The Impact of State Capacity on the Duration and Intensity of Civil Wars

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4-2017

Leviathan Lost: The Impact of State Capacity on the Duration and Intensity of Civil Wars

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Recommended Citation Simon, Sarah, "Leviathan Lost: The Impact of State Capacity on the Duration and Intensity of Civil Wars" 01 April 2017. CUREJ: College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, University of Pennsylvania, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/205.

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/205 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Leviathan Lost: The Impact of State Capacity on the Duration and Intensity of Civil Wars

Abstract While wars between nations have declined over the past twenty years, intrastate conflicts are on the rise. Scholars are now examining the conditions under which civil war is likely to break out, to last longer, and to intensify, and the strength of the local government has emerged as a critical factor that could potentially mitigate the harms posed by civil wars. This thesis addresses two research questions: what is the impact of state strength on (1) conflict duration and (2) conflict intensity? oT answer these research questions, I conduct several quantitative analyses of all internal conflicts occurring in the years 1960-2015, examining the relationship between state strength and conflict duration and battle deaths per year. This thesis ultimately finds that state strength, as proxied by military, fiscal, and bureaucratic capacities, is negatively correlated with conflict intensity but is positively correlated with conflict duration. This thesis concludes with the presentation of two case studies – the First Congo War and the Troubles of Northern Ireland – to illustrate how strong states may experience longer, but less bloody, civil wars.

Keywords political science, civil wars, internal conflict, mixed methods, war, northern ireland, congo, Social Sciences, Political Science, Jessica Stanton, Stanton, Jessica

Disciplines International Relations | Other Political Science

This article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/205 Leviathan Lost The Impact of State Capacity on the Duration & Intensity of Civil Wars

Sarah Simon University of Pennsylvania

“For by Art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth or State, which is but an artifi- cial Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended … [without the State] there is con- tinual fear, and the danger of violent death; and life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” – Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) 2

Table of Contents

Literature Review �� 4 State Capacity��5 Conflict Duration ��7 Conflict Intensity ��9 Theory �� 10 State Capacity & Duration ��12 State Capacity & Intensity ��14 Methodology & Case Studies�� 15 Research Question 1 (Duration) ��16 Research Question 2 (Intensity) ��17 Case Selection �� 18 Statistical Findings �� 18 Duration �� 18 Intensity �� 21 Case Studies �� 23 First Congo War ��23 The Troubles �� 32 Conclusion & Implications �� 52 Figures & Tables �� 56 References �� 61 Acknowledgements �� 70 Abstract Leviathan While wars between nations have declined over the past twenty years, intrastate conflicts are on the rise�, leading scholars to Lost examine the conditions under which civil war is likely to break out, to last longer, and to intensify� The strength of the local The Impact of State Capacity government has emerged as a critical factor on the Duration and that could potentially mitigate the harms posed by civil wars� This thesis addresses Intensity of Civil Wars two research questions: what is the impact of state strength on (1) conflict duration and (2) conflict intensity? To answer these research questions, I conduct several quantitative anal- Sarah Simon yses of all internal conflicts occurring in the University of Pennsylvania years 1960-2015, examining the relationship between state strength and conflict duration and battle deaths per year� This thesis ulti- “For by Art is created that great Leviathan called mately finds that state strength, as proxied by a Commonwealth or State, which is but an artifi- military, fiscal, and bureaucratic capacities, is negatively correlated with conflict intensity cial Man; though of greater stature and strength but is positively correlated with conflict du- than the Natural, for whose protection and defence ration� This thesis concludes with the presen- it was intended … [without the State] there is con- tation of two case studies – the First Congo tinual fear, and the danger of violent death; and life War and the Troubles of Northern Ireland of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” – to illustrate how strong states may experi- – Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) ence longer, but less bloody, civil wars�

o one is in control� It is very fright- stroyed their mother, remarking, “There’s ening� Power is in the streets, and no doubt in my mind it was brought on the Nit belongs to those with a gun,” stress of what happened�” said a businessman to a journalist from the Despite the similarity of their situa- Associated Press in 1997� In his country, tions, these two citizens were describing an ongoing civil war had spurred trav- lawlessness and violence in two separate el bans from the capital, leading many to civil wars on two different continents� The book plane tickets under false names, and a businessman, Robert Mulamba, spoke to sense of dread had fallen over the city� An- reporters in what was then known as Zaire, other citizen echoed his sentiments, telling known today as the Democratic Republic another journalist how the gunmen had of the Congo� As Mulamba grimly awaited killed his brother: “My mother Florence gunmen in the anarchic streets of Kinsha- heard the shots from the house, and she sa, the civil war in which Ken Funston’s always remembered how she saw two men brother was gunned down was drawing to running away cheering” (O’Boyle, 2017)� a close after decades of violence� Funston He went on to describe how the targeting lived in County Fermanagh in Northern of his brother in the civil war later de- Ireland, which since 1969 had been rocked 4 by sectarian violence in which over 3,000 diers and civilians alike, and those that people, Funston’s brother among them, do not die directly from violence are often would ultimately die� Despite their dra- harmed by the subsequent failure of insti- matically different life circumstances, both tutions, threats to public health, and col- Mulamba and Funston found themselves lapse of the local economy (Imai & Wein- subjected to and terrorized by capricious stein, 2000)� Moreover, civil wars are on and random violence� Despite their dra- the rise: a third of all nations since 1960 matically different countries, both Mulam- have experienced internal conflict of some ba and Funston regarded the rebels with a sort, and intrastate wars have occurred far mixture of hostility and fear� And despite more frequently than have interstate wars the dramatically different levels of polit- over the past seventy years (Blattman & ical development in their countries, both Miguel, 2010; Dosse, 2010)� Mulamba and Funston found themselves In recent years, the civil war literature in the middle of a conflict spurred by mas- has turned away from analyzing the de- sive grievances against the state� Griev- sire to engage in civil war (namely a focus ances against governments are pervasive on economic greed or political grievance) and eternal� But what makes Mulamba and towards an opportunity-based model of Funston’s circumstances unique is these civil war outbreak� This model focuses grievances boiled over in the form of civil on the political opportunity structure in war� place that informs potential rebels’ deci- As Mulamba’s and Funston’s stories sion to wage civil war, and at its center is should illustrate, civil wars demonstrate a discussion of state capacity (Tilly, 1978)� remarkable variation in their outbreak, Scholars are now examining the condi- violence, combatants, length, and inten- tions under which civil war is likely to sity� The shortest civil wars end within break out, to last longer, and to intensify, minutes after the staging of a bloody coup and the strength of the local government d’état, while some internal conflicts last has emerged as a critical factor that could decades – the Sudanese Civil War began potentially mitigate the harms posed by in August 1955 and is still being fought civil wars� Underlying this scholarship is to this day, sixty-one years later� Mean- the hope that states can protect their citi- while, some civil wars have seen the death zens from violence within their own bor- of millions, while some civil wars kill two ders, and the ability of the state to amelio- dozen people per year and are punctuat- rate the natural conditions of anarchy has ed by long lulls in the violence� Some civil been a centerpiece of political theory from wars are fought between two clearly-de- the 1600s onwards� While much atten- fined armies in pitched battles with clear tion has been paid to the ability of states frontlines, while other civil wars entail to forestall civil war onset, more research years of guerilla warfare between a strong is needed regarding how state strength state and a rebel group barely clinging to and legitimacy can change the character survival� But Mulamba’s and Funston’s and dynamics of civil wars once they oc- stories also show that, regardless of their cur� This thesis hopes to fill this gap in intensity or length, one thing is certain the literature by addressing the two fol- about civil wars, and that is the tremen- lowing research questions: why are some dous toll they take on local populations civil wars more intense than others, and and economies� Civil wars victimize sol- why do some civil wars last longer than 5 others? These questions have importance the existing literature regarding state because they examine the qualities and strength, intensity of conflict, and length characteristics of civil wars under various of conflict, using the existing scholar- conditions of state strength, leading to a ship to later inform my decisions of how greater understanding of the opportuni- to operationalize state capacity� Following ty structures rebels face when fighting this, I advance a theory of how three ma- against a government� These questions jor components of state capacity (military also have significance for peacekeepers in strength, government revenues, and bu- generating policy prescriptions for pre- reaucratic quality) influence duration and dicting, forestalling, and resolving intra- intensity of conflict� After this, I outline state conflict� my data and methodology for my quantita- This thesis will advance hypotheses re- tive and qualitative analyses� I then present garding the extent to which state capacity the findings of my quantitative analyses impacts the intensity and length of civil of all internal conflicts occurring in the years 1960 – 2015� This thesis finds that war and ultimately argues that military, state strength is positively correlated with fiscal, and bureaucratic capacity are essen- duration of civil war; that is, the stronger tial components of state capacity� Using a state, the longer civil war within its bor- these proxies for state capacity, I will show ders is likely to endure� In addition, this that state strength is negatively correlated thesis finds that state capacity is statisti- with conflict intensity but positively asso- cally significantly and negatively correlat- ciated with civil war intensity� In addition ed with battle deaths occurring in a civil to my statistical analyses, this thesis pro- war, meaning that stronger states tend to vides two case studies to illustrate how experience lower-intensity conflicts� To il- state capacity may lengthen civil wars lustrate the potential mechanisms leading but attenuate their intensity: first, Robert to these relationships, I then provide the Mulamba’s war of First Congo War, and two case studies of the First Congo War second, Ken Funston’s war of the Troubles and the Troubles of Northern Ireland� The in Northern Ireland� In the First Congo final section concludes with implications War, the dissolution of the Zairian state, of the findings and questions for further coupled with fallout from the Rwandan research� genocide, allowed rebels to quickly un- seat the Mobutu regime, with thousands Literature Review of battle deaths and tens of thousands of civilian deaths occurring in only a few ntrastate wars have occurred far more months of conflict� On the other hand, in frequently in recent years than in- the Troubles in Northern Ireland, one of ter-state wars and tend to endure lon- the strongest states in the world underes- I ger, and their effects range from extreme timated the severity of grievances held by loss of human life to economic damage citizens of one of its peripheral provinces (Fearon, 2004; Themnér & Wallensteen, and struggled to strike an appropriate bal- 2013)� Because of the massive harms posed ance between the use of military and polit- by civil wars, scholars have sought to iden- ical strategies, leading to a low-intensity tify specific ways in which the effects of conflict of nearly thirty years� civil wars persist and impact the popula- In the following section, I outline tion� To begin with, civil wars kill both 6 on and off the battlefield: nearly as many as coercion, co-optation, and cooperation people are indirectly killed by civil wars with potential internal adversaries� States through damaged infrastructure and in- can help keep the civil peace and stop civil creased spread of disease as are killed in war outbreak through high levels of gov- battle (Ghobarah, 2003)� Moreover, civil ernment spending on political goods and wars destroy national education systems, the establishment of trustworthy institu- inflicting damage that persists for gen- tions (Fjelde & De Soysa, 2009)� But when erations, and also cause flight of human states cannot keep control and descend and physical capital (Chamarbagwala & into civil war, Collier, Hoeffler, and Soder- Moran, 2011; Collier, 1999; Lai & Thyne, bom (2004) note that a state’s lack of eco- 2007)� Further, countries take years to nomic and military capacity can lengthen recover and develop after civil wars, and the duration of a civil war� Moreover, esca- civil war-torn states unsurprisingly expe- lation of civil war can lead to an increase rience reduced international trade (Bay- in military spending in the warring coun- er & Rupert, 2004; Flores & Nooruddin, try itself and in neighboring countries, re- 2009)� Post-conflict countries tend to re- quiring more demands on state fiscal ca- ceive less foreign direct investment and pacity (Phillips, 2015)� On the other hand, development aid, and countries that bor- state capacity – as measured by military der post-conflict countries see reduced quality and gross domestic product – has economic growth (Garriga & Phillips, been shown not to be associated with in- 2014; Murdoch & Sandler, 2004)� While tensity of civil war conflict (Lacina, 2006)� the literature regarding the impacts of However, it is not immediately clear what civil wars is well-developed, not as much impact other measures of state capacity research has been conducted on factors have on conflict intensity� Much of the lit- impacting conflict duration and intensity� erature focuses on defining state capacity, This is a critical area of research because state capacity’s impact on internal devel- when civil wars break out, external coun- opment, how state capacity can forestall tries and multilateral organizations often civil war onset, and how state capacity can attempt to reduce the harms posed by the aid the resolution of civil wars� war, and loss of life is a primary way that State capacity is a crucial and diffi- intrastate war threatens future stability� cult concept to define and operationalize� Thus, the scholarship should attempt to Kocher (2010) criticizes the use of the term address factors that lead to higher losses “state capacity,” noting, “You might in- of life, along with longer civil wars� This quire about my capacity to solve equations literature review will begin by analyzing or shoot jump-shots, but it would not make the existing literature about state capaci- much sense to inquire about my capacity ty and then turn to an examination of the in general�” Kocher (2010) insists that first literature regarding conflict duration and researchers must identify what type of ca- intensity� pacity states must have and the objectives State Capacity for which that capacity is useful� Some major theoretical measures of state capacity At first blush, states avoid violent chal- include military power and capacity, bu- lenges to their authority through multi- reaucratic and administrative capacity, fis- ple methods, including three strategies cal capabilities, and quality and coherence that Fjelde and De Soysa (2009) identify of political institutions (Hendrix, 2010)� 7 Various ways to operationalize military more prone to produce terrorists (Besley capacity abound, namely military person- & Persson, 2010; Rotberg, 2002)� In addi- nel per capita (Diehl, 1983; Jones, Bremer tion, state capacity may provide protection & Singer, 1996; Mason & Fett, 1996; Way- from regional contagion, as state capacity man, Singer & Goertz, 1983), log military has been shown to decrease the likelihood spending per capita (Henderson & Singer, that a state will become infected by civil 2000), and log GDP per capita (Fearon & conflict occurring in neighboring territo- Laitin, 2003)� In addition, two major ways ries (Braithwaite, 2010)� to operationalize bureaucratic or admin- As a result, a wealth of literature points istrative capacity include expert assess- to state capacity as a fundamental factor ments of bureaucratic quality and rule of of civil war onset; in conditions of civil law, along with export profiles, natural re- war, the internal security of the state is sources, and extractive capacity (Hendrix, no longer assured, and the natural securi- 2010)� Further, the quality and coherence ty dilemma that states exist to prevent is of political institutions is usually identified exacerbated (Posen, 1993)� Hendrix (2011) as a critical factor providing state capacity identifies a negative and significant cor- (Gurr, 1974; Hegre et al�, 2001)� However, relation between civil war onset and fiscal Hanson and Sigman (2013) go further and capacity as measured by tax revenue, and identify other measures of state capacity, other research notes that controlling for like control of tax evasion, implementation measures of state capacity reveals a strong of government decisions, and maintaining negative correlation between democrati- the monopoly on violence as important el- zation of a country and likelihood of civ- ements of state capacity� Moreover, various il conflict (Gleditsch & Ruggeri, 2010)� theorized dimensions of state capacity can Goodwin and Skocpol (1989) argue that be difficult to disentangle from one an- democratization, bureaucratic effective- other, making it tricky for researchers to ness, and size of government army should identify which measures of state capacity prevent the outbreak of civil war since the are significant (Hanson & Sigman, 2013; government is more capable of holding Cingolani, 2013)� the state together� Democratization may Setting aside questions of how to define prevent the outbreak of civil war because state capacity, the literature has examined they produce fewer radicalized elements the impact of state capacity on general eco- and provide less exclusionary outlets for nomic development and national security� the resolution of ethnic conflict (Gvosdev Besley and Persson (2010) contend that & Gurr, 2000)� Relatedly, an effective bu- a lack of state capacity, as manifested in reaucracy is capable of policing rural areas weak or failed states, is a major obstacle to and providing services that make citizens development, and indicators of state weak- less inclined to rebel, which may decrease ness all have negative impact on fidelity the likelihood of civil war onset (Fearon & to human rights, leading weak states to Laitin, 2003)� However, scholars disagree have worse human rights records on av- on the extent to which strong state ca- erage than strong ones (Englehart, 2009)� pacity decreases risk of war onset� Sobek Lack of state capacity can lead to securi- (2010) argues that strong states have a ty concerns as well: a low legal capacity decreased risk of experiencing civil war, can contribute to the likelihood of inter- while Thies (2010) claims that state capac- nal violence, and failed states are similarly ity does not affect civil war onset� How- 8 ever, both Sobek (2010) and Thies (2010) has been well-documented, the impact note that civil war onset may reduce state that state capacity can have while civil capacity, implying a potential reverse cau- wars are ongoing is not as clear� This is sality� Besley and Persson (2008) back up a vital question; while state capacity can this assertion, finding that the prospect of be an important bulwark against civil war an external war spurs much more invest- outbreak, the literature generally fails to ment and development of fiscal capacity address what happens when “all else fails” than does the prospect of a civil war� and strong states do experience internal conflict� Moreover, the literature lacks Finally, state capacity may also be an agreement on how to define state capacity important characteristic that can contrib- and how to operationalize it in the context ute to the resolution of civil wars� Capable of civil wars, and policymakers and peace- states that experience civil violence might keepers may want answers to the question be more able to credibly commit to a trea- of “what tools or resources may be useful ty or negotiation, which increases the like- to states when fighting a civil war?” Later, lihood the violence can reach a bargained this thesis will seek to address these gaps conclusion (McBride, Milante, & Skaper- in the literature by proposing a theory of das, 2011; Sobek, 2010)� Other measures state capacity and how it impacts duration of state capacity, like bureaucratic effec- and intensity of conflict� tiveness and quality of military, may be linked to the outcome of civil wars� An Conflict Duration effective state bureaucracy represents the ability of a government to function even Another major question scholars have in times of regime stress, and correspond- asked about civil wars centers around the ingly, bureaucratic quality should make it determinants of the duration of civil con- more likely the government wins a civil flict� Grievances and ethnic conflict may war (Goodwin & Skocpol, 1989; Knack, be linked to length of conflict (Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2004)� Collier et 2001; Schock, 1996)� Similarly, a strong al� (2004) provide three key conceptualiza- government army may be able to forestall tions of civil war: rebellion-as-investment losses of territory to rebel groups, making (in which the critical incentive for fight- it harder for rebels to win (Balch-Lindsay ing is the payoff to rebels once war ends), & Enterline, 2000)� On the other hand, rebellion-as-mistake (in which military Lacina (2006) finds that quality of mili- optimism prevents the recognition of any tary is not strongly correlated with sever- mutually advantageous settlement), and ity of civil war� DeRouen and Sobek (2004) rebellion-as-business (in which the rebel- also find that size of army alone might not lion pays off through income or satisfac- necessarily increase the likelihood of vic- tion while fighting occurs)� Collier et al� tory, indicating that nonmilitary aspects (2004) find that the key factors that length- of state capacity are important as well� en conflict are low per capita income, However, DeRouen and Sobek note that, high inequality, and a moderate degree while state capacity is necessary for peace of ethnic division, indicating that rebel- agreements, it might not be sufficient con- lion-as-mistake and rebellion-as-business ditions for a sustainable civil peace� are better conceptualizations of civil war Overall, while the impact of state ca- – that is, “rebellions will occur where and pacity on civil war onset and resolution only where they are profitable” since the 9 opportunity costs of civil wars must be Other characteristics of the civil war low in order for them to occur� Ethnic re- itself – such as its ultimate outcome and bellions or rebellions motivated by griev- the goals and structure of its rebels – may ance tend to be long in duration, especially influence its duration� Fearon (2004) finds “sons of the soil” wars that pit a peripher- that civil wars emerging from coup d’états al ethnic minority against state-support- or revolutions tend to be shorter, as do civil ed migrants of a dominant ethnic group wars in Eastern Europe and former Sovi- (Fearon, 2004)� Wucherpfenning, Met- et Union states� Cunningham et al� (2009) termich, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2012) confirm that civil wars resulting from find that ethnicity per se does not matter coups are shorter on average� In addition, as much as how government and nonstate governments that face rebels motivated by leaders capitalize on it, finding that reb- secessionist goals take longer to prevail els’ ethnic linkage to an excluded makes (Brandt, 2008)� The duration of civil wars conflict endure longer� On the other hand, may also be a function of whether it ends other scholars find that ethnic fractional- in government victory, rebel victory, or a ization makes conflicts shorter (Cunning- negotiated settlement, since the baseline ham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009)� hazard rates vary from outcome to out- Another proposed factor in the dura- come (Brandt, 2008)� On the rebels’ side, tion of civil wars are the presence of natu- Cunningham (2006) finds that the pres- ral resources in the country experiencing ence of multiple rebel organizations in the conflict� Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala (2009) same conflict leads to narrower bargain- find that fighting in regions with valuable ing ranges, higher risk of info asymme- minerals – namely, petroleum, gemstones, tries, last mover advantages, and shifting and drugs – lasts substantially longer alliances� Therefore, the number of active than fighting in regions without those rebel organizations at the start of the con- natural resources present� Other schol- flict should cause wars to endure longer� ars confirm this finding, possibly since Subsequent research has confirmed this it may make rebellion as a business more “veto players” hypothesis (Cunningham et profitable (Fearon, 2004; Wucherpfennig al�, 2009)� et al�, 2012)� On this note, alluvial dia- Not only does the number of rebel monds and illegal drugs may be the most groups impact the duration of civil war, strongly linked to duration of civil war, but the strength of those groups may since they are considered “lootable” and also matter� Kalyvas and Balcells (2014) more easily capitalized on by rebels (Ross, propose three types of civil warfare: (1) 2003)� Lootable resources like diamonds conventional warfare, which consists of and drugs make non-separatist conflicts pitched battles and clear frontlines; (2) ir- endure longer but pose little danger in regular warfare, which consists of a con- separatist conflicts; on the other hand, un- ventional state army versus lightly armed lootable resources like hydrocarbons tend guerillas; and (3) symmetric nonconven- to spur separatist conflicts (Ross, 2003)� tional (SNC) warfare, which consists of Other characteristics of a country, in ad- a government and rebels matched at low dition to its abundance of natural resourc- levels of military sophistication� They find es, like its democratization and population that irregular conflicts tend to last longer size have been found to lengthen conflict than other conflicts, meaning that the (Cunningham et al�, 2009)� relative military capacities of states and 10 rebels matter for the duration of civil war� Kalyvas, 2014; Lu & Thies, 2011; Lujala, Absolute rebel and government strength 2009)� Relatedly, scholars have linked eth- may be a critical factor as well, since rebel nic dominance and ethnic polarization to strength – as measured by a high mobi- greater battle deaths in civil wars (Lacina, lization, arms-procurement, and fighting 2006; Lu & Thies, 2011)� capacity and a legal political wing – have Other characteristics of the country ex- been found to make conflicts shorter periencing internal conflict may contrib- (Cunningham et al�, 2009)� On the other ute to the intensity of civil wars� Lujala side of the equation, some argue that, at (2009) shows that natural resources, such minimum, state capacity should increase as the presence of gemstones, hydrocar- the length of time it takes for insurgents bons, and drugs within regions experienc- to win (Mason, Fett, & Weingarten, 1999)� ing conflict, increase the number of battle However, the literature on conflict dura- deaths� Importantly, Lujala (2009) finds tion has not fully examined the correlation that nationwide aggregates of presence of between state capacity and length of civil natural resources do not retain this predic- war� When it has addressed this relation- tive power; hydrocarbons and gemstones ship, the measures of state capacity may be must be present in the areas of fighting flawed� For example, DeRouen and Sobek in order to correlate with battle deaths� (2004) proxy state capacity with how democratic the country is, which does not Other scholars find that whether or not a seem to be a fair assessment of a country’s nation is a major oil exporter is a strong strength� Severely authoritarian or repres- predictor of how intense its civil war will sive regimes may have high state capacity, be (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014)� Another insofar as they can accomplish and achieve geographic factor increasing severity of the objectives they set, while some coun- civil war is how rough or mountainous the tries may be nominally democratic but terrain is, which may allow rebels to find lack solid institutions or bureaucracies� shelter and regroup (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014)� In terms of state activities, Wellen- Conflict Intensity dor (2013) shows that education spending and male secondary school enrollment The research regarding conflict inten- have a pacifying effect on civil war intensity proposes several variables that might sity, while others contend that democrat- lead to higher conflict intensity� Some ic institutions can also reduce fatalities studies show that intensity of conflict is during civil wars (Lacina, 2006)� Lujala significantly correlated with the degree of (2009) confirms the finding that countries income inequality and wealth inequality, that were considered to be democracies a indicating that severity of grievance held year before the conflict started seem to by rebels might lead to more intense wars experience conflicts with fewer battle-re- (Murshed & Gates, 2005)� Lu and Thies lated deaths� Finally, countries with larger (2011) corroborate this assertion, finding populations seem to experience more se- that the Gini index of a country is statis- vere conflicts (Lujala, 2009)� tically significantly correlated with battle deaths in civil wars� Ethnic fractionaliza- In addition, some research shows that tion, another main grievance cited by the characteristics of the conflict itself, such literature, has been shown to be correlat- as the method of warfare or foreign inter- ed with severity of conflict (Balcells & vention, can affect how intense the conflict 11 will become� Kalyvas and Balcells (2014) have been shown to affect civil war inten- find that conventional wars – those con- sity, but most of these characteristics of sisting of two armies fighting pitched bat- nation-states are immutable and not sub- tles with clear frontlines – are most like- ject to change over a short period of time� ly to have high amounts of battle deaths, State capacity, on the other hand, may be while SNC wars tend to be less intense� In manipulable by foreign countries or peace- addition, scholars have found a strong cor- keeping organizations through grants or relation between external support for the provision of arms� If state capacity is asso- warring parties and intensity of conflict ciated with more or fewer battle deaths in (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2014; Lacina, 2006; a conflict, it may be worth examining for Lujala, 2009)� However, Gleditsch (2007) policymakers seeking to reduce intensity notes that civil wars that attract foreign of civil wars� With that in mind, this the- intervention are typically more intense sis will now advance a definition of state to begin with, but other studies control capacity and present a theory of how state for previous conflict intensity levels and capacity impacts conflict duration and in- conclude that various types of interven- tensity� tions can impact civil war intensity, finding that military interventions often lead Theory to more intense conflicts (Craig-Morse, 2013; Sousa, 2014)� As a result, civil vi- his thesis advances the following olence during the Cold War was signifi- definition of state capacity: the cantly more deadly than thereafter (Laci- Tability of a state to set and achieve na, 2006; Lujala, 2009)� As put by Lu and various policy objectives� This definition Thies (2011), “[s]pecifically, the USA and consists of two components: (1) the set- USSR through their many interventions ting of policy and (2) the implementation nearly tripled the number of battle-related of policy� The first component requires deaths in a civil conflict during the Cold states to be able to coordinate and set pol- War period” (p� 226)� icy goals and objectives; intrinsic in this requirement is the necessity that govern- Overall, civil war intensity can have ments possess a leadership structure that far-reaching consequences on the region, can decide the policy objective� Second, such as increasing numbers of refugees this definition of state capacity necessi- and enhancing neighborhood spillover ef- tates that governments must be able to fects and collateral damage (Murdoch & implement policies to achieve the selected Sandler, 2002; Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, objective; in order to do this, states must 1989), making the study of its correlates coordinate amongst various bureaucracies vitally important� However, while the lit- once the objectives are set and use avail- erature has indirectly addressed the im- able tools and resources to complete the pact of state capacity through discussion objective� I contend that a state possesses of technologies of warfare (namely, Kaly- state capacity when it can accomplish both vas and Balcells, 2014), scholars have gen- aspects of this definition� erally not examined this characteristic that is present in all civil wars – the state Because there are different objectives at and its capacity to fight a civil war� Some different times for different governments, qualities of countries, such as oil exporta- state capacity might not always refer to tion, rough terrain, and democratization, the same capabilities; put more specifical- 12 ly, different types of capacities will mat- determine and set their policy goals – and ter for the policy objective selected by the hypothesize what the objectives of states government� For example, the objective of might be when engaged in civil war� To protecting citizens from foreign invasion be sure, various states will set different requires different tools, resources, and goals, depending on the disposition of the abilities than does the objective of pro- top leadership, the history of the country, viding housing to citizens� For the first and the strength of the insurgency, but objective, military capacity will be an im- this thesis contends that governments are portant factor – how strong is the state’s concerned with two primary objectives military, and how able is it to stop invad- during civil war: (1) maintaining the sta- ers? But for the latter objective, fiscal ca- bility of their regime, and (2) ending the pacity might be more important — how civil war� These two objectives are neces- much money does the government have, sary for governments to achieve but may and can it provide goods to its citizens? not be sufficient in and of themselves; the In these examples, we more clearly see the leadership might set other goals, depend- definition of state capacity because the pol- ing on the exact nature of the conflict, but icy objective is identified, along with the they must achieve these two objectives at skills, resources, and tools a government minimum in order to maintain control� needs to achieve the objective� The defini- This section now turns to an analysis of tion of state capacity that I advance in this these two state objectives� thesis addresses Kocher’s (2010) concerns First, this thesis contends that states that “state capacity” does not hold water are concerned with the stability and safe- as a general concept� Kocher (2010) insists ty of their own regime during a civil war� that researchers must identify what type This is one of their primary objectives of capacity states must have and the ob- during a civil war because the leadership jectives for which that capacity is useful� I of the state may be harmed or killed if agree in part, contending that in order to their regime’s stability is not assured� In talk about state capacity, researchers must the case of internal conflict, the leaders specify the policy objective the govern- of the regime seek to ensure that violence ment seeks to achieve and whether or not is not used against them; thus, the lead- the state has the capability to achieve it� ers of states are concerned with the sta- However, my proposed definition departs bility of their regime and with their own from Kocher’s by noting that state capaci- physical safety during periods of civil war� ty can cut across policy areas and that we Second, this thesis contends that states are can conceptualize the notion of a “strong also concerned with winning the civil war state” more broadly� Under this proposed when war breaks out within their borders� definition, a strong state is that which can In many ways, winning the civil war is an set policy goals and has a variety of effec- ancillary goal that arises due to concerns tive tools, resources, and skills for achiev- of regime stability, and states might be ing those goals� Strong states have a broad content to allow civil wars to endure, if repertoire of abilities and can direct their they don’t cause too much trouble or if it resources to achieving their set objectives� allows the government leaders to consoli- Turning to an examination of civil wars, date their regime� So perhaps some states let us briefly set aside the first component do not prioritize winning the civil war� of the theory – that states must be able to With that noted, there are unique reasons 13 that states are concerned with ending civ- tion of action after a settlement has been il wars� For example, governments might reached, and fiscal resources to maintain fear losing natural resources or econom- its military and to provide material bene- ic damage after a prolonged civil war; in fits to citizens to remove incentives to join addition, governments might fear inter- the rebel group(s)� A professional and au- ference or manipulation by foreign gov- tonomous bureaucracy, including military ernments or multinational organizations officer corps, can allow the state to act in like the United Nations if the conditions more coordinated fashion and decrease of anarchy persist for too long� Moreover, the likelihood of fractionalization and states focus on ending civil wars because neo-patrimonialism in the officer corps� they need to retain the sole legitimate use Moreover, bureaucratic quality is a criti- of violence within their borders� Weber cal component of the first part of the pro- (1968) proposes that governments become posed theory of state capacity; without a sovereign when they have a monopoly on strong bureaucracy and leadership, states the legitimate use of force in a given terri- might not even be able to set policy objec- tory� In the case of civil war, rebel groups tives in the first place� Thus, the following intrinsically challenge this monopoly on capabilities emerge as critical elements of violence within the nation’s borders, thus state capacity when considering the policy challenging the state’s sovereignty as objectives of states during civil wars: (1) well� Indeed, in many cases, governments military capacity, (2) fiscal capacity, and are fighting rebel groups who seek to be- (3) bureaucratic capacity� come the new government and to possess Now that we have adequately defined that monopoly on violence� Thus, because the key components of state capacity for states seek to retain the legitimacy of their the identified policy objectives, I now seek regimes, states are concerned with ending to answer the research questions posed by civil war when it breaks out in their bor- advancing hypotheses of how these three ders� key elements of state capacity influence Therefore, if we accept that these are the duration and intensity of conflict� the two primary objectives of states State Capacity & Duration during civil wars, an analysis of state capacity must take into account what tools First, I hypothesize that state capacity and resources are necessary for achieving should increase the duration of civil wars these two objectives� For the first objec- because it buffers the state from potential tive of maintaining the stability of the re- rebel victory� Brandt et al� (2008) find that gime, a strong military can help maintain rebels win early if they win at all, meaning physical safety of leaders and ensure that that state capacity can protect the govern- the governmental structure remains safe ment in these early stages and allow them and intact� Thus, an important measure of to hold onto control� Rebels tend to win state capacity should be the military ca- early because weak states may be viewed pacity a state possesses� For the second as incompetent or predatory by the pop- objective – ending the civil war – a vari- ulace, and at the first sign of a viable al- ety of capabilities are useful� They include, ternative, the population abandons the but are not limited to, a military strong incumbent government, causing it to lose enough to defeat the insurgency, a bureau- as a function of its own weakness rather cracy capable of negotiation and coordina- than as a result of rebels’ military com- 14 petence� Thus, stronger states should be using violence, meaning these cases in shielded from this effect, preventing the which civil wars break out are already rebels from winning quickly, consequently above some threshold of rebel group via- lengthening the duration of civil war� bility� This too makes rapid government State capacity, as earlier defined, en- victory more difficult� In addition, even tails the ability of a government to set and very strong states may find it difficult to achieve its policy and military objectives� penetrate and govern effectively periph- In the case of civil war, this thesis contends eral regions of their territories� If civil that states both want to maintain regime war breaks out in these regions, strong stability and win the civil war, but keep- states may not be able to win quickly or ing the regime stable is a prerequisite for may underestimate the threat posed� For winning the civil war� Therefore, regime these reasons, I argue that state capacity stability is the most important concern of should increase the duration of civil wars� a state in the case of civil wars� I contend The following hypotheses follow from this that governments are concerned primari- theoretical argument: ly with “just holding on” because winning H1a: State military expenditures increase the war is an ancillary goal, subservient to the duration of civil wars. making sure the leaders of the regime stay H1b: State revenues increase the duration alive� Therefore, in the instances where of civil wars. the government cannot win a decisive vic- H1c: State bureaucratic quality increase the tory quickly, state capacity should enable duration of civil wars. the governments to “just hold on” and In line with this theory, external sup- wait the rebels out� Specifically, a strong port for the government and external sup- military means that attacks by rebels are port for the rebels should increase the du- less likely to cripple the state’s military ration of civil wars� External support, be it and that the physical safety of the regime through arms, food, or funds, should give is more secure, both of which lengthen the either side more resources to maintain the amount of time it takes for the rebels to status quo of war� On the other hand, rebel win� Therefore, I hypothesize that state strength relative to the government should capacity should lengthen civil wars� shorten the duration of civil wars, since a The natural follow-up question is that, higher relative strength would allow the if a state is strong, shouldn’t that allow it rebels to win fast against a relatively weak to win faster, thus shortening conflicts? state� Below a certain threshold, increas- However, this thesis still considers cases es in rebel group strength relative to the only where the state is weak enough to al- government might not necessarily have an low a civil war to break out in the first effect on the duration of the war, since the place� Perhaps winning quickly is too government would still maintain an ad- challenging for these states, and state ca- vantage over the rebels� However, over a pacity allows them to hold out, since they certain threshold, increases in rebel group can’t outright defeat the rebels immediate- strength relative to the government might ly� Moreover, this thesis also constitutes speed rebel victory or shorten the civil a set of cases in which the rebel group is war� Finally, I hypothesize that rough ter- strong enough to amass enough resourc- rain lengthens civil wars because it allows es to decide to challenge the government rebel groups to squirrel away in the moun- 15 tains, making it harder for the govern- strategies are most effective� Thus, re- ment to seek them out� Moreover, a moun- gimes with high state capacity are more tainous terrain may make it harder for the adept at using multiple strategies, leading rebels to access government strongholds, to a decrease of battle deaths relative to causing the war to drag on� Therefore, conflicts with weaker governments, who roughness of a country’s terrain should may have to resort to brute force in the increase the duration of civil wars� The absence of more sophisticated techniques following hypotheses follow from this the- – or in the worst cases, cannot put up any oretical argument: credible defense� H1d: External support for the government Examining each aspect of state capaci- and/or rebels increases the duration of civil ty separately confirms this theory� First, wars. I predict military expenditures to be neg- H1e: Rebel strength relative to the state de- atively associated with battle deaths per creases the duration of civil wars. year� Although this is initially counterin- H1f: Rough terrain increases the duration tuitive, states with high military expendi- of civil wars. tures can be choosier about which battles to fight, are more able to minimize their State Capacity & Intensity own casualties, have better intelligence, Conflict intensity relates more strongly and can participate in targeted killings to the second objective of states when en- of rebels, all of which are associated with gaged in civil war: winning the war itself� lower intensity conflicts� On the other While the preservation of regime stability hand, weak states may be attacked more necessitates violence, winning the war re- frequently, have worse intelligence (which quires it more strongly� This thesis will may lead to mass killings in the absence contend that killing members of a rebel of better information), and may not pos- group is but one method of many for win- sess the officer corps, financial resources, ning a civil war� Other strategies may in- equipment, or training to protect their clude stifling recruitment, containing the personnel when attacked� As opposed to spread of rebellion and violence, and de- having military engagements foisted upon priving rebels of funding and arms, among them by the rebel group, strong states may others� In the second objective of winning be able to take the offensive and engage civil wars, inflicting battle deaths will in operations more assured to succeed� play an important role, but each strategy While at first blush, this may appear to is associated with an opportunity cost� If increase rebel battle deaths, the state often a government kills rebels exclusively as its has more personnel than there are rebel strategy for winning the war, it probably fighters� If states can minimize loss of life won’t be using other strategies, as it di- in their own ranks, which strong states verts resources away from other strategies are more capable of doing, the intensity toward its selected technique� Conversely, of the conflict is likely to diminish� Over- if a state uses techniques of non-violence all, states with stronger militaries may be like depriving rebels of new recruits and more cautious about using them and pos- targeting supply chains, they will prob- sess the restraint not to use them inappro- ably focus less on specifically inflicting priately, leading to fewer battle deaths� In battle deaths� Overall, states cannot have addition, I hypothesize that government it all – they must pick and choose which revenues and bureaucratic quality are neg- 16 atively associated with civil war intensity, potheses: since these elements of state capacity pro- H2a: State military expenditures are nega- vide flexible resources that can be used on tively associated with battle deaths. a variety of governmental objectives be- H2b: State revenues are negatively associ- yond simply killing rebels� For example, ated with battle deaths. higher government revenues can be used H2c: State bureaucratic quality is negative- to provide aid to war-torn regions to min- ly associated with battle deaths. imize grievances and stall rebel recruitment; for example, higher revenues could Considering other factors on civil war allow the state to increase public sector intensity, I hypothesize that conventional employment, addressing hypothetical reb- wars should lead to higher battle deaths� el concerns about high unemployment� Conventional wars – as defined by Kalyvas Likewise, higher bureaucratic quality can and Balcells (2014) – pit traditional armies keep government services functioning against one another in pitched battles with during civil strife, preventing the conta- clear frontlines� These wars should have gion of violence� A high-functioning bu- higher battle deaths because more military reaucracy can also help a strong state find personnel are involved in the fighting on political settlements to internal conflict both sides and because both sides possess and facilitate the mediation of differences more sophisticated technologies of war� between warring factions� In addition, democratization of a regime should suppress civil war intensity due Finally, as described before, strong to the public backlash against high battle states often face rebellions that emerge in deaths� In democracies, governments are peripheral regions of the country that are more accountable to the populace, which difficult to access and may not be a core is naturally adverse to violence� Thus, de- interest for the government� This results mocracies have an interest in minimizing in conflicts of long duration but with rel- fatality in civil wars� The following hy- atively few battle deaths, since few mili- potheses follow from these considerations: tary confrontations occur in these internal conflicts� Perhaps these conflict have long H2d: Conventional civil wars should expe- lulls between violence or consist of long rience higher battle deaths. periods of small-scale guerilla attacks on H2e: Democracies should experience lower police stations and military installations, battle deaths. which don’t generate as many casualties as This thesis will now present my ev- pitched battles� On the other hand, when idence and approach for testing the ad- the state is weaker, the military challenge vanced hypotheses� After the discussion of to the state tends to be more serious and this study’s methodology, a presentation of can challenge the government in both ru- the results of the statistical analyses and ral and urban areas� In these circumstanc- case studies follow� es, military defections may occur, and the rebel groups may be relatively strong and Methodology & Case Studies well-mobilized� Consistent with my pre- dictions about duration, these conflicts n order to answer the two research should be associated with shorter duration questions posed by this article, I will but higher intensity� From these theoret- Iemploy two different methods and ical arguments emerge the following hy- sources of quantitative data� For my first 17 research question – why do some civil army, government revenues, and bureau- wars last longer than others? – I use Cox cratic quality� For military expenditures, proportional hazard models to examine I used data from the World Bank’s World which factors are salient for impacting the Development Indicators on military ex- length of a civil war conflict� For my sec- penditures as a percentage of GDP� I then ond research question –– why are some lagged the variable by one year to reflect civil wars more intense than others? – I the fact that the effect of an increase in employ a regression analysis to find the military spending may take some time to statistically significant predictors of in- reveal itself� For government revenues, I tensity of conflict� Per the suggestions of also relied on the World Development In- Hendrix (2010) and Kocher (2010), and as dicators’ time series data on government described above, I intend to use three in- revenues excluding grants as a percentage dependent measures of state capacity: (1) of that country’s GDP� Finally, for bureau- military capacity, (2) fiscal capacity, and cratic quality, I used data from the PRS (3) bureaucratic capacity� After I detail Group’s (2017) International Country Risk my methodology and data sources for my Guide, which since 1984 has assigned each quantitative analysis, I will explicate the country a yearly score on a scale of 1-6 selection of and research for my case stud- rating the quality of its bureaucracy� ies� Other control variables I included as Research Question 1 (Duration) suggested by the literature include (1) log total population, (2) log GDP per capita, (3) For my first research question, regard- whether or not the civil war took place in ing the duration of civil wars, I construct- the Cold War, (4) ethnic fractionalization, ed a dataset based on the UCDP Dyadic (5) roughness of the country’s terrain, (6) Dataset, version 1-2016, which consists of how democratic the country is, (7) relative all armed conflicts occurring from 1946- strength of the rebel group, (8) external 2015� In the UCDP dataset, an armed support for the government and rebels, conflict is defined as “a contested incom- and (9) “veto players,” or how many dyads patibility that concerns government and/ are present in the conflict� I will discuss or territory where the use of armed force the sources and treatment of each of these between two parties, of which at least one variables in turn� is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calen- First and second, I obtained data on dar year�” Each observation in the dataset each country’s population and its per cap- represents a conflict between a govern- ita GDP from the World Development In- ment and a rebel group, as opposed to the dicators and then took the natural log of conflict-year version, where each observa- each observation� Third, I constructed a tion represents a conflict between a gov- dummy variable for whether the civil war ernment and all rebel groups opposing it� occurred after the Cold War (1 is yes, 0 My dataset consists of 587 conflict dyads, is no)� Fourth, I took a measure of eth- and my dependent variable is the time, in nic fractionalization (the ethno-linguistic years, each dyad lasts, which I calculated fractionalization measure) from Kalyvas based on the start and end dates of each and Balcells’ (2014) replication data, which dyad� To test my hypotheses, I obtained measures the ethnic fractionalization of a data on military expenditures, size of country using the multitude of languages 18 spoken in the nation as a proxy� Fifth, I intensity variable only codes conflicts as obtained a measure of how mountainous minor (between 25 and 999 battle-related each country is from Kalyvas and Balcells deaths in a given year) or full-scale war (2014), since several studies point to rough (1,000 or greater battle-related deaths in terrain as a factor in the intensity of civil a given year), and many conflicts do not war� Sixth, I obtained each nation’s Poli- change between minor and full-scale over ty score from the Polity IV dataset; high- their duration� To remedy this, I rely on er values correspond to more democratic data from the UCDP Battle Deaths Data- countries, while lower values refer to more set, version 5�0, which is compatible with autocratic countries� Seventh, I used a mea- the UCDP Dyadic Dataset and contains sure of relative rebel strength from Cun- data on battle deaths (soldiers and ci- ningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013)’s vilians killed in combat) in state-based Nonstate Actor Dataset� This measure is armed conflicts between the years 1989- coded on a scale of -2 to 2, with -2 mean- 2015 (Melander, Pettersson, & Themner, ing the rebels are much weaker than the 2016)� The Battle Deaths Dataset only government, -1 meaning they are merely counts deaths caused by the warring par- weaker than the government, 0 meaning ties that can be directly related to com- the government and rebels are at parity, bat; it does not, for example, include civil- 1 meaning the rebels are stronger than ians who die due to disease or starvation the government, and 2 meaning the rebels caused by the conflict� Therefore, this are much stronger than the government� dataset only measures the intensity of mil- Thus, positive scores indicate that the itary confrontations, not the war’s wider rebels have a military advantage over the impact on loss of life� From this dataset, government� Eighth, I obtained data for I used the best estimate of annual battle external support for the government and fatalities, of which I then took the natural rebels from the UCDP External Support log� To test my hypotheses, I use the same Dataset (Primary Warring Party Data- independent variables for state capacity set), which states whether or not external as my first research question� In terms of support was provided to the government control variables, I use these same inde- and rebel groups (Högbladh, Pettersson, pendent variables from my first research & Themner, 2011)� Ninth and finally, for question: log population, log GDP per the “veto players” variable, I summed the capita, relative rebel strength, ethnic frac- number of dyads active in each conflict at tionalization, post-Cold War, Polity score, the time of the observation� I then created and roughness of the country’s terrain� I a set of Cox proportional hazard models, included three different variables based on introducing more covariates each time� the prior literature review of conflict in- The results are presented in subsequent tensity, in which I evaluated whether each sections� civil war in my dataset was a conventional, irregular, or SNC war by using Kalyvas Research Question 2 (Intensity) and Balcells’ (2014) measures� For my second research question, re- After compiling this data, I treated garding the impact of state capacity on the the dataset as time-series cross-sectional intensity of civil wars, I also constructed a data and created a panel dataset based on dataset based on the UCDP Dyadic Data- dyad-year observations� I then created a set, version 1-2016� In this dataset, the random effects linear model for panel data 19 and tested the introduction of covariates ment revenues to understand the strength on the natural log of battle deaths in each of the Zairian state as the war unfolded� dyad-year� I tested for heteroskedasticity After developing a timeline of the major in all of the models, and when present, I events in the war, I referred to secondary provide heteroskedasticity-robust stan- sources for commentary regarding the in- dard errors� fluence of state capacity on the Zairian government strategy in the war� In the second Case Selection case, due to the richness of the scholarship This thesis presents two case studies: regarding the Troubles, I relied mainly on the First Congo War and the Troubles of secondary sources in my consideration of Northern Ireland� These cases were chosen this second case study� I again constructed because they provide examples of an ex- a timeline of major events of the Troubles tremely weak and extremely strong state, to understand the evolution of the conflict, respectively� On the one hand, in the First after which I consulted secondary sources Congo War, the Zairian state had basical- for their arguments regarding British pol- ly ceased to exist, allowing the outbreak icy at the time, namely Neumann (2003), of civil war� As will be discussed later, the Woodwell (2005), Edwards (2010), and tax collection system of the Zairian state Weitzer (1987)� Throughout this process, I was virtually nonexistent, and the military referred to primary sources of British pol- suffered from multiple problems of lack of icy, namely Cabinet papers and transcripts professionalism, low pay, and terrorization of debates in the House of Commons, along of the population� Zaire’s incredible weak- with British newspapers reporting on the ness allows this thesis to examine con- development of the conflict� Following the flict duration and intensity under circum- presentation of the major events and shifts stances of low state capacity� On the other in British response, I analyzed how British hand, the Troubles of Northern Ireland state capacity may have aided or hindered was chosen as a case study because it rep- its government in the search for solutions� resents the other end of the spectrum of This thesis will now present the find- state strength� Northern Ireland is ruled ings of its quantitative study, after which by the United Kingdom and, as such, is a a presentation and discussion of the case province of one of the strongest states in studies follow� the world� Despite this high level of state capacity, violent challenges to the state’s authority occurred� This case was select- Statistical Findings ed because it may reveal how strong states behave when faced with internal conflict� Duration After the cases were selected, I began eginning with the effect of state research into the First Congo War� To capacity on civil war duration, the research and draw conclusions about the Baverage length of the 587 dyads in influence of state capacity on the develop- the PRIO/UCDP dataset is 6�189 years� ment of the conflict, I first consulted pri- Figure 1 displays the Kaplan-Meier sur- mary source documents, namely African vival function for all civil war dyads coded newspapers, to construct a timeline of the in my dataset� The graph shows that most war� I also examined the aforementioned conflicts between a government and a reb- data on military expenditures and govern- el group tend to be resolved quickly, while 20

els 2 through 5, I add more covariates, including ethnic fractionalization, roughness of terrain, Polity score, and relative rebel strength� In these models, post-Cold War and log population retain their sign and statistical significance� In addition, lagged military expenditures achieves statistical significance with a negative sign, meaning that military capacity is associated with longer conflicts, as hypothesized� And finally, in models 6 and 7 of Table 1, I add external support for rebels/government and veto players respectively� In these models, fiscal capacity, as measured through government revenues, achieves Figure 1� Duration of civil wars� statistical significance with a negative sign, indicating that fiscal capacity causes conflicts to endure longer� In addition, a select few conflicts persist many years, other variables like rough terrain and eth- even decades� nic fractionalization become statistically In order to test Hypotheses 1a through significant at the p<0�1 level, both with 1f, I run several Cox proportional hazard negative signs, meaning that they increase models, estimating the effect of state ca- the duration of civil wars� This confirms pacity on the hazard of a civil war end- hypothesis 1f, that rough terrain is asso- ing� In model 1 of Table 1, I test for the ciated with increased civil war duration� impact of three measures of state capacity In addition, in model 7 of Table 1, rela- on the duration of civil wars� Negative co- tive rebel strength is statistically signif- efficients mean a negative association with icant at the p<0�05 level, indicating that the hazard rate of termination; thus, neg- rebel strength makes civil wars end soon- ative coefficients indicate longer conflicts� er� This is as I hypothesized in 1e, given In model 1 of Table 1, the only statisti- that a higher relative strength would al- cally significant variables are the log pop- low rebels to win fast against a state that’s ulation of a country and whether or not relatively weak compared to them� Final- the conflict occurred after the Cold War; ly, external support is negatively correlat- the former makes conflicts longer, and ed with the hazard rate and is significant the latter makes conflicts shorter� This at the p<0�01 level – external support for second finding tentatively confirms H1d, both the rebels and the government seems that external support for the government to lengthen civil wars substantially, con- or rebels should lengthen civil wars, as firming hypothesis 1d� the post-Cold War era has been associated In Tables 2, 3, and 4 (contained in the with a dramatic reduction in the amount appendix), I test for robustness of my of funding and arms contributed from the findings regarding state capacity� Each two warring superpowers� of these models contains the same con- Moving rightward on Table 1, in mod- trol variables as Table 1 with only one 21

Table 1� Impact of state capacity on conflict duration measure of state capacity included� Table also contained in the appendix, presents 2 contains military capacity, Table 3 con- the duration of civil war with each of the tains fiscal capacity, and Table 4 contains three measures of state capacity held at bureaucratic capacity� In each of these sets their 75th percentiles� As the results of the of models, each of my measure of state ca- Cox proportional hazard models would in- pacity retains the same statistical signifi- dicate, the Kaplan-Meier curves show that cance and sign of Table 1, confirming my holding military expenditures and gov- findings that military expenditures and ernment revenues at their 75th percentile government revenues are strong predic- moves the curve outward, meaning that tors of how long a conflict will last, while military and fiscal capacity lengthens civil bureaucratic quality fails to achieve sta- wars� Predictably, the survival curves for tistical significance� In addition, variables bureaucratic quality above and below the such as relative rebel strength, external 75th percentile are quite similar� support, rough terrain, log population, and post-Cold War tend to maintain their The findings of Table 1 confirm my statistical significance and sign of coef- hypothesis that state capacity contributes ficient, which indicates that my findings to longer civil wars� States with higher are robust� To provide a visual, Figure 3, military expenditures and greater fiscal 22 resources are able to prolong conflicts, es- Intensity pecially when they are unable to win out- To investigate the effect of state ca- right� These strong states may also expe- pacity on civil war intensity, I created a rience civil wars in far-off regions where time series cross-sectional dataset with they are unable to project power, making dyad-year as the unit of observation� Table it difficult for them to win quickly� These 5 tests all three measures of state capacity states may have militaries strong enough on battle deaths per year� Beginning with to withstand rebel attacks and capable models 1 and 2 in Table 5, nothing except enough to protect the physical safety of the lagged dependent variable is statisti- the regime, lengthening the rebels’ time cally significant� Initially, military expen- to victory as well� Surprisingly, bureau- ditures seems to be positively correlated cratic quality does not follow this trend, with battle deaths per year, but in mod- as it has a positive coefficient, meaning el 3, military expenditures becomes neg- that more effective bureaucracies end civ- atively associated with intensity of civil il wars sooner� This might occur because war and achieves statistical significance� stronger bureaucracies are more capable When ethnic fractionalization is added, it of credibly committing to a negotiated set- seems to suppress battle deaths per year tlement, and they can negotiate faster� In as well� Moving rightward, in model 4, I addition, stronger bureaucracies can crip- add the type of war (conventional, irregu- ple recruitment efforts of rebels and more lar, or SNC) to the model, and we see that effectively control the press, both of which conventional wars and irregular wars are might prevent the rebels from winning or statistically significant and positively cor- allow the government to win faster, thus related with battle deaths per year� Final- shortening the civil war� Bureaucracies ly, in model 5 of Table 5, military expendi- are also unlikely to “offend” or frighten tures retains its statistical significance, as citizens of the country in the way that dis- do the dummy variables for conventional plays of military strength might; in this and irregular wars� In addition, a coun- sense, the exercise of government strength try’s Polity score is negatively correlated through the bureaucracy might not in- with intensity, meaning that more dem- flame the population against the state in ocratic countries experience less intense the same way that flexing the military conflicts� forces might� Finally, external support for In Tables 6, 7, and 8 (found in the ap- the government and/or rebels causes wars pendix), I test for robustness by includ- to drag on because both sides have more ing just one of the three measures of state resources available to them, which either capacity in the models� Table 6 contains prevents them from being defeated or dis- models with military expenditures, Table incentivizes them from negotiating� As a 7 contains models with government rev- result, the post-Cold War era sees shorter enues, and Table 8 contains models with conflicts since this external support is less bureaucratic quality� In each of these sets available to governments and rebels alike� of models, the coefficients of the three But as one predicted, when the rebels are measures of state capacity retain their stronger than the government, civil wars negative signs, and only military expendi- are shorter in duration – simply because tures is statistically significant, as in Ta- rebels can win faster� ble 5� This confirms hypothesis 2a, but we 23

Table 5� Impact of state capacity on conflict intensity� cannot confirm H2b and H2c, although correlated with intensity level of a con- the signs of their coefficients are negative� flict� One might expect that ethnic frac- Conventional and irregular wars continue tionalization increases the intensity of to be strongly positively correlated with conflict; greater levels of ethnic fraction- battle deaths, and a country’s Polity score alization may make the state more willing continues to be negatively correlated with to kill rebels because combatants on both intensity, indicating that democracy can sides may be more likely to belong to dif- attenuate violence when civil war breaks ferent religions, making it easier to dehu- out� Therefore, we can confirm both H2d manize and “otherize” the enemy� In addi- and H2e – conventional civil wars appear tion, ethnic fractionalization may increase to be more intense, and civil wars in dem- the strength and unity of rebel groups, leading to increased deaths due to the reb- ocratic countries appear to experience few- els successfully killing more government er deaths� Thus, my findings appear to be combatants� However, the results of my robust to the inclusion of control variables regression analyses require further exam- and across different measures of state ca- ination of this hypothesis� Perhaps ethnic pacity� fractionalization is negatively correlated A surprising finding is that ethnic frac- with civil war intensity levels due to the tionalization is consistently negatively way conflict dyads were constructed for 24 the purposes of this research� As described first place� In this latter case, weak states above, this study treats one state paired cannot protect their own troops or shield with one rebel group as a conflict dyad, as civilians from collateral damage� In both opposed to one state paired with all rebel cases, weak states experience more intense groups fighting at once� This might lead conflicts� As expected, conventional civil to lower battle deaths in each conflict dyad wars experience greater amounts of casu- measured but possibly high overall bat- alties, given that these wars pit two strong tle-deaths across all rebel groups� States armies against one another in convention- with higher levels of ethnic fractionaliza- al warfare, causing high amounts of battle- tion might theoretically have more rebel field fatalities� Finally, democratic coun- groups and sides involved in the conflict; tries must be more careful when fighting a thus, there might be low battle-deaths in civil war, because high casualties threaten a conflict against a government and one the stability and electability of the current rebel group but high total battle-deaths government� As a result, democracies ex- when accounting for the entire war with perience less intense civil wars� all rebel groups� Therefore, the total num- The next section provides two case ber of deaths in a conflict might be posi- studies to illustrate how stronger states tively correlated with ethnic fractionaliza- may experience internal conflict that is tion, raising a possible question for future longer but less intense than average� The research of ethnic fractionalization’s im- first case study, the First Congo War, pro- pact on conflict-wide intensity� vides an example of a weak state that ex- To summarize, the picture that emerges perienced a short but bloody civil war� In from these findings is one of strong states this example, an unprofessional military that can contain conflicts, protect civil- and a limited government revenue base ians and their own troops, kill rebels with prevented the regime in Kinshasa from more precision and intelligence, and pick forestalling the end of the civil war and their battles� States with high military ex- protecting its own personnel and citizens penditures may be able to procure more from violence� In the second case study, sophisticated technologies of warfare and the Troubles of Northern Ireland, a strong be choosier in the battles they fight, min- state was challenged by sectarian violence imizing casualties on their own side and in a peripheral region of its country and killing only the rebels that are necessary spent nearly thirty years seeking a politi- for victory� And while government reve- cal settlement to the conflict with the lim- nues and bureaucratic quality were not sta- ited use of military force� tistically significant, their coefficient was negative, indicating that these measures of Case Studies state strength likely provide governments with flexible resources to fight civil wars First Congo War in non-violent ways, such as the provision of aid to war-torn regions or the search ver since its independence from for political solutions to internal conflicts� Belgium, Congo has exhibited Weak states must either resort to tremen- Emany of the hallmarks of a weak dous violence in the absence of other co- state� When it achieved independence in ercive tools to seek victory, or they do not 1960, a lack of central authority and re- possess the tools to inflict violence in the gional fragmentation enabled high levels 25 of political violence and division, espe- mind, Mobutu systematically rechanneled cially along ethnic lines (Young & Turn- resources earmarked for the military to- er, 1985)� Political mobilization in Congo wards his Presidential Guard (Shearer, occurred on ethnic lines not due to rigid 1999)� This lack of investment eventually ethnic identities – and in fact, many schol- came back to haunt Mobutu in the 1970s, ars describe the considerable fluidity of when the regime faced internal rebellion Congolese ethnic identities at the time – in the two Katanga rebellions� When faced but rather due to the lack of state legiti- with this internal conflict, Mobutu had to macy and institutions (Breuilly, 1994)� In outsource the protection of the national the absence of this central power, Chief defense to Moroccan and French troops of the Army Mobutu Sese Seko staged a to compensate for Zaire’s weak army (Cal- coup in 1965 and established his regime laghy, 1984)� Even after this threat abated, in the state he renamed Zaire (Young & Mobutu continued to neglect the military, Turner, 1985)� While the relative weak- refusing to pay Zaire’s military personnel ness of the government is not unusual for with state funds� Instead, he encouraged a state emerging from colonial rule, what them to seek payment through extortion is unusual about Congo is just how weak of the citizenry, such as kidnapping for it remained for decades� As the post-coup ransom or looting (Reno, 1998)� Michael decades went on, the Zairian state weak- Shafer (1982) summarizes the importance ened in the three key measures of state of the military in Zairian politics as re- strength advanced by this thesis: (1) mil- sulting in “Mobutu’s extraordinary ef- itary strength, (2) revenue collection and forts to divide, control, manipulate, politi- government spending, and (3) bureaucrat- cize, and otherwise deinstitutionalize and ic quality� This thesis will first illustrate de-professionalize it�” Overall, the Zairian this decline in state strength, after which military was ill-equipped to handle the it presents the evolution of Zairian con- coming civil war that would soon tear the flict� This section will end by arguing that region apart� the quick but intense victory of the rebels Second, a strong state needs taxation in the first Congo War was related to the and revenues in order to survive, and the lack of Zairian state capacity� Zairian state struggled to obtain these revenues� The Zairian tax collection sys- State Decline tem was fraudulent and ineffectual� The First, due to a lack of serious internal or World Development Indicators (2016) data external challenges to its authority, Mobu- show Zaire’s tax revenues in the 1970s tu’s regime could afford to have a corrupt, and 1980s at a measly 6-11 percent of the ineffective, and weak military� The main country’s GDP, a number which dropped role of the Zairian national army (FAZ) to 5 percent of GDP by 1995� For compari- was to promote internal security with son, the WDI data show the United States little consideration of national defense at roughly 18 percent of GDP around the (O’Ballance, 2000)� Mobutu understood same time, which is considered a low lev- well the risk that a strong military could el of tax collection by Western standards� pose to a ruler, having himself seized pow- Moreover, Callaghy (1984) notes that so er in a coup� Thus, the Mobutu regime many economic transactions were being had a vested interest in maintaining a conducted in the Zairian black market that weak military (Atzili, 2007)� With this in the actual tax burden on Zaire’s citizens 26 was probably miniscule� In the absence of er (1985) describe how Kinshasa was only a robust tax collection system, Mobutu re- home to 6 percent of Zaire’s population lied on external support, foreign debt, and but was allocated 31 percent of the bud- short-term policies to sustain the network get for government investments� On the of patrimony he used to control the state other hand, Kasai Province held nearly 20 (Atzili, 2007)� Young and Turner (1985) percent of the country’s population and re- describe how Mobutu seized vast swaths ceived virtually no funds� Overall, the rev- of land and commercial enterprises owned enue collection of the Zairian regime was by foreign nationals in a movement he far from robust, and even when it managed called “Zairianization�” This immense se- to collect funds, the government rarely questration of economic resources allowed spent its revenues equitably or effectively� Mobutu to distribute even more goods Third and finally, an effective state to the political class, thus bolstering his must rely on bureaucracies and institu- patrimonial system� Therefore, the lack of tions to set and achieve governmental consistent revenues greatly crippled the objectives� Zaire also lacked this quality ability of the Zairian state to plan, budget, of an strong state� As Young and Turner and deliver public services� (1985) note, the state of Zaire did not ex- But even when there were revenues to ist in a meaningful sense outside of Mobu- spend, the Mobutu regime “spent little on tu’s personal authority� Although Mobu- public goods, and when it did, the focus tu originally paid lip service to building was mostly on extravagant, highly visi- Zaire’s institutions – namely through his ble, and often misguided projects” (Atzili, 1967 founding of the Popular Movement 2007, p� 159)� For example, the govern- of the Revolution, Zaire’s sole political ment poured nearly a billion dollars into party – these institutions performed few the construction of the Ingha-Shaba Dam services and often merely allowed Mobutu and an associated high-power grid that to further his personal control over the ed- transferred the dam’s energy to the near- ucation system, the military, and regional by Shaba mines, projects which could have authorities (Atzili, 2007)� In the absence of used much cheaper energy sources� While meaningful reforms, Mobutu waged two these lavish, high-profile infrastructure public relations campaigns: “Authenticity” development continued, state spending on in 1971 and “Mobutism” in 1974� These social services dwindled from 17�5 percent public relations campaigns, coupled with in 1972 to under 1 percent in 1992 (Le- milquetoast economic reforms like Zair- marchand, 2001)� Moreover, as the years ianization and “Radicalization” in 1974, went on, more and more money was di- represented Mobutu’s attempts to curry verted from the state’s budget to a discre- favor with the populace and other African tionary fund for the president – by 1992, leaders through rhetoric (Callaghy, 1984)� 95 percent of Zaire’s annual budget went Much like he downsized the military, either to Mobutu’s personal accounts or Mobutu preferred to shrink the size of the to the accounts of his beneficiaries (Atzili, Zairian bureaucracy, fearful of the threat it 2007)� Even when the government spent could pose as an independent power base, funds on investment projects, peripheral and instead relied on a network of clients provinces were marginalized, while the to provide state services (Reno, 1998)� By capital and core regions received the li- 1975, faced with growing foreign debt and on’s share of investment� Young and Turn- economic woes caused by the falling price 27 of copper, Mobutu abandoned even the Banyamulenge, along with other minori- pretense of nation building and chose to ty ethnic groups across the country, climb protect his own authority by monopoliz- to top political positions in the eastern re- ing resources for himself and his patrimo- gions, hoping to prevent more populous nial network (Weinstein, 2000)� This shift ethnicities from coalescing into credible away from institution building paved the opposition (Autesserre, 2008)� This move way for state deterioration and, eventual- exacerbated existing ethnic grievances, as ly, civil war� Overall, the Zairian state had manifested in the Kanyarwandan War, in a weak military, poor revenue extraction, which members of the Hunde and Nande ineffective government spending and dis- ethnic groups massacred Rwandan emi- tribution of public goods, and incompetent grants (Lemarchand, 2009)� In 1981, in bureaucracies and institutions� All of these an attempt to improve his popularity in deficiencies contributed to its loss of legit- the region, Mobutu too eventually turned imacy in the eyes of the people, leading to against the Banyamulenge, portraying the onset of the First Congo War, as de- them as “Rwandans” (Weinstein, 2000)� scribed in the next section� Throughout the mid-1990s, the Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga regularly attacked the Onset of Civil War Banyamulenge, killing 14,000 Tutsis in For centuries, tensions had existed be- the process (Lemarchand, 2009)� tween various ethnic groups in eastern The definitive event that precipitated Zaire, and these tensions would eventually the First Congo War was the outbreak of contribute to the onset of the First Con- the Rwandan genocide� During the 100- go War� Since the 1800s, members of the day genocide, nearly 800,000 Tutsis were semi-nomadic Tutsi tribe had emigrated slaughtered by Hutu aggressors, which to eastern Zaire, some forcibly relocated caused Tutsis to flee en masse from the to Congo to perform manual labor for Bel- country in an exodus that was called the gian colonialists and others later fleeing Great Lakes refugee crisis (Straus, 2013)� the 1950s social revolution that brought The Rwandan genocide was brought to an the Hutus to power in Rwanda (Lemarch- end in July 1994 by the overthrow of the and, 2009)� Tutsis who emigrated from Hutu government in Kigali by the Tut- Rwanda before Congolese independence in si-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front� 1960 are referred to as Banyamulenge and Over the course of the crisis, 1�5 million had the right to citizenship under Zair- refugees fled across the border to eastern ian law (Vlassenroot, 2002)� After Zaire Zaire, including Tutsis who fled the Hutu achieved independence, Tutsis contin- génocidaires but also those that feared re- ued to emigrate from Rwanda, and these prisal from new Tutsi RPF regime� This latecomers were known as Banyarwanda� latter group consisted of the génocidaires However, “native” locals – members of the themselves, the former Rwandan army Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga ethnic groups (FAR), and independent Hutu paramili- – often failed to distinguish between the tary groups known as the Interahamwe two Tutsi groups, referring to them both (Reyntjens, 2009)� Many of these second as Banyamulenge and treating them as group of refugees took up residence in ref- foreigners (Mollel, 2008)� After solidi- ugee camps in the Kivu region of Zaire fying his control of the country in the and established the camps as bases for re- 1960s, Mobutu helped select members of arming themselves (Weinstein, 2000)� In 28 the first half of 1996, nearly one hundred began to spiral out of control in late 1996, Tutsi – Rwandan and Zairian Banyamu- other enemies of Mobutu in multiple sec- lenge – died per month in attacks launched tors joined forces with the Banyamulenge over the Zaire-Rwanda border from resi- in what they named the Alliance for Dem- dents of refugee camps (Gribbin, 2005)� In ocratic Forces for the Liberation of Con- response to the massive influx of refugees go (AFDL)� The AFDL fought under the over its borders, the Zairian Parliament banner of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a former ordered all peoples of Rwandan or Bu- Marxist rebel who led one of the three rundian descent to be repatriated to their major rebel groups that combined into countries, including the Banyamulenge the AFDL (Quinn, 2004)� The violence (Lemarchand, 2009)� However, many ref- in east Zaire in October 1996 is regarded ugees resisted repatriation, and the Hutu by scholars as the beginnings of the First génocidaires grew bolder as Mobutu ac- Congo War� The next section describes tively supported their training and sup- the progression of the conflict and its res- plied them for an invasion of Rwanda olution through the toppling of Mobutu a (Reyntjens, 2009)� As attacks from Hutus bloody seven months later� harboring inside Zaire continued, the new RPF leadership in Kigali began to train Progression of the War. and equip the Banyamulenge in order to By late October, the AFDL had de- protect themselves from cross-border at- feated the Zairian forces occupying Uvi- tacks from Hutu refugees (Shearer, 1999)� ra and Bukavu, and the AFDL controlled The long-simmering ethnic tensions fi- the land between the two cities� See Fig- nally boiled over in an exchange of gun- ure 4 for a map of the AFDL offensive in fire between Rwandan Tutsi and Zairian the First Congo War� As an AfricaFocus Green Berets on August 31st, 1996 (Reyn- bulletin reported on October 26th, 1996, tjens, 2009)� This battle marked the be- “The FAZ are losing territory and re- ginning of the Banyamulenge Rebellion, treating, sometimes even before engaging the primary goal of which was to expel the rebels” (IRIN Briefing, 1996)� In a re- extremist Hutu forces from east Zaire sponse to this rapid territorial loss, on No- and seize power in the Kivu provinces� vember 20th, 1996, Mobutu suspended the The government in Kigali finally chose Zairian Army Chief of Staff, General Elu- to deploy its Tutsi militias for operations ki Monga Aundu, and replaced him with in Zaire, and on October 7th, 1996, the Lieutenant-General Mahele Bokungo Lie- Rwandan government supported Banyam- ko, who had a successful history of crush- ulenge who began an uprising in the Kivu ing armed rebellion� In addition, Mobutu town of Bukavu, after the vice-governor transferred the Presidential Division and based there proclaimed that Banyamu- Civil Guard under Mahele’s direct com- lenge would have to leave (Solomon, 1997)� mand, providing the FAZ with superior The Banyamulenge managed to fend off quantities and quality of arms (“Mobutu an attack by the FAZ, causing tensions Appoints,” 1996)� However, Mobutu’s at- to rise between Rwanda and Zaire, which tempts to reform the military seemed to eventually culminated in an exchange of be in vain� The FAZ continued to back- mortar fire over Lake Kivu between the pedal into the end of the year, as the rebels two nations’ armed forces (Reyntjens, controlled Uvira, Bukavu, Goma, Bunia, 2009)� As the Banyamulenge Rebellion Walikale, Butembo, and Lubero by De- 29

Figure 4� Map of AFDL offensives from Stearns (2012)� cember (Solomon, 1997)� As a reporter in the rebel advance, temporarily satisfy- from Business Day in Johannesburg noting them and giving them buffer against ed in January 1997, “The rebel movement the former génocidaires� This pause con- that was born in the hills of east Zaire ef- tinued until late January 1997 (Reyntjens, fortlessly routed the army, seized towns, 2009)� During this time, the AFDL and dismantled refugee camps and sent thou- Rwandan forces committed many atroc- sands of recalcitrant Rwandans home� ities against Hutu refugees, and Amnes- Nothing, it seemed last year, could halt ty International (1998) estimates that as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for many as 200,000 Rwandese Hutu refu- the Liberation of Congo-Zaire” (Wrong, gees were massacred in this time� While 1997a)� This capture of nearly 800 x 100 the AFDL and RPF carefully managed km of territory along the border of Rwan- NGO and press access to the areas where da, Uganda, and Burundi caused a pause these atrocities occurred, the United Na- 30 tions Office of the High Commissioner for rebels on February 25th, and those pres- Human Rights later conducted a mapping ent described the takeover as orderly and exercise of atrocities in the First Congo peaceful: “They were disciplined, so we War and documented the killing of tens knew they were not Zairian troops,” re- of thousands of Hutu civilians (United Na- marked an American procurer for the tions Office, 2009)� Catholic Church� The takeover of Kali- ma put the AFDL in charge of a 1450 km After a quiet start to 1997, the Mobu- strip of territory (“Refugees flee camp,” tu regime announced a counter-offensive 1997)� Around this time, nine senior offi- against the AFDL in the eastern provinc- cers of the FAZ defected to join the rebels es� Mobutu hired European and African in late February� The officers cited “low mercenaries around January 20th, along morale, years of low wages, and dismal with members of the Angolese UNITA living conditions … but what demoral- and Rwanda’s exiled Hutu army (“Belgian ized them the most was a two-tiered army leads,” 1997)� Revealing the weakness of command – one from the armed forces and the state, government troops resorted to the other from a ground of underground looting, banditry, and exactions as they commanders close to Mobutu” (“Reports fled in disarray from towns across the of Zairean troops looting,” 1997)� As Wil- country (“14 Zairean Soldiers,” 1997)� The liams (1997) argues, “Armies founded on Zairian counteroffensive placed the front- internal pacification are always better at line at the central towns of Walikale and bullying and terrorizing the local popu- Tingi-Tingi, pinning 400,000 refugees lace than fighting a well-disciplined force� between the advancing FAZ troops and The Zairian army rapidly disintegrated, the AFDL� However, with the rebels’ cap- exposing Mobutu’s soft underbelly�” With ture of the Lake Tanyanyika port of Kale- the FAZ in shambles, the southern AFDL mie around February 3rd, 1997, the gov- forces captured Kindu with ease by mid- ernment’s counter-offensive faltered, and March, and the northern pincer traveled the AFDL proceeded to handily seize Pu- down from Isiro to capture Kisangani, the nya, Moba, the Tingi-Tingi refugee camp, third-largest city in Zaire and also the and Lubutu by mid-February (“Calls for site of the local headquarters of the FAZ Zairean premier,” 1997)� By this point, (“While the relief basics pour in,” 1997)� blaming his neglect of the army for the Next, the AFDL set its sights on rebels’ steady advance, opposition newspa- Lubumbashi in the south, the country’s pers took to openly poking fun at Mobutu’s second largest city and hub of copper and prostate cancer, and the rapid depreciation cobalt mining� On its march south, the of the Zairian currency caused citizens to AFDL took Pweto, and regional military start referring to the zaire as “prostates” sources remarked that “[t]he rebels took (“Mobutu cracks down,” 1997)� Pweto with little fighting because gov- The AFDL then headed westward in ernment troops were afraid of their ad- two pincer movements, the north of which vance and afraid of popular anger directed eventually took Isiro, putting it in con- against them by residents” (“Zairean city trol of 1000 km of territory along Zaire’s is next target,” 1997)� The AFDL next eastern border (Mills, 1997)� The south- prepared a pincer movement on Lubum- ern pincer movement began with Kalima bashi from Kamina in the northwest and and its refugee camp, which fell to the Kasenga in the northeast� In early April, 31 they captured the diamond capital Mbu- (“UN alarmed,” 1997)� Given the conflict’s ji-Mayi, where “[t]raders said Zairian sol- high levels of civilian victimization, the diers based in the town were nowhere to international community had attempted to be seen” (“Zaire’s rebels push on,” 1997)� negotiate a settlement throughout the war, Over time, it became apparent that the but now, growing increasingly fearful of FAZ’s counter-strategy appeared root- the instability of the country, South Af- ed in minimal resistance, when it chose rica finally succeeded, with Mobutu and to fight back at all� The rebels captured Kabila agreeing to peace talks hosted by Lubumbashi in mid-April, where they Nelson Mandela (Laufer, 1997)� However, were cheered by residents ready for regime these peace talks were largely unsuccess- change, and despite the rebels’ capture of ful, with Mobutu only agreeing to step these mineral-rich regions, mining compa- down after a long transition period, while nies expressed confidence that ratification Kabila demanded Mobutu’s immediate res- of their existing deals could be concluded ignation (“Zaire: Mobutu said ‘willing to with rebel leaders (“Mobutu battles to re- step down,’” 1997)� Reyntjens (2009) con- gain,” 1997)� Later that month, on April tends that the AFDL did not take these 17th, American Mineral Fields sealed a $1 negotiations seriously but instead partici- billion deal to develop the Kolwezi copper pated only to appear willing to attempt a tailings project in Zaire through a back- diplomatic solution, while still continuing door agreement with the AFDL, giving to press steadily onwards� Kabila a much-needed boost of revenue After repeated international attempts (“Zairean rebel leader Kabila,” 1997)� to bring both parties to the table again, The AFDL captured three more towns the AFDL eventually reached striking by April 25th and routed the north and distance of Kinshasa’s airport around May south pincer movements to advance 6th (“US presses Kabila,” 1997)� Tensions steadily on Kinshasa from the Bandundu ran high in Kinshasa for the next two province in the north and from Kikwit in weeks, as residents expected the rebels the east (“Seven years after,” 1997)� While to attack from multiple directions, final- the AFDL troops marched inexorably ly activating their long-promised western onwards, Kabila paused to meet with in- front by ordering in hundreds of Katan- ternational officials to discuss the fate of gese fighters waiting across the Ango- 85,000 Hutu refugees who disappeared lan border (Wrong, 1997c)� Attempts to south of Kisangani� This was not the first mount a more serious defense were un- time the AFDL was accused of commit- dermined by Mobutu’s worsening cash ting atrocities, as the UN refugee agen- crisis; since the rebels seized Zaire’s dia- cy reported claims of three mass graves mond and copper-producing regions, the near the empty refugee camps of Kibum- oil industry was virtually the govern- ba, Katale, and Kilimanyako (“Hundreds ment’s only source of revenue� Business- of fleeing Hutus,” 1997)� Kabila brushed men reported Prime Minister Gen Likulia off the concerns of international media- Bolongo “ha[d] gone cap in hand to lead- tors, calling the disappearance of these ing companies, demanding contributions� refugees “a little problem”� The AFDL At the central bank, the presses [kept] was also under international heat for the printing money, but with the highest de- massacre of thousands of refugees in the nomination worth just $0�28, the proce- Tingi-Tingi refugee camp in early March dure produce[d] little in terms of money 32 supply” (Wrong, 1997b)� In a desperate at- Analysis tempt to shore up the military in the final The First Congo War provides an exam- days of the war, the authorities also tried ple of a short but bloody civil war in which to launch a military recruitment drive at the state was weak, and the weakness of the university in Kinshasa� Traditionally, Zaire contributed both to the short dura- the student population supported the rad- tion of the war and also its high intensity� ical opposition� As one student remarked First, state weakness likely contributed to to the South African Business Day news- the short duration of the First Congo War paper on May 8th, “Joining the losing side due to the weakness of the Zairian mili- at this late stage did not seem a good idea” tary and the government’s limited revenue (Wrong, 1997b)� collection� Throughout the war, the FAZ On May 12th, the AFDL resumed its failed to stop the AFDL advance and, on march towards Kinshasa, abandoning its many occasions, chose not to fight back at pledge to Mandela to wait for a second all� Often, Zairian soldiers were nowhere round of peace talks� And by May 17th, to be seen, as the rebels took city after city 1997, the rebels marched triumphantly (“Zaire’s rebels push on,” 1997)� As Solo- through Kinshasa, cheered by onlookers mon (1997) notes, “As the war continued, and met with isolated resistance (“ANC it became obvious that Mobutu’s generals congratulates,” 1997)� The AFDL fanned did not have a military counter-strategy throughout the city, captured Mobutu’s … even with a military plan, Kinshasa riverside palace and its nearby fortified would not have the available soldiers to military base, and ordered government transport to the battlefield�” While it is troops to surrender their weapons by the impossible to say for certain, the war may end of the day� Zairian soldiers readily have lasted longer if the Zairian army had complied, eager to tie white cloths around posed more of a credible threat or won their heads to show their support for Kabi- even a few battles� la� “Today, we finally feel free,” said for- Moreover, the FAZ often did the work mer army captain William Mazaza to the of recruitment for the rebels through their South African Business Day as he hand- looting and pillaging of towns, causing lo- ed in his weapons to the AFDL (“Reb- cal citizens to celebrate when the AFDL els stamp their authority,” 1997)� Nelson finally arrived� A more professional mil- Mandela remarked, “As far as Kabila is itary and higher military expenditures concerned, he will enter Kinshasa without to pay personnel may have prevented the bloodshed� His troops have been acknowl- rapid disintegration of the Zairian forces edged, even by his enemies, as being dis- when faced with the AFDL threat� Even if ciplined and courteous” (“Mandela: Kabila Mobutu still eventually lost, it is likely that doing ‘excellent’ job,” 1997)� In an address he would have held on at least marginally to the nation, Kabila proclaimed himself longer if his military had been more able president on May 17 and immediately or- or willing to fight back� Similarly, a lack dered a violent crackdown to restore order of government revenues severely crippled to the country� He then reorganized the the Mobutu regime by the end of the war� nation under the name it goes by today – As the AFDL seized region after region, the Democratic Republic of the Congo� Mobutu’s neo-patrimonial network began to collapse, giving the regime few sourc- 33 es of revenue� By the end, as the rebels technologies, low military expenditures, approached Kinshasa, the meager oil in- and untrained personnel all contributed dustry was the only source of cash for the to high loss of life in the Zairian forces, government, forcing the Prime Minister indicating that weak states may be less to beg for contributions from businesses able to protect themselves in battle� While (Wrong, 1997b)� Higher government rev- weaker states may also be unable to inflict enues may have prevented the war from heavy casualties on rebel groups, their in- ending so quickly, as Mobutu may have ability to minimize their own casualties been able to divert funds to paying per- might explain the negative correlation be- sonnel, hiring more mercenaries, or buy- tween state strength and intensity of civil ing more military equipment� To these wars� In the example of the First Congo ends, state weakness likely contributed to War, a weak state was unable to protect the short duration of the war� itself from loss of civilian and military life, unable to raise the funds to mount a na- Second, the intensity of the First Congo tional defense, and unable to forestall the War is also likely related to the weakness toppling of its own regime, even if only for of the Zairian state� Compared to other a few months� Thus, the Zairian case ex- civil wars, Zaire saw relatively high bat- emplifies how state strength may be pos- tle deaths� The median number of annu- itively correlated with civil war duration al battle deaths in the Battle Deaths 5�0 and negatively correlated with intensity� dataset is 189 deaths per year, while the First Congo War saw 5,761 casualties in The Troubles just seven months of conflict (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005)� Figure 5 contains a his- n the other hand, the Troubles of togram of average battle deaths per year Northern Ireland represent a case for all conflicts noted in the UCDP/PRIO Oin which a strong state – in fact, one of the strongest states in the world, Armed Conflict Dataset� Moreover, the the United Kingdom – experienced inter- Battle Deaths Dataset does not include ci- nal conflict with low intensity and long vilian deaths, which occurred in startling duration� For nearly thirty years, between amounts in the First Congo War� As stat- 1969 and 1998, Northern Ireland, a prov- ed earlier, some estimates of civilian vic- ince of the United Kingdom, experienced timization in the war number in the hun- ethnic conflict over the constitutional dreds of thousands, indicating that weak and political status of the province vis- states may not be able to protect civilians à-vis Britain; over the course of the con- from the rebel group once civil war breaks flict, 3,532 people died, of whom 1,841 out (Amnesty International, 1998)� were civilians (Fay, Morrissey, Morrisey, Moreover, undisciplined government & Smyth, 1999)� By virtue of the fact that forces may turn to looting, pillaging, and this case is thirty years in length, while inflicting violence upon the civilian popu- the Zaire’s civil war lasted only seven lation in the absence of formal remunera- months, this study will devote consider- tion� In the case of Zaire, Mobutu encour- ably more time to outlining the develop- aged such behavior, reportedly asking his ments in the internal conflict� This case soldiers once why they needed salaries study begins with a discussion of the geo- when they had guns instead (“Congo’s graphic, political, and ethnic tensions that Curse,” 2010)� Moreover, unsophisticated existed prior to the outbreak of internal 34 conflict, followed by an explanation of the the beginning of the British treatment of evolution of the conflict� Ireland as a region on its periphery� Frus- Background trated by this treatment, the Republican rebellion of the 1790s first articulated the The root grievance held by participants principle of the unity of the Irish people, in the Troubles centered around the con- as well as their separation from England� stitutional status of Northern Ireland� The Having previously granted legislative in- majority of Northern Ireland’s population dependence to an Irish parliament in 1782, were unionists, who wanted Northern Ire- the unrest caused by this insurrection ul- land to remain in the United Kingdom, timately caused London to resume the di- and many of whom were Protestant de- rect government of the island in the early scendants of colonists from Great Brit- 1800s (Foster, 1989)� The Act of Union ain� However, a significant minority were in 1801 abolished this Irish parliament in Catholic and nationalists, who wanted Dublin and formally annexed the island Northern Ireland to unite with the Repub- of Ireland to Great Britain, which laid the lic of Ireland, creating a unified Ireland in- roots for a conflict between supporters of dependent of Great Britain (Foster, 1989)� the United Kingdom and supporters of Even to this day, public polling shows that Irish Nationalism� unionists tend to see themselves as Brit- In 1845-49, the infamous Great Irish ish, and nationalists tend to identify as Famine occurred, when a potato blight Irish (Northern Ireland Life and Times, destroyed two-thirds of Irish potatoes, 2014)� Thus, the conflict took place along leading to an estimated 1 million deaths� political, religious, and ethnic lines, much London’s response to this crisis was de- of which was caused by Anglo-Irish histo- cidedly lackluster, marked by public relief ry leading up to the Troubles� schemes being abandoned in 1846 by the Nationalists contend that Anglo-Irish newly-elected Whig government and the history started in the year 1170, when continued selling of Irish potatoes abroad Strongbow and other Normans invaded (Foster, 1989)� Neumann (2003) character- Ireland, but it is arguable whether the so- izes London’s response to the famine as called Old English actually can be consid- one of “initial disinterest, aloofness, and ered “English” (Kee, 1989)� Regardless, crisis management” (p� 12)� Gradually over only in the sixteenth century did the loose the nineteenth century, recognizing their relationship between the island of Great failure in governance during the famine, Britain and the island of Ireland begin to British politicians developed the solution shift� By the death of Elizabeth I in 1602, of “home rule,” which granted Dublin in- the monarchy “could properly claim to dependence in a number of policy areas have conquered most of Ireland” (Adelman while maintaining constitutional linkages & Pearce, 2001, p� 3)� Shortly thereafter, to the United Kingdom (Murphy, 1986)� settlers from Scotland and England es- The introduction of a modest home rule tablished a Protestant community in Ire- bill in 1912 sufficiently alarmed Union- land, and between the early seventeenth ists in Northern Ireland, causing Union- and late eighteenth century, the British ists and Nationalists to form paramilitary government exercised only informal and organizations to defend their respective loose control over Ireland, preferring to causes (Foster, 1989)� In 1919, anger bub- treat it as a ‘place apart�’ This marked bled over as the Irish War of Independence 35 broke out� After the resolution of this war, each ideology will be referred to as Loy- an act of British parliament partitioned alism (for Unionism) and Republicanism the island of Ireland into Northern Ireland (for Nationalism)� In addition, because and Southern Ireland, the latter of which there were fewer Catholics in Northern became the Irish Free State in 1922� 1921 Ireland, this thesis occasionally uses the represents the formal creation of the prov- terminology of majority/minority to refer ince of Northern Ireland as a separate en- respectively to Protestants and Catholics� tity, which before was merely a collection Over the next sections, this thesis will de- of six counties in Ireland� tail the evolution of the conflict over five However, the partition of Ireland into distinct periods: 1969-72, 1972-75, 1976- Northern Ireland and the southern Repub- 82, 1982-88, and 1989-98� Throughout lic of Ireland exacerbated the ethnic con- the discussion of the conflict, this thesis flict within the province� Northern Ireland will pay particular attention to the evolu- consisted mainly of Protestants who want- tion of British military, economic, and po- ed to remain in the United Kingdom, but a litical strategies� After each section, this significant minority of Catholic National- thesis will consider how the case of the ists still wanted Northern Ireland to join Troubles may be illustrative of some of the the Republic of Ireland� Especially after earlier arguments regarding state capaci- the end of the Second World War, tensions ty: namely, that strong states tend to ex- continued to build and eventually came to perience longer but less intense conflicts a head in the late 1960s� Around this time, on average� several Nationalist civil rights marches 1969 – 1972 occurred, many of which were attacked by Before August 15th, 1969, the primary Unionists, and Unionist organizations be- British military strategy was to avoid the gan to organize counter-demonstrations deployment of British troops (Neumann, (Neumann, 2003)� The conflict finally 2003)� But the Northern Ireland riots of boiled over in August 1969, when the Brit- August 1969, in which six Catholics and ish Army was deployed to the streets of two Protestants were shot dead and 133 Northern Ireland after riots and attacks were treated for gunshot wounds, forced in Belfast, marking the beginning of the the British government to respond by de- Troubles� The Troubles pitted republi- ploying the British Army on the streets can paramilitaries such as the Provisional of Northern Ireland (Kelley, 1982)� When Irish Republican Army (IRA) against loy- the British government agreed to provide alist paramilitaries such as the Ulster Vol- these troops “in aid of the civil power,” unteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense it had decided that its primary aim was Association (UDA)� British state security the re-insulation of Great Britain from forces, including the British Army and the the conflict occurring in Northern Ire- Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), even- land – meaning, London sought to avoid tually became embroiled in the conflict� contagion of the conflict to the mainland As a brief note, this thesis will refer (Neumann, 2003)� Immediately, then, the generally to Unionists and Nationalists objective was to revitalize the Stormont as groups of individuals who wanted re- system of Irish home rule, which would spectively to remain in or leave the Unit- restore the constitutional status quo be- ed Kingdom� The more radical strains of fore the war� But this did not appear to be 36 cess as possible” to ensure the protection of civil rights (Hansard Archives of the House of Commons [Hansard], 1970)� As Neumann (2003) puts it, “[t]here was no point in embarking on a mission to assert the authority of constitutional government if its defense involved the abolition of what one wanted to preserve” (p� 29)� In addition to military strategy, the Northern Irish citizens juxtaposed against British government also implemented in British Marines (Hillen, 1980)� 1969 an agenda of political reforms� Re- sults from the Cameron Commission’s a long term strategy: as early as August report showed that Catholics harbored 19th, 1969, Home Secretary James Cal- many political and social grievances re- laghan stated it was “urgent” to “press on garding the allocation of housing, jobs, with the reorganization of the regular po- and the manipulation of electoral bound- lice forces” (Public Record Office [PRO], aries� Protestants, on the other hand, were 1969)� It became clear that the govern- concerned about the constitutional status ment’s priority was to ensure the swift of Northern Ireland as a part of the UK withdrawal of British troops and to pro- (Cameron, 1969)� In response to this find- tect the British mainland� ing, the British government encouraged Moreover, British strategic thinking a series of legal safeguards, such as a law around this time seemed to center around against the incitement of religious hatred, two major principles: first, the principle of the establishment of a Commissioner for minimum force, and second, the mainte- Complaints, and the creation of a Minis- nance of civilian government� In the first try for Community Relations (Neumann, principle, the security forces’ role is regard- 2003)� In addition, criticisms of local po- ed as obeying the duty to respond to force licing were noted led to three new policies: only with what is absolutely necessary to (1) the RUC, the police force in Northern restore law and order (Mockaitis, 1995)� Ireland, was made into a “British” police To this end, British government officials force, (2) the Ulster Special Constabulary believed there could be no “military solu- was disbanded in the wake of criticisms of tion” – to coerce the population through Protestant partisanship, and (3) the Ulster violence or put down any violent expres- Defense Regiment (UDR) was established sion with military means alone would have under the command of the British Army violated the principle of minimum force� as a new locally recruited part-time force� It was also regarded as counterproductive: a solution would have to be found “by By late 1969, though, the British mili- proper parliamentary, constitutional, and tary strategy of minimum force had been electoral processes, [because] this is the interpreted as “minimum action,” and British way of doing things”, said Arthur the newly appointed English head of the Young, the newly-appointed head of the RUC even described his approach as “soft- RUC (“Military police take over,” 1969)� ly, softly” (“Military police take over,” In a similar vein, the British government 1969)� In practice, this allowed Protestant wanted to preserve “as normal a legal pro- marches to intensify, and “no go” areas in 37 Derry-City and West-Belfast were estab- longer a merely intercommunal matter; lished, creating pockets where the IRA and a situation approaching armed con- was free to organize (Kelley, 1982)� Britain flict was developing” (PRO, 1971)� At this also initially failed to recognize the IRA as point, British policy shifted towards to a credible threat, and by early 1970, riots “eliminating the hard core of terrorists” became a part of everyday life (Neumann, (Hansard, 1971a)� However, the securi- 2003)� By this point, the Provisional IRA ty forces’ campaign was always meant to had split from the Official IRA, and the be limited, and the British forces reject- Provisional IRA (henceforth referred to as ed the notion that any means would have the IRA) successfully baited the security justified the defeat of the IRA (“Progress forces into a repressive reaction, allowing in Ulster,” 1971)� In line with this tenta- them to skillfully escalate their campaign tiveness, London attempted to accelerate to the point they gained the confidence the “swift exit” of British forces through to launch an offensive against the British heavy reliance on the locally-recruited forces (Smith, 2002)� UDR (Hansard, 1971b)� London also devolved considerable decision-making au- The conflict escalated in mid-1970 thority to the Army; for example, London with intense riots erupting in parts of declared legality as the only guideline in Derry and Belfast, leading to gun bat- relation to the level of force, which was tles between unionists and nationalists vague and never translated into simple op- in which seven people were killed (Bell, erating procedures (Neumann, 2003)� 1993)� However, the British government characterized this renewed outbreak of On August 9th, 1971, anger bubbled over violence as a combination of excessive when the British Army introduced intern- drinking, long evenings, boredom, and a ment� At dawn, armed soldiers launched “taste of excitement” on behalf of Catho- raids and arrested 342 people suspected of lic teenagers (Wilsworth, 1970)� Early in involvement with the IRA, most of whom July 1970, a British Army raid in the Low- who had no links to the Republican para- er Falls district of Belfast sparked a riot militaries (Spjut, 1986)� This precipitated four days of violence in which twenty-four and gun battles between soldiers and the people died, and internment marked the Official IRA� Following this escalation of complete alienation of the Catholic com- violence, the British Army imposed a 36- munity from the existing structures of hour curfew and raided hundreds of homes government (Neumann, 2003)� In turn, after gassing the neighborhood with CS this allowed the IRA to ratchet up its gas (Campbell & Connelly, 2003)� Schol- military campaign; in the six months pri- ars have found the Falls Curfew created a or to internment, there were twenty-five negative backlash effect, where the Brit- deaths, but the following six months saw ish Army’s actions may have contributed 185 deaths (Hansard, 1972)� Internment to IRA recruitment (Duffy, 2009; LaFree, demonstrated that British reliance on Dugan, & Korte, 2009)� purely repressive means of addressing the It took until February 1971 for Lord situation were counterproductive� Around Carrington, then Secretary of State for this time, the failure of London’s political Defense, to acknowledge that “the recent strategy became apparent as well� After riots represented a new phase in the cam- British soldiers shot dead two Catholic ci- paign of violence� The disorder was no vilians in Free Derry in July 1971, riots 38 ing about “an acceptable level of violence” (Chartes, 1971)� Around the same time, London began to reconsider the viability of home rule, or devolving powers to a Northern Irish legislative body� Maudling began to advocate openly for power-sharing in which minority representation was guaranteed as early as March 1972 (PRO, 1972a)� However, this memorandum was met with mixed reception by the Cabi- Northern Irish girl watches member of net, and on March 30th, 1972, the British paramilitary (Belfast Forum, 2011)� government dissolved Northern Ireland’s Government and Parliament, instituting erupted in the city, and the Social Demo- direct rule from Westminster and taking cratic and Labour Party (SDLP) – the ma- over the governance of the province (Neu- jor Nationalist political party – protested mann, 2003)� by withdrawing from the Parliament of Northern Ireland in Stormont (Bell, 1993)� These early years of 1969-72 exemplify three major themes of this case study as it The conflict continued to escalate into relates to the correlation between state ca- 1972, when, on January 30th, the British pacity and duration/intensity of conflict� army shot twenty-six unarmed civilians, First, the early years of the Troubles in- thirteen of whom were killed, during an dicated that strong states like the United anti-internment demonstration in Derry Kingdom may underestimate the severity (Conway, 2003)� The event became known of civil unrest in peripheral regions� Nat- as “Bloody Sunday” and was the highest urally, in London, the state’s monopoly death toll from a single shooting incident on the legitimate use of force was taken during the conflict in Northern Ireland� for granted, but in Northern Ireland, no Subsequent violence, namely during the wide consensus existed about the role or funerals of eleven of those killed on Bloody responsibility of the security forces (Neu- Sunday and the detonation of multiple car mann, 2003)� To put a finer point on it, in bombs throughout February and March, Northern Ireland, members of the commu- gradually led the British government real- nity were actively resisting the execution ize that the IRA could not be defeated mil- of state authority� By this time, London itarily (Neumann, 2003)� Harry Tuzo, the was well-accustomed to its subjects reject- commanding officer of the British Army ing British authority, given its recent ex- in Northern Ireland at the time, described perience with the decommissioning of its the IRA’s military campaign as “an ac- colonial empire, but for Northern Ireland tivity that could be carried on until they citizens – who were represented in Parlia- choose to desist finally from what they are ment, were equal under British law, and doing” (quoted in Kelly, 1976)� This meant could participate via normal channels of that defeating the IRA as a precondition government – to resort to such violence for political progress was no longer via- was unthinkable to Westminster� Even ble, and Reginald Maudling, then Home when entering the conflict, the British Secretary of the British government, came government did not seem to grasp the to view the military as a tool for bring- severity of the grievances and the deeply 39 divided nature of the society: the princi- economic solutions lengthened the con- pal objective of the intervention in Au- flict� London’s vast array of policy options gust 1969 was simply, as Home Secretary may have been an embarrassment of rich- Callaghan put it, not “to get sucked into es, and in this way, the number of resourc- the Irish bog” (Callaghan, 1973, p� 15)� In- es possessed by strong states might cause deed the British Army would fail in this indecision on the part of policymakers� endeavor, as twenty-six long years of con- Perhaps if London chose to respond with flict awaited it in ‘the Irish bog�’ more military resoluteness or prevented Second, the case of the Troubles indi- IRA activity in the early years, the Trou- cates that strong states may fail to strike bles may have ended sooner� a balance on what constitutes an appropri- 1972 – 1975 ate use of military force in responding to The British government initially re- internal conflict – either being too timid garded the abolition of the Northern Irish or too repressive� The British Army os- Parliament in Stormont as a temporary cillated between these two extremes over measure (Neumann, 2003)� It retained the first three years of the Troubles: on not only its vision of Northern Ireland as the one hand, the security forces were un- ‘a place apart’ but also its desire to insu- willing to take extreme military action to late the British mainland from political eliminate terrorists altogether, which lead conflict in the province� To achieve these to the establishment of “no go” areas where ends, the British government gradually the IRA was free to organize� On the oth- came to appreciate devolution as the best er hand, the British Army swung too far arrangement, but self-government had to in the other direction with internment, be supplemented by a cross-community which may have increased the duration of coalition to mitigate sectarian divisions� the conflict, as it handed proverbial am- This would eventually lead to signing of munition to IRA for use in its recruitment the Sunningdale Agreement in late 1973, campaigns� London learned through the but prior to that, beginning in 1972, Brit- internment that solely repressive ways of ain began to recognize that its political ending the conflict would fail� This lead to and military aims were crucially inter- the third major theme exemplified by this twined (Neumann, 2003)� case study: the idea that strong states may attempt other solutions, such as econom- In the early stages of direct rule, Brit- ic or political reforms, in the absence of ain struggled to balance the competing a definitive military strategy� The British imperatives placed on its military� Dual government tried many political reforms, mandates existed for the British Army, such as altering laws regarding discrim- including stopping paramilitary activi- ination towards the minority community ty while simultaneously “regaining the and changing the composition of the po- trust” of the minority Catholic community lice force� It also attempted economic solu- (Neumann, 2003)� As Lord Windlesham, tions through providing employment to a Minister of State under Home Secretary Northern Irish citizens (Neumann, 2003)� William Whitelaw, explained it, London’s While these solutions may have eventually policy at this time contained twin objec- contributed to the solution of the conflict tives: “British policy rests on the security many years later, it is arguable that the forces in Northern Ireland countering ef- oscillation between military and political/ fectively and impartially, the use of force 40 … by extremists of whatever kind� At which paved the way for the signature of the same time, the government is work- the Sunningdale Agreement in December ing towards a new form of administration 1973 (Smith & Neumann, 2005)� in Northern Ireland” (“Ulster beyond,” The Sunningdale Agreement attempt- 1972)� Another concern of the British gov- ed to establish a power-sharing North- ernment emanated from its commitment ern Ireland Executive and a cross-border to political and constitutional solutions: to Council of Ireland� However, in its con- this end, a lower level of violence was ben- struction of the power-sharing agreement, eficial (Edwards, 2020)� These conflicting Westminster assumed that Unionists objectives led to the scaling down of secu- cared much more about devolution and rity forces in Catholic areas, and this fail- home rule, when they really were con- ure to maintain military pressure on the cerned with constitutional stability that IRA allowed them “to regroup and extend would prevent a united Ireland (Neumann, their influence” (Dewar, 1985, p� 64)� It 2003)� Unionists began to feel that “new also resulted in the rise of Loyalist para- Stormont” would cause Britain to sell out military activity, since the lax policing of Northern Ireland� Declarations from the Catholic communities raised Unionist sus- picions about the commitment of the Brit- Home Secretary Maudling that “[i]f, by ish forces to neutrality (Edwards, 2010)� agreement, the North and South should at some time to come together in a United In late May 1972, the IRA exploded Ireland … not only would we not obstruct twenty-two bombs in Belfast in what be- that solution, but … the whole British came known as “Bloody Friday�” In re- people would warmly welcome it” surely sponse, two months later, on July 31st, didn’t help matters (quoted in Rees, 1985, the British Army launched Operation Mo- p� 277)� Structural imbalances towards the torman, in which they deployed 12,000 Nationalists and continuing violence con- soldiers to re-take the “no-go areas” the tributed to this feeling of unease, and over IRA had been using for recruitment and the next months, Unionist opposition, vi- operations (Sanders, 2013)� Motorman was olence, and a loyalist general strike cased a limited military operation in the sense the collapse of the Northern Ireland Ex- that it demonstrated overwhelming mili- ecutive in May 1974 (O’Leary & McGar- tary strength in combination with explicit ry, 1996)� After this, Britain re-introduced warnings about the character and timing direct rule� of the operation� As such, it was done “to encourage the more responsible elements Despite the failure of Sunningdale, to keep the streets clear” (PRO, 1972b)� Neumann (2003) argues that the British Scholars credit the Motorman operation government still did not understand that for its benefit to British intelligence, which power-sharing would work only if the ma- contributed to a reduction of paramilitary jority was assured of Northern Ireland’s activity: in the three weeks before Motor- constitutional status (p� 97)� Failing to man, there were 2,595 shooting incidents grasp the true source of Loyalist discon- across Northern Ireland, but in the three tent, London developed a new strategy of weeks after, only 380 shooting incidents “Ulster nationalism�” A major component occurred (Smith, 2002)� In addition, Mo- of Ulster nationalism involved changes torman strengthened the SDLP’s resolve to British military strategy described as to participate in constitutional politics, “Normalization,” which consisted of two 41 major components: policy primacy and with the British government and Northern “Criminalization” (O’Leary, 1989)� Police Ireland Office� The British government primacy aimed for the indigenous police agreed to the ceasefire, eager to convert force, the RUC, to take over all law en- these “men of violence” to peaceful means forcement, while Criminalization abol- and encourage all parties to commit to a ished the use of detention and assignment settlement (Dixon, 2001)� Incident centers of Special Category status to paramilitary were established to monitor the ceasefire, prisoners (Campbell & Connolly, 2003)� and the establishment of these centers was Contrary to its first impression, Normal- also seen as additional encouragement for ization did not in fact have the purpose of Republicans to enter the political process a “swift exit” but rather was aimed at mak- (Dixon, 2008)� O’Brien (1999) notes that ing the engagement more sustainable for the British government sponsored what the British forces in the long term (Ken- would soon become Sinn Fein’s first of- nedy-Pipe, 2014)� The British government, fices and even offered to help with public it appeared, was in it for the long haul� relations if the Republicans would par- However, Neumann (2003) argues that the ticipate in the elec¬¬tions� Despite all introduction of Normalization in 1974-75 of London’s efforts, it soon became clear represented “a missed opportunity to de- that the Republicans would not go polit- feat the IRA by military means” (p� 83)� ical (McKittrick & McVea, 2002)� Just as Public outcry after the Birmingham pub Westminster failed to appreciate the im- bombings, where twenty-one English ci- portance of constitutional stability to the vilians were killed in November 1974, and Unionists, it overestimated the degree of severe damage to IRA military capabili- compromise Republicans would be willing ties from Operation Motorman may have to make on their ultimate goal of a united allowed the British Army to strike a fatal Ireland (Neumann, 2003)� The first major blow against the IRA (Neumann, 2003)� breach of the February truce occurred in However, preferring to focus on political July 1975, when four British soldiers were killed by an IRA bomb near Forkill, and and constitutional solutions, the British the violence re-escalated shortly thereaf- government diverted its energies to the ter, with six more major attacks occurring implementation of Normalization (Han- before November (Kelley, 1982)� sard, 1975)� This period of the Troubles came to an In late 1974 and early December 1975, end on December 5, 1975, when the Brit- the IRA agreed to a truce and ceasefire ish Army ended the policy of internment in accordance with its new Normalization policy (Spjut, 1986)� In that time, 1,981 people were interned, and the interroga- tion techniques used on internees have been described by the European Commis- sion on Human Rights in 1976 as torture (Sanders, 2012)� 1975 drew to a close with many Unionists viewing the introduction of Normalization with unease: Neumann Belfast IRA man on patrol (2003) contends that, in practice, the in- (Belfast Telegraph, 1987)� troduction of the policy – with its reduc- 42 tion of British troops, release of detainees, use of security forces in Catholic areas, and sustaining of the IRA ceasefire – in- which allowed the IRA to regroup� This, dicated to many observers the beginning too, may have lengthened the conflict and of a British withdrawal� The sharp devia- serves as another example of a strong tion from previous military strategy led to state struggling to strike a good balance political instability in the late 1970s and with its use of military force� The British early 1980s� government seemed to reach that happy The period of 1972-75 saw similar medium in Operation Motorman, which trends in the influence of the British gov- was applauded by scholars for its effective- ernment’s considerable state capacity on ness despite its limited scope� Both Mo- the duration and intensity of the internal torman and its warning of civilians before conflict� First, the British government its implementation exemplify how strong continued to misunderstand aspects of the states may experience internal conflict of conflict due to its location in a peripher- a lower intensity; states with high capacity al province� Specifically, London did not may be able to protect civilians and their understand Unionist desires, thinking own troops when employed in military op- them to prize devolution more highly over erations� And while some scholars believe a stable constitutional order that would the IRA could have been defeated alto- guarantee Northern Ireland’s place in the gether in the mid-1970s, this is certain- United Kingdom� Moreover, its lack of un- ly up for debate� Instead of striking down derstanding of local politics manifested more heavily against the IRA during this itself in Normalization, which devolved time, the British government focused on power to local police forces like the UDR the third theme of strong states – polit- and RUC, which were viewed as partisan ical, economic, and constitutional solu- in the conflict� Neumann (2003) argues tions, like Sunningdale, Criminalization, that the British government undermined and inducements for Republicans to par- itself in this decision and notes that there ticipate in the political process� Although was “little understanding amongst British each of these policies would fail in turn, ministers that, in a deeply divided society, the British reliance on them illustrates the acceptance of law-enforcement was how strong states may prefer to use other bound to be perceived in sectarian terms, tools in their toolboxes in lieu of military and that impartiality was determined by force, thus decreasing the intensity of civil the local security forces’ communal com- war – and possibly lengthening it� position as much as by their objective pro- 1976 – 1982 fessionalism” (p� 182)� Arguably, the shift This period was characterized by the in reliance to local security forces, most of longest continued period of undiminished whom were Protestant, may have caused British direct rule� Going into 1976, the the conflict to endure longer� British government decided that no new Second, as before, the military poli- constitutional initiatives would be pursued cy of Britain was fraught with internal before a stable constitutional, political, contradictions during this period� Dual military, and economic order was estab- mandates of “regaining the trust” of the lished (Neumann, 2003)� While devolution Catholic community and fighting the and power-sharing continued to be the paramilitaries led to a scaling down of the primary British objective, its actualization 43 was believed to lie in the long term� In Although the British government not- the meantime, direct rule would have to ed the importance of the shared Irish bor- suffice� Throughout this period, violence der, it began to take the position of Dublin dropped by nearly 75% from 1976 to 1978, more seriously after August 1979, when and while scattered attacks still occurred, the IRA assassinated Lord Mountbatten this period of the Troubles was consid- in the Republic of Ireland and killed 18 erably less intense that its predecessors British soldiers in Warrenpoint� This was (Neumann, 2003)� a turning point for the new Thatcher Cab- Because direct rule had been adopted inet that underscored the importance of on a basically permanent basis, coopera- cooperation on border security (Thatcher, tion between London and the Republic 1995)� Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of Ireland had broken down (Ceallaigh, of State for Northern Ireland, Humphrey 1996)� Desiring the eventual unification Atkins, invited members of both govern- of the island of Ireland, the Irish gov- ments to participate in a Constitution- ernment in Dublin wanted the British al Conference in 1980� This conference, government to recommit to a regime of along with a series of inter-governmental devolution and power-sharing that would meetings between 1976 and 1981, failed incorporate cross-border cooperation be- to achieve any significant change in Brit- tween the Republic and Northern Ireland ish strategy, but finally, in 1981, London (Neumann, 2003)� Thankfully for Dublin, threw its weight behind another constitu- its credibility with the Nationalist minori- tional initiative aimed at an internal set- ty in Northern Ireland allowed it pres- tlement and devolution (Joyce & Murtagh, sure London by undermining Britain’s 1983)� But by this point, neither the Irish military and political strategies� Later government nor the SDLP were appeased, in this period, Westminster expressed it both of which were frightened by the im- was essential that “Irish Prime Minister mense degree of Catholic support for the Charles Haughey should not support” the ongoing prison hunger strikes and the hunger strikes of Republican prisoners in potential growth of Sinn Fein as a viable 1980 and 1981 (Emery, 1980)� Moreover, electoral force (Neumann, 2003)� the land border between the Republic and These hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981 Northern Ireland gave Dublin bargaining were prompted by the withdrawal of Spe- power� Callaghan, elected Prime Minister cial Category status� Special Category had of the UK in April 1976, accused Dublin existed since 1972 and allowed paramili- of not taking seriously “the vital need for tary prisoners to claim they were “political close border cooperation if the IRA threat prisoners�” Its removal was tantamount to was to be contained” (Callaghan, 1987, p� claiming there was no difference between 499)� Later, after Margaret Thatcher un- “convicted terrorists” and “run-of-the- seated the Labour majority in 1979, she mill criminals” (Neumann, 2003, p� 110)� too echoed the sentiment that “the border Thatcher defended the withdrawal of the … is of crucial significance to the secu- status by confirming, “There is no such rity problem” (Thatcher, 1995, p� 385)� It thing as political murder, political bomb- became clear that the Republic of Ireland ing, or political violence� There is only was a crucial partner in resolving the criminal murder, criminal bombing, and Troubles, one whose preferences would criminal violence” (“Mrs� Thatcher pledg- have to be accommodated� es no sellout,” 1981)� What really was at 44 stake was Britain’s policy of Normaliza- began to advocate strongly for British co- tion� The second of the hunger strikes, operation with Dublin� Their pivot, part- occurring in 1981, saw ten Republican ly caused by electoral pressure caused by prisoners die in the Maze prison, includ- Sinn Fein, evidenced that direct rule from ing the notable Bobby Sands, who had won London was untenable for the minority a by-election to be elected as a Member and that Britain was no longer viewed as of Parliament at Westminster (English, an impartial and honest broker (Neumann, 2005)� After his death on hunger strike, his 2003)� SDLP eventually withdrew from election agent, Owen Carron, held his seat the by-election for the seat of Fermanagh after an increased vote (English, 2005)� and South Tyrone to show support for Bobby Sands, a move London found incon- International media coverage brought ceivable (Taylor, 2014)� More importantly, attention to the hunger strike and the Re- though, Bobby Sands’ victory, as well as publican movement, causing the popular- Sinn Fein’s relative success in the Assem- ity of the hunger strikers to surge in the bly elections, refuted the idea that “men of Catholic community (White, 1993)� Lon- violence” or supporters of the IRA were don could not understand the support for on the fringes of society, although a clear the hunger strikers, given that Criminal- majority of Catholic still supported consti- ization led them to believe that those in tutional Nationalists like the SDLP� This the jails were criminals on the fringes of clear refutation of British belief in the society (Neumann, 2003)� The British gov- moderate middle contributed to a gradu- ernment failed to grasp that even anti-Re- al growth of British distrust of the local publican Catholics, like Mairead Corrigan, political process� The Secretary of State noted peace-maker, saw them “as men from for Northern Ireland, Roy Mason, once set our community� We know how they have up a local economic council, and in so do- come to be there� And above all we don’t ing, he made it explicit that no politicians want them suffering within the prisons” should be included: “If, in this province, (quoted in O’Malley, 1997)� As a result, you decide to bring politicians on … then what had previously been a fringe element your economic council, first of all, will be of Northern Irish politics then emerged as very quickly bloated; and secondly, I don’t a potent electoral force: Sinn Fein, wide- want political squabbles to spill over” ly regarded the political wing of the IRA (“Roy Mason on the economic prospects,” (Taylor, 2014)� In 1982, another Northern 1977)� In the absence of more permanent Ireland Assembly was established at Stor- solutions, British politicians decided to mont, but its attempt to “win back support wait it out until “existing leaders [were] for moderates” backfired when the SDLP replaced by abler successors more willing decided not to take its seats, allowing to reach a compromise across sectarian Sinn Fein to gain five seats, even narrowly barriers” (Walker, 1977)� Until then, di- missing two more seats in Belfast North rect rule would continue� and Fermanagh (Neumann, 2003)� As all these political developments were This dawn of Sinn Fein as a credible unfolding, the military’s counterinsurgen- electoral force meant that constitutional cy campaign in Northern Ireland remained Nationalists like the SDLP experienced limited� Citing familiar reasons, Mason difficulties in staying moderate (Taylor, declared, “A democracy functions by the 2014)� As time went on, even the SDLP will of the people and through the rule of 45 law� It cannot behave like a totalitarian disadvantageous outcomes in the Assem- state, nor is it right that it should” (Han- bly in 1982, forced Westminster to return sard, 1977a)� Similarly, the British govern- to the drawing board once again� ment still perceived that “tough” security As before, British policy during 1976- measures would drive IRA recruitment by 82 reflected the governments’ lack of un- alienating moderate Catholics (Hansard, derstanding of the forces at its periphery� 1977b)� The British Army’s activity also The British government could not grasp did not escalate due to the assumptions of that even those who desired peace still Normalization, the overarching policy at saw hunger strikers as men from their the time – namely that the gradual return communities, and its resoluteness on the to local law enforcement would make the revocation of Special Category status led situation more stable (Neumann, 2003)� to international and domestic sympathy However, Normalization failed to achieve for the hunger strikers� This in turn led its promise of completely stabilizing the to the rise of Sinn Fein, which pulled con- situation for a few reasons� First, the RUC, stitutional Nationalists in their direction the local authority to which the British as they battled for electoral power� Strong Army was gradually ceding its respon- states, like the UK in the case of Northern sibilities, was still essentially exclusively Ireland, may underestimate actors or mis- Protestant, which caused law enforcement calculate decisions made in regions they to be regarded as a tool in the Catho- do not view as vital, which may contribute lic-Protestant power struggle (Brown & to conflict duration� In addition, strong MacGinty, 2003)� Moreover, government states might downplay military solutions rhetoric about adherence to “law and or- in favor of political solutions� By this time, der” failed to convince observers, given the British government settled into a fair- the Army’s heavy reliance on uncorrobo- ly stable pattern of limited counterinsur- rated evidence, extended holding powers, gency, believing that tough security mea- and non-jury courts (Neumann, 2003)� sures would drive IRA recruitment� The While they may have been strictly speak- military gradually became viewed as a ing “successful,” many of the operations tool by which a political settlement could that were carried out by the Army did not be reached� As Neumann (2003) notes, align with the British ideal of civilian po- “[The norm of minimum force] reinforced licing (Weitzer, 1995)� London’s conviction that there could be Neumann (2003) argues that British no ‘military solution,’ and that it was the policy during these years of 1976-82 made security forces’ task to buy time for a po- assumptions of “an almost ideal game sit- litical settlement in achieving an accept- uation, that is, one in which London was able level of violence … in that sense, it the only actor to determine the strategic was the British government rather than environment” (p� 121)� In reality, countless the IRA, which had first embarked on a players and factors – including the gov- ‘long war’” (p� 181)� While this long war ernment of the Republic of Ireland, a glob- dragged on, London sought an accommo- al recession, hunger strikers, Sinn Fein, dation with Dublin and downplayed local and the IRA’s indefatigable disruption politics� During these years, deaths were – all frustrated London’s attempts to im- among the lowest of all of the years of the plement strategy� The consequences of the conflict, indicating that a state’s reliance second hunger strike in 1981, along with on solutions beyond military force may 46 contribute to lower deaths, which may be identities of fellow paramilitary members in some way connected to state capacity� (informants who became known as “super- 1982 – 1988 grass”)� The supergrass system was credited by 1983 as having ‘broken up the Ul- The most significant event of the 1982- ster Volunteer Force command structure 88 period was the signing of the An- in Belfast and virtually eliminated the glo-Irish Agreement in 1985� Constraints IRA in Northern Belfast” (Moloney, 1983)� and pressures had arisen from the direct Second, on a few occasions, the security rule experiment of 1976-82, and London forces drastically exceeded the appropri- came to believe Westminster governing ate level of force; one particularly notable the province would contribute little to the incident occurred in which six unarmed containment of the conflict, nor was there Catholic men were shot dead by a RUC any realistic prospect of power-sharing at undercover unit (Neumann, 2003)� While the time� Therefore, the only way to pre- no one in London wanted to make what vent the conflict from spiraling into the became known as “shoot to kill” as official mainland was to seek an accommodation government policy, members of the gov- with Dublin, making direct rule logisti- ernment harbored a certain sympathy for cally easier for the British government� the security forces, who had been thrust Seeking to reduce the violence while ne- in a situation where “they were expected gotiations between the Irish and British to play by rules which the IRA would have governments were underway, the British never dreamt about” (Neumann, 2003, p� Army’s main goal was to gain efficiency at 131)� Despite the government’s sympathy containing paramilitary activity, particu- for the difficulty of the Army’s position, larly through improvements in cross-bor- though, shoot-to-kill did not make its way der security cooperation� Despite her into official military policy� reputation as “Iron Lady,” in Northern In the absence of consequential shifts Ireland, the Thatcher period was not as- in British counterterrorism policy, Irish sociated with an increased use of military cross-border cooperation emerged as force, given that the existing political the primary security concern at the time and constitutional objectives limited the (Thatcher, 1995)� Several notable attacks military objectives that could be pursued occurred to spur this shift, such as the Har- (Thatcher, 1995)� Indeed, the Home Secre- rods bombing in December 1983, where tary of Thatcher’s Cabinet, Douglas Hurd, an IRA car bomb outside a department deemed the three most popular options for store in London killed six people, and the escalating the use of force – internment, Brighton hotel bombing in October 1984, shoot-to-kill, and cross-border hot pursuit where five people died in a bomb attack – as counterproductive and inadvisable on the site of Conservative Party confer- (Neumann, 2003)� ence (Buchan, 2011)� These events under- With that said, two new experiments scored the fact the Northern Ireland con- in military strategy did emerge in these flict would spiral into the mainland, if left years: the systematic use of accomplice ev- unchecked� Accordingly, London sought idence, and shoot-to-kill (Hansard, 1984)� to make the Irish government a responsi- First, the British Army began to rely heav- ble stakeholder in the management of the ily on intelligence from arrested members situation in Northern Ireland� On the Irish of the paramilitaries who divulged the side, Garret FitzGerald, then the Taoise- 47

The 1985 signature of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (BBC News, 2014)� ach (Ireland’s prime minister equivalent), agreement� The mid-1986 collapse of the believed that the only way to resolve the recently-reinstated Northern Ireland As- conflict was “to act urgently and resolute- sembly exemplified the British govern- ly together on the political front” to find ment’s abandonment of devolution at this a new constitutional solution (Havilland, time� This new focus on the Irish dimen- 1983)� sion culminated in the signing of the An- However, the British government did glo-Irish Agreement (AIA) by Thatcher not want the Irish government to have any and FitzGerald on November 15, 1985 real authority� As Christopher Mallaby, (Kenny & Kenny, 1986)� the coordinator of Anglo-Irish relations in The AIA established the Anglo-Irish the Cabinet, explained to Neumann (2003), Intergovernmental Conference, which “Any situation where the British govern- would be made up of officials from the ment would require the Irish govern- British and Irish governments� The body ment’s agreement to any action or policy sought to promote “cross-border cooper- would [have been] unacceptable” (p� 125)� ation” and had a consultative role only – Gradually, British constitutional strategy that is, it had no power to make decisions during this time shifted to a negotiation of or change laws (Cochrane, 1997)� The UK a balanced inter-governmental framework also agreed that all British Army patrols that granted Dublin a “legitimate inter- in Northern Ireland would have a civilian est” but “no real powers” in the affairs of RUC escort (Cox, 1987)� Finally, the treaty Northern Ireland (Neumann, 2003)� Brit- confirmed that there would be no change ish political strategy in Northern Ireland in the constitutional position of North- accordingly shifted during 1982-88, favor- ern Ireland unless a majority of its people ing to sideline the local political parties consented to a united Ireland (O’Leary, while focusing on an inter-governmental 1987)� For the Irish government, the AIA 48 supported and strengthened Constitution- through similar tactics� To this end, Britain al Nationalism in the wake of fears of a began to understand the desires and fears nascent and radical Sinn Fein; it also per- of the players in its peripheral province, ceived the AIA as indirectly providing an and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, while un- incentive for Unionists to agree to pow- popular domestically, did cause local polit- er-sharing (Neumann, 2003; FTN 68)� ical parties to revisit their intransigence� The improved cooperation between the As before, the British government chose to British and Irish government would lat- downplay the military element in favor of er become key in the passage of the Good political strategies – the major goal of the Friday Agreement thirteen years later military during this period was to contain (Ruane & Todd, 2003)� paramilitary activity and become more ef- However, the AIA failed to improve ficient at this task� The British Army saw cross-border security cooperation; the mi- a slight hiccup in its gradual calibration nority also became no more inclined to of ‘appropriate use of force’ when several support the Northern Irish institutions, shoot-to-kill incidents occurred, but over- and Dublin’s public criticism of Britain all, in this case, a strong state chose to intensified (Neumann, 2003)� In addi- sideline military solutions for political or tion, the accord was strongly rejected economic solutions� Namely, the British fo- by Unionists (Cox, 1987)� In response to cus on obtaining an accommodation from strong Unionist opposition, Thatcher re- Dublin and its use of intelligence through sponded that “the people of Northern Ire- the supergrass structure both represented land can get rid of the inter-governmental the state’s attempts to fight the war using conference by agreeing to devolved gov- less violent techniques� Arguably, strate- ernment” (O’Leary & McGarry, 1996, p� gies like these may have taken longer to 234)� Despite this opposition, the AIA is work, lengthening the conflict’s duration, credited with several political results: it but they most likely resulted in the deaths did cause the Unionists to re-engage po- of fewer people, lowering its intensity� As litically, and the AIA also contributed in previous years, the period of 1982-88 to the marginalization of Republicans, illustrated several major themes in how leading to a perception in the Republican strong states choose to respond to civil camp of political and military stalemate� wars� This forced the leadership to review the 1989 – 1998 assumptions on which its strategies were The successful conclusion of the Belfast based, and the 1988 broadcasting ban of Agreement in 1998 represents the great- twelve organizations, including Sinn Fein, est achievement of British policy in North- also contributed a Republican sense of ern Ireland and the end of the Troubles marginalization (“Whose oxygen,” 1988)� in Northern Ireland� In marked contrast All of these changes contributed to the to the AIA, British policy shifted towards parties’ increased willingness to come to the promotion of an agreed settlement, the bargaining table in the 1990s, when and because there was no point imposing the Troubles drew to a shaky close� changes to the constitutional position of This penultimate period from 1982-88 Northern Ireland (because either party saw a refinement of British strategy, as would find it unacceptable), Britain was evidenced by the conflict’s later resolution prepared to accept any outcome as long 49 as it had achieved sufficient agreement be- tioned political objectives� London’s goal tween the local parties� London began to of a devolved government on the basis of refer to itself simply as “partisan for prog- an agreed settlement necessitated a cease- ress” (Neumann, 2003, p� 149)� fire from the IRA, which would allow Re- At the beginning of this period, having publicans to participate in the settlement achieved cooperation with the Republic (Hollywood, 1997)� of Ireland through the AIA, the British Although paramilitary activity on the government returned to its traditional ob- British mainland intensified in 1994 and jective of facilitating agreement on devo- 1995, the British government seemed con- lution and a limited Irish dimension� To vinced this rise in paramilitary activity achieve this, it launched negotiations for represented the beginnings of a peace set- a settlement amongst the various parties, tlement: as John Major (2013), the Prime focusing on the principle of consent and Minister of the UK at the time, described, the integrity of the political process� How- “[A]n offer of peace needed to be accom- ever, a major question emerged of whether panied by violence, to show their volun- or not to include Sinn Fein in this polit- teers that they were not surrendering” (p� ical process� Earlier on, London’s aim of 433)� In order to trigger a permanent IRA political stability meant that there was no ceasefire that would enable Sinn Fein to point in including Sinn Fein if it destroyed participate in political talks, the leaders of the likelihood of securing a settlement the SDLP and Sinn Fein produced several (Major, 2013)� However, if the IRA ended drafts of a declaration of principles which its campaign of violence, talks with Sinn would be announced by the British and Fein might become possible and make the Irish prime ministers� The final draft of peace more stable (McKittrick & Brown, their document referred to the collective 1989)� London also knew that there was a right of the “Irish people” to self-determi- perceived political and military stalemate nation and overturned the idea of consent in the Republican community at this time by stating consent had to be achieved “over and took steps to maintain this perception� a period” wherein the two governments The military strategy shifted at this would legislate for Irish unity, regardless time as well� The British Army remained of opinion in Northern Ireland (Mallie involved only to the extent that it served & McKittrick, 1997)� Had they been an- as a tool to support the political process nounced, these principles obviously would and maintain the Republican perception of have triggered an end to the IRA’s military military stalemate (Neumann, 2003)� The campaign, since it negated the principle of then-Secretary of State for Northern Ire- consent, abdicated the need for agreement land, Peter Brooke, made it clear that the from both sides, and rejected Westminster military presence was “made necessary by as a neutral arbiter (Major, 2013)� Natu- violence, [would] be maintained as long as rally, the British government thought that there [was] violence, but [would] certain- this document would have torched the po- ly be reduced when violence [came] to an litical process, as the majority would have end” (Hennessy, 2000, p� 68)� In addition, viewed it as selling out Northern Ireland’s the formulation of Westminster’s mili- place in the United Kingdom (Neumann, tary strategy was guided, as it often was 2003)� throughout the conflict, by its aforemen- After several months of bilateral nego- 50 tiations, the Joint Declaration for Peace down, the responsibilities of these institu- (also known as the Downing Street Decla- tions would be transferred to a standing ration, or DSD) was announced on Decem- Inter-Government Conference (O’Leary, ber 15th, 1993, by the British Prime Min- 1997)� This Joint Framework was clear- ister Major and the Irish Prime Minister, ly overbalanced towards the Nationalist Albert Reynolds� It nominally resembled position, since the Irish side had made no the draft written by the SDLP and Sinn new concessions to justify the Joint Dec- Fein leaders, but its content was funda- laration’s favoritism towards it� In fact, its mentally different from the proposals of default mechanism was an invitation for the original draft (Mallie & McKittrick, Nationalists to make the Northern Ireland 1997)� In fact, many thought it to represent assembly unworkable, thus torching the the exact opposite: the DSD restored the need for any Unionist cooperation (Neu- constitutional status quo by stating that mann, 2003)� self-determination had to be exercised on Accordingly, the peace talks back- the basis of consent and gave no timeline tracked in February 1996, when two civil- for a united Ireland (Cox, 1996)� Neumann ians were killed in the London Docklands (2003) refers to the DSD as a “tactical bombing, which represented the end of the masterstroke” that united the whole spec- seventeen-month IRA ceasefire (Joyce, trum of constitutional Nationalism, along 2016)� IRA violence continued for the next with the biggest Unionist party, behind its two years, but despite widespread calls for agenda of devolved government and the an all-out security offensive, London re- principle of consent (p� 152)� sisted the urge to reintroduce internment Shortly thereafter, on August 31st, (Hibbs, Harnden, & Savill, 1996)� Prior to 1994, the IRA issued a statement announc- this, the reliance on locally recruited se- ing the complete cessation of military ac- curity forces had been met with intense tivities� Throughout this ceasefire, the criticism after it was revealed that mem- IRA machine was far from inactive; to the bers of the UDR had passed on sensitive contrary, targeting, training, and acquisi- files to Loyalist paramilitaries (Hansard, tion continued as normal during this time 1990)� In the end, fifty-nine UDR officers (Sharrock, 1995)� The Combined Loyalist were charged, and this event damaged Military Command followed suit not soon what little remaining impartiality the se- after, on October 13th, 1994, when they is- curity forces were perceived to have� Just sued a statement announcing a ceasefire on as Britain was beginning to mediate an behalf of all loyalist paramilitaries (McAu- agreed settlement, it was extremely im- ley, 2005)� The temporary cessation of portant that the military situation not es- hostilities allowed a Sinn Fein delegation calate (Neumann, 2003)� The peace talks to meet with officials from the Northern continued at Stormont in June 1996 with- Ireland Office in January 1995� A month out Sinn Fein� But in May 1997, a gener- later, the British and Irish governments al election was held across the UK, and released the Joint Framework document Sinn Fein increased its share of the vote (O’Leary, 1995)� The Joint Framework to 16%, making it the third largest par- document proposed North-South institu- ty in the region, and winning two seats tions that would be established by an Act in Parliament (Taylor, 2014)� Shortly after of Parliament; in the event that a future the election, the new British Prime Minis- Northern Ireland assembly would break ter, Tony Blair, endorsed the Framework 51 Documents and the criteria for inclusion ty community (Cox, Guelke, & Stephen, in all-party talks and signaled his com- 2006)� Finally, the three “strands” referred mitment to meet with Sinn Fein to clar- to three sets of institutions: (1) the demo- ify certain issues (Pruitt, 2007)� On June cratic institutions of Northern Ireland, de- 25th, 1997, the British and Irish govern- scribed above, (2) the “north-south” insti- ments gave the IRA five weeks to call an tutions created between Northern Ireland unequivocal ceasefire, and the heat on the and the Republic of Ireland, and (3) the IRA intensified on July 18th, when John “east-west” institutions created between Hume of the SDLP and Gerry Adams of Ireland and Great Britain� O’Leary (1998) Sinn Fein called on the IRA to renew its describes these institutions as making ceasefire (Pruit, 2007)� The IRA finally “Northern Ireland bi-national” and estab- acquiesced on July 19th, announcing the lished “elements of co-sovereignty�” While renewal of its 1994 ceasefire� many commentators have compared the Agreement to the Sunningdale Agreement With the IRA agreeing to end its vio- of 1973 (leading one Member of Parlia- lence, this paved the way for Sinn Fein to ment even to refer to it as “Sunningdale sign the Mitchell Principles in September for slow learners”), scholars note major 1997, which was a list of six ground rules issues omitted by Sunningdale that were agreed to by the parties in Northern Ire- addressed by the Good Friday Agreement, land regarding participation in the talks� including the principle of self-determina- After Sinn Fein’s signature of the Prin- tion and the recognition of both national ciples, multi-party talks resumed (McK- identities (Rasnic, 2003)� ittrick, 1996)� Throughout this final phase of negotiations, the British government The Good Friday Agreement was set to maintained it was not committed to any be approved by voters across the Ireland particular outcome and would support any in May 1998� In response, the Loyalist conclusions resulting from the discussions, Volunteer Force declared a ceasefire in the provided sufficient consensus emerged hopes it would encourage voters to reject (Neumann, 2003)� Finally, on April 10th, the Good Friday Agreement� But on May 1998, the Belfast Agreement (commonly 22nd, the referendums were held on the known as the Good Friday Agreement) Belfast Agreement, one in the Republic of was signed at Stormont� Ireland and the other in Northern Ireland� They succeeded with 94% and 71% in fa- The Good Friday Agreement consisted vor respectively (Cox, Guelke, & Stephen, of several components, including devolu- 2006)� Neumann (2003) argues that the tion, power-sharing, designation, and the integration of Sinn Fein into the political Three Strands� Under the Agreement, process extracted a high price, since Lon- Northern Ireland would have a devolved don failed to extract a definitive commit- government, where the UK parliament ment to decommission arms� Due to spot- would transfer legislative powers to the ty disarmament, violence continues to this new Northern Ireland Assembly� This day on a small-scale basis� Despite this body would in turn devolve executive continuing unrest, many consider 1998 to powers to the Northern Ireland Executive, be the end of the Troubles (Aughey, 2005)� which would consist of both unionists and nationalists, and special voting arrange- Analysis ments gave veto rights to the minori- The final years of the Troubles, along 52 with the entire course of the conflict, il- Second, stronger states may equivocate lustrate two key themes regarding the in- on the use of military force and choose fluence of state capacity on conflict dura- to rely on political or economic strate- tion and intensity: (1) the underestimation gies instead� In continuation with policy of states of conflicts occurring at their that began in the 1980s, the military was peripheries, and (2) the subordination of downplayed during this final period, and military strategies to political or econom- the British Army remained involved in the ic strategies� province only to the extent it supported First, the case of the Troubles illustrates the political process and maintained the that states – strong and weak alike – may Republicans’ belief in a military stalemate� misunderstand or underestimate conflicts Instead, in the 1990s, the British govern- which occur in peripheral regions� For the ment devoted its energies to facilitating first decade of the civil unrest, the British agreement on devolution and power-shar- government underestimated the severity ing, and the Downing Street Declaration, of grievances held by participants in the the Joint Framework, and the Mitchell violence and misinterpreted their political Principles all exemplify political strat- objectives� As Neumann (2003) contends, egies that contributed to the resolution “London’s initial reactions to the street of the war through the acceptance of the marches, protests, and civil disturbanc- Good Friday Agreement� Strong states, es in the second half of the 1960s was a like the UK, may understand that the use mixture of disbelief, uncertainty, and re- of overwhelming force could inflame the luctance … the reforms the Westminster population against them� Weak states may government pressed for after the violent understand this too, but the key difference clashes of October 1968 were too modest between weak and strong states in this re- to have the effect of securing peace” (p� 16)� gard is that strong states have alternatives� The case of Zaire also illustrated this ten- Strong states may try to use political, con- dency of states to underestimate conflicts stitutional, or economic tools before re- in their peripheries, as its rebellion began verting to the use of military force, and in the eastern provinces, as far from Kin- these policies may sometimes conflict or shasa as possible� However, the case of the contradict each other (e�g� 1970s military First Congo War indicates that it is much strategy as it came to simultaneously win- more dangerous for weak states to neglect ning over the Catholic community while the periphery, as they are more susceptible putting down the IRA)� One possible rea- to toppling quickly when faced with rebel- son strong states experience longer civil lion in far-flung regions of their country� wars is that it takes them a longer time Strong states, like the United Kingdom, to settle on a strategy, given the many might be able to afford to neglect or mis- tools and options from which they may understand peripheral provinces, since choose� In the case of Northern Ireland, their intrinsic strength buys them time it took at least fifteen years for the British to “figure it out�” In this regard, state ca- government to settle on the combination pacity may be associated with increased of military and political pressures it used duration of civil wars because the endog- to eventually seek a settlement� This hes- enous strength of these states insulates itance to use military force from strong them from conflict for longer than in weak states might also explain my earlier sta- states� tistical findings of a negative correlation 53 between military expenditures and battle statistical relationship between low battle deaths� Although initially surprising, this deaths and state capacity� However, if this relationship may make more sense in the is not the case, this opens up a potential context of strong states possessing the avenue for future research� On that note, restraint to make sure those military ex- this thesis now concludes with a discus- penditures are used in a way that does not sion of the implications of its findings for contribute to rebel recruitment� policymakers and researchers� Overall, the Troubles of Northern Ire- land provide a case in which a strong state Conclusion & Implications – one of the strongest in the world – ex- his thesis has shown that state ca- perienced a long but less intense inter- pacity is a statistically significant nal conflict� In this instance, the central predictor of the duration and in- government underestimated the severity T tensity of civil wars, finding that both mil- of grievances held in one of its peripher- itary capacity and fiscal capacity are as- al regions, and its lack of familiarity with sociated with longer but less intense civil the local political situation caused initial wars� States possessing these capabilities errors and miscalculations of policies� In may face wars in peripheral regions, like addition, the state took time to strike a Northern Ireland, in which they underes- balance between military and political in- timate the severity of the threat faced and struments of power, eventually favoring experience difficulty projecting power in the latter, which may have contributed to the unfamiliar region� These strong states a lower level of intensity but a longer dura- also possess resources that allow them to tion� It is worth noting that this intrastate pick their battles, protect their own troops conflict had a favorable outcome for the and civilians, target rebels more effective- government� In the case where a state is ly, and forestall the rebels’ recruitment strong and it still eventually loses its civil efforts through the reliance on political war, the mechanisms contributing to my solutions and through the provision of aid statistical findings of long duration and and government services� Despite these low intensity may be dramatically differ- apparent strengths, the set of cases exam- ent – perhaps, in these circumstances, the ined in this thesis still deals with states resources allow governments to hang on weak enough to allow a civil war to break longer, or the state vascillates and errs on out in the first place and with rebels above the side of too little or too much military the threshold of rebel group viability� The force� Moreover, it is possible to conceive case of Northern Ireland also indicates of a strong state – perhaps an authoritari- that strong states’ use of non-military an regime like the current one fighting the solutions to civil wars may increase their Syrian civil war – that does not favor the duration� As a result, these strong states British government’s strategy of restraint experience protracted conflicts with fewer and instead uses its military superiority as battle deaths per year� its primary strategy� How would we explain the finding of low intensity and long On the other hand, weak states either duration in this instance? At first blush, it must resort to tremendous violence in the is possible that these circumstances simply absence of non-military strategies, or, as do not occur as often as situations of Brit- in the case of Zaire, they have no credible ish restraint do, which may explain the military or security presence in the first 54 place� Both of these governmental situa- state strength and conflict duration, this tions contribute to a shorter duration of thesis enters this important variable of civil wars� Weak states are also unable state capacity into the scholarly conversa- to protect civilians and control their own tion of the predictors of conflict duration� forces, as evidenced by the mass looting Similarly, the body of literature regarding and desertion of Zairian forces, which may conflict intensity has focused on largely be associated with higher-intensity con- immutable qualities of the nation-state, flicts� These weak states allow conflicts such as oil exportation, rough terrain, in the periphery to blossom into threats ethnic fractionalization, and democrati- in urban areas as well, as shown by the zation, with little attention paid to state AFDL’s quick capture of major cities like capacity as a potential factor� This thesis Lubumbashi and Kisangani in the early makes a valuable contribution in its argu- months of the First Congo War� Overall, ment that the endogenous strength of one weak states are less able to achieve their of the most important actors in any civil objectives of maintaining the stability of war – the state itself – must be considered their regime and country, leading to short in discussions of conflict intensity� but bloody conflicts� However, this study is limited in a few This thesis contributes significantly to dimensions that open up opportunities for the scholarship of civil wars and expands future research� In the quantitative anal- upon existing discussions described in its yses, chiefly, there are concerns of poten- literature review� The proposed definition tial reverse causality in the connection of state capacity addresses criticisms that between military spending and conflict state capacity is difficult to operational- intensity; it could be the case that states ize while providing a workable framework that have low military expenditures spend within which scholars can continue to ad- less on their military due to the low inten- dress the influence of state strength on sity of the conflict, which would weaken variables of interest� While the literature the assertion that military expenditures regarding the impact of state capacity on decreases civil war intensity� While lag- conflict onset is well-developed, this the- ging the military expenditures variable sis has made an important contribution by does partially solve this problem, it is analyzing how state strength might mat- worth noting as a possible limitation of ter in cases where the state is weak enough this research� In addition, this study could to allow a violent challenge to its authori- be improved by larger amounts of data on ty� State strength, it appears, matters even military, fiscal, and bureaucratic capacity, after civil wars break out� In addition, this as the World Development Indicators have thesis expands upon existing discussions about 360 missing observations, while the within the literature regarding conflict ICRG data only begins in the year 1984� duration and intensity� The former body On the qualitative side, examination of ad- of scholarship has not fully examined the ditional case studies would aid scholars’ relationship between state capacity and understanding of the mechanisms linking length of civil war, and when it has an- state capacity to conflict duration and in- alyzed the correlation, it often relies on tensity� Given their unique and qualitative imperfect proxies of state capacity like nature, claiming generalizability from the democratization� Through its quantitative cases of Zaire and Northern Ireland is dif- examination of the relationship between ficult� In particular, as briefly discussed 55 in the conclusion of the Northern Ire- seem to possess the bureaucratic capa- land case study, an examination of case in bility of committing to negotiated settle- which strong state does choose to employ ments and of maintaining the provision of overwhelming military force would con- government services, even in the depths of tribute greatly to the findings of this the- civil wars, meaning that peacekeepers may sis� Nevertheless, the two case studies pre- wish to strengthen state bureaucracies as sented in this thesis provide a real-world a means of decreasing civil war intensi- illustration of a few of the potential ways ty� Another question for further inquiry in which state capacity may influence con- would be examine the iterative aspects flict duration and intensity� of government capacity – how do rebel groups react to increases in government Despite their potential limitations, the capacity, and how much does rebel group findings presented in this thesis have im- capacity matter for conflict duration and portant implications for peacekeepers and intensity? Setting these questions aside policymakers� Stronger states tend to ex- for the future, this thesis is nevertheless perience lower intensity conflicts that lin- a first step towards understanding how ger for decades� This could raise a norma- strong states seek to maintain control of tive question for peacekeepers on whether their populations, how state capacity can they encourage more military spending – lessen the intensity of conflicts, and how on the one hand, conflicts may become less states can mitigate conditions of anarchy bloody, but on the other hand, they may when civil war breaks out within their endure longer� Moreover, stronger states borders, becoming Leviathans once again� 56 Figures & Tables

Figure 2� Duration of civil war by outcome�

Figure 3� Duration of civil war with measures of state capacity held at 75th percentiles 57

Figure 5� Histogram of annual battle deaths of the conflicts contained in the UCDP/PRIO dataset�

Table 2� Impact of military spending on duration of civil war� 58

Table 3� Impact of government revenues on duration of civil war�

Table 4� Impact of bureaucratic quality on duration of civil war� 59

Table 6� Impact of military expenditures on intensity of civil war�

Table 7� Impact of government revenues on intensity of civil war� 60

Table 8� Impact of bureaucratic quality on intensity of civil war� 61

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Acknowledgements

Foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advi- sor, Professor Jessica Stanton, for her helpful remarks and support throughout writing of my thesis. For having changed my topic in January, Professor Stanton quickly helped me get back on track and always provided thoughtful advice and practical knowledge, both of which were invaluable in the research process.

I also would like to thank Dr. Eileen Doherty-Sil for her encouragement of the honors program, as well as for giving me the opportunity to serve the Political Science department as President of Pi Sigma Alpha. It has been an enriching experience, and I am thank- ful for her support over the past year.

I am indebted to the communities to which I belong. I thank my fellow thesis writers for their moral support and for making me feel less alone on what could have been a very lonely process. I also would like to thank members of the Government and Politics Association, all of whom have stretched and stimulated my mind through civil discourse and debate. Tey have given me knowledge, confdence, and empathy for those with whom I disagree.

In addition, my sincere thanks go to my friends at the University of Pennsylvania. Tanks specifcally to Samuel Byers and Joe Kiernan for their advice in selection of my case studies and review of drafs, to Jess McDowell for the accountability she provided and persistence she inspired, and to Mark Toubman for reserving countless hours of Weigle booths, for providing helpful advice, and for mod- eling excellence in friendship for me.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank my parents, Philip Simon and Jane Mayes Simon, for providing me the opportunity to study at an Ivy League institution – an opportunity of which I could only have dreamed – and for supporting, educating, and inspiring me throughout my life.