International Security and Estonia 2018
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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ESTONIA 2018 CONTENTS Introduction . 2 The domestic political situation in Russia . 4 The Russian economy . 12 The effects of the sanctions . 14 The Russian military . 18 Russian foreign policy . 24 Outlook for the Minsk Agreements . 28 Rosneft and Gazprom as the tools of Russian foreign policy . 31 Relations between Belarus and Russia . 32 Intelligence from the territory – threat to foreign nationals in Russia 35 The FIFA World Cup in Russia – Putin’s PR project . 42 Influence operations . 44 Information warfare units targeting NATO . 47 Kremlin’s use of misrepresentation of historical events in influence operations . 48 Cyber threats . 52 Terrorism in Europe . 58 North Korea’s weapons programme continues . 61 The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s mission . 67 2 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION am pleased to present the Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service’s third I public report, in which we describe the world security environment surroun- ding Estonia . In 2017, Russian meddling abroad was starkly exposed for a large share of the public in the US and Europe . The topic received an unprecedented and quite deserved level of attention . Defining mo- ments included the unanimous assess- ment of US intelligence agencies regarding Russia’s interference in the 2016 Ameri- can election, French president Emmanuel Macron’s denunciation of Russian media channels as “agents of influence”, and Ger- man chancellor Angela Merkel’s warning MIKK MARRAN to Russian president Vladimir Putin not to Director General, meddle in the German election . Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service Estonian security institutions have been talking for years about attempts on Rus- sia’s part to splinter the unity and trust Russia’s fight against the West also that exists between nations in the West . takes place on Russia’s own territory . The The awareness of this fact is now spread- respective chapter of the report examines ing more broadly in the US and in many the modus operandi used by Russian places around Europe . Unfortunately, no special services to recruit or intimidate changes can be seen in Russia’s behav- foreign nationals inside Russia (a practice iour . In the years ahead, Russia seems known as gathering “intelligence from the likely to continue its politics of division territory”) . The purpose of the chapter is and opposition to the system of Western not to dissuade people from visiting Rus- values . In our report, we illustrate on just sia, but we do draw attention to the large how broad a front Russia is waging this scale and aggressiveness of the activities battle by listing the conflicts and regions pursued by Russia’s intelligence services, where we see Russian interference as and describe the dangers that people highly likely this year . could face who travel there . INTRODUCTION 3 In early 2018, the big question pertaining Estonian security does not exist in a to Russia is what will happen after its vacuum; our security and well-being March presidential elections . The world is depend on that of our friends, and their witnessing a carefully choreographed piece vulnerabilities are our vulnerabilities . That of theatre that attempts to leave the im- is why our report also covers the issue of pression of free elections . But behind the terrorism . Although the threat of terror- scenes, a cynical plan is being executed to ism is low in Estonia, it is high in Europe ensure Putin and his inner circle retain their as a whole, and poses a threat to Estonian grip on power for yet another term . In the citizens travelling abroad . report, we detail how complicated this task An acute problem that emerged in 2017 is given Russia’s declining socioeconomic was the threat from North Korea, which indicators and gathering mood of protest . could lead to noteworthy developments Our aim is to cover the events in Russia this year . In spite of the fact that the that tend all too often to reach the public in Korean peninsula is geographically far distorted or incomplete fashion . The Putin from us, increased tensions in that region regime is masterful at fostering a false also impact our security . We are therefore image and creating deceptions . A vivid keeping a close eye on the situation there example of the above is Zapad-2017, the and also in other distant conflict zones . major military exercise held last autumn . The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service For the benefit of the entire internation- recently marked its 25th anniversary . Our al community and the Russian public, it mission continues to be the same – to was painted as a minor counterterrorism protect the Estonian state from external exercise held in Belarus, but actually this security threats by providing trustworthy was but a disguise for large-scale manoeu- intelligence for decision-makers . Our task vres that were a test run for all stages of a is to ensure that when Estonian leaders full-scale war on NATO . Although this was gather to make key decisions from the not the first time this scenario had been standpoint of security, they know more rehearsed, a greater level of concealment about the topic than what is available over could be detected on this occasion . Unfor- public channels . tunately, disinformation and half-truths also showed up in Western coverage of the Just as important is the realization that exercise . we – the government, society and the citizens – create our own security space Although Russia conducts large-scale every day . The well-known slogan to military exercises, our report states clearly: “think globally, act locally” is also valid the threat of a direct military attack on when it comes to understanding security NATO member states in 2018 is low . We in the Baltic Sea region in 2018 . will discuss this matter in more detail in the chapter on the Russian military . Bonne lecture! 4 THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA In 2018, internal tensions will grow in Russia, the economy will remain stagnant, and the regime will fail to convince the populace that there is light at the end of the tunnel. In the coming years, this may destabilize the foundations of the current political system in Russia. he main goal for Putin and though Russia’s current political leaders the political ruling clique is have never shied away from using to stay in power . In the short various administrative means for influ- T term, this means that the encing election results, such attempts 2018 presidential elections have to be will run significant risks on a backdrop carried out smoothly . The unfavourable of general discontent . The ruling elite domestic political situation will give the remember 2011, when State Duma Kremlin less manoeuvring room . election fraud was the last straw that led to resentment brimming over into As regards the re-election of Putin, the protests among the middle class in the domestic political realities in 2018 are largest cities . The elite want to avoid a now less in his favour than ever before repeat of such a scenario at all costs . – dissatisfaction with the actions of the But eliminating the root causes of the political elite and the situation in the dissatisfaction – political and economic country has grown significantly . Political stagnation – is impossible as long as activism is simultaneously on the rise, the system continues to be tilted in the especially among young people . Even ruling clique’s interests . THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA 5 THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA THE DOMESTIC ruling elite . With the personal standard POLITICAL REALITY of living declining, the lavish lifestyle of senior officials and corruption cases The domestic political situation in caused greater resentment . Moreover, Russia in 2018 will also be character- as the recession dragged on, there was ized by growing discontent among increasing lack of confidence in the the population . The reasons for the capability of the central government, broader dissatisfaction of its citizens all the more since top Russian leaders come down to the political and eco- did not go beyond well-worn clichés in nomic impasses, either separately or addressing solutions to the country’s in combination . The first serious signs problems . As a result, many citizens of growing discontent emerged in the have long since started to doubt second half of 2015, when the number whether their leaders’ prescriptions are of protests increased due to the coun- feasible . A certain segment of society try’s economic difficulties . During that – above all, the younger generations time, public accusations against the – are bothered by the political system Kremlin and Putin were rare, and the itself; the stagnated, kleptocratic sys- direct triggers for the protests and the tem is seen as the main obstacle to the slogans were largely apolitical . But the country’s development, and is seen as scope of political demonstrations had having a negative impact on their future grown significantly by spring 2017 . prospects . Russia’s economic downturn affected how society react- ed to the actions of the AS REGARDS THE RE-ELECTION OF PUTIN, THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL REALITIES IN 2018 ARE NOW LESS IN HIS FAVOUR THAN EVER BEFORE – DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ACTIONS OF THE POLITICAL ELITE AND THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY HAS GROWN SIGNIFICANTLY . 6 THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA When comparing the current situation to 2011, the main differences are the va- riety of reasons for the discontent and the spectrum of those dissatisfied . In 2011, the catalyst for the protests at the start of the decade was dissatisfaction among a fairly small part of society – mainly the Moscow and St . Petersburg middle class – with the current political system . The overwhelming majority of people in Russia did not support the protests . Putin’s public approval ratings are still high, but it is questionable how reliable or valid the figures are, given the current atmosphere in Russia .