Proefschrift Mario 12/11/02 10:45 Page 293
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proefschrift mario 12/11/02 10:45 Page 293 8 Reflections This book has explored and attempted to account for the genesis and outcomes of armed peasant resistance to Shining Path in the Peruvian department of Ayacucho. More generally, I have tried to use the phenomenon of peasant village-defence groups as a critical lens through which to examine the impact of sociopolitical violence on the peasants of Ayacucho, and their varied responses to it. The detailed information presented in the preceding chapters has admittedly been thick, and the risk at this point is that the reader comes away with the feeling of hav- ing by now lost sight of the forest for the trees. The purpose of this final chapter, then, is to try to balance the perspective by drawing out some of the broader social and theoretical implications of the story. However, rather than simply presenting a comprehensive analytical summary of the preceding chapters, I will instead attempt to offer conclusions by addressing some topics and issues on the subject about which there presently is little written in what is otherwise a sizeable body of scholarly and journalistic literature on the Peruvian civil war and its various aspects. In this way I hope to contribute to filling in some of the gaps within the existing Shining Path/civil war literature, specifically with regard to more general theoretical debates on (1) armed revolution and State counterinsurgency, (2) civilian/militia-military relations under conditions of war, (3) and the interrelated and overlapping themes of post-con- flict democratic consolidation, civil society, and citizenship. Before proceeding, however, I would like to enter a cautionary note. Even though the story I have presented is framed with a specific period, and is tidily wrapped up with an episodic ending, it would nevertheless be a mistake to assume that the processes and struggles described here have run their course. The overall impression I should wish to leave the reader with in this final chapter is not of definitive conclu- sions, but rather of open-ended processes which will undoubtedly take many surpris- ing turns as they evolve in the future. Of Peruvian politics and society, Stern once observed: “[i]mportant events seem to fall from the sky, in an unpredictable yet steady stream of happenings.... The sense of a chaotic world buffeted by accident and sur- prise becomes increasingly difficult to resist” (1998:6). On the one hand, the politi- cal landscape of the country has changed almost unrecognisably since the fall of Fujimori and his Rasputin-like intelligence chief, Montesinos. On the other hand, even as the nation sets up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission—hitherto unimag- inable in the time of Fujimori—in the hopes of identifying responsibilities for atroci- ties and promoting national reconciliation, unmistakably ominous signs point to a possible resurgence of Shining Path not only in the Ene, Apurímac, and Huallaga val- leys, but also in Lima itself.1 Clearly, despite appearances, democratic transition, peace, and a revitalised civil society all still rest on shaky ground, for the chances of a durable peace and democratic consolidation are seriously threatened by enduring and worsening economic problems, which, as a wellspring for resentment and frus- tration, can all too easily translate into a new round of violence and political turmoil. 293 proefschrift mario 12/11/02 10:45 Page 294 From Victims to Heroes 8.1 Rethinking Shining Path through peasant counter-rebellion In the early 1980s, most urban dwellers and external observers held the common and mistaken view of the revolution waged by Shining Path as an “indigenous peasant insurrection,” that stood for “Indian revindication.”2 The mistake was understand- able, given that very little was known at the time about the revolutionary organisa- tion, and given that “a picture of a peasantry in opposition to the state appealed to the desire of radical intellectuals in Lima and abroad to imagine the dedication of the downtrodden to overthrowing the status quo” (Starn 1999:66). That the Peruvian military also shared this interpretation of Shining Path as a peasant-based revolution was to have grave consequences for the highland peasantry.3 As we saw in chapter 2, it was this presumption of “indigenous subversion” that informed and propelled the brutal strategy of repression that the army subsequently unleashed upon the rural population (see Tapia 1997). As Remy points out, the cam- paign of indiscriminate repression was also fuelled by paranoia and intense racism: An indio (and if from Ayacucho, all the worse) was identified as a real or potential member of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso). In this context the army attacked and occupied peasant population centers. Fear and distrust of the “other” led any soldier seeing a puna Indian wearing a poncho to suspect that weapons might be hidden under the poncho, and would first fire and find out later. The army was an army of occupation (Remy 1994:124). Armed with greater information, scholars would later establish that the Shining Path party and the revolution it was waging were initiated and led by privileged, urban, middle-class teachers and intellectuals from the UNSCH, none of whom were of peasant background. In fact, “dark-skinned kids born in poverty filled the bottom ranks under a leadership composed mostly of light-skinned elites” (Starn 1998:229; see Chávez de Paz 1989). We have seen in chapter 1 that before initiating armed actions, Shining Path had “little influence among the regional peasantry” (Degregori 1998:128) owing to the dominance of other, more mass-based Marxist political par- ties which had stronger links with the peasantry (see Hinojosa 1998; Gorriti 1999). This is not to say, however, that the Shining Path did not eventually manage to attract significant support from a number of social sectors, such as the educated rural youth, or to win at least the passive acceptance, if not the full and active assistance, of much of the regional peasantry. Fear was certainly a motivating factor that ensured peasant compliance to guerrilla claims (see Degregori 1996a). However, as shown in chapter 3, to put it all down to fear belies the fact that in the early years of armed struggle, Shining Path did succeed in finding a reservoir of sincere sympathy and support among the peasantry. In its early years, many peasants viewed it not just as an arbiter of local justice and an enforcer of moral order, but also as a viable vehicle for per- sonal advancement and social change, in spite of its benign authoritarianism (Degregori 1998; del Pino 1998; Manrique 1998; Starn 1998). At a more psycho- logical and affective level, Shining Path’s appeal can also be pinned down to the fact that, like other political parties, it provided its rank and file members with a group 294 proefschrift mario 12/11/02 10:45 Page 295 Reflections identity, a feeling of collective solidarity and camaraderie; and, perhaps most impor- tantly, a sense of higher purpose and a reason for being—and power over life and death. Even its authoritarian discipline and its insistence on violence and sacrifice were attractive to those politicised and educated youth and radical sectors disillu- sioned with the democratic experience and the decadence of the dominant bourgeois- criollo national culture (see Hinojosa 1998:77). As the 1980s was drawing to a close, Shining Path indeed appeared extremely close to toppling the inept and corruption-ridden government of Alan Garcia—a pres- ident whose various methods of attempting to assert civilian control over the military only succeeded in disaffecting and alienating the armed forces (Crabtree 1992; Tapia 1997; Klarén 2000; del Pino 1993b). In hindsight, though, it is clear that by insisting on extreme sectarianism and ideological “orthodoxy” (as defined by Guzmán), and by completely rejecting the need to forge alliances with what it disparagingly referred to as the “revisionist” parties of the Marxist left, Shining Path created its own severe limitations to ever winning power. Moreover, in the rural countryside, Shining Path’s attempts to apply and expand its strategic blueprint would eventually give rise to an increasing number of tensions and contradictions in its relations with the peasantry, as we saw in chapter 3. This Maoist-inspired guerrilla strategy involved breaking the peasantry’s links of “dependency” on the capitalist market economy by preventing them from taking and selling their rural agricultural produce in urban centres. Shining Path’s strategy also required local peasant populations to provision armed guerrilla units by labouring communally to plant and harvest crops, which were eventually levied as “revolutionary tax,” often in their entirety, and irrespective of time- honoured Andean principles of reciprocity or the more practical consideration that the peasants were then left with less, or nothing at all, to eat. In time, Shining Path’s revolutionary strategy would also include the assassination of local civilian authorities if they could not be intimidated to renounce their post, and replacing them with their own “commissars” appointed by the Party without the prior approval of the local population. The unpopularity of these policies and actions, due largely to their incompatibility with peasant cultural values and livelihood goals and practices, bred intense resentment and disaffection that ultimately erupted into open conflict and widespread peasant resistance to the revolutionary movement. It was in the punas of Huanta, among the so-called Iquichano ethnic group of peasant communities, that violent peasant counter-rebellion against Shining Path was born. In chapter 3, I described and inferred the possible reasons behind the counter- rebellion of Iquichano villages, like Uchuraccay and Huaychao. These need not be repeated here. What is important to note is that apart from the congratulatory prais- es of President Belaúnde for the villagers of Huaychao, the news that these remote villages had begun to capture or kill suspected guerrillas was greeted with suspicious disbelief by most outsiders, including foreign scholars.