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Lebanon and the Peace Process: the Case for Greater Realism

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Lebanon and the Peace Process: the Case for Greater Realism LEBANON AND THE PEACE PROCESS: THE CASE FOR GREATER REALISM PAUL A. JUREIDINI The initial dismay and disappointment in Washington and a number of Arab capitals which greeted Likud's victory in the recent Israeli elections has given way to a growing sense of doom and foreboding as tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbours have increased markedly and violence has erupted in the occupied territories and areas which are controlled by the Palestinian National Authority. In Washington, the initial reaction was back to the drawing board. But this is a presidential election year and it is an established fact that during such elections, the United States generally turns inward and reduces its international interactions by at least fifty per cent. This time, however, this fact is complicated by another: the secretary of state, Warren Christopher, Ambassador Denis Ross and Ambassador Martin Indyck are considered to be damaged goods for their involvement in the Israeli elections in open support of Labour and the then prime minister, Shimon Peres. They, in other words, have no credibility with the new order in Israel. Israel and its Arab neighbours, therefore, do not expect an American initiative to re-invigorate the peace process much before February 1997. Despite Ambassador Ross's efforts to keep the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on track, the peace process is adrift without the steady hands of the United States at the helm. Uncertainty over the outcome of the American presidential elections, the post- election appointment of a new cabinet and foreign policy team, and over what, if anything, the current administration can do, has contributed directly to uncertainty and scepticism in Arab capitals. These have also served to undermine any and all initiatives undertaken by the Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, since his confirmation. No one in the Arab world, especially in Syria and Lebanon, is prepared to take seriously Israeli initiatives not blessed by Washington. If America will not be an active player based on her interests in pursuing the peace process as it was presented to the participants prior to and at Madrid in 199–or on a reformation of the understandings that led to Madrid and takes into account Likud's hard line–then none of the regional players will pursue negotiations with the amount of commitment that will be needed to move it forward or, at least, prevent it from stalling or unravelling. No one involved with the peace process has expressed a desire to quit. All, in their different activities and pronouncements since the Israeli elections, have given a clear indication that they want the process to continue. Prime Minister Netanyahu has stated that he was “not elected to kill the peace process.” King Hussein of Jordan has on many occasions expressed his belief that the peace process is irreversible and will continue. The Arab world reaffirmed its commitment to and support of the peace process at its summit meeting, as have Syria and Lebanon; the Palestinian National Authority continues to proclaim its adherence to the Oslo Agreements. Professed optimism, declarations of commitment, support and attachment notwithstanding, the process has cooled and could soon become frozen in time and place. Some in Israel who put emphasis on security only and not on reconciliation among peoples of the region, believe that integration is a step backward. Many Palestinians in the territories, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon feel that the process will come undone if Israel and the PNA cannot overcome the crisis over Hebron, the settlements issue, and the ‘final status’ negotiations. A majority of Jordanians are fearful of the effects on their country of a derailed Israeli-Palestinian track and the resulting turbulence that would occur. In Syria, many predict years of fruitless discussions if the topic of the return of the Golan is not on the table. A majority of the Lebanese believe that their country will become, once again, the battlefield. Yet, tensions in the Middle East continue to mount at an alarming rate. The area, and especially the Arab members of the American-led coalition against Iraq, have been shaken by what is seen as unilateral and unjustified American action against Iraq. They have either openly criticised the United States or have distanced themselves from US actions. Israel and Syria are about to back themselves into a major war in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon–and maybe well beyond it–that neither wants. The violence in the occupied territories over Israel's opening of the tunnel under the al-Aqsa and Dome of the Rock mosques in Jerusalem has seriously undermined the trust that had been created between the parties. This has become a major complicating factor in Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Jordanian relationships. Finally, the cold peace between Egypt and Israel threatens to become colder and icier. When Prime Minister Netanyahu's reintroduction of two major Israeli themes into the negotiation process is taken into account, this rather long introduction is relevant to the topic of this article. The two themes are 1) absolute security for Israel is paramount in any and all negotiations, and 2) what has now been dubbed as the ‘Lebanon First’ option, Lebanon before and ahead of Syria and not Lebanon as the first Arab state to make peace with Israel. It is precisely these points that now threaten renewed hostilities between Lebanon and Syria on one hand and Israel on the other. ‘Reintroduction’ is used deliberately because the emphasis on absolute security and the ‘Lebanon First’ option is not new. Absolute security was pursued by Israel in its negotiations with the Lebanese government in 1982-83, and by the Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir, in the early stages of the bilateral talks with Lebanon after the Madrid conference. The ‘Lebanon First’ option was initially put on the table by Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and pursued by his successor, Peres, after Prime Minister Rabin's tragic death. While Prime Ministers Rabin and Peres did not exclude Syria and the return of the Golan as part of the equation, Prime Minister Netanyahu has, at least for the time being. And this might be the new twist in this reiteration of an old option. The ill-fated 17 May 1983 Agreement between Israel and Lebanon was in essence a ‘Lebanon First’ option linked to Israel's search for absolute security. In fact, it was the embodiment of both. It never saw the light of day for reasons that are well known: opposition by Syria and its allies and supporters in Lebanon, and abandonment by the United States and by some of the United States' Arab and West European allies. More importantly, and of greater relevance today as these issues are being revisited, is the fact that it failed not because it was a ‘Lebanon First’ option, but (and this should have been obvious to all, especially Israel) because Lebanon could not provide Israel with the absolute security it sought since Lebanon lacked the means, national resolve and will to do so. With an army of about 40,000-60,000 soldiers that were then being retrained and re-equipped by the United States and still in the throes of an internal civil conflict, Lebanon became attached to Israel through military agreements and arrangements which in essence made the Lebanese army an extension of the Israeli Defence Force. By doing so, Lebanon unnecessarily endangered the security of Syria, a country that was still technically–and still is–at war with Israel despite the American brokered red line agreements which still govern the extent of Syrian force deployments in Lebanon. In other words, Lebanon allowed itself to be caught between Israeli and Syrian security requirements. Lebanon's descent into hell in 1975 was the result of many factors, both internal and external. From an internal point of view, the most fateful decision was limiting the size and growth of the Lebanese army to numbers much inferior to those of both Israel and Syria. One of the unstated reasons for this decision was fear of coups d'état. Certainly this was a phenomenon that was becoming evident to political scientists and others who studied the politics of the Third World in the post-independence era that followed de-colonization, and certainly one which became evident in the region as coups d'état toppled regimes in Syria (the first in the region), Egypt, Iraq and Libya. Coups d'état were also attempted in Jordan. The stated reason for the Lebanese decision not to build-up the level of its armed forces to those approaching the size of Israel's and Syria's is intriguing. It was based on a metaphysical belief that Lebanon's weakness (that is the small size of its armed forces) was actually its strength. The Lebanese seemed to believe that by not creating a large military which could threaten either of its two powerful neighbours, Israel and Syria would have an interest in maintaining Lebanon's security. At that time, it was thought that a build-up of the Lebanese armed forces to the requisite level necessary for deterrence would be met by similar build-ups by its neighbours. This would force Lebanon to seek alliances with its neighbours, other regional powers or one of the two superpowers to further any and all efforts by Lebanon to provide for its security. All these measures would thus undermine Lebanon's efforts to remain neutral in Arab-Arab disputes and would alter its status as a non-confrontational country in the Arab-Israeli conflict. When it became evident in the mid-1950s that Lebanon's neutrality and its non- confrontational status would not be respected, it was already too late.
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