Jarmo Sunnari

THE CFSP LOCKED IN THREE TRADITIONS

A Case Study of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the on Disarmament Crisis in January – March 2003

University of Tampere Department of Political Science and International Relations International Relations Master’s Thesis April 2007 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract in Finnish i List of tables and pictures ii

PART 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

1.1. Introduction to the study 1 1.2. A method as a hybrid of methods 5 1.3. Building up a research design 7 1.4. Building up a method 11 1.5. Forming the hypothetical questions 14 1.6. A summary of method•building 15

PART 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: THREE TRADITIONS

2.1. An overview of the theory 16 2.2. Categories according to world views 21 2.3. Human Nature as factor of world view 27 2.4. International Community as factor of world view 30 2.5. Theory of War as factor of world view 33

PART 3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE IRAQ DISARMAMENT CRISIS

3.1. An overview of the Crisis: emphasis on the CFSP 37 3.2. List of events 44

PART 4. ANALYSIS PART I: PRIMARY MATERIAL

4.1. An overview of the Analysis part I 46 4.2. Bush: State of the Union 2003 48 4.3. The Letter of Eight 51 4.4. Vilnius Group Statement 54 4.5. Extraordinary European Council 55 4.6. Chirac: Interview to TF1 and 2 58 4.7. Blair: Statement on Iraq 60

PART 5. ANALYSIS PART II: SECONDARY MATERIAL

5.1. An overview of the results of the Analysis part I 63 5.2. Academic articles on Iraq crisis 65 5.3. Media coverage – first search: 13 articles 70 5.4. Second search: 13 articles 74 5.5. Third search: 9 articles 78 5.6. A summary of the media coverage 80

PART 6. INTERPRETATIVE ANALYSIS: PARALYSIS

6.1. Back to the basics 82 6.2. From basics to the future 84

SOURCES Primary material for Analysis part I 87 Primary material for Analysis part II 88 Books and articles 90 Www•sources 93 Other sources 95 APPENDIX Chronology of the Iraq Disarmament Crisis 99 Abstract in Finnish i

Tampereen yliopisto

Politiikan tutkimuksen laitos

SUNNARI, JARMO: THE CFSP LOCKED IN THREE TRADITIONS – A Case Study of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union on Iraq Disarmament Crisis in January – March 2003

Pro gradu •tutkielma, 98 s., 7 liites.

Kansainvälisen politiikan tutkimus

Huhtikuu 2007

Tutkielman aiheena on Euroopan unionin yhteinen ulko• ja turvallisuuspolitiikka (YUTP) Irakin aseistariisumiskriisin aikana. Tutkimuksen kohteena on YUTP:n lamaantuminen kriisin aiheuttaman poliittisen paineen vuoksi, ja se käsittelee ajanjaksoa tammikuusta maaliskuuhun vuonna 2003. Tutkimuskysymys kuuluu: miten Irakin aseistariisumiskriisi lamautti EU:n YUTP:aa tammi• maaliskuussa vuonna 2003? (How did the Iraq Disarmament Crisis paralyse the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union between January and March 2003?)

Tutkielma pohjaa Martin Wightin kolmen tradition teoriaan, ja sen metodi on yhdistelmä laadullista sisältöanalyysiä ja tulkinta•analyysiä poststrukturalistisessa viitekehyksessä. Analyysin ensimmäisessä vaiheessa tarkastellaan kriisin amerikkalaisen ja eurooppalaisten toimijoiden julkilausumaluontoisia tekstejä ja toimijat jaotellaan Wightin teorian kategorioihin. Analyysin toisessa vaiheessa ensimmäisen vaiheen tuloksia verrataan akateemiseen tutkimukseen ja kansainvälisen median uutisointiin kriisistä.

Analyysin ensimmäisen vaiheen tutkimusmateriaaliin kuuluvat Yhdysvaltojen presidentti George W. Bushin State of the Union •puhe 28.1.2003, niin kutsututThe Letter of Eight (30.1.2003) ja Vilnius Group Statement (5.2.2003) •julkilausumat eurooppalaisten valtioidenad hoc •ryhmittymiltä, puheenjohtajavaltio Kreikan yhteenveto Eurooppa•neuvoston ylimääräisestä kokouksesta 17.2.2003, Ison•Britannian pääministeri Tony Blairin puhe maan parlamentissa 25.2.2003 ja Ranskan presidentti Jacques Chiracin televisiohaastattelun (10.3.2003) katkelmat.

Kriisin aikana EU:n jäsenmaiden näkökannat erkaantuivat kauas toisistaan ja maat sivuuttivat YUTP:n toimintatavat, mikä lamaannutti tämän. Tutkielma selvittää, millä tavoin ja miksi eri tahot suhtautuivat eri tavalla Irakin kriisiin. Analyysin ensimmäisessä vaiheessa toimijat jaotellaan Wightin teorian esittelemien kategorioiden mukaan: Yhdysvallat ja Iso•Britannia revolutionismin ja realismin välimaastoon, Ranska, Vilnius Group ja Eight Leaders realismin ja rationalismin välimaastoon ja EU rationalismiin.

Tutkielma osoittaa, että toimijoiden näkemyserot johtuvat yhteisen ajattelutavan ja identiteetin puutteesta. Tämä puute on sisäsyntyinen ongelma EU:n YUTP:ssa, eikä se ole poistettavissa nopein ratkaisuin, vaan siihen vaaditaan yhteisen eurooppalaisen identiteetin kehittymistä. Ongelman ymmärtäminen helpottaa kuitenkin sen kontrolloimista: kun tiedetään, millaisessa tilanteessa YUTP lamaantuu, ilmiöön voidaan varautua. Niin ikään YUTP:n toiminnan ja vaikutuksien tunteminen auttaa järjestelmän kehittämisessä. Näistä syistä toimenpidesuosituksiin kuuluvat julkisen keskustelun käyminen YUTP:n hyvistä ja huonoista puolista sekä sen tulevaisuuden hahmottelu, joita käsitellään tutkielman päätösosassa. Suositeltavia jatkotutkimuskohteita tämän työn pohjalta ovat EU:n kansalaisten näkemykset YUTP:n kehittämisestä Irakin aseistariisumiskriisin jälkeen ja EU:n ulkoministerien sekä YUTP:n korkean edustajan haastattelututkimus YUTP:n kehittämismahdollisuuksista. List of tables and pictures ii

TABLE 1. Textual selection matrix by Hansen. 10

TABLE 2. Textual selection matrix for this study. 10

TABLE 3. Differences in quantitative and qualitative content analysis. 11

TABLE 4. Matrix for hypothetical questions. 14

TABLE 5. Source: Knutsen: “Table 1 The three paradigms of 18 International Relations”.

TABLE 6. Table 5. with author's additions. 19

PICTURE 1. Elaborated research design for discourse analysis. 7

PICTURE 2. The research design for Western Debate on the 8 Bosnian war.

PICTURE 3. The research design for the CFSP in Iraq Disarmament Crisis. 9

PICTURE 4. Three traditions merge into one another. 20 1

PART 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY AND METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

“That’s the whole story of . Europe’s history is punctuated by crises from which, in every case, it has emerged stronger.” President 10 March, 2003

1.1. Introduction to the study

The research question of the study is: How did the Iraq Disarmament Crisis1 paralyse the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union between January and March 2003? Iraq Disarmament Crisis is a widely used term of the developments in international relations that led to the invasion of the so called Coalition of the Willing (or Coalition led by the United States) to Iraq. The timeline of the crisis is held to have been from the beginning of 2002 to late March 2003 when the actual war fighting began. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent invasion to Afghanistan by the UN mandated and U.S. led forces in October, 2001 were on the background and the Crisis developed on a deepening scale throughout the year 2002. The period from January to March 2003 the crisis evolved remarkably rapidly. The culmination point was on 21 Dec, 2002 when President Bush sent U.S. troops to the Gulf region. To many observers this signalled a turning point from which there would be no easy return. Sending an army in is both politically and economically such a large•scale undertaking that it would have demanded a lot of political courage to bring the army back home without doing anything under the judging eyes of international diplomatic corps and domestic tax payers. Because of the rapid deterioration of the situation during those months that period of time was chosen to be under examination in this study.

Before being able to assess the paralysis of the CFSP one has to have an understanding of the concept as such. Since it was founded by Maastricht Treaty in 1992, there has been a lot of research on it and it is to some extent a contested concept. In a nutshell it is both an aim and a mechanism to pool together foreign and security policies of the EU Member States in order to gain benefits of integration also in these political sectors. After Maastricht, the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997

1 For general overview of the Crisis, see for example Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_disarmament_crisis An overview that emphasises the CFSP is included into this study (APPENDIX). 2 established five fundamental objectives and identified several ways to pursue these objectives. The chapters below might be exhausting but they are necessary in order to understand what the EU as an institution thinks of the CFSP. Obtained from the Internet site of the European Union these are: The Amsterdam Treaty spells out five fundamental objectives of CFSP:

· to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principle of the Charter; · to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; · to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principle of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders · to promote international co•operation; · to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The treaty also identifies several ways in which these objectives are to be pursued:

· defining the principles and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, which is done by the European Council; · deciding on common strategies. These instruments were introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty and set out overall policy guidelines for activities with individual countries. Each strategy specifies its objectives, its duration and the resources that will have to be provided by the EU and the Member States. So far there are Common strategies on , Ukraine, Mediterranean and the Middle East Peace Process. They too are decided by the European Council. · adopting joint actions and common positions. These commit the Member States to adopting a certain position and a certain course of action. They are decided by the General Affairs Council.

Additionally, mechanisms for regular political dialogue with a whole range of third countries have been set up, usually with troika meetings at ministerial, senior officials and working group level, summits and in some cases, meetings with all Member States and the Commission at ministerial or senior officials level.

Outside these regular mechanisms, the EU maintains a political presence, particularly in areas of crisis or conflict. Special Representatives have been appointed to the Great Lakes (Africa), Middle East, Stability Pact, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ethiopia/Eritrea and Afghanistan. These Special Representatives provide a direct link to developments in these areas and allow the EU to have an active involvement in the search for lasting solutions.2

The roots of the CFSP are, however, further back in history. The beginning of the foreign policy cooperation of the European Community (predecessor of the EU) dates to the end of the1960's, when the six Member States of the EC decided in the Hague Summit to develop cooperation in the field of foreign policy.3 The aims and means of intergovernmental cooperation were decided by

2 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm 3 The ground for this had been layed down by so called Pléven and Fouchet plans in the beginning of 1950's and 1960's, respectively. 3 Davignon Report in the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Luxembourg in 1970. The European Political Cooperation, as it was called, was seen to foster integration and peaceful international cooperation. The mechanisms of foreign policy cooperation were affirmed during the 1970's and 1980's. One culmination point was in 1987 when the Member States of the EC signed the Single European Act. But even though the signatories committed to create a European foreign policy, the nature of the EPC remained intergovernmental.4

One of the grounding problems of the CFSP has always been the level of commitment of its participants on it. In a sense a political ground has not been the problem: already starting from, at least, the 1970's there has been a moral and, to some extent, treaty•based obligation for the participants to consult each other before taking a stand in (important) issues in international politics. This basic rule has then been developed later in different contexts. What has constituted the problem is that the participants have failed to live by the basic rule. This was also the case in Iraq Disarmament Crisis. This phenomenon is closely linked with the question of European identity, both an identity of the EU in world affairs as well as a notion of Europeanness among people. Like in the case of this study, the question of European identity strikingly appears in a context of transatlantic relations. This is something we come back to in the concluding chapters.

The term paralysis that I use here to describe the malfunctioning of the CFSP is my own. In my opinion it pictures well what happened in January – March 2003 since I view the CFSP first of all as a process: a process of diplomatic communication to soundly find joint positions for the EU Member States. The natural movement in process paralysed during the period as the participating states became locked behind their respective positions and the differences of these positions were too extensive to be bridged. The CFSP did not break or disappear. It is true that it fundamentally stopped offering a sound mechanism with which to agree upon a particular matter, but with time and other issues at hand the process began its movement again.5

To argue that something stopped working is, of course, also an argument that ithad been working before the event took place. This is one of the most studied and argued issues around the CFSP and there are different views on whether the common policy has ever worked. That debate has not been included into this study either. In my opinion it is wrong to judge that the CFSP does not work when the participating countries do not have precisely identical foreign and security policies. The key is

4 Koskela (1999), pp. 13•14. 5 The Evian Summit, 30 May – 1 June, 2005, was an ice breaking moment to this direction but that is beyond both the subject and the timeline of this study. 4 the term common which differs for example from the terms unified, single, like the Single Market. When the foreign ministers of the EU sit around a table and discuss an issue trying to find a common position the qualifications of the CFSP have been met. Quite near to this approach comes also Dieter Mahncke in his article Transatlantic Relations6 when he states that one can speak of a common foreign policy in the framework of the CFSP in two cases: Member States acting as unit or acting in a coordinated manner. In the run up to the invasion in Iraq, for example, the Greek Presidency of the EU stated that the UK and had aligned with the US outside of the framework of the EU7.

Along with the so called Iraq Disarmament Crisis the point of views of the states that participate in the CFSP diverged greatly. It seems that the ultimate source of difference stems from a mixture of the Member States' national interests in Iraq, ideologically constructed world views of the states' leaders, and a so called Transatlantic Dilemma in European politics. According to some authors, the dilemma means the differences in attitudes of European states in their foreign policies in relation to the influence of foreign policy of the United States on European politics. In this sense, the paralysis of the CFSP in January – March 2003 was affected by the factors of transatlantic relations as well as the Member States' own characteristics.

Examining a variety of viewpoints, the Theory of Three Traditions or International Theory of Mr. Martin Wight is an especially illuminating tool for it allows and explains the simultaneous existence of contradictory views. This theory is the basis of my analysis in which I regroup the most important different stances of the Member States on the Iraq question according to the categories of Wight's Three Traditions. Technically I pose questions and try to find answers to them from the primary and secondary material aiming to gain understanding of the deadlock of the CFSP in January – March 2003. The primary material consists of statements and one interview of leaders of state or groups of leaders of state, and the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council. The secondary material consists of academic articles and media coverage.

6 Mahncke (2004b), p. 197. 7 Statement by George Papandreou on Iraq and the joint declaration of eight European leaders http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=397&article=177 5

1.2. A method as a hybrid of methods

In Lene Hansen's words “at the heart of foreign policy research [there] should be an engagement with politically pertinent issues, but 'reality' is always larger than the number of questions one can ask of it; to formulate a research project is therefore inevitably to make a series of choices.” That series for her post structuralist discourse analysis consist of the following choices:

· whether one should study official foreign policy discourse or expand the scope to include the political opposition, such as the media and marginal discourses · whether one should examine the foreign policy discourse of one Self or of multiple Selves (one or several identities) · whether one should select one particular moment or a longer historical development · whether one should study one event or issue or a multiplicity · which material should be selected as the foundation for and object of analysis8

In the following chapters, after explaining why I have come up with a hybrid of methods, I will answer these fundamental questions by building up a research design. Following that I will introduce the methodological basis of this study more in•depth.

The method of this study is a unique hybrid of parts of other methods. It is unique because of the research question and the subject. To study CFSP it is, of course, possible to use existing methods and to formulate the research question accordingly. Actually, this is what I did in the first place. However, I was dissatisfied with the restrictions that the methods posed for the questions I could have asked. I wanted to gain a deeper understanding of the CFSP and therefore my original plan was to study the constructed future visions of the CFSP by examining the narratives told about it. The method back then was Narrative Research. I also wanted to get in touch with the official CFSP documents for I had already read texts written about CFSP and about documents. After collecting and reading a number of these documents, however, I came to the conclusion that in this case that research question and the method where not revealing enough. But I did have an idea of the documents and I thought I was not finished with them yet, so I went through a process of trying to figure out what I actually wanted to know which would also makes me feel content with what I was doing. It took some time to figure out that Iraq Disarmament Crisis was an event that had a huge

8 Hansen (2006), p. 73. 6 impact, a negative one, on the CFSP. Not because it would not have been obvious, but because I was already used to avoiding the Iraq issue which is quite an awful mess, to say the least. But having become comfortable with the idea of choosing Iraq, I also became convinced of the importance of the subject. That is why I ended up with the research question at hand, and the question, for its part, led me to this mixture of theory and method. I do understand that using a research method that is unique and a hybrid construction of other methods is a risky business. To avoid defaults I have tried to make the method technical, transparent and logical.

The method is a hybrid of certain existing methods: something from (qualitative) content analysis, something from interpretative analysis (and a certain new elaborated version: Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis) and something from post structuralist discourse analysis. The research design is taken from Lene Hansen's new elaboration of post structuralist discourse analysis, but the actual analysis is not on discourses. The structure of how the questions are posed and answers looked for them comes from the content analysis added with Hansen's intertextual reading. Finally, the actual analysis is an interpretative one. The chapters below show how I formulate the basis of the methodology for the study: research design, hypothetical questions, intertextual reading and interpretative analysis. 7

1.3. Building up a research design

Here I construct a picture of the research design a similar to but smaller construction than in Hansen's book Security as Practise9. Picture 1., below, shows an elaborated design for discourse analysis research, made by Hansen. That one lays a ground for the post•structuralist discourse analysis. As an example, it is followed by Picture 2., the research design of Hansen's study Western debate on the Bosnian war. And finally Picture 3. shows the design of this study using Hansen's model.

Number of Selves tells the approach to defining the identity or identities examined in the study, Intertextual models tells how the reading is done,Temporal perspective limits the time scale and Number of events organises the time scale and the subject accordingly.

Number of Selves Intertextual models •Single 1.Official discourse •Comparison around 2.Wider political debate events or issues 3a.Cultural representations •Discursive encounter 3b.Marginal political discourses

STUDY

Temporal perspectives Number of events •One moment •One •Comparative moments •Multiple – related by issue •Historical development •Multiple – related by time

PICTURE 1. Elaborated research design for discourse analysis: 10

9 Hansen (2006). 10 Hansen (2006), p. 81. 8 These categorizations are to help in assessing the subject adequately from different angles. The idea is to make choices, for example, the Number of Selves, and then to name what these categories stand for. Later on I will place the choices of this study into the picture above, both the choices of which categories I use and the choices of the content of each category.

In the section Intertextual models Official discourse means state•level documents, both the official statements of leaders of state and the legal documents of state institutions. Wider political debate means the discussion carried on in the media by journalists, commentators, politicians and so on. Part three means texts that do not pursue to be universally accepted for they either openly emphasize cultural aspects (3a) or represent, for example, critical academic research (3b) or expressions of marginal political groups.

Number of Selves Intertextual models Model 1. Official discourse Single: the West Model 2. Wider political debate Model 3b. Academic

WESTERN DEBATE ON THE BOSNIAN WAR

One moment: subdivided One: Bosnian war into seven periods Temporal perspective Number of events

PICTURE 2. The research design for Western Debate on the Bosnian war: 11

11 Hansen (2006), p. 88. 9

Number of Selves Intertextual models Model 1. Official discourse Three: Realists Model 2. Wider political debate rationalists, revolutionists Model 3b. Academic

CFSP IN IRAQ DISARMAMENT CRISIS IN JAN•MARCH 2003

One moment: period One: Iraq Disarmament Crisis of three months Temporal perspective Number of events

PICTURE 3. The research design for the CFSP in Iraq Disarmament Crisis:

For comparative reasons I have added here two pictures of research design, the first is the one of Lene Hansen, the second this study. Picture 3. shows that Hansen's study only has one Self (identity) to examine but this study has three of them. It does not mean that the aim in this one would be higher but only that while Hansen traces the construction of the particular identity, I do not, for I refer to Wight's theory and take the three identities straight from it. The other parts of the design are seemingly similar but they differ largely in the scope of research: Hansen's amount of material is much larger and her analysis deeper. For choosing texts Hansen has formulated a textual selection matrix. It is introduced below in Table 1. which is followed by Table 2. expressing the textual choices for this study. 10 MATERIAL TEMPORAL HISTORICAL MATERIAL LOCATION TIME OF STUDY GENERAL MATERIAL Three criteria: Conceptual histories 1) Clear articulations 2) Widely read and attended to 3) Formal authority KEY TEXTS • Primary reading of broader • Conceptual histories set of sources • Quoted in contemporary • Digital search engines debates • Re•published TABLE 1. Textual selection matrix by Hansen12.

MATERIAL TEMPORAL LOCATION TIME OF STUDY GENERAL MATERIAL • Media coverage on Iraq Disarmament Crisis and CFSP during Jan • March 2003 • Academic analysis of the issue • UN Security Council resolution 1441 • UN Security Council draft resolution submitted by the U.S., the U.K. and Spain • Counter proposal to previous submitted by France, Russia and • Speeches and Statements of the Presidency of the EU • Speeches and Statements of leaders of state KEY TEXTS 1. Bush: State of the Union 2. Letter of Eight 3. Vilnius Group Statement 4. Extraordinary European Council 17 Feb, 2003 Presidency Conclusions 5. Chirac: Interview 6. Blair: Statement on Iraq TABLE 2. Textual selection matrix for this study

12 Hansen (2006), p. 82•83. 11

1.4. Building up a method

Content Analysis, which is normally a quantitative research method, is a system of examining large textual masses using key words. With the development of computer technology this scanning is often made using special software designed for it.13 I use the system of content analysis in a qualitative way compensating the key words with key questions and instead of scanning quantitative results from large textual masses I scan qualitative results from small textual masses. Table 3. below summarizes the differences:

Method Search agent Search target Search source Content analysis Key word Quantitative: amount Large textual masses of hits Qualitative content Key question Qualitative: nature of Small textual masses analysis (version) hits TABLE 3. Differences in quantitative and qualitative content analysis

The three traditions of Martin Wight's theory, which represent the three Selves (identities) in Hansen's model, have each certain ontological foundations. The analysis of this study uses those ontological foundations by formulating questions according to these ontological characters and finding answers to them from the primary sources, which are official documents (in Hansen's design: Model 1. Official discourse), and scanning the results from the analysis' first part through the secondary sources, which are texts from the media and academic research (in Hansen's design: Model 2. Wider political debate and Model 3b. Marginal political discourses). The system of double reading, with two different sets of material, is similar to both Hansen's system of intertextual reading and Tellis's wording of triangulated research strategy.

Hansen formulated a system of intertextual reading whose purpose is to examine the construction of Selves from textual material by defining the discourses that shape the identities. The same model can also be used other way around: when identities are known by the discourses they cling to, the actors can be regrouped according to identities by reading and interpreting their texts.

13 Neuendorf (2002), Stemler (2001). 12

Hansen's system has three stages14:

1) Reading identities and policies from original texts 2) Reading texts written on original texts 3) Comparison of stages 1 and 2

A similar three•way approach is introduced in Tellis'sApplication of a Case Study Methodology15. Tellis writes that a case study is also known as a triangulated research strategy. Triangulation can occur with data, investigators, theories, and even methodologies. The protocols that are used to ensure accuracy and alternative explanations are called triangulation. The need for triangulation arises from the ethical need to confirm the validity of the processes.

Tellis refers to Denzin's The research act and identifies four types of triangulation, of which number one is similar to Hansen's intertextual reading and is being used in this study.

· Data source triangulation: researcher looks for the data to remain the same in different contexts

· Investigator triangulation: several investigators examine the same phenomenon

· Theory triangulation: investigators with different viewpoints interpret the same results

· Methodological triangulation: one approach is followed by another, to increase confidence in the interpretation16

The concluding part of analysis is put together by interpretative method. According to Kimberly Neuendorf the focus of interpretative analysis is on the formation of the theory from the observation of messages and the coding of those messages. It involves theoretical sampling, analytical categories, cumulative, comparative analysis, and the formulation of types or conceptual categories. The analyst is in a constant state of discovery and revision therefore assumed to be a competent observer.17 Recent elaboration from Psychological studies calledInterpretative Phenomenological Analysis puts a stronger emphasis on the notion that while a researcher in this method is trying to 14 Hansen (2006), p. 59. 15 Tellis, Winston (1997), Application of a Case Study Methodology. http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3•3/tellis2.html 16 See above. 17 Neuendorf (2002), pp. 6•7. 13 get inside the individual's (who is studied) personal perception or account of an event or state of things, the researcher cannot do this directly or completely. That is because the access to the target's perception is dependent on the researcher’s own conceptions.18

Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis assumes that the analyst is interested in learning about the respondent's psychological world, either in the form of beliefs or constructs that are made manifest or suggested by the respondent's talk. Also the respondent's story, itself, can be said to represent the respondent's identity. Either way meaning is central, and the aim is, in Jonathan Smith's words, to try to understand the content and complexity of those meanings rather than measure their frequency. These meanings are not transparently available, they must be obtained through a sustained engagement with the text and a process of interpretation.19

Arto Haapala sums up in his articleInterpretation and Knowledge20 that “[I]n interpretation we temporarily abandon our own point of view, and its attitudes, and learn a new point of view, that of the artist. By means of empathy, we step into the world of another.” This is how I approach the interpretative analysis ending this Thesis: it is not so much trying to be a picture viewed from a distance but a conception of state of affairs as observed from the inside. Literally, an interpretation is a creation of a cognitive mind, therefore it carries and openly states a possibility of misjudgment. However, I perceive that a better option than claiming to show an objective truth without a voiced possibility of misjudgment, and then fail to make the correct judgment.

18 Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. http://www.psyc.bbk.ac.uk/ipa/whatisipa.htm 19 Smith (2003), p 64. 20 Haapala (1995), pp. 199•200. 14

1.5. Forming the hypothetical questions

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the structure with which the hypothetical questions are formed. The questions themselves are formulated and answered in an analysis part after the theory chapters for the assumptions behind the theory are essential in the process. The theory has three traditions which in this study are taken to be Selves or identities outlined in chapter Building up the research design. These are: Realists, Rationalists and Revolutionists. The theory chapters also introduce three concepts which serve as approaches for tracing down the ontological assumptions behind the traditions/Selves. These concepts are: assumption or view of (1) human nature, (2) international community and (3) war.

Table 4. shows a matrix for hypothetical questions. Variants are given capital letter symbols as codes: A, B, C, X, Y, Z. Questions are formed using the same basic wording and sentence but altering the codes which gives the following example questions.

Examples: “X”'s 1. view of “A” is “XA”, so who and why in this text/document is like “X”? 2. “Z”'s view of “C” is “ZC” so is the actor/actors in this text like “Z”? HUMAN NATURE INTERNATIONAL WAR = A COMMUNITY = C = B REALISTS Unchangeable, Anarchical, cyclical, Appears in cycles, = X opportunist, low wisdom to prepare for characteristic to human morale and ultimately the war being selfish RATIONALISTS Better and worse To some extent “When all else fails”, = Y sides, need for social anarchical but areas of ultimate mean and contracts structured peace and should be limited as stability by social much as possible, war contracts and is avoidable by social international contracts and int. cooperation cooperation REVOLUTIONISTS Changeable, Actual or latent struggle “Holy” if fought for = Z ultimately good, high between good and evil, revolutionist’s purpose, morale if only allowed emancipation of peoples also revolutionists who to be free possible but need to stick to non•violent establish new rules and struggle orders TABLE 4. Matrix for hypothetical questions. 15

1.6. A summary of method•building

Critique for this study and its research methodology could state that it is unscientific in nature for it does not fully exploit already existing research methods, accepted by scientific community, and because, to some extent, replication is not possible (for the interpretative part: interpretation is always bound to subject's personal capacity and background). These are serious challenges to whatever study, but regarding them, I refer to Winston Tellis'sApplication of a Case Study Methodology and point out two things that one has to bear in mind while judging the relevance of the methodological background: First, what is regarded as the best practice by the mainstream theories and methods shifts constantly according to the changes of those mainstreams. In other words, a certain level of courage towards individual thinking is also a necessity for a scientific approach. At least without it, research is under a threat of being just another repetition of recognized things. Second, to some extent, the accusation of being unscientific is an old relic of positivist epistemology which has successfully been counter•argued by post•positivist epistemologies, in particular critical theories. As critical theories have shown, positivist argument is based on assumption of only one objective truth that is perceivable, where as most post•positivist (or post• modern, for that matter) theories acknowledge a humane weakness in front of understanding. This goes back to the very theory of knowledge and what is commonly accepted as knowledge or fact. Post•positivist epistemology accepts that there are multiple interpretations of things and “the truth” is a piece of knowledge stemming from only one point of view.21

The value added in this kind of method•building is clear: while not giving a totally new approach, it does, however, give one that is not extensively used. This methodological approach is set to show at least something totally new from the researched issue, if not new answers to the question, then at least a new route to those (old) answers, which, in turn, might lead us to some further questions, or, at least, it leaves out certain new possibilities as ”already studied”. In addition, this kind of method• building gives its complement to the field of study, small and humble, yes, but a complement anyway. We cannot tell what new ideas this approach may stimulate in the future, but the one thing we do know for sure, is that in this study a special attention was paid to the requirements of the research question, which, in turn, paid a special attention to the research ethical questions of what and why to study. 21 Post•positivism critique, see for example Fischer, Frank (1998), Beyond Empiricism: Policy Inquiry in Post• positivist Perspective. In Policy Studies Journal Vol.26 No.1. 129•146. 16

PART 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: THREE TRADITIONS

2.1. An overview of the theory

Martin Wight’s International Theory22, Theory of the Three Traditions, also known as the Theory of Three R’s, is not one of the most well•known theories in the study of International Relations (IR). The author did not publish many texts in his lifetime but he was a popular lecturer of IR in the London School of Economics (LSE) where he did most of his academic career. He was also a prominent member of the British Council of International Relations, which was established after the Second World War (WWII) to address questions of IR especially from the point of view of the United Kingdom. He did not write down his own theory as a book but instead explained it, and used it, in his lectures in the LSE. After his death (born 1917, died 1972) his wife Gabriele Wright together with one of his former students, Brian Porter, organised his lectures and using Porter’s lecture notes, published his theory in a book in 1991, calledInternational Theory, The Three Traditions. That book is the main source of his theory, in general, and also in this study.23

To put it short, the basic argument behind the theory is that every phenomenon of IR can be approached from different aspects. These aspects find, or emphasize, different features in the phenomena under examination. Therefore, in order to fully understand the phenomena in IR, and the working of the whole system of international relations, or in other words international politics, it is necessary to acknowledge the simultaneous existence of these differing views. At this point it is worthwhile to notice that according to many other theories of IR, these different aspects are more or less different theories of IR. Different theories on their part, or schools of thought, of IR can all be equally relevant and explanatory of the same particular phenomenon of IR when the matter is approached from a different point of view: theorists of Liberalism tend to emphasize the effect, or lack, of cooperation, while theorists of Realism put emphasis on the power structure and use of force.

Regardless of how simple the thought behind Wight’s theory may seem, it is not the common way

22 Wight’s concept of international theory is introduced in the beginning of next chapter. 23 Short introduction to Martin Wight and his theory can be found also, for example, in Griffiths (1999) pp. 168•173, Bull (1991) pp. ix•xxiv and in Knutsen (1997) pp. 252•257. 17 to understand the world in IR (or in Political Science in general) because the discipline, as many others especially in Social Sciences, is based on the dialogue of competing theories which usually tend to look at phenomena (or IR) through certain exclusionary models in order to explain their logic. Different exclusionary models give different views of the world. The idea of Wight’s theory is to allow the simultaneous existence of these different views. Nevertheless, as a theory, Wight’s one also has a model, but an incorporating one. His model consists of three categories, which he explains to be wide traditions of thought or study and he names them as Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism. The reason why he calls these categories as traditions is that he constructs them through historical analysis. He examines the writings of politicians and philosophers in European history and uses their ideas as factors and elements to build his categories. It is, though, clear to Wight that the borders of these categories are not, and could not be, well defined, as the categories overlap to some extent. And usually thinkers tend to be placed in the grey area between the ideal borders of two categories.

Political phenomena are usually explained with one theory, such as Liberalism, and when one explanation is given, it is normal that another author challenges this reasoning by explaining the issue with a different theory. These explanations often reveal quite a narrow, though at the same time very deep, picture of the state of affairs. This leads to the situation in which those who share the axioms of a certain theorist like the world view and the idea of man, also agree with this one. And just because there are people who regard phenomena with different axioms, it is worthwhile to use, as to explain phenomena, a theory that uses different axioms to study the issue. To put it academically, this acknowledgment of parallel existence of different axioms mirrors the historical construction of understanding a certain issue, and to put it simply, different views tend to culminate to one overriding view, so behind an accepted explanation may be found a series of explanations that were not so broadly accepted, but yet they represent the truth to somebody. One of the most important tasks of the university institution, according to Wight, is to teach off the parochial tendency to always regard “our era” as the culmination of development24. The same goes with the tendency to regard “our truth” as the only truth.

24 Wight (1991), pp.6. Parochial attitude to regard our era as the culmination point of the development and that we are at the edge of unequalled prosperity or catastrophe. 18 Primary Primary (Main) topic Ideological (Key) unit of level of or focus tradition explanatory analysis analysis factors Realism human groups (inter•) military conflict, order conservatism group/state might/power, in anarchy level balance of power Rationalism rational actors (inter•) bargaining, rational co• liberalism individual compromise, operation level interests Revolutionism capitalist world world systems structural economic radicalism system level power, development, repression, political exploitation independence

TABLE 5. Source: Knutsen: “Table 1 The three paradigms of International Relations”.25 (Outlook of the table has been modified, content has not.)

The table above is taken from Knutsen’s bookA History of International Relations Theory. Here he explains the difference between Wight’s categories. Knutsen separates the unit and level of analysis as well as explanatory factors, topic of focus and ideological tradition to which these categories refer to.

In the following table (TABLE 6) I have added some clarifying remarks. PICTURE 4. summarizes the relations of the traditions to each other and shows how they merge into one another.

25 Source: Knutsen, Torbjørn L. (1997), A History of International Relations Theory. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 19 Primary Primary (Main) topic Ideological (Key) unit of level of or focus tradition explanatory analysis analysis factors Realism human groups (inter•) military conflict, order conservatism group/state might/power, in anarchy level balance of power (additions) groups actor must to force capable of have means of somebody to using power expressing/ do something using power Rationalism rational actors (inter•) bargaining, rational co• liberalism individual compromise, operation level interest (additions) groups (inter•) non• “no might - to seduce avoiding or military need to somebody to lacking power organisation negotiate” do something level Revolutionism capitalist world world systems structural economic radicalism system level power, development, repression, political exploitation independence (additions) groups actor must to free predominantly have means of somebody to using power expressing/ do something using power

TABLE 6. Table 5. with author's additions. 26

26 Table 1 (Knutsen, 1997) with additions by author, 20th April 2006. Additions are in italics. 20

HEGEMONIC SIDE

Hegemonic system by power politics

Revolutionism Realism Ideology Anarchy (Future, (Past, change) continuity)

Rationalism Liberalism (present, prudence)

Balance of power by negotiation and counter weighting

PLURALISTIC SIDE

PICTURE 4. Three traditions merge into one another. 21

2.2. Categories according to world views

Wight defines the international theory as being “political philosophy of international relations”27. The concept refers to the political theory that is speculation about state, authority, power, laws, and so on, in the realm of a society, and whose earliest authors Wight sees philosophers like Plato. About international relations, however, one cannot properly talk before the advent of sovereign state, that is, a state which acknowledges no political superior. This Wight sees happened in Western Europe at the time of Machiavelli28, though the evolution had started two centuries earlier, but the states of the Holy Roman Empire (of the German Nation), for example, needed another one and a half century to appear. Nevertheless, Wight sees no tradition of enquiry, or body of theory, on international relations before our times. The sovereign state is a new concept, and even though, for example, ancient Greco•Roman civilizations had international relations, most of the classical political writing is concerned with thepolis (city), not of the relations of the polises. The development of the states•system and its control became an interest of the generations who fought the two World Wars. From the concentration on the state, interest has shifted to foreign policy, to international institutions and international control. 29

Writers of international theory since Machiavelli can be divided into three groups and their ideas into three traditions: rationalists, realists and revolutionists. These traditions can in some sense be related to three interrelated political conditions which comprise the subject•matter of the field of IR. These conditions are introduced in the following list, taken from Wight‘s book:

( a) International anarchy: a multiplicity of sovereign states acknowledging no political superior, whose relationships are ultimately regulated by warfare. ( b) Diplomacy and commerce: continuous and organized intercourse between these sovereign states in the pacific intervals: international and institutionalized intercourse. ( c) The concept of a society of states, or family of nations: although there is no political superior, nevertheless the recognition that the multiplicity of sovereign states forms a moral and

27 Reader should bear in mind that Wight developed his theory decades ago. It is, nevertheless, still relevant and fits to the contemporary study of IR. Relevancy comes from the fact that there is no, nor has been, a one overriding theory in IR able to silence other views. A good example of Wight’s theory’s accurateness in today’s study is its use by a group of known scholars around the University of Leeds School of Politics and International Studies. See: http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/ 28 Niccolò Machiavelli (1469•1527), a renaissance thinker, writer, political philosopher and diplomat from the city state of Florence in Italian peninsula. 29 Wight (1991), p.1. 22 cultural whole, which imposes certain moral and psychological and possibly even legal (according to some theories of law) obligations • even if not political ones. As Burke observed: ‘The writers on public law have often called this aggregate of nations a commonwealth.’30 31

Three traditions can be differentiated by how they emphasize the above mentioned political conditions. Realists tend to put stress on international anarchy, Rationalists on international intercourse and Revolutionists on society of states or international society.32

For clarity, it is best, at this point, to look at the precise definition of Wight: “A view which emphasizes expertise, technique andvirtù (virtuosity), which appeals implicitly to the principle of justification by success, asserts that war is natural to man and that it is no use waging it with kid gloves, and which implies a repetitive or cyclical theory of history, may be called Realist. A theory which stresses the moral tensions inherent in political action and the necessity and difficulty of justifying political power, which maintains that war may be waged only with economy of means, and that there are strict limits to what is permissible in war, and which appeals to the principle of the choice of the lesser evil, is in the Rationalist traditions. The Revolutionist view of international relations assumes the necessity of universal renovation. It divides the world into the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness, the former being in a state of latent or actual holy war with the latter. It is a view which postulates ideological uniformity between states as desirable and asserts an interim ethic until the kingdom of light is triumphant. It is one, moreover, in which all principles have an ideological limitation, and in which the end justifies the means; or which alternatively asserts that the kingdom of light will triumph only through identification of political with private ethics.”33

Revolutionists

Revolutionists believe so passionately in the moral unity of the society of states or international society that the conformity is possible and also necessary. They identify themselves with the above• mentioned society and therefore claim to speak in the name of it and feel the need to give effect to it, as the first aim of their international policies. The reason to do international politics is to change the world, and the reason for this change is the betterment of the world. The idea is doing good and the logic goes that as a reason of act, doing good is legitimate as such. There is a notion of evangelism in Revolutionism. Comparing this to Realists and Rationalists, the difference is not in

30 Wight’s source: Edmund Burke, ’Letters on a Regicide Peace’,The Works of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke (London: Samuel Holdsworth, 1842), vol. II, p. 299. 31 Wight (1991), p. 7. 32 Wight (1991), pp. 7•8. 33 Wight (1991), p. 259. 23 the sincere will to do good but in the factors that constitute the good. For example, Realists and Rationalists do not assume that it would be possible to change the world. Rationalists, however, do believe that social contracts can ease human intercourse, but for Realists signing treaties is more like theater and the play ends when stronger parties so decide. The built•in dilemma of Revolutionism is their eagerness to make the change fast and wide, in a world, where a lot of people • maybe the majority if included Realists and Rationalists • do not believe in change as Revolutionists do. Therefore Revolutionists’ counterparts are likely to oppose the change at hand, but Revolutionists believe that it is necessary, the end justifies the means, and that it is the most important thing of their time and their life. Wight names three outstanding examples of international Revolutionists: the religious Revolutionists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; the French Revolutionists, especially the Jacobins; and the totalitarian Revolutionists of the twentieth century.34

Present day Revolutionists are, for example, extremist anti•globalization movements which use the method of violent protests to make organised society show its ultimate dependence on the use of violence. This they do in order to undermine society’s legitimacy. But Revolutionists do not always have to be extremists or violent. Finnish President Tarja Halonen could be regarded as an example of a modern, moderate Revolutionist. Matias Möttölä tells about Professor Osmo Apunen’s definition, according to which Halonen belongs to the same neo•normative and ‘ideological’ tradition as other contemporary foreign policy elite in Finland. Halonen, for example, did not support military intervention in Yugoslavian wars nor banning the arms sales block to Bosnian Muslims. Regardless of the cruelty the warring parts resorted to, President maintained the pacifist idea of not using military means in solving (military) problems.35

Another example of Revolutionist policy can be found in the foreign policy texts of the U.S.. The National Security Strategy of the U.S. expresses the aim of changing other societies to be more in accordance with its own society. The U.S. will “expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy” (Italics added)36. The ultimate purpose and motivation of al•Qaeda’s international is being argued about, but if seen as aiming to change the balance of power in world politics by undermining the U.S. supremacy and Western dominance, it can be seen as Revolutionary politics, too.

According to Wight, Western civilization is especially marked by Revolutionist heritage, kind of a

34 Wight (1991), p. 8. 35 Möttölä (2005), p.7. 36 U.S. National Security Strategy 2002 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15421.htm 24 missionary character. A significant feature in this tradition is a formal lack of linear development of ideology because Revolutionist ideologies always try to deny or annul their predecessors. When a new ideology is born, its legitimacy is increased by giving it an image of independence. This is also linked to the Revolutionist way of dividing the world into spheres of good and bad: in order to pursue the ideological goal, the good that will come in the future, the Revolutionist has to declare the past as being the bad. The logic goes that also all the ideologies that existed in the past were part of the bad. The path to a better future is tied in the Revolutionists' ideology at hand.37 The formal lack of linearity does not, however, mean an actual one. Revolutionists, unlike Realists, do believe that the world in general is on its way to a better future. It is only the former ideologies that are invalidated, not their direction to a better life. Realists, on the other hand, see human life as a cyclical occurrence: states of affairs shift between better and worse, between order and disorder, between peace and war.38

Rationalists

Rationalists emphasize (international) cooperation. They focus on it even though they regard global environment mostly an anarchical system. Despite the cruelty that sometimes characterizes human intercourse, Rationalists believe that man is a rational being. Rationalism is close to Empirism in which belief follows evidence and knowing the interests or reasons. Broadly speaking, it is also kind of middle road of European or Western ways of thinking. In its roots there is a Descartesian belief in ration39 as well as a Grotian emphasis on international law40. Rationalism combines Naturalist and Positivist orientations of (older) . These are system•based on the law of nature and system•based on conventions and treaties. Rationalism is a horizontally wide tradition in which many ways of thought can be counted in.41

For example, from Finnish point of view it can be difficult to outline Rationalism’s borders because the tradition is strongly present in overall Scandinavian political systems. This is because pluralist democracy together with corporatist system and system of proportional elections makes politics consensus•based and diminishes the possibility of political extremism to take over in national

37 Wight (1991), p. 12. 38 Wight (1991), p. 14•5. 39 The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: René Descartes http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/descarte.htm 40 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Hugo Grotius http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grotius/ 41 Wight (1991), p. 14•5. 25 politics. In a country with majoritarian electoral system in which political power relations can change fundamentally overnight it is more likely that Rationalists are found where ideological groups merge, that is, at the edges. This also makes it more likely for a statesman/stateswoman from a majoritarian system to use stronger language in political statements than his/her counterpart in a proportional system. The latter do create political extremism but it is most often marginalized to the edge of the political system. The picture below shows where Rationalists can be found in the majoritarian electoral system.

ß••••••••PARTY A••••••••••••••[Rationalists]•••••••••••••PARTY B•••••••••à The above axis demonstrates political system as a spectrum from, say, the political left to the political right.

Realists emphasize anarchical character of international relations, power politics and war. The assumption is that a conflict is an endogenous feature in relations between states. It stems from the very nature of a human being and the constraints that human intercourse has, for example scarce economy, raw material or water resources. The termrealism comes from the perception that it is more important what is happening in reality (what is the world really like) than what should happen (what the world should be like). Former Finnish President Paasikivi summarized the view in saying that “wisdom begins at recognition of facts”42. The roots of Wight's realism are in Macchiavelli's Prince where, for the first time in Western history after Hellenic era, the writer observes politics without ethical premises. Macchiavelli differentiated between theological•ethical rationalism that prevailed in the Middle Ages, and latent revolutionism whose roots go back to the birth of Christianity. As Macchiavelli's successor Wight names Thomas Hobbes43 who wroteLeviathan during the English Civil War. The way of thinking calledraison d'état and one of its masters, the Iron Chancellor of Germany, Otto von Bismark44, stand for later examples of applied realism45. More recent realists who have written on International Relations are, for example, Raymond Aron with Peace and War. A Theory of International Relations in 1966, Hans Morgenthau withPolitics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace in 1948, and Kenneth Waltz with Theory of

42 Paasikivi•seura: Paasikiven linja ja ulkopolitiikka http://www.paasikivi•seura.fi/paasikivenlinja.htm 43 Hobbes, Thomas: The Leviathan. Chapter XIII. Original published in 1660. http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan•contents.html 44Wikipedia: Otto von Bismarck http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Otto_von_Bismarck 45 Wight (1991), pp. 15•17. 26 International Politics in 1979.46 Wight stated that during his time everybody was a realist. By this he meant that the mental burden of WWII was still heavy, memories of the war were fresh and hardly any thinker or politician had a rosy picture of international affairs. Realism, in its all versions and updated theories, did hold the position as the mainstream paradigm in the study of International Relations, at least in Anglo•American tradition, well into the 1980's. Its dominance only started to decrease when it faced the critique from paradigms like constructivism, post•structuralism and crit ical theory.47

Realist tradition has three scientific presumptions or approaches: mechanistic, biological and psychological. Mechanistic approach in international relations emphasizes the system ofbalance of power48 and stability kept up by balancing other states. The concept appeared in European political literature already in the 15th century. Today the concept has asserted its authority and is used as much by realists and rationalists. Biological approach became common with Darwin's theory of evolution. His concept natural selection can be captured in the law of thesurvival of the fittest, which in IR theory comes near to Hobbesian concept of the the war of all against all. The notion legitimizes the old concept of natural law, which has been used by people like Hitler who found it as a justification for Third Reich's policy of conquest. He called it getting lebensraum, living space. Psychological approach emphasizes the role of human nature in international relations. Psychological theories might not look like realist ones at a first glance but the rationale goes that the more comprehensive explanation they offer for human behavior, the more the fate of humans will be determined, and the less there will be room for ethics and moral choices in human intercourse, like in international relations. This diminished role of ethics leads straight to realism. The division of the three traditions could be simplified by saying that realists make sociological, rationalists ontological and revolutionists ethical or normative descriptions of international relations.49

46 Aron (1966), Morgenthau (1948), Waltz (1979). 47 See, for example, Torbjørn (1997). 48 See, for example, Morgenthau (1967). 49 Wight (1991), pp. 18•22. 27

2.3. Human Nature as factor of world view

All theories of IR are founded on certain ontological assumptions. They give to theories their dynamism but also make more difficult finding an understanding between theorists. Behind of these judgments there is an ontological assumption of its own that it is not possible to prove the supremacy of one assumption over another. Just like according to an agnostic it is not possible to prove supremacy of one religion over another. The reason for this inability is that ontological assumptions, like religions, appear on the level of belief. To understand Wight's theory it is essential to notice that all human beings capable of thinking have certain basic assumptions in common, and what these assumptions are, has a crucial impact on which theories seem more accurate than others to a certain person. Knowing the ontological assumptions of a person, or a theory, gives guide to knowing how the person, or theory, regard other issues. Examples of these assumptions are: a view of whether human nature is basically good, bad, or beyond the axis of good•bad; a view of whether human being is essentially an individual or part of a group, or both; a view of whether human being is capable of understanding the meaning of life and taking it as a guide to personal life, or understanding that it is not possible because the issue is too complex, or there is no meaning which to understand etc. The way how a person views these issues affects his or her behavior and can also have an important role in alignment with political forces.

Realists and the paradox of Hobbes

Realists tend to be pessimistic about human nature. For them human nature is plain bad: mankind is divided into rogues and fools and the rogues prey on the fools. Hobbes50 and Machiavelli51 share the sinister notion on human nature but this does not prevent them from doing international politics. Indeed, if somebody says he or she does not like Realism, maybe he or she does not like the reality. Nevertheless, Realists' view of the badness in human nature leads to Hobbesian paradox: seeking relief from anarchy and the war of all against all, people agree upon a social contract by which they give supreme authority to one actor, leviathan, whose task it is to guarantee stability. But it may happen that this one is also plain bad by nature. And because the others will not have any powers against this ruler, they might end up being in a worse situation than at the beginning: in thewar of

50 Hobbes, Thomas: The Leviathan. Chapter XIII. http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan•contents.html 51 Machiavelli (1999), p. 71, 74. 28 all against all no one had supreme authority52.53

The Realists of our time, however, are more cautious when they speak about human nature. Whereas the theorists of the 16th and 17th centuries were writing for the elite, princes and aristocrats, today the audience is likely to be common people, and the texts themselves written in favor of democracy. Today's theories that rest on the notion of badness of human nature are wrapped in a disguise that makes them look more acceptable.54 For example psychological phenomena or larger social structures can work as the disguise Wight mentioned. Indeed, the neorealist paradigm of Kenneth Waltz, introduced in Theory of International Politics, is a structuralist one.55

Revolutionists and the paradox of Rousseau

Revolutionists are optimistic and perfectionist about human nature. But just like Realists, also Revolutionists have a paradox, that of Rousseau's:men are born free but everywhere they are in chains.56 According to Revolutionism, those few who differ from the general law that men are born free and good enchain the others. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels pictured similar occurrence in The Communist Manifesto: good and evil, in the form of the oppressed and the oppressor, have always fought and they still do57. Some people will be born or grow up as good people (oppressed, the poor, working class etc.) while others will be born or grow up evil (oppressor, the rich, ruling class etc.)58 Revolutionists may claim to speak on behalf of the majority of population, or sometimes with the voice of a conscious minority, but the method for changing the world most often is enlightenment or (re•)education. The central belief is that increase in knowledge equals emancipation: the world is bad because people do not understand the consequences of their acts, and when this comprehension reaches everybody, the world becomes a better place. Sometimes, however, Revolutionists are doubtful that all are capable of being (re•)educated. In these cases the methods have included eliminating the unwanted people. During the French Revolution, that was called theory of depopulation and it can be regarded as an extreme form of optimism (unless

52 Hobbes, Thomas: The Leviathan. Chapter XIII. http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/hobbes/leviathan•contents.html 53 Wight (1991), p. 26. 54 Wight (1991), pp. 26•27. 55 Waltz, Kenneth (1979). 56 Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Jean•Jasques Rousseau http://www.iep.utm.edu/r/rousseau.htm#H4 57 This was written in 1848, but according to the premisses, the argument should be still valid. Typical for Revolutionists, they claimed that has come a time when the whole global system can be changed to a better one for good. 58 Marx – Engel: Manifesto of the Communist Party http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist•manifesto/index.htm 29 extreme form of pessimism)59 because it stated that on cleaning the worse part of the population the remaining part could be made good. The thought went on that the very act of depopulation – that being mass murders – would not have a negative effect on the remaining part.60

Accepting the paradoxes

According to Rationalist the very existence of paradoxes is central for understanding human behavior, they explain it by the concept of tension. For they are not any more pessimistic than optimistic, they describe the tension as being the impossibility of consolidation between the edges in human nature. Society is a field of cooperation of rational beings. It is mainly working well, but not all the time. Rationalist has a Realist side so he or she will not be surprised when cooperation breaks down into conflict. But there is also the Revolutionist side which make Rationalist a small reformist pursuing betterment of society by fine adjustment, taking very small steps. 61

A notion of human nature carries with it also a certain ontological notion of history. Realists tend to perceive the cyclical character of human history: conquests, revolutions, defeats. Here comes also a tendency to observe international relations from sociological perspective for history seems to offer enormous number of examples and lessons. Revolutionists emphasize instead the upward linearity of history towards a final solution that either waits in the future62 or has just been achieved63. The dynamics of Revolutionism stem from a messianic (liberating, emancipating) aim, for example bringing down the tyrant and establishing a zone Liberté, of Égalité, Fraternité (French Revolution), or destroying the capitalism and making a world wide revolution (Communist Manifesto by Marx and Engels). Rationalists' perception on history is cautious and agnostic. One has to take into consideration coincidences and unexpected elements. There does seem to be a progress in the course of history but that is not anything like the inevitable natural law: whereas one species or era is developing, the other may decline or fall. The success and prosperity acquired over a long period of time may be lost or destroyed during one generation. Also the ideas and thoughts that lend wings for human progress can be channelled to spread destruction and terror.64

59 See page 21, Picture 5, the circle shows how Revolutionism and Realism merge into one another at their edges. That is the location for the theory of depopulation. 60 Wight (1991), p. 28. 61 Wight (1991), p. 29. 62 For example Kant's perception on perpetual peace which can be created to replace the state of war that is also the state of nature. Kant (1989). 63 For example Hegel's perception on the State as an overground embodiment of the absolute spirit: the final, fully• fledged shape of society that mankind has purposely approached. Määttänen (1995), p. 241, Saarinen (1994), p.176. 64 Wight (1991), p. 29. 30

2.4. International Community as factor of world view

Wight speaks of international society, most politicians in this study of international community. There are nuances: society probably leaning more towards the system of organizing a group, and community on the existence of a group. The wordinginternational community, prevailing nowadays, might be a trend of the time, or it might express that state of international cooperation is more (only) existing than it is (even) organized.

For Wight international society is a ”political and social fact, attested to by the diplomatic system, diplomatic society, the acceptance of international law and writings of international lawyers, and also, by a certain instinct of sociability, one whose effects are widely diffused among almost all individuals, from tourist curiosity to a deep sense of kinship with all mankind.”65

For Realists international society is most often non•existent. In Hobbesian way international relations/society equals the state of nature, and that, in Hobbesian thinking, is a war of all against all. No natural society or community of states exists; society is created by social contract. This non• existence is also a prevailing approach in the 20th century study of IR. For example Wight quotes Hans Morgenthau who points that above national societies exists no international society so intergrated as to be able to define for them the concrete meaning of justice or equality, as national societies do for their members.66

Hobbes wrote about the leviathan. At the beginning of the 21st century the leviathan is the UN, and more precisely the UNSC, who have been given supreme authority to decide on the security of the world. The way how the UNSC is organized67 underlines the other way of seeing international society that Realists also sometimes have. That one states that the great powers constitute whatever international society there is.68 For example, in the Iraq Disarmament Crisis it was said that the international community was divided. It was, but it was so most visibly in the UNSC where two blocks, both led by great powers, argued over the matter while other states in the UNSC, and in the rest of the international community for that matter, lined with the rivalling powers. It was a situation where two great powers wanted the rest of the international community to follow them,

65 Wight (1991), p. 30. 66 Wight (1991), p. 31. 67 The UNSC consist of five permanent members (, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States), each having the right to veto, plus fifteen rotating members, none having the right to veto. 68 Wight (1991), p. 32. 31 and three other great powers objected, resulting to the two powers ignoring that community, making up another one (the Coalition of the Willing) and pursuing their goal with the help of this new international community. This proves the claim that whatever international society or community there is, it is constituted by great powers.

Rationalists, for their part, see “international law as potentially a law having for its subjects both institutions and individuals, just as municipal law does • •.”69 According to this school of thought, in the state of nature men are still bound by the law of nature, which means here pre•Hobbesian idea of a moral law of nature. The law of nature commands sociable behavior; state of nature is therefore a condition of sociability, if not of society. Based on John Locke's view of state of nature and state of war having as the only thing in common the absence of a political superior. From this view international society is a true society but institutionally deficient, lacking a common superior or judiciary. Wight captures the difference saying that “[w]hile the Realist will say that the force is the dominant mode of intercourse between nations, the Rationalist argues that, on the contrary, custom is.”70 For the Realist custom gives coating to force, for the Rationalist force steps in where custom breaks down. Wight does admit that the distinction between force and custom is not easy to define, but he notes that a greater part of the totality of international relationships reposes on custom rather than force.71

On Revolutionist theory Wight says that it assimilates international relations to a condition of domestic politics. He refers to Christian Wolff's72 concept civitas maxima as a great society or a super•state in which individual states are citizens, and which could exercise authority over them. The more international society is conceived as acivitas maxima, the more international relations will be conceived as domestic politics. There are three possible ways of trying to bring about this assimilation: doctrinal uniformity, doctrinal imperialism, and cosmopolitanism.73

Doctrinal uniformity is about demanding homogeneity among the members of international society. It requires doctrinal and structural conformity, and ideological homogeneity between states. An example of this kind of Revolutionism is Kant'sPerpetual Peace. In his construction there can be no peace until all governments were of the same ideological compulsion, republican.74 In a way the

69 Wight (1991), p. 37. 70 Quotation: Wight (1991), p. 39. 71 Wight (1991), p. 37•39. 72 Christian Wolff (1679•1754): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_Wolff_(philosopher) 73 Quotation: Wight (1991), p. 41. 74 Wight (1991), p. 42., and Kant (1989), p. 21. 32 acquis communitaire75 of the European Union could be seen as a modern example of this. The only thing that runs counter to it, is the fact that in the EU it is the Member States who actually decide what obligations are imposed on them. In doctrinal imperialism civitas maxima is tried to be actualized, or international relations assimilated into domestic politics, by a single great power trying to spread a creed and impose uniformity. There are many examples of this from the first French Republic imposing the rights of man wherever its armies could conquer, Stalinism in Eastern Europe, and so on. 76One modern example of this is the eagerness to spread Western values – democracy, freedom, rule of law – in parts of the world where they do not prevail. Cosmopolitanism attempts to actualize civitas maxima by proclaiming a world society of individuals, which overrides nations or states, diminishing or dismissing the middle link. Cosmopolitanism rejects the idea of society of states and sees society of individuals as the only true international society. This is the most revolutionary of Revolutionist theories and it implies the total dissolution of international relations. The communal note of cosmopolitanism should not let blind from the fact that not all means of trying to achieve that one society are sympathetic ones. As Wight defines, hard Revolutionists may resort to violence, soft Revolutionists to yearning and talk.77

75 Pact of treaties the Candidate Country must accept and absorb in order to achieve Member State's status. 76 Wight (1991), p. 42•43. 77 Wight (1991), p. 45•47. 33

2.5. Theory of War as factor of world view

According to Wight war is a central feature of international relations. If this is too Realist a statement, one can say that war is the ultimate feature of international relations, just as revolution is the ultimate feature of domestic politics.78 Whatever the approach, war is nevertheless constantly present in international relations, if not as actual war fighting, then at least as a latent threat, looming behind strategic scenarios. The way the war, and the threat of it, was seen in the arguments during the Iraq Disarmament Crisis is an especially important defining factor. Attitudes varied a lot: from the U.S. led point of view that the war was an immediate necessity, to a stance supported by many EU Member States that the war was an option but the moment for that had not arrived, to Russia‘s, China‘s, Germany’s point of view that in no circumstances will the war be justified nor necessary. According to Wight the three traditions have different things to say about the war. They are presented in the following chapter divided into two parts. The first one assesses the character of war, the second the conduct and purpose of war as a policy.

Character of war

For Rationalists a war is a necessary evil that is to be minimized as far as possible. The object of war is peace, not vice versa. From municipal society a war has been banished by inherent social cooperativeness of men, but in international relations there exists no supreme authority able to conduct the behavior of the members of the system.79 It is a feature of the system of international relations as they have been before and as they are at the moment. The future remains to be seen. Though international cooperation at present seems to be growing, we cannot tell whether an economic or political crisis will come and undermine our systems of cooperative mechanisms, like international stock markets or criminal courts, for example. Rationalist stance differs from Realist and Revolutionist in that both the latter do predict the future and to them a war might not be an unwanted event: Realists see that a war is natural and inevitable. Therefore it will not disappear and placing one’s policies according to such an illustrious view, one is bound to lose the next time when a war breaks out. Realists always have to prepare themselves for the next war, for it will come sooner or later. Peace is not a norm but rather the laboratory of the war.80 Revolutionists predict a long term emancipatory development both in international relations and in human intercourse in

78 Wight (1991), p. 206. 79 Wight (1991), pp. 206•7. 80 Wight (1991), pp. 208•9. 34 general. They think of a series of wars directed consciously or unconsciously toward an ultimate future peace, that is, reconstruction of international society. War is the agent or instrument of history. 81 The reason why war is fought either makes it acceptable or unacceptable: whether it contributes or hampers the development, whether it is started and won by Revolutionists or by some others.

Purpose and conduct of war

The centre of Rationalist theory of the purpose and conduct of war is based on the old doctrine of a just war. Aquinas82 laid down three criteria: it must be declared by proper authority, it must have a just cause and it must be fought in the right frame of mind. Neo•scholastics' additions to the criteria were that it must be fought by just means and the evil caused and the harm wreaked by the war must be less than the evil which the war is intended to control or destroy. The difficulty lies in that the vagueness of these criteria makes a debasement of the just war theory very possible, and allows for endless argument and complex casuistry. The theory of just war has faced further deflation as its original supporter, the Church, has abandoned it. Nevertheless, the idea that the war needs to be justified has become indissolubly combined with civilized Western tradition. The debate around the invasion to Iraq has largely been around the question whether it would be just or not. For example, an EU Member State Finland commented after the launch of the Coalition's operation that it is not backed by the UN mandate and is therefore illegal, whereas the Coalition Member States argued that the UN had accepted the use of force already in previous resolutions and therefore the invasion was legal and just.83

Realists have three particular facets on their doctrine of the conduct of war. The first is the belief in the preventive war84, second is an acceptance of unlimited war, and the third is the destruction of the enemy as the goal of war.85 The doctrine of unlimited warfare stands against the Rationalist idea of minimizing the necessary evil. However, it is important to see that, by and large, with the

81 Wight (1991), pp. 212•3. 82 Catholic Encyclopedia: St. Thomas Aquinas http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14663b.htm Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Saint Thomas Aquinas http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas/ 83 Opinion stated clearly in the speech of President Halonen in UN General Assembly th58 session, 21 Sept, 2004: ”Some nations resorted to use of force, which was not compatible with international law.” 84 Present day concept: pre•emptive war or strike. ”• • we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self•defence by acting pre•emptively against such terrorists • •.” Quotation from U.S. National Security Strategy: Overview of America's International Strategy. 2002. 85 Wright (1991), pp. 220•1. 35 emergence of nation states, national and mass conscript armies, and so called total wars, the nature of warfare in general has shifted towards ultimate destruction of societies.86 For Revolutionists legal definitions of a war are nonsense, the criterion of the just war is ideological. For example, to Bolsheviks in the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the difference between just and unjust war is that former is fought for liberation and to defend the people, whereas unjust wars are fought to conquer and enslave.87 On the level of ideas this is a simple division but with real world events the difficulty lies in making the difference between what is said and done. As an example Wight mentions the Communist 88 theory and practice: they seem to have combined the Rational theory of talking of just war and winning over the conquered by kindness, with the Realist practice and method of displaying terror and ruthlessness among the conquered. A present day example is that the U.S. led Coalition has argued from the beginning that the invasion to Iraq is for liberating the people from under the harsh rule of totalitarian dictator , and as such, it is an action for enhancing the universal Human Rights. In many cases in the street protests against the invasion, the protesters accused the U.S. for acting as an imperialist conqueror.

Revolutionists go further, for what is theirjust is the same which washoly to previous religious fighters. Wight perceives that a fully developed doctrine of the holy war comes from the Muslim theory that divides the world into two: Dar•al•Islam, the abode of Islam (Islam means ‘submitting oneself to God’), and Dar•al•Harb, the abode of war. Wight's reasoning here is, of course, subject to criticism, depending on the way of defining the word holy, it is quite likely that we meet holy wars a lot before Muslim conquests, and in many places. But regardless of where Wight is looking for the holy war, the phenomenon as such is what we are interested in, not its origins89. Nevertheless, Dar• al•Harb, the abode of war, means the part of mankind which has not accepted Islam, and where war reigns, actually or potentially, until it is absorbed in Dar•al•Islam. The holy war was transposed from Islam to Christendom in the shape of the Crusades, which were not just wars of liberation, or against insurgents, but ’a new path to heaven’. Secularized, it has become characteristic of the Revolutionist doctrine of war. The Jacobins of the French Revolution and the Communist divided the world, or mankind, into two.90

86 Wikipedia: Total war http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_war 87 Wright (1991), pp. 221•2. 88 When speaking about Communism and Communists in this chapter it must be born in mind that the theory is formed during the early part of the Cold War when the development of Communism had not achieved such softer models as, for example, Euro•Communism. 89 The actual origins of the phenomenon holy war is, obviously, subject to controversy. 90 Wight (1991), pp. 223•4. 36 The holy war is also parallel to the Realist doctrine of war in embracing the principles of a preventive war, and the total, ruthless, unlimited war, and to the extreme point of the Revolutionist theory of war in the principle of extermination. Wight traces this doctrine back to the Albigensian Crusade and the Sack of Beziers in 1209, it follows in Papal Inquisition and ‘re•education’ of southern France, it was done by the Jacobins in the French Revolution, by Franco’s Nationalists in their systematic massacres of the Reds, and Hitler’s massacres of Jews, as well as Stalin’s ‘liquidation’ of his people.91

91 Wight (1991), pp. 224•7. 37

PART 3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE IRAQ DISARMAMENT CRISIS

3.1. An overview of the Crisis: emphasis on the CFSP

Understanding the development of the Iraq Disarmament Crisis it is helpful to divide the period into three phases: the first phase is the period from President Bush's State of the Union •speech in January 2002 to Bush's decision to send troops to Gulf Region in December 2002; the second phase is the period from the march of the troops to Gulf Region to the meeting on 16 March, 2003; the third from the Azores to the start of the military operation on 20 March. The first phase is characterized by a slow deepening of the Crisis, positions are taken and commentators and specialists discuss the matter, in the second phase the disagreements of actors become visible and discussion spills from specialist•level to a wider public debate, politicians try to influence other actors via public opinion, the third phase is a hectic series of turns, last efforts when a collision already looms in the horizon. The following chapters describe how the Crisis evolved.

The hottest debate around the Iraq disarmament, before the Coalition of the Willing undertook its military operation, took place in the UN Security Council. The EU Member States, who should have, according to the Treaty of the European Union and EU procedures, agreed upon a common position and stand behind that, fell apart with their differing opinions breaking the unity of the EU in the face of the debate. The crisis did not emerge out of the blue, nor did the threat of war fighting in order to disarm Iraq. Resolution number 144192 (8 Nov, 2002), which remained the most important one concerning Iraq before the coalition's operation, refers to ten previous Resolutions and clearly states that the country has both failed to meet its duties laid down by the Security Council and obstructed the UN efforts to work on the case.93

According to most commentators, the Iraq Disarmament Crisis grew from the ground of September 2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent war on terror and increased tendency to watch over failed states. One could, however, assume that the February 2001 air strikes on Iraq's air defense network94, undertaken by the U.S and U.K., could have had something in common with the coming

92 United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1441. 8. November 2002. S/RES/1441 (2002) 93 The ten Resolutions are: 661 (1990), 678 (1990), 686 (1991), 687 (1991), 688 (1991), 707 (1991), 715 (1991), 986 (1995), 1284 (1999) and 1382 (2001). UNSC Resolution 1441. 94 CNN: Bush: Iraq strikes part of a strategy http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/meast/02/16/iraq.airstrike.03/index.html 38 struggle, but that is speculation. More widely Iraq rose to the agenda of international politics again (after the beginning of 1990) by President Bush's State of the Union speech on 29 Jan, 2002, in which he identifies Iraq, Iran and North Korea in the “axis of evil”95. After that speech the first time Iraq rises to the agenda of the European Council was in Copenhagen 12 – 13 Dec, 2002 in the Council's Declaration on Iraq which gives full and unequivocal support for Security Council Resolution 1441 of 8 Dec, 2002.96 Prior to that the Council meetings in Barcelona, March 15 – 16, Seville, June 21 – 22, and Brussels, October 24 – 2., say nothing about the matter. There is, however, a chapter concerning the Middle East and Israeli•Palestinian Crisis in Conclusions from Seville and Barcelona.97.

This shows that even though the Iraq Disarmament Crisis was underway the leaders of the EU Member States did not see it as an important issue in the CFSP or perhaps they saw it but did not want to make it obvious, for example, in search of a common position (which already by then was divided) or was not to show the disunity, unless necessary. After Iraq has risen on the agenda, nevertheless, it occupied a large part of it: not only does Copenhagen Council give a particular declaration on Iraq, but the next Council is distinctly assembled to discuss Iraq and bridge the disentangled views inside the EU. The Council following that starts on the same day as the Coalition's operation, and includes a chapter on Iraq in its Presidency Conclusions in which the emphasis is in minimizing the suffering and in the post•conflict stabilization and reconstruction. It also states that the Member States are ”determined to strengthen the capacity of the European Union in the context of the CFSP and the ESDP.”

After the summer of 2002, when President Bush has introduced the doctrine of pre•emption in a speech at West Point (the policy was formalized in a document titled The National Security Strategy of the United States of America98), the gap over Iraq become apparent when the U.S. accuses France of brokering China to sell forbidden material to Iraq via Syria.99 According to Katten and Laitin France had large on•going commercial programs in Iraq due to President Hussein's monopoly in the UN's Oil For Food Program and his reward to French companies (and to

95 State of the Union 2002. Read on 15 Feb, 2007. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129•11.html 96 Copenhagen European Council 12 and 13 December, 2002, Presidency Conclusions, 15917/02, POLGEN 84. 97 In Barcelona and Seville Councils: Barcelona European Council 15 and 16 March, 2002, SN 100/1/02 REV 1. Seville European Council 21 and 22 June, 2002, Presidency Conclusions, 13463/02, POLGEN 52. 98 U.S. National Security Strategy: Overview of America's International Strategy. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15421.htm 99 The Center for International Trade and Security. Export Control Newsletter numbers 25•26. Read on 15 Feb, 2007. http://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/html/xcnews26.htm 39 smaller extent German and Russian). The authors have an even stronger claim when they say that ”[i]t was apparent that economic sanctions were becoming ineffective because smuggling across bordering nation boundaries was on the increase as was illicit trade with France, Germany and Russia.”100 This is the setting in which the end of the year 2002 approached.

On September 12 President Bush asks the UN to enforce the resolution or the U.S. would have to do it alone. The next month the U.S. Congress authorises an attack on Iraq101. On the UN issues Resolution 1441 that orders Iraq to declare its WMD's by December 8, which it also does, though the U.S. declares the report unconvincing. On the UN weapon inspectors, led by Mr. , return to Iraq after almost four years. Halfway down that month the European Council takes Iraq on its agenda and on 21st Bush sends U.S. troops to the Gulf region, which is a concrete saturation point with no return without gain. For example Chief Inspector Hans Blix understands that the troops are not coming back without a major shift in policy but also believes that war is not inevitable and the U.S. is only putting pressure on Iraq 102.

The official approach of the EU is not very different in that the Brussels European Council recognizes that the military build•up has been essential in obtaining the return of the inspectors103. Mr. Blix assumes that the tone of the Resolution is so grim that no state would have approved it unless it was under a threat of an immediate military strike.104 At the time, military personnel presume that speed is essential in the negotiations because the last winter months February and March would be the best time for a military strike taking into consideration nature and weather conditions.105

January 2003 sees more U.S. accusations of France secretly selling prohibited material to Iraq. On 16th the UN inspectors find eleven undeclared empty chemical warheads in Iraq and their report on 27th is critical but asks more time for the inspectors106. The same day fifteen EU Member States sign a common stance107. The next day President Bush gives the year's State of the Union •speech and

100 Alternatives to War with Iraq Available to the U.S. and their Probable Outcomes. Analysis by Stanley L Katten and Howard Laitin (former RAND Corporation analysts). Read on 15 Feb, 2007. http://members.aol.com/dkhosh/myhomepage/report.html 101 Joint Resolution on Iraq. Read on 10 April, 2007. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july•dec02/joint_resolution_10•11•02.html 102 Blix (2004), pp 128. 103 Brussels Extraordinary European Council 17 Feb, 2003, Presidency Conclusions, 6466/03, POLGEN 7. 104 Blix (2004), pp 104. 105 Blix (2004), pp 109. 106 The status of nuclear inspections in Iraq http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/elbaradei27jan03.htm 107 General Affaires Council 27 January, 2003: Conclusions on Iraq http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=397&article=167 40 tells the U.S. is ready to attack Iraq even without the UN108. On 30th, the third day after signing the common EU position, the leaders of eight European states (of which five then current EU Member States and three preparing to join the club in 2004) published a public letter positioning themselves with the U.S.109 The following day the Greek Prime Minister, who holds the Presidency of the EU at the time, declares the letter not to be an EU procedure110.

The letter concretely shifts the discussion of the prevailing EU CFSP outside of the EU mechanisms. It can be a consequence of failed negotiations inside the EU realm, or reflect simply the fact that so many European countries were not EU Member States at the time, thus not participants in the CFSP, but nevertheless willing to take part in this matter. From the point of view of EU's CFSP, it was a complicated act, because it involved non EU countries trying to shape the CFSP with their EU counterparts, all this happening outside the EU mechanism but everybody being aware that all these countries would be part of the EU in a few years' time. The act of course contributed in paralysing the CFSP, but it can also be seen to represent the already nonfunctioning situation of the CFSP.

In the beginning of February, the EU gives aPublic Demarche111, but the next day's lecture of Secretary of State seizes the public attention112. He brings forth evidence against Iraq which will become highly controversial. The day after that a new gap opens up in European politics when Foreign Ministers of ten Central and Eastern European countries give a joint statement, like the above mentioned Letter of Eight, positioning them in line with the U.S113. and U.K. lead line. On 17th, when the Extraordinary European council is meeting in Brussels, President Chirac attacks the so called Vilnius Group accusing the Candidate Countries of missing “a good opportunity to stay quiet”114. This comment raises support for the Candidate Countries' rights to speak up their minds, and the division between so called ”Old Europe” and ”New Europe”, conceptions introduced by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, takes more space in the media and in public discussion.

108 President George W. Bush's State of the Union speech on 28 Jan, 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128•19.html 109 Letter of Eight leaders of state on 30 Jan, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2708877.stm 110 Statement by George Papandreou on Iraq and the joint declaration of eight European leaders http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=397&article=177 111 Public Demarche of 4Feb, 2003 to Iraq http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/cfsp/74396.pdf 112 U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell addresses the U.N. Security Council on 5 Feb, 2002 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205•1.html#1 113 Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries on 5 Feb, 2003 http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/press•releases/2003/feb/2868/ 114 'New Europe' Backs EU on Iraq http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2775579.stm 41 Between the Vilnius Group Statement and Extraordinary European Council, the UN Inspectors release a further report saying that slight progress has been made115. The fierceness of the political battle is seen in the way how both camps, pro• and anti•war, declare that Mr. Blix's report supports their position116. This battle of interpretations also represents the division in public discussion in general. Newspapers all around the world receive and publish opinion letters for and against both stances, written by both regular political commentators and people who do not normally take part in struggles of international politics: the issue clearly wakes up the public. On 15 February, as well as 18 January, massive peace protests are organised all over the world. On 24 Feb the U.S., the U.K. and Spain submit a proposed UN resolution asking to authorize military force on Iraq. France, Germany and Russia submit immediately an informal counter•resolution in the UN Security Council. In the end the lobbying of the U.S., U.K. and Spain yields only one more supporter (Bulgaria)117.

At the beginning of March the option of war starts to seem so likely that countries of the Middle East suggest President Hussein to step down from power to avoid the war.118 On 6th, the same day that the UN arms inspectors publish an extensive report119, the division in the Security Council stabilizes when China joins France, Germany and Russia to officially oppose the U.S. Ten days later the Prime Ministers of the U.K. and Spain and President Bush meet in the Azores120. Participants deny it being a Council of War but many commentators believe so. And indeed, the third phase of the Iraq Disarmament Crisis starts.

On 17 March, even though France's position softens a bit when it announces that if Iraq uses chemical weapons against U.S. troops, it would support the U.S., President Chirac releases a pre• recorded CNN interview threatening to veto down a second UN resolution. Later that day Foreign Minister Villepin affirms the position. On the same day, at 13:28 (GMT) EU Presidency Greece says that the U.K. and Spain have alleged themselves with the U.S. on the Iraq Crisis outside the framework of the EU. At 13:53, British Attorney•General declares the possible war legal on the

115 Briefing of the Security Council, 14 Feb, 2003: An update on inspections http://www.unmovic.org/ 116 U.N. Report reinforces Security Council divisions. Read on 12 April, 2007. http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/02/14/sprj.irq.un/ 117 United Nations Security Council: Spain, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America :Draft Resolution. 24. February 2003. S/2003/215. And: United Nations Security Council: Letter dated 24 February 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. 24. February 2003. S/2003/214 118 United Arab Emirates suggests, Kuwait follows immediately and Bahrain the next day. 119 UNMOVIC Working Document: Unresolved Disarmament Issues. Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Programmes. http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/new/documents/cluster_document.pdf 120 Azores summit on Iraq: Press meeting http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030316•3.html 42 grounds of the existing UN resolution. At 15:00 the U.S., U.K. and Spain announce a withdrawal of their joint draft UN resolution. At 16:10, former Foreign Secretary resigns from the post of Leader of the House of Commons for being unable to support a war without international agreement and domestic support.121

The next day, 18 March, at 01:00 President Bush gives a 48•hour ultimatum to President Hussein. At 05:00 President Chirac declares the ultimatum contrary to the will of the Security Council. At 07:23, Health Minister Lord Hunt becomes the second British minister to resign over Iraq. At 09:00 German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder states that there is no justification for war. At 10:30 President Chirac gives his warning. At 11:08 Vatican State gives it warning. At 11:10 Home Officer John Denham becomes the third British minister to resign over Iraq. At 16:49, Secretary of State Powell announces that 45 countries have signed up in the so called Coalition of the Willing. The next day President Bush declares war. French Foreign Minister Villepin and German Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer still address Iraq in the Security Council but it will not lead to any changes and the military operation starts the following day.122 123

As mentioned above, the same day that the war begins, the European Council also starts a two•day meeting. The Presidency Conclusions include a chapter on Iraq demonstrating the importance of the issue for the Council but also the lateness and narrowness of its acting: the previous Council, dedicated to Iraq question, did not reach anything more than the broadly written statement. This one, however, finds lots of issues to be taken care of, giving the idea of incompleteness of the CFSP. And indeed, the urge for its improvement as well as taking care of transatlantic relations are specially voiced.124

It is important to make one further note. A reader of this text might have noted that the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Mr ) is not playing any role in the chronology above. The reason for this is simple: during the period under research, of all

121 BBC: Iraq crisis hour•by•hour: 16 – 17 March http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2855975.stm 122 BBC: Iraq crisis hour•by•hour: 18 March http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2859297.stm 123 Speech by M. Dominique de Villepin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the United Nations Security Council, New York 19 March, 2003. http://www.ambafrance•uk.org/article.php3?id_article=4917 And: Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany Mr. Joschka Fischer: Public Meeting of the Security Council on the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, New York, 19 March, 2003. http://www.germany.info/relaunch/politics/speeches/031903.htm 124 Brussels European Council 20 – 21 March, 2003, Presidency Conclusions pp. 31•34. 8410/03, POLGEN 29. 43 the tens of statements his cabinet issued, only one concerned Iraq125. And this one was not one of Mr Solana's, but the Demarche of 4 February, given by the Presidency of the EU. The High Representative was only one of the deliverers. The fact that the Presidency of the EU coordinated whatever coordination there was over the Iraq question, points to a clear division of tasks, and the High Representative was not the one responsible of voicing the CFSP on Iraq.

125 Common Foreign and Security Policy Statements (English) – 2003 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/Applications/newsRoom/loadBook.asp?target=2003&bid=73&lang =1&cmsId=257 44

3.2. List of events

To make the picture of events easier to see, a compact list of certain events or turns, crucial to the CFSP, is introduced below.126

12•13 Dec, 02 Copenhagen European Council 27 Jan, 03 General Affairs and External Relation Council: EU•15 to a common stance. 28 Jan, 03 President Bush's State of the Union speech 29 Jan, 03 Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions 30 Jan, 03 The Letter of Eight 30 Jan, 03 EU Presidency's Prime Minister says the Letter of Eight does not contribute to a common stance towards this issue. 31 Jan, 03 EU Presidency's Foreign Minister says the Letter of Eight is not an EU procedure. 1 Feb, 03 EU Presidency's Foreign Minister: “If developments are such that a strong message of peace should be sent to Iraq or preparations made for war, we shall convene an extraordinary Council”. 4 Feb, 03 Public Demarche to Iraq 5 Feb, 03 Secretary of State Colin Powell's lecture in the UN 5 Feb, 03 Vilnius Group Statement 10 Feb, 03 EU Presidency's proposal for an extraordinary European Council on Iraq 14 Feb, 03 EU Presidency's Prime Minister's letter to his EU counterparts: “• • it is now clear that the current crisis will soon reach a new, possibly decisive, turning point.” 17 Feb, 03 Extraordinary European Council (EU•15 only) 18 Feb, 03 “15 + 13”, joint position of EU•15 on Iraq, 10 acceding and 3 Candidate Countries concurring 21 Feb, 03 Extraordinary European Council Presidency Conclusions 24 Feb, 03 The U.S., U.K. and Spain submit a proposed UN Resolution. 24 Feb, 03 France, Germany and Russia submit an informal counter•resolution. 28 Feb, 03 EU•US Summit's press conference: differing views should not undermine a common will for a solution. 1 March, 03 EU Presidency's Foreign Minister says it could not be certain that the EU would have 126 Extended list of the events and turns is in the appendix of this thesis. 45 a common stance in the event of unilateral military action.

5 March, 03 Joint statement of France, Russia and Germany in opposition to the UN Resolution authorizing use of force. 6 March, 03 China joins France, Germany and Russia to officially oppose the U.S. 13 March, 03 EU Presidency's Foreign Minister in European Parliament: “• • the unity of the European Union • the fifteen • is being tested, as well as the unity of the twenty•five and twenty•eight. European Union•United States relations, our trans•Atlantic relations, are being tested. Relations between the European Union and the Arab and Muslim world are being tested.” 16 March, 03 The U.S., the U.K. and Spain meet in the Azores 17 March, 03 EU Presidency's Foreign Minister says the EU Presidency is taking initiatives right up to the last moment. 17 March, 03 President Chirac says France would veto a second UN Resolution (authorizing the use of force). 17 March, 03 British Attorney•General says the War is legal on the grounds of the existing UN resolution. 18 March, 03 EU Presidency's Foreign Minister: ”Out of this crisis the EU faces up to a real challenge • • to develop a CFSP • •.” 19 March, 03 French Foreign Minister Villepin and German Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer address on Iraq in the UN Security Council. 20 March, 03 EU Presidency's Prime Minister: “I express my deep regret that it was not possible to find a peaceful solution to the Iraq problem.” 20 March, 03 EU Presidency's Foreign Minister says there is a need to explore ways of creating a true common foreign policy. 20 March, 03 European Council: Statement on Iraq 46

PART 4. ANALYSIS PART I: PRIMARY MATERIAL

4.1. An overview of the Analysis part I

In this part I use the system of content analysis in a qualitative way compensating the key words with key questions. Chapter 1.4. Building up a method on page 16 explains the system.

The forming of the questions is introduced in chapter 1.5. Forming the hypothetical questions on page 19. As a reminder, here below there is the question format from page 19, according to which the scanning has been done, reintroduced. The question format is used together with theMatrix for hypothetical questions from page 19. The variables in questions are chosen from the matrix. The hypothetical questions were formed putting the questions and variables together are then used as “key words” in scanning the material.

Examples: “X”'s 1. view of “A” is “XA”, so who and why in this text/document is like “X”?

2. “Z”'s view of “C” is “ZC” so is the actor/actors in this text like “Z”?

According to the question format and the matrix variables the viewpoints used in the study of the material are the following:

- Who and why in this document is like Realist/Rationalist/Revolutionist?

- Is the actor/actors in this document like Realist/Rationalist/Revolutionist?

The choice between the questions one and two depends on the characters of the document. The criteria of choosing between categories (R:s) are based on the assumptions on Human Nature, International Community and War, stated in the matrix. The analysis begins with President George W. Bush's State of the Union speech on 28 Jan, 2003 for it gives the needed reference to which to 47 mirror the viewpoints of European actors. After this I examine the so called Letter of Eight on 30 Jan, 2003 and Vilnius Group Statement on 5 Feb, 2003. From here I proceed to Presidency Conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council held on 17 Feb, 2003, excerpts of an interview with President Jacques Chirac, and finally, Prime Minister 's Statement on Iraq. The documents analyzed here are not similar in length, scope, format etc. but their importance lies in their way of capturing the viewpoints of their political sides on this issue. They have been chosen after reading an extensive amount of material on this issue. 48

4.2. Bush: State of the Union 2003

President George W. Bush's State of the Union speech on 28 Jan, 2003 (Italics added.)

On the foreign policy identity of the U.S. President Bush says: “Our founders dedicated this country to the cause of human dignity, the rights of every person, and the possibilities of every life. This conviction leads us into the world to help the afflicted, and defend the peace, and confound the designs of evil men.”

The wordings conviction leads us into the world and confound the designs of evil men indicate the Revolutionist standpoint for they are the ones with high morality in actual or latent struggle against ”evil”.

In the next chapter the President says: ”Across the Earth, America is feeding the hungry •• more than 60 percent of international food aid comes as a gift from the people of the United States. As our nation moves troops and builds alliances to make our world safer, we must also remember our calling as a blessed country is to make this world better.”

By bridging together humanitarian aid and moving troops (military) under the cause of beinga blessed country, The President justifies the military means by placing them on the side of ”good” and against ”evil”, which again denotes Revolutionism.

After some paragraphs the President lays the ground to introduce Iraq by saying: “• • the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.”

This is the grounding accusation posed on Iraq's regime. The third paragraph after this states: ”We have called on the United Nations to fulfill its charter and stand by its demand that Iraq disarm.” He goes on: ”• • America's purpose is more than to follow a process •• it is to achieve a result • •”, and ”Yet the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others.”

Here the President states on the relations of the International Community and the U.S., the Community (The UN) is being asked to work, but anticipating that it might not be able to achieve these goals, Bush maintains the possibility of the U.S. to go it alone if need be. This places the point of view somewhere between Revolutionism and Realism, for Realists prepare for the war and both Realists and Revolutionists judge by themselves the situation and act alone. Rationalists tend to 49 cling to cooperation, network and institutions, on things that multiply the backing.

From outlining the activity of U.S. foreign policy the President goes on judging President Saddam Hussein: ”• • he agreed to disarm of all weapons of mass destruction. For the next 12 years, he systematically violated that agreement. He pursued chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, even while inspectors were in his country.”

Accusations of lying and preparing for the military undertakings places President Hussein clearly in the Realist category in Bush's speech. This is captured after some paras in the wording: ”The dictator of Iraq is not disarming. To the contrary; he is deceiving.”

Of the warring purpose of President Hussein Bush says: ”The only possible explanation, the only possible use he could have for those weapons, is to dominate, intimidate, or attack.”

By judging that Hussein's weapons are for ”evil” purposes contrasts the weapons under Bush command as being for ”good” purposes. This division of actors as us being thegood and them being the evil is the basis of Revolutionist thinking; the world is divided intogood and evil and the Revolutionist is set to make, or conquer, the world to be a place of the good.

There is a certain incentive to count some parts of Bush's foreign policy rhetoric to Rationalists category, for example the following: ”Some have said we must not act until the threat is imminent. Since when have terrorists and tyrants announced their intentions, politely putting us on notice before they strike?”

The latter sentence indicates rational scenario thinking, but already in the same paragraph, one sentence later, he comes to Realist pessimism, based on the idea of cyclical future, where better and worse times alternate and war is inevitable: ”Trusting in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein is not a strategy, and it is not an option.”

There is a lot of empirical evidence against President Hussein's inhumane regime, so President Bush's account is largely correctly grounded. The key to understand the following malaise in the CFSP, and international relations in general, over this issue, is not whether the ”factlist” Bush introduces is completely relevant or not, but it is the chosen policy in confronting the case. Bush goes on: ”We will consult. But let there be no misunderstanding: If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, for the safety of our people and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.” 50

He clearly and unquestionably expresses that the U.S. will act unless President Hussein does as his regime is told to by the U.S. and the International Community meaning the UN Security Council. Placing Bush's position in Wight's categories is not easy for it could be placed under any one of them if accompanied with the right arguments raised from the speech. However, the arguments with which he seeks the public approval in the first place, moral ones, indicate the main reason: a world view based on ideology. The ”factlist” of the misgivings towards President Hussein is long, but the ideological reasoning is short and sharp – it carries the weight. Put in the picture of page 21 (Picture 5. Three traditions merge into one another) Bush's foreign policy identity towards Iraq can be placed in the Revolutionist category but shifting towards Realism (round picture).

There is one good argument pointing to the Realism of the U.S. foreign policy. According to that the U.S. is a status quo power, possessing the greatest political, military and economic power at our time, and by going to Iraq, it is only trying to preserve the world system as it is and its own standing as well. No doubt there are people who think this way, but yet the Revolutionist change in the U.S. foreign policy after President Bush stepped into power and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks point out to conclude that in this case Revolutionism counts more. The argument for this is simple: had the reason to go to Iraq been sheer economic and Realist politics, the strive to democratize the country would not have been so strong. Indeed, it is the very goal of the U.S. foreign policy to bring democracy and freedom where it doesn't exist, and this was on top of the Iraq operation as well. Bringing democracy was not properly planned, as it seldom is, for it is extremely difficult, some say impossible, to bring it with guns. but it lies in the very character of Revolutionists that they always try to change the world anyway. So did the Bush Administration in this case, too. 51

4.3. The Letter of Eight

The Letter of Eight (leaders of state) issued on 30 Jan, 2003 (Italics added.)

( The leaders are: Jose Maria Aznar, Spain; Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, Portugal; Silvio Berlusconi, Italy; Tony Blair, United Kingdom; Vaclav Havel, Czech Republic; Peter Medgyessy, Hungary; Leszek Miller, Poland; Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Denmark.)

The Letter of Eight as well as the Vilnius Group Statement were both issued immediately after the two most important verbal acts of the U.S. on the Crisis, President Bush's State of the Union speech and Secretary of State Colin Powell's lecture in the UN Security Council on 5 Feb, 2003, respectively. That factor is the first to take into consideration when analysing these documents. In order to issue a joint statement of several governments at a certain point of time means that it needs to be prepared before that point of time. And because it was brought out immediately after the important U.S. verbal act, supporting the act's cause, it was planned in advance in accordance with the policy position it backed. In other words, it was a multiplier of the U.S. foreign policy. They, however, do not reflect the same Revolutionist approach as the U.S. foreign policy, they seem to be placed in the Rationalist category.

It is noteworthy that the Letter begins by appealing to values: ”The real bond between the United States and Europe is the values we share: democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the Rule of Law.”, because it right at the beginning attaches the text where the U.S. position is as well, on ideological level. More important, however, in analysing Eight states' viewpoints is to note their tendency to put the strongest emphasis on cooperation. This they both do by repeating the argument, and not only repeating, but raising it with different contexts.

The emphasis on cooperation starts by uniting the U.S. with the Leaders as opposed to a common enemy: ”The attacks of 11 September showed just how far terrorists – the enemies of our common values • •. ” 52

The Leaders look back for a proof of American goodwill: ”Thanks in large part to American bravery, generosity and farsightedness, Europe was set free from the two forms of tyranny• •.”

They do not point to more recent examples of American foreign policy which might have raised more controversial feelings.

One paragraph afterwards the Leaders state one of their grounding ideas: ”The transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime's persistent attempts to threaten world security.”

It is not a question of people or international community being threatened by President Hussein's policy but the transatlantic relations, meaning that whatever the U.S. decides to do about the matter, it is best to go with it. The next paragraph again accentuates the need for cooperation: ”In today's world, more than ever before, it is vital that we preserve that unity and cohesion.”

From the dominance of the U.S. the Leaders bring the case under UN led International Community: ”All of us are bound by Security Council Resolution 1441, which was adopted unanimously.”

Three paragraphs later the Leaders could not be more clearer in their message of cooperation: ”The solidarity, cohesion and determination of the international community are our best hope of achieving this peacefully. Our strength lies in unity.”

Yet all the emphasis on cooperation is for the sake of uniting behind an already set position as their remark of responsibility shows: ”The opportunity to avoid greater confrontation rests with him.” (Him meaning President Hussein.)

The Leaders do not have visions of the International Community actually solving the problem but only to stay together behind the existing fault line, which is that unless President Hussein clearly disarms (in practise also gives away the political weight of his regime), the U.S. would go it alone to disarm the country as President Bush two days earlier had stated in his State of the Union speech. The Letter of Eight means taking the U.S. ultimatum seriously and multiplying its weight with European backing – though it was also from Europe where the worst obstacles to the U.S. foreign policy came. 53 The end of the Letter, where the Leaders plea for the credibility of the Security Council as the key to world peace, should not be mistaken to be more than rhetoric. This is obvious: why have the Leaders not written their Letters during other crises? Why is there no similar quarrel every time when the Security Council fails to act decisively? Simply because that is not the main message of the Letter but which was stated at the beginning: transatlantic relations based on common values.

The joint foreign policy orientation of Eight Leaders of States in the Iraq Disarmament Crisis can be placed into Rationalist category in its pursuit of largest possible unity behind the future scenarios that seem most realistic. They differ from the Rationalist point of view of the 27 Jan, 2003 General Affairs and External Relations Council in that the Council puts all its hope solely in the UN led diplomacy. This difference, however, does not undermine the Rationalist categorisation of both the Eight Leaders and the conclusions of the GAERC in 27 Jan, 2003, it only tells about the identity construction of the actors: the European Union wants to see itself, as well as other States, like the U.S., equally serious actors under the UN led international arena, while those particular Leaders tend to see the U.S. as a more credible actor than the UN Security Council, or the European Union, which was not mentioned, for that matter. Compared to the standing of the European Council, the Eight Leader's stance is not orthodox Rationalism, leaning to a more powerful side (the U.S.) gives it a certain degree of Realist nuance.

The ending of the Letter puts a lot of weight in persuading members of the UNSC to follow the U.S. led route: ”• • the Security Council must maintain its credibility by ensuring full compliance with its resolutions.”, and ”We are confident that the Security Council will face up to its responsibilities.”

The tone is self•assured which indicates a trust on one's own cause; it is believed that the UNSC could actually come to back up the use of force. 54

4.4. Vilnius Group Statement

Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries in 5 Feb, 2003 (Italics added.)

Not so much different from the Letter of Eight is the statement of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ten Central and Eastern European countries (of which five were preparing to join the EU in 2004). It starts by underlining the relations between the U.S. and signatories' countries. The first paragraph starts by commenting Secretary of State Colin Powell's lecture in the UNSC saying that ”• • the United States presented compelling evidence • •.”, while at the same time the response from international community was at least ambiguous. In the same paragraph the Statement goes on: ”The trans•Atlantic community, of which we are a part • •.”

The two most important features of the statement for this analysis are, first, reiteration of the countries' readiness to move from diplomatic talk to enforcing the UNSC Resolution, and second, their requirement of the unity of the international community and demand for the UNSC to take the necessary action: ”• • danger • • requires a united response from the community of democracies.”, and ”We call upon the U.N. Security Council to take the necessary and appropriate action • •.”

Their tactic is to back up the U.S., U.K. and Spain led endeavour to persuade the UNSC but there also goes the limit; they do not back up undertakings outside the UNSC. This brings them in the Rationalist category for they see war as a necessary evil and the last resort, and that have to be supported by international community. Rationalism leaning so much on the U.S. could be questioned. This text does not reveal it, but if taken into consideration the past (and the Soviet rule) of the countries, and the economic and political assistance the U.S. has given to them, the leaning appears more understandable. It hints to a nuance of Realism like in the case of the Letter of Eight, but not to same extent because of the Vilnius countries' precondition that the UNSC should take action. 55

4.5. Extraordinary European Council

Extraordinary European Council on 17 Feb, 2003, Presidency Conclusions (Italics added.)

The Conclusions start by reaffirming the conclusions of the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 27 Jan, 2003. That document assesses Iraq within the chapter of the Middle East and somewhat briefly but clearly emphasizes the role of the UN Security Council, and urges President Hussein's regime to cooperate with it.

The third paragraph in the Council's Conclusions indicates the watershed function of the Crisis for international affairs and hints of the possibility to affect the issue: ”The way the unfolding of the situation in Iraq will be handled will have an important impact on the world in the next decades.”

Raising the concern of the effect on future development, and believing it is possible to affect it, rules out Realist approach which sees future as a cyclical phenomenon.

The fourth paragraph clearly expresses the strong leaning on the international community: ”We are committed to the United Nations remaining at the centre of the international order.”, and: ”We pledge our full support to the [Security] Council • •.”

This stressing of the UN as the center of the international community points towards Rationalist tendency for cooperation and negotiation. The way of grounding the chosen policy on large masses, in the fifth paragraph, further indicates towards Rationalist prudence: ”It is clear that this is what the people of Europe want.”

That and the next paragraphs speak more about the approach to war. Wordings like: ”We want to achieve this peacefully.”, and: ”War is not inevitable. Force should be used only as a last resort.” , unquestionably point to Rationalist direction for to Realist a war is just another way of life and to Revolutionist it is more important that the goals are targeted than by which means they are targeted. 56

Referring to the will of European people could also be seen as responding to the massive peace protests that were held around the world, and in many places in Europe, just two days before the Council on 15 Feb, 2003 (prior to that, similar protests were held on 18 Jan, 2003). Also it could be regarded as responding to the Letter of Eight (which the Presidency of the EU declared not an EU procedure) in that the Letter uses such wordings like: ”We in Europe have • •.”, and: ”We Europeans have • •.”, even though at the time of the Letter (30 Jan, 2003) the people in Europe had shown that it is not even close to anything like unequivocal backing of the Leaders' stance. Quite the opposite, for example in Spain, Italy and the U.K. (whose Prime Ministers were among the signatories) the opposition to military action was extensive.

Being Rationalist is not, however, being soft. The Council does warn Iraq that it alone will be responsible for the consequences if it ”does not take this last chance.”

The Council uses the wording ”will of the international community” as an opponent for Iraq. In addition, the Council recognizes that the military build up [of the U.S.] has been essential in the progress (bringing the arms inspectors back to Iraq). The recognition of the effect of the military build up on the negotiation process remains in Rationalist tactics, when at the same time it is stressed that war is not inevitable.

The institutional approach of the EU is unquestionably a Rationalist one. It is, also, one that was stepped over by both Realists and Revolutionists when stakes got higher. This document leaves totally open the most important pragmatic question: when will the use of force be legitimate? The Council says of the work of the arms inspectors: ”They must be given the time and resources that the UN Security Council believes they need. However, inspections cannot continue indefinitely in the absence of full Iraqi cooperation.”

The EU places itself firmly under the UN rule and points to the Security Council as the decision maker in that question. From the point of view of the UN led international order, it is fine, but from 57 the point of view of the CFSP it is more complicated. That is because, by that time, it was already clear that the Security Council was divided over the matter and the leaders of the separated blocks were also the key members of the CFSP. In other words, when it comes to the very substance of the issue, the CFSP was as divided as the Security Council, and when the Council did not take a stand over the question of the timing and legitimacy of the use of force it cleared, in a manner of speaking, the CFSP table from the quarrel and let the struggling participants fight for their views in the Security Council.

It is difficult to say which block actually won the contest because the U.S., U.K. and Spain led block failed to get the UN authorization for their aspirations, and the France, Germany and Russia led block failed to prevent the military operation. This is not, however, so important from the point of view of the CFSP because the loss of the EU, or its CFSP, is much easier to recognize: On one hand, the EU failed to have a real impact when it did not take a stand on the question when the use of force would be legitimate, even though its Members did have views on it. On the other hand, if the EU Presidency's statement that Spain and the U.K. had aligned themselves with the U.S. outside the EU framework is taken to indicate that the EU as an institution was opposing to the side of Spain, the U.K., and the U.S., then the loss of the EU/CFSP was even greater for the EU took a stand but failed to strive for its success. Either way, or both ways, the CFSP did not work: its mechanism paralysed when the Member States stepped over it – the CFSP did not have control over the development of the issue nor over its Members. 58

4.6. Chirac: Interview to TF1 and France 2

Interview given by President Jacques Chirac to TF1 and France 2 television stations (excerpts) 10 March, 2003 (Italics added.)

(This text has only excerpts of President Chirac's speech but it seems to be particularly targeted to an audience who are critically interested in France's attitude toward the Iraq Crisis. The excerpts are published by the French Embassy in the U.S.)

By saying: ”We want to live in a multipolar world, i.e. one with a few large groups enjoying as harmonious relations as possible with each another • •”,

President Chirac leaves out the category of Revolutionism. Multipolarity (or oligarchy, balance of power system etc.) is part of Rationalist and Realist categories. It is difficult to judge whether the approach of Chirac's France on the Crisis is a Realist or Rationalist one. The notion of war in the same paragraph does not help: ”We want a world where the inevitable crises • •.”.

Both categories acknowledge the inevitability of crisis but they prepare themselves to them in a different way: Realists prepare to win the war that unavoidably will come, Rationalists see the war as an ultimate means and one that has to be limited to a minimum once started. Chirac does use Rationalist rhetoric, for example: ”• • inevitable crises • • managed as effectively as possible • • to avoid clashes • •” , and further in the text: ”war is always a final resort, always an acknowledgement of failure, always the worst solution • •.”

But the overall practise of his (and France's) governance, that safeguards national interests ultimately by resorting to a nuclear weapon arms system, is more Realist. This, however, does not appear in this text.

What does appear, instead, is the way how Chirac's France uses the international community in 59 pursuing its interests. Namely, President Chirac continues: ”And the international community, by adopting UNSCR 1441 unanimously, took the decision which consisted in saying: 'we are going to disarm Iraq peacefully • •'.”

That Resolution 1441, however, does not say anything about disarming Iraqpeacefully. The Resolution does have a serious tone and it reminds that international community ”• • authorized Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its resolution 660 • •.”, which means a military operation against Iraq in 1991, and it warns Iraq of facing serious consequences. President Chirac's tactic is not so much about taming Iraq but taming the U.S. That is precisely what is threatening France's interest in a ”multipolar world”: Iraq with its alleged weapons of mass destruction cannot threaten France's security, but the U.S. by using the UNSC as a rubber tool for its aspirations, does threaten both France's international standing and also the basic current of Chirac's, and his predecessors, a national strategy ofgrandeur, an ambition to maintain the identity of a great power. All this is intertwined with a particular feature of French politics and especially President Chirac's foreign policy, the pursuit of resisting Americanization in politics and culture127, which President Chirac, of course, denies: ”I told you that France wasn't a pacifist country. Nor is she [France] anti• American • •.”

This reference to pacifism and the following to morality anyhow directs the text more toward Rationalist tradition: ”• • a moral problem. Are we going to wage war when there's perhaps a means of avoiding it? In line with her tradition, France is saying: 'if there's a way to avoid it, it must be avoided'. And we shall do our utmost to do so.”

So it seems, according to this text and its references to the UNSC Resolution 1441, Chirac's France takes its place somewhere between Realist and Rationalist categories. The more sincere its wish to avoid a war for the sake of human suffering, the more Rationalist the approach is, but the more the stance is dictated by, for example, economic interests in the oil and energy sector in President Hussein's Iraq and France's tendency to counterweigh the U.S. policy, the more the approach is a Realist one.

127 See for example pp. 19•24 in Blunden (2000): France. In Manners, Ian and Richard Whitman (eds.): The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States. Manchester University Press. 60

4.7. Blair: Statement on Iraq

Prime Minister Tony Blair's statement on Iraq on 25 Feb, 2003 (Briefing MPs) (Italics added.)

After summing up the history of the Iraqi Crisis, as he calls it, Prime Minister Blair assesses President Hussein's character: ”• • he continues to believe his WMD programme is essential both for internal repression and for external aggression. It is essential to his regional power.”

This is a Realist point of view on human nature in that it is based on the assumption of unchangeability of person. In contrast there is a line that tells about Tony Blair's character: ”I detest his regime. But even now he can save it by complying with the UN's demand.”

This is a classroom example of Rationalist perception on human nature; ignoring one's own feelings in the face of negotiating minimum losses.

Prime Minister Blair approaches the international community from between the Realist and Revolutionist viewpoints, two paragraphs later he says: ”if he refuses to co•operate • • what then? • • the will of the international community set at nothing, the UN tricked again, Saddam hugely strengthened and emboldened • does anyone truly believe that will mean peace? • • And when we make a demand next time, what will our credibility be?”

This scenario is half a Realist assessment of President Hussein's aims and impact on international community, half a Revolutionist way of seeing this one issue deterministically leading to the deterioration of the international community. Two paragraphs later, unlike many colleagues of him, Blair judges the possibilities of the work of the arms inspectors from a Realist point of view, not taking their success for granted: ”They say the time is necessary "to search out" the weapons • •. The idea that the inspectors could conceivably sniff out the weapons and documentation relating to them without the help of the Iraqi authorities is absurd.”

The following three paragraphs affirm Prime Minister Blair's Realist judgement on President Hussein: ”The issue is not time. It is will. • • If he is not willing to co•operate then equally time will not help.”

In the next chapter he continues: 61 ”• • Saddam will offer concessions. This is a game with which he is immensely familiar.”

And in the same paragraph Blair also comments on Hussein's impact on international community, again from a Realist angle: ”And what is his hope? To play for time, to drag the process out until the attention of the international community wanes, the troops go, the way is again clear for him.”

In a following paragraph Prime Minister continues: ”• • it takes no time at all for Saddam to co•operate. It just takes a fundamental change of heart and mind.”

Prime Minister does not believe in the change of President Hussein, quite the opposite, Blair is determined of Hussein's evil purposes. The international community he sees mechanistically failing to the condition of vulnerability. This evidence speaks of the Realist tendency of seeing humankind divided, using Martin Wight's wording, Rogues and Fools, the former prey the latter whenever they can.

Blair's Realist stance towards human nature and international community merges to a Revolutionist notion on war and its possibilities to make betterments on state of affairs. Following the last quoted paragraph, Prime Minister says: ”Today the path to peace is clear. Saddam can co•operate fully with the inspectors. He can voluntarily disarm. He can even leave the country peacefully. But he cannot avoid disarmament.”

Two paragraphs later he continues: ”At stake in Iraq is not just peace or war. It is the authority of the UN.”, and: ”If the UN cannot be the way of resolving this issue, that is a dangerous moment for our world. That is why over the coming weeks we will work every last minute we can to reunite the international community and disarm Iraq through the UN.”

The first quotation gives a kind of an ultimatum: Hussein cannot avoid being disarmed. This is still in line with the Resolution 1441 which demands Hussein to disarm in the face of serious consequences. Also Blair does say that he will use every opportunity to make the UN united behind the route, and probably he is sincere about this. However, it does not change the basic fact that Blair is going to put Hussein down regardless of what this or the UN decide to do, in accordance with the stance taken by President Bush.

This mechanist way of seeing war as a means of betterment, the determination to go to an open conflict (read: war) even in the face of the opposition from the international community, and ultimately, a change of camps in that who actually is on the side of the international community and who opposes it, it all comes down to a Revolutionist way of believing in one's own ends and not 62 seeing that in pursuit of these ends (i.e. making the world a better place) the actor in reality degrades the state of affairs with his own behaviour. This is not, however, a judgement whether things will eventually be better or worse in Iraq, and in the rest of the world, because of this Crisis, but it is an acknowledgement of the fact that international community did branch and the Coalition of the Willing, in which the U.K. had so important a role, contributed in running down the UN led international community.

According to Prime Minister Blair's statements, his approach to human nature and international community seems to incline to Realism and his attitude towards the war (against Hussein' Iraq) to Revolutionism. In this case, the United Kingdom governed by Prime Minister Blair seems to be placing itself between Realism and Revolutionism. 63

PART 5. ANALYSIS PART II: SECONDARY MATERIAL

5.1. An overview of the results of the Analysis part I

To sum up the results of the first part of the Analysis, it seems that, using Martin Wights categorization128,

· President Bush's foreign policy in Iraq Disarmament Crisis can be placed in the Revolutionist category but shifting towards Realism. · The joint foreign policy orientation of Eight Leaders of States in the Iraq Disarmament Crisis can be placed in the Rationalist category. It is not orthodox Rationalism, leaning to a more powerful side (the U.S.) gives it a certain degree of Realist nuance. · The joint foreign policy orientation of Vilnius Group Countries in the Iraq Disarmament Crisis can be placed in the Rationalist category. They see war as a necessary evil, the last resort, and that it has to be supported by the international community. The leaning to the U.S. hints to a nuance of Realism like in the case of the Letter of Eight, but not to the same extent, because of the Vilnius countries' precondition that the UNSC should take action. · The institutional approach of the EU is unquestionably a Rationalist one. It is, also, one that was stepped over by both Realists and Revolutionists when the stakes got higher. This, in turn, contributed to the fact that the CFSP did not work: its mechanism paralysed when the Member States stepped over it – the CFSP did not have control over the development of the issue nor over its own Members. · Chirac's France can be placed somewhere between Realist and Rationalist categories. The more sincere its wish to avoid war for the sake of human suffering, the more Rationalist the approach is, but the more the stance is dictated by, for example, economic interests in the oil and energy sector in President Hussein's Iraq and France's tendency to counterweigh the U.S. policy, the more the approach is a Realist one. · Prime Minister Blair's approach to human nature and international community seems to incline to Realism and his attitude towards the war (against Hussein' Iraq) to Revolutionism.

128 At this point it is worthwhile to bring back to mind the Picture 5. from page 23, in which categories merge into one another, it will help understanding the relations of the following positions. 64 In this case, the United Kingdom governed by Prime Minister Blair seems to be placing itself between Realism and Revolutionism.

Now the analysis continues by scanning the above mentioned results (1•6) through the set of secondary material. This second part of the analysis is also divided into two parts. In the first part academic texts are read and analysed. In the second part newspaper and magazine texts are browsed through and analysed. The first part is more in•depth reading, the second part examines only the immediate messages of the texts, like headlines, highlights and some raised points. The purpose in both parts is to find evidence either to back up or stand against the results found in the first part of the analysis. This process is part of the triangulation mentioned in the chapters concerning the methodology. The idea is to increase the credibility of the results. The secondary material consists of texts of two kinds: (1) academic articles and texts, and (2) articles and news from newspapers and magazines.

Due to the amplitude of potential material I have used certain methods of selecting the ones at hand. Academic articles and texts I have looked for in different databases and libraries, also some discussions have guided me to some texts. The criteria of choosing have been the relevance of the content to the subject matter and the newness of the publication, and the judgment has, in the end, been done solely by the author. Media coverage, a much larger set of potential material, has been chosen by using Lexis•Nexis database and a method of delimiting the search criteria. Finally a number of texts have been ordered and scanned by browsing. 65

5.2. Academic articles on Iraq crisis

President Geroge W. Bush's (the son) way of using ideological rhetoric against President Hussein in 2003 interestingly echoes the way former President George Bush (the father) did in the 1990s. Vilho Harle considers the issue in his book Hyvä, paha, ystävä, vihollinen (Good, Evil, Friend, Enemy) in the context of the in 1991. His text tells about Bush Senior's way of repeating the tradition of the struggle of good and evil in many ways in his speech129. Nevertheless, Harle points out that pictures of the enemy or definitions of the policy should not be overemphasized. The picture of the struggle between good and evil, which Bush Senior introduced, was generally accepted but did not completely displace thoughts of economic considerations and power politics behind the U.S. po licy. 130 The son is not the father but the country is the same as well as the foreign policy tradition, especially in the case of the Republican government. What is important to see here, is the pattern of trying to legitimate one's behaviour on moral grounds, as Revolutionists naturally do, yet not being able totally to step down from the accusations of Realist thinking. This only shows that the pattern is not unique and it has been very close to President Bush Junior's experience.

Peter von Ham, in his article The EU's War over Iraq. The Last Wake•Up Call, points toward the realist approach of the U.S. foreign policy on Iraq: how the Bush administration took hold of the international agenda, largely determining what issues merited discussion. Washington refused to accept limits to its room for manoeuvre by working through international organisations, be they NATO, the UN, or the EU.131 With Washington setting the international agenda, the EU had to face one fait accompli after the other. American cherry•picking approach towards Europe exposed intra• EU divisions.132

Staying out of alliances is an old bird in the U.S. As Ulrich K. Preuss notes in his article The : Critical Reflections from 'Old Europe', that already George Washington in 1796 visioned that the U.S. should stay out of permanent alliances, as much it is at liberty to do so. This pursuit of independence and unilateralism, and on the other hand adapting to world politics, the constant competition of these two broad policy lines, has been the underlying current of American foreign policy since that day. He continues by saying that American approach towards security differs from

129 Harle (1991), p. 136. 130 Harle (1991), p. 137. 131 Van Ham (2004), p. 216. 132 Van Ham (2004), pp. 218•219. 66 the European tradition in that Americans look forabsolute security (stemming from the sense of independence) while Europeans are used to accepting relative security (forced to this by history of rivalling and warring states, an early system of balance of power). This European attitude can be found in the Rationalist stances of European states. The balance of power •model comes from the Westphalian system and is a kind of early form of collective security.133 It asks for rational calculation and acceptance of modest gains to maintain the delicate balance of the system. Whereas powers who have historically shifted their policy from isolation to cooperation, and could had have the material possibility to a larger degree of independence, the U.S. and the U.K., are naturally more inclined to pursue absolute security by more independent means.

Unilateralism is not necessarily being stubborn. In this case it is the flipside of the genuinely American principle of relying on one's own strength to solve problems134. But whoever demands perfect security in an imperfect world becomes a problem for others135. During the Iraq Crisis the two concepts of security clashed: the concept of relative security with the UN model of collective security, and the concept of absolute security based on the unilateral protection of national security136. On page 183 Preuss captures the point in referring to the U.S. as an ”Empire [that] connects the universal ideas of human rights and democracy to the very particular religious notion of the chosen American people and its historic mission of bringing democracy to the world.”

On taking sides, Peter van Ham notes that the last thing Central European leaders would have wanted was to join an EU whose foreign and security policy would have been on an unfriendly footing with the U.S. He continues:”Most Central Europeans look to the U.S. for their military security, and to join the EU mainly for the economic stability”.137 Though this is a very clear•cut judgment, it seems to have certain relevance, as van Ham later points, when these Central European countries (in the words of U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, the 'New Europe' as opposed to the 'Old Europe') signed and 'mediatised' statements of transatlantic solidarity they did not ”just speak out in support of the US and its approach to fighting terror and Saddam Hussein; they also spoke out against a future Europe dominated by a Berlin•Paris tandem”.138

Van Ham raises a point on French and British stances that the first analysis of this study did not notice: that hidden behind these countries' pride was a fear of losing their permanent seats in the

133 Preuss (2005), pp. 167•168. 134 Preuss (2005), pp. 169. 135 Preuss (2005), pp. 170. 136 Preuss (2005), pp. 171. 137 Van Ham (2004), p. 221. 138 Van Ham (2004), p. 222. 67 UNSC in favour of the EU. While at the same time most EU Member States left the drama to their bigger partners to play within the UNSC. Whichever way it was, after the division had entirely broken up, on 17 Feb, 2003 when the EU was having its Extraordinary European Council, van Ham says the ”• • meeting constituted the lowest point in the short history of the CFSP.”139 This is in line with the first part analysis that stated that due to European Council's Rationalism it was stepped over by its more Revolutionist and Realist Member States causing the downfall of the common foreign policy.

Dieter Mahncke reminds that the EU's soft power 140 is dwarfed wherever and whenever the U.S. is strongly involved. This may have to do with the enormous degree of soft power that the U.S. holds, or that soft power tends to be more impressive when it is backed by hard power.141 This is an interesting viewpoint also regarding the policy of France and the U.K. in the EU. These are the two military giants in European dimension. They are capable of, to some extent, independent military missions abroad, have nuclear weapons and a permanent seat in the UNSC. One cannot help thinking that the EU, who does not havehard power at its disposal was so easily stepped over by rivalling countries because they do have it. From this perspective it could be said that the dividing line goes by the axis of giving one's own hard power to back up the U.S. hard power, or not giving it and thus also backing up the EUsoft power. In a sense, by countering the U.S. and U.K openly France struggled to maintain Europeansoft power meaningful. They did not fight this struggle primarily within the EU but in the UN as a national entity, a great power pursuing a multipolar world. So whatever the strategy, the outcome was rivalling nation states and EU procedures overrun. The cohesion of the CFSP was so limited that all backing whatsoever went somewhere else than to the EU.

William C. Wohlfort writes in his article The transatlantic dimension that ”[m]any European states have been very reluctant to relinquish sovereign power in the area of defence and foreign policy. It is hard to square such concerns with the occasionally stated goal of counterbalancing US power.” He does not see a true multipolarity on the horizon. Neither does he see that European powers would be capable of achieving a polar position individually. There is a call for more state•like foreign and defence capabilities for the EU but it most likely will not materialize any time soon, at least unless there is some major external shock.142 Taking this point of view as a discourse in which France operates, it starts to seem that Chirac's policy is more inclined towards Realism than

139 Van Ham (2004), p. 224. 140 Soft power in economic, political and cultural terms, as opposed to hard power in military terms. 141 Mahncke (2004), pp. 203•204. 142 Wohlfort (2004), pp. 198•199. 68 Rationalism. Pursuing to counterbalance the U.S. in the UNSC is struggling for one's own national influence in world politics. It is not, for example, raising the status of the EU in the UNSC. But anyway, one should not mistake to take Realism (and any other category) as a solely determined state of affairs. As Wohlforth continues, it is the U.S. that operates more in the realm of choice than any other of its international partners143. To a large extent all the European states as well as the EU were left with the role of a respondent or a defendant.

A plain comparison of France's and the U.K.'s approach to the CFSP accentuates the differences144: French Presidents from General de Gaulle to Jacques Chirac have tried to retain French grandeur and influence beyond what its economic weight might suggest. It also seeks to resist any increase in the power of those organizations which are dominated by the Americans. France has sought to project a strong European political voice, to complement and amplify its national voice, in an increasingly unfavourable international environment.145 The U.K. has allowed ambitious declaratory commitments to the CFSP which are not, however, supported by procedural mechanisms to achieve these goals. London does not want to step aside from intergovernmentalism towards supranational decision making. British policy makers use the European Arena instrumentally and are not committed to its development as a part of the integration project.146

These assessments meet, though not unquestionably underline, the results of the first part of the analysis: France and the U.K. have their policies shifting towards Realism though from different angles. Whereas this thesis claims the differences in policy orientations to stem from basic assumptions, the above mentioned analyses rest on a larger set of material and can draw on geopolitical positions, history and the structure of the respective foreign policy institutions, agendas, and so on. This analysis is grounded only on one issue, one time and the images the leaders of state want to deliver and the identities to deliver. The picture can be false, for it might be that a weak leader is not in the position to influence the foreign policy tradition, but as well the other picture might be false though resting on a larger set of material: there might be a leader powerful enough not to be constrained by traditions of foreign policy institutions. The world has seen events of all kind.

As Christopher Bertram puts it in One year on • lessons from Iraq, a common European policy is

143 Wohlfort (2004), p. 199. 144 These studies were published in 2000 so they represent more the state of affairs before and during the run up to Iraq Crisis than the situation now, four years after the IDC. 145 Blunden (2000), p. 19. 146 Forster (2000), p. 45. 69 possible on economic, trade or ecological issues, but any attempt to unite Europe in opposition to America over a matter of strategic security will tear Europeans apart once again.147 In the same paper Carl Bildt notes that: “Not only were views among key member countries very divided, but it was also obvious that practically no one tried to use the mechanism of the EU to try to bridge the divisions.” He also says that communication between Washington and various EU capitals was more intense than one between the EU capitals.148 Marta Dassu captures this by saying that “•• whenever France and the United Kingdom are on opposite sides, the EU’s foreign policy is paralysed and has virtually no influence• •.” She continues saying that “• • any crisis involving the ‘American factor’ may easily divide Europe again.”149

This thesis has concentrated in the division between the EU Member States, but there exists also another division in the EU, raised up by the Iraq Disarmament Crisis. Namely, as Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida point out, there are two dates we should not forget: the one when astonished people read in the newspapers that Spanish Prime Minister had invited those European nations willing to support the Iraq War to swear an oath of loyalty to George W. Bush, an invitation that was issued behind the backs of the other EU countries, and the 15 Feb, 2003 mass demonstrations in London and Rome, Madrid and Barcelona. The authors think that this “• • may well, in hindsight, go down in history as a sign of the birth of a European public sphere.”150 But to study that would need another Thesis. Anyhow, the set of academic texts introduced in this part does not stand against the results of the first part of the analysis, and though not using the same concepts and ways of approach, they do point to the same direction as results when it comes to the differences of the states in question, the relations of these differences and the insurmountable challenge in true integration of policies of different state entities.

147 Bertram (2004), p. 16. 148 Bildt (2004), p. 23. 149 Dassu (2004), p. 34. 150 Habermas•Derrida (2005), p. 4. 70

5.3. Media coverage – first search: 13 articles

Searches with Nexis.com have been made in the American Resource Center at Helsinki University Library151, with the help of their personnel, first using key wordsIraq war (in the headline and the leading paragraph), coalition (in the headline and the lead paragraph) andEurope (anywhere in the text), sources being Major Newspapers. This search produced 164 articles. After that, the search criteria were delimited with European Union and the result was 13 hits. The timeline in each search was from the beginning of 2002 to April 2003. Another search was done with Europe and European Union replaced by Old Europe, and the database gave 28 hits. And a search with the criteria European Union, Iraq war and disarmament gave 21 hits. The first 13 articles I ordered immediately, and of the 28 plus 21 articles I first read their headlines and bibliographical information then ordered full articles: from the 28 hits with Old Europe I ordered 13 articles, and from the 21 hits with disarmament I ordered 9 articles. These searches produced a set of 35 articles from a range of international newspapers and magazines. Below are some excerpts taken from the articles added with a short comment on the content. After that the comments are drawn together and the result analyzed. A reader is reminded to keep in mind that this part of the analysis is not meant to be as in•depth as the other parts. Quite the opposite, this part stands for having a wide view horizontally, like a panorama. Also it should be borne in mind that these articles contained many things, but only some of those things have been taken here as examples. With other research questions, one might have constructed different kind of list.

First search: 13 articles

(Three of the articles were left out due to duplication or irrelevance.)

Christian Science Monitor (29 April, 2003, Boston), Howard LaFranchi quotes Charles Kupchan: "The fact the US is talking about retribution against those who didn't go its way suggests this will not just be a blip."

This remark indicates the graveness of the transatlantic drift. It is not any news that there are political and economic disputes over the Atlantic, and journalists surely are aware of that, what is news is the determination with which the U.S. is pursuing its goal.

151 American Resource Center http://www.usembassy.fi/arc.htm 71

Times•Picayune (11 April, 2003, New Orleans), Stewart Yerton writes that ”[t]he private sectors of the United States and its allies in the Iraq war should play a major role in rebuilding Iraq and helping develop the country's energy resources, Commerce Secretary Donald Evans said Thursday in New Orleans.”

This points to the economic interests in the war. Many have argued that the Bush Administration set its campaign over oil. For example, France and Russia had invested on Iraq's oil under Hussein's rule. Here the Commerce Secretary is said to have been planning a redivision of economic actors in Iraq. Economics can be a relevant reason for some to go to war. Yet it cannot be the sole reason for the sheer size of economic costs of waging war and the attempt to bring democracy and freedom.

Financial Times (9 April, 2003, London), Deborah Hargreaves writes: ”Market euphoria over the rapid coalition successes in the Iraq war dissipated yesterday as investors turned their attention to the economy.”

Another suggestion to the economic interests in the war. This tells about the boosting impact on economy of the start of war. Continuation of the war, however, seems to have a negative impact.

St. Petersburg Times (9 April, 2003, Florida), Letters section has a letter from Press Councellor Achilles Paparsenos, the Embassy of Greece in Washington, where he states that: “Regarding your 'war coalition' report, I would like to clarify that Greece, while not participating in the war in Iraq, is honoring its bilateral and NATO treaty commitments, allowing the use of its air space and of U.S. and NATO facilities in Greece.”

This one concerns the bilateral relations between Greece and the U.S. This is interesting from the point of view that Greece held then, and during the Iraq Disarmament Crisis, the Presidency of the EU. As a country, Greece seems to be less self assured than as the Presidency of the EU. This is hardly surprising, but it definitely underlines the importance of the transatlantic relations for European countries.

Financial Times (7 April, 2003, London), Kevin Morrison writes: ”Widening US trade deficits, weakening industrial production in Europe and a downbeat British budget are likely to have little effect on global markets, which are more in step with the fortunes of coalition forces in Iraq.” 72 This one stands for a similar view of the economic interests in the war as the articles above, as is characteristic to a paper in the field of economics.

Financial Times (5 April, 2003, London) headline in Leaders section: ”Markets begin to discount the war: But that still leaves the world economy looking weak”.

Again the economic interests in the war. When the war had lasted only two weeks, hopes were high.

Chicago Tribune (27 March, 2003, Chicago), R.C. Longworth writes about the meeting of Bush and Blair: ”Blair became America's most popular foreign leader with his unstinting support for Bush's policy in the months leading up to the war. But he paid a huge price, in power and prestige, within Britain and the EU. EU foes named him 'Bush's poodle,' and political opponents at home called him 'the honorable gentleman from North Texas.'”

This indicates to the U.K. being more loyal to the U.S. than to the EU. When Mr Robin Cook resigned from the British government two days prior to the war, he made a point noting that the U.K. had abandoned its most natural reference groups, the EU, NATO, and the UN, in order to keep in with the U.S.152

Sacramento Bee (27 Jan, 2003, Sacramento), James Rosen writes about Colin Powell commenting on the UNSC diplomacy: ”'We continue to reserve our sovereign right to take military action against Iraq alone or in a coalition of the willing,' he said. Powell said the desire for a united international stand against Iraqi President Saddam Hussein cannot stand in the way of decisive action.”

Later the paper writes: ”Magnifying the U.S.•Europe split, NATO on Wednesday rejected the United States' request that the trans•Atlantic alliance begin developing plans to back a U.S.•led attack on Iraq.”

This is about the unilateral foreign policy of the U.S. There is willingness to try to cooperate, as the remark on NATO suggests. However, this will extend only to a certain level, as is expressed in Mr Powell's words, and it forces the allies to ask themselves what the point in all this is, if the U.S. would go it alone anyway.

152 Robin Cook's resignation speech on 18 March, 2003 http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/•/1/hi/uk_politics/2859431.stm 73

Guardian (1 May, 2002, London), Ian Black writes: ”America must avoid taking action on Iraq that would damage the global anti•terrorist coalition, Romano Prodi, the European commission president, warned yesterday.”

This one is about envisaging the (transatlantic) drift. Mr Prodi is appealing to the coalition known to be of high importance to Bush Administration.

Financial Times (12 March, 2002, London), Rosemary Bennet writes: ”Tony Blair yesterday attempted to placate growing opposition from Labour MPs over future military action against Iraq, saying nothing had yet been de•cided on how to deal with the threat posed by Saddam Hussein.”

In early 2002, according to this one, there seems to have been a possibility for a UN led solution to Iraq crisis though many already anticipate the coming war. To what extent a peaceful solution would be truly possible, cannot be known at this point. The speeches do not reveal whether there were already agreed hidden agendas or not. 74

5.4. Second search: 13 articles (Two of the articles were left out due to duplication or irrelevance.)

The Economist (26 April, 2003, London) writes: ”Talking at Harvard recently, Javier Solana, the EU's foreign•policy chief, warned the Americans not to try to 'cherry•pick' among their European allies, arguing that this would only encourage those in Europe who want the EU to define itself in opposition to the United States.”

This one talks about the transatlantic dilemma in the heart of the question of European identity. Mr Solana has a point and he is expressing it in a constructive way. The U.S. is at the peak of its power, so the threat Mr Solana pictures probably does not seem very urgent – especially when the whole crisis had only shown how easily the U.S. can get European states behind it. In the long run, Solana's picture has more chances to materialize. In a peculiar way the setting here is very telling: the High Representative of the CFSP is talking in an American university – during the Iraq crisis, he chose to be, or was kept, quiet, giving no statements on it.

Business Week (7 April, 2003) Readers Report section Mr. Bennet writes: ”The major foreign policy problem that the U.S. has is that we no longer have an opposing superpower to balance against our country. This is a frightening factor for many countries that don't understand us very well. Leaders of our traditional allies such as France are also falling prey to the temptation to take the easy way out and to let street demonstrations decide their governmental policy.”

This one speaks about the U.S. hegemony and reflects it to the ideal policy making: should leaders of state be above demonstrations and day•to•day politics, or, distinctly, fulfil the peoples' wishes? The author hints to the idea that the U.S. foreign policy agenda has a legitimacy stemming from its goals, bringing democracy and freedom, which would also allow waging war whose character as a defensive one is widely contested. Here the author also fails to see the wider trend in French foreign policy, that of balancing Americans, and misinterprets French President for a marionette of the French people.

Commentary (1 April, 2003), Joshua Moravzic writes: ”Given Bucharest's identification with Paris, Romania's current pro•Americanism may seem surprising, all the more so in light of the fact that in 1997 Washington vetoed France's proposal to include Romania in the first round of NATO enlargement. But Romanians remember that between 75 the two world wars they looked to Paris for security, linking themselves with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and France in the "little entente." The French, however, with their Maginot strategy, proved to be more interested in what their allies could do for them than in what they could do for their allies.”

The writer places French behaviour in historical retrospective and finds Realist calculations. It is a good point, though one has to bear in mind that it is possible to find backing to whatever arguments from the long history of nations.

Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy (April 2003), Editor Gregory R. Copley writes in the headline: ”The New US, the New Europe, the New NATO, and New Centers of Gravity”.

The editor is anticipating the impact of the Iraq crisis on world order. The disagreement in the UNSC is of such magnitude that things will not be the same afterwards: at stake are the world order militarily run by ad hoc coalitions of countries or the world order run by the UNSC – and in addition, all this is now openly voiced out.

The National Journal (8 March, 2003, Washington, DC.), highlights, by James Kitfield: ”The U.S. campaigns against terrorism and Iraq are shaking the very foundations of America's alliances. Can the Bush administration's embrace of ad hoc coalitions of expediency replace the old alliance structure?”

This one indicates to Bush administration's foreign policy stepping off from the tradition. This is about the shift in policy that occurred when President Bush came to power and strengthened after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

Time International (3 March, 2003, London), in Letters section van Donselaar Tiel writes: ”What worries me most is that George W. Bush doesn't have a policy that allows him to back off gracefully from war. He has no other option than to go into battle.”

This one comes to the same perception than Mr Talvitie has in Unitas•magazine (see below). The prestige of the superpower is understood to be a dominating factor in defining foreign policy goals, at least in this situation where the argument has already tensed. This view of the U.S. is a picture of a Realist actor. 76

National Review (24 Feb, 2003, New York), John O'Sullivan writes: ” • • West no longer had a sure instinct for what its joint interests dictated •• or if indeed it any longer had joint interests in international politics.”

This one indicates to the graveness of the transatlantic drift, though it fails to see the ease with which the U.S. got a number of European countries behind it – even though the people in these countries opposed the policy, even though the choices brought down the CFSP. The question is more likely what actually constitutes the West.

The Economist (22 Feb, 2003, London) writes on Chancellor Schroeder: ”Mr Schroeder denied he had made a U•turn. His rejection of German participation in any war, and his refusal to sign up to any UN resolution permitting one, remain as firm as ever, he says. And, for all the government's abysmal showing in the opinion polls, some 70% of Germans support him on Iraq. On February 15th, 500,000 anti•war demonstrators marched through Berlin. Only 15% of Germans••and only 17% even of conservative voters••feel Germany should join in an Iraq conflict.”

Although this excerpt looks critically Schroeder's policy, it has an interesting feature: it links German behaviour firmly to a pacifist world view. In the case of other major anti•war countries, like France, Russia, and China, the basis of their opposition to the U.S. is not so clear•cut picture of a wish for peace. Schroeder had, however, made a concession to use force as a last resort.

The Weekly Standard (3 Feb, 2003, Washington, DC.), Robert Kagan and William Kristol write: ”First, France does not, in fact, seek the disarmament of Iraq or even the elimination of Saddam Hussein's programs for producing weapons of mass destruction. • • Second, it is now clear that the government of France does not, in fact, support implementation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441• •.”

The authors of this excerpt have a Realist perception of French foreign policy making. Both authors are leading figures in a so called neoconservative establishment, so they might be inclined to view French foreign policy this way. But they do judge French policy in a more credible way than, for example, the one claiming President Chirac opposing the U.S. because he is manipulated by the street protesters.

The National Journal (1 Feb, 2003, Washington, DC.), James Kitfield writes: ”On entering office, the Bush administration championed a foreign policy that said, in essence, if the United States would only assertively lead, its allies around the world would either follow or get out of the way.” 77

The author talks about the unilateral foreign policy of the U.S. The statement affirms the change in foreign policy orientation after President Bush came to power. The idea of a leading nation, a city upon a hill,153 is not a new one in the U.S. foreign policy discussion. There is, however, one contradiction in this idea and the approach of the Bush Administration: being a city upon a hill is to be an example, one that others want to identify themselves with, whereas the idea of getting others out of the way means in practice that thecity has left thehill and is about to establish itself omnipresent.

Unitas (1 Jan, 2003, Helsinki), Heikki Talvitie writes: ”It is obviously desirable that the United States should not be driven to using force in the Middle East, because the consequences of a full•scale war there would be hard to control. But the prestige of a superpower is at stake, and it is on a hair trigger.”

The author is well aware of the negative scenarios over Iraq but he also acknowledges the Realist perception of superpower, that of prestige. This article was published not so many days after President Bush had commanded his troops to the Gulf region (21 Dec, 2002). This move obviously increased the sensitivity of prestige.

153 A phrase often used to refer to John Winthrop's famous sermon "A Model of Christian Charity", of 1630. John F. Kennedy quoted Winthrop in his famous City Upon a Hill •speech, 11 days before his inauguration. President also quoted Winthrop's speech in the 1989 Farewell Address. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_upon_a_Hill 78

5.5. Third search: 9 articles (Three of the articles were left out due to duplication or irrelevance.)

Sacramento Bee (28 April, 2003, Sacramento), James Rosen writes: ”Among international relations experts, there is widespread agreement that the war has already caused a virtual revolution in geopolitical strategic thinking.”

This indicates to the unilateral foreign policy of the U.S. and its impact on the world order more generally.

The Gazette (27 March, 2003, Montreal), Steven Edwards writes: ”Blair continues to encourage the United States to work through the United Nations. But Bush remains torn between the hawks and the doves within his administration.”

This one also points to the unilateral foreign policy of the U.S. but also to the awkward situation of the U.K. trying to be both loyal to the U.S. and loyal to its European counterparts.

Financial Times (25 March, 2003, London), Hugh Williamson writes: ”Joschka Fischer, German foreign minister, said yesterday that Germany would flatly oppose a new world order emerging from the Iraq war, based on an all•powerful US dictating terms to the international community.”

Another one about the U.S. hegemony and its impact on the world order. It is striking how the eyes of the world are not turned on President Hussein, even though he is the one whose action is longed for, but to the Bush Administration.

Newsday (20 Feb, 2003, New York) writes in a headline: “Bush Wins a Round; Both NATO and the European Union give a subtle snub to France and a bow to the U.S.” And later: “Almost at the same time, the leaders of the 15•member European Union issued a warning to Iraq to disarm 'immediately and fully,' telling Saddam Hussein he has only 'one last chance' before military force is used to disarm him. But the EU restated its objective to achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis, did not put a timetable on compliance and rejected a British proposal to add, 'Time is running out.'”

This excerpt tells that the EU is backing the U.S. instead of France in its meeting of 17 Feb, 2003. This is a very interesting point of view and should be mirrored with the following one. 79

Philadelphia Inquirer (18 Feb, 2003, Philadelphia), Daniel Rubin writes in headline: ”EU fails to back Iraq war; An emergency meeting ended with unity only on support for inspections.”

And later: ”The statement at the emergency summit on Iraq is not likely to please the United States, which wanted a firmer declaration of EU support for military action.”

In contrast to the previous excerpt, this one states that the EU is not backing the U.S. instead of France in its meeting of 17 Feb, 2003. These two American newspapers draw different conclusion from the EU meeting. Probably partly because of the broad•brush nature of the EU statement, but perhaps also partly because of rivalling domestic politics. Of course, misunderstanding of the nature of European politics and diplomacy could also have taken place, but that does not seem very likely among established papers.

Philadelphia Daily News (17 Feb, 2003, Philadelphia) writes: ” and Germany had held out for four weeks with France, arguing that it was premature for the 19•nation alliance to take steps that could imply acceptance of military action while U.N. weapons inspectors were still trying to disarm Iraq peacefully.”

This wording of 19•nation alliance is probably means Vilnius Group (10), ”Eight Leaders” (8) and the U.S. (1). Here the 19 are accused of choosing wrong tactics against Iraq, they should have waited until the weapons inspectors were finished. In some other occasion, however, they (except the U.S.) were accused of stepping over the EU mechanism. Appealing to the tactics has its difficulties, for example, this one is counter•argued by the Americans that at no point has there been a credible chance for the inspectors to disarm a country – what they do is only to inspect. The actual disarmament could be done only by two hands, that of the Iraq itself, or other countries. 80

5.6. A Summary of the media coverage

To sum up the findings, the newspaper and magazine articles (eight were left out due to either irrelevant content for the subject matter or because there had been the duplication of articles) contained, among others, the following messages (the messages are captured by the author of the study):

· Four times economic interests in the war. · Four times unilateral foreign policy of the U.S. · Twice the U.S. hegemony. · Twice graveness of the transatlantic drift. · Twice Realist approach of France. · Twice Realist calculation of superpower's prestige. · Once bilateral relations between Greece and the U.S. This is interesting from the point of view that Greece held then, and during the IDC, the Presidency of the EU. · Once the U.K. being more loyal to the U.S. than to the EU. · Once envisaging transatlantic drift. · Once possibility of a UN led solution to Iraq crisis in early 2002. · Once transatlantic dilemma at the heart of the question of European identity. · Once Bush administration's foreign policy that steps off from the tradition. · Once the Iraq crisis' impact on world order. · Once Schroeder's strong holding on anti•war policy, although he had made a concession to use of force as a last resort. · Once the EU backing the U.S. instead of France in 17 Feb, 2003 meeting. · Once the EU not backing the U.S. instead of France in 17 Feb, 2003 meeting. · Once 19•nation alliance probably meaning Vilnius Group (10), ”Eight Leaders” (8) and the U.S. (1).

After reorganizing the list, it looks as following:

- Nine times the U.S. supremacy in world politics and its consequences

- Five times the transatlantic drift and its consequences to the European politics 81 - Four times economic interests in the war

- Three times French Realism

- Twice the world order/the UN

- Twice different interpretations on European politics over the issue (and over the results of the same EU meeting)

- Once Germany's anti•war policy

- Once mentioning groups of European states taking sides in the issue (other than ”Old Europe” and ”New Europe”)

This tells us of the centers in public (media) discussion on the Iraq Disarmament Crisis. Clearly most people see the argument stemming from the behaviour of the the U.S., the only hegemonic superpower of the time. Even though President Hussein is asked to fulfil the demands posed on him, he is not the one everybody is looking at, but at President Bush. The transatlantic drift is an old bird but the magnitude with which it raises, and the long•term consequences that are envisaged, tell about its exceptional character. The drift in the UN does not come up so much in this scanning, most likely due to the search criteria that emphasized the EU. Otherwise, there is no doubt the quarrel in the UNSC would have been more visible. The extent of economic interests raised up highlights the relevance of Realist and Rationalist approaches instead of Revolutionist. So in a way, that part of the outcome could be seen opposing the results of the first part of the analysis on the U.S. and the U.K. But on the other hand, those messages came from the economic papers; it is the only natural point of view for them.

French Realism emerged three times instead of any particular message of its Rationalism. Otherwise, this would point towards France being Realistic but many of those papers were American and perhaps set to look at in somehow a biased way. For example, when Germany rose up, it was for pacifist policy. The two different interpretations of the meeting of the European Council are very interesting. The document which I judged (in the first part of the analysis) to be a sign of the EU's incapability of truly taking sides, and shifting the quarrel away from the CFSP agenda to the UNSC in order to save the intra•EU relations, is seen in two different American newspapers as a sign of taking sides. What more, they see the EU taking different sides. This would not have been possible had the document not been so broad•brush. I assume the papers here might have dealt with, to some extent, domestic politics, but nevertheless, this underlines my interpretation of the document giving ”something for everybody” in a very Rationalist way, for in another case, different interpretations would not have been so easy to make. 82

PART 6. INTERPRETATIVE ANALYSIS: PARALYSIS

6.1. Back to the basics

The way of defining the CFSP is not the most limited in this thesis for it encapsulates both ways of approach: the community acting as a unit or acting in a coordinated manner. Yet the impasse of January – March 2003 was so overwhelming that neither way of defining it could have said the EU was working as it should have. The study has shown that the Member States of the EU were so divided over the policy that, first, they stepped over the EU's mechanisms, and then, the EU was left with no other solution than to clear the table off the Crisis, let the Member States fight their quarrels outside the EU, and save what was to be saved in other EU policy areas. The CFSP temporarily stopped working, in other words, it paralyzed. This we know from the analysis. We also know what kind of differences there were in Member States' stances. What we have not, however, considered yet, is why these differences were so extensive, and what does all this mean to the CFSP.

The clue in here is Martin Wight's theory. By explaining to us where the differences in political thinking and goal setting come from, he also tells us why participants quarrel and cannot find a solution. Let us start by summarizing the situation: think of the Picture 4. on page 23 (Three traditions merge into one another), and place the actors into the picture. The U.S. is between Revolutionism and Realism, the U.K. is between Revolutionism and Realism as well, France is between Rationalism and Realism, groups of states analyzed are also between Rationalism and Realism, and the EU as an institution is in Rationalism. They have different opinions on the matter but that is not the key point. The most important thing is that when it comes down to the very basic notion of how things ought to be, they feel in a different way.

They feel in a different way, vision the future in a different way and set the goals in a different way because they understand the human nature and international community in a different way. How could they agree upon a best strategy in a crisis when they have different beliefs on how people would actually behave, different beliefs of what is possible in the international community? They cannot. But hopefully this is an example of an extreme situation, not politics•as•usual. The extreme conditions in a run•up to a major war by major actors, not supported by a majority of people, reveal 83 the vulnerability of the institutions of collective security, whether they are the UNSC or the CFSP. Of course, these are not perfect constructions. They are very much incomplete, and maybe will never be perfect, but this crisis has pointed out, not only the vulnerability of these institutions but also the route to their survival. And indeed, to their betterment. 84

6.2. From basics to the future

What is needed, and now we look strictly at the CFSP, for the community to have a true foreign policy, is a common mindset, common identity. Without these common foreign policy can take place and work, but only as far as a crisis of identity or mindset. Only insofar as the agenda is filled with either relatively small or relatively distant issues. Let us keep in mind that the High Representative of the CFSP, Mr Javier Solana, did not issue any statement over Iraq under the timeline of the study. It was a big question, and it was kept at the hands of the EU Presidency only. If there is no common identity in Europe, and the stakes in the crisis are high, then the next time when the American President asks whether Europeans are with or against them, Europe will be divided. Similarly, if there is no common mindset, and the question is posed whether Europeans will follow this way of seeing human nature or that, Europe will be divided. Another solution, instead of the common identity, to this dilemma would be so strictly organized, and sanctioned, a system that the Member States would not have room for manoeuvre. But that would be another Union than the European Union – for in the core of the idea of the EU lies, of course, the idea of freedom – any other way its membership would not be so longed•for as it is.

The crisis, however, only paralyzed the CFSP; it did not kill it. Immediately after the launch of military operations on 20 March, 2003, voices from all levels of society in Europe started to plea for more efficient common foreign policy, just like Habermas and Derrida did. The same plea was strongly urged in the following European Council, on 20 – 21 March, 2003, and the same plea has been voiced in many articles, conferences, opinion letters and political agendas. What is striking, as Habermas and Derrida cautiously predicted, is that it seems that the plea is not pronounced only by politicians but people as well. Perhaps they remember that their elected leaders did not stand in line with the people, and the idea of having a true European common foreign policy gives comfort against the fear of facing individual political leaders acting somehow not quite as they are expected to. The common policy should be seen as a safeguard for modest, rational, widely popular policy; policy in the spirit of the Treaty of the EU – united to extend to the well•being, freedom, justice and rule of law of many instead of extending to the well•being and power of the few; humane interests instead of national interests. 85

At this point, it stands for a good and skeptical attitude to ask why, in the first place, do we need to try to develop the CFSP if it is a subject of such trouble. The answer most often heard in public discussion is that the EU needs to be able to negotiate at international level with the strength of a political entity of its size. The other one, less often heard, but to mine judging the ethically most important starting point for the CFSP discussion, is this: the CFSP is essentially as much about the process as it is about policy. Even when there is no policy output per se, the participants continue to use the mechanisms of the CFSP in daily interactions154. This influence exerted on each other, fostering ever closer cooperation, in turn, prevents a unilateral or undesired foreign policy action of another Member State.155

To sum up, the CFSP institution gives a chance to the Member State to use multiple resources to strive for its foreign policy objectives, and, this should not be forgotten, creates a check for the respective Foreign Minister, or for the respective government's foreign policy of a Member State, to soften its behavior towards its European counterparts. If an extreme government with an extreme foreign policy agenda is chosen, the mechanism of the CFSP probably will cut down a certain amount of that extremism. The very mechanism of the CFSP can work as a self fulfilling process: in the first phase the CFSP, through legislation, intertwines Member States in foreign policy field, this, in turn, as a second phase, can lead to an increased incentive for the Member States to nominate as Minister of Foreign Affairs a person who is more adaptive to this mechanism and to joint foreign policy making, the third phase will thus see more a harmonious set of foreign policy approaches among the Member States, and through multiplying, in the fourth phase, this increased harmony leads to a stronger voice for the European foreign policy in world affairs, thus making the CFSP to look more desirable for the Member States.

This is, however, an ideal model of the way for the CFSP to work. In reality there are many challenges for the above•mentioned process to occur. The first one is the problem of decision making: the requirement of consensus may prevent important decisions to be made. The second is the dilemma of false flags or the lack of true interest: a Member State may pursue different objectives than it announces, or, it might lack the interest to truly put into practice what has been agreed upon. The third challenge are the changes in governments, parliaments and their respective foreign policy leaders and personnel: a new government, especially with different political affiliations, may not feel so obligated with the commitments made by its predecessor. All these

154 Reynolds (2004), p. 44. 155 Mahncke (2004a), p. 39•40. 86 three challenges can water down the effect of the CFSP, but then, on the other hand, if a foreign policy objective survives all these barriers, it surely has a strong backing.

Taking into consideration the results of the analysis, the situation in the run•up to the war, the theoretical background of the Thesis, and this summary, I argue that the Common Foreign and Security Policy paralyzed during the Iraq Disarmament Crisis because of different mindsets, stemming from the identities, of the actors. I also argue that now, after the crisis, the CFSP is better equipped to be developed further, for the paralysis both gave an incentive to work on it, and showed where its problems lay. In the light of this development having, indeed, taken speed after the crisis, I argue further that the system will, however, remain vulnerable to crises of a certain kind, those over mindset or identity. Only the future will tell whether the CFSP will be ready the next time Europe is divided over a transatlantic dilemma. 87

SOURCES

Primary material for Analysis part I:

(in order of appearance)

President George W. Bush's State of the Union speech on 28 Jan, 2003. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128•19.html Read on 6 March, 2007.

Letter of Eight leaders of state on 30 Jan, 2003. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2708877.stm Read on 29 Aug, 2006.

Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries on 5 Feb, 2003. http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/news/press•releases/2003/feb/2868/ Read on 6 March, 2007.

Extraordinary European Council: 17 Feb, 2003, Brussels. Presidency Conclusions 6466/03 POLGEN 7

Prime Minister Tony Blair's statement on Iraq on 25 Feb, 2003. http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page3088.asp Read on 5 Feb, 2007.

Interview given by President Jacques Chirac to TF1 and France 2 television stations (excerpts) on 10 March, 2003. http://www.ambafranceus.org/news/statmnts/2003/chirac_irak031003.asp Read on 6 March, 2003. 88

Primary material for Analysis part II:

ACADEMIC ARTICLES

Bertram, Christopher (2004), European views. In Lindstrom, Gustav – Burkard Schmitt (eds.), One year on: lessons from Iraq. Chaillot paper, n.68, March 2004. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.

Bildt, Carl (2004), European views. In Lindstrom, Gustav – Burkard Schmitt (eds.), One year on: lessons from Iraq. Chaillot paper, n.68, March 2004. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.

Blunden, Margaret (2000), France. In Manners, Ian – Richard G. Whitman (eds.), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Dassu, Marta (2004), European views. In Lindstrom, Gustav – Burkard Schmitt (eds.), One year on: lessons from Iraq. Chaillot paper, n.68, March 2004. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.

Forster, Anthony (2000), Britain. In Manners, Ian – Richard G. Whitman (eds.), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Habermas, Jürgen – Jacques Derrida (2005), February 15, or, What Binds Europeans Together: Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe. In Levy, Daniel – Max Pensky and John Torpey (eds.), Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe. Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War. London: Verso.

Ham, Peter van (2004), The EU's War over Iraq. The Last Wake•Up Call. In Mahncke, Dieter • Alicia Ambos and Christopher Reynolds (eds.),European Foreign Policy. From Rhetoric to Reality? College of Europe Studies. No. 1. Brussels: P.I.E.•Peter Lang S.A.

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Preuss, Ulrich K. (2005), The Iraq WAR: Critical Reflections from ‘Old Europe’. In Levy, Daniel - Max Pensky and John Torpey: Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe. Transatlantic Relations After the Iraq War. London: Verso.

Wohlforth, William C. (2004), The transatlantic dimension. In Dannreuther, Roland (ed.) European Common Foreign and Security Policy. Towards a neighbourhood strategy. London: Routledge. 89

MEDIA COVERAGE (in order of appearance)

Christian Science Monitor (29 April, 2003, Boston) Sacramento Bee (28 April, 2003, Sacramento) The Economist (26 April, 2003, London) Times•Picayune (11 April, 2003, New Orleans) Financial Times (9 April, 2003, London) St. Petersburg Times (9 April, 2003, Florida) Business Week (7 April, 2003) Financial Times (7 April, 2003, London) Financial Times (5 April, 2003, London) Commentary (1 April, 2003) Defense & Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy (April 2003) Chicago Tribune (27 March, 2003, Chicago) The Gazette (27 March, 2003, Montreal) Financial Times (25 March, 2003, London) The National Journal (8 March, 2003, Washington, DC.) Time International (3 March, 2003, London) National Review (24 Feb, 2003, New York) The Economist (22 Feb, 2003, London) Newsday (20 Feb, 2003, New York) Philadelphia Inquirer (18 Feb, 2003, Philadelphia) Philadelphia Daily News (17 Feb, 2003, Philadelphia) The Weekly Standard (3 Feb, 2003, Washington, DC.) The National Journal (1 Feb, 2003, Washington, DC.) Sacramento Bee (27 Jan, 2003, Sacramento) Unitas (1 Jan, 2003, Helsinki) Guardian (1 May, 2002, London) Financial Times (12 March, 2002, London) 90

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United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1441 8 November 2002 S/RES/1441 (2002)

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OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS FROM THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL:

Barcelona European Council: 15 and 16 March 2002 SN 100/1/02 REV 1

Seville European Council: 21 and 22 June 2002 Presidency Conclusions 13463/02, POLGEN 52

Brussels European Council: 24 and 25 Oct 2002 Presidency Conclusions 14702/02, POLGEN 67.

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Statement on the situation in Iraq by the Alternate Foreign Minister of Greece Mr. T. Giannitsis • European Parliament 12 February, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=403&article=211 Read on 6 March, 2007.

Letter from Prime Minister C. Simitis to his EU Counterparts 14 February, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=403&article=217 97 Read on 6 March, 2007.

President of the EU Council George Papandreou’s statement to the meeting of Arab League foreign ministers in Cairo 16 February, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=403&article=220 Read on 6 March, 2007.

Europe tries hard for peace 16 February, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=403&article=221 Read on 6 March, 2007.

Statement by the President of the European Council, Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis on the eve of the European Council meeting in Brussels 16 February, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=403&article=222 Read on 6 March, 2007.

Joint position on Iraq adopted by the "15" – the "13" concur 18 February, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=403&article=226 Read on 8 March, 2007.

Presidency press conference after the meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council 24 February, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=403&article=244 Read on 8 March, 2007.

Press Conference of US • EU Ministerial Meeting (Washington DC) 27 February, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=403&article=251 Read on 8 March, 2007.

Greek Foreign Minister at the Arab League summit, Sharm el•Sheikh Egypt 01 March, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=404&article=255 Read on 8 March, 2007.

Press conference following the 13th EU•GCC joint ministerial meeting 03 March, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=404&article=257 Read on 8 March, 2007.

Joint Communique: EU•GCC 13th joint council and ministerial meeting 03 March, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=404&article=258 Read on 8 March, 2007.

Greek Foreign Minister Speech at the European Parliament (12/3/2003): The Greek Presidency is under obligation to exhaust every means to the peaceful and diplomatic solution of the Iraq problem 13 March, 2003 98 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=404&article=270 Read on 8 March, 2007.

Statement by the Greek Foreign Minister on Iraq 17 March, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=404&article=272 Read on 8 March, 2007.

Statement by the Greek Foreign Affairs Minister, President of the EU – GAC, George Papandreou on the Iraq crisis, during the EU – Ukraine Association 18 March, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=404&article=273 Read on 8 March, 2007.

Statement by the President of the European Council 20 March, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=404&article=275 Read on 8 March, 2007.

European Parliament session on Iraq, Brussels 20.03.03 20 March, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=404&article=276 Read on 8 March, 2007.

Spring European Council 2003: Statement on Iraq 20 March, 2003 http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=404&article=278 Read on 8 March, 2007. 99

APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY OF THE IRAQ DISARMAMENT CRISIS, EMPHASIS ON THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE CFSP

TIMELINE: January 2002 - March 2003

JANUARY 2002

29th President Bush’s State of the Union speech identifies Iraq, Iran and North•Korea in the “axis of evil”.

MARCH 2002

14th United Nations Resolution 1409 (maintain Iraq’s territorial integrity)

15•16th Barcelona European Council

16th Barcelona European Council 15 – 16 March, 2002: Presidency Conclusions

MAY 2002

14th The UN Security Council resolution 1409: revamps the sanctions against Iraq (held 11 years), replace former with “smart sanctions”.

JUNE 2002

2nd President Bush introduces doctrine of pre•emption in a speech at West Point.

21•22nd Seville European Council

AUGUST 2002

The U.S. accuses France brokering China to sell forbidden material to Iraq via Syria.

SEPTEMBER 2002

12th President Bush asks the UN to enforce the resolution or the U.S. has to go it alone.

OCTOBER 2002

11th Congress passes a bipartisan resolution authorizing President Bush to use military force, acting alone if necessary, in order to ensure that Iraq disarms any weapons of mass destruction. 100

24th Seville European Council 21 – 22 June, 2002: Presidency Conclusions

24•25th Brussels European Council

NOVEMBER 2002

8th The UN resolution 1441 (17th resolution on disarming Iraq): Iraq to declare its WMD’s by 8 Dec, 2002.

18th The UN weapon inspectors return to Iraq after almost four years (UN resolution 1284 in the year 1999).

25th The UN resolution 1443 on Iraq.

26th Brussels European Council 24 – 25 Oct, 2002: Presidency Conclusions

DECEMBER 2002

4th The UN resolution 1447 on Iraq.

7th Iraq submits asked documents to the UN.

12•13th Copenhagen European Council:

21st Bush approves the deployment of U.S. troops to the Gulf region. British and Australian troops will join them over the coming months.

30th The UN resolution 1454 on Iraq.

JANUARY 2003

U.S. intelligence accuses France secretly selling prohibited spare parts to Iraq

16th The UN inspectors find eleven undeclared empty chemical warheads in Iraq.

18th Peace protests all around the world

21st EU Presidency's FM George Papandreou meets UN weapon inspectors on Iraq

22nd EU Presidency's Greek Ambassador interview in Washington, DC, response to Report: EU governments to seek for “maximum common view” on UN Report.

27th The UN formal report (UNMOVIC) on Iraqi inspections: highly critical, not damning. Director General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei: “With our verification system now in place, barring exceptional circumstances, and provided there is sustained proactive cooperation by Iraq, we should be able within the next few months to provide credible assurance that Iraq has no nuclear weapons programme. These few 101

months would be a valuable investment in peace because they could help us avoid a war.”

EU•15 signed a common stance.

EU General Affairs Council: Reaffirm the role of the UNSC and Resolution 1441. Council “stands ready to engage all necessary efforts to answer the needs of UNMOVIC and IAEA in personnel and practical means”.

28th President Bush’s State of the Union speech: ready to attack Iraq even without the UN.

29th Copenhagen European Council 12 – 13 Dec, 2002: Presidency Conclusions

30th Statement of Eight Leaders of EU Member State: Jose María Aznar, Spain; Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, Portugal; Silvio Berlusconi, Italy; Tony Blair, U.K.; Vaclav Havel, Czech Republic; Peter Medgyessy, Hungary; Leszek Miller, Poland; Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Denmark

EU Presidency's Prime Minister Costas Simitis on the Statement of Eight: ”• • does not contribute to a common stance towards this issue. The EU seeks to have a common foreign policy.”

31st EU Presidency's Foreign Minister Georges Papandreou says Eight State’s Statement is not an EU procedure

Meeting with President Bush and Prime Minister Blair

FEBRUARY 2003

1st EU Presidency's Foreign Minister Papandreou: “If developments are such that a strong message of peace should be sent to Iraq or preparations made for war, we shall convene an extraordinary Council”.

4th Public Demarche to Iraq

5th Secretary of State Powell gives a lecture in UN Security Council

Vilnius Group Statement: by the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia

10th Hellenic Presidency proposal for an extraordinary European Council on Iraq.

12th Statement on the situation in Iraq by the EU Presidency's Alternate Foreign Minister of Greece Mr. T. Giannitsis in European Parliament. An in•depth explanation of the EU's urge on Iraq to fully and unconditionally cooperate with the UNSC.

14th Further report from UN inspectors, their chairman Hans Blix say slight progress has 102

been made. Both the pro• and anti•war camps say Blix’s report supports their position.

Letter from Prime Minister C. Simitis to his EU Counterparts: “• • it is now clear that the current crisis will soon reach a new, possibly decisive, turning point.”

15th Massive peace demonstrations all over the world.

16th President of the EU Council George Papandreou’s statement to the meeting of Arab League foreign ministers in Cairo

16th Statement by the President of the European Council, Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis on the eve of the European Council meeting in Brussels: “We do not want dividing lines between the EU countries.” ”Simitis noted that the EU had expressed a common policy on Iraq with the decision of the General Affairs Council on 27 January • •.” ”“In any case, the EU cannot have an overall plan for resolving the problem of Iraq, given that the UN Security Council is competent for the issue.”

17th Extraordinary European Council: Bridged some gaps among Member States; EU•15 only, did not include candidate countries

President Chirac says Candidate countries lost a good opportunity to stay quiet.

18th Vilnius Ten Statement followed by Chirac’s statement

15 + 13: 15 EU Member States's joint position on Iraq, 13 EU Acceding and Candidate (10+3) Countries concur: “Simitis described the joint position of the ‘15’ as being indicative of their will to press ahead and give content to the common foreign policy • • Iraq should be under no illusion that it can 'procrastinate' • • [a]sked whether the ‘15’ would have reached a common position without the mass demonstrations, Simitis replied that a common position would have been reached but that the demonstrations “provided information which we needed, or at least some of us needed' • •”.

21st Extraordinary European Council 17 Feb, 2003: Presidency Conclusions

24th The U.S., the U.K. and Spain submit a proposed UN resolution asking to authorize military force on Iraq. In the end lobbying yields only one more supporter: Bulgaria (see: 17 March) (Official day of the proposed resolution: 7 March, 2003.)

France, Germany and Russia submit an informal counter•resolution in the UN Security Council.

Presidency press conference after the meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council: “Papandreou also clarified that the «15» were asking for more but not unlimited time for the UN weapons inspectors, so that they can continue their work.” 103

28th Press Conference of US • EU Ministerial Meeting (Washington DC): ”The differing views held by the European Union and the Unites States on the Iraq issue should not undermine the common will for a solution to the problem, the President of the EU

Council, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou said at a joint press conference with US Secretary of State Colin Powell.”

Secretary of State Powell: ”The United States and some of our European friends do have some differences with regard to the next steps that should be taken and we are exploring those differences in an open, honest and candid fashion.”

Foreign Minister Papandreou: ”• • we don't exclude the use of force, but we need to use all possible diplomatic means, every window of opportunity, in trying to resolve this crisis, even at the last moment, peacefully; and of course the importance of the UN role in this whole process.”

MARCH 2003

1st Turkey’s Speaker of Parliament voids the vote accepting U.S. troops on constitutional grounds (264 – 250, 19 absentees)

United Arab Emirates suggest President Saddam Hussein to step down to avoid the war. Kuwait follows.

EU Presidency's Greek Foreign Minister at the Arab League summit, Sharm el• Sheikh Egypt: ”• • he could not be certain the EU would have a common stance in the event of unilateral military action. Conveying the climate during his recent visit to the United States, he emphasised the need for Iraq to disarm, saying that otherwise 'war will be certain'”.

2nd Bahrain follows the above•mentioned.

3rd Press conference following the 13th EU – GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) joint ministerial meeting.

Joint Communique: EU – GCC 13th joint council and ministerial meeting.

5th Joint statement by France, Russia and Germany in opposition to a UN resolution authorising force.

Pope’s Envoy Pio Laghi to meet President Bush to plea for peace.

6th People’s Republic of China joins France, Germany and Russia to officially opposing the U.S.

13th EU Presidency's Greek Foreign Minister Speech at the European Parliament on 12 March, 2003: The Greek Presidency is under obligation to exhaust every means to the peaceful and diplomatic solution of the Iraq problem: 104

”First of all, the unity of the European Union – the fifteen – is being tested, as well as the unity of the twenty•five and twenty•eight. European Union – United States relations, our trans•Atlantic relations, are being tested. Relations between the European Union and the Arab and Muslim world are being tested.”

Repeated: ”It is up to Baghdad to put an end to this crisis, complying with the demands of the Security Council.”

16th The U.S., the U.K. and Spain meet in Azores:

President Bush says Monday is to be “moment of truth” for the international community. Participants denied that meeting was a Council of War.

17th Statement by the Greek Foreign Minister on Iraq: ”Papandreou underlined that Greece, as current holder of the EU presidency, was taking initiatives right up to the last moment.”

France: If Iraq uses chemical weapons against U.S. troops, France would support the U.S.

In a pre•recorded CNN interview President Chirac threatens to veto down second UN resolution. Later that day Foreign Minister Villepin affirm the position. (Russia back up that no further resolution on Iraq.)

At 13:28 (GMT) Greece holding the EU Presidency say Britain and Spain have alleged themselves with the U.S. on the Iraq crisis outside the framework of the EU.

At 13:53 British Attorney•General says the War is legal on the grounds of the existing UN resolution.

At 15:00 Announcement of withdrawal of the joint draft resolution by the U.S., the U.K. and Spain (that France and Russia threatened to veto).

At 16:10 Former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook resigns from the post of Leader of the House of Commons – he says he cannot support a war without international agreement and domestic support.

18th Statement by the Greek Foreign Affairs Minister, President of the EU – GAC, George Papandreou on the Iraq crisis, during the EU – Ukraine Association: ”Out of this crisis the EU faces up to a real challenge it has. And the real challenge is to develop a CFSP, which can give a very strong voice to the EU and a very unified voice to the EU.”

At 01:00 President Bush’s 48 hours ultimatum for Saddam Hussein.

At 05:00 President Chirac says ultimatum contrary to the will of the UN Security Council.

At 07:23 Health Minister Lord Hunt second British minister to resign over Iraq. 105

At 09:00 German Chancellor Schroeder says no justification for war.

At 10.30 President Chirac’s warning.

At 11:08 Vatican’s warning.

At 11:10 Home Officer John Denham third British minister to resign over Iraq.

At 16:49 Secretary of State Collin Powell says 45 countries have signed up in the Coalition of the Willing.

19th President Bush declares war.

French Foreign Minister Villepin addresses on Iraq in the UN Security Council.

German Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer addresses on Iraq in the UN Security Council.

20th Operations start.

Statement by the President of the European Council: ”'I express my deep regret that it was not possible to find a peaceful solution to the Iraq problem'. I can only hope that the hostilities end quickly so that loss of human life is kept to a minimum, particularly among the civilian population.”

European Parliament session on Iraq, Brussels, 20 March, 2003: ”Papandreou underlined the need to explore ways of creating a true common foreign policy• •.”

Spring European Council 2003: Statement on Iraq.

Timelines to be found for example in the Internet sites of Infoplease, Wikipedia, BBC, CNN, White House, Campaign Against Sanctions on Iraq (CASI). The timeline above is constructed by consulting those sites and the official documents from the Presidency of the EU.