978-9934-564-60-4 RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND TOOLS OF INFLUENCE IN THE WESTERN BALKANS Published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence ____________________________________________________________________________ 1 ISBN: 978-9934-564-60-4 Author: Dr Dimitar Bechev Project manager: Sanda Svetoka Copy-editing: Anna Reynolds Dimitar Bechev is Research Fellow at the Center for Slavic, Eurasian and East European Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, as well as Senior Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C.. He specializes in Russian foreign policy, the Balkans and Turkey. He is the author of Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe (Yale UP, 2017). Dr Bechev is a frequent contributor to Foreign Policy, Al Jazeera, the American Interest, Politico and other popular outlets covering current affairs. His quotes have appeared in Financial Times, the Economist, the New York Times, BBC. He holds a D.Phil (PhD) from the University of Oxford. NATO STRATCOM COE 11b Kalciema Iela Riga LV1048, Latvia www.stratcomcoe.org Facebook/stratcomcoe Twitter: @stratcomcoe This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO StratCom COE. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. The views expressed here do not represent the views of NATO. 2 _____________________________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION On 17 January 2019, Vladimir Putin paid a land- Russia’s forays into Europe’s southeast fuel the mark visit to Belgrade. A jubilant 100,000-strong perception of the region as a battleground of multitude waving the white-blue-and-red flags great powers.2 The list of interested parties in- of the Russian Federation and Serbia filled the cludes Turkey, China, whose economic clout streets, many people bused in from across the is on the rise; and possibly the Gulf Mon- country to participate. The hosts greeted their archies, which have also made inroads into distinguished guest with an artillery salute. the region. Crowds grew ecstatic as Putin and President Aleksandar Vučić made their way to St. Sava, the Balkans’ largest Orthodox cathedral, completed Of all these, it is Russia that poses the most di- thanks to a grant from Russia. Just weeks away rect challenge to the West. Unlike other external from the 20th anniversary of NATO’s intervention players, Moscow has wholeheartedly embraced in Kosovo, the hero’s reception Putin was given the role of spoiler acting against Western in- accentuated the two countries’ burgeoning ties. terests. Moscow is vehemently opposed to Vučić discussed his plans for partitioning Koso- ex-Yugoslav countries joining the North Atlantic vo with Russia’s president. Treaty Organisation (NATO) and is no friend of the European Union (EU) either, even though its The visit produced an agreement on Serbia’s attitude to EU enlargement remains ambiguous. inclusion in the TurkStream project, a pipeline designed to ship Russian natural gas through Russia is also unique in terms of the range of Southeast Europe bypassing Ukraine. Weeks capabilities it brings to bear. Its toolbox spans later, Belgrade was to take four MiG-29s from hard military power, economic instruments— Russia’s ally Belarus, in addition to fighter jets particularly with regard to the energy sector, el- already donated by Moscow. For Putin, the trip ements of what analysts define as ‘sharp power’ to Belgrade scored a diplomatic triumph. Apart (e.g. disinformation and disruption), as well as a from the vigour of the Serbian-Russian partner- degree of cultural appeal or ‘soft power’ rooted ship, it showcased Moscow’s influence across in shared religion and history with a number of the Balkans, and in European affairs more South Slav nations.3 Though it lags considerably broadly.1 behind the EU and NATO, Russia has proven an increasingly influential actor.4 ____________________________________________________________________________ 3 This paper starts with an analysis of the West- ern Balkans’ place in Russia’s strategy. The main contention is that Moscow’s paramount objective is balancing the power of NATO and the EU rather than establishing regional hege- mony. The paper then takes a closer look at Russia’s toolbox and the instruments it leverages to as- sert its interests across former Yugoslavia and Southeast Europe as a whole, and ends with several recommendations on how the West should respond to the Russian challenge. 4 _____________________________________________________________________________ Russia sees itself as a senior stakeholder in a concert of powers, reminiscent of classic European diplomacy in the 19th century. RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS Russian foreign policy pursues three, mutual- Defending the Fatherland against foreign inter- ly-related grand objectives. First, engagement ference, therefore, starts beyond its borders.5 with the outside world as a means of preserv- ing domestic stability, understood first and The second objective, very much stemming foremost as stability of the regime. The gov- from the first, is to ensure that Russia retains erning elite, many of whom have a background control over the post-Soviet space. This does in the security services, view global politics as not mean dislodging other players, such as Chi- a source of both threats and opportunities. The na in Central Asia or the EU in Eastern Europe. Kremlin views the West—the US and its Europe- Such an outcome would be far beyond Russia’s an allies—with a great deal of suspicion. There reach. Yet Moscow has shown its willingness to is a belief that the US is promoting a regime go to considerable lengths to protect its corner. change, either in Russia’s near abroad, in the The prime example is Russia’s annexation of Middle East, or in the Russian Federation itself. Crimea and the subsequent war in East Ukraine, ____________________________________________________________________________ 5 which has provided Moscow with leverage over foothold in the Balkans means having a say on Kyiv but has also resulted in significant costs those strategic matters, which are of direct con- because of sanctions from the West. sequence to Russia. Moscow is driven by geo- politics, with other concerns such as econom- The last objective concerns the preservation ic interests or historic bonds with the South of Russia’s status as a great power in glob- Slavs or the other Orthodox nations playing a al affairs. Though it is not a peer of either the secondary role. It sees the Balkans as a vulner- current hegemon, the US, or of a rising China, able periphery of Europe where Russia can build Russia is equipped with a large nuclear arsenal, a foothold, recruit supporters, and ultimately a seat in the UN Security Council, and a good maximise its leverage vis-à-vis the West. chunk of the Eurasian landmass; Russia sees it- self as a senior stakeholder in a concert of pow- There is no doubt that Southeast Europe lies ers, reminiscent of classic European diplomacy well beyond what Russia considers its privileged in the 19th century. sphere of geopolitical interest. In economic, social, and also purely geographical terms, The multipolar vision, originally articulated by the former Yugoslav republics and Albania Yevgeny Primakov during his term as a foreign gravitate towards the West. The EU accounts minister and later as premier between 1996–98, for the bulk of the region’s trade7 and foreign di- dictates that Russia should be prepared to bal- rect investment (up to 81.6% of the total stock ance and push back against the US in coopera- in North Macedonia and 77% in Serbia).8 tion with other states in order to obtain a fairer deal. Under Putin, Russia has made strides to- The Union is also home to sizeable immigrant wards realising this vision. From the interven- communities from the region, some of which tion in Syria in 2015 onwards, Russia’s actions date back to the 1960s.9 NATO dominates the have vindicated its claim of being more than security landscape, with Albania, Croatia, and just a regional power confined to the post-So- Montenegro already in the alliance, North viet space, as the Obama administration once Macedonia at its doorstep, and NATO’s KFOR characterised it.6 mission underwriting stability in Kosovo. There is no realistic prospect that those coun- The Western Balkans are part and parcel of tries would ever consider Russian-led struc- Russia’s strategy to establish itself as a first- tures such as the Collective Security Treaty rate player in European security affairs, along Organization (CSTO) or the Eurasian Economic with other major states such as Germany, Union (EEU) as an attractive alternative. France, and the UK. Since the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, the region has been at the forefront Russia’s only option is to act in an obstruc- of debates on critical issues such as transatlan- tionist manner to undermine the EU and NATO, tic relations, the EU’s security and defence di- making use of the Balkans’ own vulnerabili- mension, and NATO/EU enlargement. Having a ties, whether through nationalism-fuelled dis- 6 _____________________________________________________________________________ putes inherited from the 1990s, pervasive cor- Russia can leverage scarce resources to attain ruption and state capture, or citizens’ distrust in maximum payoff (or ‘play a weak hand well’, as public institutions. Strobe Talbott once characterised Primakov’s strategy), be they diplomatic or commercial Rather than drawing the Western Balkans into gains, or simply confirmation of Moscow’s sta- its own orbit, a costly exercise for a nation tus as an indispensable international actor.10 whose GDP is comparable to that of Spain, Rus- Not being bound by any particular ideology or sia is looking for leverage in the region it could normative aspirations also gives present-day then apply to the EU and the US.