Israel's Invasion of Lebanon: Background to the Crisis
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University of California Press and Institute for Palestine Studies are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of Palestine Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded on Sat, 26 Jan 2013 01:16:25 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions srael's Invasion of Lebanon: Background to the Crisis SHEILA RYAN* Ten days in June 1982 createda bitternew realityfor the worldto ponder. Israeli troops occupied the southern part of Lebanonand encircled West Beirut.The US evincedeven less officialdistress than it hadfollowing the Israeli attackon the Iraqinuclear reactor and bombing of Beiruta yearago. Announc- ing that it would be "premature"to ask that Israelitroops withdraw,the US continuedto extend massivepolitical and materialsupport for the invasion. The Arabstates manifested only mutedprotest, about whichthe US adminis- trationseemed quite unconcerned. As of earlyAugust, it is still too earlyto suggestwhat the denouementof the crisis mightbe, but it is none too soon to examinewhat led up to the crisis. What factorscombined to producea situationin which the US would give so much supportto and impose so little restrainton Israel? On a strategiclevel, two factorshave createdthe conditions in which the invasion took place. The official US antipathyto Palestiniannationalism representsa hostility of such depth as to be almostbaffling. In Israelthere has risen to power an extreme form of expansionistZionism intent upon the physicalobliteration of the Palestiniannational movement. US Strategic Antipathy To Palestinian Nationalism Over the last ten yearsthere have been recurrentwaves of expectation-or frommore than one quarter,of apprehension-that the US wason the brinkof acceding to the reality of Palestiniannationalism and of allowing it some continuedform of expression.The enormouseconomic and geopoliticalinter- ests of elites in the US were repeatedlyproffered as evidence that the US governmentwould find it imminentlynecessary to seizethe initiativeand foster *Sheila Ryan is a freelance researcherand writer, specializing in Middle East affairs, living in New York. This content downloaded on Sat, 26 Jan 2013 01:16:25 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 24 JOURNAL PALESTINE STUDIES the establishment of a Palestinian state, as a means of stabilizingthe region and thus enhancing its own long-term interests in the area. These interests were said to require close relations with the conservative oil-producing Arab states; and realpolitikwas supposed to dictate that the US would assert itself, shake off transitorydomination of its policies by Israel,and adopt a more "even-handed" perspective on the region in order to reduce polarization and enhance the internal security of its Arab allies. There are two striking characteristics of these predictions. The first is that they have never been fulfilled. The second is that they emanated from opposing points of the political spectrum: from Israelihawks and from Israelidoves; from Palestinian "rejectionists" who feared that the US was conspiring to impose a puppet "ministate," and from those in Palestinianpolitical life most optimistic about the potential of the US to assist their national cause; from conservative American geopoliticians and from radical American critics of imperialism. These predictions result in part from a failure to apprehend how deep- seated has been the US strategic hostility to Palestinian nationalism. Since the US first was confronted with the question of Palestiniannationalism as a policy issue, successive administrations have factored the Palestinians into the Soviet side of a global equation, and responded to the Palestinian movement as an element to be repressed rather than as a force to be coopted and placated to enhance US regional objectives. The major architect of this US policy edifice is Henry Kissinger; on his strategicfoundation rests the US Palestinian policy to this day. The foundation was laid in September 1970. In the spring of that year the Nixon Administration-and Kissinger as the President's National Security Adviser- came to realize that some of its fundamental premises about the Middle East would have to be re-evaluated. The assumption that the Palestinians could be dealt with as purely a refugee problem to be resolved in the context of negotia- tions between Israel and the Arab states was no longer tenable.' But within months of having first confronted the Palestinian issue in this form, Kissinger had fixed the Palestinian movement firmly in the global context of US conflict with the Soviet Union. Thus the rise of the fedayeenin Jordan was considered not in the context of regional history nor from the point of view of accommodating it, but rather in the framework of international threat, and from the perspective of suppressing it. In a graphicexample of this form of conceptualization, Kissingerwrites in his memoirs: Within a three-week period in September 1970 three major crises descended upon the Administration in corners of the world thousands of miles apart .... they all represented- I Henry Kissinger, The White House Years(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 573. This content downloaded on Sat, 26 Jan 2013 01:16:25 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS 25 or seemed to us to represent-different facets of a global Communist challenge. None could have succeeded without Communist impetus or encouragement. The Soviet military thrust into Egypt and its incitement of radical Arabs spawned the crisis in Jordan;the naval base in Cuba was a direct Soviet challenge; and Chile's election, for all its ambiguity, presented the possibility that a nation would join the Communist family by democratic processes for the first time in history.2 The Nixon Administration interpreted the suppression of the PLO in Jordanas a victory over the Soviet Union, at a time when the US was having very rough going indeed against what it perceived as "Soviet clients" in Indochina. The "forces of moderation had been preserved,"3in Kissinger'sview, and the forces of radicalism rolled back. The administration was acutely aware that this was beca~useIsrael was prepared to intervene with its full and considerable military force, at a time when US troops were stretched thin by the Vietnam war. September 1970 thus marked a watershed in two ways. It pitted the US in strategic opposition to the PLO, and it created a qualitatively new appreciation in the US administration of the Israeli military role in the region.4 This new appreciation rapidly took on a material form: US military assistance to Israel skyrocketed. There was a limited dissent within the administration to this kind of McCarthyism on a world scale. Elliot Richardson left his position as Under Secretaryof State (having devoted considerable attention to the Middle East) to assume a Cabinet post after having drafted a secret memorandum which urged, quite unavailingly, that the US find a means of accommodating Palestinian nationalism.5Pragmatic voices like Richardson's would continue to be raised in later administrations. They were never, however, heeded at the decision- making level. 2 Ibid., p. 594. 3 lbid., p. 6 31. 4 Several well-informed accounts of this period emphasize the anti-Soviet framework of formulation of Kissinger'spolicy on the Palestinians. See Nadav Safran, Israel:The EmbattledAlly (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1978), pp. 450-456; William Quandt, Decade of Decisions:American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, I967-1976. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 105-127; Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger(New York: Dell, 1974), pp. 226-241. 5 Richardson later recollected, "My last will and testament to the department on the Middle East was a paper which said in substance that the fallacy of the great-powerspolicy or the involved powers in dealing with the situation from the establishment of the state of Israel to date had been the failure to recognize that the aggrieved party were the Palestinians . .. Had the Palestinians been treated as if they were a sovereign state, even if they'd been reduced to the GazaStrip or an enclave on the West Bank where they could have a capital and a flag, the situation might have been faced up to. It seemed to me we had blown chance after chance ... My argument was that we would never achieve a real settlement in the Middle East that did not deal with the situation of the Palestinians, and I thought we ought to find ways of exploring what the solutions could be. Although we had, by neglect, created a situation in which there were very few moderate Palestiniansleft to talk to, I thought that we ought to set about establishing some contacts . ." Tad Szulc, The Illusionof Peace:Foreign Policyin the Nixon Years(New York: Viking Press, 1978), p. 312. This content downloaded on Sat, 26 Jan 2013 01:16:25 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 26 JOURNAL PALESTINE STUDIES The US pledge to Israel contained in the secret addendum to the second Sinai Disengagement Agreement was, consequently, not in substance a conces- sion to Israel since the US was not interested in dealing with the PLO in any event. The memorandum of understanding included a clause pledging that the US would neither recognize nor negotiate with the PLO unless the PLO recog- nized the state of Israel and accepted United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.