Images of the Adversary NATO Assessments of the Soviet Union, 1953–1964

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HatzivassiNATO Assessmentsliou of the Soviet Union

✣ Evanthis Hatzivassiliou

Analyses of the Cold War have long included discussion of the ri- val military alliances—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact—but the availability of new archival material in recent years, especially from the former Soviet bloc, has greatly enriched the discussion. Of the two alliances, NATO is, perhaps, the more complex case.1 A voluntary union of sovereign states that found themselves in different geopolitical conditions (the most powerful member being an ocean apart from the weaker, more exposed ones), NATO was not a supranational body that could make or dictate decisions,2 and yet it was crucial in determining the policies of the West. Special attention has been paid on its internal crisis of the 1960s, when Charles de Gaulle’s France withdrew from the integrated command of the alliance.3 The larger part of this scholarship examines the national policies of the

1. The view has also been expressed that the Warsaw Pact Organization “cannot be called an alliance in the classical sense, since Moscow had full military control of the area.” See Odd Arne Westad, “Secrets of the Second World: The Russian Archives and the Reinterpretation of Cold War History,” Diplo- matic History, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring 1997), p. 269. This article will not expand on the important problems of theory or terminology or on the differences between a voluntary alliance and the quasi- imperial character of Soviet control of Eastern Europe. Still, the article shows that the nature of NATO as a voluntary union of countries enjoying a signiªcant degree of autonomy from the major partner of the alliance substantially affected the nature of the analysis and the conclusions of the reports that are the subject of the article. 2. See this point, regarding the nature of the alliance, in John G. McGinn, “The Politics of Collective Inaction: NATO’s Response to the Prague Spring,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 111–138. 3. See among others, James Ellison, The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963–1968 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Andreas Wenger, “Cri- sis and Opportunity: NATO and the Miscalculation of Détente, 1966–1968,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 2004), pp. 22–74; N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge (London: Routledge, 2006); Maurice Vaïsse, Pi- erre Melandri, and Frédéric Bozo, eds., La France et l’OTAN, 1949–1996 (Paris: Editions Complexe, 1996); Frédéric Bozo, Deux stratégies pour l’Europe: De Gaulle, les Etats-Unis et l’alliance atlantique,

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member-states within the NATO context, but new studies have also appeared on the alliance’s functions as an organization—for example, its initiatives on propaganda and psychological warfare.4 The nature of NATO as a multilat- eral defense structure and as a forum for the projection of national policies makes it an interesting subject for research. The recent release of a large part of its archival material greatly facilitates the process.5 This article presents the conclusions of the NATO study groups on the non-military aspects of Soviet power—especially economic growth, the political system, and the prospects of Soviet policy—during the Khrushchev era. The analysis focuses on the documents of the International Staff and will not include NATO’s views on the military balance. This issue was handled also by the alliance’s Military Committee and involved a different set of consider- ations. The article is not a study of Soviet policy itself (for which information can be found in specialized works6), but on NATO’s perceptions of Soviet potential. The emphasis will be placed on the memoranda submitted to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) by the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy, the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy, the Committee of Political Advisers, the Committee of Economic Advisers, and the Atlantic Policy Advi- sory Group. These memoranda formed the basis for the discussions in the ministerial meetings of the NAC. The work of these bodies began in 1951–1952 amid the stalemate in Ko- rea, when it became clear that the Cold War would be a long process, the outcome of which would be decided by the long-term evolution of the relative strength, economic and political as well as military, of the two worlds. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, as the Soviet Union was becoming active in the periphery (which would later be termed the “Third World”), separate documents were issued on Moscow’s policies on the Middle East, Africa, and Latin

1958–1969 (Paris: Editions Plon et Fondation Charles de Gaulle, 1996); and Georges-Henri Soutou, L’alliance incertaine: Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands, 1954–1996 (Paris: Editions Fayard, 1996). 4. Linda Risso, “‘Enlightening Public Opinion’: A Study of NATO’s Information Policies between 1949 and 1959 Based on Recently Declassiªed Documents,” Cold War History, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Febru- ary 2007), pp. 45–74. 5. On the NATO Archives, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The Development of the NATO Archives,” Cold War History, Vol. 3, No. 3 (April 2003), pp. 103–106. 6. For general works, see Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945–1970 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II (New York: Macmillan, 1992); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996); and Odd Arne Westad, Sven Holtsmark, and Iver Neumann, eds., The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945–1989 (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1994).

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America. This article deals with the documents presenting economic and political developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Assessing a New Environment, 1953–1956

The question of Soviet policy in the post-Stalin era was raised in December 1952 by the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy, which stressed that the transfer of power in a totalitarian state could prove a delicate process.7 Iosif Stalin’s death in March 1953 brought Western insecurities to the fore- front. During the ministerial meeting of the NAC, in May, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles took the lead in stressing that despite declarations about peaceful coexistence the new Soviet leadership had changed only its tactics, not its aims. The USSR was, and would remain, a “total dictatorship.” Dulles’s colleagues from the other member-states expressed agreement.8 By late 1953 the NATO analysts were in a position to sketch a more detailed picture. In December 1953 the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy reported that the transition in the Kremlin had been successfully com- pleted. The new leaders had announced their intention to raise living stan- dards in the country and appeared willing to lessen international tensions through their advocacy of peaceful coexistence, the encouragement of East- West trade, the acceptance of high-level talks, and the Korean armistice. However, no change in the ideology, totalitarian structure, or ultimate aims of the regime could be traced, and Soviet preparedness for war remained at a high level. The working group noted some differences in the new regime compared to the Stalin era: no single ruler had emerged, and the prime minister, Georgii Malenkov, was a primus inter pares, with Nikita Khrushchev, the ªrst secretary of the Communist Party (CPSU), as the second most important personality. The working group stressed that loyalty was to be toward the party rather than toward a speciªc individual. Some concessions to the Soviet public, such as the amnesty of many gulag prisoners, the termination of the “doctors’ plot” campaign, and the promise of a rise in the standard of living, were seen as part of the effort to consolidate the new regime. Still, uncertain-

7. North Atlantic Council (NAC) Memorandum, “Trends of Soviet Policy,” 1 December 1952, CM(52)116, in NATO Archives, International Staff, Brussels (hereinafter referred to as NATO Ar- chives). The memorandum noted that the Soviet government viewed the development of its economic strength “as the key not only to their own security but to the outcome of the ‘two worlds’ struggle.” During the discussion in the NAC, the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, and his French counterpart, Robert Schuman, asked that Chinese capabilities be taken into account as well. See NAC Ministerial Meeting Records, 16 December 1952, CVR(52)38, in NATO Archives. 8. NAC Ministerial Meeting Records, 21 and 23 April 1953, CVR(53)20, in NATO Archives.

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ties remained: “Beria’s fall, however, does suggest that genuine collective rule is incompatible with the totalitarian nature of the Soviet State.” Noting the earlier (since December 1952) deªnition that “‘peaceful co-existence’ is in fact no more than the Soviet name for the Soviet policy that we call ‘all mischief short of war,’” the working group called for caution, stressing that Moscow’s methods and tactics could “undergo considerable mutations in order to take advantage of circumstances.”9 These observations became the basis of NATO studies during the subsequent years. Notably, the title of the relevant documents was partially revised to become “trends and implications of Soviet policy,” an indication that the NATO experts were aware that they were studying a much more mobile and energetic opponent. The working group noted that the post-Stalin regime had stabilized its position. The fall of Malenkov in early 1955 was attributed to disagreements over priorities regarding the consumer drive or the emphasis on heavy industry. The internal power struggle was masked behind disagreements over policy, mostly Malenkov’s advocacy of intensive methods for increasing agricultural production and Khrushchev’s preference for extensive methods. Noting that the post-Malenkov balance of power in Moscow was still “unstable” and that the tendency was eventually to concentrate power in the hands of one man, the NATO experts stressed that nothing “indicate[d] that the stability of the regime itself has been fundamentally af fected.”10 Khrushchev’s ascendance was seen as a partial change within a consolidated new leadership, a change that would not affect overall policy. On foreign policy, the working group stressed that peaceful coexistence focused on “inexpensive verbal appeals and symbolic acts” that could also im- press neutralist opinion in the West. Soviet foreign policy was seen as aiming to undermine the cohesion of NATO, retain strategic positions in Germany and Eastern Europe, prevent the integration of West Germany into Western defense, weaken support for the European Defense Community (EDC), split Western Europe from the United States and effect a U.S. withdrawal from the continent. According to the NATO experts, the Soviet leaders seemed genuinely to want to avoid the horrors of nuclear war, but at the same time they used the theme of nuclear disarmament as a propaganda slogan. Soviet leaders also knew that a ban on these weapons would leave the Soviet Army supreme on the European continent. Noting the close Soviet and Chi- nese coordination on Indochina during the 1954 Geneva Conference, the

9. NAC Memorandum, “Report on Trends of Soviet Policy,” 5 December 1953, CM(53)164, in NATO Archives. 10. NAC Memorandum, “Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 26 March 1955, CM(55)36, in NATO Archives; and NAC Memorandum, “Report on Trends and Implications of So- viet Policy,” 29 April 1955, CM(55)46, in NATO Archives.

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NATO experts regarded it safer to assume that Moscow and Beijing would maintain a common front, although the exact nature of their relationship was not yet clear. The pivotal point for the NATO experts was Germany and the Soviet effort to block West German rearmament. The working group repeatedly stressed that Moscow would agree to German reuniªcation only on terms ensuring that a uniªed country would sooner or later fall into its orbit. This was why the working group regarded the London Accords of autumn 1954 and the accession of West Germany to NATO as a turning point, marking a major success for Western defense and a signiªcant failure of Soviet policy. The conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955 was seen as a Soviet effort to tempt the Germans with an example of reuniªcation plus neutrality, although the NATO analysts also noted that Austrian neutrality posed serious problems of communication between NATO forces in Italy and West Ger- many. Clearly relieved by the West German accession to NATO, the experts did not express alarm either at the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact (they even noted that the Pact could be a bargaining counter in case of new discussions on European security) or at Khrushchev’s and Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin’s visit to Belgrade in May 1955. In fact, the experts had anticipated that Moscow could respond to West German rearmament by concluding an alliance with its client states. The working group insisted that the West should avoid showing signs of weakness or division.11 This fundamental conclusion—the need for unity—was strongly endorsed by the NATO statesmen at the NAC.12 Thus, in 1953–1955 the NATO experts stressed the continuity of the So- viet regime after Stalin’s death. They noted that differences in Soviet policy after March 1953 involved tactics, not the character of the Soviet polity or its foreign policy aims. They insisted that the Soviet Union could “naturally” revert to known Stalinist patterns, especially when pressed. Evidently, this conclusion was inºuenced by the Western need not to be taken off guard by the Soviet Union, but the NATO analysts underestimated the multiple changes in Soviet policymaking after March 1953, which recent research has brought to

11. NAC Memorandum, “Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 15 April 1954, CM(54)33, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 9 December 1954, CM(54)116, in NATO Archives; and NAC Memorandum, “Report on Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 29 April 1955, CM(55)46, in NATO Archives. See also NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 4 July 1955, CM(55)62, in NATO Archives; and NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 3 December 1955, CM(55)121, in NATO Archives. 12. See, for example, NAC Ministerial Meeting Record, 14 December 1953, CVR(53)53, in NATO Archives; NAC Ministerial Meeting Record, 14 December 1953, CVR(53)54, in NATO Archives; NAC Ministerial Meeting Record, 23 April 1954, CVR(54)17, in NATO Archives; NAC Ministerial Meeting Record, 9 May 1955, CVR(55)18, in NATO Archives; and NAC Ministerial Meeting Re- cord, 9 May 1955, CVR(55)19, in NATO Archives.

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light.13 They were also indirectly taking sides in an intra-Western debate: their analysis was incompatible with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s appeals for a compromise with Moscow.14 Still, the tendency expressed in the views of the majority of the member-states was to “play it safe” when facing a more mobile Kremlin. This is evident on other levels as well. Recent scholarship interprets the East German uprising in summer 1953 as a major crisis of legitimacy that had long-term consequences for the East German regime, which was the most important Soviet satellite.15 Such an interpretation does not appear in the NATO studies. Indeed, the uprising itself was not covered extensively, probably because in 1953 intelligence gathering within NATO had not yet developed signiªcantly. Although the NATO experts echoed the importance that the alliance and the United States were attributing to West Berlin,16 they refrained from pointing to opportunities for a rollback policy in East Germany or the rest of Eastern Europe. Their most pressing concern was to coordinate the NATO members’ views and responses to the ascent of So- viet power. In this respect, economic trends played a major role. The prospects of the Soviet economy, its impressive growth rates, and the relative economic growth of the two camps were thoroughly studied in the alliance.17 The issue of East- West trade was addressed in mid-1953. The relevant document was drafted by the Secretariat and was circulated by the Secretary General, Lord Ismay. The decision to initiate such a study had been reached shortly before Stalin’s death, at Turkish insistence, and was connected with the work of the Eco- nomic Commission for Europe. However, the issue became more pressing after the emergence of a new Soviet leadership. In this memorandum, “West” was taken to mean “all the trading nations, including Japan, outside the Soviet

13. See Mark Kramer, “The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Eu- rope, Part 1” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Winter 1999), pp. 3–55; Mark Kramer, “The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe, Part 2” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1999), pp. 3–38; and Mark Kramer, “The Early Post-Stalin Succes- sion Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe, Part 3” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3, (Fall 1999), pp. 3–66 . 14. On Churchill’s calls for a settlement with Moscow, see John W. Young, Winston Churchill’s Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War, 1951–5 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1996); and Klaus Larres, Churchill’s Cold War: The Politics of Personal Diplomacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002). 15. Charles S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis in Communism and the End of East Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 6, 15; Christian F. Ostermann, “The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 11, Cold War International History Project, Washington, DC, 1994; and the articles by Mark Kramer cited in note 13 supra. 16. For more on this, see David G. Coleman, “Eisenhower and the Berlin Problem, 1953–1954,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Winter 2000), pp. 3–34. 17. On the growth of the Soviet economy in the ªrst post-Stalin years, see, among others, Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 1945 (London: Longman, 2003), pp. 48–69.

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orbit,” and “East” included the People’s Republic of China. The document pointed to the low volume of East-West trade: West European exports to Eastern Europe were about two-thirds of the prewar volume, and imports from Eastern Europe no more than one-quarter of the prewar level. Trade had declined since 1949 because the Soviet-bloc countries lacked exportable sur- pluses and refused to import Western consumer goods. Furthermore, the West had imposed restrictions on exports of raw materials and manufactures of strategic importance. This hurt certain industries in Western Europe and probably made the Soviet Union more reluctant to increase the volume of exchanges. The Secretariat predicted (erroneously, as it turned out) that East— West trade would continue to decline. The memorandum concluded that trade of non-strategic goods should be encouraged, especially with the East European countries, on the condition that no Western country would become dependent on the Soviet bloc for its exports.18 In late 1954 the Secretariat presented the ªrst attempt at a thorough economic comparison of the NATO countries (including West Germany) and the Soviet bloc (excluding China), as well as a projection of the balance of economic power as it might appear twenty years in the future. The document pointed out the difªculties in such a venture, especially the unreliability of Soviet-bloc statistics, and also stressed that the study did not involve the ca- pacity of the two alliances to wage war, which would depend on additional factors, such as the resources devoted to defense or dependence on external sources of supply. Still, the ªndings were impressive. In 1952, the value of the total output of the NATO countries (including West Germany) was four times higher than the Soviet bloc’s. The output of the European NATO countries was one-and-a-half times larger, and the U.S. output two-and-a-third times larger, than that of the Soviet bloc as a whole. The average per-capita income of NATO countries was two-and-a-half times that of the Soviet bloc. Consumption of energy was four times as great in NATO as in the Soviet bloc, and steel and wheat production were three times larger. Assuming that no major war or economic depression would occur in the following twenty years, the NATO experts estimated that the rate of growth in the Soviet bloc would be considerably higher (about one-and-three-quarter times) than that of the NATO countries. The experts estimated that by 1972 the absolute margin of NATO superiority would increase but the Communist world would substantially improve its relative position. Total output in the NATO countries would be 2.75 times larger than that of the Soviet bloc, although the output of the European NATO countries would be “rather less” than the

18. NAC Memorandum, “East/West Trade,” Note by the Secretary General and Vice-Chairman of the Council, 22 June 1953, CM(53)86, in NATO Archives.

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bloc’s output. By the same time, the per-capita income in the Soviet bloc would be half the average per-capita income of the NATO countries as a whole and about 80 percent of the average of European NATO countries. The study clearly showed the importance of Europe, especially West Ger- many. Without the East European countries, the Soviet economy would still be smaller than that of the European NATO countries in 1972. But if the Soviet bloc managed to extend its hold to Western Europe, the Soviet-bloc economy would be roughly as large as the U.S. economy by the same date. Without West Germany, the West European economy would be merely half the size of that of the Soviet bloc in 1972: “Without Western Germany NATO Europe would be overshadowed.” Moreover, in the following twenty years economic growth would allow the Communist countries to extend aid to the underdeveloped states, which might also view Communism as a model for rapid development. The study concluded that the West should above all preserve its unity: “the NATO countries must stand together in order to provide an effective counterweight to the growing power of the Soviet bloc. No smaller combination of countries could hope to achieve this.”19 In 1954–1956 further studies were undertaken by the Working Group on Comparison of Economic Trends in NATO and European Communist Countries, which in 1956 was renamed the Committee on Soviet Economic Policy. The conclusions were presented to the NAC in late 1956, at a moment of turmoil in Eastern Europe. The committee stressed that in the subsequent two decades the overall rate of economic expansion in the Soviet bloc would certainly surpass that of the NATO countries, and the People’s Republic of China would also emerge as a major economic and industrial power. The So- viet Union was able to achieve higher growth rates because, as a totalitarian state, it could maximize investment without concern for the needs of the pop- ulation, concentrate investment on the desired sectors of the economy, mobi- lize cheap resources, and transfer surplus labor from agriculture to industry: “the Russians have pursued growth as a deliberate goal, made higher production the measure of success and arranged incentives accordingly.” Although growth rates could decline as the Soviet economy grew, the USSR’s ability to maintain investment at a level unattainable in a free society might permit continuing expansion. However, the declared Soviet aim of economically overtak- ing the West was not likely to be realized, although the West’s relative superiority would be reduced. By 1975 consumption per head in the Soviet bloc would reach the level of consumption in European NATO countries in 1956, although by that time the latter would have moved signiªcantly ahead. By the

19. NAC Memorandum, “Economic Comparison between the NATO Countries and the Soviet Bloc,” 9 November 1954, CM(54)99, in NATO Archives.

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same date, 1975, U.S. production would still exceed that of the USSR, but the combined output of the United States and Canada would be overtaken by the combined output of the Soviet bloc plus China. Again, this pointed to the importance of Western Europe, and especially of West Germany, in securing the West’s economic lead in the future. Soviet trade with the underdeveloped countries would also increase, with obvious political repercussions.20 By 1956, additional issues had come to the fore. The 20th Congress of the CPSU surprised the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy. A paper of early February 1956 predicted an increase of Soviet activities in the periphery, especially in Asia, but it was only in March that the ªrst report on the important party developments was presented to the NAC. In April, the U.S. delegation also circulated a long note on the congress.21 During the May 1956 NAC ministerial meeting, British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd noted that the Soviet Union’s turn to the periphery was an indication of NATO’s success in containing Soviet expansion in Europe. Belgian Foreign Minister Paul- Henri Spaak and his Dutch counterpart, Johan Beyen, stressed that the 20th Party Congress would necessitate increased NATO solidarity and vigilance.22 In the wake of de-Stalinization, the NATO experts argued in favor of increased East-West contacts, pointing out that any break in the Iron Cur- tain was beneªcial.23 In September 1956 a long memorandum titled “The Thaw in Eastern Europe” expressed hope about developments in Poland, which was regarded as the satellite with the greatest anti-Soviet disposition. The June 1956 Poznañ uprising was seen as a manifestation of this potential. The memorandum stressed that the thaw was a response to the political and economic impasse of the Stalin years and as such was aided by the passive resistance of the East European peoples and by the active resistance of the West. The NATO experts expressed strong interest in the dissatisfaction of intellectuals with the regimes, although the situation was much better for dissidents in the “northern tier” (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary). In contrast, the situation was very difªcult in East Germany, and in the “southern group” the regimes “have not merely tried to restrain [criticism], they have nipped it in the bud.” The NATO experts insisted that the USSR’s ability to retain control was not in doubt and that Tito’s Yugoslavia could not act as a model for

20. NAC Memorandum, “Comparison of Economic Growth in the Sino-Soviet Bloc and in NATO Countries,” 30 November 1956, CM(56)131, in NATO Archives. 21. NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 8 February 1956, CM(56)10, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 8 March 1956, CM(56)26, in NATO Archives; and “Note by the U.S. Delegation,” 5 April 1956, CM(56)40, in NATO Archives. 22. NAC Ministerial Meeting Records, 4 May 1956, CVR(56)20–21, in NATO Archives. 23. NAC Memorandum, “East/West Contacts,” 20 July 1956, CM(56)98, in NATO Archives.

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change in the satellites, especially after Belgrade’s reconciliation with Moscow. The West should cautiously encourage the dissidents, but “as we are not prepared to use force to liberate them [the peoples], we should not encourage fu- tile rebellions on their part.”24 Thus, in September 1956 the NATO analysts expressly indicated that despite “liberation” rhetoric, the Western alliance accepted that the European status quo would not be challenged by force. The Western powers’ inactivity in November 1956 merely made this fact public.25 The Soviet invasion of Hungary came as a surprise but was met with exceptionally calm analysis by the NATO experts. In fact, they were surprised more by the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution than by the violent Soviet reaction to it. In December 1956 the Working Group on Trends of Soviet Policy noted that the Soviet leaders had tried to strike a new balance between coercion and initiative, although things eventually got out of control in Hun- gary. Still, the system of collective leadership had worked, “in spite of hazards, persistent difªculties and evidence of conºict.”26 The experts failed to see internal friction in the CPSU as a factor contributing to the Soviet decision to invade, as recent research has shown.27 They also did not comment on Hun-

24. NAC Memorandum, “The Thaw in Eastern Europe,” 24 September 1956, CM(56)110, in NATO Archives. 25. Csaba Békés, “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 16, Cold War International History Project, Washington, DC, 1996, p. 21; Lászlo Borhi, “Rollback, Liberation, Containment, or Inaction? U.S. Policy and Eastern Europe during the 1950s,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1999), pp. 67–110; and Christopher J. Tudda, “‘Reenacting the Story of Tantalus’: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Failed Rhetoric of Liberation,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 2005), pp. 3–35. See also the commentary in Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The U.S.Crusade against the Soviet Union, 1945–56 (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999), pp. 249–269. Some scholars have suggested that the rhetoric of Radio Free Europe (RFE) played a role in precipitating not the Hungarian Revolution itself but the violent Soviet response to it. See Johanna Granville, “‘Caught with Jam on Our Fingers’: Radio Free Europe and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 5 (November 2005), pp. 811–839. However, this argument is unconvincing and has been rebutted in A. Ross Johnson, “Setting the Record Straight: The Role of Radio Free Europe in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956,” Working Paper No. 3, History and Public Policy Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Wash- ington, DC, October 2006. Even Granville concedes that further research will be needed to substanti- ate her conclusions. The NATO experts did not believe that RFE could exert such an inºuence on So- viet actions. 26. NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 3 December 1956, CM(56)133, in NATO Archives. 27. For more detailed and recent evaluations, see Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006); Mark Kramer, “The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hun- gary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 1998), pp. 163–214; Aleksandr Stykalin, “The Hungarian Crisis of 1956: The Soviet Role in the Light of New Archival Documents,” Cold War History, Vol. 2, No. 1 (October 2001), pp. 113– 144; Csaba Békés, “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality,” Cold War History, Vol. 6, No. 4 (November 2006), pp. 477–500; and Johanna Granville, The First Domino: In- ternational Decision-Making during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 (College Station: Texas A&M Uni- versity Press, 2004).

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garian appeals for help, which obviously placed the West in an embarrassing position in view of the “liberation” rhetoric of Radio Free Europe. During the lengthy discussion in the NAC in December 1956 all ministers stressed the need to reinforce the unity of the alliance but noted that the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution did not necessarily mark a return to Stalinist policies and that the West should not encourage uprisings that it could not aid militarily. Dulles went further by posing the question whether the satellite ar- mies would be a reliable ally of the Soviet Union in case of war.28

A Period of Hope and Anxiety, 1957–1959

By late 1956 the structure of non-military consultation within NATO under- went signiªcant changes at the recommendation of the Committee of the Three (also known as the Committee of the Three Wise Men), which com- prised the foreign ministers of Norway, Halvard Lange; of Italy, Gaetano Martino; and of Canada, Lester B. Pearson. The committee had been en- trusted with the task “to advise the [North Atlantic] Council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military ªelds.” In December 1956 the NAC approved the committee’s report, which called for closer consultation on non-military issues and for the adoption of a procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes between member-states. The committee stressed that “[t]hese two aspects of security—civil and military—can no longer safely be considered in watertight compartments” and called for NATO to enter the ªeld of non-military cooperation, noting that this was “an essential complement to—not a substitute for—continuous co-operation in defence.”29 Following the recommendations of the Three Wise Men, a Com- mittee of Political Advisers was set up to continue studying the trends in So- viet policy. The members of the new body would come from each delegation, assisted when necessary by specialists from the national governments. A Com- mittee of Economic Advisers was also created to study Soviet economic potential (in 1958 the older Committee on Soviet Economic Policy became a subcommittee of the new body). These reforms meant that after 1957 NATO’s analysis of the Soviet Union took on a more systematic character. In the following three years the Committee of Political Advisers pointed to a set of Soviet aims that was partly different from that attributed to the USSR in the ªrst post-Stalin years. According to the committee, Moscow now

28. NAC Ministerial Meeting Records, 11 December 1956, CVR(56)69–70, in NATO Archives; and NAC Ministerial Meeting Records, 12 December 1956, CVR(56)71, in NATO Archives. 29. “Report of the Committee of Three on Non-military Co-operation in NATO,” 10 January 1957, CM(56)127(Revised), in NATO Archives.

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aimed to maintain the cohesion of its bloc while increasing its economic strength and military capabilities, to weaken NATO and the cohesion of the West by encouraging divisions within the non-Communist states, to effect a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe and from strategic positions around the USSR, and to encourage neutralism in the periphery through political or economic penetration. Soviet efforts to penetrate the Middle East in the post- Suez period were especially noted. After the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the USSR was seen as a more conªdent power trying to negotiate from a “position of strength.” The NATO analysts insisted that the Sino-Soviet alliance remained solid. They noted that during the offshore islands crisis in 1958 the Soviet Union seemed to exert a moderating inºuence on the Chinese, but the analysts did not go further in assessing the possible repercussions of this Mos- cow-Beijing difference. Regarding internal Soviet developments, the committee stressed that despite the emphasis on heavy industry, improvements in living conditions meant that the average Soviet citizen was accepting of the regime. De-Stalinization had not been abandoned, but the party leadership was trying to show the limits beyond which criticism would not be tolerated. Khrushchev was regarded as being ªrmly in the saddle, especially after his assumption of the premiership in the spring of 1958. The Soviet leader was described as “dynamic, conªdent and pragmatic,” a man of “thrust and energy” who succeeded “in presenting himself as a popular leader,” although his tactics on Berlin after November 1958 caused much concern. The NATO experts noted that Khrushchev’s advocacy of détente referred to a “vague im- pression of relaxation, in which it would be easier for him to extract concessions from the Western Governments.”30 The meaning of détente was hotly debated within the alliance. The new Secretary General, Spaak, brought up the issue during the NAC ministerial meeting of December 1959, when all ministers agreed that the Soviet Union was changing its tactics rather than its aims. Détente, it was argued, was only a “frame of mind.” U.S. Secretary of State Christian Herter noted that the Cold War was a kind of trench warfare, but in a climate of détente it would acquire more mobility and maneuver. The two foreign ministers most suspi- cious of détente were Heinrich von Brentano of Germany and Evangelos Averoff-Tossizza of Greece, who together represented two frontline states toward which the Soviet Union kept exerting strong pressures.31

30. NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 16 April 1957, CM(57)62, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 29 November 1957, CM(57)140, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Pol- icy,” 22 April 1958, CM(58)69, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 6 December 1958, CM(58)144, in NATO Archives; and NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 25 November 1959, CM(59)96, in NATO Archives. 31. Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 4 December 1959, PO/59/1615, International Staff, Private

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After 1957 the situation in Eastern Europe became the subject of a separate set of memoranda by the Committee of Political Advisers. These documents always included a section on “Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc.” The committee stressed that the Soviet Union’s fundamental problem was unsolv- able because most of the satellites were both anti-Russian and anti-Commu- nist, and Moscow had merely managed to suppress popular unrest, not up- root it. Following the Hungarian Revolution and the Polish crisis of 1956, the Soviet Union’s hold rested more than ever on its readiness to intervene militarily in Eastern Europe. Moreover, after 1956 the USSR had stopped the economic exploitation of these states and extended aid to them. As noted in 1958, “the net contribution of the satellites to the Soviet economy has dwin- dled considerably, if it has not changed into a drain.” Although noting the in- complete and coercive character of Soviet control of Eastern Europe, the NATO experts also stressed that Soviet aims in the region were not merely strategic. The need to maintain the “conquests of Socialism” should not be underestimated, and Soviet leaders knew that if the situation in one country got out of control unrest could easily spread to the others. The NATO analysts underlined that in case of further disturbances in Eastern Europe (especially Poland or East Germany), the West should carefully try to maintain the morale of the peoples, but weaning these countries away from Moscow by economic and political means alone was impossible. The West should also strive to localize a future infra-bloc armed conºict. This was another direct admission that NATO did not have the power decisively to inºuence developments in that area.32 The NATO experts looked for centers of resistance to Moscow. Dissident intellectuals were regarded as a hopeful sign but as unable to effect change. Josip Broz Tito’s meeting with Khrushchev in Bucharest in August 1957 caused some concern among the NATO experts, although the renewed Soviet campaign against “revisionism” in late 1957 and then the open quarrel of Moscow and Belgrade on the Yugoslav Party program (which was denounced by the Soviet Union) quickly reassured them. It was clear that Tito would not become a vehicle of change in Eastern Europe. Anyway, the NATO experts had placed their hopes mostly on Poland. Strategically situated between the USSR and East Germany, the Poles were known for their anti-Soviet and anti- Communist disposition. Wladyslaw Gomulka was perceived as having come

Ofªce of the Secretary General, in NATO Archives; Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 18 Decem- ber 1959, PO/59/1663, International Staff, Private Ofªce of the Secretary General, in NATO Ar- chives; and NAC Ministerial Meeting Records, 21 December 1959, CVR(59)44–45, in NATO Ar- chives. 32. NAC Memorandum, “The Satellites,” 12 April 1957, CM(57)57, in NATO Archives; and NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 22 April 1958, CM(58)69, in NATO Ar- chives.

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to power despite Soviet objections. The committee noted that Gomulka’s insistence on the Polish “way to socialism” could be regarded as having more radical aspects than Tito’s policies in 1948. They also argued that Poland had “to some extent become a foreign body within the Soviet bloc” (April 1957) or that it had acquired a “semi-independent position” (April 1958), as shown by its reluctance to participate in the publication of a new Communist journal and by its desire to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the International Monetary Fund. In April 1958, the committee suggested that the Rapacki plan for the denuclearization of Central Europe echoed not only Soviet priorities but also “strictly Polish motives,” including the reduc- tion of the Soviet military presence in the country. Still, these hopes were dashed after 1959 when Gomulka ªrmly came out against the Yugoslavs and “revisionism,” showing that he would not challenge Moscow. Successive documents in 1958 and 1959 presented an estimation of Khrushchevite policy in identical wording: “A ºexible Soviet policy, which can isolate Tito, prefer an Ulbricht but simultaneously accept a Gomulka, may well prove more proªta- ble for the USSR in Eastern Europe than earlier Stalinist policies.”33 Regarding the economy, the abandonment of the Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan in 1957 was noted with interest. The Committee on Soviet Economic Policy stressed that Moscow was facing problems, mainly the difªculty in simultaneously accomplishing an excessively high industrial expansion and tar- gets on agriculture that were “unrealistic.” Labor was becoming scarce, mostly because of the decline of the number of births during the war years and the decision to raise the school-leaving age to seventeen years. The cuts in the armed forces, announced early in 1960, were seen as an effort to compensate for this. Still, the experts underlined that the Soviet economy continued to grow rapidly, and this allowed the Soviet Union to appear as a model to underdeveloped countries. Thus, the economic threat Moscow posed to the West had not diminished.34 This was further underlined by the Committee of Economic Advisers, which produced an interesting set of documents. In 1953–1956 the emphasis had been placed on the study of Soviet economic potential; in 1957–1959 the

33. NAC Memorandum, “The Satellites,” 12 April 1957, CM(57)57, in NATO Archives. See also NAC Memorandum, “Situation in Eastern Europe,” 28 November 1957, CM(57)138, in NATO Ar- chives; NAC Memorandum, “Situation in Eastern Europe,” 23 April 1958, CM(58)70, in NATO Ar- chives; NAC Memorandum, “Situation in Eastern Europe,” 8 December 1958, CM(58)145, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “Situation in Eastern Europe,” 20 March 1959, CM(59)31, in NATO Archives; and “Eastern Europe and the Soviet Zone of Germany,” 26 November 1959, CM(59)97, in NATO Archives. 34. NAC Memoranda, “Recent Economic Developments in the USSR and the Implications of the Abandonment of the Sixth Five Year Plan,” 7 December 1957, CM(57)149, in NATO Archives; and “Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc,” 1 March 1960, CM(60)4, in NATO Archives.

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main subject (and the title of the relevant memoranda) was “The Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc,” an indication that economic growth had allowed the Soviet Union to undertake major initiatives globally. These memoranda stressed that the economic offensive posed “a major political and strategic threat to the outside world.” The USSR and China were swiftly making advances in the Middle East and in Asia. The total volume of Communist trade or aid was small compared to that of the West. However, the Soviet bloc’s “economic offensive” focused on speciªc countries (for example Egypt, Syria, Yemen, India, Turkey, Indonesia, and, after 1959, Cuba), on “spectacu- lar” projects (the Aswan High Dam), or on oil and oil equipment. Thus, So- viet economic penetration was designed to carry maximum political weight and weaken Western positions in strategically important parts of the globe. Moreover, bulk purchases of raw materials—usually on a barter basis—the ty- ing up of a large part of the exports of these countries, and offers of prices higher than those of the world market threatened to distort world trade. The increase of Soviet trade, aided by the monopolistic nature of the Soviet economy, went hand-in-hand with the policy of exploiting feelings of nationalism and anti-colonialism in the periphery. The NATO analysts argued that this strategy was not the only reason for the intensiªcation of Soviet economic activity: industrial expansion had created more need for raw materials and had made available a larger volume of manufactured goods adequate for export. A division of labor between the bloc countries was also evident: East Germany specialized in electrical equipment and ships, Poland in railroad rolling-stock and mining equipment, Hungary in diesel engines, Czechoslovakia in heavy machinery, and so on. Still, the most successful example of Soviet trade was the supply of arms to the Middle East. Soviet technical aid was also important, and the number of Soviet technicians abroad was estimated to have risen from 2,000 in 1958 to 6,500 by late 1959. The concerted character of the “economic offensive” was taken as a further indication of its intensity and dangers. Early in 1960 the committee noted that the economic offensive was “an integral element of total communist strategy.”35

35. NAC Memorandum, “Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc,” 21 August 1957, CM(57)116, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc,” 16 June 1958, CM(58)97, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc,” 21 January 1959, CM(59)2, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “Eco- nomic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc,” 1 March 1960, CM(60)4, in NATO Archives; and NAC Memorandum, “Economic Offensive of the Sino-Soviet Bloc,” 28 October 1960, CM(60)91, in NATO Archives. See also “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 12 April 1960, CM(60)38, in NATO Archives. Western European industry called for measures to counter this economic offensive. See Spaak to Permanent Representatives, 30 October 1958, PO/58/1352, in NATO Archives.

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From Détente to Crisis and Back Again, 1960–1964

The ªrst half of the 1960s was a difªcult period for the NATO analysts. The Soviet Union was an expanding economic and military power but was visibly facing serious problems with its economy, Eastern Europe, and China. Khrushchev’s tactic of alternating threats and offers of paciªcation puzzled the West, and his eventual fall in 1964 created additional questions that needed to be answered quickly. The Committee of Political Advisers failed to predict the collapse of the 1960 four-power summit. In April 1960, the committee noted an “implicit contradiction” between Khrushchev’s hard line on Berlin and his advocacy of détente but expressed the view that the Soviet leader would be prepared for serious negotiations in the summit, including Berlin and disarmament.36 After the collapse of the summit, an ad hoc committee (consisting of ofªcials from the national governments) noted that the “ºuctuations of Soviet policy” could be attributed to the fact that Khrushchev had to deal with a Communist bloc that no longer was absolutely monolithic, because of signs of Chinese restless- ness. However, these turns of Soviet policy were contained within certain limits, such as the need to avoid general war and to safeguard the unity of the bloc. Thus, the West “must not view them with undue alarm. To be over- sensitive to these variations would, moreover, provide the Soviet leadership with an effective psychological weapon.” Regarding Berlin, the ad hoc committee noted two possible explanations for Soviet policy: either Moscow was trying to keep up pressure on the West by exposing its weakness in the former German capital; or Khrushchev and the East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, genuinely saw the existence of West Berlin as a threat to the stability of East Germany. Thus, the analysts again took a calm view of Soviet policy and tended to show some understanding for Khrushchev’s position. They concluded that the West should not discourage further negotiations, provided that it guarded its unity.37 The building of the Berlin Wall was another surprise for the NATO experts, who, however, stressed that the Soviet initiative did not affect Western control of the city and thus was kept within some limits—mostly, the need to avoid war. Serious concern was expressed about Moscow’s tendency to raise the level of verbal confrontation with Greece and Turkey (a Greek-Bulgarian exchange of accusations of espionage and a Soviet protest at the holding of NATO maneuvers in the area). This was interpreted as an effort to divert at-

36. NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 12 April 1960, CM(60)38, in NATO Archives. 37. NAC Memorandum, “NATO Review of Soviet Policy since the Summit Setback,” 30 November 1960, CM(60)107, in NATO Archives.

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tention from the former German capital. The NATO experts also noted the intensiªcation of Warsaw Pact military maneuvers after August 1961. This may suggest that the experts had not been fully convinced that the building of the wall was a defensive measure and were still fearful of an aggressive Soviet move.38 Once more, however, the analysis of the NATO experts focused on the USSR’s motives, ignoring aspects of Soviet policymaking that recent scholarship has brought to light, such as the role of the East German regime in inºuencing Soviet policy or the possibility that Khrushchev was inºuenced by his own misperceptions of U.S. policy, especially after the debacle in the Bay of Pigs.39 The picture was radically different, of course, when it came to the Cuban missile crisis. The boldness of the Soviet initiative, aimed at effecting a sudden, unforeseen, and radical change in the balance of power, seemed to scare NATO experts. Soviet action in Cuba “involved a very high degree of risk, not characteristic of Soviet behavior in the past and hence surprising.” Soviet policy was described as combining “duplicity, audacity and resourcefulness.” Still, the NATO experts continued, Moscow had miscalculated the likely U.S. reaction, and Soviet leaders’ claim that they had saved Cuba “is a small consola- tion in comparison with the prize which they had reckoned they would gain.” Khrushchev’s prestige had suffered a serious blow, and he might seek to create diversions elsewhere to compensate for the Cuban failure. Because a crisis in Berlin was regarded as unlikely, the analysts expressed the fear that the Soviet Union could try to weaken the alliance in Southeast Europe.40 Again, the southern ºank was seen as the weakest spot of NATO. Unlike Hungary in 1956 or Berlin in 1958–1961, the Cuban missile crisis occurred in a different part of the globe and was primarily a U.S. responsi- bility; indeed, research has shown that during the crisis the United States took initiatives ignoring the positions of some of its NATO allies, as well as NATO procedures.41 Still, in the December 1962 NAC, the NATO allies appeared

38. NAC Memorandum, “The Situation in Eastern Europe and Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany,” 27 November 1961, CM(61)118, in NATO Archives; and NAC Ministerial Meeting Records, 13 De- cember 1961, CVR(61)64 and 65, in NATO Archives. 39. See Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 169–234; Marc Trachtenberg, A Contructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945– 1963 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 251–351; Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrush- chev and the Berlin Crisis (1958–1962),” CWIHP Working Paper No. 6, Cold War International History Project, Washington, DC, 1993; Hope M. Harrison, “Driving the Soviets up the Wall: A Super-Ally, a Superpower, and the Building of the Berlin Wall, 1958–1961,” Cold War History, Vol. 1, No. 1 (August 2000), pp. 53–74; and Petr Lunák, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis: Soviet Brink- manship Seen from Inside,” Cold War History, Vol. 3, No. 2 (January 2003), pp. 53–82. 40. NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 26 November 1962, CM(62)109, in NATO Archives. 41. On the Cuban missile crisis, see Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Ex- plaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, rev. ed.(New York: Longman Publishing Group, 1999); Aleksandr

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reassured by—or even proud of—the strength of the U.S. reaction and the perceived Soviet capitulation.42 In this climate, the NATO analysts did not attempt a detailed description of the crisis itself, and U.S. ofªcials did not offer to reveal more details about their own handling of the affair. The Americans were content to enjoy their “golden hour,” a moment when their star was brighter than ever among their allies. The NATO experts mostly evaluated the implications for Soviet aims and tactics and the likely effects in the Euro- pean part of the NATO area. They noted that the difference from previous crises, including the building of the Berlin Wall, was that in Cuba Soviet policy ºagrantly breached the “limits” that it had respected in those previous in- stances. NATO analysis was dominated by the realization that Cuba involved “one hell of a gamble”—but one that was eventually won. The Sino-Soviet split was another problematic ªeld. In previous years, the NATO analysts had insisted that a quarrel between the Soviet Union and Communist China was improbable. In 1961–1964, they stressed that the West was in no position to exploit Sino-Soviet differences because any sign of Western intervention could bring the two major Communist powers together. Only in 1963–1964 did the Committee of Political Advisers, the Ex- pert Working Group (which reported to the former), and the newly formed Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG) present the picture of a deªnite split between Moscow and Beijing, involving the Soviet handling of the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet reluctance to supply China with nuclear weapons, and other national antagonisms. Still, APAG analysts remained rather puzzled. They kept questioning the extent of the rift and preferred a Western policy of non-involvement.43 In 1965, in the aftermath of Khrushchev’s fall, APAG re-

Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis 1958–1964 (London: John Murray Publishers, Ltd., 1997); Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 2002); Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 235–260; Raymond L. Garthoff, Reºections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1989); and Rob- ert Smith Thompson, The Missiles of October: The Declassiªed Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992). These works deal with the “main” story of the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The NATO/European dimension has been addressed in Tranchtenberg, A Constructed Peace, pp. 352–367; and Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy and the Juppiters, 1957–1963 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). However, there is still no comprehensive study of the response of the alliance to the Cuban missile crisis and its implications. 42. NAC Ministerial Meeting Records, 13 December 1962, CVR(62)58–59, in NATO Archives. 43. NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” CM(61)144, 5 December 1961, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 26 November 1962, CM(62)109, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Pol- icy,” 26 November 1963, CM(63)98, in NATO Archives; and APAG Report, 29 April 1964, CM(64)27, in NATO Archives. APAG was set up in the early 1960s to provide the NAC with studies of long-term policy problems. See its terms of reference in NAC Memorandum, “Atlantic Policy Advi- sory Group,” 31 October 1961, CM(61)101, in NATO Archives. APAG met twice a year to address a speciªc question. The 1963 meeting was on the Soviet bloc and Eastern Europe.

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ported on the prospects for relations between “Sino-Soviet World” and the West.44 The situation in Eastern Europe was another ªeld of careful study because of the evident revival of national feelings in these countries and the tendency in the Communist world to accept the notion of national roads to socialism. The Committee of Political Advisers stressed that the Sino-Soviet dispute seemed to increase the East European countries’ room for maneuver because Soviet leaders needed their support against the Chinese. The defec- tion of Albania in 1961, the Yugoslav ability to maneuver between East and West, and the increasing Romanian independence after 1964 were clear signs of this. East Germany’s treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in mid- 1964 also attracted the attention of the Expert Working Group, which noted that the agreement was “a poor substitute” for the peace treaty that the Soviet Union had promised to East Berlin and thus conªrmed that the “Zone” remained totally dependent on Moscow. Economically, the Soviet bloc was facing serious problems, including shortages of food supplies. Furthermore, the apparent success of the European Economic Community (EEC) pushed the Soviet Union to promote the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) as a medium for closer coordination with Eastern Europe, but by the mid-1960s COMECON could no longer successfully play this role. Still, the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe remained, something the NATO studies never doubted. Soviet efforts in the periphery were also noted with concern (the phrase “Third World” appeared for the ªrst time in the 1963 documents).45 These analyses were connected with perceptions of the Soviet economy, which now showed signs of strain.46 In 1961 the 22nd Soviet Party Congress referred to the future building of socialism, but the new twenty-year plan

44. NAC Memorandum, APAG Report, 13 May 1965, CM(65)46, in NATO Archives. 45. NAC Memorandum, “The Situation in Eastern Europe and Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany,” 27 November 1961, CM(61)118, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “The Situation in East- ern Europe and Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany,” 18 April 1962, CM(62)46, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “The Situation in Eastern Europe and Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany,” 30 November 1962, CM(62)111, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “The Situation in Eastern Europe and Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany,” 28 November 1963, CM(63)99, in NATO Ar- chives; NAC Memorandum, “The Situation in Eastern Europe and Soviet-Occupied Zone of Ger- many,” 24 April 1964, CM(64)36, in NATO Archives; and NAC Memorandum, “The Situation in Eastern Europe and Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany,” 3 December 1964, CM(64)124, in NATO Archives. See also the questionnaires and the replies of the member-states in Spaak to Permanent Rep- resentatives, 9 February 1961, PO/61/142, in NATO Archives; and Texts of Replies, 12 April 1961, PO/61/425. 46. For Soviet economic problems in the early 1960s, see Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Econ- omy, pp. 70–97. For the importance of the 1960s as a turning point in Soviet economic performance, see also David G. Engerman, “The Romance of Economic Development and New Histories of the Cold War,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 28, No. 1 (January 2004), pp. 23–54.

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tried to maintain the simultaneous emphasis on heavy industry and raising the standard of living. The NATO experts noted that this could place more strain on Soviet resources. The Soviet Union had had difªculties maintaining the high growth rates of the past because the pursuit of many tasks and agricultural policy had failed to produce the desired results. The East European countries were experiencing food shortages, although these seemed “embarrassing rather than dangerous.”47 Soviet economic potential was still viewed with concern, but the NATO analysts seemed now to be more optimistic about the relative economic growth of East and West. In a memorandum presented to the NAC in March 1963, APAG studied “Western Economic Power in Relation to the East-West conºict.” The advisory group noted that West- ern economic potential was superior to that of the Soviet bloc and that the latter’s economic difªculties were proof that the Western system was more effective in addressing the problems of the modern world. APAG stressed the failures of Soviet and Chinese agriculture, the failure to raise signiªcantly the standard of living, the burden that the East European countries (and Cuba) now represented for the Soviet economy, and the fact that even in the Third World the Soviet Union seemed to be facing setbacks. Overall production in the NATO countries was three times larger than in the Soviet bloc, and growth in the West was sustained by economic integration, especially in Europe.48 The combination of Soviet economic problems and the revival of national feelings in Eastern Europe again raised the issue of East-West trade. Disagreements emerged between the NATO members on this issue. The NATO committees stressed that although the expansion of East-West trade was desirable, the Western countries should avoid offering long-term credits to Eastern Europe. The United States supported this view in the NAC. The committees also noted that the evolution toward greater autonomy or diver- sity and the obvious dissatisfaction of intellectuals in Eastern Europe did not mean that the Soviet hold on the region was fading. Thus, the West should try to encourage independent elements with a cautious policy. Although some member-states were eager to try to weaken Soviet control of Eastern Europe through an expansion of trade, others noted that the monopolistic nature of the Soviet-bloc economy and the totalitarian character of the Soviet political system would ensure that the USSR would beneªt from an expansion of exchanges. The NATO analysts insisted that Western countries should not

47. NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 5 December 1961, CM(61)144, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 26 November 1962, CM(62)109, in NATO Archives; and NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 26 November 1963, CM(63)98, in NATO Archives. 48. NAC Memorandum, APAG Report, 15 March 1963, CM(63)10, in NATO Archives.

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overestimate their own potential. This was also the conclusion of the APAG reports of March 1963 and April 1964. In October 1964, the Committee of Economic Advisers again noted the disagreements between NATO members: some believed that a visible policy of differentiation among the East European countries could spark adverse Soviet reactions and prove counter- productive.49 The fall of Khrushchev in autumn 1964 again surprised but did not alarm NATO analysts. In November 1964 and April 1965 the Expert Working Group and APAG noted that Khrushchev’s removal was motivated by internal realities (mostly his style of leadership and his decision to create separate agricultural and industrial contingents in the CPSU) and by the concern caused by the Sino-Soviet split, rather than by disagreements on policy toward the West. The new leaders were seen as members of the Khrushchev group who strove to reassert the position of the party, and their ascent was regarded as a partial change in the power structure. This led the NATO experts to conclude that the new leaders would seek to consolidate their position, deal with the internal problems of the world Communist movement, and try to penetrate the Third World through the new concept of “revolutionary de- mocracy.” Still, the country faced serious economic problems, which might call for even more radical reforms than those that cost Khrushchev so dearly: “[Khrushchev’s] elimination does not alter the realities of power in the world or the complexity of the internal and external situation against which the So- viet policies must be conducted.”50 Early in 1965 the Secretary General of NATO, Manlio Brosio, initiated a general discussion on East-West relations. This conªrmed the lack of major change in Soviet policy toward the West, even on issues such as Berlin or Viet-

49. NAC Memorandum, “Problems of East/West Trade,” 26 March 1962, CM(62)29, in NATO Ar- chives; NAC Memorandum, “Policy toward the East European Satellites,” 28 November 1962, CM(62)143, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “The Situation in Eastern Europe and the So- viet-Occupied Zone of Germany,” 28 November 1963, CM(63)99, in NATO Archives; NAC Memo- randum, “NATO Countries’ Trade with Communist Countries,” 29 June 1964, CM(64)52, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “NATO Countries’ Trade Policy toward the Eastern European Countries,” 20 October 1964, CM(64)78, in NATO Archives; NAC Memorandum, “The Situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet-Occupied Zone of Germany,” 24 November 1965, CM(65)92, in NATO Archives; APAG report, 15 March 1963, CM(63)10, in NATO Archives; and APAG Report, 29 April 1964, CM(64)27, in NATO Archives. See also the summary of the views of the member- states in 16 August 1962, PO/62/498, in NATO Archives. APAG was more receptive to the idea of differentiation in trade with individual East European countries. On the ministerial debate of Decem- ber 1963, see NAC Ministerial Meeting Records, 18 November 1963, CVR(63)65–66, in NATO Ar- chives; and NAC Ministerial Meeting Records, 16 December 1963, CVR(63)73, in NATO Archives. 50. NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy,” 28 November 1964, CM(64)118, in NATO Archives; and NAC Memorandum, “Trends and Implications of Soviet Pol- icy,” 27 April 1965, CM(65)32, in NATO Archives. See also APAG Report, 13 May 1965, CM(65)46, in NATO Archives.

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nam. However, the delicate matter of intra-NATO disagreements over policy toward Eastern Europe again came to the fore. Although some member-states had shown interest in encouraging the “desatellisation” of Eastern Europe, Brosio stressed that the Soviet Union effectively controlled the region and that policy toward Eastern Europe was “important but subsidiary” compared to policy toward Moscow itself. He also noted that the alliance members should keep in mind the need for unity. Their national policies toward the bloc should not be allowed to become competitive. This call for unity was the main theme of NATO’s effort to respond to Khrushchev’s fall.51 However, more intra-NATO disagreements on policy toward Eastern Europe would surface in the second half of the 1960s.

NATO Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1953–1964: Mirroring the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Alliance

Being at the same time reports and assessments, the NATO studies of the So- viet Union pose interesting questions regarding perceptions of the adversary and the accuracy of the analysis. Their conclusions on the long-term prospects of the Soviet economy can be distinguished from their conclusions on short-term political developments. With the former the experts proved more successful, whereas their predictions about the latter often proved wrong. Regarding the long-term prospects of the Soviet system and economy, the NATO studies consistently painted the picture of a Soviet Union that combined a revolutionary dynamic with traditional Russian geopolitical ambi- tions and stressed that Soviet leaders understood the world in terms of an un- bridgeable contest between two huge power blocs. The alliance experts underlined the dynamism of the Soviet economy and stressed that this allowed Moscow to penetrate areas of the globe beyond the reach of its military power. Still, they also pointed to the basic contradictions of the Soviet system, such as arbitrary rule, rigidity stemming from the totalitarian nature of the state, the absence of a price system that reºected real costs of production, and the competition for resources between industry/armaments and the need to raise the standard of living as a tool for legitimization of the Communist regimes. Regarding short-term changes in Soviet policy, the NATO studies proved much less successful. Although the NATO experts usually were prepared to give Khrushchev the beneªt of the doubt (regarding him better than Iosif

51. Brosio to Permanent Representatives, 1 February 1965, PO/65/56, in NATO Archives.

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Stalin), they were repeatedly surprised by developments in Soviet policy, including the effects of the 20th Congress of the CPSU in Eastern Europe, the hopes placed on Poland in 1957–1959, Khrushchev’s tactics in 1960–1961, the building of the Berlin Wall, and the “gamble” in Cuba. The alliance experts usually rushed to provide explanations for the “sources of Soviet con- duct” after the event but could rarely anticipate it. However, historians should not measure the NATO analyses against contemporary historiographical writings and simply tally up the NATO analysts’ mistakes. “We now know” from hindsight, but the alliance experts, who were living through the Cold War and its insecurities, did not. Evaluating the long- term development of Soviet economic potential was a more attainable aim than the short-term anticipation of diplomatic or political initiatives. The NATO experts correctly attributed the large Soviet troop reductions announced in 1960 to economic and demographic realities, an estimation that has been veriªed by recent research.52 This indicates that studying economic trends made it easier for the analysts to grasp Soviet motives, even on such a delicate issue as the strength of the Soviet Army. Long-term economic realities depend on larger (and thus more permanent and more distinguishable) trends, whereas sudden decisions inºuenced by personal character or tactical U-turns in policy are more difªcult to foresee. Still, one could also point to additional factors that account for the relative but almost constant failure of the NATO studies to anticipate Soviet political initiatives. Such factors indicate some of the limits in the function of the alliance. First, an analysis of the Soviet economic and political system in the 1950s or 1960s was a more complicated exercise than the counting of Soviet troops or warheads, and as such it could not but be critically inºuenced by the ideological preconceptions or biases of the analysts themselves. As people of their era, the analysts were fervent supporters of the school of thought later known as traditionalist. They were alarmed at the Stalinist phenomenon, which they could not forget even after the death of Stalin. They believed that in an overall struggle between freedom and totalitarianism the Soviet system would display a natural tendency to revert to Stalinist methods when threatened. By “Stalin- ist methods” they also meant Soviet aggressiveness (including military aggressiveness), which was taken for granted. The NATO analysts regarded Soviet policy as more rational, well-organized, and determined—and the Soviet bloc as much more monolithic—than they actually were. The most telling example was the experts’ hesitation regarding the analysis of the Sino-Soviet relationship. They failed fully to appreciate the effects of the 1958 offshore is-

52. Matthew Evangelista, “‘Why Keep Such an Army?’ Khrushchev’s Troop Reductions,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 19, Cold War International History Project, Washington, DC, 1997, pp. 24–26.

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lands crisis as a catalyst for the emergence of an independent Chinese Communist force in international affairs. After 1960 the Sino-Soviet rift was constantly being downgraded even when it had become clear that it was un- bridgeable.53 The experts’ tendency to see the world’s cleavages in black-and- white terms was part of their era but also an important obstacle to more accu- rate assessments. Although a cultural or ideological interpretation of their analysis (or of the Cold War in general) can be carried too far, these aspects cannot be ignored in evaluating NATO studies.54 The second factor involves the nature of the alliance. NATO was a defensive alliance, striving to preserve the balance of power against an adversary who enjoyed a crushing superiority in conventional weapons and the advantage of geography. In the relentless world of strategy, NATO’s position was difªcult anyway, and the realization that the Soviet Union was rapidly developing its economic base and technological capabilities was not making things easier. Laboring under traditionalist assumptions, the NATO experts (and the West’s statesmen) were not prepared to reach bold conclusions and preferred to err on the side of caution. Perhaps, there is an instinctive (or even “natural”) tendency in a defensive alliance to take into account worst-case scenarios. How- ever, this placed obvious restrictions on their analyses—their analysis of the Sino-Soviet split being an example of their reluctance, or inability, to view the Communist world as anything other than monolithic. Other factors were at work. The NATO study groups tended to reºect the disparity within the alliance and to suffer from disagreements between the member-states, even from the reluctance to share crucial information gath- ered through national channels. In late 1956 NATO’s Three Wise Men urged the member-states to “put more meaning into and get greater results from consultation by making full use of the means provided by NATO” and expressly encouraged the governments to share information.55 Still, the results

53. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, p. 211; and Lorenz M. Lüthi, “The People’s Republic of China and the Warsaw Pact Organization, 1955–63,” Cold War History, Vol. 7, No. 4 (November 2007), pp. 479–494. See also Odd Arne Westad, ed., Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), especially the chapters by Constantine Pleshakov, “Nikita Khrushchev and Sino-Soviet Relations,” pp. 235–240, and Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong, “Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance,” pp. 246–294. 54. For a thorough discussion of the importance of ideology as a factor inºuencing, though not necessarily determining, perceptions and decision-making in the Cold War, see Mark Kramer, “Ideology and the Cold War,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (October 1999), pp. 539–576. See also the comments in Tony Shaw, “The Politics of Cold War Culture,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 2001), pp. 59–76. 55. “Letter of Transmittal of the Report of the Committee of Three,” 17 November 1956, CM(56)126, NATO Archives.

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were not always satisfactory even after 1956. Seeking the invaluable intra- NATO consensus, the committees tended to concentrate on the lowest common denominator, namely, material that could be accepted by all. Thus, the studies tended to end with calls to preserve the unity of the alliance, which was the alliance’s most important, though unspoken, term of reference. This meant that NATO analyses usually were more “conservative” than U.S. assessments. For example, the Americans were more prepared to undertake initiatives aiming to undermine (though not forcibly overthrow) Soviet control in Eastern Europe. NATO analyses had to take into account the anxi- eties and perceived needs of the European members of the alliance and their fear that they could be crushed by the colossus in the East. Conscious of their vulnerability, the European NATO countries tended to focus on the alliance’s ability to resist the Soviet Union rather than on the West’s potential for rollback or for a political or economic counteroffensive. NATO’s worldview (if NATO as an organization ever had such a thing) was inherently defensive. There was a substantial difference in the roles of a superpower—an actor pos- sessing its own substantial power, internal cohesion, and ability to make and implement decisions relatively quickly—and of a voluntary alliance, which needed to deal with the different priorities, attitudes, and traditions of its members.56 NATO could function as the shield of the West but not as its van- guard for a counteroffensive in a Cold War of multiple dimensions—military, political, economic, cultural, psychological. NATO was an instrument aiming to prevent a Soviet victory in the Cold War (thus allowing the Americans to win it) but not a force that could, by itself, bring about a Western victory in that conºict. This hypothesis draws on more than just the NATO studies of the Soviet Union and will have to be checked against the evidence of the vast ar- chive of the alliance and the archives of the member-states. The apparent leading role of the United States in intelligence-gathering cannot be fully evaluated here. However, it seems safe to suggest that the ºaws of U.S. intelligence were reºected in the ºaws of NATO analysis. NATO’s surprises were, on the whole, identical to those of the United States—for example, the case of the Cuban missile crisis. Although NATO intelligence records are not yet fully accessible, historians should keep in mind the role of intelligence as a factor shaping not only speciªc events but also perceptions.57

56. This is a point that strongly attracts recent scholarship on the alliance. Studying Anglo-American differences on NATO’s propaganda functions, Risso stresses that the intergovernmental nature and structure of NATO, as well as its function as a forum for the coordination of countries with different political traditions and practices, make its study even more interesting. See Risso, “‘Enlightening Pub- lic Opinion,’” p. 47. 57. See the discussion in Raymond L. Garthoff, “Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Spring 2004), pp. 21–56.

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One must take into account NATO’s primarily defensive aims and disposition: intelligence was ªltered through this fundamental priority. On another level, NATO’s analyses of the USSR were exceptionally valu- able to the smaller members of the alliance, which lacked the services to study the Soviet bloc. This is an indication of the smaller members’ relative dependence on the alliance structure, although one should not overlook that if one of these smaller states applied all its diplomatic capital to inºuence a NATO study in a speciªc direction, it could indirectly maximize the inºuence of its views. Greece and Turkey played this game in the alarmist observations of the NATO studies regarding the southeastern front during the Berlin Wall and the Cuban missile crises.58 Last but not least, NATO itself did not remain static or unchanged in the period under discussion, and this was reºected in the mechanisms of its analyses and the conclusions of the alliance experts. The analyses became more systematic and comprehensive with the passage of time, as NATO’s organization itself was growing. A ªrst step was made in 1957, after the Three Wise Men’s report, when new committees were formed to study particular aspects of So- viet activity. A further leap is evident in the early 1960s, when the collapse of the May 1960 summit and the Berlin crisis displayed the need for more accu- rate analysis. The creation of APAG may be seen as a response to this need. On the other hand, despite growing internal problems in the alliance, NATO studies became signiªcantly more conªdent during the ªrst half of the 1960s. Apart from the Soviet humiliation in the Cuban missile crisis and the signs of a serious Sino-Soviet rift, many other factors may account for this. One should point to the evident slowdown of the Soviet economy and the resur- gence of national sentiment in Moscow’s Eastern European empire. These seemed to reassure the NATO analysts and statesmen, who felt that time was on their side. Still, the alliance experts were not prepared to adopt a more re- laxed attitude in the Cold War. Soviet economic power was continuing to grow, the Soviet Army was enormous, and the USSR was extremely active in the Third World.

Conclusions

This article brieºy discusses the larger trends of NATO analysis of the Soviet system, an aspect of Western attitudes in the Cold War that has not yet been fully studied and on which ample space exists for further research. The em-

58. For a reference to these tactics by Greece and Turkey, see Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Greece and the Cold War: Frontline State, 1952–1967 (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 73–79, 88–94.

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phasis that NATO was willing to place on the non-military elements of Soviet power shows that the alliance refused to treat foreign, defense, economic, and internal policies as watertight compartments and that it viewed the Cold War as a complex, multifaceted process. The readiness of NATO to study and to react to the trends and “implications” of Soviet policy offers a testimony to the interactive character of the Cold War, although this involves perceptions as well as realities and should be carefully treated. The decision to undertake these studies came as a result of the West’s realization in the early 1950s that the Cold War was going to be a long conºict, one that would not necessarily be decided by military force. The evident ascent of Soviet economic power, Khrushchev’s claim that the Soviet Union would surpass the West in economic development, and the increasing Soviet economic activity in the periphery led alliance analysts to call for the adoption of an extremely cautious attitude toward Moscow. Still, even in the 1950s, the NATO experts stressed that the Soviet system suffered from fundamental deªciencies and that the West’s economic lead would not disappear. In the early 1960s, at a time when the Soviet economy was slowing down, the NATO analysts adopted an even more conªdent tone. At no time during the “golden era” of the Soviet economic ascent did the NATO experts doubt that the economy was the strong card of the West or that the West’s political system was more capable of addressing the problems of modernity. The NATO experts also correctly stressed the violent nature of Soviet control of Eastern Europe and the existence of local forces of resistance, although they also noted that the West had little means to effect change there— a reality that became clear in a particularly painful manner in November 1956. But the NATO studies were much less successful in anticipating spe- ciªc Soviet political initiatives, including the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the building of the Berlin Wall, and the deployment of missiles in Cuba in 1962. Evidently, in a long Cold War it was easier to study larger economic trends or the sui generis political system of the opponent than to predict particular moves of a dictatorship under an admittedly unpredictable leader such as Khrushchev. The nature of the issues addressed in the NATO studies inevitably raises questions about the nature of the Cold War—questions that have attracted the interest of recent scholarship. Was the Cold War a security dilemma or a fundamental clash of social systems in which a lasting truce was unattainable?59 Were the 1950s a missed opportunity for a truce?60 Until the mid-

59. See the discussion in Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 36–60. 60. Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood, eds., The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity

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1960s the NATO analysts and the statesmen of the member-states were rather pessimistic on that level. They labored under the assumption that although the West would be prepared to accept such a compromise, the nature of the Soviet system made the USSR incapable of reaching an accommodation with the West. They believed that the Soviet Union could accept some rules gov- erning relations with the West (leading to a Cold War of lower intensity and lesser dangers), but this was as far as Moscow could go. This assumption was based on deep distrust of the Soviet system, on the strong fears of the Euro- pean members of the alliance, on the extreme competitiveness of the postwar bipolar international system, and on the unstable character of Khrushchevite diplomacy, which tended to reinforce Western distrust. As a result, by 1963– 1964 conditions existed for a “constructed peace,” which in essence would be a European “settlement” or an “arrangement” but not a deªnite end to the Cold War. At the same time, these conditions would bring new challenges, including a test of intra-alliance unity in the second half of the 1960s. NATO’s studies of the “other superpower” were not themselves the policies of the Western alliance. The very nature of NATO as an alliance of sovereign states casts doubt on whether it ever had such a thing as a concrete “policy” on these issues. The NATO study groups were not decision-making bodies, but their analyses were a crucial input for the member-states and an important aspect of Western policymaking.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Anne-Marie Smith and the archivists of the NATO Ar- chives for their kind assistance, as well as John O. Iatrides for his invaluable comments and suggestions.

for Peace? (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littleªeld, 2006), esp. the chapters by Mark Kramer, “Interna- tional Politics in the Early Post-Stalin Era: A Lost Opportunity, a Turning Point, or More of the Same?” pp. xiii–xxxv; and Vojtech Mastny, “The Elusive Détente: Stalin’s Successors and the West,” pp. 3–26.

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