Brief of Appellee

Home , Interim order

20180344 FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF SUPREME COURT NOVEMBER 30, 2018 STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA In the Supreme Court State of North Dakota

Supreme Court No. 2018- 0344 Burleigh County District Court No. 08-2017-DM-00999

Matthew Hagen Plaintiff / Appellee

Charlotte Horst Defendant / Appellant

Appeal from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgement, and Judgment issued by the Honorable Bruce A. Romanick, District Court Judge, Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

DePuydt Law Office Mary Depuydt; ND ID: #08267 511 Beaver Avenue PO Box 215 Wishek, ND 58495 Telephone: 701-452-4340 Fax: 1-701-540-6439 Email: [email protected] E-Service: [email protected]

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Authorities……………………………………………………………………...ii Statement of the Case...... ¶1 Statement of the Facts ...... ¶¶2-7 Law and Argument I. The District Court Correctly Interpreted the Law When It Concluded that Horst Did Not Have Right To Appointed Counsel For This Custody Matter...... ¶¶ 8-11 a. Standard of Review ...... ¶¶11 b. Appointed Legal Counsel Is Not A Rights In Civil Matters Adjudicating Primary Residential Responsibility...... ¶9-11 II. The Court Did Not Act Unconstitutionally When it Issued An Emergency Ex Parte Interim Order Without First Holding an Evidentiary Hearing and, After an Evidentiary Hearing Was Held Within the Time Required, Issuing an Interim Order...... ¶¶12-16 a. Standard of Review...... ¶12 b. Emergency Ex Parte Orders Are Not Inherently Unconstitutional, and The Court Adhered to All Due Process Requirements...... ¶¶13-16 III. the District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Ordered Horst to Pay Child Support...... ¶¶17-20 a. Standard of Review...... ¶17 b. Child Support Obligations are Not Inherently Unconstitutional...... ¶¶18-19 c. The District Court Expressly Complied With the Child Support Guidelines and, Therefore, the Child Support Obligation is Correct...... ¶20 IV. The District Court Correctly Disregarded Horst’s Claims Of Violations of Sex Trafficking Laws, Torture, Attempted Man Slaughter, Kidnapping, and Violations of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution...... ¶¶21-23 a. Standard of Review ...... ¶21 b. Horst Does Not Raise Any Valid or Rational Basis for A Finding on Any of the Above-Listed Grievances and, Therefore, The Court Was Correct In Disregarding These Arguments...... ¶22-23

V. The District Court Was Correct In Concluding That the Evidence Supported A Finding That It Is in the Minor Children’s Best Interests For Hagen to Be Awarded Primary Residential Responsibility...... ¶¶24-26 a. Standard of Review...... ¶24 b. The Court Dedicated Significant Time Addressing Each Best Interest Factor, and Was Correct in Concluding That The Best Interest Factors Strongly Favored Hagen...... ¶¶25-26 VI. The District Court Did Not Error When It Concluded That it Was in the Minor Children’s Best Interest to Award Horst Supervised Parenting time Instead of Unsupervised Parenting Time And To Condition The Availability Of Unsupervised Parenting Time on The Satisfaction of Specific Requirements...... ¶¶27-31 a. Standard of Review...... ¶27 b. Supervised Visitation Is Necessary to Protect the Safety of the Children...... ¶28-30 c. The Prerequisites to Unsupervised Visitation Are Tailored Specifically to The Perceived Danger and, Therefore, Are Reasonable and Supported by the Evidence...... ¶31 Conclusion ...... ¶32

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Beylund v. Levi, 2015 ND 18, 889 N.W.2d 907 ...... ¶12 Buchholz v. Buchholz, 1999 ND 36, 590 N.W.2d 215...... ¶17 Davis v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444 (8th Cir. 1996) ...... ¶9 Doe v. Hennepin County, 858 F.2d 1325, (8th Cir. 1988) ...... ¶14 Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, (7th Cir. 1988) ...... ¶14 Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1977)...... ¶14 Eklund v. Eklund, 538 N.W.2d 182 (N.D. 1995) ...... ¶18 Estate of Allmaras, 2007 ND 130, 737 N.W.2d 612 ...... ¶21 Fonder v. Fonder, 2012 ND 228, 823 N.W.2d 504 ...... ¶25 Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1985) ...... ¶14 Lawrence v. Delkamp, 2003 ND 53, 658 N.W.2d 758 ...... ¶29 Marquette v. Marquette, 2006 ND 154, 719 N.W.2d 321...... ¶28 Martin v. N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2009 ND 181, 773 N.W.2d 190 ...... ¶12 Nee v. Linwood Securities Co., 174 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1949) ...... ¶24 Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 NW 2d 741, 756 (N.D. 1978)...... ¶13 Riddle v. Riddle, 2018 ND 62, 907 N.W.2d 769 ...... ¶9 Riemers v. O'Halloran, 2004 ND 79, 678 N.W.2d 547 ...... ¶13 Riemers v. State, 2007 N.D. App. 3, 738 N.W.2d 906 ...... ¶18 Schaffner v. Schaffner, 2017 ND 170, 898 N.W.2d 428 ...... ¶29 State v. DuPaul, 527 N.W.2d 238 (N.D. 1995) ...... ¶8 Steffes v. Steffes, 1997 ND 49, 560 N.W.2d 888...... ¶27 Weller v. Dep't of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990) ...... ¶14 Wheeler v. Burgum, 2018 ND 109, 910 N.W.2d 845 ...... ¶9 Wolt v. Wolt, 2010 ND 26, 778 N.W.2d ...... ¶27 Statutes N.D.C.C. § 14-05-22(2) ...... ¶28 N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2 ...... ¶25 N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(2,3) ...... ¶28 Rules N.D.R.Ct 8.2(1)(A,B) ...... ¶16 Treatises Wright & Miller, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Sec. 2585, p. 729 ...... ¶25

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[¶1] This is an appeal filed by the Defendant/Appellant, Charlotte Horst, (“Horst”) from a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgement, issued by the

Honorable Bruce A. Romanick, Judge of the District Court, in and for Burleigh County on

August 16, 2018. The Plaintiff/Appellee, Matthew Hagen, (“Hagen”) was awarded primary residential responsibility of the Parties’ minor children subject to Horst’s supervised parenting time which would graduate from supervised parenting time to unsupervised parenting time upon the completion of certain conditions deemed necessary to protect the well-being of the minor children.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

[¶2] The Parties are the biological parents of two minor children who are twins, namely

D.X.H. and M.J.H., both born in 2011 (the “Children”). The Parties were never married.

[¶3] Prior to the commencement of this action, there was no court order establishing primary residential responsibility and/or parenting time for the Children. Both Children resided with Horst from the time of their birth until September, 2015.

[¶4] In September, 2015 Horst left the state of North Dakota with the Children, and two additional children who are not subject to this action (“Non-Subject Children”) and whose biological father is Scott Hagen, the man to whom Horst was married prior to conceiving the Children. Horst’s reason for removal of the four children from the State of North Dakota was to protect them from what she perceived to be a threats of coup d’etat by then president

Barak Obama, his intentionally inflicted crash of the United States Economy, and launch of high-altitude electromagnetic pulse missiles across the world by the United States military, including upon the United States itself. E.g., Pl. Ex. 1, Doc Index # 12, and Trial

at 00:20:41. Horst was discovered in Baltimore, Maryland a few days after absconding.

State v. Horst, No. 08-2015-CR-02591 (Comp. with Aff., Doc. Index #1) It was Horst’s intent to remove all four children from the United States via boat and take them to Jericho.

Trial at 00:20:55.

[¶5] Burleigh County District Court had issued an order awarding the Non-Subject

Childrens’ father with primary residential responsibility and forbidding removal of the

Non-Subject Children from the State of North Dakota prior to Horst’s absconding with all four children. Scott Horst v. Charlotte Horst, No. 30-07-C-00374 (J, Doc Index # 16; Am.

J., Doc. Index #19; and Second Am. J, Doc, Index #37). On account of Horst’s disregard for said order, Horst was arrested, charged, and convicted of removal of a child from the state in violation of a custody decree, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-18, a Class C Felony. State v. Horst,

No. 08-2015-CR-02591 (Criminal J., Doc Index #28)

[¶6] Upon Horst’s arrest in Baltimore, the Children were placed into the care of Hagen and the Children have resided with Hagen since.

[¶7] Horst was sentenced to 1 year, all but 133 suspended as a result of the removal charge. Id. As a term of her supervised probation, Horst was prohibited from leaving the

State of North Dakota. Id. Horst violated the terms of her probation by going to and remaining in Kansas. Id. (Pet. for Revocation, Doc. Index #36). Horst was arrested on a warrant issued upon a petition for revocation, Id. (Sheriff’s Return of Service, Doc. Index

#39) and extradited to North Dakota, Id. (Waiver of Extradition, Doc. Index #40). After a hearing on the revocation petition, Horst was sentenced to 163 days, with credit for 155 served. Id. (Second Am. Criminal J., Doc. Index # 53).

LAW AND ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE LAW WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT HORST DID NOT HAVE RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL FOR THIS CUSTODY MATTER.

a. Standard of Review

[¶8] “The standard for review of denial of appointed counsel is whether the court acted arbitrarily, unconscionably, or unreasonably in doing so.” State v. DuPaul, 527 N.W.2d

238, 240 (N.D. 1995).

b. Appointed Legal Counsel Is Not A Rights In Civil Matters Adjudicating Primary Residential Responsibility.

[¶9] "Generally, there is no right to counsel in civil matters." Riddle v. Riddle, 2018

ND 62, ¶16, 907 N.W.2d 769; Davis v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1996). Where a district court has authority to appoint counsel in non-criminal matters, the Legislature has identified a source of funding and provided that upon a finding of indigency an applicant is entitled to appointed counsel. Wheeler v. Burgum, 2018 ND 109 ¶9, 910 N.W.2d

845 (pointing to N.D.C.C. § 25-03.1-13; N.D.C.C. § 27-20-26; and N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-

05 as examples).

[¶10] This action is a self-evidently civil action. The only issues that were to be determined by the District Court in this case were which parent should be awarded primary residential responsibility of the Children and the appropriate parenting time schedule for the Children. Horst has not provided any case or statute that provides for appointed counsel in this type of civil action and, therefore, the Court acted in accordance with the law when it declined to appoint counsel to Horst.

[¶11] Likewise, Horst provides no support for her assertion that “war crimes” can be committed through civil law nor, even if somehow possible, that Horst would consequentially be eligible for appointed counsel. Furthermore, any of the tangential issues raised by Horst such as “war crimes” and the application of international treaties vis-a-vis her marriage to Scott Horst are irrelevant to the District Court’s determination of primary residential responsibility and parenting time, consequently any rights to appointed counsel that may or may not exist for such issues are, likewise, irrelevant.

II. THE COURT DID NOT ACT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY WHEN IT ISSUED AN EMERGENCY EX PARTE INTERIM ORDER WITHOUT FIRST HOLDING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND, AFTER AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WAS HELD WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED, ISSUING AN INTERIM ORDER.

a. Standard of Review.

[¶12] “The standard of review for a claimed violation of a constitutional right is de novo”. Beylund v. Levi, 2015 ND 18, ¶9, 889 N.W.2d 907; Martin v. N.D. Dep't of Transp.,

2009 ND 181, ¶ 5, 773 N.W.2d 190.

b. Emergency Ex Parte Orders Are Not Inherently Unconstitutional, and The Court Adhered to All Due Process Requirements.

[¶13] It is a well-established rule of law that an enactment of the Legislature is presumed to be valid, and the presumption is conclusive unless clearly shown to be in contravention of the State or Federal Constitution. Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 NW

2d 741, 756 (N.D. 1978). “A party must do more than submit bare assertions to adequately raise constitutional issues. A party asserting a constitutional claim must bring up the heavy artillery or forego the claim.” Riemers v. O'Halloran, 2004 ND 79, ¶6, 678 N.W.2d 547

(internal citations omitted).

[¶14] While to the author’s knowledge, neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor Supreme Court of North Dakota have adjudged the issue of whether civil emergency ex parte orders regarding custody are constitutional, this topic is extensively discussed in the context of emergency child removal on account of allegation of deprivation. It is well- settled that the requirements of process may be delayed where emergency action is necessary to avert imminent harm to a child provided that adequate post-deprivation process to ratify the emergency action is promptly accorded. E.g., Weller v. Dep't of Social

Services, 901 F.2d 387, 393 (4th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Hennepin County, 858 F.2d 1325, 1329

(8th Cir. 1988); Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, 380-81 (7th Cir.

1988); Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 1985); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566

F.2d 817, 826 (2d Cir. 1977). In such cases, due process requires that the opportunity to be heard “is not eliminated, but merely postponed.” Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 826 (citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).

[¶15] Ex parte motions in child deprivations matters are highly similar to ex parte motions in child custody matters and, therefore, provide strong persuasive precedent for a similar outcome. Custody matters and child deprivation matters invoke the same fundamental constitutional rights of a parent to a child, i.e. to what extent and in what circumstances a parent may be deprived of custody and control of their child. Moreover, the danger to a parent’s constitutional rights is less acute in custody cases where, except in extreme cases, the child will be in the custody of one of two parents with equal inherent rights instead of in the custody of the state which has no inherent rights. Consequentially, temporary suspension of due process is similarly constitutional so long as sufficient safeguard requirements are met.

[¶16] Rule 8.2 of the North Dakota Rules of Court, which delineates the procedure for ex parte custody orders, has built due process safeguards which sufficiently address the balance for safety of the children and an opportunity for the non-moving party to be promptly heard. Firstly, an ex parte custody order cannot be granted except in the case of exceptional circumstances, which is defined as “[t]hreat of imminent danger to any party or minor child of the party; or circumstances indicating that an ex parte interim order is necessary to protect […] any minor children of the parties[…]. N.D.R.Ct 8.2(1)(A,B).

Secondly the party requesting the order must put forth an affidavit establishing good cause for the order and, consequentially, an ex parte order cannot be granted arbitrarily or for minimal reason. Id. at (2). Thirdly, reasonable efforts must be made to include the non- moving party if at all possible. Id. at (4). Fourthly, a full evidentiary hearing on the merits must be held within thirty days, ensuring that the non-moving party has a real opportunity to be heard. Id. at (5)(A). Fifthly, an ex parte order cannot be used to supplant an existing order on the merits. Id. at (7). As a consequence of the above, Rule 8.2 is constitutional.

III. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT ORDERED HORST TO PAY CHILD SUPPORT.

a. Standard of Review.

[¶17] “Child support determinations involve questions of law which are subject to the de novo standard of review, findings of fact which are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, and may, in some limited areas, be matters of discretion subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. A court errs as a matter of law when it fails to comply with the requirements of the Guidelines.” Buchholz v. Buchholz, 1999

ND 36, ¶11, 590 N.W.2d 215.

b. Child Support Obligations are Not Inherently Unconstitutional.

[¶18] “A party making a constitutional challenge must do much more than acknowledge, in passing, the constitutional difficulties of a statute, and parties must bring up the "heavy artillery" when asserting constitutional claims” Eklund v. Eklund, 538

N.W.2d 182, 188 (N.D. 1995) (holding that the appellant’s assertion of unconstitutional denial of equal protection and due process under the law, and that these statutes amount to an impermissible Bill of Attainder without citation to a single case as precedent was without merit and failed to raise a constitutional claim.) Also, Riemers v. State, 2007 N.D.

App. 3, ¶ 8, 738 N.W.2d 906 (holding that the appellant’s argument that child support orders are facially unconstitutional was insufficient when no specific case law or fact was cited in in support of the assertion).

[¶19] Here, Horst argues that a child support obligation constitutes “financial warfare” and for that reason is unconstitutional. In order to effectively raise these arguments, Horst has the obligation to do more than simply allege unconstitutionality. Horst fails to meet this obligation because she provides no citation or specific fact(s) in support of this argument and de facto, has foregone the claim.

c. The District Court Expressly Complied With the Child Support Guidelines and, Therefore, the Child Support Obligation is Correct.

[¶20] The District Court’s conclusions of law outline how the child support obligation figure was reached, and that calculation is in strict conformity with Chapter 75-02-04.1 of the North Dakota Century Code. Horst provides no fact or argument asserting that the calculated amount is incorrect. For this reason, the child support obligation should be upheld by this Court.

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISREGARDED HORST’S CLAIMS OF VIOLATIONS OF SEX TRAFFICKING LAWS, TORTURE, ATTEMPTED MAN SLAUGHTER, KIDNAPPING, AND VIOLATIONS OF THE FIRST, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, EIGHTH, NINTH, TENTH, ELEVENTH, AND TWELFTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.

a. Standard of Review

[¶21] “The interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law, which is also fully reviewable on appeal.” Estate of Allmaras, 2007 ND 130, P 13, 737 N.W.2d

612 (citing Estate of Gleeson, 2002 ND 211, P 7, 655 N.W.2d 69).

b. Horst Does Not Raise Any Valid or Rational Basis for A Finding on Any of the Above-Listed Grievances and, Therefore, The Court Was Correct In Disregarding These Arguments.

[¶22] At numerous points Horst raised claims of war crimes and a declaration of war against US citizens (18 U.S.C 113B), slavery and sex trafficking (18 U.S.C. 77), torture

(22 U.S.C. 78), attempted manslaughter (18 U.S.C. 113C), and kidnapping (78 22 U.S.C.

78, Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and Violence Against Women Act). These arguments are so detached from reality and lacking in legal or factual basis as to not warrant a response, and the District Court did not error when it refrained from addressing these arguments in its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

[¶23] Furthermore, as has been addressed elsewhere, claims of constitutional violations must be supported by concrete and specific legal precedent and/or facts, which Horst did not provide at any point in her appellant’s brief and, consequentially, she has failed to raise this issue on appeal.

V. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED A FINDING THAT IT IS IN THE MINOR CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS FOR HAGEN TO BE AWARDED PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

a. Standard of Review.

[¶24] "A finding [of fact] is 'clearly erroneous' only when, although there is some evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." The mere fact that this Court might have viewed the facts differently if it had been the initial trier of the case, does not entitle this

Court to reverse the lower court. E.g. Nee v. Linwood Securities Co., 174 F.2d 434 (8th

Cir. 1949); Wright & Miller, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Sec. 2585, p. 729

b. The Court Dedicated Significant Time Addressing Each Best Interest Factor, and Was Correct in Concluding That The Best Interest Factors Strongly Favored Hagen.

[¶25] “Although the trial court must consider each best interest factor under N.D.C.C.

§ 14-09-06.2, a separate finding is not required for each factor. The trial court need only consider all of the best interest factors and make findings with sufficient specificity to enable the reviewing court to understand the basis for its decisions.” Fonder v. Fonder,

2012 ND 228, ¶11, 823 N.W.2d 504.

[¶26] In its 28-page Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment, the District Court extensively outlines the facts presented to the District Court, expressly contemplates and weighs credibility of the witnesses, and lays out in detail its application of the facts to the best interest factors. The Horst conflates dissatisfaction with the outcome with error in the fact finding; Horst points to nothing in the record which suggests that the

District Court made any error in its findings, let alone erred sufficiently to be overturned or to have the matter remanded. For this reason, this Court should affirm the findings of fact of the District Court.

VI. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERROR WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS IN THE MINOR CHILDREN’S BEST INTEREST TO AWARD HORST SUPERVISED PARENTING TIME INSTEAD OF UNSUPERVISED PARENTING TIME AND TO CONDITION THE AVAILABILITY OF UNSUPERVISED PARENTING TIME ON THE SATISFACTION OF SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS.

a. Standard of Review.

[¶27] A district court's decision on parenting time is a finding of fact, which we review under the clearly erroneous standard of review. Wolt v. Wolt, 2010 ND 26, ¶ 38, 778

N.W.2d 786, Bertsch v. Bertsch, 2006 ND 31¶ 5, 710 N.W.2d 113. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support the finding, or if, on review of the entire evidence, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made." Steffes v. Steffes, 1997 ND 49, ¶

8, 560 N.W.2d 888.

b. Supervised Visitation Is Necessary to Protect the Safety of the Children.

[¶28] A district court should grant such rights of parenting time as will enable the child to maintain a parent-child relationship that will be beneficial to the child, unless the court finds, after a hearing, that such rights of parenting time are likely to endanger the child's physical or emotional health, N.D.C.C. § 14-05-22(2), or there is evidence of physical or sexual abuse by a parent, N.D.C.C. § 14-09-29(2,3). In the case of a finding of endangerment, the court may mandate supervised parenting time, Schaffner v.

Schaffner, 2017 ND 170 ¶ 9, 898 N.W.2d 428, or curtail or eliminat parenting time entirely if justified, Marquette v. Marquette, 2006 ND 154 ¶9, 719 N.W.2d 321.

[¶29] Upon a finding of risk to the wellbeing of a child evidenced by the non-custodial parent’s actions, it is appropriate for a court to condition parenting time on the completion of counseling services. See Lawrence v. Delkamp 2003 ND 53 ¶¶ 11, 12, 658 N.W.2d 758.

[¶30] The District Court clearly identified numerous reasons why the safety of the

Children necessitated supervised visitation. In particular, the District Court identifies the following severe issues with Horst’s parenting and decision making which put the Children at immediate and obvious risk if placed in her care without supervision:

a. Insufficient food and nutrition, (citation to findings document, then id

afterwards), Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for J., Doc.

Index # 144, ¶34;

b. Inadequate clothing for acclimate weather and extremely poor hygiene,

Id., at ¶ 35;

c. Insecure and constantly fluctuating housing, Id., at ¶36;

d. Unsafe and unsanitary living conditions, Id., at ¶37;

e. Anger management issues resulting in physical abuse of the Children, Id.,

at ¶¶ 65, 69;

f. Delusional thoughts which lead to irrational belie and behavior, Id., at

¶66;

g. Indications of an ongoing flight risk, Id., at ¶66; and

h. Inability and/or unwillingness to ensure that the people whom the Children

are living with are safe, Id., at ¶70;

The record and evidence give no iota of indication that the Children would receive different care and/or not be inappropriately removed from the State of North Dakota if Horst were immediately allowed to exercise unsupervised parenting time. For this reason, the District

Court was clearly correct when granted Horst only supervised parenting time.

c. The Prerequisites to Unsupervised Visitation Are Tailored Specifically to The Perceived Danger and, Therefore, Are Reasonable and Supported by the Evidence.

[¶31] The District Court determined that to protect the safety of the Children, Horst must first complete the following: (a) establish a steady and consistent living situation in the same housing and with consistent and safe living-mates, if any, for a period of six (6) months; (b) complete an intensive anger management therapy, as evidenced by a signed letter from Horst’s treating therapist, stating that he/she believes that Horst has a firm grasp on anger management strategies; and (c) complete an in-person parenting classes as evidenced by documentation proving her participation. Each of these requirements goes to the heart of the most significant safety concerns facing the Children while in Horst’s care.

These restrictions are far from unreasonable given the evidence presented to the District

Court and are less restrictive than those requested by Hagen in his proposed findings.

Because the prerequisites are bare minimum necessary for plausible belief that the care the

Children will receive during unsupervised parenting time will be adequate, the Court was correct in requiring them.

CONCLUSION

[¶32] The District Court effectively took into consideration all evidence and testimony presented to it and did not err in any application of the law, conclusion, or finding of fact.

As the District Court has made no error, this Court should affirm the District Court’s decision in full.

Respectfully submitted this 30th day of November, 2018.

/s/ Mary DePuydt Mary DePuydt; ND ID: #08267 Attorney for the Appellees/Plaintiffs 511 Beaver Ave P.O. Box 215 Wishek, ND 58495 (701) 452 - 4340 [email protected]

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned attorney, hereby certify pursuant to rule 5(f) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure that my office served the foregoing Brief of Appellees by e-mailing true and correct copies of the same on November 30, 2018 to:

Charlotte Horst Defendant/Appellant [email protected]

/s/ Mary DePuydt Mary DePuydt; ND ID: #08267

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing Brief of Appellees complies with the type-volume limitations imposed by the North Dakota Rules of Appellant Procedure. The Brief of Appellants contains 3378 words of proportionately spaced type as counted by Microsoft Word, the software used to prepare the Brief of Appellees.

/s/ Mary DePuydt Mary DePuydt; ND ID: #08267