VOLUME 53 “Get Lost!” European Return Policies in Practice Published by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung 1 2 European Return Policies in Practice Policies European Return “Get Lost!” DEMOCRACY “Get Lost!” European Return Policies in Practice Published by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Published under the following Creative Commons License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0. Attribution – You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author or licensor (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Noncommercial – You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No derivatives – If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you may not distribute the modified material. “Get Lost!” European Return Policies in Practice Produced by the Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Concept and editing: Kirsten Maas-Albert Translation into English by Jan K. Schwing, ready to read Production : Micheline Gutman Title photo: Landing, shot at Vancouver Airport, 陈涣霖 Special thanks to all the photographers for their consent to use their pictures. ISBN 978-9-46400-741-1 This publication is available online on eu.boell.org and can be ordered at Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung European Union Rue du Luxembourg, 47-51 – B-1050 Brussels – Belgium T +32 2 743 00 E [email protected] W eu.boell.org CONTENTS Preface 7 Bente Scheller Unwelcome in One’s Own Country – Return to Syria 11 Thomas Schmid A “Safe Country of Origin” with Persisting Problems – 35 Return to Kosovo Thomas Schmid Reintegration under the Pressures of Stabilisation – Return to Tunisia 53 Friederike Stahlmann Humanitarian Plight and Violence – Return to Afghanistan 71 Thomas Schmid “If You Never Travel, You Will Never Know if Life Is Better Elsewhere” – 91 Return to Senegal The Authors 110 PREFACE “People who have no right to stay in Europe must be returned to their countries of origin. When only 36% of irregular migrants are returned, it is clear we need to signifi- cantly step up our work. This is the only way Europe will be able to show solidarity with refugees in real need of protection.”1 In his 2017 State of the Union speech, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker summed up in two sentences what has become a trend in recent years: the European Commission as well as the EU Member States are putting great effort into building a more “effective” return policy. Various documents, recommendations and legislative acts have since been pub- lished and set in motion by the European Commission and the Council, such as the Commission’s European Agenda on Migration (2015), the EU Action Plan on return (2015), the Renewed Action Plan on return (2017) and a Proposal for the Recast of the Return Directive (2018). The new European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has already announced a draft proposal for a new migration package. Her Commission is on track to present this in the first or second quarter of 2020, and return policy is high on the agenda. Yet it is for the EU Member States to take all the necessary steps to make sure migrants are returned. Under EU rules, Member States have to first encourage migrants to participate in a voluntary return programme. As a measure of “last resort”, Member States must enforce return, including by use of “coercive methods”, such as detention.2 The setting up of a Frontex Return Office was therefore intended to scale up the Agency’s assistance to Member States. Among the tasks assigned to Frontex is that of ensuring the coordination or the organisation of joint return operations of Member States, including by means of chartering aircraft for such operations. According to the figures made available by the Agency, in 2017 the number of people removed with support by Frontex (renamed the European Border and Coast Guard Agency after a legislative reform adopted in 2016) exceeded 13,000.3 In parallel with its increasing role in removal operations, Frontex has come under scrutiny regarding the respect of fundamental rights in the context of such operations.4 The Commission, however, did make the necessary legislative proposals to expand the role of Frontex on return, to enhance EU information systems, enable an exchange of information on return decisions and facilitate enforcement across the European Union. 1 Jean-Claude Juncker, State of the Union Address, 13 September 2017, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_17_3165 (retrieved on 25.11.2019) 2 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/e-library/multimedia/publications/towards-an-effective-re- turn-policy_en 3 Frontex (2018). Return. Online: https://frontex.europa.eu/operations/return/ 4 https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2019C47/ Preface 7 Besides this, the Commission has intensified efforts to convince countries of ori- gin to readmit their nationals. High-level dialogues and financial support to third countries are cornerstones of these efforts. Yet, readmission agreements are often characterised by “unbalanced reciprocities”, pointing to the fact that these agree- ments involve different costs and benefits for the countries of origin and destination. While readmissions address a key concern for countries of destination (the removal of migrants), they can place substantial economic and even political burdens on countries of origin, while the economy of a country of origin is often dependent on the remittances of its expatriates living abroad. Funding is mainly coming from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). Under AMIF, Member States have been allocated more than €800 million for return operations for the period 2014-2020. The Commission is investing €5 million in a Readmission Capacity Building Facility and has proposed to increase the Frontex budget for returns. As of 2021, AMIF will be integrated into the new “Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). “The gist of what is being proposed – vigorously by some Member States – is that EU development assistance should be subject to annual assessments which would review, inter alia, the third country’s performance in relation to the EU’s migration control objectives, which include cooperation on readmission. Depending on the outcome of the assess- ment, funding allocation would be increased or decreased”.5 It is true that the flipside of the right to protection is the obligation to leave the country in the event of a failed asylum application. But in spite of all the legal and executive efforts, the number of actual deportations de facto has not increased. In 2018, 478,155 persons were ordered to leave the EU, of which 35.63% effectively returned to a third country,6 while in 2017, 36.6% of the 516,115 persons ordered to leave the EU actually left to a third country.7 But while forced return is not seen as working well enough, efforts to raise the numbers of “voluntary” returnees are being reinforced. Between 2014 and 2018, 116,723 persons received assistance from EU funds to return “voluntarily” to their country of origin.8 In addition, Member States support “voluntary returns” with their own pro- grammes, such as Germany’s “Perspektive Heimat” funded by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The resources made available for it are enormous and advisory centres for migrants are popping up all over in coun- tries of origin. The centres aim to advise potential migrants, discourage them from leaving the country and help to reintegrate returnees. Often, migrants only have the 5 https://www.ecre.org/ecre-publications/ 6 European Commission, DG Migration and Home Affairs, 2018 Annual Activity report, June 2019, p. 10, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/home_aar_2018_final.pdf (retrieved on 25.11.2019) 7 ECRE, Return Policy: Desperately seeking evidence and balance, July 2019, p. 2, https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Policy-Note-19.pdf (retrieved on 25.11.2019) in Practice Policies European Return 8 Fund facts from the Members State National Programmes in the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund 2014-2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/publications/fund-facts-members-state-nation- al-programmes-asylum-migration-and-integration-fund-2014_en (retrieved on 25.11.2019) “Get Lost!” 8 choice to agree to a “voluntary return” or to risk being forcefully deported, which raises serious questions of how voluntary these returns are. The overall emphasis of current EU policies on increasing the “effectiveness” of return, including through the use of informal and non-binding readmission arrange- ments, raises a set of issues concerning the impact of those measures on relevant EU standards in a number of areas, including respect of fair and legal remedy proce- dures, identification and re-documentation of migrants, and the effective protection of personal data. Besides, deportations to Afghanistan which are executed by differ- ent European Member States, clearly ignore the situation on the ground and severely endanger the lives of the deportees. The discussions over potential safe returns to Syria equally ignore the situation on the ground and threats and dangers to the indi- viduals. In general, political and public awareness of deportations, “voluntary” returns and the fate of those affected often go no further than the Member States or EU bor- ders. To date, there has been little interest in the individual’s life or at time survival back in their countries of origin, nor concerning the question whether “voluntary” returns and reintegration efforts had any chance to be successful. Against this backdrop, this publication intends to shed light on what are at times dramatic realities for people returning to Afghanistan and Syria and aims to contrib- ute facts to the current debate on such returns. The contributions concerning Tunisia, Senegal and Kosovo, on the other hand, provide insights into the current return and reintegration programmes and place them within the policy context of “tackling the root causes of flight” as well as domestic economic situations in countries of origin.