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Redrawing the 151 Mile Border Between North and South Korea

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Redrawing the 151 Mile Border Between North and South Korea The Demilitarized Zone: Redrawing the 151 mile border between North and South Korea Harbin, Heilongjiang North Koreans in are promised to paid 500 Yuan ($79) per month for their labour in China, + The underground Korean network mainly operate in the northeast region of China, only find their pay to be that of half or nothing. Defector Trends where high concentration of ethnic Koreans are found Jilin, Jilin Commercial brokers charge about $2,000 - 10,000 per person to escape North Korea NUMBER OF CUMULATIVE "Escaping North Korea", Sarah Buckley, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3932591.stm 28 July, 2004 + NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS IN SOUTH KOREA 19,964 + + Pyongyang + Pyongyang 39° 1’ 10” N, 125° 44’ 17” E Beijing Propaganda balloons arrive in Pyongyang after + about 5 hours of floating after leaving just + Anbyon plains 2 million South Korean 17,986 Choi boshik, who defected from Senyang, Liaoning South of the DMZ DPRK Crane Restoration Project tourists visit Mt Keumkang North Korea has sent 400 million + propaganda leaflets to North since Nov 1998 - July 2008 2005. In 2010 and 2009 he has Over 20,000 North Korean defectors now 2.2 million sent over 80 million leaflets each It is estimated that 8,000-10,000 + live in South Korea. Many of them live in year. The extra large balloons he North Koreans cross the border the city of Ahnyang, a satellite city 25km South Korean tourist Landmines invented can carry about 60,000 South Korean tourist 05. OCT 07 1950 illegally to find food and work south of Seoul shot dead July 2008 X in the DMZ region ~10,000 leaflets and can fly to shot dead July 2008 06. OCT 20 1950 h Northern Limit Line capital Pyongyang in 2~3 hours. h t 2km 38˚37’ N 133˚00’ E a 38˚37’ N 133˚00’ E Some of these balloons even have p <<< Current DMZ Military Demarcation Line Mt Keumgang Tours 15,059 13. Jul 10 1951- 27 1953 (Armistice signed) DMZ 2km GPS devices to be dropped at an n o i 12. Apr 22 1951 North Korea troops t A small number of people 09. Dec 26 1950 Southern Limit Line accurate location. a 10. Jan 24 1951 r g defect to the US. i 07. OCT 26 1950 1.1 million active Civilian Control Area ~10km + Sariwon Propaganda balloons arrive in m Clandestine Routes - Approx. total areas Approximately 100 North Imnam Dam top of Propaganda balloons arrive here after e 11. Jan 25 1951 Pyongyang after 3-5 hours of n a only about 30% make it to 8.3 million reserve Bukhan River DMZ : 907 km2 3 hours of floating from just South r Korean defectors are now launching from Yeonpeong Island, c 01. Aug 1945-June 25 1950 completed in 2003 of the DMZ are living in the US 03. Sep 15 1950 02. Jul/Aug 1950 04. Sep 26 1950 CCA 1,528 km2 under wind speeds of 4-5m/s their final destination Inland tour starts ~20km Border Control Area Feb 2003 - Jul 2008 3,000 mile (4,800km) clandestine journey 08. Nov 24 1950 Injin River 2nd tunnel 4th tunnel 12,250 Hwanggang Dam Peace Dam + Sokcho 22miles down stream of Imnam 38th parallel Pre-war line Dam completed in 2005 Chrowon plains United Nations drew South Korea installed Samsung Crane Restoration Project Northern Limit Line Floodwater release Yeoncheon, X SGR-1 armed robot adjacent to (NNL) 1953 Haeju (port) Sep 2009, 3 killed Kyoung-gi Korean War 38˚03’ N 123˚45’ E DMZ, $200,000 each. Jul 2010 38˚03’ N 123˚45’ E Haeju + 38˚00’ Parallel + 38˚00’ Parallel Ha Noi, Vietnam 1950.06.25 1950.06 1950.07 1950.08 1950.09 1950.10 1950.11 1950.12 1951.01 1951.02 1951.03 1951.04 1951.05 1951.06 1951.07 1951.08 1951.09 1951.10 1951.11 1951.12 1952.01 1952.02 1952.03 1952.04 1952.05 1952.06 1952.07 1952.08 1952.09 1952.10 1952.11 1952.12 1953.01 1953.02 1953.03 1953.04 1953.05 1953.06 1953.07 1953.07.27 North Korea fires artillery at South Korea’s Big 1st tunnel brocast Yeonpyeong island in the Yellow Sea and South Korea KEASONG 37° 58’ 0’’ N, 126° 33’ 0” E + KEASONG 37° 58’ 0’’ N, 126° 33’ 0” E + returned fire, Killing 4 South Koreans and injuring 19 ROKS X+ Baeknyeong Island + Panmunjom + 9,706 Nov 23, 2010 Baengnyeong Island [Kaesong Industrial Region opened, 2003] Kaesong Industrial Region 2003 NK” Cheonan sinking X o Mar 26 2010 3rd tunnel Battle of Daecheong China intervenes (Oct. 1950) Armistice was signed at Panmunjom, ROKS Cheonan Sinking 4th tunnel : Mar 3, 1990 Death of 46 Seamen 26 Mar 2010 X Nov 10 2009 Radi Vientiane, Laos Korea July 27, 1953 which ended the n 18 November 1998 Naval clashes near the NNL Daecheong Island South Korea troops United Nations Security Council Korean War in 1953 pe Yangon, Burma 3rd tunnel : Oct 17, 1978 In 2000, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il Deaths of 4 South Korean sail- Battle of Daecheong Kumgangho made its + Resolutions (Jul. 1950) met at a summit meeting, the first be- ors and the sinking of a North South and North Korean navies clash 0.69 million active “O maiden voyage from tween heads of state of the two nations Korean vessel, Jun 29, 2002 near the NLL on 10 November 2009 + Donghae harbour Korean War broke with North Korea 2nd tunnel : Mar 19, 1975 8.0 million reserve invading South on June 25, 1950 Kim Jong-un : 28 Dec 2011.~ Yeonpyeong Island North Korean artillery shelling Kaesong Tours Kim Il Sung 1st tunnel : Nov 15, 1974 Death of Kim, Il-Sung Kim Jong-Il : Jul 1994 ~ Dec 2011 X Supreme Leader of North Korea Yeonpyeong Island US troops Bangkok, Thailand 28 December 1972 – 8 July 1994 8 July 1994 Supreme Leader of North Korea Supreme Commander of the KPA Dec 2007- Dec 2008 7,688 X Nov 23 2010 Apr 2010 - May2010 1896 Workers Party of North Korea August 28, 1946 - June 30, 1949 First Battle of Yeonpyeong 28,500 Yeonpyeong Island + Workers’ Party of Korea June 30, 1949 - Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [D.P.R.K.] North Korea : September 9, 1948 Jun 15 1999 Human settlements + SEOUL 37° 34’ 8”N, 126° 58’ 36” E X 6,305 Disputed territory Second Battle of Yeonpyeong + SEOUL Chinese, North, and Formal declaration of DPRK Jun 29 2002 + Infiltration tunnels Propaganda leaflet + September 9, 1948 Korean War h Protectorate of Japan 2012 South Korean fishing t Kingdom of Great Joseon 1392–1897 1950-53 a Incheon launch points + 18 November 1905 p ROK Government proclaimed Inicidents 31 N. Koreans X and crab catching area n o Greater Korean Empire 1897–1910 [Independence declared March 1, 1919] August 15, 1948 i Water bodies t drift down South via water, Phnom Penh, Cambodia a Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam r Provisional Government of Republic of Korea (1919-1948) Republic of Korea [R.O.K] South Korea : August 15, 1948 g 4 defects, 27 returns to North Russia attempts to control Korea. Japanese GPS jamming i 1~3rd Rhee Syngman 4th Yun Bo-seon Park Chung-hee 10th Choi Kyu-hah 14th Kim Yong-Sam 16th Roh Moo-hyeon suggests 38th parallel as dividing line Annexation by Japan m Surrender of Japan after investigations July 24, 1948 – April 26, 1960 Aug 13, 1960 – Mar 22, 1962 Dec 17, 1963 – Oct 26, 1979 Oct 26 1979 –Sept 1 1980 25 Feb1993 – 25 Feb 1998 25 Feb 2003 – 25 Feb 2008 between the spheres of influence. However, 22 August 1945 e 22 August 1910 n 15th Kim Dae-Jung 17th Lee Myung-bak Feb 05 2010 11th,12th Chun Doo-hwan 13th. Roh Tae-woo 0 5 10 20 km a 4,411 no formal agreement was met. Annexation by Japan 1910- 45 Sept 1 1980 – 25 Feb 1988 25 Feb1988 – 25 Feb 1993 25 Feb1998 – 25 Feb 2003 25 February 2008 – 25 Feb 2013 r c North Korea-declared "Inter-Korean MDL" 1999 border 1896 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 NUMBER OF NORTH KOREAN 3,130 DEFECTORS PER YEAR (224,125 acres). This area called the demilita- serve the area as a national park or construct it harness energy or become a cultural asset of building a concrete wall “5-8m high, 10-19m on land into water. Unlike the DMZ, which was be worth as much as US$ 70,000. Peak season retreated. Battle of Daecheong in 2009, a North Furthermore, since late 1990s with left leaning since its opening in 1998 (Ministry of Unification, the South Korean counterparts earn. The opera- nary North Koreans and motivate some to risk Korea. Some make it to the U.S. and other 2,809 2,927 HISTORY OF THE DMZ rized zone (DMZ) accounts for about 0.5% of a peace park. Nevertheless, DMZ is not free that creates value for both North and South DMZ AS A BARRIER thick at the bottom, and 3-7m wide in the up- clearly marked and agreed by both North Korea is short, typically between early May to between Korean gunboat crossed the NLL and entered FLOWS IN THE DMZ North Korean friendly South Korean government 2008). In December 2007, a second agreement tion started in March 2005, and as of June 2010 their lives and defect to South Korea.
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