INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced fix>m the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly fi-om the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter 6ce, wiiile others may be from any type o f computer printer. The quality of this reproductioa is dependent upon the qualityofthe copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect rq>roduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back o f the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white photographic prints are available for aity photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell & Howell Infonnation Company 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE KANT AND RELIGIOUS PASSION A Dissertation SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy By ALBERT MITCHELL KOSTELNY Norman, Oklahoma 1997 UMI Number: 9726709 Copyright 1997 by Kostelny, Albert Mitchell All rights reserved. UMI Microform 9726709 Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 KANT AMD RELIGIOUS PASSION A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY BY ' X . mijJi'jj Kenneth R. Merrill Edward T. SanJcowski Tom W. Boyd L. Laird Zev M. Trachtentferg © Copyright by ALBERT MITCHELL KOSTELNY 1997 All Rights Reserved Il Now, let me ask you something: what can one expect from man, considering he's such a strange creature? You can shower upon him all earthly blessings, drown him in happiness so that there'll be nothing to be seen but the bubbles rising to the surface of his bliss, give him such economic security that he won't have anything to do but sleep, nibble at cakes, and worry about keeping world history flowing— and even then, out of sheer spite and ingratitude, man will play a dirty trick on you. He'll even risk his cake for the sake of the most glaring stupidity, for the most economically unsound nonsense, just to inject into all the soundness and sense surrounding him some of his own disastrous, lethal fancies. What he wants to preserve is precisely his noxious fancies and vulgar trivialities, if only to assure himself that men are still men (as if that were so important) and not piano keys simply responding to the laws of nature. Man is somehow averse to the idea of being unable to desire unless this desire happens to figure on his timetable at that moment. But even if man was nothing but a piano key, even if this could be demonstrated to him mathematically— even then, he wouldn't come to his senses but would pull some trick out of sheer ingratitude, just to make his point. And if he didn't have them on hand, he would devise the means of destruction, chaos, and all kinds of suffering to get his way. For instance, he'd swear loud enough for the whole world to hear— swearing is man’s prerogative, setting him apart from the other animals— and maybe his swearing alone would get him what he wanted, that is, it'd prove to him that he's a man and not a piano key. Now you may say that this too can be calculated in advance and entered on the timetable— chaos, swearing, and all— and that the very possibility of such a calculation would prevent it, so that sanity would prevail. Oh not In that case man would go insane on purpose, just to be immune from reason, I believe this is so and I'm prepared to vouch for it, because it seems to me that the meaning of man's life consists in proving to himself every minute that he's a man and not a piano key. And man will keep proving it and paying for it with his own skin; he will turn into a troglodyte if need be. And, since this is so, I cannot help rejoicing that things are still the way they are and that, for the time being, nobody knows worth a damn what determines our desires. (F. Dostoevsky, Notes From Underground) -IV- CONTENTS ABSTRACT ............................................... vi ABBREVIATIONS.............................................. viii Chapter I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.................................. 1 A. Kant's Dispassionate Enlightenment.................3 B. Moral Character v. Religious Passion.............. 18 II. KANT AND MORAL CHARACTER..............................37 A. Moral Reason in Kant's Morality................... 39 1. Definition of Moral Reason.....................42 2. Moral Faith within Moral Reason............... 49 3. Imagination within Moral Reason............... 61 B. Moral Feeling in Kant's Morality.................. 69 1. Definition of Moral Feeling................... 70 2. The Role of Happiness........................ .75 3. The Role of Forgiveness........................ 83 4. The Role of Respect for the Moral Law........ 90 C. Moral Character (as Reason and Feeling).......... 94 1. Kant and Moral Character.......................98 2. Kant's bloodless formalism................... 103 3. An Unyielding Kant seen as Unfeeling........ 109 III. KANT AND RELIGIOUS PASSION.......................... 178 A. What is Kant's Religion?.......................... 179 1. Kant's Definition of Religion................ 179 2. Did Kant Follow the Religion of his day?.... 187 3. Was Kant a Religionist?.......................208 4. Kant's Motive in his Religious Works........ 220 B. What is Religious Passion (for Kant)?........... 222 1. Definition of Religious Passion.............. 223 2. Kant's Opposition to Religious Passion...... 225 3. An Unbelieving Kant seen as Unfeeling....... 232 4. Cone lus ion......................................236 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................... 272 APPENDIX: A Chronology of Kant's Works..................... 310 ABSTRACT In Chapter One, I argue that Kant provided a critique of reason as a result of his silent decade (1770- 1780) in which he began his lifelong struggle against the Romanticist movement. Kant lost his enlightened struggle against the passionate resistance of the (religious) romantics coincidental with the aftermath of the French revolution. As a result, the perception of Kant (portrayed by the romantics) as unfeeling, unyielding, and unsatisfying began to be disseminated. In Chapter Two, I show that a theory of moral character can be perceived in Kant's mature writings to offset the perception of Kant as the enemy-to-the-emotions. When it is seen that Kant did allow a place for feelings in the development of moral character, the defused argument reverts into a question of adequacy. In Chapter Three, I approach this question of adequacy by comparing Kantian moral character (in its religious application) to religious passion. In order to appreciate the uniqueness of Kant's position, I analyze Kant's (so-called) religious side with respect to his moral principles. Having demonstrated how it is possible to perceive Kant as anti- -vi- religious (especially, from the romantic's viewpoint), I then proceed to show how and why it is that Kant so adamantly opposed religious passion. As a result of this moral opposition to religious passion, Kant is seen as unbelieving and hence unfeeling. That Kant's (dispassionate) Enlightenment movement gave way to the (passionate) Counter-Enlightenment of the Romantics might imply that Kant's moral stance was emotionally inadequate. But in order to properly evaluate Kant's position, it is necessary to first adequately understand it. I maintain that in light of the evidences I present there is a genuine need to rethink (as well as to reevaluate) the perception of Kant as unfeeling. In short, the key point that decided Kant's fate in his fight with the romantics was his steadfast refusal to yield a place for religious passion in his moral thought. It was this subtle— often overlooked— trait that helped to stigmatize Kant's position as unemotional, unduly formalistic, and empty. - v i i - ABBREVIATIONS (of Kant's writings as commonly cited in this work): Anthropoloqy: Anthropolocry From a Pragmatic Point of View (1798). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Mary Gregor (1974). Another translation referred to is that by Victor Lyle Dowdell (1978). "Beginning” : "Speculative Beginning of Human History" (1786). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Ted Humphrey (in Perpetual Peace and other essays. 1983). Conflict: Conflict of the Faculties (1798). Unless otherwise stated the assumed translation in use will be that by Mary Gregor (1979). Another translation referred to is that by Mary Gregor and Robert Anchor (in Religion and Rational Theology. 1996). Correspondence. Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99. Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Arnulf Zweig (1967). first Critique: Critigue of Pure Reason (1781, 1787, 1790). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Norman Kemp Smith (1933). Other translations referred to are those by: (1) John Miller Dow Meiklejohn (1855); (2) Friedrich Max Müller (1881); and (3) Wolfgang Schwarz (1982). second Critique: Critigue of Practical Reason (1788). Unless otherwise stated, the assumed translation in use will be that by Lewis White Beck (1956).