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A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 1. the Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy

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A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 1. the Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 1. The Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy H. Dooyeweerd Vertaald door: William S. Young en David H. Freeman bron H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 1. The Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy (vert. William S. Young en David H. Freeman). The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, z.p. 1969 (2de druk) Zie voor verantwoording: http://www.dbnl.org/tekst/dooy002newc05_01/colofon.php © 2013 dbnl / erven H. Dooyeweerd, William S. Young, David H. Freeman i.s.m. V Foreword (abreviated) to the first edition The appearance of this first systematic presentation of my philosophy fills me with a deep sense of appreciation to God for the strength He granted me to overcome innumerable difficulties. I would also like to acknowledge my indebtedness to the Board of Directors of the Dr Kuyper Foundation (Kuyperstichting) whose support made the publication of this work possible. The first rudimental conception of this philosophy had ripened even before I came to the Kuyper-foundation (1921). Originally I was strongly under the influence first of the Neo-Kantian philosophy, later on of HUSSERL's phenomenology. The great turning point in my thought was marked by the discovery of the religious root of thought itself, whereby a new light was shed on the failure of all attempts, including my own, to bring about an inner synthesis between the Christian faith and a philosophy which is rooted in faith in the self-sufficiency of human reason. I came to understand the central significance of the ‘heart’, repeatedly proclaimed by Holy Scripture to be the religious root of human existence. On the basis of this central Christian point of view I saw the need of a revolution in philosophical thought of a very radical character. Confronted with the religious root of the creation, nothing less is in question than a relating of the whole temporal cosmos, in both its so-called ‘natural’ and ‘spiritual’ aspects, to this point of reference. In contrast to this basic Biblical conception, of what significance is a so-called ‘Copernican’ revolution which merely makes the ‘natural-aspects’ of temporal reality relative to a theoretical abstraction such as KANT's ‘transcendental subject’? From a Christian point of view, the whole attitude of philosophical thought which proclaims the self-sufficiency of the latter, turns out to be unacceptable, because it withdraws human thought from the divine revelation in Christ Jesus. H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 1. The Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy VI The first result of the Biblical point of view with respect to the root of all temporal reality was a radical break with the philosophical view of reality rooted in what I have called the immanence-standpoint1. The discovery of the transcendental ground-Idea at the foundation of all philosophical thought, made it possible to display the different theoretical views concerning the structure of reality, as developed by the dominant immanence-philosophy, in their dependence upon a supra-theoretical a priori. It made the inauguration of criticism possible upon a much more deeply lying plane than a supposed merely theoretical one. If temporal reality itself cannot be neutral with respect to its religious root, if in other words the whole notion of a static temporal cosmos ‘an sich’, independent of the religious root of mankind, rests on a fundamental misconception, how can one any longer seriously believe in the religious neutrality of theoretical thought? One of the fundamental principles of this new philosophy is the cosmological basic principle of sphere-sovereignty. Its development was suggested by (the famous Dutch thinker and statesman) ABRAHAM KUYPER, but depends upon the introduction of a religious Christian foundation into philosophy. On this principle rests the general theory of the modal law-spheres developed in Volume II. The first conception of this theory was gained after the discovery of the inner structure of the modal aspects of human experience which I could explain even in my inaugural address The Significance of the Cosmonomic Idea for Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (1926). In the elaboration of this theory difficulties arose, not only because it could nowhere find a point of contact in the immanence-philosophy, but also because it cannot become fruitful apart from a close contact with the special theory of the modal law-spheres, which investigates the basic problems of the various special sciences in the light of the Christian transcendental ground-Idea. For this reason in my earlier publications I discussed the theory of the modal law-spheres always in connection with my own field of special science, i.e. jurisprudence. I wished to assure myself that this philosophical theory has a principial 1 Translator's note. The meaning of this terminology will become clear in the course of the discussion. D.H.F. H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 1. The Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy VII value for special scientific thought before I drew any provisional systematic conclusions. The theory of the structures of individuality which I have developed in the third volume has also given rise to many systematic problems. Even in my work The Crisis in the Humanistic Theory of the State (1932) I have not only indicated the importance of this theory with respect to the view of the structure of naïve experience, but I have also shown its significance for sociology and jurisprudence. In its earlier stage this theory had not yet been worked out to a sufficient degree. Its significance is not limited to the sciences, but it touches the fundamental structures of empirical reality. I am strongly convinced that for the fruitful working out of this philosophy, in a genuinely scientific manner, there is needed a staff of fellow-labourers who would be in a position independently to think through its basic ideas in the special scientific fields. It is a matter of life and death for this young philosophy that Christian scholars in all fields of science seek to put it to work in their own specialty. I am also very thankful that from the outset I found at my side my colleague Dr VOLLENHOVEN, professor of Philosophy at the Free University of Amsterdam, whose name has been inseparably joined to my own. It was a great joy to both of us to find an enthusiastic independent fellow-worker in Prof. Dr H.G. STOKER, whose publications made our movement known in South Africa, and who in his profound constructive criticism has called attention to various points which require further working out. And although I cannot see through STOKER's peculiar concepts in their full compass, and at first sight have certain objections to them, yet this does not prevent me from rejoicing greatly over the fact that STOKER is making his philosophical gifts, of which he already gave evidence in the circle of MAX SCHELER, serviceable to a further independent construction of this new philosophy. His cooperation is to be esteemed of great value, particularly in his own special field of psychology. And finally I am further encouraged by the rise of a circle, though it be still modest, of scientific adherents, each of whom endeavours in his own department to make the newly developed philosophy fruitful. Bound by one and the same Christian faith, equally inspired by the stimulating effect of the Christian root of life in the practice of science, a first circle of scientific workers has thus H. Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought. Deel 1. The Necessary Presuppositions of Philosophy VIII attached itself to this philosophy. God grant that this modest group may grow and that many that should be our adherents, but who still resist the Christian Idea of science, may be convinced that the question is not a matter of a ‘system’ (subject to all the faults and errors of human thought) but rather it concerns the foundation and the root of scientific thought as such. In conclusion let me make two final remarks. The first is addressed to my opponents on grounds of principle. I am fully conscious that any method of criticism which tries to penetrate to the religious motives of a thinker is in danger of causing an emotional reaction and giving offense. In tracking down a philosophical train of thought to its deepest religious foundations I am in no way attacking my adversaries personally, nor am I exalting myself in an ex cathedra style. Such misunderstanding of my intention is very distressing to me. An act of passing judgment on the personal religious condition of an adversary would be a kind of human pride which supposes it can exalt itself to God's judgment seat. I have continually laid emphasis on the fact that the philosophy which I have developed, even in the sharp penetrating criticism which it exercises against non-Christian immanence-philosophy, constantly remains within the domain of principles. I wish to repudiate any self-satisfied scientific attitude in confronting immanence-philosophy. The detailed criticism of the Humanistic immanence-philosophy in the second part of the first volume, must be understood as self-criticism, as a case which the Christian thinker pleads with himself. Unless this fact is understood, the intention of this philosophy has not been comprehended. I should not judge immanence-philosophy so sharply were it not that I myself have gone through it, and have personally experienced its problems. I should not pass such a sharp judgment on the attempts at synthesis between non-Christian philosophy and the Christian truths of faith, had I not lived through the inner tension between the two and personally wrestled through the attempts at synthesis.
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