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Written evidence submitted by CSW (IRN0014) frequency, organisation and weaponry that this nomenclature no longer suffices. About CSW 4. The violence has mutated into a deadly CSW1 is a human rights organisation specialising campaign with outworkings that increasingly in the right to freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) reflect Nigeria’s main religious fault line. that works on over 20 countries across Africa, Asia, Religion and ethnicity function as effective Latin America and the Middle East. Nigeria is one rallying points for the militia. In a region where of CSW’s focus countries. ethnicity generally correlates with religion, This submission focuses on the country’s critical these attacks appear to constitute a campaign security situation and growing repression, which of ethno-religious cleansing. militate against investment and sustainable 5. The government’s seeming inability – or development. unwillingness – to address this violence Overview of the Security Situation definitively contrasts with its harsh treatment of civil society and ordinary members of the 1. Despite an electoral victory in 2015 bolstered public who peaceably express concern or by President Muhammadu Buhari’s military dissent. credentials and stated aim of defeating the 6. In a 2020 report CSW highlighted Nigeria’s Boko Haram terrorist insurgency, his critical security vacuum,3 having warned administration has overseen a relentless earlier that “this pivotal West African nation decline in security. [was] close to failing.”4 In December CSW 2. Resurgent terrorist factions continue to launch warned again of the urgent need “to ensure deadly attacks in the northeast. In the protection for Nigeria’s besieged citizens, and northwest attacks by diverse armed gangs of to avert the nation’s descent into failed Fulani ethnicity primarily effect the statehood.” However, by May 2021, seasoned predominantly Hausa Muslim farmers. Attacks observers had concluded that Nigeria’s perpetrated by assailants alternatively termed inability to “provide peace and stability” for its armed Fulani herders, Fulani militants or citizens has converted what was a “weak state” Fulani militia are reported regularly from into a failed one. “Nigeria has become a fully central states, particularly Benue, Kaduna and failed state of critical geopolitical concern. Its Plateau.2 These attacks are now occurring in failure matters because the peace and southern Nigeria with increased frequency. prosperity of Africa and preventing the spread 3. There is a long history of disputes between of disorder and militancy around the globe nomadic herders and farming communities depend on a stronger Nigeria.”5 across the Sahel, occasioned by competition for land and water, and exacerbated by Non-State Actors: Boko Haram/Islamic desertification and other factors. However, State West Africa Province (ISWAP) current attacks are so asymmetric in terms of 1 https://www.csw.org.uk/about.htm 3 2 These terms are not a condemnation of an entire people https://www.csw.org.uk/2020/06/15/report/4689/article.ht group, as some have claimed erroneously; they are used in an m effort to distinguish this irregular trained and well-armed 4 faction from law abiding Fulani communities who have lived https://www.csw.org.uk/2020/01/30/press/4542/article.ht peaceably alongside farming communities, and who are often m stigmatised and, infrequently, targeted due to their shared 5” https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/05/27/nigeria-is-a-failed- ethnicity with these perpetrators of violence. state/ 7. Violations of the right to freedom of religion or links with some in Katsina and Sokoto states, belief (FoRB) have occurred for decades in as well as in Adamawa, Kogi and Taraba states northern states, bolstered by a comprehensive in the centre. By September 2020 the governor marginalisation of minority faiths dating back of Kano, a state which has yet to be affected, to the colonial era. 6 Longstanding impunity for called for an increased military presence, as religion-related crimes has assisted in creating terrorists were beginning to gather in the an enabling environment for the emergence of Falgore Forest area.8 extremist groups with an antipathy towards 11. In May 2021 news emerged that ISWAP had FoRB that allows for violence.7 overrun the original Boko Haram’s Sambisa 8. Terrorist factions operating in the northeast Forest headquarters, compelled Shekau to continue to mount campaigns of murder, rape, surrender, and asked him to step down. He and abduction. Both Boko Haram factions have chose to take his own life instead by detonating been gaining ground since 2018, despite a suicide vest.9 official proclamations of their “technical 12. In June ISWAP reportedly arrested 30 defeat” in 2015. commanders loyal to Shekau and appointed 9. Boko Haram reportedly controls 8 out of 10 Abu-Musaab Al Barnawi, son of Boko Haram’s local government areas (LGAs) in Borno State. founder Mohammed Yusuf, to replace Shekau In January, at least 25 soldiers died when a in Borno.10 suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden 13. The ramifications of Shekau’s death are still truck into a military convoy in Goniri, on the manifesting. The sect could either be border of Yobe and Borno states. In February, weakened by fissures, or consolidate behind at least 20 soldiers died in an ambush in ISWAP’s dogma, which includes ensuring Malari, Borno State. Ten people were killed and Muslim communities are not harmed unless 47 injured in a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) they are deemed apostate.11 attack on two districts in the Borno state 14. It also remains be seen whether ISWAP’s capital, Maiduguri. An attack in May on the emphasis on safeguarding the Muslim remote town of Ajiri in Borno state killed 10 community will facilitate an alliance with the al civilians, 12 vigilantes and five soldiers. The Qaeda affiliate known as Ansaru, which is violence continued throughout the Ramadan operating again in the northwest following a season. six-year hiatus.12 10. During 2020, the Abubakar Shekau faction progressively secured alliances with bandits operating in Niger and Zamfara states in the northwest and was reportedly formalising Non-State Actors: Militia Violence 6 Non-Muslims in Shari’a states report being unable to enjoy rights to which they are constitutionally entitled, including difficulty or denial of access to schools, social amenities, and 8 work in the security sector, among others, and the denial of https://humangle.ng/fear-as-terrorists-invade-falgore- promotions beyond a certain level. In most Shari’a states, the forest-in-kano/ 9 construction of churches is severely restricted; most https://humangle.ng/boko-haram-strongman-shekau-dead- congregations cannot purchase land for church construction, as-iswap-fighters-capture-sambisa-forest/ nor obtain certificates of ownership for land purchased for 10 https://guardian.ng/news/albarnawy-replaces-shekau-as- this purpose. In many Shari’a states, and particularly in rural iswap-boko-haram-leader/ areas, the education of female minors from minority faith 11 Such designations are undertaken in accordance with IS’ communities is frequently curtailed by abduction, forcible Takfiri ideology. conversion and marriage without parental consent, 12 Ansaru split from Shekau because its members objected to undertaken by local men, often with the complicity of attacks on Christian and government targets in which traditional leaders and religious institutions. members of the Muslim community were increasingly 7 More recent incarnations include Maitatsine in the 1980s, becoming collateral damage. However, al Qaeda does not quite Kata Kalo in 2009 adhere to a same Takfiri ideology as IS. 15. Violence perpetrated by an irregular armed LGA, while eight were killed in Dong village, Jos faction comprising members of Fulani ethnicity North LGA. has been reported in Plateau state since March 2010. Attacks on non-Muslim farming 18. Benue, the first state to ban open grazing of communities elsewhere in central Nigeria have cattle in 2018 following significant militia been ongoing since 2011 but increased attacks, also experiences ongoing violence. On exponentially in 2015.13 In a region where 20 March the state’s governor, Samuel Ortom, ethnicity generally correlates with religion, narrowly escaped assassination when he was ethnic minorities are invariably also religious ambushed on his farm in the Tyomu minorities. Consequently, these attacks may community.15 Blaming the leadership of Miyetti constitute ethno-religious cleansing, as land is Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria frequently occupied after its owners flee to (MACBAN) for the attack, the governor said he safety. was marked for elimination, but would not be 16. According to the Southern Kaduna Peoples intimidated into restoring open grazing. While Union (SOKAPU), the attacks have displaced at MACBAN denied involvement, the Fulani least 143 southern Kaduna communities. Nationality Movement, (FUNAM), which had “Over 160,000 persons, mostly women and previously asserted ownership of Nigerian land children, [are] now living under very harsh and dehumanising conditions devoid of food, from Sokoto to the Atlantic, claimed medication, and other necessities of life,”14 responsibility in a press release. Stating that it because there are no official camps for tens of acted on behalf of millions of Fulani in 15 thousands of internally displaced persons countries, FUNAM called the governor an (IDPs). Attacks occur almost daily; a recent infidel who was attempting to destroy Fulani attack on the Goska community in Jema’a LGA values and inheritance: “Wherever you are, during the afternoon of 31 May claimed four once you are against Fulani long term interest, lives. In the previous week, Godogodo town we shall get you down.”16 and Golkofa village in Jema’a LGA experienced 19. In April over 70 people were killed and many similar attacks. more were wounded in a series of attacks 17. Plateau state also continues to experience within a two-week period on Agatu, Guma, worrying levels of militia violence.