EETU PIKKARAINEN

3. FROM THE OF INTERACTION TO THE SEMIOTICS OF EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

In the of education, there seems to be a shift towards an ontological turn. The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to the ongoing discussion by framing what the ontology for a could be and what it could offer. Some of the current literature in this movement be reviewed briefly and critiqued for a too narrow and too shallow understanding of ontology and a lack of ontological seriousness. The task of ontology will then be concretized as the solving of fundamental problems in the philosophy of education. A solution to these problems will be sketched by introducing an alternative ontological theory originally developed by C. B. Martin. This solution is closely connected to the theme of this book because Martin’s theory is essentially the ontology of interaction. Finally, it will be argued that one cannot draw practical conclusions directly from ontological theory: at the very least, a semiotic analysis of human interaction is needed.

WHAT THE ONTOLOGY FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION COULD BE

Ontology is a core area of theoretical philosophy. A common and useful delineation is to say that theoretical philosophy is divided into , the study of , and , the study of as such. Furthermore, ontology is the most general area of metaphysics; it is the study of “ as being” – the most basic structure of reality (Loux 1998, 15). The concept of category is used frequently here; it usually refers to the most general classifications into which can be divided. Such classifications are typically objects or substances, properties, kinds or species, relations, events or processes, and the like. Ontological theories usually try to determine what categories there are and the formal relations between categories; for example, is one category dependent on another? (e.g., Loux 1998; Lowe 2001; Keinänen 2008). After the empiricist critiques (especially Hume’s), Kant’s Copernican Revolution, and the rise of , metaphysics lost its reputation for a time. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant tried to show that, although our knowledge of reality is structured categorically, those categories must reside only in the transcendental structure of our cognitive apparatus; we have neither right nor reason to claim anything about the structure of reality as such, even though that reality is the source

K. Tirri and E. Kuusisto (Eds.), Interaction in Educational Domains, 51–61. © 2013 Sense Publishers. All rights reserved. E. PIKKARAINEN of our knowledge (see Kant 1982/1787, the preface to the second edition). In the last century, metaphysics and ontology again became respectable areas of research, but, at least to begin with, only in a Kantian (or neo-Kantian) mode as a means of analyzing human ontological commitments. A leading figure here was P. F. Strawson (1959), who called his approach descriptive metaphysics (a description of the common and necessary way to think about reality) as different from revisionary approaches, which can only be either minuscule corrections to the descriptive theory or then perhaps beautiful, but unbelievable constructions, such as the pre-Kantian rational of Descartes, Leibniz, or Berkeley. At the end of the twentieth century and continuing into the twenty-first, a renaissance of serious, revisionary ontology as the study of reality occurred, independent of the structure of our cognitive apparatus (e.g., Armstrong 1980). It became usual to redefine descriptive vs. revisionary differentiation so that both are situated as serious metaphysics of a mind-independent reality. However, descriptive now began to be devalued and restricted, while revisionary – generally taking off from the problems found in descriptive studies – endeavored to formulate new and better hypotheses about the basic structure of reality (Keinänen 2008). Of course, we have no way of evaluating these hypotheses empirically as is done with scientific hypotheses, but rather we must assess these instead using formal criteria (comprehensiveness, methodicalness, conceptual economy, and elegance) and perhaps indirectly by considering their helpfulness in solving theoretical problems unsolvable in other ways (Martin & Heil 1999, 49). Thus, there are four possible approaches of ontology as the cross tabulation of two dimensions. First, there is the dimension of seriousness (reality as such) vs. non-seriousness (thoughts and commitments) and second, there is the dimension of descriptiveness (interpretive) vs. revisionism (inventive). The serious descriptive and revisionary alternatives have been briefly described above. The non-serious descriptive area could perhaps be thought of as a phenomenological analysis of ontological commitments. The last area of non-seriousness and revisionism is especially interesting and important for ontology in a philosophy of education. I would tentatively call it practical ontology, because it has a close connection to the questions of and is perhaps even thought to be based on values. (See Table 1.) The borderlines between these areas should probably not be stressed, but rather their interdependence and fruitful interaction should be emphasized. So what can these areas or approaches offer the philosophy of education? If we accept that a philosophy of education is an essential part of the theory of education, a theory that should help us understand what education is – that is, what are we doing

Table 1. Different Approaches of Ontology

Object Aim Thoughts about being Being as such Description Phenomenological commitment analysis Descriptive metaphysics/ontology Invention “Practical ontology” Revisionary metaphysics/ontology

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