The Sonet Space Program Ta M Fk
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REP BORUKD MIME NMICWL WI? Director of • Top Seerot Central Intelligence rft. .'• LOGGER The Sonet Space Program \" • National Intelligence Estimate Volume Q—The Estimate CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED 1997 - • .., !>•*. ta M fk Top Secret NIEI1-I-83JX -TCSJ0S4-I3- 3 ATTHEWTCWALARCHIVES .. : •Sft^-^aivl-''' '^op-Oeertt NIE 11-1*83 THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM VOLUME II—THE ESTIMATE Information available as of 19 July 1983 was uied in [he preparation of this Estimate. TCSS00G83 TUJJ Oeuel' •.THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State. Also Participating: The .Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps CONTENTS Page SCOPENOTE _. .. - I CHAPTER I. SOVIET VIEWS OF SPACE ! 1-1 Military Factors _ - 1-1 ••• Diplomatic Factors - — 1-2 Economic Factors , „ -„..... 1-3 Scientific Factors - .- « 1-3 Prestige Factors „ _ - „.... 1-3 Design Philosophy _- 1-4 CHAPTER IL THE SOVIET EFFORT IN SPACE II-l Design Bureaus — — _ — II-3 Space Launch Vehicles _ „ _ II-4 Space Launch Facilities _ _ II-8 Space Mission Control Network _ II-8 Space Operations _ „ „ _ „ 11-13 Space Systems of the 1980s , 11-14 Possible Developments in the 1990s 11-15 CHAPTER III. SOVIET SPACE SYSTEMS IH-1 Reliability, productivity, and Obstacles - III-3 Imagery Collection _ IH-4 Radar Imaging „ III-6 ELINT Reconnaissance. _ III-6 Naval Targeting and Surveillance _ HI-8 Submarine Detection _ „ EE-12 Warning and Attack Assessment „ _ 111-13 Nuclear Detection „ ,..„ _ DJ-15 Aircraft Surveillance ~ _ - III-15 Communications and Data Relay EH-17 The Direction of Comsat Developments HI-W Navigation „ 111-23 Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy _ „..,..... „ 111-24 Meteorological „ _ _ 111-25 Calibration _ ^ IH-25 iil res com sa - TOF seMn. Page CHAPTER IV. SPACE SYSTEMS IN WARTIME IV^l Augmentation and Replacement IV-1 Space'System Defenses IV-4 Maneuverability IV-4 Decoys „ IV-5 Satellite-to-Satellite Missiles on Manned Spacecraft . IV-6 Defense Against Electronic Warfare IV-6 Satellite Hardening _ IV-6 Signature Reduction (Stealth) , IV-7 Defense Against Damage to Support Systems „ IV-7 Space Warfare Capabilities „ IV-7 Orbitallnterccptor „ ., IV-8 Direct-Ascent ABM-Type Interceptor _ IV-1I Space Launch Vehicles and ICBMs .„ '. „.„„, ~....IV-11 Electronic Warfare „ _ .. IV-I2 Radiofrequency Damage . IV-M Lasers..™ „ _ ."...„ IV-14 Space-Based Particle Beam Weapons —IV-17 Ground Site Attack IV-18 Other Space-Based Weapons „ IV-18 Likelihood of Interference With US Space Systems _ IV-18 CHAPTER V. SOVIET MANNED SPACE ACTIVITIES _ V-l Current and Development Projects „ V-l Salyut Space Stations „ V-l Cosmos 929-Type Manned Spacecraft „ V-3 Future Projects V-5 Modular Space Station _ V-5 New Resupply Vehicle V-5 Large Space Station „ V-7 Space Solar Power Station .-. V-7 Geosynchronous Space Station. _ „ .: "V-7 Space Transportation System _. .'. V-8 Space Tug „ _ — V-10 Military Space Plane _. _ V-10 CHAPTER VL LUNAR AND PLANETARY EXPLORATION VI-1 CHAPTER VIL INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND COOPERATION VIM Intercosmos _ VH-1 Intersputnik „ VII-2 Intelsat and Inmarsat _ „ VII-3 Commercial Space Launch Services™ VII-3 Remote Sensing .„ VIM Processing and Manufacturing of Materials in Space VIM Other Areas of Competition _ VIM --•> RffROQUCED AT THE NATIONAL «tOWES • SCOPE NOTE This Estimate describes current Soviet space capabilities, identifies elements of the space program in various stages of development, and es timates how these will affect future Soviet capabilities in space through the 1980s and into the 1990s in the absence of space-related arms control agreements. Volume I presents. the Key Judgments and a summary of how expected Soviet space developments will affect political, military, and economic competition as well as Soviet prestige. Volume II provides a more detailed discussion of the missions-arid capabilities of the Soviet space program. For purposes of this Estimate, we have judged the likelihood of various Soviet space developments as ranging from very low to very high. These judgments, stated in terms of probability of occurrence, would be: Very low—less than 10 percent Low = 10 to 40 percent Moderate=40 to 60 percent High = 60 to 90 percent Very high = more than 90 percent. i res mo so. Top Sccrc4- .V ^rH ifittsi£mai3&ib_ HEPR00UCEDAIIHENAT1ONAI.AHCHWES, . ; &Jeti{L-tKA.(££jj T i UriT'ii i r' CHAPTER I SOVIET VIEWS OF SPACE 1. Despite their large and comprehensive space with one of its responsibilities defined as the destruc program, we believe that Soviet leaders perceive that tion of enemy military space systems. This ABM/space overall US leadership "in space could continue. Thus, defense organization became subordinate to Soviet air the Soviet space program is viewed by the leadership defense forces (Voyska PVO) when the reorganization as an important part pf the overall competition with of Soviet air and air defense forces took place in 1980. the United States. The space program is viewed by the Soviet leadership as an instrument of policy, the essential goals of which remain the same both in peace 3. There is very little direct knowledge of Soviet and war. Soviet foreign policy goals include the expan military policy for the use of space. Such a policy sion of Soviet influence, die eclipsing of the United almost certainly exists, however, and we believe its States as a superpower, and, as First Deputy Premier general outlines can be extrapolated from Soviet mili Andrei Cromyko recently pointed out, the control of tary writings and teachings as well as current trends in the direction of international relations. Domestic poli the Soviet space program. cy goals include the maintenance and improvement of A. Soviet military thinkers do not consider space to centralized political control over the state as well as be a demilitarized zone with an international status the economic and scientific growth of the Soviet analogous to that of Antarctica. From the Soviet Union. The space program contributes directly to each military perspective, space is viewed as an extension of of these goals. It is, therefore, viewed by the Soviets as theaters of operations rather than as a separate arena contributing significantly to the correlation of forces, of conflict They have claimed that war cannot be which include, but are not limited to, military, diplo waged exclusively in space, and any major conflict on matic, economic, scientific, and prestige factors. The Earth cannot be conducted without involving space use of space fox these objectives is important, but it is systems. One of their most authoritative writers, Mar also difficult and costly. Accordingly, the Soviets have shal Sokolovsldy, has noted that "the concept of a adopted a design philosophy that reduces the risks and theater of military operations may include the entire costs of operating in the space environment. territory of a belligerent or coalition, whole continents, large bodies of water, and extensive regions of the Military Factors atmosphere, including space." Soviet military pre cepts, such as the importance of surprise, the necessity 2. The military factor is viewed as the most impor of confusing the enemy, and the use of overwhelming tant element in the correlation of forces and the Soviet force to secure military objectives, are also likely to space program is predominantly military in nature. apply to Soviet military operations in space during a More than 70 percent of Soviet space missions are for war. military purposes only, with another 20 percent serv ing a dual military-civil function. Soviet interest in the 5. The Soviets view space systems as an integral military aspects of space is as old as space flight itself. part of their overall offensive and defensive force. Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s Soviet Classified Soviet military teachings require that in writings discussed an interest in and requirements for conflict the combat readiness of military assets in space defense. The organization responsible for anti- space be comparable with that of those forces it is ballistic missile (ABM)/space defense (PRO/PKO) was called on to support Soviet writers also acknowledge established in the mid-1960s. It was subordinate to the the need for a "correct relationship between active then existing Soviet air defense forces (PVO Strany) equipment in orbit and standby equipment on the I-1 TCS 5086 83 -Top-S«tral RaW3MJCEQATn«NAT10IW.t«iCmES': ! Jsli/L-W^V.E^. ground." This includes the maintenance of sufficient Diplomatic Factors reserve equipment, both in orbit and on the ground. presumably to augment or replace space-related 8. The Soviet's view of space in the framework of equipment Thus, with regard to readiness, support, international diplomacy is in large measure de and reserves, the Soviets view their assets in space the termined by their adversary relationship with the same as the rest of their armed forces, United States. Soviet perceptions of an overall US lead in space heighten the competition. The Soviets have 6. Short of direct US-Soviet conflict, it seems un gone to great lengths to characterize their space likely the Soviet leadership would risk physical de program as "peaceful and scientific," in contrast to struction of US satellites, whereas they could perceive that of the United States, which they have termed nondestructive interference as 2 somewhat less risky aggressive and militaristic.