To combine with NCCI charter, NGOs members have to pay the fees 3 months in advance. Those that have not paid yet are kindly requested to pay contacting Giovanna: [email protected] EDITORIAL Issue 82 – September 20th, 2007 ------------------------------------------- Hidden under the spotlights Over the last few weeks, an old discussion is coming back amongst humanitarian actors, logically linked with a new interest of the International Community toward the Iraq Humanitarian Crisis: can humanitarian action on the ground become visible? How could we improve our visibility? Since 2003 this question has been recurrent, with issues ranging from the defence of humanitarian space (which is still a concern today) to the visibility of aid operations. Today, more and more actors are wondering what to do, especially in the three northern governorates where, while the daily GHT security is better than in the rest of the country, low visibility is still the norm for most of actors. I However, the question is sensitive, as organisations know what they would leave behind by L changing their profile, but have to identify, obviously, what might be the benefits, but also importantly the consequences. H In most countries in the world, visibility is a fait acquis, so this question is not as recurrent as it is in Iraq. Nor is it as sensitive as it is in Iraq. Indeed, in Iraq today, being visible or different is a threat for any civilian. Following the attacks against the humanitarian community in 2003, almost all G actors in Iraq started to operate through a “low profile” strategy. Today discussions and perceptions I are very different according to the location that the interventions take place. In Amman, where people are safe, the subject may be often considered more theoretical. At ground level, the subject is not theoretical when it comes to saving lives and protecting operations so that they can continue to H deliver relief. This is especially true in hot spots across the whole central area of Iraq. Y What does “low profile” strategy mean? L By the end 2003, a “low profile” strategy has been seen by most of actors as the only way to remain in Iraq to reduce targeting of aid workers. It means no communications on activities, on locations of K work, and sometimes not even on sectors of activities in which the organisation is engaged. Some organisations don’t even mention in their international communication or on their websites that E they are working in Iraq. It meant removing identifying stickers or flags, cutting visible links with E the international community, even often hiding the name of the organisation, and the field staff presenting themselves only as Iraqis. Since this strategy has been developed, it appears that it reached one of its objectives: while Iraq remains the deadliest country for aid workers in the world, there were not any other large scale W I attacks against the humanitarian community, as had occurred prior the implementation of this strategy. So it can be assumed that the death toll might have been worse without it. Nevertheless, the “low profile” is a double edged sword. Admittedly, it gave better security to aid workers, but it also made them and their operations nearly invisible. Yet invisibility is perceived de facto by donors and the international community as an absence life saving work, which is simply not the case. As a result, funds for humanitarian action in Iraq have been diminishing over time. So the question quickly came on the table: how can we increase visibility while continuing to keep a low profile strategy? Especially when donors, who are not visible in the country either, are expecting more publicity on the projects they fund; as the donors also have an obligation to their constituencies to NCC show what they are doing with their tax contributions. Indeed, low profile doesn’t necessarily mean complete invisibility. NCCI members requested to NCCI to improve their visibility by communicating on their behalf. In addition, communication may remain possible in some areas or sectors. Not through logos or stickers, but through press releases, reports that do not mention the location or scale of the projects, etc…or through any other innovative communication tool. This is important both inside and outside of Iraq. Why is visibility considered as necessary for humanitarian organisations? First, because it increases operational transparency, which is a fundamental principle of humanitarian aid programmes. Second, because it shows concrete action, which is indispensable to get funds. Third, because it often improves the humanitarian space, through an active communication with communities on the impartiality of the aid and the aid workers. Then there is also another reason that is often considered as not necessary and not often appreciated by aid workers: to make publicity for donors and partner organisations. Obviously, the way an organisation should or decides to communicate depends on lots of factors, including their own internal strategy and principles. But generally speaking, what has to be taken in consideration for more visibility in Iraq? Of course, when access to vulnerable people can be denied or aid workers killed, donor’s visibility requirements will come last. The first element to be considered when considering visibility options is the protection of civilians. Indeed, visibility may increase their vulnerability if they are become associated with international aid or the aid community. So any visibility should be discussed with communities in order to have their own perception and wishes. Second, but often the first concern of most of organisations, is the security of aid workers. As for the community, they know better that anyone what can be said or done regarding the communication on programmes they run on the ground, especially in hot spots, to keep them and the beneficiaries as safe as possible. Third, the security of the whole humanitarian community should be taken in consideration. Indeed, an organisation that feel safe enough in a community to communicate on their operations may, highlighting the kind of work they do, jeopardise another one working on the same sector but in an area where they have to keep a very low profile, or remaining totally hidden. Fourth, the local context where the organisation is working in. Indeed, while it may be possible to communicate on some programmes in some areas because of the security situation or the links built over time with the community, the same programme should remain invisible in another area, even in the same district. Undeniably, as so often in Iraq, it is impossible to define a global strategy for the whole country. Everything can change from one governorate to another, from one district to another, from one village to another, or from one sector to another. Finally. while in 2003 the decision to switch to the low profile strategy was taken collectively, nowadays the increased localisation of the context prevent such a cohesive strategy. Decisions on visibility strategies shouldn’t be imposed by an external partner. Every organisation working in the field should be the only decision maker for the types of visibility that they can use. Field staff are the only one that can understand what could be, locally, the possible repercussions or consequences of a visibility strategy, including very innovative ones, on the community, on their staff and, sometimes, on the entire humanitarian community. --------------------------------------- Salaam, NCCI Team NCCI Weekly Highlight 2 Issue 82 – 09/20/2007 ____________________________________ Humanitarian Updates From NCCI, NGOs’ reports from the field and UN agencies Advocacy - America's Deadly Shock Doctrine in Iraq Source: Alternet Document: Book Excerpt Date: September 14, 2007 Access: Open The following is an excerpt from Naomi Klein's new book, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Henry Holt, 2007). The unanticipated violence that now engulfs Iraq is the creation of the lethally optimistic architects of the war -- it was preordained in that original seemingly innocuous, even idealistic phrase, "a model for a new Middle East". The disintegration of Iraq has its roots in the ideology that demanded a tabula rasa on which to write its new story. And when no such pristine tableau presented itself, the supporter of that ideology proceeded to blast and surge and blast again in the hope of reaching that promised land. - U.N. Officials Say Countries Involved In Iraq War Are Not Doing Enough for Iraqi Refugees Source: International Herald Tribune Document: Book Excerpt Date: September 14, 2007 Access: Open Countries involved in the Iraq war have a "moral obligation to do more" to accommodate the growing number of Iraqis fleeing their homeland, the U.N. secretary-general said Tuesday, the same day his humanitarian chief accused the United States of not doing enough about the refugee crisis. Operational Humanitarian Space - Diyala the worst province for basic services Source: IRIN Document: Article Date: September 16, 2007 Access: Open Ahmed urged all parties to the conflict to understand the neutrality of NGOs and authorise the delivery of humanitarian aid to families as many have been living in poverty, lacking water and food supplies. Humanitarian Needs and Assistance - Iraq humanitarian crisis grows despite U.S. surge Source: Alertnet Document: Article Date: September 19, 2007 Access: Open Iraq's humanitarian crisis is getting worse and more Iraqis are fleeing their homes despite the recent surge of U.S. troops, aid workers say, with donors reluctant to fund support for millions of displaced. - The Nightmare Is Here Source: New York Times Document: Opinion Date: September 15, 2007 Access: Open We've heard from General Petraeus, from Ambassador Crocker, and on Thursday night from President Bush. What we haven't heard this week is anything about the tragic reality on the ground for the ordinary citizens of Iraq, which is in the throes of a catastrophic humanitarian crisis.