Ncc I W Eek Ly H Ig H Light

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Ncc I W Eek Ly H Ig H Light To combine with NCCI charter, NGOs members have to pay the fees 3 months in advance. Those that have not paid yet are kindly requested to pay contacting Giovanna: [email protected] EDITORIAL Issue 82 – September 20th, 2007 ------------------------------------------- Hidden under the spotlights Over the last few weeks, an old discussion is coming back amongst humanitarian actors, logically linked with a new interest of the International Community toward the Iraq Humanitarian Crisis: can humanitarian action on the ground become visible? How could we improve our visibility? Since 2003 this question has been recurrent, with issues ranging from the defence of humanitarian space (which is still a concern today) to the visibility of aid operations. Today, more and more actors are wondering what to do, especially in the three northern governorates where, while the daily GHT security is better than in the rest of the country, low visibility is still the norm for most of actors. I However, the question is sensitive, as organisations know what they would leave behind by L changing their profile, but have to identify, obviously, what might be the benefits, but also importantly the consequences. H In most countries in the world, visibility is a fait acquis, so this question is not as recurrent as it is in Iraq. Nor is it as sensitive as it is in Iraq. Indeed, in Iraq today, being visible or different is a threat for any civilian. Following the attacks against the humanitarian community in 2003, almost all G actors in Iraq started to operate through a “low profile” strategy. Today discussions and perceptions I are very different according to the location that the interventions take place. In Amman, where people are safe, the subject may be often considered more theoretical. At ground level, the subject is not theoretical when it comes to saving lives and protecting operations so that they can continue to H deliver relief. This is especially true in hot spots across the whole central area of Iraq. Y What does “low profile” strategy mean? L By the end 2003, a “low profile” strategy has been seen by most of actors as the only way to remain in Iraq to reduce targeting of aid workers. It means no communications on activities, on locations of K work, and sometimes not even on sectors of activities in which the organisation is engaged. Some organisations don’t even mention in their international communication or on their websites that E they are working in Iraq. It meant removing identifying stickers or flags, cutting visible links with E the international community, even often hiding the name of the organisation, and the field staff presenting themselves only as Iraqis. Since this strategy has been developed, it appears that it reached one of its objectives: while Iraq remains the deadliest country for aid workers in the world, there were not any other large scale W I attacks against the humanitarian community, as had occurred prior the implementation of this strategy. So it can be assumed that the death toll might have been worse without it. Nevertheless, the “low profile” is a double edged sword. Admittedly, it gave better security to aid workers, but it also made them and their operations nearly invisible. Yet invisibility is perceived de facto by donors and the international community as an absence life saving work, which is simply not the case. As a result, funds for humanitarian action in Iraq have been diminishing over time. So the question quickly came on the table: how can we increase visibility while continuing to keep a low profile strategy? Especially when donors, who are not visible in the country either, are expecting more publicity on the projects they fund; as the donors also have an obligation to their constituencies to NCC show what they are doing with their tax contributions. Indeed, low profile doesn’t necessarily mean complete invisibility. NCCI members requested to NCCI to improve their visibility by communicating on their behalf. In addition, communication may remain possible in some areas or sectors. Not through logos or stickers, but through press releases, reports that do not mention the location or scale of the projects, etc…or through any other innovative communication tool. This is important both inside and outside of Iraq. Why is visibility considered as necessary for humanitarian organisations? First, because it increases operational transparency, which is a fundamental principle of humanitarian aid programmes. Second, because it shows concrete action, which is indispensable to get funds. Third, because it often improves the humanitarian space, through an active communication with communities on the impartiality of the aid and the aid workers. Then there is also another reason that is often considered as not necessary and not often appreciated by aid workers: to make publicity for donors and partner organisations. Obviously, the way an organisation should or decides to communicate depends on lots of factors, including their own internal strategy and principles. But generally speaking, what has to be taken in consideration for more visibility in Iraq? Of course, when access to vulnerable people can be denied or aid workers killed, donor’s visibility requirements will come last. The first element to be considered when considering visibility options is the protection of civilians. Indeed, visibility may increase their vulnerability if they are become associated with international aid or the aid community. So any visibility should be discussed with communities in order to have their own perception and wishes. Second, but often the first concern of most of organisations, is the security of aid workers. As for the community, they know better that anyone what can be said or done regarding the communication on programmes they run on the ground, especially in hot spots, to keep them and the beneficiaries as safe as possible. Third, the security of the whole humanitarian community should be taken in consideration. Indeed, an organisation that feel safe enough in a community to communicate on their operations may, highlighting the kind of work they do, jeopardise another one working on the same sector but in an area where they have to keep a very low profile, or remaining totally hidden. Fourth, the local context where the organisation is working in. Indeed, while it may be possible to communicate on some programmes in some areas because of the security situation or the links built over time with the community, the same programme should remain invisible in another area, even in the same district. Undeniably, as so often in Iraq, it is impossible to define a global strategy for the whole country. Everything can change from one governorate to another, from one district to another, from one village to another, or from one sector to another. Finally. while in 2003 the decision to switch to the low profile strategy was taken collectively, nowadays the increased localisation of the context prevent such a cohesive strategy. Decisions on visibility strategies shouldn’t be imposed by an external partner. Every organisation working in the field should be the only decision maker for the types of visibility that they can use. Field staff are the only one that can understand what could be, locally, the possible repercussions or consequences of a visibility strategy, including very innovative ones, on the community, on their staff and, sometimes, on the entire humanitarian community. --------------------------------------- Salaam, NCCI Team NCCI Weekly Highlight 2 Issue 82 – 09/20/2007 ____________________________________ Humanitarian Updates From NCCI, NGOs’ reports from the field and UN agencies Advocacy - America's Deadly Shock Doctrine in Iraq Source: Alternet Document: Book Excerpt Date: September 14, 2007 Access: Open The following is an excerpt from Naomi Klein's new book, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Henry Holt, 2007). The unanticipated violence that now engulfs Iraq is the creation of the lethally optimistic architects of the war -- it was preordained in that original seemingly innocuous, even idealistic phrase, "a model for a new Middle East". The disintegration of Iraq has its roots in the ideology that demanded a tabula rasa on which to write its new story. And when no such pristine tableau presented itself, the supporter of that ideology proceeded to blast and surge and blast again in the hope of reaching that promised land. - U.N. Officials Say Countries Involved In Iraq War Are Not Doing Enough for Iraqi Refugees Source: International Herald Tribune Document: Book Excerpt Date: September 14, 2007 Access: Open Countries involved in the Iraq war have a "moral obligation to do more" to accommodate the growing number of Iraqis fleeing their homeland, the U.N. secretary-general said Tuesday, the same day his humanitarian chief accused the United States of not doing enough about the refugee crisis. Operational Humanitarian Space - Diyala the worst province for basic services Source: IRIN Document: Article Date: September 16, 2007 Access: Open Ahmed urged all parties to the conflict to understand the neutrality of NGOs and authorise the delivery of humanitarian aid to families as many have been living in poverty, lacking water and food supplies. Humanitarian Needs and Assistance - Iraq humanitarian crisis grows despite U.S. surge Source: Alertnet Document: Article Date: September 19, 2007 Access: Open Iraq's humanitarian crisis is getting worse and more Iraqis are fleeing their homes despite the recent surge of U.S. troops, aid workers say, with donors reluctant to fund support for millions of displaced. - The Nightmare Is Here Source: New York Times Document: Opinion Date: September 15, 2007 Access: Open We've heard from General Petraeus, from Ambassador Crocker, and on Thursday night from President Bush. What we haven't heard this week is anything about the tragic reality on the ground for the ordinary citizens of Iraq, which is in the throes of a catastrophic humanitarian crisis.
Recommended publications
  • Importance of Recycling Construction and Demolition Waste
    WMCAUS IOP Publishing 245 IOP Conf. Series: Materials Science and Engineering1234567890 (2017) 082062 doi:10.1088/1757-899X/245/8/082062 Postwar City: Importance of Recycling Construction and Demolition Waste Hanan Al-Qaraghuli, Yaman Alsayed, Ali Almoghazy Master's degree students at the Technical University of Berlin Campus El Gouna, Department of Urban Development [email protected] Abstract - Wars and armed conflicts have heavy tolls on the built environment when they take place in cities. It is not only restricted to the actually fighting which destroys or damages buildings and infrastructure, but the damage and destruction inflicts its impacts way beyond the cessation of military actions. They can even have another impact through physical segregation of city quarters through walls and checkpoints that complicates, or even terminates, mobility of citizens, goods, and services in the post-war scenario. The accumulation of debris in the streets often impedes the processes of rescue, distribution of aid and services, and other forms of city life as well. Also, the amount of effort and energy needed to remove those residual materials to their final dumping sites divert a lot of urgently needed resources. In this paper, the components of construction and demolition waste found in post-war cities are to be discussed, relating each one to its origins and potential reuses. Then the issues related to the management of construction waste and demolition debris resulting from military actions are to be discussed. First, an outlook is to be given on the historical example of Berlin and how the city was severely damaged during World War II, and how the reconstruction of the city was aided in part by the reuse of demolition debris.
    [Show full text]
  • Democratization in Iraq by Kate Lotz and Tim Melvin
    H UMAN R IGHTS & H UMAN W ELFARE Democratization in Iraq by Kate Lotz and Tim Melvin Prospects for political and economic success in Iraq are uncertain. The U.S.-led effort can fail in many ways, notably by a loss of political will in the face of terrorism and weak allies. On the other hand, success could change the shape of political institutions throughout the Middle East (Robert J. Barro in Business Week, April 5, 2004). In great numbers and under great risk, Iraqis have shown their commitment to democracy. By participating in free elections, the Iraqi people have firmly rejected the anti-democratic ideology of the terrorists. They have refused to be intimidated by thugs and assassins. And they have demonstrated the kind of courage that is always the foundation of self-government (George W. Bush, from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, February 7, 2005). Restructuring Iraq's political system will be laden with difficulties, but it will certainly be feasible. At the same time, the blueprint for Iraq's democracy must reflect the unique features of Iraqi society. Once the system is in place, its benefits will quickly become evident to Iraq's various communities; if it brings economic prosperity (hardly unlikely given the country's wealth), the postwar structure will gradually, yet surely, acquire legitimacy (Adeed and Karen Dawisha in Foreign Affairs, May/June 2003). With the war in Iraq over, Coalition forces are still present as the cultivation of Iraqi democracy is underway. Coalition-led democratization in Iraq will prove to be a lengthy and complex objective, but one which will be pursued until successfully accomplished.
    [Show full text]
  • From Dictatorship to Democracy: Iraq Under Erasure Abeer Shaheen
    From Dictatorship to Democracy: Iraq under Erasure Abeer Shaheen Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2015 ©2015 Abeer Shaheen All rights reserved ABSTRACT From Dictatorship to Democracy: Iraq under Erasure Abeer Shaheen This dissertation examines the American project in Iraq between 1991 and 2006. It studies the project’s conceptual arc, shifting ontology, discourses, institutions, practices, and technologies in their interrelatedness to constitute a new Iraq. It is an ethnography of a thixotropic regime of law and order in translation; a circuit through various landscapes and temporalities to narrate the 1991 war, the institutionalization of sanctions and inspection regimes, material transformations within the American military, the 2003 war and finally the nation- building processes as a continuous and unitary project. The dissertation makes three central arguments: First, the 2003 war on Iraq was imagined through intricate and fluid spaces and temporalities. Transforming Iraq into a democratic regime has served as a catalyst for transforming the American military organization and the international legal system. Second, this project has reordered the spatialized time of Iraq by the imposition of models in translation, reconfigured and reimagined through a realm of violence. These models have created in Iraq a regime of differential mobility, which was enabled through an ensemble of experts, new institutions and calculative technologies. Third, this ensemble took Iraq as its object of knowledge and change rendering Iraq and Iraqis into a set of abstractions within the three spaces under examination: the space of American military institutions; the space of international legality within the United Nations; and, lastly, the material space of Baghdad.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq, Iran and the Plan to Remake the Middle East
    @drseyyedhosseinatharilibrary Israel and the Clash of Civilisations Cook 00 pre i 21/11/07 06:25:30 Also by Jonathan Cook Blood and Religion The Unmasking of the Jewish and Democratic State ‘Jonathan Cook’s timely and important book on the Palestinians in Israel is by far the most penetrating and comprehensive on the subject to date. … This work should be required reading for policymakers and for everyone concerned with the magnitude of the tasks confronting the two parties and the international community.’ – Dr Nur Masalha, Senior Lecturer and Director of Holy Land Studies; Programme Director of MA in Religion and Confl ict, St Mary’s College, University of Surrey, and author of A Land Without a People and The Politics of Denial Cook 00 pre ii 21/11/07 06:25:30 Israel and the Clash of Civilisations Iraq, Iran and the Plan to Remake the Middle East JONATHAN COOK @drseyyedhosseinatharilibrary Pluto P Press LONDON • ANN ARBOR, MI Cook 00 pre iii 21/11/07 06:25:30 First published 2008 by Pluto Press 345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA and 839 Greene Street, Ann Arbor, MI 48106 www.plutobooks.com Copyright © Jonathan Cook 2008 The right of Jonathan Cook to be identifi ed as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 0 7453 2755 6 hardback ISBN 978 0 7453 2754 9 paperback Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data applied for This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources.
    [Show full text]
  • Télécharger Le COI Focus
    COMMISSARIAT GÉNÉRAL AUX RÉFUGIÉS ET AUX APATRIDES COI Focus IRAK La situation sécuritaire à Bagdad 14 novembre 2018 Cedoca Langue de l’original: néerlandais DISCLAIMER: Ce document COI a été rédigé par le Centre de documentation et de This COI-product has been written by Cedoca, the Documentation and recherches (Cedoca) du CGRA en vue de fournir des informations pour le Research Department of the CGRS, and it provides information for the traitement des demandes individuelles de protection internationale. Il ne processing of individual asylum applications. The document does not contain traduit aucune politique ni n’exprime aucune opinion et ne prétend pas policy guidelines or opinions and does not pass judgment on the merits of the apporter de réponse définitive quant à la valeur d’une demande de protection asylum application. It follows the Common EU Guidelines for processing internationale. Il a été rédigé conformément aux lignes directrices de l’Union country of origin information (April 2008) and is written in accordance with the européenne pour le traitement de l’information sur le pays d’origine (avril 2008) et conformément aux dispositions légales en vigueur. statutory legal provisions. Ce document a été élaboré sur la base d’un large éventail d’informations The author has based the text on a wide range of public information selected publiques soigneusement sélectionnées dans un souci permanent de with care and with a permanent concern for crosschecking sources. Even recoupement des sources. L’auteur s’est efforcé de traiter la totalité des though the document tries to cover all the relevant aspects of the subject, the aspects pertinents du sujet mais les analyses proposées ne visent pas text is not necessarily exhaustive.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq's Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and the Evolving Insurgency
    F Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457 -8746 Email: [email protected] Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence and the Evolving Insurgency Developments through late -January 2007 Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chai r in Strategy [email protected] With the Assistance of Emma Davies Updated: January 26, 2007 Cordesman: Iraq’s Sectarian and Ethnic Violence 1/26/07 Page 2 Executive Summary The insurgency in Iraq has become a “war after the war” that threa tens to divide the country and create a full -scale civil conflict. It has triggered sectarian and ethnic violence that dominates the struggle to reshape Iraq as a modern state, has emerged as a growing threat to the Gulf region, and has become linked to th e broader struggle between Sunni and Shi’ite Islamist extremism, and moderation and reform, throughout the Islamic world. Since its inception in the spring of 2003, the nature of the fighting in Iraq has evolved from a struggle between Coalition forces and former regime loyalists to a much more diffuse conflict, involving a number of Sunni groups, Shi’ite militias, and foreign jihadists, and which has spread to become a widespread civil conflict. In the process, the complex patterns of conflict in Iraq ha ve become a broad struggle for sectarian and ethnic control of political and economic space. Open violence has become steadily more serious, but it is only part of the story.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Download
    Charting the Territory: Space and Power in the Iraq War Stefka Hristova Michigan Technological University [email protected] Abstract I analyze the 2007 mapping and walling of Baghdad’s neighborhoods into ‘gated communities’ and ‘ghettos’ as a way of distinguishing and segregating Sunni and Shia ‘friends and ‘foes’. This walling was part of the Iraq War (2003-2010) in which a US-led military coalition invaded the state and framed its occupation as a project aimed to reconstruct Iraq into a modern democratic state. I situate this walling project within Foucault’s notion of gridding space, and argue that it exemplifies the materialization of the cell technique, and Carl Schmitt’s articulation of three modes of empty space in relation to territory. I argue that the walling process was an attempt to produce what I call a “continuous security”, predicated upon the assumption of a population´s characterized belonging to the circumnavigated territory. On the outskirts of the walls, however, the security measures remained to be discontinuous – risk here was high as the space was inhabited by a heterogeneous milieu. The outskirts, on the other hand, can be articulated as spaces of discontinuous security where “place-based” global sovereignty and uneven networks of places have come to characterize population. The imposition of the disciplinary mechanism of walling was met with resistance and had a disastrous impact on the life of Baghdad’s residents, as shown by Haifa Zagnana (2010) and soon was abandoned both by the US military and by the Iraqi government of that time. Keywords Walling; mapping; Iraq; war security Published with Creative Commons licence: Attribution–Noncommercial–No Derivatives Charting the Territory 940 Introduction BAGHDAD – The U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Urban Bridge: Walking Baghdad by Sarah Almaki a Thesis Submitted
    The Urban Bridge: Walking Baghdad by Sarah Almaki A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate and Postdoctoral Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Architecture. Carleton University Ottawa, Ontario © 2015 Sarah Almaki 1 The Urban Bridge Walking Baghdad 2 Acknowledgments This project would not be possible if it were not for my grandmother Wafiqa Alsaleh, and my aunt, Nawal Almaki, it was their life journeys that lead me to back to Baghdad. It would be impossible without my father, mother and sister; their relentless support gave me the strength I needed to pursue my passion. I would like to thank my friends and colleagues from all parts of the world, for each of them added a voice that helped relate my work back to the world. I would like to thank my professors Johan Voordouw, Roger Connah and Andrew King, without them questioning my stance on architecture I would not have found my way, and the Azrieli School of Architecture for opening its doors to inquiries of curious minds. This is a project of and for Baghdad; this city will forever be a part of me. 3 Contents Contents Acknowledgments Acknowledgments 2 3 3 Abstract Abstract 5 6 6 Introduction: City of Walls Introduction: City of Walls 9 10 10 1.Context: Reading Baghdad 1.Context: Reading Baghdad 13 14 14 1.1. Hard City 1.1. Hard City 13 14 14 1.1.1. The Nine Districts within the Walls 1.1.1. The Nine Districts within the Walls 15 16 16 1.1.2.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War
    Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775-3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457-8746 Web: http://www.csis.org/burke Email: [email protected] Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War: The Critical Problems and Failures the US Must Address if Iraqi Forces Are to Eventually Do the Job Anthony Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy With the Assistance of: Brian Burton George Sullivan Iskandar Jahja William D. Sullivan Revised, November 28, 2006 Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development 11/28/06 Page ii Executive Summary Iraq is already in a state of at least limited civil war, and may well be escalating to the level of a major civil conflict. What began as a small resistance movement centered on loyalists to the Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein has expanded to include neo-Salafi Sunni terrorism, become a broadly based Sunni insurgency, and now a broader sectarian and ethnic conflict. The current combination of insurgency, Sunni Arab versus Shi’ite Arab sectarian conflict, and Arab versus Kurdish ethnic conflict could easily cause the collapse of the current political structure, leading to a Shi’ite or Shi’ite-Kurdish dominated government, with strong local centers of power, and an ongoing fight with Iraq’s Sunnis. It could escalate to the break up of the country, far more serious ethnic and sectarian conflict, or violent paralysis. It has already led to widespread ethnic cleansing in urban areas by militias and death squads of all three major ethnic and religious groups.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Rights and Post-War Reconstruction
    H UMAN R IGHTS & H UMAN W ELFARE Human Rights and Post-War Reconstruction Introduction by Roberto Belloni Lecturer in International Politics Queen's University Belfast The expression “post-war reconstruction,” commonly adopted by both practitioners and academics, is somewhat misleading. Reconstruction does not entail rebuilding or return to the pre– war state of affairs as the expression seems to suggest. Rather, reconstruction involves difficult multiple transitions: from war to peace, from a state to a market economy, and from authoritarianism to democracy. Each transition taken by itself would be daunting. Taken together, they can be almost overwhelming. The task is complicated by the continuing influence of wartime elites, donors' short attention span, and changing global priorities. Notoriously, support for post-war reconstruction is not driven by the needs on the ground, but from the interests of international organizations and bilateral donors engaged in the process. For example, the average Bosnian citizen received much more aid than the average Afghan, despite Afghanistan's much lower pre-war levels of economic and social development. As the cases included in this Review Digest confirm, the process of reconstruction has a contradictory impact on human rights. Often for the first time citizens of war-torn societies are given the possibility to enjoy political and civil rights. Simultaneously, however, important limitations on individual rights are imposed. International officials working to further democratization and state-building see the rule of law and the respect of human rights as a barrier rather than bedrock for their actions. A form of benevolent autocracy—most evident in the Balkans—is seen as indispensable to prepare the local population for democratic self-governance and the rule of law.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War: Can Iraqi
    Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457 -8746 Web: http://www.csis.org/burke Email: [email protected] Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War: Can Iraqi Forces Do the Job? Anthony Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy With the Assistance of: Brian Bur ton George Sullivan Iskandar Jahja William D. Sullivan Revised, October 4, 2006 Cordesman: Iraqi Force Development 10/4/06 Page ii Executive Summary Iraq is already in a state of limited civil war. What began as a small r esistance movement centered around loyalists to the Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein has expanded to include neo - Salafi Sunni terrorism, become a broadly based Sunni insurgency, and now a broader sectarian and ethnic conflict. The current combination of insurgenc y, Sunni Arab versus Shi’ite Arab sectarian conflict, and Arab versus Kurdish ethnic conflict could easily escalate to the break up of the country, far more serious ethnic and sectarian conflict, or violent paralysis. If Iraq is to avoid this, it needs to forge a lasting political compromise between its key factions: Arab -Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurd – while protecting other minorities. Political conciliation must also address such critical issues as federalism and the relative powers of the central and r egional governments, the role of religion in politics and law, control over petroleum resources and export revenues, the definition of human rights, and a host of other issues.
    [Show full text]
  • Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan
    Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(4) 496-528 ª The Author(s) 2011 Do Working Men Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0022002710393920 Rebel? Insurgency http://jcr.sagepub.com and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines Eli Berman1, Michael Callen1, Joseph H. Felter2, and Jacob N. Shapiro3 Abstract Most aid spending by governments seeking to rebuild social and political order is based on an opportunity-cost theory of distracting potential recruits. The logic is that gainfully employed young men are less likely to participate in political violence, implying a positive correlation between unemployment and violence in locations with active insurgencies. The authors test that prediction in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines, using survey data on unemployment and two newly available mea- sures of insurgency: (1) attacks against government and allied forces and (2) violence that kill civilians. Contrary to the opportunity-cost theory, the data emphatically reject a positive correlation between unemployment and attacks against government and allied forces (p < .05 percent). There is no significant relationship between unemployment and the rate of insurgent attacks that kill civilians. The authors iden- tify several potential explanations, introducing the notion of insurgent precision to adjudicate between the possibilities that predation on one hand, and security 1 UC San Diego, San Diego, CA, USA 2 Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA, USA 3 Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA Corresponding Author: Jacob N. Shapiro, Politics Corwin Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA Email: [email protected] Berman et al. 497 measures and information costs on the other, account for the negative correlation between unemployment and violence in these three conflicts.
    [Show full text]