uses) as well as other com- delegation demanded that Israel be Despite Mubarak’s pledges to explicitly singled out. On May 9, just Clinton and declarations in Wash- mittees, held meetings. There were also numerous informal consulta- one day before the scheduled adop- ington, the Egyptian-Israeli confron- tion of the three main conference ex- tation continued through the tions among the delegates. On May 5, Canada presented a proposal for tension documents and three days NPTREC, which opened in New before the end of the conference, York on April 19, 1995. By this time, a consensus decision to extend the NPT indefinitely. (The United States Egypt and 13 other members of the it was apparent that Egypt could not Arab League (Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq,

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 23 Gerald M. Steinberg

Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab national capitals, most of the Arab acclamation (explicitly endorsed by Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco, cosponsors indicated that their rep- 111 of the participating 178 nations) Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, resentatives were prepared to sup- that extended the NPT indefinitely.67 and Yemen) tabled a draft resolution port the consensus for NPT The conference also adopted docu- focusing explicitly on Israel. The text extension, regardless of the response ments on “Strengthening the Review called for Israel’s immediate accep- to the Middle East resolution. Process” and on “Principles and tance of the NPT and IAEA safe- Based on these discussions, the Objectives for Nuclear Non-Prolif- guards, and sought to link the U.S. delegation prepared an alterna- eration and Disarmament.” They consensus on the South African tive Middle East resolution, which, addressed general issues, but had package to endorsement of this in marked contrast to the Egyptian specific importance with respect to draft. Egypt insisted that its resolu- proposal, included a specific en- Israel and the Middle East. These tion be adopted prior to the formal dorsement of the peace process and resolutions emphasized the goal of decision on the NPT extension, linked the MEWMDFZ to this pro- universality and provisions for a thereby complicating and delaying cess. Israel was not mentioned by strengthened review process, con- the overall conference activities and name (although the report produced sisting of an annual 10-day prepara- 63 threatening to block consensus. by Committee III and attached to the tory committee meeting in each of The U.S. government recognized final document named all non-NPT the three years preceding a review that approval of such a document states). The objectives of this deci- conference every five years. Among would have a negative impact on Is- sion were not stated explicitly, but the stated objectives of this process raeli policy in the peace process, were apparently designed to provide were the consideration of “prin- without changing Israeli policy with Egypt with something to show for ciples, objectives and ways in order respect to the NPT or other arms its efforts, avoid embarrassment for to promote the full implementation limitation measures. This move, just Mubarak and a deep rift in relations of the Treaty, as well as its univer- before the scheduled end of the con- between Cairo and Washington, sality,” thereby insuring that the Is- ference, was a direct violation of the while also not pushing Israel into a raeli exceptionality would continue pledges Mubarak had made to corner. to receive attention. In addition, the Clinton, and according to reports, the resolutions specified the goal of At this point, a sponsor (or spon- reaching agreement on a CTBT and U.S. president called Mubarak from sors) had to be found, and the three Moscow “and warned him against a fissile material production cut-off NPT depository states (the United 68 64 agreement. Israel was active in playing such a dangerous game.” States, Britain, and Russia) agreed Members of the U.S. delegation met negotiations for the CTBT, and to play this role. Although some ana- backed this treaty. However, cut-off intensively with the Arab delega- lysts later called this “an inspired tions, and during a caucus of the proposals are problematic for Israel, political manuever” by Egypt and as they are viewed as “back-doors” Arab states, many of the co-sponsors the Arab states,66 the role of the de- declared that they would not vote for to the NPT and external inspection pository states was the result of a on the activities at the Dimona fa- this resolution, leaving Egypt and proposal from a member of the Syria isolated. cility. As noted, the Israeli govern- American delegation, and the politi- ment has not taken an official position At this stage, various other pro- cal implications were apparently not on the cut-off, but Rabin termed posals were discussed, including one recognized at the time. (Israel, as a these proposals “unworkable.”69 that would have linked Israel with non-NPT signatory, is not bound by other non-NPT signatories in the re- any of the resolutions, although U.S. At the same time, these resolu- gion (Oman and the United Arab officials contacted Israeli tions were also seen as providing Emirates), but the representatives of policymakers in Israel and sought support for the Israeli position, par- these states objected, reportedly be- their response to some of the events ticularly with respect to the direct cause they did not want to be in- and resolutions.) negotiation of a regional NWFZ cluded with Israel.65 After another among the countries. Section five of Regarding the extension itself, the the set of principles calls for the “es- round of intense consultations, and South African draft led to the nego- phone calls from Washington to the tablishment of internationally recog- tiation of a declaration adopted by nized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on

24 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 Gerald M. Steinberg the basis of arrangements freely ar- ACRS process.71 However, there tion was articulated to the public at rived at among the States of the re- was no official confirmation from both the domestic and international gion.” Section six mentions the either government. Shortly thereaf- levels. This is a major change from Middle East specifically in this con- ter, Mousa and other Egyptian offi- past policy, when Israel’s leaders text, noting that the “specific char- cials resumed their campaign, and generally avoided any public discus- acteristics of each region” should be continued to block efforts to resume sion of its nuclear or deterrent poli- considered. the ACRS with discussions on non- cies and sought refuge behind The conclusion of the NPTREC nuclear weapons limitations and standard phrases that provided no ex- marked the end of a major phase in CBMs. In addition, public pressure planation or justification. Rabin, the conflict over Israel’s NPT status on Israel continued. In November Peres, and other Israeli leaders and its ambiguous nuclear deterrent. 1995, after an earthquake in the Red clearly articulated the links between The conference ended with a unani- Sea, Mousa said that “Egypt was the maintenance of the nuclear ca- mous decision to extend the NPT following up” reports that this might pability and the continued threats to indefinitely, without a change in Is- be related to Israeli nuclear tests, and national survival, combined with the raeli policy or status. However, the this theme has been repeated fre- military, geographic, and demo- 72 provisions in the formal decisions quently by Egyptian officials. Thus, graphic asymmetries in the region. and in the Middle East Resolution the conflict between Egypt and Is- Perhaps the clearest example of this left the opportunity for continuing rael over the status of the Israeli new formulation, developed in the the conflict in future review confer- nuclear deterrent continued after the course of the conflict with Egypt, ences and other meetings. Indeed, NPTREC, much as it had before. was presented by Ehud Barak, shortly immediately after the end of the con- after he became foreign minister in ference, the Egyptian government AN ISRAELI VIEW OF January 1996. In the absence of indicated that the issue was far from LONG-TERM proven and reliable regional peace resolved, and that the conflict would IMPLICATIONS agreements, Barak declared, “Israel’s nuclear policy, as it is per- continue. In a meeting of the plenary For both Washington and Jerusa- of the Conference on Disarmament ceived in the eyes of the Arabs, has lem, the outcome of the NPTREC not changed, will not change and (CD) in June, Egypt’s Ambassador was a major diplomatic achieve- Mounir Zahran urged implementation cannot change, because it is a fun- ment. The United States succeeded damental stand on a matter of sur- of the Middle East Resolution, and in obtaining an indefinite extension called for “concrete actions” in its vival which impacts all the without causing divisions or dissen- generations to come.”73 implementation with respect to Is- sion among the signatories (although 70 rael. The process and conflict be- not quite the consensus or unani- The process that accompanied the tween Israel and Egypt disrupted mous support the administration had NPT extension, and the concomitant and set back the Arab-Israeli peace initially sought) and without a nega- increase in the active role of Israel process and would continue to do so. tive impact on other foreign policy in international organizations and fora Shortly after the assassination of objectives, most notably the Arab- dealing with arms control and non- Rabin in November 1995, Shimon Israeli peace process. Israel was proliferation—such as the CD and Peres, who became the prime min- able to maintain its nuclear deterrent the Organization for Security and Co- ister, met with Mubarak and Mousa posture while avoiding conflict with operation in Europe—enabled the in Egypt. Peres sought to strengthen the United States. (Indeed, their close government to consolidate and support for the peace process in Is- coordination had the effect of en- strengthen the domestic political com- rael by demonstrating improved re- hancing bilateral ties and increasing mitment to these policies. Despite lations with Egypt. In the wake of the understanding of each other’s its unconventional policies, Israel this meeting, Peres is reported to interests and objectives.) avoided the political and diplomatic have stated that he had received a isolation that they had feared and that The conflict also forced the Israeli had apparently been sought by Egypt. pledge from Mubarak for a year’s government to provide a rationale “cease fire” on the nuclear issue, and for the policy of nuclear ambiguity, In addition, the U.S. government resumption of cooperation in the and the underlying logic of this op- accepted the Israeli position that

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 25 Gerald M. Steinberg nuclear arms control and the status results were mixed, at best. The Resolution and the frequent review of the Israeli deterrent were inextri- Mubarak government did not suc- conferences provide mechanisms for cably linked to the Middle East peace ceed in its stated objective of forc- maintaining pressure on Israel, for process, and discussions of the ing Israel to accede to the NPT or seeking to isolate Jerusalem, and for former are dependent on substantial pledge future acceptance, and to giving the Egyptian government a progress in the latter. This link can place all nuclear facilities under cause around which to build domes- be seen in the language adopted by safeguards. As in the case of the tic legitimacy and claim inter-Arab the NPTREC in the resolution on the CWC, Egypt was unable to gain sus- leadership. Despite the outcome, Middle East and in formal state- tained support from the Arab states Egypt is able to claim a pivotal dip- ments issued by the U.S. State De- or recognition as the leader of the lomatic role in the region and gain partment.74 The United States and Arab world, even on this issue. In the attention of the United States. Israel also established a formal fo- various meetings of the Arab League Domestically, the role that Egypt rum for bilateral consultations on prior to the NPTREC, as well as dur- played in confronting both Israel and nonproliferation and arms control ing the conference itself, represen- the United States on this issue was issues in order to increase coordina- tatives of these states distanced very popular, thereby strengthening tion and prevent misunderstanding themselves from the Egyptian posi- the legitimacy of the regime.76 In this and conflict. tion. During the conference, South sense, the NPT conflict should be In a broader sense, the American Africa, and not Egypt, emerged as seen as only one issue, albeit the most policies adopted during this process the central broker between the ad- visible, in a series of Egyptian efforts reflect a shift from an exclusive em- vanced industrial states and the to assert dominance and slow the phasis on the universal nature of the NAM. acceptance of Israel in the region. NPT regime to a regional approach In addition, as a result of the con- The Egyptian government has also to arms control. For many years, the tinued and single-minded campaign, urged the Arab states to suspend re- United States had consistently the Egyptian government is seen by gional economic cooperation with placed primary or exclusive empha- many, both in the region and outside, Israel in the context of the sis on the combined NPT/IAEA as responsible for disrupting the Casablanca and Amman Economic framework. The policies adopted by peace process, although this may be Summits and the Barcelona Confer- the United States in the context of changing more recently under the ence (sponsored by the European the NPT extension process seem to government of Benjamin Union). Cairo has blocked progress demonstrate tacit acceptance of the Netanyahu. The hostility from in all of the multilateral working Israeli position that its nuclear poli- Egypt and the conflict generated groups, accused Israel of planting cies are linked to the regional secu- over this issue had a negative impact mines in the Sinai (this accusation rity environment, which is beyond on Israeli public opinion and reduced was later retracted), and strongly the scope of global regimes such as support for risk taking. Critics of protested Israeli-Turkish military 77 the NPT. The first steps in this pro- the Labor government’s policies ar- cooperation agreements. From the cess of change in the American ap- gued the high level of hostility from Israeli perspective, the multiplicity of proach to nonproliferation can be Egypt and attempts to isolate Israel, conflicts, and the stated Egyptian seen following the , and the 16 years after the peace treaty, were objective of “reducing Israel to its 78 realization that the effectiveness of negative precedents for proceeding ‘natural’ size,” indicate that Cairo’s the application of the NPT on a glo- with withdrawal from the Golan campaign on the NPT was not fun- bal basis was flawed in regions such Heights in order to reach a peace damentally motivated by threat per- as the Middle East.75 These changes agreement with Syria. Mousa’s Au- ceptions, but rather is a means of were expressed in the 1991 Bush gust 1994 visit to Israel, which fo- slowing the process of normalization Initiative, but then, the regional cused on the nuclear issue, was between Israel and other Arab framework was still closely coupled particularly important in this sense. states, in the effort to enhance Egypt’s own power in the region.79 to the NPT and IAEA. By 1995, this This does not mean that the out- link was much looser. For Egypt, the NPTREC, the ACRS come was a total defeat for Egyp- process, and the bilateral discussions From the Egyptian perspective, the tian diplomacy. The Middle East with Israel were not seen as the ba-

26 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 Gerald M. Steinberg sis for stability that would serve the supported by the national security mary settings for this conflict are interests of all states in the region, bureaucracy, the political leadership, likely to return to the bilateral and but rather an arena of political con- and the press. In the absence of fun- regional levels. flict in a broader zero-sum game. damental political changes in the re- There were other global and re- gion going far beyond the small steps gional factors that shaped Egyptian towards conflict resolution taken to policy: Iraq and Saddam Hussein, far, this is not likely to change. the end of the Cold War, a decline in Similarly, Egyptian policy and em- Egyptian influence in the Middle phasis on this issue are likely to con- 1 The research for this paper was supported by a grant from the Ihel Foundation; Yona Cymerman East and the Arab world due to the tinue, and indeed, have continued and Lea Rappaport provided research assistance. wider Middle East peace process, following the NPT extension deci- 2 Article X.2 of the NPT, which entered into and a waning of domestic political sion. The ACRS process is still fro- force in 1970, specifies that “Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a support for efforts to weaken Israeli zen, and Egypt and Israel maintain conference shall be convened to decide whether military capabilities and end the opposing positions in the United Na- the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed or fixed nuclear monopoly. Expectations of tions, IAEA, CD, and other interna- periods. This decision shall be taken by a major- support, particularly from the U.S. tional fora. The events leading up to ity of the Parties to the Treaty.” government, appear to have influ- and during the NPTREC reinforced 3 Judy Aita and Jacquelyn S. Porth, “Last-Minute Egyptian Move Sets Back NPT Conference enced the Egyptian perceptions. The the positions of the major actors, and Deadline,” (Washington, D.C.: United States available evidence indicates that the pattern of Egyptian demands, Is- Information Agency, NEA 306, May 10, until late 1994 or early 1995, the raeli resistance, and U.S. efforts to 1995). 4 For a general summary and assessment of the United States did not convey the contain the tensions and limit dam- NPTREC, see Tariq Rauf and Rebecca Johnson, message that it would not press Is- age to the political relationships in the “After the NPT’s Indefinite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime,” rael for concessions or compromise region is likely to be repeated in the The Nonproliferation Review 3 (Fall 1995). 80 to Cairo. By that time, the Egyp- 1997 PrepCom and in other fora for 5 See for example, Abdallah Hammudah and tian campaign was in full gear, and many years. Sawsan Abu Husayn, “Interview with Foreign Minister Amr Musa,” Al-Sharq Al-awsat (Lon- both domestic and regional political At the same time, the experience don), August 24, 1995, p. 7; in FBIS-NES-95- commitments had been made. In an from the 1995 NPTREC indicates 167 (29 August 1995), p. 9. area where policies change slowly, 6 Gerald M. Steinberg, “Middle East Arms Con- that Egyptian efforts to isolate Israel trol and Regional Security,” Survival 36 (Spring even if Egyptian leaders had decided on this issue—and the attempts to 1994). 7 The sessions of the ACRS are closed and infor- that the anti-Israel campaign was too link an end to the Israeli nuclear de- costly in terms of bilateral relations mation is limited. For a discussion of the pri- terrent capability to the continuation mary issues, see Alan Platt, ed., Arms Control and with Israel, the regional peace pro- of the NPT regime—do not have Confidence Building in the Middle East (Wash- cess, and relations with the United ington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1992); strong support from many Arab and Steven Speigel and David Pervin, eds., Practical States (and there is no indication that non-aligned states. Although these Peacemaking in The Middle East, Vol. I: Arms the major actors in Cairo reached conflicts will continue in the Control and Regional Security (New York: Gar- these conclusions), it would have land Publishing, 1995); Joel Peters, Pathways to PrepComs, NPT review confer- Peace: The Multilateral Arab-Israeli Talks (Lon- been difficult to suddenly abandon ences, and in the annual meetings of don: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996); and Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Middle its policies in the few months that the IAEA, their intensity will be re- remained before the NPTREC. East Arms Control and Regional Security Work- duced. Thus, they are unlikely to ing Group (ACRS),” in A. Makovsky, ed., This analysis suggests that in deal- disrupt the continuity of the global Building a Middle East Community: The Fu- ture of the Middle East Multilateral Peace Pro- ing with Egypt, U.S. government nonproliferation regime. cess (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute officials should be extremely wary for Near East Policy, forthcoming). Following the indefinite extension 8 of creating expectations in the future Mohamed Nabil Fahmy, “Egypt’s disarma- of the NPT, Egypt’s leverage on this ment initiative,” The Bulletin of the Atomic regarding pressure on Israel. As the issue declined. As a result, in the Scientists (November 1990), pp. 9-10. In 1978, evidence presented above indicates, President Sadat had sought to include agree- context of the NPT, the conflict be- ment on the Israeli nuclear capability in the the long-standing policy of nuclear tween Israel and Egypt on the status context of the Camp David Agreements that ambiguity is deeply ingrained in Is- of the Israeli nuclear program peaked led to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, but raeli security doctrine, and is widely this was rejected by the Israelis, and the issue in 1995, and in the future, the pri- was dropped for many years. See William

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 27 Gerald M. Steinberg

Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Poli- sions on Relations between Israel and Egypt; ernment Press Office, Jerusalem). tics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1986), p. Senior Official: ‘This is a Cold Peace’” (in 30 David Makovsky, “Ministry to air problems 222; also, Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, Hebrew), , November 25, 1994, p. A5. with Egypt,” Jerusalem Post, November 25, In the Eyes of the Arabs: Israel’s Nuclear Im- 19 Gerges, pp. 71-72. 1994, p. A-3; Alon Pinkus, “Egypt using NPT age (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv Univer- 20 Wail al Abrahsi, “General Saad al Shazli: dispute to slow normalization,” Jerusalem Post, sity Press, 1994). Numerically, the weaponry of the Arab coun- February 22, 1995, p.2; and “US: Egypt’s ‘no’ 9 Some of the other Arab participants also tries is capable of defeating Israel” (in Arabic), on NPT damaging ties,” Jerusalem Post, Feb- sought to include discussion of the Israeli Ruz el-Yusef, January 23, 1995, pp. 10-11. ruary 17, 1995, p. 1. nuclear policy in the context of CBMs, but 21 Ibid. 31 APS Diplomat, “Perry pressing Israel on with less fervor than in the case of Egypt. See 22 News, No. 18 (February nuclear treaty,” January 27, 1995, cited in Jentleson, “The Middle East Arms Control 17, 1995); “Egyptian, Syrian, and Saudi Leaders Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 18 (February and Regional Security Working Group Conclude Summit in Alexandria” (in Hebrew), 17, 1995); and Aluf Benn, “The U.S. Expects (ACRS).” Yediot Ahronot, December 30, 1994, p. 2. an Israeli Gesture to Insure Egyptian Support 10 Mousa had come to Israel before for short peri- 23 Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of for the NPT” (in Hebrew), Haaretz, Decem- ods in the context of the negotiations between Is- Nuclear Restraint,” International Security 19 (Fall ber 7, 1994, p. A4. rael and the Palestinians. 1994)) argues that domestic political and ideo- 32 CRS Issue Brief, January 5, 1995, p. 4; “Votes 11 Avi Beker, “Israel’s Long Corridor: Ambiguity logical differences between Israel’s major par- Lacking to Extend Nuclear Pact,” Reuter News and Nuclear Non-Proliferation,” Institute of the ties have led to conflicts over nuclear policy. Reports, January 24, 1995; “Israeli Question World Jewish Congress, Policy Forum, No. 7 While some individuals, such as Could Derail Treaty Renewal,” Inter Press Inter- (1995), p. 6. and some of his proteges, are reportedly more national News, January 26, 1995; all cited in 12 Joint press conference, Israeli Foreign Minister “willing to embrace a regime,” as Solingen Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 18 (February 17, Shimon Peres and Egyptian Foreign Minister claims, the evidence for the broader claim re- 1995). Amre Mousa (questions and answers in En- garding parties and ideologies is not supported 33 William Epstein, “Indefinite Extension— glish), Israel Information Service, Israel Min- by the evidence. While Peres made some iso- With Increased Accountability,” The Bulletin istry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, August 31, lated statements indicating greater enthusiasm of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 1995), p. 1994. for the concept of a Middle East NWFZ fol- 28. 13 Zeev Schiff, “Egypt Tries to Persuade Non- lowing implementation of comprehensive 34 John Simpson and Darryl Howlett, “The NPT Aligned Against Signing NPT” (in Hebrew), peace agreements, including Iran, this was far Renewal Conference: Stumbling toward 1995,” Haaretz, September 29, 1994, p. 1; Shlomo from the Egyptian demands for immediate Is- International Security 19 (Summer 1994), pp. 56- Shamir, “U.N. Decides to Call on Israel to Ac- raeli accession to the NPT. More importantly, 59. cede to the NPT” (in Hebrew), Haaretz, Novem- with the possible exception of Peres, between 35 Epstein, p. 27. ber 18, 1994, p. A4. 1977 (when Likud first formed a government) 36 Simpson and Howlett. 14 Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 18 (Febru- and 1995, there was no discernible difference 37 Mitchell Reiss, “The Last Nuclear Summit?” ary 17, 1995), citing Agence France-Presse between the nuclear policies of Labor (par- The Washington Quarterly 17 (Summer 1994), International News, January 15, 1995, Agence ticularly during the government of the late p. 11. France-Presse International News, January 16, Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin) and Likud-led 38 Zachary Davis and Warren Donnelly, “The 1995, and Reuter News Reports, January 24, governments. Many of the key policymakers Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Preparations 1995. in the Ministry of Defense (such as Director for a Vote on its Extension,” CRS Issue Brief, 15 Ibid. General David Ivri) and the Israel Atomic En- January 5, 1995, p. 3; also Reiss, p. 5. 16 Under the terms of the NPT, Egypt had two ergy Commission served under both govern- 39 Answer by Richard Falk, in “Symposium: options: it could vote against extension, but still ments. The Middle East: What Is Our Long-Term Vi- be bound by the majority, or it could withdraw in 24 Israel Line Computer News Service, Israel In- sion,” in Bruce Riedel, William Quandt, Rich- accordance with the provisions of the treaty. See formation Service, Israel Foreign Ministry, De- ard Falk, Middle East Policy 3 (December Davar, January 31, 1995, p. 3; Fawaz A. Gerges, cember 30, 1994. 1994), p. 12; Eugene Bird, “Israel Nuclear Pro- “Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour,” Foreign 25 Reuter News Reports, “Peres says nuclear row gram Blocks U.S.-Backed Non-Proliferation Affairs 74 (May/June 1995); “Egypt ties NPT with Egypt near solution,” February 2, 1995; Initiative,” cited by Paul Power in “Middle policy to Israeli Moves,” Reuter News Service, and Reuter News Reports, “Israel won’t join East Nuclear Issues in Global Perspective,” February 10, 1995; “Egypt Refuses to Budge on Nuclear Treaty—Peres,” January 11, 1995; Middle East Policy 4 (September 1995), p. Nuclear Non-proliferation Stand,” Agence cited in Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 18 202. France-Presse International News, February 12, (February 17, 1995). 40 Simpson and Howlett, p. 59. 1995; “Arabs won’t sign NPT without Israel,” 26 Address by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon 41 Reiss, p. 11. Reuter News Reports, February 16, 1995; “Egypt Peres to the 49th session of the United Nations 42 McGeorge Bundy, William J. Crowe, Jr., and Makes Israeli Adherence Condition of NPT Ex- General Assembly, September 29, 1994 (Israel Sidney D. Drell, Reducing Nuclear Danger (New tension,” Agence France-Presse International Information Service, Israel Ministry of For- York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), News, February 16, 1995; all cited in Nuclear eign Affairs, Jerusalem). p. 68-69; Roger Molander and Peter Wilson, Proliferation News, No. 19 (March 7, 1995), 27 Remarks by the Minister of Foreign Affairs “On Dealing with the Prospect of Nuclear p. 13. upon Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, Oslo, Chaos,” The Washington Quarterly 17 (Sum- 17 The White House, Office of the Press Secre- December 10, 1994 (Israel Information Service, mer 1994), pp. 36-37. tary, July 26, 1994, President Clinton, Prime Min- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem). 43 Reiss, p. 11. ister Rabin of Israel, and King Hussein of Jordan 28 David Makovsky, “Peres plans to meet with 44 Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 18 (February (transcript); and Zeev Schiff, “The Reinforced Mubarak over NPT crisis,” Jerusalem Post, Feb- 17, 1995). Nuclear Wall” (in Hebrew), Haaretz, January ruary 20, 1995, p. 1; and Nitzan Horowitz, 45 Akiva Eldar, “To Strike Egypt in the Pocket- 27, 1995, p. C1. “Egypt and Israel will resume contacts on the book” (in Hebrew), Haaretz, November 30, 1994, 18 Eytan Rabin and Aluf Benn, “Intelligence Re- NPT, After U.N. discussion” (in Hebrew), p. A1; Akiva Eldar, Aluf Benn, and news agen- port: Egyptian Arms Buildup Worrying” (in Haaretz, April 7, 1995, p. A3. cies, “Mubarak warned on possible US aid cut, if Hebrew), Haaretz, January 17, 1995, p. 1; Guy 29 Statement from Cairo Summit, February 3, Egypt obstructs NPT Extension” (in Hebrew), Bechor, “Foreign Ministry Will Hold Discus- 1995 (Israel Information Service, Israel Gov- Haaretz, April 4, 1995, p. 1; and Gerges, p. 73.

28 The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 Gerald M. Steinberg

46 Reuter News Reports, February 6, 1995, “Ar- dent Gore’s foreign policy aide Leonard Furth “Six Difficult Nuclear Questions” (in Hebrew), abs Take Stand Against Israeli Nuclear Privi- called Osamah El-Baz (Gore was the formal Haaretz, February 24, 1995, p. B2 . lege,” cited in Nuclear Proliferation News, No. head of the American delegation to the NPT 79 Segev, p. 5. 19 (March 7, 1995), p. 8. Extension Conference), and both reports may 80 Egyptian policymakers viewed many of the 47 Akiva Eldar, “Israel and the Palestinians be correct. statements and publications of American officials Agreed to End Closure only if Steps are Taken 65 Power, p. 204; and Segev, p. 5. and analysts regarding NPT universality and ex- Against Terror” (in Hebrew), Haaretz, Febru- 66 “Indefinite Extension of the Non-Prolifera- pressions of concern and critiques of the Israeli ary 13, 1995, p. 1. tion Treaty: Risks and Reckonings,” Report of policy of nuclear ambiguity as indications of sup- 48 Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 19 (March the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Confer- port for the Egyptian position. The 1991 Bush 7, 1995) p. 13. ence, New York, April 17 to May 12, 1995, Middle East Arms Control Initiative was seen 49 Ibid. Rabin’s statement reflects the view of Acronym, No. 7 (September 1995). as explicit endorsement of the 1990 Mubarak some but not all Israeli analysts and officials 67 Continued dissension and dissatisfaction by Initiative. See Yahya M. Sadowski, Scuds or that Mousa and Fahmy were the primary forces some states, including the Arab states, blocked Butter: The Political Economy of Arms Con- in this anti-Israel campaign, while Mubarak adoption of a formal Final Declaration and as- trol in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: acted to limit this tension, in response to sessment of the status of the NPT and its opera- Brookings, 1993) p. 41; and Moshe Zak, “The American requests and a recognition of the tions. This also occurred in the 1980 and 1990 Bush Plan: Between Shamir and Mubarak” (in importance to Egyptian interests and regional NPT Review Conferences (see Epstein, p. 29). Hebrew), Ma’ariv, May 31, 1991, p. B2. stability of fostering better relations with Is- 68 “Indefinite Extension of the Non-Proliferation rael. As a member of the Egyptian delegation Treaty: Risks and Reckonings,” Report of the in the United Nations in the 1980s, Mousa 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, developed a reputation for deep antipathy to- New York, April 17 to May 12, 1995, Acronym, wards Israelis; Fahmy’s father resigned as For- No. 7 (September 1995). eign Minister in protest to President Sadat’s 69 David Makovsky, “PM: Egyptian Model of Full peace initiative in 1977. Withdrawal Difficult To Change,” Jerusalem 50 Although Jordan formally tended to follow Post, September 24, 1995, p. 1. the Egyptian position, the 1994 Jordanian- 70 Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 27 (June 15, Israeli Peace Treaty calls for a Middle East 1995). An Egyptian view of the Conference was free from WMD, “both conventional and non- presented by Mahmoud Karem, Director of De- conventional,” without specific reference to partment of Disarmament Affairs, Egyptian Min- nuclear weapons or the NPT and IAEA. istry of Foreign Affairs, in “The 1995 NPT 51 Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 20 (March 21, Review and Extension Conference: A Third 1995). World Perspective,” a paper submitted to the 52 Ibid. Institut Francais des Relations International 53 Aluf Benn, “Israel will agree to Nuclear Free (IFRI), June 1995. Zone to Begin Two Years after Signing of Re- 71 Guy Bechor, “The Nuclear Scarecrow is Less gional Peace Agreement” (in Hebrew), Haaretz, Threatening” (in Hebrew), Haaretz, January 3, February 21, 1995, p. 1. 1996, p. B2; PPNN Newsbrief, (Fourth Quar- 54 Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 21 (April 4, ter 1995), p. 2, citing , 1995). December 17 and December 23, 1995. 55 Ibid. 72 Salamah Ahmad Salamah, “Closeup: Nuclear 56 Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 19 (March 7, Tests in al-Aqaba?” Al Ahram, November 28, 1995), p.13. 1995, p. 10; in FBIS-NES-95-233 (5 December 57 Press Briefing By Ambassador Robert 1995), p. 10. In contrast, the Egyptian Minister Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary Of State For Near of Science announced that the seismic evidence Eastern Affairs And David Satterfield, Assistant showed that the movement was the result of an Director For Near Eastern And South Asian Af- earthquake. fairs, The White House, Office of the Press Sec- 73 Aluf Benn, “Barak: Nuclear Policy Has Not and retary, April 5, 1995. Will Not Change” (in Hebrew), Haaretz, Decem- 58 Hillel Kuttler, “Moussa: Israel’s Fears of NPT ber, 31, 1995, p. A10. Baseless,” Jerusalem Post, April 5, 1995, p. 7. 74 United States Information Agency Near East/ 59 Paul Power, “Middle East Nuclear Issues in South Asia English Washington File, Tuesday, Global Perspective,” Middle East Policy 4 (Sep- June 25, 1996; Transcript: State Department tember 1995), p. 203. Briefing, Briefing from Acting State Department 60 Statement by Farouk Al-Shara, Minister of For- Spokesman Glyn Davies, Tuesday, June 25, 1996. eign Affairs of the Syrian Arabic Republic, to the 75 Gerald M. Steinberg, “Non-Proliferation: Time Conference of the State Parties to the Treaty on for Regional Approaches?” Orbis 38 (Summer the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 1994). April 19, 1996, New York. 76 For a discussion of the role of Egyptian domes- 61 Rauf and Johnson. tic factors in this process, see Gerges, pp.69-78, 62 Tom Zamora Collina, “South Africa Bridges and Guy Bechor, “The Egyptian Campaign on the the Gap,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/ NPT Increased the Popularity of Mubarak and August 1995), p. 30. Mousa on Cairo’s Streets” (in Hebrew), Haaretz, 63 Nuclear Proliferation News, No. 18 (February April 19, 1995, p. 2. 17, 1995); Power, p. 204; and Epstein, p. 28. 77 Arieh O’Sullivan, ” Denies Letting IAF 64 Shmuel Segev, “Egypt Moving Toward Anti- Train There,” Jerusalem Post, April 8, 1996. US Anti-Israel Policy,” Jerusalem Post, May 17, 78 Amre Mousa, cited in Davar Rishon (in He- 1995, p. 5. There are also reports that Vice Presi- brew) April 11, 1996; cited by Zeev Schiff,

The Nonproliferation Review/Fall 1996 29